General v Urro Before the Court are the Consolidated Petitions for Quo Warranto, and Certiorari and/or

Prohibition (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction filed by Atty. Luis Mario General (petitioner). The petitioner seeks to declare unconstitutional the appointments of Alejandro S. Urro, Constancia P. de Guzman and Eduardo U. Escueta (collectively, the respondents) as Commissioners of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), and to prohibit then Executive Secretary Leandro Mendoza and Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary Ronaldo V. Puno from enforcing the respondents oath of office. Particularly, the petitioner asks that respondent Urro be ousted as NAPOLCOM Commissioner and he be allowed to continue in office. with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. Issue: The petitioner claims that Roces was supposed to serve a full term of six years counted from the date of her appointment in October (should be September) 2004.[13] Since she failed to finish her six-year term, then the petitioner is entitled to serve this unexpired portion or until October (should be September) 2010. Held: In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondents appointments is not the lis mota of the case. From the submitted pleadings, what is decisive is the determination of whether the petitioner has a cause of action to institute and maintain this present petition a quo warranto against respondent Urro. A staggered term of office is not inconsistent with an acting appointment Appointments may be classified into two: first, as to its nature; and second, as to the manner in which it is made.[34] Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary appointments, unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of the office involved.[37] The Presidents power to issue an acting appointment is particularly authorized by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292). Therefore, his term of office is not fixed but endures at the pleasure of the appointing authority. His separation from the service does not import removal but merely the expiration of his term a mode of termination of official relations that falls outside the coverage of the constitutional provision on security of tenure[38] since no removal from office is involved. Sana v Career Executive Board Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing Executive Order No. 883, series of 2010 (EO 883),1 which granted Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) rank to eligible lawyers in the

executive branch, and a related administrative issuance, Career Executive Service Board (CESB) Resolution No. 870,2 for violating Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. Issue: Whether unconstitutional Held: We dismiss the petition on the threshold ground of mootness. At the time this petition was filed, however, President Aquino had already issued EO 3 revoking EO 883 expressly (under Section 1) and CESB Resolution No. 870 impliedly (under Section 2). EO 883 and CESB Resolution No. 870 having ceased to have any force and effect, the Court finds no reason to reach the merits of the petition and pass upon these issuances validity. US v Wilson It suffices to state that Tennessee authorities arrested Wilson on October 5, 1988, and held him in jail pending the outcome of federal and state prosecutions. After certain preliminary proceedings, Wilson eventually pleaded guilty to various federal and state criminal charges. On November 29, 1989, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee sentenced Wilson to 96 months' imprisonment The District Court denied Wilson's request for credit for time served during his presentence state custody. EO 887 is

The Attorney General implemented this provision by computing the amount of credit after taking custody of the sentenced federal offender Issue: Whether or not district courts now may award credit when imposing a sentence. Held: We do not accept Wilson's argument that 3585(b) authorizes a district court to award credit at sentencing. Section 3585(b) indicates that a defendant may receive credit against a sentence that "was imposed." The final phrase of 3585(b) confirms this interpretation. As noted above, it authorizes credit only for time that "has not been credited against another sentence." Tesoro v Director of Prisons
On October 10, 1934, petitioner, Eufemio P. Tesoro, was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of falsification of a public document This penalty was to expire on October 28, 1937. On November 14, 1935, the then Governor-General Frank Murphy granted the petitioner a parole, which the latter accepted, subject to the following conditions:

2. That he will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner; On December 3, 1937, petitioner was charged in the justice of the peace court of San Juan, Rizal, with the crime of adultery
February, 1938, the same Jose Nagar lodged a complaint with Board of Indeterminate Sentence, and upon the same facts supporting the criminal action

aforementioned, charged the petitioner with violation of the conditions of his parole. Simeon Figalang, a parole officer assigned to investigate the case, submitted his report to the board, and, on the strength thereof and papers supporting it, the acting chairman of the board addressed a communication to the President By virtue of this order, the petitioner was arrested and recommitted to the custody of the Director of Prisons. Thereupon, petitioner sued for a writ of habeas corpus against the Director of Prisons, and upon denial thereof by the trial court, took the present appeal.

conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence. HELD: The SC affirmed the following: 1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. 2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. 3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and

Issue: Whether or not President can terminate parole and cause for the reincarceration of the convict Held:
When a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in the same state in which he was at the time the pardon was granted And the rule is well-settled that, in requiring the convict to undergo so much of the punishment imposed by his original sentence as he had not suffered at the time of his release, the court should not consider the time during which the convict was at large by virtue of the pardon as time served on the original sentence.

Torres v Gonzales In 1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president w/ the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring that the Exec Dept erred in convicting him for violating the

because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice. In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the Presidents executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. Norberto Jimenez & Loreto

Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they made during the war. The case was proceeded against Jimenez because Barrioquinto was nowhere to be found. Jimenez was then sentenced to life imprisonment.

Before the period for perfecting an of appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.

Barrioquinto learned about the proclamation and he surfaced in order to invoke amnesty as well. However, Commissioner Fernandez of the 14th Amnesty Commission refused to process the amnesty request of the two accused because the two refused to admit to the crime as charged. Jimenez & Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain Tolentino was

Barrioquinto vs Fernandez

Amnesty Compared w/ Pardon Admission Amnesty

FACTS

Not

Needed

in

the one who committed the crime being charged to them. ISSUE:

oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks that the and obliterates released he the by had offense with which he is charged person as amnesty stands before the law precisely though

Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty. HELD:

Pardon

is

granted

by

the

committed no offense. In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, the admit having committed

President and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and take proved no by the the thereof; person courts while pardoned, because notice

amnesty by Proclamation of the President with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice.

criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance.

Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of the political criminal offenses, generally and before or after the institution of prosecution sometimes after conviction.

Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into