PP vs.

NITAFAN
FACTS:
An information was filed against private respondent Betty Sia Ang for the crime of Estafa. The private respondent filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. On January 7, 1988, the respondent judge granted the motion to quash anchoring that a trust receipt transaction is an evidence of a loan being secured so that there is a creditor-debtor relationship. The respondent judge ruled that the penal clause of Presidential Decree No. 15 on the Trust Receipts Law is inoperative because it does not actually punish an offense mala prohibita. The law only refers to the relevant estafa provision in the Revised Penal Code.

The private respondent, adopting the same reasoning as with the respondent judge asserts that P.D. 115 is unconstitutional as it violates the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for non-payment of a debt. She argues that where no malice exists in a breach of a purely commercial undertaking, P.D. 115 imputes it. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON PD 115 is unconstitutional (for violating the prohibition against imprisonment for non-payment of a debt). RULING: The factual circumstances in the present case show that the alleged violation was committed sometime in 1980 or during the effectivity of P.D. 115. The failure, therefore, to account for the P114,884.22 balance is what makes the accused-respondent criminally liable for estafa. Contrary to the reasoning of the respondent court and the private respondent, a trust receipt arrangement does not involve a simple loan transaction between a creditor and debtor-importer. The title of the bank to the security is the one sought to be protected and not the loan which is a separate and distinct agreement. The Trust Receipts Law punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling of money or goods to the prejudice of another regardless of whether the latter is the owner or not. The law does not seek to enforce payment of the loan. Thus, there can be no violation of a right against imprisonment for non-payment of a debt.

Trust receipts are indispensable contracts in international and domestic business transactions. The prevalent use of trust receipts, the danger of their misuse and/or misappropriation of the goods or proceeds realized from the sale of goods, documents or instruments held in trust for entruster-banks, and the need for regulation of trust receipt transactions to safeguard the rights and enforce the obligations of the parties involved are the main thrusts of P.D. 115.

GARCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Jose Garcia, herein petitioner charged his wife Adela Santos, herein private respondent for committing the crime of Bigamy having been married twice. On January 8, 1992, the City Prosecutor filed an information charging private respondent for Bigamy at the Regional Trial Court. On March 2, 1992, private respondent, Adela Santos filed a Motion to Quash the information on the ground that the offense has already prescribed. Private respondent contends that the crime of Bigamy prescribes after fifteen (15) years from the discovery of the offended party of such offense. Accordingly, petitioner discovered the offense on 1972, and that the Information was filed on 1991, eighteen (18) years from discovery of the offense thereof. On the part of the petitioner, he contends that the period of prescription was interrupted by the series of travels made by private respondent outside the coutry. That the filing of the Motion to Quash must be based on the information. The Regional Trial Court granted the Motion to Quash and dismissed the case based on prescription. The petitioner appealed the case to the Court of Appeals which ruled in favor of the private respondent and uplifting the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence, this petition. ISSUE/S: Bigamy as a public offense, prescription should have been counted from the time the state discovered its commission; A Motion to Quash cannot also go beyond what is stated in the information; The factual bases of the Motion to Quash are not conclusive; and The prescriptivre period has been interrupted several times. RULING: Petitioner's position is untenable.

On the first issue, It is true that bigamy is a public offense. Article 91 of the RPC provides that "[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . . ." This rule makes no distinction between a public crime and a private crime. In both cases then, the discovery may be by the "offended party, the authorities, or their agents." Article 91 does not define the term "offended party." We find its definition in Section 12, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court as "the person against whom or against whose property, the offense was committed." It is settled that in bigamy, both the first and the second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances. On the second issue, the petitioner's contention that a motion to quash cannot go beyond the information which states that the crime was discovered in 1989, is palpably unmeritorious. Even People v. Alagao, which he cites, mentions the exceptions to the rule as provided in paragraphs (f) and (h) of Section 2, and Sections 4 and 5 of the old Rule 117: (a) extinction of criminal liability, and (b) double jeopardy. SEC. 2.

Form and contents. - The motion to quash shall be in writing signed by the

accused or his counsel. It shall specify distinctly the factual and legal grounds therefor and the court shall consider no grounds other than those stated therein, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. It is clear from this Section that a motion to quash may be based on factual and legal grounds, and since extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy are retained as among the grounds for a motion to quash in Section 3 of the new Rule 117, it necessarily follows that facts outside the information itself may be introduced to prove such grounds. On the third issue, The petitioner likewise claims that the factual bases of the private respondent's motion to quash are inconclusive. The petitioner cannot be allowed to disown statements he made under oath and in open court when it serves his purpose. It is immaterial to whom the private respondent was first married; what is relevant in this case is that the petitioner was informed of a prior marriage contracted by the private respondent. Lastly, the petitioner draws our attention to the private respondent's several trips abroad. We agree with the Court of Appeals that these trips abroad did not constitute

the "absence" contemplated in Article 91. These trips were brief, and in every case the private respondent returned to the Philippines. Besides, these were made long after the petitioner discovered the offense and even if the aggregate number of days of those trips are considered, still the information was filed well beyond the prescriptive period.

GO vs. BSP
FACTS: On August 20, 1999, an Information for violation of Section 83 of Republic Act No. 337otherwise known as the General Banking Act was filed against Jose Go, herein petitioner. Upon arraignment, Jose Go pleaded not guilty. Before the commencement of the trial, Jose Go filed a Motion to Quash information on the claiming that the Information was defective, as the facts charged therein do not constitute an offense under Section 83 of RA 337. Jose Go contends averred that based on the facts alleged in the Information, he was being prosecuted for borrowing the deposits or funds of the Orient Bank and/or acting as a guarantor, indorser or obligor for the banks loans to other persons. The use of the word and/or meant that he was charged for being either a borrower or a guarantor, or for being both a borrower and guarantor. Go claimed that the charge was not only vague, but also did not constitute an offense. He posited that Section 83 of RA 337 penalized only directors and officers of banking institutions who acted either as borrower or as guarantor, but not as both. The Regional Trial Court granted the Motion to Quash and dismissed the said case. The prosecution, not contented with the ruling of the Regional Trial Court appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the Regional Trial Court erred in granting the motion. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision in favor of the prosecution and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court. Hence, the filing of this petition. ISSUE: WON the information charging Jose Go for violation of Section 83 of RA 337 is sufficient. RULING: The Court does not find the petition meritorious and accordingly denies it.

The facts and circumstances necessary to be included in the Information are determined by reference to the definition and elements of the specific crimes. The Information must allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged. HOWEVER, assuming that the facts charged in the Information do not constitute an offense, we find it erroneous for the RTC to immediately order the dismissal of the Information, without giving the prosecution a chance to amend it. Although an Information may be defective because the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the dismissal of the case will not necessarily follow. The Rules specifically require that the prosecution should be given a chance to correct the defect; the court can order the dismissal only upon the prosecutions failure to do so. The RTCs failure to provide the prosecution this opportunity twice constitutes an arbitrary exercise of power that was correctly addressed by the CA through the certiorari petition. This

defect in the RTCs action on the case, while not central to the issue before us, strengthens our conclusion that this criminal case should be resolved through full-blown trial on the merits.

PP vs. TABIO
FACTS:
Jimmy Tabio was charged with three (3) counts of rape in a single Information. Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment before the Regional Trial Court. On 25 November 2003, the RTC handed down a decision finding appellant guilty and imposing the penalty of death on three (3) counts of qualified rape.On 7 June 2005, the Court issued a Resolution transferring the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, finding Jimmy Tabio guilty of all three (3) counts for simple rape only and not qualified rape.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in finding him guilty of all three (3) counts of rape despite the alleged failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. RULING:

The case is again before us for our final disposition. Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear and unequivocal that both qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be alleged with specificity in the information. The Court also observes that there is duplicity of the offenses charged in the information, which is a ground for a motion to quash. Three (3) separate acts of rape were charged in one information only. But the failure of appellant to interpose an objection on this ground constitutes waiver. While the Court affirms that appellant is guilty of simple rape, we nonetheless find that only the first rape was conclusively proven. The second and third rapes of which appellant was charged and found guilty, were not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Our courts have been traditionally guided by three settled principles in the prosecution of the crime of rape: (1) an accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove and even more difficult to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution; and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. In a prosecution for rape, the complainants candor is the single most important issue. If a complainants testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the sole basis thereof. We must uphold the primacy of the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused when the evidence at hand falls short of the quantum required to support conviction.

MIRANDA vs. TULIAO

FACTS: On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao. Two informations of murder were filed against police officers, one of which remained at large during the trial.

The RTC convicted said accused personnel and sentenced reclusion pertua. The Supreme Court, on automatic review, reversed the decision and acquitted the police officers based on reasonable doubts.

Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and ElizerTuliao.

Respondent Tuliao filed

criminal

complaint

for

murder

against

petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest. The petition was denied by Judge Tumaliuan on the ground of the absence of petitioners, thus, the court did not acquired jurisdiction over them. Judge Anghad took over the case and ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest. Respondent file a petition praying that a temporary restraining order be issued to enjoin Judge Anghad to form proceeding with the case. Two days after the Resolution of the Court granting the prayer of respondent, Judge Anghad dismissed the two Informations for murder agaist petitioner.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners on their petition to cancel the warrant of arrest. Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the reinstatement of the cases. Whether or not double jeopardy would attach

RULING: On the first issue, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the past decisions of the Supreme Court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance. After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis

of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, prudence dictates and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper.

Motion to Quash on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutors resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutors resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.

On the second issue, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. JudgeAnghads order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.

Lastly, in any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.

PP vs. GARFIN
FACTS: On June 22, 2001, private respondent was charged with violation of the "Social Security Act,". That on or about February 1990 and up to the present, in the City of Naga, Philippines, within the functional jurisdiction of SSS Naga Branch and the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, while being the proprietor of Saballegue Printing Press, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally refuse and fail and continuously refuse and fail to remit the premiums due for his employee to the SSS in the amount of (P6,533.00), representing SSS and EC premiums for the period from January 1990 to December 1999, and the 3% penalty per month for late remittance in the amount of ELEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-THREE PESOS and 28/100 (P11,143.28) computed as of 15 March 2000, despite lawful demands by letter in violation of the above-cited provisions of the law, to

the

damage

and

prejudice

of

the

SSS

and

the

public

in

general.

The case was raffled to Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City. Accused Serafin Saballegue pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was set for pre-trial.5 Three days thereafter, the accused filed a motion to dismiss6 on the ground that the information was filed without the prior written authority or approval of the city prosecutor as required under Section 4, of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court. After considering the arguments raised, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss in its first questioned Order dated February 26, 2002, to wit: After considering the respective arguments raised by the parties, the Court believes and so resolves that the Information has not been filed in accordance with Section 4, par. 3 of Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure Rule 112, Section 4 No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or has not the been Ombudsman approved by or the his City deputy. Prosecutor. The Information will readily show that it has not complied with this rule as it This Court holds that the defendants plea to the Information is not a waiver to file a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. By express provision of want the of rules and by may a be long raised line at of any decisions, stage of the questions of jurisdiction proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether required. RULING: No. Under Presidential Decree No. 1275. The Regional State Prosecutor is clearly vested only with the power of administrative supervision. As administrative supervisor, he has no power to direct the city and provincial prosecutors to inhibit from handling certain cases. At most, he can request for their inhibition. Hence, the said directive of the regional state prosecutor to the city and provincial prosecutors is questionable to say the least. the approval of the city or provincial prosecutor is no longer

Petitioner argues that the word "may" is permissive. Hence, there are cases when prior written approval is not required, and this is one such instance. This is too simplistic an

interpretation. Whether the word "may" is mandatory or directory depends on the context of its use. We agree with the OSG that the use of the permissive word "may" should be read together with the other provisions in the same section of the Rule. The paragraph immediately preceding the quoted provision shows that the word "may" is mandatory. It states: Sec. 4, Rule 112. Within five (5) days from his resolution, he (investigating prosecutor) shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action. In sum, we hold that, in the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases or a prior written approval of the information by the provincial or city prosecutor, the information in Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597 was filed by an officer without authority to file the same. As this infirmity in the information constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, the respondent judge did not err in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.

BINAY vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: Cases were filed by the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan against Mayor Binay of Makati for Illegal Use of Public Funds and Violation of Anti -Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on September 1994. The information filed constituted crimes which were committed by the petitioner in his incumbency in the year 1987. The petitioner filed a motion to quash alleging that the delay of more than 6 years constituted a violation of his constitutional right of due process. His arraignment therefore was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the motions. Subsequently, the Sangguniang Bayan issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to quash and further the latters motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend the accused pendente lite which was later granted and ordered for a 90-day suspension. Petition for certiorari was filed by Mayor Binay in the Supreme Court praying that the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration be set aside and claimed that he was

denied of his rights when the suspension was ordered even before he could file his reply to the petitioners opposition. SC then, directed the SB to permit petitioner to file said reply. The SB nonetheless reiterated its previous resolutions and order after the submission of the reply. Meanwhile, RA 7975 redefining the jurisdiction of SB took effect on May 1995 so much so that the petitioner filed before SB a motion to refer his cases to the RTC of Makati alleging that the SB has no jurisdiction over said cases when it issued its resolutions and suspension order on June 1995. The SB in a follow-up resolution denied the petitioners motion. Hence this present petition, prohibition and mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of SB over the criminal cases. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan has jurisdiction over the case of after the passage of RA 7975. RULING:
YES. RA 7975 which was further amended by RA 8249 states that the SB shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the commission of the offense: 1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. Under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, mayors are "local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher.

PP vs. MAGAT
FACTS: Two informations for incestuous rape were filed against appellant. Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty but bargained for a lesser penalty for each case. The mother of the complainant and the public prosecutor agreed and an order was issued the same day imposing ten years imprisonment for each case. After three months, the cases were

revived at the instance of the complainant on the ground that the penalty was too light. Appellant was re-arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty. Two months later, he entered anew a plea of guilty. The court then imposed the penalty of death. He now appeals on the ground that there was double jeopardy upon the re-arraignment and trial on the same information. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused plea for a lesser offense was valid.

RULING: The first order issued by the trial is void ab initio on the ground that the accuseds plea is not the plea bargaining contemplated by law and the rules of procedure. The only instance where a plea bargaining is allowed under the Rules is when the accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense. Sec 2 Rule 116 (note that there is a new set of Rules of Criminal Procedure).Here the reduction of the penalty is only a consequence of the plea of guilty to a lesser penalty. The appellant did not plead to a lesser offense but pleaded guilty to the rape charges and only bargained for a lesser penalty. He did not plea bargain but made conditions on the penalty to be imposed. This is erroneous because by pleading guilty to the offense charged, accused should be sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded. It is the essence of a plea of guilty that that the accused admits absolutely and unconditionally hid guilt and responsibility for the offense imputed to him. Hence, an accused may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on the court by admitting his guilt provided that a certain penalty will be meted unto him. Since the judgment of conviction is void, double jeopardy will not lie. Whatever procedural infirmity in the arraignment of the accused was rectified when he was re-arraigned and entered a new plea. He did not question the procedural errors in the first arraignment and having failed to do so, waived the errors in procedure. Under the present rule, if the present rule, if accused enters a plea of guilty the trial courts are now enjoined to conduct searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea, to require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt and precise degree of culpability, and to ask if he so desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so. case digests, case digests of supreme court decisions, case digests Philippines, mobile phone deals, laptop computers, gadgets, free legal opinion, online jobs, best law firms in Mindanao

ARGEL vs. PASCUA

FACTS: Petitioner who was charged with murder was previously acquitted by Judge Pascua. After his acquittal, respondent judge modified her decision on the account that she made a mistake of rendering her previous judgment believing there was no witness against the accused due to the fact that the testimony of the witness was not attached to the records when she wrote her decision. After finding the accused guilty of murder she ISSUE: Whether or not a final judgment by the court can still be amended or modified. RULING: No. The final judgment becomes the law of the case and is immune from alteration or modification regardless of claims of incorrectness or error. A judgment of acquittal in criminal cases becomes immediately effective upon its promulgation. It cannot be recalled for amendment only in case of any clerical error, clarify any ambiguity caused by omission or mistake in the dispositive portion. The inherent power of the court to modify its decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case. ordered the arrest of the accused.

PP vs. DELA TORRE

FACTS: Wilfredo dela Torre, appellee, has three children from a common-law relationship, the eldest of which is Mary Rose. When Mary Rose was 7 yearsold, her mother left them together with her youngest brother so she and her other brother were left to the care of her father. Mary Rose was the brightest in her class despite their poverty. However, in January 1997, a sudden change in Mary Roses behavior behavior was noticed. She was twelve years old at that time. She appeared sleepy, snobbish and she also urinated on her panty. When confronted by her head teacher, Mary Rose admitted that she was abused repeatedly by her father. Her father, however, denied vehemently the charges being imputed to him by her daughter. The RTC convicted appellee of two counts of acts of lasciviousness and four counts of murder. However, the RTC refused to impose the supreme penalty of death on appellee. It maintained that there were circumstances that mitigated the gravity of the offenses such as the absence of any actual physical violence or intimidation on the commission of the acts, that after the mother of Mary Rose left the conjugal home, for more than five years, Wilfredo, Mary Rose and her

brother were living together as a family and Mary Rose was never molested by her father. The prosecution seeks to modify the RTC Decision by imposing the supreme penalty of death of the accused. It argues that it has proven that the victim is the daughter of the accused, and that she was below eighteen years old when the rapes took place. As a consequence, the trial court should have been imposed the penalty of death pursuant to Section 11 of R.A. 7659. . ISSUE: Whether or not the Court erred in penalizing the appellee with reclusion perpetua in each of the four indictments of rape, instead of imposing the supreme penalty of death as mandated by R.A. 7659. RULING: Under Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, any party may appeal from a judgment or final order unless the accused will be put in double jeopardy. In People vs. Leones, it declared that: while it is true that this Court is the Court of last resort, there are allegations of error committed by a lower court which we ought not to look into to uphold the right of the accused. Such is the case in an appeal by the prosecution seeking to increase the penalty imposed upon the accused for this runs afoul of the right of the accused against double jeopardyWhen the accused after conviction by the trial court did not appeal his decision, an appeal by the government seeking to increase the penalty imposed by the trial court places the accused in double jeopardy and should therefore be dismissed. The ban on double jeopardy primarily prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves as a deterrent from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. Being violative of the right against double jeopardy, the appeal of the prosecution cannot prosper.

PP vs. RONDERO
FACTS: