REPUBLIC v.

SANDIGANBAYAN (2011) The petitioner cannot rely on principle of judicial notice The petitioner also claims that since the Bane deposition had already been previously introduced and admitted in Civil Case No. 0130, then the Sandiganbayan should have taken judicial notice of the Bane deposition as part of its evidence. As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending. Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where sufficient basis exists in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case. The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the rule on mandatory taking of judicial notice; neither is the applicability of the rule on discretionary taking of judicial notice seriously pursued. Rather, the petitioner approaches the concept of judicial notice from a genealogical perspective of treating whatever evidence offered in any of the children cases Civil Case 0130 as evidence in the parent case Civil Case 0009 - or of the whole family of cases. To the petitioner, the supposed relationship of these cases warrants the taking of judicial notice. We strongly disagree. First, the supporting cases the petitioner cited are inapplicable either because these cases involve only a single proceeding or an exception to the rule, which proscribes the courts from taking judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases. Second, the petitioners proposition is obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly procedure. The petitioner itself admits that the present case has generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood, involve issues of varying complexity. If we follow the lo gic of the petitioners argument, we would be espousing judicial confusion by indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in one case, which was presumably found competent and relevant in another case, simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases. It is the duty of the petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies upon in support of the relief it seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on the court. We invite the petitioners attention to our prefato ry pronouncement in Lopez v. Sandiganbayan: Down the oft-trodden path in our judicial system, by common sense, tradition and the law, the Judge in trying a case sees only with judicial eyes as he ought to know nothing about the facts of the case, except those which have been adduced judicially in evidence. Thus, when the case is up for trial, the judicial head is empty as to facts involved and it is incumbent upon the litigants to the action to establish by evidence the facts upon which they rely. We therefore refuse, in the strongest terms, to entertain the petitioners argument that we should take judicial notice of the Bane deposition. NACU v. CSC (2010) FACTS: PEZA issued Memorandum Order prohibiting its employees from charging and collecting overtime fees from PEZA-registered enterprises. Edison (Bataan) Cogeneration Corporation (EBCC) filed a complaint against Nacu for allegedly charging it overtime fees. Acting on the complaint, PEZA immediately conducted a preliminary investigation, during which Atty. Cajulis, PEZAs lawyer, interviewed Ligan, a document processor at EBCC . o Ligan attested that the overtime fees went to Nacus group, and that, during the time Nacu was confined in the hospital, she pre-signed documents and gave them to him. Atty. Olaivar of PEZA Legal Services Group requested the NBI to verify the genuineness of Nacus signatures appearing on the Statements of Overtime Services (SOS). Original copies of 32 SOS and a specimen of Nacus signature were then sent to the NBI for comparison. NBI informed Atty. Olaivar that no definite opinion can be rendered on the matter since the standards/sample signatures of the subject submitted were not sufficient and appropriate to serve as basis for a specific comparative examination. o The NBI then requested that, should PEZA still want it to conduct further examination, it be furnished with additional standard/sample signatures.

PEZA referred the 32 SOS, together with the same standard specimen of Nacus signatures/initials, to the PNP Crime Lab for determination of the genuineness of Nacus signature. In Questioned Document Report No. 052-02, Perez, Document Examiner II of the PNP Crime Lab, stated her findings, thus o The questioned signatures and the submitted standard initials/signatures of Irene K. Nacu WERE NOT WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON. Finding a prima facie case against Nacu, PEZA Director General De Lima filed a Formal Charge against her for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. o Nacu denied that the signatures appearing on the ten overtime billing statements were hers. She averred that it was impossible for her to charge EBCC overtime fees as the latter was well aware that PEZA employees may no longer charge for overtime services; that she had no actual notice of Memorandum Order No. 99-003; and that she caused no damage and prejudice to PEZA and EBCC. During the hearing, PEZA presented the following witnesses: Rosario Perez, the document examiner who examined the SOS; Atty. Dante Quindoza, Zone Administrator of BEZ, who testified that Nacu was one of the officials authorized to sign the documents; Romy Zaragosa, Corporate Relations Manager of Covanta Energy, who attested that meetings were held on November 17, 2001 and January 25, 2002, wherein Ligan testified that he gave the payment for overtime fees to Nacu; Roberto Margallo (Margallo), Enterprise Service Officer III of PEZA, who testified that he knows Nacus signature and that he was certain that the signatures appearing on the SOS were hers; Omar Dana, EBCC plant chemist, who testified that EBCC paid, through Ligan, overtime fees to Nacu and some other persons; Elma Bugho, PEZA Records Officer, who testified on the issuance of PEZA Memorandum Order No. 99-003; and Miguel Herrera, then Division Chief of PEZA at the BEZ, who testified that he was responsible for the implementation of PEZA rules and regulations and for assigning examiners upon the request of zone enterprises and brokers. PEZA Central Board of Inquiry, Investigation, and Discipline (CBIID), with the approval of Director General De Lima, found Nacu guilty of the acts charged. Nacu died and was substituted by heirs. CA affirmed. o CA brushed aside Nacus objections to (a) Ligans written statement because it was not made under oath and Ligan was not presented as witness during the hearing; (b) the PNP Crime Labs findings for being unreliable in light of the NBIs own finding that the samples were not sufficient; and (c) Margallos testimony identifying Nacus signatures on the SOS, on the ground that he was not presented as an expert witness. The CA pointed out that proceedings in administrative cases are not strictly governed by technical rules of procedure and evidence, as they are required to be disposed of summarily.

ISSUE: WON Nacu is guilty of the allegations and is supported by substantial evidence DECISION: YES. Petition DENIED. HELD: Substantial evidence, the quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings, means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that a person is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant . Overall, the testimonies of the witnesses, the statements made by Ligan during the preliminary investigation, and the findings of the PNP Crime Lab on its examination of the signatures on the SOS, amounted to substantial evidence that adequately supported the conclusion that Nacu was guilty of the acts complained of. Petitioners allegations of unreliability, irregularities, and inconsistencies of the evidence neither discredited nor weakened the case against Nacu. The PNP and the NBI are separate agencies, and the findings of one are not binding or conclusive upon the other. Moreover, as pointed out by the Office of the SolGen in its Comment, the NBIs finding referred only to the insufficiency of the samples given; the NBI did not actually make a determination of the genuineness of the signatures. While the NBI may have found the samples to be insufficient, such finding should not have any bearing on the PNP Crime Labs own findings that the samples were sufficient and that some of the signatures found on the overtime billings matched the sample signatures. The difference of opinion with respect to the sufficiency of the samples could only mean that the PNP Crime Lab observes a standard different from that used by the NBI in the examination of handwriting. o CA did not rely solely on the PNP Crime Lab report in concluding that the signatures appearing on the ten SOS were Nacus. Margallo, a co-employee who holds the same position as Nacu, also identified the latters signatures on the SOS. Such testimony deserves credence . It has been held that an ordinary witness may testify on a signature he is familiar with. Anyone who is familiar with a persons writing from having seen him write, from carrying on a correspondence with him, or from having become familiar with his writing through handling documents and papers known to

have been signed by him may give his opinion as to the genuineness of that persons purported signature when it becomes material in the case. The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed; otherwise, the protection does not come into play. Moreover, the right must be claimed at the appropriate time, or else, it may be deemed waived. In the present case, it does not appear that Nacu invoked her right against self-incrimination at the appropriate time, that is, at the time she was asked to provide samples of her signature. She is therefore deemed to have waived her right against self-incrimination. Next, petitioners assail the credibility of Ligans statement because it was not made under oath and Ligan was not presented as witness during the hearing. Nacu was allegedly denied due process when she was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Ligan. o It is settled that, in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. The measure of due process to be observed by administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not compromised. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable or violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits, or documentary evidence submitted by the parties, as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimonies. In addition, petitioners claim that there were inconsistencies in Ligans statement. While Ligan allegedly stated that Nacu gave him pre-signed documents during the time that she was in the hospital, and that these pre-signed documents referred to the ten overtime billings referred to in the formal charge, the record does not show that Nacu was confined in the hospital on the dates indicated in the said billings. o Ligan did not specifically mention that the dates indicated in the pre-signed documents were also the days when Nacu was confined in the hospital. He merely said that Nacu pre-signed some documents during the time that she was in the hospital, and that she gave these documents to him. Neither did he state that these pre-signed SOS were the same ten SOS cited in the formal charge against Nacu. It was petitioners own assumption that led to this baseless conclusion. In Nacus defense, petitioners contend that she (Nacu) was not aware of the existence of Memorandum Order No. 99-003. They aver that there was no evidence showing that Memorandum Order No. 99-003 was posted, published, and promulgated; hence, it cannot be said that the order had already taken effect and was being implemented in the BEZ. Petitioners claim that Nacu had, in fact, no actual knowledge of the said order as she was not furnished with a copy thereof. o Nacu cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the said order. As correctly opined by the CA, it is difficult to believe that Nacu, one of the employees of PEZA affected by the memorandum order, was not in any way informedby posting or personal noticeof the implementation of the said order, considering that over a year had lapsed since it had been issued. From the testimonies of the other witnesses, who were employees of PEZA and PEZA-registered enterprises, it was evident that the prohibition against charging and collecting overtime fees was common knowledge to them.

SISON V PEOPLE (1995) FACTS: After the 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was a time when the Aquino administration was openly challenged by Marcos loyalists through rallies. In one particular rally (which was dispersed by the police for not having a permit to rally) in Luneta, Stephen Salcedo was killed. Apparently, after the police dispersed the rallyists (using tear gas and truncheons), some Marcos loyalists chased people wearing yellow (Coryista) and mauled them Thats how Salcedo died. He was mauled by some Marcos loyalists (8 were accused as principals, 5 were convicted), hitting and boxing and kicking him all over his body, even when he was down already. The attackers even punched him with stones in their hands and kicked him on the head. He lost consciousness and when the Lunetas electrician rushed him to PGH, he was already dead. The medical report showed that the cause of death was hemorrhage, intracranial trauma. (note: theres a graphic description of the mauling in the original case, and nakakawa siya, pinagtulungan talaga. Sabi pa, he even had a chance to sit on the pavement and wipe the blood from his face, but his attackers went after him again). Some press people were present in the mauling, and a lot of pictures were taken of the incident (which reached the front pages of newspapers) The prosecution presented as evidence testimonies of 12 witnesses, including 2 eyewitnesses, newspaper accounts of the incident, and various photographs during the mauling.

RTC convicted the 5 attackers as principal, and an accomplice (a movie starlet Annie Ferrer whose participation in the crime was to shout gulpihn niyo ang mga cory hecklers! immediately before the incident). CA confirmed and increased sentence to reclusion perpetua (and acquitted the starlet) In relation to our topic (object evidence), the relevant part of the case is the error assigned to the lower court in admitting the photographs in evidence since they were not properly identified by the one who took them ISSUE: WON the photographs of the incident should be admitted in evidence HELD: YES. The use of these photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. REASONING: The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. o That the photographs are faithful representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat. When the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence, appellants, through counsel Atty. Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for lack of proper identification. However, when the accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove (yessss, the name!) Dumayas, counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used Exhibits V, V1-V48 to prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the victim. The photographs were adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri as part of the defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all the other accused per understanding with their respective counsels. At subsequent hearings, the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused who took the witness stand. No objection was made by counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro appeared at the 3rd hearing and interposed a continuing objection to their admissibility. An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal that only 3 of the appellants could be readily seen in various belligerent poses lunging or hovering behind or over the victim. Appellant Sison appears only once and he, although (allegedly) afflicted with hernia is shown merely running after the victim. Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the pictures. The absence of the two appellants in the photographs does not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. While the pictures did not record Sison and Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally identified by the eyewitnesses. Appellants' denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball identification. DISPOSITION: Petition is denied. Decision modified (increased award of moral damages and indemnity for death) PEOPLE v. YATAR (2004) FACTS: Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, 17 year old Kathylyn Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang. They were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband, appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyns friend, Cecil Casingan. On the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang (grandmother), left for their farm in Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn (cousin) told Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to leave, she would just stay home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in the house. Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel. They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the house through the back door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there, and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother. At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the house. She later noticed appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back and

forth at the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang. At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he was wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellants eyes were "reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her where her husband was as he had something important to tell him. Judily ns husband then arrived and appellant immediately left and went towards the back of the house of Isabel. In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house were off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was open. She noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid. Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body of her granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance. A daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the police. At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was found in Isabel Dawangs house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and found the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds. The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the ladder of the house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m The police discovered the victims panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters from the house of Isabel. When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylynss death, however, he was placed under police custody. Appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police station. They suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (Hes running away!). Police Officer Orlando Manuel exited through the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running away. Appellant was approximately 70 meters away from the station when Police Officer Abagan recaptured him. He was charged with Rape with Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty." After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced to Death.

ISSUE: DECISION: HELD: