6 13 13 0204 61383 Declaration of Coughlin Concernign Trespass Conviction and Hill's Sworn Testimony 13-17328

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OFElectronically

NEVADA
Filed
Jun 13 2013 09:09 a.m.
Z COUGHLIN
)
Tracie K. Lindeman
)
Clerk of Supreme Court
APParently
)
V.
) Supreme Court No: 61383
)
MATT MERLISS, MERLISS LIVING TRUST, )
RESPONDNET
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.
DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN CONCERNING THE CRIMINAL
TRESPASS CONVICTION AND ASSERTIONS IN PLEADINGS, SWORN TESTIMONY AT
TRIAL, TRANSCRIPTS OF VIDEO RECORDINGS, AND POLICE REPORTS CONCERNING
WHETHER COUGHLIN WAS SERVED AND EVICTION NOTICE PROPERLY AND TIMELY,
WHETHER A STAY WAS IN EFFECT, AND WHETHER COUGHLIN WAS ISSUED A
TRESPASS WARNING AND, IF SO, WHETHER HE FAILED TO OBEY IT, and supplemental to
motion to proceed in forma pauperis as to petit for rehearing or some functional equivalent to
challenge the dismissal of this appeal
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COMES NOW, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ., and hereby swears under penalty
of pejury that the following is true and based upon his first hand knowledge:
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please incorporate by reference herein the arguments and authority found in the attached handwritten
filings in cv11-03051 and cv11-03628. Coughlin apologizes for the state in which this is submitted,
but he has to go check in with probation at the RJC in a minute and never knows when they are going
to arrest him for something or other, whereupon he would again be at the mercy of the washoe county
jail and its deprivation of the access to justice or means of filing anything that idigents like Coughlin
face therein:
61383 is not moot at all. Coughlin could still receive tremendous benefit from it, even beyond
the consideration of the collateral consequences in 62337 and 61901 and the spectre of the $42K
attorney fee award at issue in 61383 (where such was never a "case" arising the the justice court,
necessarily, as it was premised upon an application of nrs 69.050, which relates to atty fee awards for
appeals of JUDGMENT by justice courts, and it would be consitutionally violative to subject
coughlin to such with no right to review therof of any sort (ie, such was necessarily not a decision by
the justice court, ie, the atty fees for the work done just on appeal, and therefore could not be said to
have "arisen" in the justice court.
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DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

Docket 61383 Document 2013-17328
hatley 231 se 2d 633, 634-35. in re ak 628 se 2d 753, 755.
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as to Waugh alleged bar, see Zamarripa 747 p.2d 1386 nevada case provides exception allowing this
Court to consider appeal in this matter, and Waugh's reliand on "must not be tried anew and citioation
to njcrpc 72-75 is distinguished from Anvui's "de novo" review2 standard per Mackie 329 p.2d 448,
as such RJC not an 'inferiro tribuanl' as de novo review precludes such an interpretiation and the
3/30/12 and 1/11/12 and 8/21/12 8/28/12 orders in cv11-03628 rule on constitutional and validity of
nrs 40.253(5)-(6) and nrs 40.385.
further,the RJC "proceeding" appealed is not a "case" and was not one "arising in" as the RJC lack
jurisdiciton to even hold the 10/25/11 "Trial" therein given the lack of a complaint being filed or 20
days accorded to file an answe rper njcrcp rule 109
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pluas waugh is called in to doubt by kjb 2jdc 103 nev 473
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This court's three Justice Panel's 5/28/13 Order indicates Article 6 Sec 6 is an issue, but I have some
thoughts on that...or maybe a Mandamus Petition would be better route to go.
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judge flangan's 5/29/13 order in cv11-03628 struck Coughlin's 5/20/13 emergency amended notice of
appeal and Coughlin's arrest in by the rjc bailiff's of 5/23/13 prevented his filign the
motion/notice/surreply he intended to that night...
dist ct has no pwoer to strike notice of appeal lils 414 f.2d 612 plus paul v armstrong may allow for
cert 1 nev 82 further waugh relies on a repealed statute in nrs 40.410, also, where merliss did not
himself hold title to the property, but rather, his living trust, art 6 sec 8 may retlate to the title issues
making the RJC inappropriate forum thus not 'arising in" 29 nev 181 also, Coughlins' 12/30/11
motion in cv11-03628 whas A MOTION FOR STAY PER NRS 40.385, WHICH KEEPS
GETTING MISCHARACTERIZED AS ONLY A MOTION FOR TRO. AND RJC'S REFSUAL TO
RULE ON SUCH NRS 40.385 MOTION (KEPT SAYIGN MUST ASK DIST CT FOR STAY AND
CHANGES TO NRS 40.385 CIRCA 10/1/11, MAY OR MAY NOT APPLY, IF THEY DO NRAP 8
NECSSARILY IMPLIES SUCH A MOTION NO 'ARISING IN ' RJC AND SHOUDL
THEREFORE NOT FACE AN ART 6 SEC 6 BAR.
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SEE OEENL
rough sketch as to why Waugh doesn't apply...see 6 10 13 filing in CV11-03628 for idea of what
Petition for Rehearing may be focused on...NRS 40.386 is not discretionary, I don't think...plus
Waugh was an appeal of a plenary UD action, not an appeal of a de novo review by the Dist Ct of an
Justice Court decision..
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Also, wherre Dist Ct basis its decision on second prong of NRCP 56(c) (ie, genuine issue of fact part)
wherre NRS 40.253 limits jurisdiction to, essential, the "no legal defense" second prong of NRCP
56(c) (Anvui says summary eviction appeal are review based on the standard applied to review of
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summary judgment, as "they are analogous", but clearly, under NRS 40.253(6), they aren't identical,
as "no legal defense" is all that is contained therein, nothing about "genuine issue of material fact",
which is what Flanagan hung his hat on in denying appeal.
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I think exception to nev const article 6 sec 6 bar involves where dist court exceeds jurisdiction or fails
to embrace jurisdiction (the 1/11/12 failure by flanagan to grant a stay under NRS 40.385 where such
is not discretionary (ie, plunk down $250, you get your stay, period) is a failure to embrace his
jurisdiction, and basing the denial of my appeal on the "genuine issue" prong of nrcp 56(c) when Nrs
40.253(6) clearly does not contain such a standard, exceeds jurisdiction, furhter, the 6/25/12 award of
attorney's fees based on nrs 69.050 exceeds jurisdiction in that such statute only applies to judgments,
which necessarily stem from civil actions, ie, plenary trials, not summary evictions...so, more
exceeding jurisdiction exception to article 6 sec 6 bar.
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IV. To the extent Coughlin trying appeal decision, is to the district court's this court has no
jurisdiction.
A review of Coughlin's opening brief reveals that he thinks his appeal(s) somehow include a
review of the district court's decision on the merits of his appeal from Reno Justice Court.
The Nevada Constitution vests final appellate jurisdiction over decisions in the justice courts
in the district court. Nevada Constitution Art. 6 6. NRAP 3A(b) sets forth what orders and acts by a
district court are within the appellate jurisdiction of this court. Unless authority is provided by a
statute or a rule, this court has no jurisdiction. Kokkosv. Tsalikis, 91 Nev. 24, 25,530 P.2d 756
(1975). Here, to the extent that either of Coughlin's notices of appeal could be construed to include
the district court's order of March 30, 2012, denying Coughlin's appeal from Reno Justice Court, this
court has no appellate jurisdiction.
5/28/13 Order: "The district court has final appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising in justice
courts. Nev. Const. art. 6, 6; see also Waugh v. Casazza, 85 Nev. 520, 521, 458 P.2d 359, 360
(1969). Although NRAP 3A(b)(3) authorizes an appeal from an order refusing to grant an injunction,
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and NRAP 3A(b)(8) authorizes an appeal from a post-judgment order awarding attorney fees, see
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Winston Prods. Co., Inc. v. DeBoer, 122 Nev. 517, 525, 134 P.3d 726, 731 (2006) (recognizing that
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an order awarding attorney fees and costs is substantively appealable as a special order after final
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judgment), because the orders challenged in this case arose from the district court's exercise of
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appellate jurisdiction over an appeal from a justice court decision, the district court's orders were
ostensibly rendered final and are not appealable to this court."
The Justice Court never considered whether NRS 69.050 allowed for an award of attorney's
fees. Rather, only NRS 69.030 was considered therein (decided wrongly, given NRS 69 only applies
to "judgments" in plenary matters). The key distinction here is whether Nevada Const. art. 6 sec. 6
applies to "cases arising in Justice Courts" or, rather over "decisions in Justice Courts", because,
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clearly, the Justice Court here, the RJC, made no "decision" as to whether attorney's fees on appeal of
a summary eviction were available or in order here. The same could be said with respect to whether
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an NRS 40.385 stay would be granted, as Judge Sferrazza repeatedly indicated that he felt he had
been divested of jurisdiction to rule on that (see his 12/1/11 and 12/8/11 Orders in 1708).
The Justice Court never ruled on whether Couglhin could get a stay under NRS 40.385, or
upon the posting of a supersedeas bond pursuant thereto of $250. As such, finallappellate jurisdiction
as to such where there was no "decision in" the justice court as to those issues, does not lie with the
District Court, but, rather, it was the 1/11/12 Order in District Court denying Coughlin's 12/30/11
Motion for Stay pursuant to NRS 40.385 that was the first decision thereon, and as such was a
"decision in" or matter "arising in" the District Court and appealable to the Nevada Supreme Court.
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and his own true and correct transcription of the video recordings of 11/13/11 by Hill and Merliss as
propounded to Coughlin from the Reno City Attorney's office, Coughlin's recording of and interview
ith rpd Sargent Marcia Lopez on 1/13/12 at a time when she was aware such recording was being
made, rpd Officer Carter's 11/15/12 Police Report (including the written statement of Richard G. Hill,
Esq.), and Hill's associate, Casey D. Baker's filings of 11/20/11 in the reno justice court summary
eviction proceeding in rev11-1708 and of 1/21/12 in the appeal therefrom (which both include sworn
Declarations by Hill), and the 8/23/12 Complaint by the SBN against Coughlin in NG12-0204, and
the 5/31/12 SCR 117(2) Petition by NNDB Chairman Susich in 60975, and a document that Coughlin
has obtained which may be the letter Hill sent to the SBN on 1/12/12 resulting in NG12-0204 (King
failed to admit any such letter into evidence, curiously, severely weakening his case with respect to
the allegation that Coughlin failed to reply or appropriately respond or cooperate with disciplinary
authorities incident to the enclosures that King referenced (but, again, did not included) in King's
2/14/12 letter to Coughlin.
NRS40.400Rules of practice.The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure and
Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals and new trials, so far as they
are not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220 to40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings
mentioned in those sections.
[1911 CPA 661; RL 5603; NCL 9150]
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Given that Baker appeared for Merliss while employed by Richard G. Hill, Esq. in RJC Rev11001708 (beyond what was mailed to Merliss personally, and in addition to Merliss and Hill's
indications as to whom Coughlin should serve what in August 2011 and thereafter), service of the
10/19/11 Notice of Appeal in CV11-03051, appealing the 10/13/11 and 10/17/11 Orders in Rev11001708 satisfies NRAP 3(d). Why neither Hill nor Baker ever filed anything in that case is unclear.
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NRAP Rule 3(d)Serving the Notice of Appeal.

(1)In General.The appellant shall serve the notice of appeal on all parties to the action in the
district court. Service on a party represented by counsel shall be made on counsel. If a party is not
represented by counsel, appellant shall serve the notice of appeal on the party at the partys last
known address. The appellant must note, on each copy, the date when the notice of appeal was filed.
The notice of appeal filed with the district court clerk shall contain an acknowledgement of service or
proof of service that conforms to the requirements of Rule 25(d).
(
A motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, supported by required documents, must be made in
the first instance to the district court, and only if that motion is denied is there occasion to file an in
forma pauperis motion with the appellate court. Boling-Bey v. U.S. Parole Com'n, 559 F.3d 1149
(10th Cir. 2009). In re Interest of K.D.B., 233 Neb. 371, 445 N.W.2d 620 (1989).
http://www.ccwashoe.com/public/ck_public_qry_doct.cp_dktrpt_frames?backto=P&case_id=CV1103051&begin_date=&end_date=
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NEFR Rule9.Electronic service.
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(a)Applicability.Electronic service of documents is limited to those documents permitted to be

served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or facsimile transmission. A complaint, petition or
other document that must be served with a summons, and a summons or a subpoena cannot be served
electronically.
(b)Service on registered users.When a document is electronically filed, the court or authorized
electronic filing service provider must provide notice to all registered users on the case that a
document has been filed and is available on the electronic service system document repository. The
notice must be sent by e-mail to the addresses furnished by the registered users under Rule 13(c). This
notice shall be considered as valid and effective service of the document on the registered users and
shall have the same legal effect as service of a paper document. A court is not required to make a
document available until after the clerk has reviewed and endorsed the document.
(c)Consent to electronic service.Other than service of a summons or subpoena, users who
register with the electronic filing system are deemed to consent to receive service electronically. A
party may also agree to accept electronic service by filing and serving a notice. The notice must
include the electronic notification address(es) at which the party agrees to accept service.
(d)Service on nonregistered recipients.The party filing a document must serve nonregistered
recipients by traditional means such as mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or facsimile
transmission and provide proof of such service to the court.
(e)Service list.The parties must provide the clerk with a service list indicating the parties
to be served. The clerk shall maintain the service list, indicating which parties are to be served
electronically and which parties are to be served in the traditional manner.
(f)Time of service; time to respond.Electronic service is complete at the time of transmission
of the notice required by subsection (b) of this rule. For the purpose of computing time to respond to
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documents received via electronic service, any document served on a day or at a time when the court
is not open for business shall be deemed served at the time of the next opening of the court for
business.
Coughlin has and hereby again provides the 2JDC with a service list for CV11-03051 to indicate
that Richard G. HIll, Esq. has indicated, as has his client (correct me if you feel otherwise, please)
that Hill and his office are appearing on Merliss's behalf in CV11-03051. Please add registered efiler
Hill and Casey D. Baker, Esq., to the service list therein, and at least send him courtesy notification
emails when there is a filing. Further, please provide Coughlin a waiver of the electronic filing fees
(which necessarily includes the yearly eFlex subscription of $300 (or at least some pro-rated or per
case fee for access and ability to efile in CV11-03051 considering that, at least implicitly, Coughlin's
IFP Application thereon was granted, at least to the $216.00 2JDC filing fee, otherwise, that 12/8/11
$216.00 check from Coughlin in the RJC docket of 12/8/11 (see NRS 4.420, District Court docket
entries are prima facie evidence of fact) must have applied to CV11-03051 considering Judge Berry
entered an Order 12/8/11 as to Coughlin's 11/8/11 NRS 40.385 Motion for Stay (Court's don't
generally enters Order on Motions in cases where a filing fee has not been paid where an in forma
pauperis application has been denied in full...)...but that means that CV11-03628 never met with a
$216.00 2JDC filing fee from Coughlin...its one or the other, but not both. Sort of like the situation
Coughlin spelled out in his 12/22/11 Notice of Posting Supersedeas Bond, Where is my Stay and the
12/22/11 email to Hill, Baker, and RJC Judge Sferrazza vis a vis the NRS 40.254 bar against utilizing
NRS 40.253's summary eviction procedures against a commercial tenant for a no cause eviction
Additionally, the claim preclusion effects elucidated in CG Wallace likely apply to all the various
purported claims for rent, damages, etc. Merliss may wish to make, but didn't, in the "Trial" that
Rev11-001708 was converted to by the 10/13/11 Order.
Rule10.Payment of filing fees.
(a)Filing fees.The court clerk is not required to accept electronic documents that require a fee.
If the clerk does accept electronic documents that require a fee, the court may permit the use of credit
cards, debit cards, electronic fund transfers, or debit accounts for the payment of filing fees associated
with electronic filing. A court may also authorize other methods of payment consistent with any AOC
guidelines that may be adopted.
(b)Waiver of fees.Anyone entitled to waiver of nonelectronic filing fees will not be charged
electronic filing fees. The court or clerk shall establish an application and waiver process consistent
with the application and waiver process used with respect to nonelectronic filing and filing fees.
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That's weird, the docket attached hereto lacks and entry for the 11/8/11 Motion for Stay by Coughlin
in CV11-03051, but it also lacks and entry striking such a Motion, and clearly, Coughlin has a file
stamped copy thereof, and additionally, the 12/8/11 Order therein certainly speaks to such a filing....
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26. 3336 - Ord Deny

in Forma Pauperis
08-Nov-2011Extra Text: Transaction 2576889 - Approved By:
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NOREVIEW : 11-08-2011:10:22:39
27. NEF - Proof of
Electronic Service
08-Nov-2011Extra Text: Transaction 2576924 - Approved By:
NOREVIEW : 11-08-2011:10:27:44
28. 2490 - Motion ... 01-Nov-2011Extra Text: AMENDED MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROCEED ON
APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
29. 3860 - Request
for Submission
01-Nov-2011Extra Text: DOCUMENT TITLE: AMENDED
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA
PAUPERIS (NO PAPER ORDER) PARTY
SUBMITTING: ZACH COUGHLIN DATE
SUBMITTED: 11/01/11 SUBMITTED
30. 3860 - Request
for Submission
19-Oct-2011 Extra Text: DOCUMENT TITLE: MOTION TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS (DEFENDANT)
(PAPER ORDER PROVIDED) PARTY
SUBMITTING: ZACH COUGHLIN DATE
SUBMITTED: 10/19/2011 SUBMITTED BY: V.
ALLEN DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:
31. 1075 - Affidavit ... 19-Oct-2011 Extra Text: AFFIDAVIT OF POVERTY
(DEFENDANT) - NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM
RENO JUSTICE COURT
32. 2385 - Mtn
Proceed Forma
Pauperis
19-Oct-2011 Extra Text: NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM RENO
JUSTICE COURT
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Coughlin certainly does not feel that his appeal in 61383 is "moot", as an Order by the Nevada
Supreme Court undoing that ordered in CV11-03628 of 1/11/12 (especially where such a refusal to
excercise its jurisdiction to entere the non-discretionary, automatic stay required under NRS 40.385
pursuant to Coughlin's 12/30/12 Motion for Stay (see pages 12-13, and 18 therein, as its so much
more than a Motion for TRO, though NRCP 62 does provide for an automatic 10 day stay as to
Orders such as that of 1/11/12, which begs the question as to how it was appropriate for Hill to insist
on throwing away the personalty he had removed from the former home law office (the 12/30/12
Motion in CV11-03628 was not directed solely to enjoining the 12/21/11 Order in Rev11-001708, a
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closer reading than that done by Hill or Baker will reveal the NRS 40.385 Motion for Stay therein),
3/30/12 (especially where such an order exceeded the 2JDC's jurisdiction
Consider, speaking of the idea that 61383 is "moot", the collateral consequences to Coughlin
of the various Orders appeal from in CV11-03628 remaining in place (beyond the fact that Hill and or
Merliss now has a "judgment" for $42,065 in attorney's fees against Coughlin for the appeal of a
summary eviction, with particularly emphasis on the salience of the conviction in 61901 and
associated testimony by Hill vis a vis that criminal trespass conviction and Coughlin's alleged lack of
competency, and or "conduct" or "candor" (whether to the tribunal, for which there is an RPC, 3.3,
that requires such, or, apparently to some non-existenct RPC that the OBC's King believes require
candor to opposing counsel (actually, its RPC 3.4, requiring "fairness", rather than "candor") in
62337:
The 12/14/12 Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law now on appeal in 62337 (despite the fact
that that the title of that 12/14/12 FOFCOL fails to categorize or identify such as a "decision"
sufficient to invoked SCR 105(3)'s docketing of such or implementation of a briefing schedule or
transmission of any ROA (ironic given Hill and Echeverria's criticism that the title of Coughlins' file
bare little relation to that addressed therein).That 12/14/12 FOFCOL includes the following:
"19. State Bar Counsel called attorney Richard Hill to testify at the hearing of this matter: Mr. Hill
has been a member in good standing with the State Bar of Nevada for 33 years. See Transcript of
Proceedings of Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 36, L 22 P 37 L 4. Mr. Hill was retained by Dr.
Merliss to assist Dr. Merliss in a landlord tenant dispute with his tenant Coughlin. See Transcript
of Proceedings of Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 37, L14 -20. (HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 37:14
to 37:20) Q And how did you first come into contact with Mr. Coughlin? A Well, I was hired by a
Dr. Matthew Merliss. My office was to remove a tenant from a home at 121 River Rock in Reno. Dr.
Merliss had been going back and forth with Mr. Coughlin for several months. Mr. Coughlin had not
paid any rent for, at that point I believe it was --)
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(NOTE: actually, it was Hill's associate Casey D. Baker, Esq. who worked the case, so why it is that
Hill was an appropriate witness to testify to all sorts of matters in a case that he had not appeared in
(either 1708 or 03628 up until approximately August 2012 (where that appeal was docketed in the
2JDC on 12/21/11, and by Hill's appearing in Baker's place upon Baker absconding to Kentucky at a
time, August 2011 when 99% of the work in 1708 and 03628 had already been done by Baker,
briefing was over, the appeal was denied and oppositions to post-judgment motions had been filed by
Baker) is not clear:
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 38:20 to 38:23) "Q And did you end up representing Dr. Merliss
inan eviction action?
A My office did. I assigned the case to my associate at the time, Casey
Baker.")
The FOFCOL continues on misrepresenting Hill's actual participation in 1708 and 03628:
"Mr. Hill represented Dr. Merliss in Reno Justice Court and Washoe County District Court and
two appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court in the matters involving Dr. Merliss and Coughlin. See
Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 39, L 13 -24. Mr. Hill has also reviewed
filings in of a case in which Coughlin is involved with Washoe Legal Services. See Transcript of
Proceedings Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 39, L 25 P 40, L 3. (HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages
39:13 to 40:3) Q "Could you describe to the panel in a chronological manner some of the events that
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you have personal knowledge of that exhibited this behavior that formed your opinion? MR.
COUGHLIN: Objection. Relevancy. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled. THE WITNESS (Hill): I've
read (NOTE: Hill's Declaration in support of the Motion for Attorney's Fees that Baker made first in
his 2/24/12 Answering Brief (violating DCR 13 where Baker made such a motion for fees again on
4/19/12) attests only to reading everything Baker filed, but regardless, there is a difference between
Hill as a witness asserting that he had personal knowledge of whether or not Coughlin displayed
candor to the tribunal or anyone else, or fairness to opposing counsel or overall competency had Hill
actually appeared in or worked the cases during the time frames of the alleged events or misconduct
to which he testifies to (asserting first hand knowledge thereof as to such events or conduct) and Hill
merely perusing the file after the fact) virtually everything that Mr. Coughlin has filed, not only in the
Department 7 eviction case, and before that the Reno Justice Court's eviction case. He's now got -had two appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court in that case, and I've read virtually everything that he's
done. I've also followed the filings that he's had in his dealings with Washoe Legal Services. And I've
followed the filings that he had in the supreme court discipline matters."
20.
In the eviction proceeding between Dr. Merliss and Coughlin, Mr. Hill's firm obtained
an eviction order allowing Coughlin one week to vacate the premises. (NOTE: here the FOFCOL
mischaracterizes what that 10/27/11 Order in 1708 actually said, where it reads: ""That the
sheriff/constable of Reno Township, or one of their duly authorized agents be, and hereby is, directed
to remove each and every person found upon and within the rental unit" ...the difference is clear and
order "allowing Couglin one week to vacate" sounds more like a trespass warning than one that
indicates the WCSO is "directed to remove each and every person found upon and within the rental
unit") Ultimately, Coughlin failed to comply with the eviction order and was convicted of criminal
trespass. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 41, L 18 -P 44, L 12.
21.
On behalf of his client Dr. Merliss, Mr. Hill sought and obtained an order in favor of
Dr. Merliss and against Coughlin awarding Dr. Merliss attorney's fees in the amount of $42,065.50.
Washoe District Court Judge Patrick Flanagan entered the order on June 25, 2012. See Transcript of
Proceedings of Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 47, L 3-7. -See Hearing Exhibit 2, P 3, L 10-11.
The motion seeking attorney's fees was based on Coughlin's conduct in the defense of the eviction
matter, which conduct was characterized as frivolous and vexatious and presumably so found by
Judge Flanagan. See Hearing Exhibit P 2, L 8-13; P 3, L 4-11.
22.
Based on Mr. Hill's experience and background, his review of the pleadings in the
litigation between Dr. Merliss and Coughlin and his review of the pleadings in Coughlin's litigation
with Washoe Legal Services, Mr. Hill is of the opinion that Coughlin is not competent to practice
law. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 39, L 1 -12.
23.
Based on Mr. Hill's experience in litigating with Coughlin, Coughlin was not truthful
with either counsel or the court. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 53, L 6
-16. Mr. Hill felt that Coughlin's filings were abusive, at one point calling Mr. Hill's associate a
lichen. Coughlin has accused Mr. Hill of bribing the Reno Police Department to have Coughlin
arrested. Mr. Hill's staff is terrorized by Coughlin. See Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 54, L 4
-15."
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 40:11 to 41:4) Hill: "In the appeal -- we had recovered a $42,000
attorney's fee award against Mr. Coughlin for handling just his appeal of the eviction. He would file
these documents that would have a caption on it that would indicate that it was a motion under
Rule 59, for example. (NOTE: compare to 12/14/12 FOFCOL not including characterizing in title
identifying such as a "decision" sufficient to implicate SCR 105(3)) And you would get into it, and
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there would be no mention in the body of Rule 59, there would be no analysis of Rule 59, but we
would have to run down all of the little issues that he would raise on the off chance that if you don't
respond to one, the district court judge is going to find something that he thinks is important, and the
client ends up having an adverse result. $42,000 on a no-cause 30-day eviction, and that's just for the
appeal of it, is absolutely astronomical. But that should tell you -- I have provided Mr. King with a
copy of Judge Flanagan's orders in which he sets forth the reasons for such an extraordinary
award, being Mr. Coughlin's behavior, and the quality of the work that he was filing."
Hill demonstrates his own RPC 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 violations where he falsely characterizes the
"reasons" Judge Flanagan provides for entering the attorney fee award of 6/25/12 in CV11-03628
(FHE 2): "HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 40:25 to 41:4) I have provided Mr. King with a copy of
Judge Flanagan's orders in which he sets forth the reasons for such an extraordinary award, being Mr.
Coughlin's behavior, and the quality of the work that he was filing."
Actually, as Hill and King (see King's inclusion of such 8/28/12 Order in his 8/30/12 email to
Coughlin) well know, Judge Flanagan's 8/21/12 and 8/28/12 Orders in 03628 clearly contradict Hill's
assessment that Judge Flanagan's 6/25/12 Order in 03628 "sets forthe the reasons for asuch and
extraordinary award, being Mr. Coughlin's behavior, and the qualiity of the work that he was
filing...". Rather, Judge Flanagan's 8/28/12 Order in 03628 makes clear:
"...Coughlin's Motions here attempts to re-litigate substantive issues this Court has already
decided, or frivolous claims this Court has previously ignored...Accordingly, Coughlin's Motion to
Alter or Amend Order, or Pled in Alternatid [sic] Motion to Set Aside Attorney Fee Award and
Motion for Order Shortening Time and Notice of Appeal of Atly [sic] Fee Award of 6/25/12 and
NRCP 60(b)(4) Motion to Set Aside Attorney's Fees are DENIED."
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Time to add some more Richard G. Hill, Esq. chestnuts to the lie pile, especially considering Hill's
testimony under oath at Coughlin's 11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing and the follow sworn testimony by
Hill from the 6/18/12 Trial, viewed in conjunction with the statements Hill made to the RPD Officer
Chris Carter and Sargent Marcia Lopez just prior to and at the time of the 11/13/11 custodial arrest of
Coughlin at his former home law office for trespassing:
THE COURT: When Mr. Hill is here to ask some questions that I think you've explored the
possibilities, and I don't know what else you can offer the Court in terms of this case via crossexamination. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir, Your Honor. I'll wrap this up quickly. BY MR.
COUGHLIN: Q Mr. Hill, at any time on that day, November 13th, did the owner of the premises
warn the arrestee to leave the property? A I think the message was communicated. Q Via what
medium? A The fact that you were handcuffed and arrested. Didn't you get the picture? Q Okay, prior
to the handcuffing and the arresting, did anybody say, "You need to leave the premises?" A I didn't
hear that. Q Nobody said that? A I did not hear that, sir. Q Did you say it? A No. Q Did Dr. Merliss?
A Not that I heard. Q Did the police? A No, not that I heard. Q So, nobody that you heard of warned
the person arrested for trespassing? Page -110 (see transcript of 6/18/12 criminal trespass trial in
RMC 11 CR 26405.
Now, compare Hill's sworn testimony of 6/18/12 in RMC 11 CR 26405 with his sworn testimony at
Coughlin's formal disciplinary hearing, and it becomes clear that Hill finally figure out that an
essential element of a criminal trespass conviction under RMC 8.10.010 is a failure to leave by one
after being warned to do so...so, magically, at the 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing in NG12-0204
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(see 61901 and 62337) Hill managed to "remember" such a warning...well, sort of...not initially, then
he couldn't keep straight whether the Police identified themselves or not, whether three minutes
intervened before some such "order" to "come out, Zach", or whether there was just some vague
"coaxing".
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 43:1 to 44:4)
Richard G. Hill, Esq.: "Two weeks after the eviction on a Sunday
Dr. Merliss comes to town and says, I want to see the
house. I meet him about 10:30, 11:00 o'clock on a Sunday
morning at the house. We go in. Back door is open.
There's food wrappers on the counter that've been there
that weren't there the last time I was in. Windows are
open again, and it's a very exacerbating situation.
And he says, I want to check the basement. I
didn't know there was a basement in the house. There's
things piled in the stairwell to get down into the
basement, tool kits, and heavy stuff.
We get it out of the way. We get down there.
And I can see when he pushes on the door, and he turns to
me, and he says, "It's barricaded," from the inside. It
wasn't locked, it was barricaded.
We know what's going on. So we call the
police. The police come over. They try to get Zach out
of the basement, whoever was in there at that point. The
police bang on the door, "Come on out, Zach. Police. You
have to go." No response. They turned to us and say,
we're going to leave. Wait a minute. I'm the owner. You
have the authority to break the door down. "We don't do
that."
So Dr. Merliss goes down to the bottom of the
stairs. Dr. Merliss kicks the door open, and the police
officer sticks his head around the corner and pulls his
gun out, and here's Mr. Coughlin down there. Mr. Coughlin
voluntarily came upstairs with his dog and was placed
under arrest."
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
" Q Mr. Hill, did the Reno police identify
themselves as law enforcement prior to your client kicking
the door down on November 13th?
MR. KING: Objection. Relevance.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I believe they did, sir.
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BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Is that what you testified on June 18th in
your sworn testimony in the criminal trespass trial?
A I believe it is.
Q Did you testify to that today?
A I believe I just did.
Q Just now, but not earlier when you were
providing an answer to Mr. King, and you went through what
happened?
A Mr. Coughlin, let me make it easy for you. I
don't recall what I testified to on direct from Mr. King.
It is my clear recollection that before Dr. Merliss kicked
the door down in the basement, the police had identified
themselves loudly and clearly.
Q Can you describe that in as much detail as
possible?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: The relevance, Mr. Coughlin,
as to your competency or candor, which are the two issues
raised?
MR. COUGHLIN: It goes to whether or not there
was a criminal trespass, which I believe -MR. ECHEVERRIA: You were convicted of
criminal trespass, true?
MR. COUGHLIN: I was.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sustained.
MR. COUGHLIN: But a conviction under
Claiborne is not something you're entitled to just say,
all right, conviction, and be done with it.
Further, I'm not offering it to prove whether
or not there was conviction. I'm offering it to impeach
Mr. Hill's credibility, which is severely impeached by
this in that he lied, and his client lied to get an arrest
made.
MR. KING: Mr. Chairman, if I can respond?
MR. COUGHLIN: That's been proven in my
filings.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me, Mr. Coughlin.
Mr. King?
MR. KING: This is totally beyond the scope of
the direct examination. If he wants to call him back or
make it his case, but if the convictions of the criminal
trespass and of the theft at Walmart, which will be coming
in, the appeals are exhausted. Those are final decisions
as the supreme court has -MR. COUGHLIN: Why did we have testimony on
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it?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, you are going
to cease interrupting.
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir.
MR. KING: To the extent that Mr. Coughlin
wants to refute the answers that Mr. Hill gave regarding
his demeanor or conduct, whatever. To the extent he wants
to attempt to suggest that the arrest wasn't valid or that
he wasn't convicted, I would say it should be excluded.
Otherwise, we'll be retrying those cases here today, and
that's not the purpose of this hearing.
MR. COUGHLIN: Sir, I'm not trying to retry
it. I'm trying to impeach Mr. Hill's credibility.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: To that extent I'll allow
that question.
MR. COUGHLIN: Thank you, sir.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: But you better have some
evidence that -- if you are going to ask questions, they
better be based on fact.
MR. COUGHLIN: They are. They're based on
video.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a -- propose a
witness that will testify that the police did not identify
themselves?
MR. COUGHLIN: I have a video of the
sergeant -MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a witness?
MR. COUGHLIN: -- admitting to that.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a witness?
MR. COUGHLIN: So you're telling me it has to
come in the form of a witness as evidence?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: If you are intending to
impeach him on some facts, then I would require that you
make an offer of proof as to what witness will impeach
Mr. Hill.
MR. COUGHLIN: I would like to show Mr. Hill a
video of Marsha Lopez, the sergeant with him that day,
admitting that Mr. Hill's account is wrong.
MR. KING: I'm going to object to any video or
display of videos. And the reason I will object is,
number one, they are irrelevant. Number two, they're all
edits. And number three, he's trying to show that
something didn't occur by showing an excerpt of a video.
It would be totally irrelevant and immaterial.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'll address the
admissibility of the video when that appears.
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Right now Mr. Coughlin has asked Mr. Hill

whether the police identified himself. Mr. Hill said that
they have. I think you've laid the groundwork. If you
have impeachment testimony that's admissible, when you
offer it -MR. COUGHLIN: I'll ask a more clarifying
question.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please proceed to another
subject.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q So when they identified themselves, how long
between identifying themselves and kicking the door down?
A Three minutes. Two or three minutes.
Q Which one of them identified themself?
A I believe there was a lady sergeant, and there
was a male officer. And I believe he's the one who banged
on the door with his nightstick and identified himself as
being with the police. And I believe his words were, come
on out, Zach.
Q Was that it, come out Zach? Does that
identify it as being the police?
A He identified himself as being with the Reno
Police Department.
Q In what words?
A I believe those were the words he used, sir.
Q What words?
A This is the police, please come out Zach.
Q Because previously all you said was, come on
out Zach.
A I believe you're mistaken, sir.
Q So you're saying that officer Chris Carter,
Junior, three minutes before the door was kicked in by
your client, banged on the door with his nightstick, and
said, this is the police. Come on out, Zach?
A Mr. Coughlin, three minutes is probably a long
estimate. The process was we had cleared the stairwell -Q Did he say, this is the police?
MR. KING: Objection. Argumentative.
THE WITNESS: I believe he did, sir.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me. Let me -- I'm
going to go ahead and overrule. Go ahead.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Did he say, this is the police?
A I believe he did, sir.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: You've asked that three times
now.
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THE WITNESS: At least.

BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Did Sergeant Lopez, the female sergeant?
A She may have, but I don't recall.
Q Did you have a video camera with you?
A We had Dr. Merliss's phone.
Q Did you take 14 videos that you propounded to
the Reno city attorney that day?
THE WITNESS: We gave them what we had. The
number I don't recall.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Was there some reason -- you seem to have
video of every moment of that day, except for this
announcing themselves as law enforcement. Is that what
you're testifying to right now?
A Mr. Coughlin -MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, the issue here
is whether or not you're competent to be an attorney and
should continue in the practice of law. You're focusing
on a rather minor detail, and I would like you to focus on
the broader issues.
MR. COUGHLIN: It's not just competency, it's
candor.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: You've indicated you want to
impeach him. The issue is Mr. Hill has testified that the
police identified themselves. You say something
different. I've asked you for an offer of proof. You've
laid the foundation. Let's proceed.
MR. COUGHLIN: It also goes to -MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please proceed, Mr. Coughlin.
You would do yourself some good if you will focus on the
issues, if you will."
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So to compare in closer detail:

HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 55:1 to 55:22)
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
"Q Mr. Hill, did the Reno police identify
themselves as law enforcement prior to your client kicking
the door down on November 13th?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I believe they did, sir.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
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Q Is that what you testified on June 18th in

your sworn testimony in the criminal trespass trial?
A I believe it is.
Q Did you testify to that today?
A I believe I just did.
Q Just now, but not earlier when you were
providing an answer to Mr. King, and you went through what
happened?
A Mr. Coughlin, let me make it easy for you. I
don't recall what I testified to on direct from Mr. King.
It is my clear recollection that before Dr. Merliss kicked
the door down in the basement, the police had identified
themselves loudly and clearly."
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Now, considering Hill's testimony under oath at Coughlin's 11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing and
the follow sworn testimony by Hill from the 6/18/12 Trial, viewed in conjunction with the statements
Hill made to the RPD Officer Chris Carter and Sargent Marcia Lopez just prior to and at the time of
the 11/13/11 custodial arrest of Coughlin at his former home law office for trespassing:
BY MR. COUGHLIN: "Q Mr. Hill, at any time on that day, November 13th, did the owner of the
premises warn the arrestee to leave the property? A I think the message was communicated. Q Via
what medium? A The fact that you were handcuffed and arrested. Didn't you get the picture? Q
Okay, prior to the handcuffing and the arresting, did anybody say, "You need to leave the
premises?" A I didn't hear that. Q Nobody said that? A I did not hear that, sir. Q Did you say it? A
No. Q Did Dr. Merliss? A Not that I heard. Q Did the police? A No, not that I heard. Q So, nobody
that you heard of warned the person arrested for trespassing? Page -110 (see transcript of 6/18/12
criminal trespass trial in RMC 11 CR 26405.
However, that is not quite how Hill put it at the 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing now on
appeal in 62337:
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 43:8 to 43:23) Hill: "And he says, I want to check the basement. I didn't
know there was a basement in the house. There's things piled in the stairwell to get down into the
basement, tool kits, and heavy stuff. We get it out of the way. We get down there. And I can see when
he pushes on the door, and he turns to me, and he says, "It's barricaded," from the inside. It wasn't
locked, it was barricaded. We know what's going on. So we call the police. The police come
over. They try to get Zach out of the basement, whoever was in there at that point. The police
bang on the door, "Come on out, Zach. Police. You have to go." No response. They turned to us
and say, we're going to leave. Wait a minute. I'm the owner. You have the authority to break the
door down. "We don't do that.""
Also:
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BY MR. COUGHLIN:
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" Q So when they identified themselves, how long
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A Three minutes. Two or three minutes.
Q Which one of them identified themself?
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A I believe there was a lady sergeant, and there

was a male officer. And I believe he's the one who banged
on the door with his nightstick and identified himself as
being with the police. And I believe his words were, come
on out, Zach.
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Q Was that it, come out Zach? Does that

identify it as being the police?
A He identified himself as being with the Reno
Police Department.
Q In what words?
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A I believe those were the words he used, sir.
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Q What words?
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A This is the police, please come out Zach.
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Q Because previously all you said was, come on
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out Zach.
A I believe you're mistaken, sir.
Q So you're saying that officer Chris Carter,
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your client, banged on the door with his nightstick, and
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said, this is the police. Come on out, Zach?
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A Mr. Coughlin, three minutes is probably a long

estimate. The process was we had cleared the stairwell -Q Did he say, this is the police?
MR. KING: Objection. Argumentative.
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THE WITNESS: I believe he did, sir.
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MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me. Let me -- I'm
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going to go ahead and overrule. Go ahead.

BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Did he say, this is the police?
A I believe he did, sir."
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The most glaring error in the Panel's approach to the 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing, the
grievances, and the FOFCOL is that the Panel applied to instruction or jurisdictional mandate in SCR
111(8) and the 6/7/12 Order in 60838 (which spoke only to the "nature and degree of punishment" for
the one conviction at issue in 60838) to a whole range of mere allegations which have yet to be
proven or even subject to the fulcrum of due process. Simply put, the Panel skipped past the
requirement to provide due process (notice and opportunity to be heard) as to a rash of mere
allegations, and went directly to determining the nature and degree of punishment that should issue,
doing so in what can only be seen a a fraudulent attempt to apply the Order in 60838 to allegations
mere allegations in no way connected to the conviction at issue and noticed in that 60838 SCR 111(6)
Petition . Such allegations of contemptous conduct in NG12-0435 supported only by a since
overridden (by virtue of the 6/19/09 Final Decree) 4/13/09 Order After Trial that spoke only to
vexatiousness vis a vis NRS 7.085 (which simply is not contemptuous conduct or anything related to
"candor").
The smoking guns to support such a finding that this was the Panel's approach:
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 71:10 to 71:15)
MR. ECHEVERRIA: " I believe the issue that this
panel has to determine is what the degree, if any, of
punishment should be for the conduct that you have alleged
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to have been involved with, in terms of candor to the
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court, candor to counsel, candor to witnesses, competency
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to practice law."
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Further, the OBC's King and Hill clearly attempt to mislead the NNDB Panel in characterizing
the 6/25/12 $42K atty fee award in 03628 as a "sanction". Its funny, at one turn King is
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BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Mr. Hill, is it somewhat incongruous for you to
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assert to this panel that I completely lack competency,
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and yet you ran up, counting the trial court $20,000 you
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asked for, and the $42,000 you were ultimately awarded in
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that appellate court?

MR. KING: Objection. Argumentative and
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irrelevant.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sustained.
MR. COUGHLIN: I think it goes to his
credibility.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm sorry?
MR. COUGHLIN: Your Honor, I think it goes to
his credibility to the extent that he's saying, well,
Mr. Coughlin is so baseless and vexatious, yet I was able
to bill 60 grand for it.
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To me it's like, well, at some point if

somebody's arguments are so worthless and so unsupported,
shouldn't you be able to bring it home for less than 60
grand for a summary eviction?
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MR. KING: Mr. Chairman, if I could respond by
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pointing out the fact that the order from Judge Flanagan,
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which has been admitted, suggests that that was -- that
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those fees were generated because of Mr. Coughlin's

vexatious conduct. And that the fees were reasonable and
were awarded against Mr. Coughlin, not one cent of which
has been paid.
So I think any suggestion to the contrary is
irrelevant, because Judge Flanagan's order is to be
accepted by the panel. (NOTE: classic RPC 3.1 violation by King, ie, he indicates Flanagan's Order
merely suggests the fees were the result of a sanction, and its not until the next sentence that King is
alread then arguing that such a mere suggestion must be, essentially, given the ol' SCR 111(5), "a
conviction is conclusive proof of guilt"/SCR 111(8) "we are only her today to determine the nature
and extent of your punishment for the suggestion, er, uh...conviction/sanction we are assuming you
were guilty of in our skipping past the whole trial on the merits part of due process...ie, a suggestion
of guilt is good enough for the NNDB Panel to treat it as a conviction/sanction that conclusively
established guilt sufficient to allow the Panel to just skip straight to the sentencing phase....
MR. COUGHLIN: Your Honor, if I can quickly
counter that. I don't know that's actually pled in your
complaint, Mr. King, or included amongst one of the three
grievances. The extent to which -- am I here today
because this like Judge Gardner's sanctions coming up two
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years later? Am I here today on Judge Flanagan's
sanction? Is he a grievant and accorded a case number
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too?
MR. KING: Mr. Chairman, I was responding to
his question.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I believe you're here today
to measure all of your conduct as a practicing lawyer. So
I'd like to move on. If you have further questions of
Mr. Hill, please ask them. I've now afforded you in
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excess of 20 minutes. I'll give you another five.

MR. COUGHLIN: So we're not here today based
on what's been noticed?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: We're not here today to
relitigate orders that have been filed (NOTE:no, rather the Panel was there to assume something
"suggested" by an Order provides conclusive proof of guilt/sanctionable conduct, even where King
and Hill know full well the 8/28/12 Order in CV11-03628 makes explicilty clear that the 6/25/12
Order was not a "sanction", King's nonsensical allusions to a conclusive suggestion or whatever,
notwithstanding) that you have appealed, and that you have lost.
MR. COUGHLIN: I'm not asking -- I'm asking
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what is it limited to? Because it sounds like from what
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MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't intend to impose any

limits on you in terms of what you attempt to proffer as
evidence. I will rule on what you proffer as evidence.
MR. COUGHLIN: I'm saying what he's limited
to, your Honor.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: The issue here, sir, as I
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understand the supreme court's order with respect to your
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conviction of theft, and the issues here with respect to
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the other grievances that have been filed against you are
to the extent as to what, if any, should be the punishment
that you should sustain as a result of your conduct.
MR. COUGHLIN: Yet this is entered into
evidence.
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MR. ECHEVERRIA: This is what?
MR. COUGHLIN: This order has been entered
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into evidence.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Exhibit 2 has.
MR. COUGHLIN: But it's not pled in any
complaint. Judge Flanagan's not a grievant. I wasn't
noticed that that was the purpose of this hearing to some
extent today.
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MR. ECHEVERRIA: You were noticed that the

issue of your conviction of trespass was an issue, that
your handling of that case was an issue, and it's relevant
as to that"
To the extent Echeverria's indicating "that your handling of that case was an issue" refers to
Coughlin's handling of either Rev11-1708 (the summary eviction from former home law office that
Hill's associate, not Hill (contrary to the FOFCOL's assessment that Hill appeared in the trial
court...which Hill attempts to imply when its convenient, only to back off such characterization when
its not (like he gets caught in lying that Coughlin "didn't raise the issue in the trial court" (vis a vis
Coughlin's argument that NRS 40.254 forbid utilizing summary procedures in NRS 40.253 against a
commercial tenant in a no cause eviction...something Coughlin clearly did raise in the trial court at
page 6 of his 10/17/11 filing therein), such a contention is clearly at odds with the text of King's
8/23/12 Complaint in the three grievances on appeal in 62337, as nothing therein notices Coughlin
that his "handling of that case" (either the trial court in rev11-1708 or the appeal thereof in CV1103628) would be at issue (including the 6/25/12 Order in cv11-03628 that became formal hearing
exhibit 2) or had otherwise been noticed per SCR 105(2) or 105(2)(c). Then Echeverria continually
allows King and HIll to testify as to matters peripheral to the trespass conviction, purportedly to
support some allegation of misconduct vis a vis "candor" to either the tribunal or opposing counsel, or
some lack of competency, or, perhaps, "fairness to opposing counsel" (which Echeverria seems to
continually describe as "candor" to opposing counsel) but when Coughlin seeks to ask question
related thereto, Echeverria sua sponte objects by asserting that Coughlin is not to "relitigate" his
trespass conviction, and otherwise precludes Couglhin from even impeaching HIll's testimony or
showing bias, particularly as to all the testiony related to the issues Hill testified to (candor to tribunal
and opposing counsel, whether Coughlin was abusive to opposing counsel or if Hill's staff (hearsay)
was "terrorized" by Coughlin, whether Coughlin lacked competency, etc.
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IV. To the extent Coughlin trying appeal decision, is to the district court's this court has
no jurisdiction.
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5/28/13 Order: "The district court has final appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising in justice
courts. Nev. Const. art. 6, 6; see also Waugh v. Casazza, 85 Nev. 520, 521, 458 P.2d 359, 360
(1969). Although NRAP 3A(b)(3) authorizes an appeal from an order refusing to grant an injunction,
and NRAP 3A(b)(8) authorizes an appeal from a post-judgment order awarding attorney fees, see
Winston Prods. Co., Inc. v. DeBoer, 122 Nev. 517, 525, 134 P.3d 726, 731 (2006) (recognizing that
10
an order awarding attorney fees and costs is substantively appealable as a special order after final
11
judgment), because the orders challenged in this case arose from the district court's exercise of
12
appellate jurisdiction over an appeal from a justice court decision, the district court's orders were
13
ostensibly rendered final and are not appealable to this court."
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The Justice Court never considered whether NRS 69.050 allowed for an award of attorney's
fees. Rather, only NRS 69.030 was considered therein (decided wrongly, given NRS 69 only applies
to "judgments" in plenary matters). The key distinction here is whether Nevada Const. art. 6 sec. 6
applies to "cases arising in Justice Courts" or, rather over "decisions in Justice Courts", because,
clearly, the Justice Court here, the RJC, made no "decision" as to whether attorney's fees on appeal of
18
a summary eviction were available or in order here. The same could be said with respect to whether
19
an NRS 40.385 stay would be granted, as Judge Sferrazza repeatedly indicated that he felt he had
20
been divested of jurisdiction to rule on that (see his 12/1/11 and 12/8/11 Orders in 1708).
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The Justice Court never ruled on whether Couglhin could get a stay under NRS 40.385, or
upon the posting of a supersedeas bond pursuant thereto of $250. As such, finallappellate jurisdiction
as to such where there was no "decision in" the justice court as to those issues, does not lie with the
District Court, but, rather, it was the 1/11/12 Order in District Court denying Coughlin's 12/30/11
Motion for Stay pursuant to NRS 40.385 that was the first decision thereon, and as such was a
"decision in" or matter "arising in" the District Court and appealable to the Nevada Supreme Court.
Appealability and appellate review of injunctions, see Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions 324 to 336
27
Issuance of extraordinary writs by appellate courts, see Am. Jur. 2d, Certiorari 1 et seq.; Am. Jur.
28
2d, Habeas Corpus and Postconviction Remedies 1 et seq.; Am. Jur. 2d, Mandamus 1 et seq.;
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Am. Jur. 2d, Prohibition 1 et seq.; Am. Jur. 2d, Quo Warranto 1 et seq. Organization of state
courts, see Am. Jur. 2d, Courts 1 et seq. Trial, generally, see Am. Jur. 2d, Trial 1 et seq. I.
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4
5
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Jurisdiction of Appellate Courts C. Appellate Jurisdiction of State Courts Topic Summary Correlation
Table References 75. Generally West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and
Error k17 to 25, 30 to 32 A.L.R. Library Validity, construction, and application of concurrentsentence-doctrinestate cases, 56 A.L.R.5th 385 An appellate court has the responsibility to
determine whether it has jurisdiction to review a case.[FN1] The parties may not confer jurisdiction
on an appellate court by waiver, acquiescence, or consent.[FN2] When a lower court does not have
jurisdiction over the case before it, an appellate court also lacks jurisdiction to review the merits of
the claim.[FN3] CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: The issue of appellate jurisdiction is one of
10
law over which Supreme Court has unlimited review. State v. Scoville, 286 Kan. 800, 188 P.3d 959
11
(2008). Parties cannot confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of Appeals directly or indirectly
12
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where it is otherwise lacking. Men & Women Against Discrimination v. Family Protection Services
Bd., 725 S.E.2d 756 (W. Va. 2011). [END OF SUPPLEMENT] [FN1] Williamson v. Misemer, 316
Ark. 192, 871 S.W.2d 396 (1994); In re Marriage of Dureno, 854 P.2d 1352 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992);
Ex parte Lewis, 663 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. App. Amarillo 1983). [FN2] Burchell v. Burchell, 684 S.W.2d
15
296 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dept., Inc., 302 Md. 281, 487 A.2d 288 (1985); In re
16
Estate of Lloyd, 676 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1984). [FN3] Armour v. L.H., 259 Neb. 138,
17
608 N.W.2d 599 (2000). AMJUR APPELLATE 75 C. Appellate Jurisdiction of State Courts Topic
18
Summary Correlation Table References 76. Constitutional and statutory provisions West's Key
19
Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and Error k17 to 25, 30 to 32 A.L.R. Library
20
21
22
23
Validity, construction, and application of concurrent-sentence-doctrinestate cases, 56 A.L.R.5th

385 The jurisdiction of an appellate court is often established by various constitutional and statutory
provisions, and may not be unlimited or absolute.[FN1] Appellate jurisdiction is derived from the
constitutional or statutory provisions, and can be acquired and exercised only in the manner
prescribed.[FN2] The technical requirements in some statutes, such as the time to bring a statutory
24
appeal, are jurisdictional, and the matter of acquiring jurisdiction by an appellate court is a technical
25
matter over which it has no discretion.[FN3] However, some state rules of appellate procedure are not
26
jurisdictional.[FN4] Unless there are constitutional limitations,[FN5] a legislature has the right to
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abridge or extend the right to appeal.[FN6] In the absence of express statutory language prohibiting
28
judicial review, a legislative intent to prohibit judicial review must be established by specific
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legislative history or other reliable evidence of intent.[FN7] CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases:
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction unless the appellant has satisfied the statutory
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requirements for appellate jurisdiction. Wright v. Omaha Public School Dist., 280 Neb. 941, 791
N.W.2d 760 (2010). Acting in its appellate capacity, the superior court has limited statutory
jurisdiction, and all statutory requirements must be met before it properly invokes this jurisdiction.
Spice v. Pierce County, 149 Wash. App. 461, 204 P.3d 254 (Div. 2 2009). [END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] Ex parte Lewis, 663 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. App. Amarillo 1983). [FN2] In re Nunez, 165 Conn.
435, 334 A.2d 898 (1973); Smith v. Sampson, 114 N.H. 638, 325 A.2d 796 (1974). [FN3] In re
Covault Freeholder Petition, 218 Neb. 763, 359 N.W.2d 349, 22 Ed. Law Rep. 346 (1984). [FN4]
Vincent v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Com'n, 717 P.2d 391 (Alaska 1986). [FN5] People v.
10
Pollenz, 67 N.Y.2d 264, 502 N.Y.S.2d 417, 493 N.E.2d 541 (1986). [FN6] Geraud v. Schrader, 531
11
P.2d 872 (Wyo. 1975). [FN7] Texas Dept. of Protective and Regulatory Services v. Mega Child Care,
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Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. 2004). 2012 Thomson Reuters. 33-34B 2012 Thomson Reuters/RIA.
No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. All rights reserved. AMJUR APPELLATE 76
The decision whether to grant an interlocutory appeal from a district court order lies within the
district court's discretion. 28 U.S.C.A. 1292(b). Mills v. Everest Reinsurance Co., 771
F. Supp. 2d 270 (S.D. N.Y. 2009).
Hill's 4/26/13 Motion to Dismiss and Stay Briefing Schedule in 61383 reads:
"MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL AND STAY BRIEFING Respondent, MATTHEW
MERLISS, by and through his counsel, RICHARD G. HILL, LTD., and RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ.,
moves this court to dismiss this case and to stay the briefing schedule in the interim. The first notice
of appeal that Mr. Coughlin filed was February 15, 2012. It was untimely, is now moot, and must be
dismissed. The second notice of appeal, filed July 30, 2012, was not timely and must be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. Appellant has not filed a bond, or other security for costs, as required by NRAP
7, providing yet another reason why this case must be dismissed. Finally, Mr. Coughlin mistakenly
thinks he is appealing the district court's decision denying his appeal from an eviction order in Reno
Justice Court.
FACTS
The facts pertaining to this motion are:
This eviction case began in Reno Justice Court. NRS 4.370(g). See EXHIBIT 1, tenant's
answer, etc. Note: The "Appendix" that Coughlin has filed in this case is totally unuseable and the
subject of a motion to strike. All exhibits to authenticated by the affidavit of counsel, EXHIBIT 19
hereto.
On October 27, 2011, Reno Justice Court issued an eviction order. EXHIBIT 2.
On November 3, 2011, Coughlin filed a notice of appeal to the Second Judicial District Court.
See EXHIBIT 3.
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On December 30, 2011, Coughlin filed a motion in the district court seeking a temporary
restraining order against Merliss. See EXHIBIT 4. district court declined to issue the preliminary
injunction requested by Coughlin to restrain Merliss from removing abandoned personal property
from Coughlin's former residence. See EXHIBIT 5. Notice of entry was filed that day, and
electronically served on Coughlin on the same day, January 11, 2012. See EXHIBITS 17 and 18.
On February 15, 2012, Coughlin filed a notice of appeal in the district court. It was five days
late. See EXHIBIT 6. Coughlin purports to be appealing " ... all the various orders dismissing this
case, including but not limited to those entered January 13, 2012." The only orders entered as of that
date were: a) An order filed January 6, 2012, setting the appellate briefing schedule in the district
court; b) the order refusing to issue the temporary restraining order I preliminary injunction filed by
Coughlin, referred to in number 4, above; and c) an order issued February 8, 2012 that Coughlin show
cause why he should not be held in contempt of court, which was set for a hearing on March 23,
2012.
EXHIBIT 16 hereto is a true and correct copy of the district court's docket for the case below.
There is no indication that Coughlin posted security for costs with his notice of appeal
On March 30, 2012, the district court denied Coughlin's appeal from the eviction order issued
by Reno Justice Court. See EXHIBIT 7. Notice of entry was filed and electronically served on
Coughlin that same day. See EXHIBITS 8 and 9.
On June 25, 2012, the district court granted Merliss' motion for fees against Coughlin. See EXHIBIT
10.
On the same day, June 25, 2012, notice of entry of that order was filed and served on
Coughlin. See EXHIBIT 11. That notice was electronically served on Coughlin on June 25, 2012.
Therefore, Coughlin's notice of appeal was due no later than July 26, 2012,
On July 30, 2012, Coughlin filed a handwritten notice of appeal in the district court as to the
fees awarded to Merliss. See EXHIBIT 12. His filing was four days late.
On April 24, 2013, this court consolidated Coughlin's two pending appeals. At that time, the
clerk of the court filed, and Merliss was served with, Coughlin's opening brief. See filing 13-11983 in
this case in this court.
Document No. 2013-12021 in this case purports to be Coughlin's notice of posting bond on
appeal, but there is no record of any bond or security having been filed in the district court or this
court. See EXHIBIT 16, the district court's docket.
Coughlin's "opening brief," document number 2013-12020, is almost exclusively addressed to
seeking review of the district court's decision denying his appeal from Reno Justice Court. It is
apparent that he thinks he is appealing the ruling on the merits of the eviction.
ANALYSIS
I. The failure to mandates dismissal.
NRAP 7 requires an appellant to post $500.00 security for costs on appeal. That has not been
done in this case, despite the attempt by Coughlin to make it appear that he has done so. See filing 1312021. It has long been the law in Nevada that the failure to post the required security prevents this
court's review of the appeal and mandates dismissal. Shute v. Big Meadow Inv. Co., 41 Nev. 361,
362, 170 Pac. 1049 (1918).
II. The on the of fees the district court was not timely taken.
The notice of entry of the award of fees in the district court was electronically
served on Coughlin, who was, at that time, an e-filer with that court. Reference is made to
EXHIBIT 9, the proof of service issued by the district court. That document shows the electronic
service of the notice of entry on Coughlin was completed on June 25, 2012. EXHIBIT 10 is
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Coughlin's handwritten notice of appeal. It bears a file stamp that it was not filed in the district court
until July 30, 2012.
NEFCR 9(t) states:
Electronic service is at the time of transmission of the
notice subsection of this rule. For the purpose of
computing time to respond to documents received via electronic
service, any document served on a day or at a time when the court
is not open for business shall be deemed served at the time of the
next opening of the court for business.
(Emphasis added.)
Therefore, service of the notice of entry on Coughlin was legally completed on
June 25, 2012, at which point, the time for him to appeal the award of fees began to run. NRAP 4(a)
(1) provides that a notice of appeal must be filed" ... not later than 30 days after the date that written
notice of entry of the judgment or order appealed from is served." (Emphasis added.) Coughlin filed
his notice of appeal after notice of entry. The time limit in NRAP 4(a) is mandatory and an appeal
filed late must be dismissed. Magee v. Whitacre, 60 Nev. 202,204,96 P.2d 201, 202 (1939), abrogated
on other grounds in Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 996 P.2d 416 (2000). Thus, the notice of
appeal filed July 30, 2012, was defective and failed to vet jurisdiction in this court.
III. The appeal of the denial of an injunction was untimely, is now moot, and
must be dismissed.
a) The appeal was untimely.
On February 15, 2012 (EXHIBIT 6), Coughlin initiated an interlocutory appeal of the order
entered January 11, 2012 (EXHIBIT 5), in which the court denied Coughlin's request for a temporary
restraining order and a preliminary injunction. Coughlin's appeal of that order was not timely either.
The notice of appeal was due February 10, 2012, but was not filed until February 15, 2013, five days
late. Compare EXHIBITS 17 and 18 (notice of entry filed and served January 11, 2012) with
EXHIBIT 6 (notice of appeal filed February 15,2012).
As is Coughlin's invariable practice, after the district court declined to grant the requested injunction,
Coughlin filed a motion to alter or amend the court's order, relying on NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59.
See EXHIBIT 14. Coughlin mistakenly believes that tactic enlarges his time to appeal. Merliss
submits that the motion to alter or amend was not timely, and did not invoke the tolling provision of
NRAP 4(a)(4)(B) or (C), because NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59 do not apply to an order denying an
injunction. Therefore, Coughlin's attempt to appeal the denial of his requested injunction was also
late, and it must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
b) The appeal of the denial of injunctive relief is moot.
The appeal of the denial of an injunction is now moot because of subsequent events.
Therefore, the appeal in this court should be dismissed. Independence Party of Richmond County v.
Graham, 413 F.3d 252, 256 (2nd Cir. 2005).
Mootness is a question of justiciability. This court does not render advisory opinions. There
must be an actual live controversy throughout the case, including on any appeal. Subsequent events
may render a case moot. Personhood Nevada v. Bristol, 126 Nev. (Adv.Opin. 56) 245 P.3d 572,574
(2010).
Coughlin had been evicted from a home he rented from Merliss. EXHIBIT 2. Several weeks
later, Coughlin was found living in the basement of the property and was arrested. See EXHIBIT 15,
a motion filed in the district court, which sets forth a chronology of events. Coughlin appealed the
decision of the justice court to the district court. EXHIBIT 3. Coughlin wanted the district court to
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prevent Merliss from removing his (Coughlin's) possessions from the home in accordance with NRS
118A.460. EXHIBIT 4. The district court denied Coughlin's motion. EXHIBIT 5. Merliss then
disposed of the "trove" that Coughlin had left in the home.l fn 1 This writer personally counted 13
automobile seats in the basement of the home.) See, declaration of Richard G.Hill, Esq. Later, on
March 30, 2012, the district court denied Coughlin's appeal on the merits. EXHIBIT 7.
As of today, Coughlin's appeal in this court, of the district court's refusal to enjoin Merliss'
disposition of the property left in the home, is moot. First, Coughlin lost on the merits of his appeal in
the district court. EXHIBIT 7. That appeal is now final and binding. Therefore, Coughlin could never
make the showing that he has a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims as is required for the
issuance of any injunctive relief. Clark County School District v. Buchanan, 112 Nev. 1146, 1150,
924 Nev. 716 719 (1996), citing Christensen v. Chromalloy Amer. Corp., 99 Nev. 34, 36, 656 P.2d
844,846 (1983).
Second, because he was not restrained by the district court, Merliss properly proceeded to
dispose of the items of personal property left at the home by Coughlin. Accord, NRS 118A.460. Thus,
even if this court were to determine that Coughlin could show the elements necessary for the issuance
of injunctive relief, and even if this court somehow concluded that the district court abused its
discretion in the matter, this court's order would, nonetheless, be an exercise in futility. If this court
were to reverse the district court's decision, it would not provide Coughlin with any relief. The
property Coughlin abandoned on Merliss' property is gone and cannot be restored by an order of this
court. This court would be issuing nothing more than an advisory opinion. Cj, Personhood.
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IV. To the extent Coughlin trying appeal decision, is to the district court's this court has
no jurisdiction.
RELIEF REQUESTED
Under the circumstances, the court should immediately stay the briefing schedule. The court
should dismiss this entire consolidated appeal. Coughlin has not posted the mandatory bond for costs
on this appeal. The first notice of appeal was not timely, and the question presented is now moot. The
second notice of appeal was not timely and must also be dismissed. Contrary to the focus and
contrary of Coughlin's opening brief, this court does not have appellate jurisdiction to review the
district court's decision on the merits of Coughlin's appeal to that court from Reno Justice Court.
The briefing schedule in this case must be suspended until this motion and the motion to strike
Coughlin's appendix have been decided. Otherwise, Merliss will incur needless fees and costs.
WHEREFORE, respondent prays that this court stay the briefing schedule; dismiss this entire
case; that appellant, Zachary Coughlin, be sanctioned; that respondent be awarded attorney's fees and
costs pursuant to NRAP 38; and for such other, further and additional relief as seems just to the Court
in the premises.
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DATED this of 26th of April, 2013. /s/ Richard G. Hill, Esq."

EXHIBIT INDEX
EXHIBIT NO. DESCRIPTION
1 Tenant's Answer/Affidavit to 30 Day No Cause Eviction; Motion for Sanctions and Attorney's fees;
Counterclaim for Damages
2 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Summary Eviction
3 Notice of Appeal to District Court
4 Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order or Injunction Preventing Merhss from
"Disposing" of Tenants Property; or, in the Alternative, Motion for Stay
5 Order (1-11-12)
6 Notice of Appeal (2-15-12)
7 Order (3-30-12)
8 Notice of Entry of Order (3-30-12)
9 Proof of Service
10 Order (6-25-12)
12 Proof of Service
13 Notice of Appeal (7-30-12)
14 Motion under NRCP 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact; or, pled in the alternative,
Motion under NRCP 59 to alter or amend the Order Denying Motion to Prevent Disposal of Personal
Property
15 Second Motion for Order to Show Cause
16 District Court docket
18 Proof of Service
19 Declaration of Richard G. Hill, Esq. 2
Hill's 5/20/13 Reply in 61383 reads:
" REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AND MOTION TO STAY BRIEFING
SCHEDULE
Respondent, MATTHEW MERLISS, by and through his counsel, RICHARD G. HILL, LTD.,
and RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ., replies to the opposition [sic] by appellant, ZACHARY BARKER
21
COUGHLIN, to appellant's motion to dismiss and to stay briefing schedule.
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1. After Mr. Coughlin was granted a telephonic extension by the Clerk of the Court within which to
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file his response, it was, nonetheless, filed a day late. The opposition does not conform to of the
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format requirements of NRAP 27(d). It is single spaced and is 15 pages long. This means it is almost
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twice as long as allowed by the rules.
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The opposition is mostly unintelligible. The exhibits are totally unuseable, and how they relate
to, or support, the opposition is a mystery. The entire filing typifies Coughlin's inability to focus on
discrete legal issues or follow the rules of the Court. It is an unfair tactic for Coughlin to try to force
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his opponent (and court staff) to wade through 2 mountains of jumbled gibberish trying to glean any
meaningful contentions. The Court should not waste its time with Coughlin's perpetually incoherent
filings.
10
1.On April 24, 2013, respondent, Merliss, moved to strike the appendix filed by Coughlin (Doc. #1312021). Coughlin's "appendix" does not comply with any of the Court's content or formatting
requirements in NRAP 30(c) or (d), and it was not served as required by NRAP 30(e). Coughlin has
completely ignored that motion. The Court should accept that failure as an admission that the motion
to strike should be granted.
2.Appellant proved that Coughlin never posted the required $500.00 appeal cost bond as to either of
his notices of appeal. In his opposition, Coughlin claims to have paid the bond, but cites to no
evidence (ie. a receipt). By contrast, appellant's motion to dismiss included the district court docket,
which shows no such deposit by Coughlin as to either of his notices of appeal. See, Exhibit 16 to the
motion to dismiss. Coughlin's consolidated appeal must, therefore, be dismissed. Shute v. Big
Meadow Inc. Co., 41 Nev. 361,362,170 Pac. 1049, 1050 (1918).
4. Notice of Appeal -Denial of Injunctive Relief.
11
Coughlin's first notice of appeal was not filed" ... no later than 30 days after the date that written
12
notice of entry ... [was] served." Cf .. , NRAP 4(a)(1). Coughlin's reference to a tolling motion is
13
unpersuasive, because neither NRCP 52 nor NRCP 59 apply to the court's decision to deny Coughlin
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injunctive relief. While that decision was an appealable order, the denial of injunctive relief is not a
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judgment after trial to which either of those rules apply.

Coughlin's appeal of the denial of the injunctive relief is now unquestionably moot. This is so because
no order that this Court could possibly issue will provide Coughlin with any meaningful relief.
Personhood Nevada v. Bristol, 126 Nev. __ (Adv. Opin. 56), 245 P .3d 572,574 (2010). While
18
Coughlin's opposition recognizes that there are exceptions to the mootness doctrine, he offered
19
neither facts nor law to support any possible exception. shall
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5. Notice of Appeal-Attorney's Fees.
21
Appellant proved that Couhglin's second notice of appeal was due no later than July 26, 2012,
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30 days after Coughlin was electronically served with notice of entry of the district court's award of
attorney's fees against him. By silence, Coughlin concedes that his July 30, 2012 notice of appeal,
Exhibit 13 to Motion to Dismiss, was untimely.
Coughlin's response is that he filed a notice of appeal on July 24, 2012. A copy of that paper is
attached as EXHIBIT 1 to this reply. The district court docket has that filing lodged as a motion. See,
Exhibit 16 to motion to dismiss at page 3 of 14. That docket also shows no filing fees or security for
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costs filed with either the July 24, 2012 or July 30, 2012 notice of appeal. rd. Coughlin's request to
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proceed in forma pauperis was denied. See filing number 13-1198 in this Court.
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Coughlin relies on the July 24, 2012 paper as both a "tolling motion" and as a notice of appeal.
He cannot have it both ways. He cannot simultaneously divest the district court of jurisdiction by
appealing, yet also ask that court to grant him relief. If Coughlin, a suspended attorney, really
believed that he had filed a notice of appeal on July 24, 2012, then he must explain why he re-filed
his notice of appeal on July 30, 2012. That filing belies his assertions in opposition to the motion to
dismiss. This is typical of the procedural nonsense which has been the hallmark of Coughlin's
behavior in this case. The Court need not reach the conundrum Coughlin created, because as with his
February 25, 2012 notice of appeal, there is no proof that his July 24, 2012 filing (Exhibit 1) was ever
served on Merliss' counsel. That document was paper-filed and does not include a certificate of
service. Cf., NRCP 5 and NRAP 3(d)(1). Thus, Coughlin's July 24, 2012 filing is not a valid motion
10
invoking either NRCP 52 or NRCP 59, because of his violation of NRCP 5 (every pleading or paper
11
filed in a case" ... be served upon each of the parties." Emphasis added.). He also violated DCR 13(1)
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and (2). The effect of his failure to make service means the tolling effect of Rules 52 and 59 was
never invoked. Rivera v. MIT Fossarina, 840 F.2d 152, 154 (1st Cir. 1988) (dealing with FRCP 5(a),
FRCP 52, and FRCP 59 [the timeliness of a motion to alter or amend a judgment is determined by the
date of service, not the date of filing].) As with his February 25, 2012 notice of appeal as to the denial
15
of injunctive relief, discussed above, his additional failure to timely serve the notice of appeal as to
16
the award of attorney's fees is a fatal flaw. NRAP 3(d). The July 24, 2012 notice of appeal was not
17
served, and the July 30, 2012 notice was not timely. That appeal must also be dismissed. In Re:
18
Powell's Estate, 63 Nev. 19, 21, 158 P.2d 545 (1945).
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CONCLUSIONS SOUGHT AND RELIEF

1. The present briefing schedule must be stayed, or, at a bare minimum, reinstituted once the Court
resolves the motion to dismiss.
2. The unopposed motion to strike Coughlin's appendix (Doc. #13-12021) should be granted.
3. Coughlin has failed to post the required bond for costs as to either appeal. Dismissal is required.
4. The appeal regarding the denial of injunctive relief is moot and was not timely filed or served.
24
Dismissal is required.
25
5. Coughlin admits that the notice of appeal regarding the award of attorney's fees by the district court
26
was not timely. His attempt to rely on a prior filing is unsound because that paper is internally
27
inconsistent and was not properly served.
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6.Coughlin, a patently vexatious litigator, should be ordered to pay Merliss a multiple of Merliss' fees
incurred on this frivolous appeal.
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WHEREFORE, respondent prays that this Court strike Coughlin's purported appendix (Doc.
#13-12021), and dismiss this consolidated appeal; and for such other, further and additional relief as
seems just to the Court in the premises.
DATED this of May, 2013 /s/ Richard G. Hill, Esq."
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FGA, Inc. v. Giglio, 278 P.3d 490

=30APPEAL AND ERROR
=30XIIIDismissal, Withdrawal, or Abandonment
=30k779Grounds for Dismissal
=30k78 I Want of Actual Controversy
=30k 781( l)k. In general.
Nev.,2012
Page I
The Supreme Court has a duty to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into
effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to
declare principles of law which cannot affect the matter in issue before it.
Personhood Nevada v. Bristol, 245 P.3d 572
Nev.,20l0
Even when an appeal is moot, Supreme Court may consider it if it involves a matter of widespread
importance that is capable of repetition, yet evading review.
Stephens Media, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State ex reI. County of Clark, 221 P.3d
1240 Nev.,2009
Supreme Court will exercise its discretion to adjudicate a moot case when: (I) the contested
issue is likely to arise again, and (2) the challenged action is too short in its duration to be
fully litigated prior to its natural expiration.
Stephens Media, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State ex reI. County of Clark, 221 P.3d
1240 Nev.,2009
Issue of whether juror questionnaires were subject to public disclosure fell within exception to
mootness doctrine for issues that were capable of repetition, yet would evade review because
of the nature of its timing; it was exceedingly likely that media would seek access to juror
questionnaires and voir dire proceedings in future high-profile criminal trials, and closure of
voir dire proceedings and the conclusion of the underlying criminal trial were both likely to
expire before the constitutional implications of the closure were properly considered.
University and Community College System of Nevada v. Nevadans for Sound Government,
100 P.3d 179Nev.,2004
30K781(1) Page 2
Even if appeal, by state university and county regional transit commission, from district
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court's preliminary injunction enjoining them from unlawfully restricting access to their property by
cIrculators of referendum and initiative petitions for general election ballot was moot because time
period for gathering signatures had ended, the matter was capable of repetition yet evadmg revle,:", as
exceptIOn to mootness doctrine; circulators had relatively short time in whIch to gather sIgnatures
because Legislature convened biennially, and determining reasonablenessof lIme, place, and manner
restrictions on signature gathering required intensive factual inquiry by district court into particular
facts of each case.
University and Community College System of Nevada v. Nevadans for Sound Govemment
100 P.3d 179 Nev.,2004
Even when an appeal is moot, the appellate court may consider it when the matter is capable
of repetition, yet evading review.
Traffic Control Services, Inc. v. United Rentals Northwest, Inc., 87 P.3d 1054
Nev.,2004
Appeal of trial court's decision enforcing injunction, so as to enforce former employee's covenant not
to compete after his employer had assigned employee's one-year covenant not to
co.mpele to another entity, was not moot, and would be reviewed by Supreme Court, though
mJuntlOn hd expired, given relatively short term of noncom petition covenant, and likelihood that
SImIlar Issue would arise in future, rendering issues capable of repetition, yet evading review.
McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 Nev.,1990
Importance of resolving issues concerning right to die asserted by quadriplegic who was dependent
on respirator justified review of case despite quadriplegic's death.
Young Inv. Co. v. Reno Club, 208 P.2d 297 Nev.,1949
Although a judgment if affirmed may not be enforced by reason of change of circumstances
pendmg appeal, ItS subject matter is not moot if judgment, if left unreversed, precludes party agamst
whom It stands as to a fact vital to his rights.
C
Morrow v. Morrow, 156 P.2d 827 Nev.,1945
The duty of Supreme Court is to decide actual controversies by judgments which can be carried to
effect, not to give opinions on moot questions or abstract propositions, nor to declare
principles or rules of law which cannot affect matters in issue in cases before it.
In CV11-03628 Judge Flanagan's 5/29/13 Order reads:

"ORDER On May 22, 2013, Plaintiff, ZACHARY COUGHLIN ("Coughlin"), filed an
Amended Emergency Notice of Appeal and Emergency Notice and Motion an Request
for Submission.
COUGHLIN has filed an Amended Emergency Notice of Appeal apparently to
incorporate "all the orders" of this Court "to whatever extent" they have not been
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previously included in his prior appeal No. 61388. This is improper. "[A]n appeal
permitted by law from a district court to the Supreme Court may be taken only by filing
a notice of appeal with the district court clerk within the time allowed by Rule 4."
NRAP 3(a)(emphasis added). An appeal may be only taken from certain orders of a
district court in a civil case. NRAP3A(b).
COUGHLIN cannot avoid the requirement to specifically identify the discrete
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orders appealed from this district court in his Notice of Appeal by indiscriminately
appealing from "all the orders." COUGHLIN may only appeal certain determinations
and those appeals must be timely filed. COUGHLIN'S Amended Emergency Notice of
Appeal is ineffective and unauthorized by the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The Clerk is directed to STRIKE this pleading from the court's record.
DATED this Act day 29 of May, 2013. /s/ Patrick Flanagan District Court
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Judge"
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A three Justice panel of the Nevada Supreme Court, in a 5/28/13 Order in 61383
ruled: "Order Dismissing Appeal:
This is an appeal from district court orders denying an emergency motion for a
19
temporary restraining order or injunction and awarding attorney fees in a landlord-tenant
20
matter. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Patrick Flanagan, Judge.
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Appellant moved the district court for a temporary restraining order or injunction
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in an appeal from a justice court order in a landlord tenant dispute. Following the denial
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of that motion, appellant appealed to this court. Subsequently, the district court entered
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an order awarding attorney fees to respondent and appellant also appealed from that
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order. The district court has final appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising in justice
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courts. Nev. Const. art. 6, 6; see also Waugh v. Casazza, 85 Nev. 520, 521, 458 P.2d
27
359, 360 (1969). Although NRAP 3A(b)(3) authorizes an appeal from an order refusing
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to grant an injunction, and NRAP 3A(b)(8) authorizes an appeal from a post-judgment

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order awarding attorney fees, see Winston Prods. Co., Inc. v. DeBoer, 122 Nev. 517,
525, 134 P.3d 726, 731 (2006) (recognizing that an order awarding attorney fees and
costs is substantively appealable as a special order after final judgment), because the
orders challenged in this case arose from the district court's exercise of appellate
jurisdiction over an appeal from a justice court decision, the district court's orders were
ostensibly rendered final and are not appealable to this court. For the same reasons, to
the extent that appellant seeks to appeal from any other order or determination arising
from the district court's appellate review of the justice court matter, this court likewise
lacks jurisdiction to consider any such appeals. Accordingly, as we lack jurisdiction over
this appeal, we ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.fn1 (fn1: Respondent's April 26, 2013,
motion seeking to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction on other grounds and his
April 26, 2013, motion to strike are denied as moot. To the extent that respondent seeks
attorney fees based on the motion to dismiss this appeal, that request is denied. We
further deny as moot any other requests for relief pending in this matter.) /s/ Justices
Gibbons, Douglas, and Saitta.
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52B C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant 1576: XII. Reentry and Recovery of Possession by Landlord C.
Statutory Dispossession Proceedings; Summary Proceedings 7. Appellate Review 1576. Standard
of review West's Key Number Digest, Landlord and Tenant 233k291(18), 315(1), 315(3). Under
some statutes, however, dispossession proceedings are triable de novo on appea1. Ala.-Hyde v.
Isbell, 254 Ala. 373,48 So. 2d 465 (1950). Mo.-Conley v. Dee, 246 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952).
Where there is a trial de novo, the appellate court should consider the facts of the case . Ariz.-Olds
Bros. Lumber Co. v. Rushing, 64 Ariz. 199,167 P.2d 394 (1946).] and render a proper judgment.
Ariz.-Olds Bros. Lumber Co. v. Rushing, 64 Ariz. 199, 167 P.2d 394 (1946). Mo.-Conley v. Dee,
246 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. C!. App. 1952). Whether the unlawful detainer notice requirement is calculated
in accordance with the timing provisions of the civil rules is a matter of statutory interpretation to be
reviewed de novo. Wash.-Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wash. 2d 365, 173 P.3d 228 (2007). An
order granting a summary eviction under a lease providing for periodic rent reserved by the month, or
any shorter period, should be reviewed on appeal based upon the standard of review for an order
granting summary judgment, which is de novo review, because such proceedings are analogous.
Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212, 163 P.3d 405 (2007).
[FNl ] N.Y.-Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 43 Misc. 2d 639, 251 N.Y.S.2d 693 (App.
Term 1964). [FN2] CaL-Whipple v. Haberle, 223 Cal. App. 2d 477, 36 Cal. Rptr. 9 (5th Dis!. 1963).
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Reviewing decision regarding issuance of a protective order D.C.-Graham v. Lanier Associates, 19

A.3d 361 (D.C. 2011). Plenary review of sufficiency of notice to quit Conn.-Bayer v. Showmotion,
Inc., 292 Conn. 381,973 A.2d 1229 (2009). [FN3] Ala.-Hyde v. Isbell, 254 Ala. 373,48 So. 2d 465
(1950). IlL-Woodson v. Benson, 330 IiI. App. 248, 70 N.E.2d 742 (1st Dis!. 1947). [FN4]IlI.Mitchell v. Tyler, 332 III. App. 577, 76 N.E.2d 237 (1st Dis!. 1947). Mass.-Staples v. Collins, 321
Mass. 449, 73 N.E.2d 729 (1947). [FN5] [FN6) [FN7] . [FN8] . [FN9] Nev.-
A review of Judge Flanagan's 3/30/12 Order and Bakers 2/24/12 Answering Brief reveal the
extent to which Judge Flanagan, willing or not, was led down a clearly erroneous path by Baker and
his purposefully misstatements of the law, especially as to the Standard of Review applicable to an
appeal of a summary eviction. Flanagan writes:
Standard of Review
On civil appeals from justice courts to district courts, a case "must not be tried anew.'
NJCRCP 72(c). Whether on appeal at the Nevada Supreme Court from a district court, or appeal at a
district court from a justice court, a lower court's findings "will not be disturbed on appeal unless they
are clearly erroneous and are not based on substantial evidence." Gibellini v Klindt, 110 Nev. 1201,
1204,885 P.2d 540, 542 (1994).
"[A]n order granting summary eviction under NRS 40.253(6) should be reviewed on appeal
based upon the standard for review of an order granting summary judgment under NRC 56 because
these proceedings are analogous." Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212 215, 163 P.3d
405, 407 (2007). Summary judgment is proper only if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. NEV. R. CIV P. 56(c); see Wood v.
Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). The moving party bears the initial
burden of proving there is no genuine issue of material fact. Main v. Stewart, 109 Nev. 721, 726-27,
857 P.2d 755, 758 (1993).
Once the moving party satisfies this burden, however, the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 727. While the pleading and the
record must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the party must do more
than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the operative facts Wood, 121 Nev. at 729.
To avoid having summary judgment entered against it, the party must (page 5) by affidavit or
otherwise, set forth specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Id.
Legal Analysis
This Court has reviewed all of the parties' pleadings and the exhibits attached thereto This
Court also has considered all of the parties' relevant arguments. After this review and consideration,
this Court will not disturb Judge Sferrazza's October 27, 2011 Order granting summary eviction. This
Court finds that Order was based on substantial evidence and it was no clearly erroneous. Thus, this
Court concludes Merliss has met his initial burden of proving there is no genuine issue of material
fact regarding whether Coughlin was summarily evicted properly. Consequently, the burden shifts to
Coughlin to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Although Coughlin raises several claims and makes numerous allegations in his Brief
Coughlin fails to present additional facts related to his defenses raised in RJC that undermine or
legitimately call into question the substantial evidence upon which Judge Sferrazza relied when
he granted summary eviction. This Court gives substantial deference to the lower court's factual
findings in this regard, particularly in light of the numerous hearings held before Judge Sferrazza
and Coughlin's related opportunities to present evidence supporting his various defenses. Therefore,
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this Court finds no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Coughlin was
summarily evicted properly in the lower court. As a result, Coughlin's appeal is DENIED.
It is entirely unclear why Judge Flanagan's Order indicates:

Standard of Review On civil appeals from justice courts to district courts, a case "must not be
tried anew.' NJCRCP 72(c)... when a review of JNCRCP 72(c) reveals no such authority. Rather
NJCRCP 72(c) reads: (c)Content of the Notice of Appeal.The notice of appeal shall specify the
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from;
and shall name the court to which the appeal is taken.
Perhaps Judge Flanagan intended to cite to NJCRCP RULE76A.POWERS
OF DISTRICT COURT ON APPEAL. A case appealed must not be tried anew. Upon
an appeal heard upon the record or a statement of the case, the district court may
review all orders affecting the judgment appealed from and may set aside, or confirm,
or modify, any or all of the proceedings subsequent to and dependent upon such
judgment, and may, if necessary or proper, order a new trial. However, it was not a
judgment that Coughlin appeal (particulary where Judge Sferrazza ruled that the
10/25/11 date was not a Trial but, rather, a continuation of a summary eviction
proceeding (he made numerous contradictory rulings in that regard, but the the
10/25/11 Eviction Decision and Order has one title, and the 10/27/11 FOFCOL and
Order of Summary Eviction certainly indicates NJCRCP 109 did not actually come
into play. Regardless, Baker, Coughlin, and Judge Flanagan all cite to Anvui in the
Order and their Briefs...and Anvui makes extremely clear that appeals of summary
eviction are reviewed de novo, which means tried anew, so Judge Flanagan's
invocation of some rule holding that civil appeals from justice courts to district courts,
a case "must not be tried anew is clearly erroneous.
In his 2/24/12 Answering Brief, Baker writes: RESPONDENT'S ANSWERING BRIEF
Respondent, MATT MERLISS ("MERLISS"), by and through his counsel, RICHARD G.
HILL, LTD. and CASEY D. BAKER, ESQ., submits his Answering Brief.
I. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES: The only issue in this appeal is whether the Reno
Justice Court erred in granting a summary eviction of appellant, ZACHARY COUGHLIN
("COUGHLIN") by its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Summary Eviction
("FFCL&O") dated December 27, 2012. See Record on Appeal ("ROA") at Vol. II, pp. 75-80.
EXHIBIT 1 hereto.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: Although Coughlin has muddied the record to a
spectacular degree with his abusive filings, at its core, this is a simple no-cause residential summary
eviction case. The pertinent facts are as follows:
The underlying facts of the eviction are set forth in the FFCL&O. The statutory notices and
other documentary evidence the court relied on in making its findings of fact can be found at ROA,
Vol. V, pp. 85-89; 90-94; 95-109; 113-128. EXHIBITS 2, 3, 4 and 5 hereto. The Standard Rental
Agreement ("LEASE") for the home at 121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada (the "PROPERTY") can be
found at ROA, Vol. V, pp 129-132. EXHIBIT 6 hereto. Those facts were established during two
evidentiary hearings, in which Coughlin fully participated. The first hearing was on October 13, 2011,
and lasted 90 minutes. A continuation of that hearing occurred on October 25, 2011, and lasted
several hours. l See FFCL&O at 1. The purpose of those hearings was to "determine the
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truthfulness and sufficiency of the tenant's and the landlord's affidavits," to determine whether
there is any "legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer," and whether "the tenant is guilty
of an unlawful detainer".2 NRS 40.253(6). FFCL&O at 4, Para. 3. Those hearings were Coughlin's
opportunity to substantiate, by competent evidence, any legal defense he may have had to the
eviction.
The only defenses raised by Coughlin below were based on what he claimed was "retaliatory"
conduct by Merliss, and "habitability" issues at the property. Both defenses were based on provisions
of NRS Chapter 118A.3 See FFCL&O at 3, Para. 9 et seq. See, also, ROA, Vol. I, pp. 238-266; ROA,
Vol. V, pp. 194-198. At the first hearing, Coughlin alleged his defenses, but did not offer any
evidence to support them. Judge Sferrazza could have granted an eviction after that hearing, but chose
instead to allow Coughlin another opportunity to substantiate his allegations.4 NRS 40.253(6).
Since Coughlin's defenses were based on alleged "habitability" issues, the court required him to
deposit, pursuant to NRS 40.355(5), the amount of rent Coughlin claimed he had withheld for
those reasons, before he would be allowed to substantiate them with evidence.5 ROA, Vol.l, p.
153. Coughlin ultimately failed to raise any material factual dispute, and the court properly granted
the eviction. The lockout was performed on November 1, 2011. Coughlin filed his first notice of
appeal on November 3, 2011.6 ROA Vol. III, pp. 229-233. On November 13,2011, Coughlin was
found living in the basement of the property, and was arrested.7 ROA, Vol. III, pp. 18-33. Coughlin
continues to file additional papers in both courts, wherein he attempts to raise new arguments he
never raised below.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW: "[A]n order granting summary eviction under NRS
40.253(6) should be reviewed on appeal based upon the standard for review of an order granting
summary judgment under NRCP 56 because these proceedings are analogous.,,8 Anvui, LLC v.
G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212, 215,163 P.3d 405 (2007). "To successfully defend against a
summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party must transcend the pleadings and, by
affidavit or other admissible evidence, introduce specific facts that show a genuine issue of
material fact. 9 Torrealba v. Kesmitis, 124 Nev. 95, 178 P.3d 716 (2008).
'"A case appealed must not be tried a new."10 NJCRCP 76A. Further, "a [lower court's]
findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous and are not based on
substantial evidence."11 Gibellini v. Klindt, 110 Nev. 1201, 1204, 885 P.2d 540 (1994) (emphasis
added). "The notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the
judgment, order or part thereof appealed from ...,,12 NJCRCP 72(c). "Only those parts of the
judgment which are included in the notice of appeal will be considered by the appellate Court.,,13
Reno Newspapers, Inc. v. Bibb, 76 Nev. 332, 335, 353 P.2d 458 (1960).
IV. ARGUMENT: Despite having filed more than 50 pages in two briefs, Coughlin fails to
articulate or coherently analyze what he claims to be errors by the justice court. 14 Please see Merliss'
counter-motion to strike excess pages, filed herein on February 9, 2012. If the court is going to
consider anything beyond the first five pages filed by Coughlin, Merliss specifically requests leave to
file a supplemental brief to meet those arguments. He does not make so much as a single citation to
the ROA, and his failure in this regard is sanctionable.15 See NRAP 28(a)(8) and (e). See also,
Weddell v. Stewart, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. 58,261 P.3d 1080, 1084 (Sept. 29,2011) (" ...it is imperative
that the parties follow the applicable procedural rules and that they comply in a timely fashion with
[the court's] directives."); and Smith v. Emery, 109 Nev. 737, 743, 856 P.2d 1386 (1993). The Court
and Merliss are unfairly left to speculate as to the bases for his appeal. 16 Cf., Schuck v. Signature
Flight Support ofNevada, Inc., 126 Nev. _ (Adv.Op. 42),245 P.3d 542,544-545 (Nov. 4, 2010) (the
court is "not obligated to wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts which
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might support the nonmoving party's claim.") Cf., NJCRCP 74(b). The incoherency of Coughlin's
briefs makes that task nearly impossible. This difficulty is compounded by Coughlin's refusal to pay
for a transcript of the proceedings below. 17Cf., NJCRCP 74(b). On or about February 8, 2012,
Coughlin attempted to supplement his opening brief with a CD that supposedly contained the audio
recordings of the hearings below. Not only was this an improper attempt by Coughlin to circumvent
the record on appeal, the CD delivered to the undersigned's office was so badly damaged, that it
would not be opened, even by counsel's IT professional. Because of Coughlin's transgressions,
Merliss has been deprived of the ability to accurately cite to the hearing below. As best Merliss can
tell, Coughlin alleges the following errors:
1. Judge Sferrazza mistakenly called the October 25, 2012 hearing a "trial" and
required Coughlin to deposit the withheld rent with the court
Summary eviction hearings are conducted pursuant to NRS 40.253(6). "Formal" eviction
proceedings are conducted pursuant to NRS 40.290 through NRS 40.420. "Formal" eviction
proceedings contemplate the filing of a complaint, an answer, conducting discovery, and a formal
"trial.,,18 Id. They can include claims for damages by both sides. "Formal" evictions can either be
initiated by the landlord in the first instance, or, where a summary eviction has been commenced, and
the tenant establishes a legal defense at the hearing, the court must then order the parties to proceed
under those statutes.19 See NRS 40.253(6).
When Judge Sferrazza continued the October 13, 2011 hearing, he misspoke and called the
second hearing a "trial." That same word, "trial," was entered into the court's order.20 ROA, Vol. I, p.
153. Coughlin has seized upon the word "trial" to argue that he should have been afforded some
further procedural protections of the "formal" eviction proceedings (mainly, delay). This argument is
nonsense.21 See, NJCRCP 104 ("Prior to the holding of a hearing for summary eviction, the justice
shall determine the method of service of notice of the hearing on both parties."). The only way the
court could have ordered the parties to proceed with a "formal" eviction is if it found that Coughlin
had raised a legal defense to the summary eviction.22 NRS 40.253(6). Here, it found the opposite.
In ruling from the bench, the court explained more than once that the purpose of the October
25, 2011 proceeding was to allow Coughlin another opportunity to substantiate the defenses he had
alleged at the first hearing, because he had not yet done so.23 Coughlin's unexplained and unexcused
refusal to pay for a transcript makes it impossible to cite Judge Sferrazza's statements with precision.
The court's order reflects this, in that it required Coughlin to deposit the withheld rent if he
(Coughlin) wished to have another opportunity to prove up his habitability defenses. If he failed to
post the rent, the eviction would be granted, because he had not established a legal defense as
required by NRS 40.253(6). The court's inadvertent use of the word "trial" did not somehow take the
case out of the summary proceedings, nor could it have, and any argument that it did exalts form over
substance and ignores the clear purpose of the order. 24 Accord, Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424,
427, 996 P.2d 416 (2000) (the important inquiry is on "what the order or judgment actually does, not
on what it is called.")(emphasis in original). Coughlin knew the October 25, 2011 hearing was merely
a continuation of the first hearing. He knew that there had not been any formal complaint filed. There
is not one in the record. He recognized, and argued repeatedly, that all he had to do to defeat the
summary eviction was establish a material factual dispute for trial. In fact, he argues as much in the
"statement of facts and law" he purports to incorporate in his first notice of appeal.25 ROA, Vol. III,
pp. 230-233. Coughlin did not explain how he could have possibly been prejudiced by the court's
misstatement, so it is of no consequence.
As to the rent deposit, NRS 118A.355 specifically provides that "[a] tenant does not have a
defense to an eviction under paragraph (d) of subsection 1 unless the tenant has deposited the
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withheld rent into an escrow account pursuant to this subsection." Coughlin was attempting to set up a
defense based on "habitability".26 NRS 118A.355(l)(d). ROA, Vol. I, pp. 238-266. He had withheld
rent in the process, while purporting to invoke that statute.27 Id. Even though the eviction proceeding
was for "no-cause," and not expressly based on Coughlin's failure to pay rent, the court was correct to
require him to deposit what he claimed he had withheld, in order to proceed with his defense. The
statute is plain on its face, and makes logical sense, as well. If Coughlin did not have the rent, and
failed to prove his case, the court has, in effect, improperly enjoined the landlord's use of his property.
In any event, the October 13, 2011 order was not an appealable order under NJCRCP 72A. For that
reason, it is not properly at issue here. It is also moot, since the court eventually returned Coughlin's
deposit to him, as discussed further, below.
2. Not finding any ambiguity in the lease regarding "weeds"
One "habitability" item alleged by Coughlin was that weeds were growing in the yard. The
court found that maintenance of the surrounding grounds, including any weeds, were Coughlin's
responsibility under paragraph 22 of the Lease. 28 See FFLC&O at Para.11-11.1. That paragraph
provides in part that "Tenant will irrigate and maintain any surrounding grounds, including lawns and
shrubbery, if they are for the Tenant's exclusive use." 29 EXHIBIT 6 at 2, Para 22. It is undisputed
that the yard at the property was for Coughlin's exclusive use. The Lease is unambiguous, and the
court's finding was correct. Moreover, "weeds" do not constitute a "habitability" issue under NRS
118A.290, in any event, and Coughlin never presented any evidence that they did, or that he complied
with the statutory protocol for withholding, or had any right to withhold, any rent for that, or any
other alleged "habitability" issue.30 FFCL&O at Para.12-12.l.
3. Granting a no-cause summary eviction against a "commercial" tenant
Coughlin now argues that he was a "commercial" tenant, and therefore not subject to summary
eviction. He first raised this argument in his "opposition to motion for order to show cause," which he
filed on December 5, 2011, six weeks after the eviction was granted.31 ROA, Vol. IV, pp. 253-261.
Merliss addressed it in his reply filed the following day. 32 See, "Supplemental Justice Court Appeal
Proceedings," at 2, filed herein on January 4, 2012. Merliss' reply is identified as item number 4. For
reasons unknown, copies of those documents were not made available to Merliss through the court's
electronic filing system. First, Coughlin has the law wrong. Summary evictions are available against a
tenant of any property that is subject to NRS Chapter 118A, which Merliss' property unquestionably
was. 33 NRS 40.254. Second, Coughlin affirmatively waived any argument that NRS Chapter l18A
does not apply by basing his entire defense (retaliation/habitability) on what he alleged were
violations of that chapter. 34 See FFCL&O beginning at ,9. See, also, ROA, Vol. I, pp. 238-266.
Moreover, because the court adopted Coughlin's position and ruled on that basis, he is judicially
estopped from changing his theory now. 35 Marcuse v. Del Webb Communities, 123Nev. 278, 163
P.3d 462 (2007). Additionally, since Coughlin never timely raised the argument below, it cannot form
the basis for any relief on appeal.36 Schuck. The lower court recognized as much at the December
20,2011 hearing on Coughlin's motion to contest personal property lien. For that hearing, Merliss had
subpoenaed Darlene Sharpe, the real estate agent who had facilitated the rental of the property to
Coughlin, to testify in the event the court was going to allow Coughlin to belatedly argue this issue.
ROA, Vol. VI, p.183. At that hearing, Judge Sferrazza appropriately recognized that Coughlin was
improperly attempting to relitigate the eviction based on previously unraised arguments, and did not
let the parties address or present any evidence on the matter. Ms. Sharpe was prepared to testify that
(1) Coughlin never mentioned that he was an attorney, or that he had either a "law practice" or a
"mattress business," (2) that Coughlin had represented himself on his rental application as a "selfemployed researcher," and (3) that Coughlin had surreptitiously altered the lease to allow for
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"commercial" use of the property. See, Reply in Support of Motion for Order to Show Cause,
identified as item number 4 in the Supplemental Justice Court Appeal Proceedings, filed herein on
January 4, 2012. In any event, Coughlin has not cited to anywhere in the ROA that would support this
new argument, and neither this Court nor the court below are or were obligated to sift through the
record in search of some fact which might support his claim.37 Schuck. Finally, even if Coughlin
were running one or more unlicensed businesses out oft he property, he does not explain how that
would take this matter out of NRS Chapter l18A.
4. Not holding a hearing on Coughlin's motion to contest personal property lien within
10 days
The FFCL&O was entered on October 27, 2011. Coughlin's first notice of appeal was filed on
November 3,2011. Coughlin filed his first motion to contest persona] property lien on November
16,2011.38 ROA, Vol. III, pp. 153-160. NRS 40.253(8) provides that a hearing on that motion must
be set within 10 days after the motion is filed. However, Coughlin refused to cooperate with court
staff to set the hearing he requested, so it did not take place within 10 days.39 ROA, Vol. IV, pp.2,
22-23. Then, on November 23, 2011, Coughlin inexplicably filed another notice of appeal.40 ROA,
Vol. III, p. 5. What is important for this court's purposes is that neither notice of appeal identifies any
perceived error regarding the court's procedure in setting a hearing on that collateral matter. Nor is
such an "issue" appealable under NJCRCP 72A. As such, this "issue" is inappropriate for the court's
consideration here.41 Reno Newspapers, Inc.
5. Not granting Coughlin a stay
Coughlin was granted in forma pauperis ("IFP") status by the Reno Justice Court on October
6, 2011.42 ROA, Vol. I, pp. 274-275. IFP status only applies to the trial level of litigation, not to
appeals. 43 NRS 12:015. Casper v. Huber, 85 Nev. 474, 456 P.2d 436 (1969). Accordingly, if he
wished to stay the enforcement of the FFCL&O and stop the lockout, he was required to post a
supersedeas bond, and obtain an order granting a stay, before the lockout occurred.
As to the bond requirement, since this case was not a "formal" eviction, NJCRCP 73A(a)(1)
(4) do not apply. Instead, this case falls under the "catchall" provision at the end of subsection (a) of
that Rule, which provides in pertinent part "In cases not provided for in (1), (2), (3) or (4) above, the
giving of an appeal bond, under the provisions of Rule 73, shall stay proceedings in the court below
upon the judgment or order appealed from ... except where the appellate court may otherwise direct
upon such terms as it may in its discretion impose.,,44 NJCRCP 73A(a). NJCRCP 73 provides that
"The bond or equivalent security shall be in the sum or value of $250 unless the justice court fixes a
different amount." (Emphasis added). NRS 40.385(1) provides that a stay may be obtained by posting
a bond in the amount of $250.00 with the trial court.
Coughlin deposited $2,275 with the court pursuant to NRS 118A.355 and the court's order of
October 13,2011. He orally moved the court for a stay of the eviction at the end of the October 25,
2011 hearing, but did not cite any authority for his request. Accordingly, that motion was denied.45
ROA, Vol. II, pp. 85,2. Thus, although the court ordered that Coughlin's deposit would serve as his
appeal bond, it denied a stay because Coughlin did not provide the court with any basis to grant one,
as was his legal responsibility. Then, at Coughlin's specific request, the court held an emergency
hearing on November 7, 2011, where it amended the FFCL&O and returned all sums on deposit to
Coughlin, as he was clamoring. The court then set the supersedeas bond at $2,700.00, as it was
entitled to do.46 ROA, Vol III, pp. 218-219; Vol. II, pp. 4,27. Coughlin now argues that he should
have been granted a stay of the eviction because he had funds on deposit with the court at the time of
the lockout. Even if he would have been entitled to that relief, that position is inconsistent with his
prior demands that all of his deposit be returned to him, and he is judicially estopped from arguing it
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now.47Marcuse. If Coughlin wanted to apply those funds to a super-sedeas bond under JCRCP 73A
or NRS 40.385, he should have either made that request at the October 25, 2011 hearing when the
eviction was announced, or sometime between that hearing and the lockout a week later. He never did
so. In fact, he did just the opposite. When Coughlin filed his "motion for stay' 48 (ROA, Vol. II, p. 3.)
on October 31,2011, in which he demanded his deposit back 49 (ROA, Vol. II, pp. 4, 27), the lockout
had not even occurred. That confirms that Coughlin had no intention of posting a bond. or applying
those funds in order to obtain a stay. He cannot be heard to argue otherwise now. Then, after he
received his deposit back, he did not deposit any additional funds with the court until on or about
December 8, 2011 when he finally paid the filing fee to perfect his appeal. Thereafter, on December
14, 2011, he posted $250.00 for his appeal bond, and $1.00 for his "supersedeas bond" (which sums
he has subsequently moved to have returned to him).50 ROA, Vol. IV, pp. 210-211.By then, his
request for a stay had been moot for approximately six weeks.
6. Sheriff's removal oftenant "within 24 hours of receipt of the Order."
Coughlin tries to imply some sort of wrongdoing in relation to the lockout in this case on page
1 of his second opening brief. But he does not inform the court to which "order" he is referring that
provided for a lockout "within 24 hours," or what, exactly, his argument is. 51 Cf., Schuck. In this
case, the court announced the eviction at the hearing on October 25, 2011.52 ROA, Vol. II, p. 85.
That eviction was not effective until after 5:00 p.m. on October 31, 2011, six days later. This was
confirmed in the FFCL&O signed by the court on October 27, 2011. Coughlin was locked out on
November 1, 2011. This "argument" is frivolous, unsupported, nonsensical and cannot form the basis
for any relief here.
7. The trial Court's Application of NRS 118A.490
Coughlin complains that it was reversible error for the "trial court" to apply NRS 118A.490. He does
not cite to anywhere in the ROA to support his allegation that that statute was ever applied by the
court.53 Cf., Schuck. In fact, it never was. The justice court applied NRS 118A.355(5). This
"argument" is of no moment.
8. The Security Deposit.
Coughlin alleges that Merliss has not returned or accounted for the security deposit under the Lease.
He has not cited to anywhere in the ROA to substantiate that allegation. 54 Cf., Schuck. He does not
explain how the security deposit has anything to do with the underlying no-cause eviction, or how the
lower court erred in relation to it.55 Cf., Gibellini. Coughlin wants to discuss what he thinks is a
claim for damages, but neither this Court nor the court below have or had jurisdiction to even
consider the matter. 56 NJCRCP 76A, Reno Newspaper, Inc.; NRS
V. CONCLUSION: Despite two opportunities to do so, Coughlin failed to meet his burden
below to introduce, by affidavit or other admissible evidence, specific facts that show a genuine issue
of material fact. As such, the justice court properly granted the summary eviction based on the
evidence before it; namely, the Lease, the statutory notices served by Merliss, and the testimony
adduced at the hearings. Coughlin has not met his burden here to show that any of the court's findings
were clearly erroneous and not based on substantial evidence. The "arguments" he presents in his
briefs are nonsensical, and,. for the most part, untimely, not properly preserved or before this court,
and derived from unappealable activity below. None of Coughlin's arguments are supported by any
citation to the record. As such, he has not given this court any evidentiary or legal basis to overturn
any ruling by the lower court. What Coughlin really wants to do is relitigate the case here, which is
not permitted. Coughlin is not entitled to any relief, and his appeal must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, Merliss prays that Coughlin take nothing by way of his appeal; that same be
dismissed in its entirety; and that the judgment of the lower court, including its order of December
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27, 2011, be affirmed; that Merliss be awarded his fees and costs of this appeal in accordance with
NRS 69.050; that Coughlin be held in contempt of court as prayed for in Merliss' motion for order to
show cause, filed herein on January 20, 2012; and for such other, further and additional relief as
seems just to the court in the premises. /s/ Casey D. Baker 2/24/12
Judge Flanagan's 3/30/12 Order denying Coughlin's appeal, amongst other things, in 03628 reads:
ORDER
This case is an appeal from Reno Justice Court ("RJC") and involves the summary eviction of
a tenant, Plaintiff ZACHARY COUGHLIN ("Coughlin"), under NRS Chapter 40. Currently before
this Court are three matters, all of which have been fully briefed and submitted for decision.
The first matter before this Court is Coughlin's Motion under NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59 to
Alter or Amend the Order Denying Motion to Prevent Disposal of Personal Property. The second
matter is Defendant MATTHEW MERLISS's ("Merliss") Motion for Leave to File Answering Brief
in Excess of Five Pages. The third and final matter is the parties' Appellate Briefs, including
Coughlin's Opening Brief and Merliss's Answering Brief. This Court will address each of these
matters in turn. Fn1 (fn1: The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of this case.
Thus, this Court will recite neither the facts nor procedural history unless doing so is necessary to this
Court's determination.) (page 1)
NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59
The object of Coughlin's Motion filed on January 30, 2012 appears to be this Court' Order
dated January 11, 2012. In that Order, this Court denied Coughlin's emergency request for a
temporary restraining order. Coughlin made the request after Judge Sferrazza of RJ entered an Order
on December 21, 2011, in which he ordered: (1) Coughlin to pay $480.00 to Merliss for storage of his
personal property between November 1,2011 and November 16,2011; and (2) Coughlin shall have
access to the premises from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. December 22, 2011 and December 23, 2011 to
remove his personal property.
Coughlin claims this Court's January 11, 2012 Order "is clearly
inaccurate to the extent it purports to find that the undersigned made any agreement to waive his
security deposit in exchange for additional access to the property." (PI. Mot. at p. 12.) In addition,
Coughlin aver counsel for Merliss misled this Court by claiming Coughlin was permitted to remove
persona property after 5:00 p.m. Coughlin further alleges counsel for Merliss "boarded up" the
premises "install[ed] a chain and padlock on the back gate," and later attempted to file suit for the
disposal costs of removing the property, all of which prevented Coughlin from removing the items in
the first place. (Pl. Mot. at p. 14.) Consequently, Coughlin contends this Court's Order should be
amended or altered under NRCP 52 or 59 to include these allegations as additional findings of fact.
Conversely, in his Opposition filed on February 3, 2012 Merliss avers Coughlin fails to
articulate which findings he wants amended under NRCP 52. Even if Coughlin did articulate such
findings, however, Merliss contends relief under NRCP 52(b) is nonetheless unavailable to Coughlin
because this Court's Order did not contain a final judgment, as that rule requires. Similarly, Merliss
contends Coughlin is not entitled to relief under NRCP 59(e) because "n judgment has ever been
entered by this court in this case, so there is no judgment for this court t alter or amend." (Def. Opp'n
at p. 2.) In short, Merliss contends Coughlin's Motion lacks an evidentiary basis, is "nonsense ... filed
only to delay this matter and drive up fees," and i "completely devoid of any merit whatsoever," to the
extent "it is even decipherable." (page 2) (Def NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59 The object of Coughlin's
Motion filed on January 30, 2012 appears to be this Court' Order dated January 11, 2012. In that
Order, this Court denied Coughlin's emergency request for a temporary restraining order. Coughlin
made the request after Judge Sferrazza of RJC entered an Order on December 21, 2011, in which he
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ordered: (1) Coughlin to pay $480.00 t of his 1, 2011 16, 2011; and (2) Coughlin shall have access to
the premises from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. December 22, 2011 and December 23, 2011 to remove his
personal property. Coughlin claims this Court's January 11, 2012 "is clearly inaccurate to the extent it
purports to find that the undersigned made any agreement to waive his security deposit in exchange
for additional access to the property. " (PI. Mot. at p. 12.) In addition, Coughlin aver counsel for
Merliss misled this Court by claiming Coughlin was permitted to remove personal property after 5:00
p.m. Coughlin further alleges counsel for Merliss "boarded up " the premises gate, " first place. (PI.
Mot. at p. 14.)
Consequently, Coughlin contends this Court's Order should be amended or altered under
NRCP 52 or 59 to include these allegations as additional findings of fact. such findings, however,
Merliss contends relief under NRCP 52(b) is nonetheless unavailable to Coughlin because this Court's
Order did not contain a final judgment, as that rule requires. Similarly, Merliss contends Coughlin is
not entitled to relief under NRCP 59(e) because "no judgment has ever been entered by this court in
this case, so there is no judgment for this court to alter or amend. " (Def. Opp'n at p. 2.) In short,
Merliss contends Coughlin's Motion lacks an evidentiary basis, is "nonsense ... filed only to delay this
matter and drive up fees, " and is "completely devoid of any merit whatsoever, "to the extent "it is
even decipherable ." (Def Opp'n at p. 1, 2.) In fact, Merliss claims Coughlin should be subject to
"vexatious litigation tactics." (Def. Opp'n at p. 1,2.)
After reviewing the parties' pleadings and the exhibits reviewing this Court's January 11,2012
Order, this Court has gleaned from Coughlin's Motion certain additional findings of fact that
Coughlin contends should be included - by amendment 0 alteration - in this Court's Order. Ultimately,
however, this Court's Order is unamendable or unalterable under the Rules Coughlin cites because
said Order does not contain a final appealable judgment, or a disposition that resolves all of the
parties' Simmons Self-Storage Partners, LLC v. (explaining jurisdiction to consider an appeal from
the district court depends on whether the district court has entered a final judgment); Lee v. GNLV
Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2 416, 417 (2000) (defining "final judgment" as presented in the
case, and leaves nothing for the future consideration of the court, except for post-judgment issues
such attorney's fees and costs."). relief under NRCP 52 or 59 is unavailable to Coughlin. Although
Simmons and GNL V involve appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court from th district court, this Court
finds the jurisdictional principles announced in those cases also apply t the district court when the
district court considers appeals from the justice courts, as well a when the district court considers
motions under NRCP 52 or 59, as we Therefore, this Court concludes Coughlin's Motion Under
NRCP 52(b) to Amend or Additional Findings of Fact; or, Pled in the Alternative, Motion Under
NRCP 59 to Alter a Amend the Order Denying Motion to Prevent Disposal of Personal Property is
DENIED. Leave to File Answering Brief in Excess of Five Pages In light of the voluminous record in
this case (which exceeds 2,000 pages), including lengthy briefs filed by Coughlin,2 this Court finds
good cause exists to grant Merliss leave to file 2 This Court acknowledges Merliss's complaint that
Coughlin has violated the page limits contained in Orders fro this Court, as well as the local rules.
However, pursuant to this Court's longstanding policy of considering cases on the merits, as opposed
to dismissing them for procedural reasons, this Court will overlook such violations in this particular
case. After reviewing the parties' pleadings and the exhibits attached thereto, and after reviewing this
Court's January 11, 11, 2012 Order, this Court has gleaned from Coughlin's Mafia certain additional
findings of fact that Coughlin contends should be included - by amendment 0 alteration - in this
Court's Order. Ultimately, however, this Court's Order is unamendable or unalterable under the Rules
Coughlin cites because said Order does not contain a final appealable judgment, or a disposition that
resolves all of the parties' claims. See Simmons Self-Storage LLC v. Rib Roof, Inc., 247 P.3d 1107,
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1108 (Nev. 2011) (explaining jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the district court depends on
whether th district court has entered a final judgment); Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996
P.2 416, 417 (2000) (defining "final judgment" as presented in the case, and leaves nothing for the
future consideration of the court, except for post-judgment issues such as attorney's fees and costs.").
As a consequence, this Court finds the relief under NRCP 52 or 59 is unavailable to Coughlin.
Although Simmons and GNLV involve appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court district court,
this Court finds the jurisdictional principles announced in those cases also apply to the district court
when the district court considers appeals from the justice courts as well as when the district court
considers motions under NRCP 52 or 59, as we have in this case. Therefore, this Court concludes
Coughlin's Motion Under NRCP 52(b) to Amend or Make Additional Findings of Fact; or, Pled in the
Alternative, Motion Under NRCP 59 to Alter or Amend the Order Denying Motion to Prevent
Disposal of Personal Property is DENIED.
Leave to File Answering Brief in Excess of Five Pages
In light of the voluminous record in this case (which exceeds 2,000 pages), including lengthy
briefs filed by Coughlin,2 this Court finds good cause exists to grant Merliss leave to file (fn2)
(fn2:This Court acknowledges Merliss's complaint that Coughlin has violated the page limits
contained in Orders from this Court, as well as the local rules. However, pursuant to this Court's
longstanding policy of considering cases on the merits, as opposed to dismissing them for procedural
reasons, this Court will overlook such violations in this particular case)... (page 4) an answering brief
in excess of five pages. In addition, this Court denies Merliss's motion t strike the excess material
filed by Coughlin and also denies Merliss's request for leave to file supplemental brief to meet the
arguments contained in that excess material. fn3 (fn 3 See note 2, supra. Merliss made this request in
footnote 14 of his Answering Brief discussed infra)
Appellate Briefs
As mentioned previously, this case involves the summary eviction of Coughlin from 121
River Rock Street, Reno, NV 89501 ("the Property"). After two hearings in RJC in which Coughlin
alleged defenses of habitability, retaliation, and discrimination, Judge Sferrazza adjudged Coughlin
summarily evicted from the Property pursuant to NRS 40.253(6) by Order dated October 27, 2011.
Specifically, Judge Sferrazza found Merliss properly terminated Coughlin's tenancy and thereafter
properly served Coughlin with a notice of unlawful detainer. Judge Sferrazza further found "Coughlin
failed to present any evidence that Merliss acted in an prohibited, discriminatory, or retaliatory
fashion as alleged by Coughlin, or otherwise.' (Sferrazza, J., Order, Case No. REV2011-001708, Oct.
27, 2011.)
As a result, Coughlin was ordered to vacate the premises by October 31, 2011 at 5:00 p.m.
Coughlin failed to do so. He also failed to remove his personal belongings. Consequently Merliss
sought a personal property lien for storage of Coughlin's personal belongings in the Property from the
period of November 1, 2011 to November 16, 2011. Coughlin filed a motion to contest the lien. On
December 21, 2011, Judge Sferrazza ordered Coughlin to pay to Merliss $480.00 as "fair and
reasonable compensation" for Merliss's storage of his personal belongings. (Sferrazza, J., Order, Case
No. REV2011-001708, Dec. 21, 2011.) Judge Sferrazza also granted Coughlin access to the Property
to remove his personal belongings by December 23, 2011 5:00 p.m. Coughlin failed to do so. As a
result, Merliss hired a contractor to dispose of Coughlin's personal belongings. Coughlin appealed.
Coughlin filed his Opening Brief ("Brief') on February 6, 2012. fn4 (fn 4 This pleading
replaced an Opening Brief Coughlin previously filed two days earlier. Consequently, this Court will
treat this brief as the operative pleading. In addition, on February 7, 2012 Coughlin filed a
Supplement to Appellant's Opening Brief to which he attached an exhibit containing a CD of audio
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recordings) Merliss filed his Answering Brief ("Response") on February 24, 2012. This Court took
the matter under submission on February 27, 2012. This Order now follows. As a preliminary matter,
however this Court notes it is the issue of summary eviction and the Judge Sferrazza's October 27,
2011 Order that presently concerns this Court. Fn5 (fn5 On appeal, Coughlin's Brief spans fortyseven pages and contains several allegations and claims. Many of these claims touch upon collateral
issues like, for example, alleged relationships between Merliss's counsel and law enforcement, alleged
unconstitutional acts of city employees under Monell v. Dep't of' Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 65 (1978), and
Merliss' s alleged disinterest in complaints from people like Coughlin and others associated wit
Coughlin. As such, this Court will not address these issues. In addition, because Coughlin failed to
timely file his notice of appeal regarding the personal property lien, see NRS 40.253(8), and because
Coughlin's notice of appeal fails to identify an error regarding the court's procedure in setting a
hearing on this issue, this Court will no consider this issue.)
Standard of Review
On civil appeals from justice courts to district courts, a case "must not be tried anew.'
NJCRCP 72(c). Whether on appeal at the Nevada Supreme Court from a district court, or 0 appeal at
a district court from a justice court, a lower court's findings "will not be disturbed on appeal unless
they are clearly erroneous and are not based on substantial evidence." Gibellini v Klindt, 110 Nev.
1201, 1204,885 P.2d 540, 542 (1994).
"[A]n order granting summary eviction under NRS 40.253(6) should be reviewed on appeal
based upon the standard for review of an order granting summary judgment under NRC 56 because
these proceedings are analogous." Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212 215, 163 P.3d
405, 407 (2007). Summary judgment is proper only if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. NEV. R. CIV P. 56(c); see Wood v. Safeway,
Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). The moving party bears the initial burden of
proving there is no genuine issue of material fact. Main v. Stewart, 109 Nev. 721, 726-27, 857 P.2d
755, 758 (1993).
Once the moving party satisfies this burden, however, the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 727. While the pleading and the
record must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the party must do more
than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the operative facts Wood, 121 Nev. at 729.
To avoid having summary judgment entered against it, the party must (page 5) by affidavit or
otherwise, set forth specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Id.
Legal Analysis
This Court has reviewed all of the parties' pleadings and the exhibits attached thereto This
Court also has considered all of the parties' relevant arguments. After this review and consideration,
this Court will not disturb Judge Sferrazza's October 27, 2011 Order granting summary eviction. This
Court finds that Order was based on substantial evidence and it was no clearly erroneous. Thus, this
Court concludes Merliss has met his initial burden of proving thee is no genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether Coughlin was summarily evicted properly. Consequently, the burden shifts to
Coughlin to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Although Coughlin raises several claims and makes numerous allegations in his Brief
Coughlin fails to present additional facts related to his defenses raised in RJC that undermine or
legitimately call into question the substantial evidence upon which Judge Sferrazza relied when he
granted summary eviction. This Court gives substantial deference to the lower court's factual findings
in this regard, particularly in light of the numerous hearings held before Judge Sferrazza and
Coughlin's related opportunities to present evidence supporting his various defenses. Therefore, this
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Court finds no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Coughlin was summarily
evicted properly in the lower court. As a result, Coughlin's appeal is DENIED.
CONCLUSION Accordingly, in summary, this Court orders: 1) Coughlin's Motion Under
NRCP 52(b) to Amend or Make Additional Findings of Fact; or, Pled in the Alternative, Motion
Under NRCP 59 to Alter or Amend the Order Denying Motion to Prevent Disposal of Personal
Property is DENIED; 2) Merliss's request for leave to file Answering Brief in excess of five pages is
GRANTED; and (page 6) 3) Coughlin's appeal regarding summary eviction from the Property is
DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. (page 7)
The thing is: NRS40.400Rules of practice.The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of
Civil Procedure and Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals and new
trials, so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, apply
to the proceedings mentioned in those sections.
As such, no local rule respecting page limits is applicable in an appeal to the Justice Court
of a summary eviction. While Couglin has respect for Judge Flanagan's Order, Coughlin's Brief in
excess thereof somewhat sought permission to exceed such orders, and to whatever extent it did not,
it may be characterized as an open refusal allowable under RPC 3.3
Iveson v. Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, 66 Nev. 145, 152,206 P.2d
755 (1949); Abelleria v District Court, 17 Ca1.2.d 280, 295, 109 P.2d 942 (1941). "Excess of
jurisdiction" for which certiorari will issue exists where the act is within the judge's general power but
is not authorized because the conditions for the exercise of such power (i.e., for example, lack of
notice) are wanting. Iveson at 151. Both Judge Sferrazza and Judge Flanagan exceeded their
jurisdiction in a number of ways. Judge Sferrazza was no longer able to rule that Coughlin's Motion
for Jury trial was untimely upon his amending his 10/13/11 Order on 10/25/11 to recharacterize the
setting of the 10/25/11 date as a continuation of the summary eviction proceeding rather than the
trial (the use of the term trial was unfortunate, Your Honor said Hill's associate Baker. Judge
Sferrazza further exceeded his juridiction in ordering a 118A.355(5) rent escrow deposit where the
RJC has yet to promulgate and have approved a corollary to JCRLV 44.
It was reversible error to rule that Coughlin's demand for a jury trial was too late, particularly
where:
Plaintiff: Your Honor, if I may as well, there was something shoved through my mail slot last night
as well from Mr. Coughlin bearing a file stamp of yesterday, Emergency Demand for Jury trial and
Amended Tenant's Affidavit Answer Counter-Claim. Again, I havent had a chance to look at this. I
know it's not appropriate to have a jury trial here and the court has already ruled that there's not been
entertaining a third party claims, this is a summary eviction. But, again, I havent had a chance to
even look at this because it's [INDISCERNIBLE 3:45] yesterday. Judge: All right. Well, you have 10
days to respond to that as well. So we'll put those aside for the moment and now.
The Docket in 1708 shows that Coughlin made an appropriate jury trial demand in 1708 on
10/11/12 and deposited the required sums pursuant to NRCP 38 and JCRCP 38.
NRS40.310Issue of fact to be tried by jury if proper demand made.Whenever an issue of fact
is presented by the pleadings, it shall be tried by a jury, if proper demand is made pursuant to the
Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure or the Justice Court Rules of Civil Procedure
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NRS40.310Issue of fact to be tried by jury if proper demand made.Whenever an issue of fact

is presented by the pleadings, it shall be tried by a jury, if proper demand is made pursuant to the
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Defendant: There -- for the record, there was no certificate in my name, US Postal Service certificate
mailing on file with respect to a notice. In the context of summary eviction proceedings, courts are
directed to adhere very strictly to the notes requirements given the summary nature of it. That's one
safeguard that is insisted upon. A right to a jury trial is granted by the United States Supreme Court
from -- in summary -- in eviction cases. Jury trial is an absolute right for all citizens in the United
States. I said it's a 1970s case. I think it might be called Pearson. I believe I cite to it in my... (Page
33). Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
Judge Sferrazza committed reversible error where, throughout the entirety of the 10/13/11 date
and the entire morning of the 10/25/11 date, he put the initial burden on Coughlin, forcing him to
testify, refusing to allow Coughlin to function in his dual role as a self representing litigant, and to
address issues prior to the landlord meeting the initial burden upon him to prove his case as to an
unlawful detainer action, and limiting the issues and presentation such that Coughlin was not
permitted to bring counterclaims, or counter set-offs, as entitled to under NRS 118A.490.
Judge: ...the burden is on the landlord first to establish a prima facie case for the unlawful detainer
action. And so Im going to have the landlord present its evidence with respect to the lease and the
no-cause eviction. Then the defendant will have the opportunity because I think the only issue then is
whether or not this unlawful detainer action no-cause eviction is a retaliatory eviction and you will,
the defendant will need to meet the requirements for a retaliatory eviction as set up in the statute. And
Im going to limit you to your presentation with respect to those issues. I know you brought up a lot
of other things, one of them being a demand for a jury trial which the court finds is not timely and
that request is denied. (Page 68).
Coughlin's 10/11/12 filed and served demand for a jury trial was timely as to the 10/25/11 trial,
whether, depending upon NRS 40.400, on applies NJCRCP 38 or NRCP 38:
NRCP 38(b)Demand.Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury
by serving as required by Rule 5(b) upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at any time
after the commencement of the action and not later than the time of the entry of the order first setting
the case for trial. or:
NJCRCP 38(b): b)Demand.Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by
a jury by filing and serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at the time that the
party requests the matter be set for trial or before the entry of the order first setting the case for trial,
whichever comes first.
The trial of 10/25/11 was not set, and the entry of the order of the 10/13/11 Order so setting
the matter for trial for 10/25/11, until after Coughlin had already filed his 10/11/12 Demand For Jury
trial.
Oddly, while Judge Sferrazza refused to allow Coughlin to address or bring counterclaims, he
did allow Baker the benefits of a plenary trial where Baker was permitted to undertake discovery
pursuant to
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OCT 6 Motion to Proceed in Fonna Pauperis filed and submitted. GRANTED per Judge
Sferrazza.dss Tenant' s Answer/Affidavit to 30 Day No Cause Eviction & Unlawful Detainer; Motion
for Sanctions and Attorney's Fees; Counterclaim for Damages filed. Hearing set for OCTOBER
13,2011 at 8:30 AM. Both parties notified by mail. Left message for tenant. Spoke to Landlords
attorney. Dss
OCT 11 Motion to Continue filed by Tenant SUBMITTED. ks OCT 12 Landlord's Opposition to
Tenant's Answer/Affidavit to 30 Day No Cause Eviction; Motion for Sanctions and Attorney's Fees;
and Counterclaim for Damages filed. cv
OCT 13 Plaintiff, represented by CASEY BAKER, ESQ. Defendant, ZACHARY COUGHLIN
appeared for a Summary Eviction hearing before Judge SFERRAZZA. Hearing held. Tenant's Motion
to Continue Denied. If tenant posts rent of S2,275.00 by 9:00 am, Monday October 17, 2011 a trial
will be set for OCTOBER 25, 2011 AT 10:00 am. If tenant does not post the monies, eviction
GRANTED at 9:00 am. October 17, 2011. Jj; Emergency Ex Parte Motion filed. cv
OCT 17 Opposition to Emergency Ex Parte Motion filed. cv
OCT 17 Emergency Motion To Stay, Set Aside, Vacate Eviction Hearing Order filed.bc
OCT 17 Emergency Ex Parte Motion filed. cv
$2,275.00 CASH posted by ZACHARY COUGHLIN, 121 River Rock St., Reno, NV. 89501
MROA 296:
"Judge: What does that have to do with the rent though, sir? Because what we are here today on is
the failure to pay rent.
Defendant: Your Honor, the statute to me is complicated and confusing but my
understanding of it is that Mr. Merliss or Dr. Merliss failure to assert that he was owed rent for a
good, it seems like three months, takes this case out of the purview of the sections
requiring a depositing of a rent escrow amount and his failure to cure the habitability issues
within 40 days
Judge: Okay. Regardless of that have you paid the rent or not, first of all?
Plaintiff: Your Honor, may
Judge: I'm sorry?
Defendant: Your Honor, thats a factual determination. I think that would need to be made
upon viewing evidence.
Plaintiff: Your Honor, may I please. We are not here on a non-payment of rent. Your Honor,
I want to be very clear
Judge: But you said a five-day Notice
Plaintiff: Were here on a no-cause termination to vacate. Mr. Coughlin was a month-tomonth
tenant since March 2011. We served a 30-day no cause termination Notice to vacate.
Judge: Ill have two files.
Plaintiff: Yes, sir. That was from the previous the non-payment of rent we had a hearing a
couple of weeks ago. Those were dismissed. Gone, theyre gone.
Judge: So, which case number is still pending?
Plaintiff: This, Your Honor, this case is ends in 1708.
Judge: Right. So, 1492.
Plaintiff: Dismissed a couple of weeks ago.
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Judge: Fine. That was dismissed by the landlords..."
MROA 303:
"Plaintiff: Your Honor Rule 109 speaks to a 20 day period Notice prior to a hearing which I
believe is applicable in this case and has not been provided.
Defendant: Im sorry I didnt catch any of that.
Judge: He said.
Plaintiff: Rule 109 Your Honor, setting of Trial and actions."
MROA 304:
"Defendant: To that I filed a tenancy answer, a third party counterclaim bringing in third
parties.
Judge: Well first of all as to the third party complaint Im going to rule as I indicated earlier
that there is a specific statutory procedure in this case which is applicable under Chapter 40 of
the NRS. Therefore you are governed by that statutory procedure which does not allow for
counterclaims to be heard. At the same time you can file a separate independent action as
indicated by counsel for the
Defendant: NRS 40 you say Your Honor does not allow for third?
Judge: Chapter 40 in a summary proceeding such as this does not allow for counterclaims to
be filed in the same action, if they are filed as separate action. Thats under Rule 81 of the
justice court Rules of civil procedure."
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MROA 305:
"Judge: I will allow you to testify as to what happened and why you believe the summary eviction
should not be applicable in this case. If you establish a case to my satisfaction then I will set it
over to Trial, right?
Judge: Youve come in to argue a motion to dismiss based on failure to comply with Notice
and other issues which I denied at this point. So you can sit down and if you want to test the
fire as to why this should not be a summary eviction I will permit you to do so.
Defendant: Even were this to go forward as a summary eviction Your Honor I would just
like to state for the record I am moving for a continuance based upon the unduly prejudicial
nature of the shutting off the electricity in the middle of the five days that you were here.
Judge: Well you were here quite some time ago and knew all about this, so thats denied.
You first came in here to court and back in this court dismissed the prior case in case number
1492 trying to find the date at which
Defendant: I believe it was the 26th Your Honor of September the hearing approximately.
Plaintiff: That was the 27th Your Honor, I remember because that was my birthday.
Judge: Alright in any event thats been more than 20 days and I know on that date you were
fully aware of what was happening because the plaintiff tried to proceed at that time which I
denied. They attempted to proceed on this case as well. Alright? You probably do not
remember that, sir.
Defendant: I remember the hearing Your Honor and I just, I would think there is something
that when a tenant alleges a retaliatory eviction that the summary and extremely quick nature
of this process is slowed somewhat.
12/31 TRANSCRIPT OF 10/13/11 SUMMARY EVICTION PROCEEDING AND 10/25/11
CONTINUATION
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THEREOF OR TRIAL PURSUANT TO NJCRCP RULE 109

000305
Judge: Only if the court finds that there is a meritorious defense, which I havent done so, I
havent even been presented any evidence to persuade me that you have any meritorious
defense whatsoever.
Defendant: Are you sure Your Honor?.
Judge: And I am giving you that opportunity to proceed. So do you want to proceed or not?
Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor I have abundance of evidence in support.
Judge: Come up here and take the stand, sir.
Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor may I bring my laptop with me because it has pictures that I
intend to offer and a videotape as well?
Judge: Wait a second sir, no you may not what am asking you for is to establish a prima facie
case of retaliatory eviction through your testimony and then if I determine and establish the
prima facie case then well set it over for Trial.
Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor.
Judge: So if you want to come up here. Go ahead sir.
Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor. I believe a prima facie case has been established with
respect to the claims of retaliatory eviction. And been supported by the various Exhibits that
had been attached to both my original tenants answer and subsequent tenants answer. Just
most recent motion for continuance and specifically
Judge: I have that.
Defendant: Specifically Your Honor whats convenient here is this has all pretty much been
detailed in emails to and from the landlord and myself. Further I took videotapes of an
incident where a good deal or property damage was done to my home law office." MROA 306.
MROA 307:
"Judge: Done by whom?
Defendant: The landlords, agents and if you referenced the lease I believe its subsection 28,
the lease specifically provides that any damage done to the tenant or his property by the
landlord or the landlords agents is to bewould result in the landlord being held viable for
such damage. I can testify as to the damage done, I have a videotape showing the landscaping
crew doing the damage. The third party defendants were involved in that to some extent. The
landlord admitted in writing that he authorized to third party defendant Green Action Lawn
Services conduct in that regard. Aside from the property damage with respect to the
landscaping incident a prima facie case can be established.
Judge: So how was that retaliatory, what were they retaliating for?
Defendant: I believe he is evicting me Your Honor based in part on a number of factors
thats one because I complained about it. Two is
Judge: Because you complained about the lawn service?
Defendant: The conduct of Green Action Lawn Service, yes. They caused what I believe is
at least $1,000 damage. In addition the landlord failed to ensure a number of habitability
issues that were brought to light in writing and he was given 14 days. The statute allows a
deduction from the landlord. The landlord agreed in writing to these deductions.
Judge: Well you have deducted three months rent.
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Defendant: Thats a factual matter Your Honor that I believe is in dispute.

Judge: So you are saying you have paid the rent? Do you have the evidence of payment of
the rent today sir?"
MROA 308-309
"Defendant: Payment in the sense that rent deductions agreed to in writing and worked on
incident thereto amounts to a payment of the rent in addition to
Judge: Okay well do you have evidence of that?
Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor. The stairs Mr. Merliss, the stairs to the law office were
crumbling, they were presenting a hazard and an aesthetically displeasing appearance. Mr.
Merliss agreed to a rent deduction and the stairs were repaired, he was submitted a statement
in that regard. He subsequently filled [inaudible 0:17:12] Notices that ignored that rent
deduction. Ignored the rent deduction he agreed to in writing and the attached agreement.
Judge: Okay, sir I need to know precisely first of all how much is your rent per month?
Defendant: $900 a month.
Judge: How much was the bill for the stairs?
Defendant: $1,250.
Judge: Anything else, offsets that you are claiming today?
Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor, the landlord agreed to a $350 offsets for taking care of the
weeds at the house I offered to
Judge: So how much was that 300?
Defendant: He agreed $350 for that season and he failed to respond to a request for the prior
season. So I believe I can argue $700...
Defendant: Well Your Honor he never responded to a previous seasons request in that regard
after 14 days Notice and I believe NRS 118A allows her rent deduction I believe the
Judge: But habitability, what does the weeds a year ago have to do with habitability?
Defendant: The weeds were extreme Your Honor, they created a noxious weed ordinance
hazard, they
Judge: Okay wait a second, whose responsibility is under the lease to maintain the
[CROSSTALK]?
Defendant: That person is the landlord Your Honor, in addition.
Judge: Do you have citation to the lease?
Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor and I will sight to that but even absent that his subsequent
conduct ratifies an interpretation that would deem the landlord responsible for. I believe the
noxious weed ordinance affect in Reno specifies that its the property owners responsibility.
But the lease does speak to that Your Honor. My attachments, there is a good deal of
photographic evidence attached as Exhibit where there is three to the motion for continuance
instead of a two.
Judge: Brings up the issue of the mold and the insulation.
Defendant: All these issues are in writing attached to the original September tenants answer
where in approximately 30 pages of emails between myself the tenant and the landlord
Merliss proved that he was provided 14 days written Notice of various habitability issues
including mold growing on insulation that had fallen from the ceiling and hit a dirt ground
that lacked vapor layer. Theres pictures I know the printouts there are not that clear, I do
have high quality colored photographs on my laptop. Just another small matter Your Honor, there was
a matter of $125 deduction that was agreed to for the disposal. All these deductions
the landlord Merliss has subsequently seem to have forgotten.
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Judge: Okay wait a second, we have weeds the total you were claiming is 700 and now you
say it is $125 for what?
Defendant: A broken kitchen garbage disposal.
Judge: Which you repaired?
Judge: You have receipts for all this?
Defendant: I have submitted statements to opposing counsel.
Judge: Alright so, if I understand this correctly you owed $2,700 in rent.
Defendant: Your Honor opposing counsel said rent is not an issue here.
Judge: No you are making it an issue. I mean you are the one who said that Im supposed to
look at this because this is in retaliation for your complaints right?
Defendant: To the extent that an eviction is being sort, yes Your Honor. But the issue of
whether or not I own it you may not believe this but its conceited at this point.
Judge: Conceited how?
Defendant: Or not even alleged by opposing counsel.
Judge: What they did is they dismissed the action from nonpayment of rent. So they are not
evicting you based on nonpayment of rent. That doesnt mean and you were talking about a
counterclaim today which you wanted me to address for retaliatory eviction. And Im trying
to find out what the retaliation was for. You are saying it has nothing to do with rent then
thats fine. What is the retaliation about? (MROA 310)
MROA 311:
"Defendant: Subject to NRS 118A.510 the retaliation applies because it occurred after written
Notice by the tenant to the landlord of both items. Both matters in statutes such as noxious
weed ordinates as well as complaining about habitability issues and
Judge: retaliation is for complaining about noxious weeds?
Defendant: Noxious weeds, property damage done by the landscaping crew and failure to
cure habitability issues and the landlords parts after 14 days written Notice in pass.
Judge: Okay so you have noxious weeds, landscaper damages and what was the third?
Defendant: All these various, please fix it landlord types of written Notices.
Judge: Thats not habitability; habitability is specifically defined by statutes. So specifically
what was the habitability issue, lack of heat or?
Defendant: Your Honor I believe the insulation matter with its attended, mold problems it
comes within the essential services. I have seen some authority that seems to suggest
insulation is an essential service. There is safety issues with regard to
Judge: Insulation is an essential service.
Defendant: Or at least I believe so in some situations or at least it speaks to habitability,
insulation does. There is a window thats remained broken with exposed shards of glass held
in by the [inaudible 0:24:30] in the window, that presents a hazard. The stairs, the crumbling
stair rises my mailman has complained about that to the extent it looks bad, its not that safe.
The wood deck to the front entry way seems rotted out."
MROA 312 (important because it establish that Coughlin plead and or argued that the "first
eviction" in 1492 provided a basis under NRS 118.510 for arguing retaliation incident to Coughlin
defended based upon habitabilty in that prior action, resulting in a retaliatory possessory action in
1708:
"Judge: So what you are saying is because you complained about these four things the
landlord might have had to evict you?
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Judge: It had nothing to do with the nonpayment of rent?
Defendant: I believe it had to do with invoking the statutory right to deduct rent.
Judge: So. Okay so prior to your exercising your statutory right to deduct rent and you
determined that the first eviction was [inaudible 0:26:37] because I think you claim
retaliatory eviction based on the first eviction did you not?
Defendant: Yes.
Judge: So your retaliatory eviction was based on these things and not your failure to pay
rent?
Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor including that you complained of the property damage by the
third party agency of the landlord and his employees or agency."
MROA 312-313 (so much for the 10/13/11 hearing being held for the purpose of
"establishling the truthfulness and sufficiency of the landlord and tenant's affidavits (the landlord had
yet to file an affidavit, and, at that point, Baker had not even filed his attempt to satisfy that
requirement via his privilege asserting 10/19/11 Declaration of Casey D. Baker (which goes to the
fraud issues respecting the fact that Baker and Merliss lied about whether the lease had expired or
been terminated, which goes to the effectiveness of the 8/22/11 notice) and Merliss did not even show
up to the 10/13/11 hearing, so instead of ruling that, per se, the landlord did not meet the requirement
upon such a "testing the truthfulness and sufficiency of the landlord's affidavit", Judge Sferrazza
simply placed that burden solely on Coughlin, then allowed Baker to skip putting anything into
evidence or putting on any testimony, and rather, just proceed to "making argument"):
"Defendant: Your Honor Im happy to cross-examine or I am happy to simply present an
argument.
Judge: Anything else sir.
Defendant: No sir Your Honor.
Judge: Okay you can step down. Okay with the landlord you can make any argument.
Plaintiff: Thank you Your Honor lets just start with the statutes Your Honor. If I understood
Mr. Coughlins testimony, his contention is that the no-cause eviction is in retaliation for his
complaints to the landlord about habitability. I think thats what he testified to and he named
a couple of things, weeds, landscaper damage, installation, windows. NRS 118A.290
provides what habitability is. Mr. Coughlin, he must show among other things Your Honor
that the property substantially lacks one of these enumerated items. Effective waterproofing,
plumbing facilities, water supply, electrical lighting outlets et cetera.
Plaintiff: Your Honor just moving forward with the other items identified by Mr. Coughlin.
Insulation windows, garbage disposals.
Judge: Well the other question I heard about the weeds, he says he had them done for 350
and there was some agreement he would get a credit, you indicated that the landlord actually
had the weeds
Plaintiff: Your Honor the
Judge: Taken down.
Plaintiff: Yes. My understanding is the only rent deduction ever agreed to by the landlord
was $350; I believe it was for June it could have been for May, for Mr. Coughlin to deal with
the weeds. That was not disputed and in fact Your Honor if we go back to the last case, the
quantification of the rent in our five day no pay Notice gives credit for that. The court gave
credit for it in its minute order. Dr Merliss also paid landscapers to Dr Merliss also owns a
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property next door. The landscapers were doing the weeds next door; there were still weeds in
Mr. Coughlins property as I understand it he didnt care of the weeds. So landscapers also
pulled the weeds over there. Thats my understanding it has nothing to do with this
proceeding. Mr. Coughlins third party claims as he calls them have something to do with the
landscapers pulling the carpet out of his front yard or something.
Judge: Well there were no third party [inaudible 0:33:36] files, so there are not even an issue
here.
Plaintiff: I understand sir Im trying to shed a little light on the weed situation. There was a
credit, that is the only credit Mr. Coughlin has not shown any other agreed upon credit and
whats interesting here Your Honor is that on one hand Mr. Coughlin is arguing that the
landlord agreed to all these rent deductions and then on the other hand he is saying that
because Im claiming rent deductions he is evicting me to retaliation. It doesnt make any
sense Your Honor, which is it and he has not presented any presented any proof either. Under
NRS 118A.510 your owner Mr. Coughlin has the burden to prove that the eviction was in
retaliation for one of these enumerated things. He is hanging his hat on habitability, but the
lease puts the duty on Mr. Coughlin to maintain the property, every time he has got broken
blinds or a broken window that how did the inside pane get broken? We dont know Mr.
Coughlin wont let us inspect, he is claiming thats a habitability issue.
Judge: Well I do have a question though; the court previously ruled that he needed to deposit
the rent which he disputed. But whats your position in respect to the requirement to deposit
rent on the alleged habitability.
Plaintiff: Your Honor I think the court got it exactly right last time requiring Mr. Coughlin to
deposit the rent into an escrow account, thats what the Rules and the statutes I believe
provide. In this case though Your Honor the only issue is possession based on a no a cause
termination of the lease. Mr. Coughlin owes rent but we are not here to seek rent today. If
there is going to be claims for rent thats a separate civil action it is not a summary
procedure
Defendant: Objection Your Honor its unduly prejudicial for Mr. [David] to be able to
interject all these accusations and then run and cry wolf when it comes time to support them
as he has done in his pleadings as you say, opposing parties concedes this point when nothing
of the sort was done. He says Mr. Coughlin outright lies in his pleadings he is making this"
(Judge Sferrazza continually allowed the lawyer, Baker, to testify, essentially, in light of the
fact that the client, landlord Merliss, didn't show up on 10/13/11. RPC 3.7 requires a lawyer to
withdraw if a substantial likelihood exists that he will become a witness. Further, Baker did not have
first hand knowledge upon which he could offer his testimony, rather, his "testimony" consisted
entirely of hearsay.
MROA 317-318:
"Plaintiff: Yes sir Your Honor, if I may at this time provide some further support such as I
referenced my attention to earlier with regard to showing high quality photographs, eliciting some of
these habitability issues with regard to certainly having, some of these pictures of
mold are kind of disturbing. I dont think anybody in this courtroom would want to live in
that situation; there is not just weed ordinance....
Plaintiff: Your Honor I wouldnt want to live there with that mold stain where it was. I
submitted Notice in writing not only 14 days passed but a good time of time passed $500 was
spent in eradicating the mold issue. With respect to the habitability.
Judge: Who spent $500?
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Defendant: Im sorry Your Honor?

Judge: Who spent $500?
Defendant: I did Your Honor; I submitted a statement to Mr. Baker. Your Honor the broken
window comes within the purview of Section 0.290 of NRS 118A in addition to the noxious
weed ordinance that the City of Reno has. Comes within language in Section 290 speaking to
a violation of the housing code or complaint thereof.
Judge: Well so how do you get around the lease, the lease requires you to maintain the law?
Defendant: Thats Mr. Bakers interpretation of the lease Your Honor, the lease does not say
weeds. It does not say weeds, it says lawn. There is no lawn its dirt. In that regard I have that
high quality, high density green woolen carpet to make the appearance of a sort of [inaudible
0:39:24] grass installation. A good deal of money and time we spent so that I could have a
law office that didnt have a dirt lawn. Mr. Merliss a neurologist who has chosen to spent
upwards of apparently five grand to litigate this rather than fix a window and stand behind the
rent deductions. Who didnt show up today, who didnt stand up in court, when you yourself
MROA 319-320:
"Your Honor told him to raise his right hand and stand to be sworn? He has clearly indicated a
lack of respect for this process. He has indicated a habit of kind of shifting tasks which he
seems to find minor and tedious on the people whose responsibility it isnt to do those tasks.
He is essentially trying to mimic this pro-bono property manager. He says go get two
estimates for that little problem you alerted me to and then deducted them. Im not at the
country right now Im in Thailand or somewhere. Well thats what landlords do, Im an
attorney thats going to take me an hour or two can I bail you $225 for that Dr. Merliss? No I
cant I am just doing for free for you. You seem to employ time honored landlord tactic of
ignoring tenants for any complaints and hoping to win by [inaudible 0:40:50] or just make
them feel like they are being tedious or you know high maintenance. When a clear review of
the 30 somewhat pages show that I have been extremely conscientious throughout the year
and a half that I rented from Dr. Merliss. To the extent that I have endured disgusting
conditions in this place in efforts to save Dr. Merliss money. Just to
Judge: Alright so here is the deal I think I have heard enough. I am
Defendant: Your Honor can I show the pictures of?
Judge: I have looked at them, I see the mold.
Defendant: You cant see the mold in those reproductions.
Judge: Alright bring up any other pictures youve got, but what you said is youve corrected
that; you spent $500 to do that.
Defendant: Yes sir you honor, may I approach.
Judge: You may.
Defendant: Counsel was provided [inaudible 0:41:44] these pictures in addition to
photograph reproductions.
Judge: You are going to have to hand it to me because I cant see it in the lighting.
Defendant: I will do a slide show Your Honor if that will be alright. And there is a short
video where the issues of the property damage are essentially admitted by the Green Action
Lawn Service.
Plaintiff: No, Im going to Object to any video of anythingit has no relevance to
possession of property today and I have never seen it.
Defendant: You were provided a copy of it counsel.
Judge: Well I am going to look at your pictures not the video so.
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Defendant: Okay, Your Honor.

Judge: I do have a question Mr. Baker the rent was last paid when?
Defendant: Your Honor I would have to check, my recollection is maybe but I dont know,
again we are not seeking rent today.
Judge: No, Im understanding that but I believe it is integral to the defense you have
[inaudible
0:43:21] how much rent is owed.
Defendant: Im not sure [inaudible 0:43:29] sir but.
Judge: Well because I believe he needs to deposit the rent less any amount that he is entitled
to credit for.
Defendant: Yes, Your Honor I agree with you.
MROA 321:
"Plaintiff: You can go to the next picture in that order [inaudible 0:43:44]. [OFF MIC
CONVERSATION]
Plaintiff: June 1 the rent was due sir.
Judge: There was five months.
Plaintiff: June, July, August, September, October and I believe there is a, there should be a
credit for 350.
Defendant: For the amounts my co-tenant paid?
Judge: No, for what he is saying is undisputed is the weeds.
Defendant: I believe he is referring to [inaudible 0:44:39] who you all paid to the landlord
for June Your Honor.
Plaintiff: We can make it five full months Your Honor.
Defendant: This goes to the Rule 11 issues I am speaking off Your Honor. Complainants and
attorneys blindly files motions against [inaudible 0:44:52] without doing reasonable
investigations as to whether or not their plans are based on fact or law. Can they just churn
and burn landlord/tenant claims through the courts, collect money for them without knowing
whether or not its professional to do so.
Plaintiff: I am happy to address to the joint obligation in Mr. Coughlin and Mr. [inaudible
0:45:24] under the lease Your Honor.
Defendant: Your Honor the pictures of the carpet being left in the street and on the sidewalk,
thats how Mr. Merliss employees left the carpet. It was installed in a manicured manner.
They came on and for some reason he decided to pay both me and his crew of landscapers to
do the same job. One wonders if he is so well off as a neurologist that he can afford to have" (MROA
322:) "Judge: Alright so I will give you one last chance to add anything else.
Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor I believe the retaliation argument a prima facie case has been
made specifically with regard to habitability issues, the habitability includes safety. The
crumbling stair rises clearly presented a situation where that was an issue. Habitability
includes windows being broken that was clearly supported in writing by the attached emails.
Judge: Alright, sir. I am going to rule now because first of all I find under the NRS if you
want to make a habitability claim you have to deposit the rent and if it wasnt clear in my
order previously I am going to make it very clear today.
Defendant: Your Honor.
Judge: But now sir I am going to give you credit for your alleged habitability issues. The rent
that is due as of today will be 4,500. Im going to give you credit for the stairs of 1250, weeds
of 350 weeds of 350 twice. The garbage disposal 125 and the window 150 which comes out
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to 2225. In addition Im going to give you 500 credit for the mold abatement, which is 2725.
So the 4500 minus 2225 is 2275. I will continue this till tomorrow at 9:00 AM for you to
deposit the 20. It wont be tomorrow it will be Monday.
Defendant: Your Honor [inaudible 0:48:25] $1,000 claim for damage to the landscaping
installation if you wouldnt mind." (such a counterclaim's nexus of facts is so closely tied here to the
possessory action as to make it reversible error for Judge Sferrazza or Flanagan to refuse to permit
Coughlin to bring such a claim or at the very least assert a set-off (nevermind the fact that there was
no testimony by Merliss as to how much rent was owed (much less a verified affidavit swearing to
such or that his claim is "authorized by law" as required by NRS 40.254...)
Judge: I am not going to do anything for that, but it has nothing to do with the landlord so far
as I am concerned at this point that is a third party claim which you can proceed against the
third party.
Defendant: Your Honor the lease is
Judge: That is not habitability sir, that has nothing to do
Defendant: But the lease says he is liable for damage done on my lawn.
Judge: Who said?
Defendant: The lease says that subsection 28.
Judge: Well
Defendant: Clearly.
Judge: Not by third parties.
Defendant: It does Your Honor, it says by his agents or employees he is responsible.
Judge: Yeah and [inaudible 0:48:58] that they are his agents I find they are in independent
contractor and so if you deposit the rent by Monday at 9:00 oclock with the court in the
amount of 2275 I will continue this for Trial on the merits to determine whether or not there
really is a habitability issue. If the rent is not deposited then there will be no continuance the
eviction will be granted forthwith on Monday morning at 9:00 oclock. And furthermore the
court is now making any finding other than that you have made an argument about
habitability and that you are entitled to Trial on that issue if you deposit the rent. Alright but
you are not entitled to Trial if you dont deposit the rent. And I have given you credit based
on your allegation which is, which I do not find was substantiated today; I simply find that
you made that allegation, that this is what you were owed. And so if you deposit the rent then we will
set this for Trial and it will be the following week after that on the same court day.
The same day of the week.
Defendant: Tuesdays and Thursday. So on the Tuesday it will be at 10:00 AM.
Judge: What day is that?
Defendant: Well you are looking at, okay he has had until 17th to post the 2275 and you are
saying have the hearing the following week that will be 25th October.
Judge: Okay 25th October what time?
Defendant: That would be at 10:00 oclock.
Judge: Alright, so thats the courts order and I will see you back then have a good day.
[0:51:42]
31/"
It is intellectually dishonest and inaccurate for Baker to suggest something like how much rent
his client felt was due was "actually litigated" or "not disputed" in 1492 (especially where Judge
Sferrazza alleges the landlord dismissed that case (actually, it would seem only judges are allowed to
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"dismiss" cases...) where Baker and Merliss turned tail and ran from that case. Regardless, Baker
failed to incorporate by refernce or otherwise have admitted into evidence (difficult to have any such
itemized non-pay notice from 1492 authenticated when landlord Merliss fails to show up...when
Coughlin allegedly failed to show up on 3/15/12 (or was allegedly a couple minutes late) in Rev12375, Coughlin's filing of 3/8/12, apparently, did not suffice to speak for
him, though it was 40 pages and verified...
MROA 315: "Plaintiff: Yes. My understanding is the only rent deduction ever agreed to
by the landlord
was $350; I believe it was for June it could have been for May, for Mr. Coughlin to deal with
the weeds. That was not disputed and in fact Your Honor if we go back to the last case, the
quantification of the rent in our five day no pay Notice gives credit for that. The court gave
credit for it in its minute order. Dr Merliss also paid landscapers to"
At MROA 302:7-12, Baker himself admits that NRCP 56(c)'s first prong ("genuine issue of
material fact") is not a part of the NRS 40.253(6) analysis, but rather, its the second JMOL prong that
the Legislature chose to place alone in that statute:
"Defendant: Yes Your Honor I think that hits the nail right on the head. This is a summary
proceeding provided by statute NRS 40.254 and NRS 40.253(6). The only issue here today is
possession of the property; the courts inquiry is very focused and has only asked you
whether there is a legal defense to the alleged unlawful detainer."
Its funny, where Coughlin's complaint that landlord Merliss was attempting to turn him into a
pro-bono handyman or property manager are echoed in Merliss failing to show up to the 10/13/11
summary eviction proceeding. Being a landlord is a job...there is more to it than cashing a rent check
and paying off the mortgage each month, yet Merliss did not even attend the "evidentiary hearing" of
10/13/11, nor, obviously, "participate" (see Baker's 2/24/12 Answering Brief in 03628)
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: Although Coughlin has muddied the record to a spectacular
degree with his abusive filings, at its core, this is a simple no-cause residential summary eviction
case. The pertinent facts are as follows:
The underlying facts of the eviction are set forth in the FFCL&O. The statutory notices and
other documentary evidence the court relied on in making its findings of fact can be found at ROA,
Vol. V, pp. 85-89; 90-94; 95-109; 113-128. EXHIBITS 2, 3, 4 and 5 hereto. The Standard Rental
Agreement ("LEASE") for the home at 121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada (the "PROPERTY") can be
found at ROA, Vol. V, pp 129-132. EXHIBIT 6 hereto. Those facts were established during two
evidentiary hearings, in which Coughlin fully participated. The first hearing was on October 13, 2011,
and lasted 90 minutes. A continuation of that hearing occurred on October 25, 2011, and lasted
several hours. l See FFCL&O at 1. The purpose of those hearings was to "determine the
truthfulness and sufficiency of the tenant's and the landlord's affidavits," to determine whether
there is any "legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer," and whether "the tenant is guilty
of an unlawful detainer".2 NRS 40.253(6). FFCL&O at 4, Para. 3. Those hearings were Coughlin's
opportunity to substantiate, by competent evidence, any legal defense he may have had to the
eviction.
The only defenses raised by Coughlin below were based on what he claimed was "retaliatory"
conduct by Merliss, and "habitability" issues at the property. Both defenses were based on provisions
of NRS Chapter 118A.3 See FFCL&O at 3, Para. 9 et seq. See, also, ROA, Vol. I, pp. 238-266; ROA,
Vol. V, pp. 194-198. At the first hearing, Coughlin alleged his defenses, but did not offer any
evidence to support them. Judge Sferrazza could have granted an eviction after that hearing, but chose
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instead to allow Coughlin another opportunity to substantiate his allegations.4 NRS 40.253(6).
Since Coughlin's defenses were based on alleged "habitability" issues, the court required him to
deposit, pursuant to NRS 40.355(5), the amount of rent Coughlin claimed he had withheld for
those reasons, before he would be allowed to substantiate them with evidence.5 ROA, Vol.l, p.
153. Coughlin ultimately failed to raise any material factual dispute, and the court properly granted
the eviction. The lockout was performed on November 1, 2011. Coughlin filed his first notice of
appeal on November 3, 2011.6 ROA Vol. III, pp. 229-233. On November 13,2011, Coughlin was
found living in the basement of the property, and was arrested.7 ROA, Vol. III, pp. 18-33. Coughlin
continues to file additional papers in both courts, wherein he attempts to raise new arguments he
never raised below.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW: "[A]n order granting summary eviction under NRS
40.253(6) should be reviewed on appeal based upon the standard for review of an order granting
summary judgment under NRCP 56 because these proceedings are analogous.,,8 Anvui, LLC v.
G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212, 215,163 P.3d 405 (2007). "To successfully defend against a
summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party must transcend the pleadings and, by
affidavit or other admissible evidence, introduce specific facts that show a genuine issue of
material fact. 9 Torrealba v. Kesmitis, 124 Nev. 95, 178 P.3d 716 (2008).
(Unlawful detainer proceedings are designed to afford the owner or landlord a speedy remedy to
recover possession
of his or her land after expiration of the term of the tenancy or right of possession of the tenant.[8]..
Its rather telling that Merliss and Baker continually alleged that Coughlin's tenancy or lease had
"expired" on March 1, 2011...yet, no eviction was sought until August 22nd 2011...yet they expect
one to believe such was not sought in retaliation, even where the events of May 23, 2011, and the
written correspondence between Coughlin and Merliss, especially those between March 2011 and
August 2011 (with a special emphasis on May 2011 and August 11th - 16th, 2011) demonstrate a
clear retaliatory animus and connection) Prima facie right to possession must be shown clearly
Nev.Farnow v. Department 1 of Eighth Judicial Dist. Court in and for Clark County, 64 Nev.
109, 178
P.2d 371 (1947).
[FN4] Ill.Beach v. Boettcher, 323 Ill. App. 79, 55 N.E.2d 104 (1st Dist. 1944).
Prima facie defense
N.Y.Core Management Corp. v. Loeb, 118 N.Y.S.2d 657 (App. Term 1952).
C. Statutory Dispossession Proceedings; Summary Proceedings 5. Pleadings 1554. Answer,
counteraffidavit, and subsequent pleadings , Landlord and Tenant 291(9), 305, 305.1, 307 A
defendant in a summary proceeding for possession of lease property generally is required to file an
answer or other appropriate pleading. A defendant in a summary proceeding for possession of lease
property generally is required to file an answer or other appropriate pleading.[1] The answer or other
pleading may either deny the allegations of plaintiff's pleading[2] or set up new matter constituting a
defense.[3] An answer or other pleading of the defendant is sufficient where it sets up in proper form
any defense that, if established, will prevent a recovery of judgment by the plaintiff.[4] [FN4] Ill.
Beach v. Boettcher, 323 Ill. App. 79, 55 N.E.2d 104 (1st Dist. 1944). Prima facie defense N.Y.Core
Management Corp. v. Loeb, 118 N.Y.S.2d 657 (App. Term 1952). C. Statutory Dispossession
Proceedings; Summary Proceedings 6. Evidence, Trial, and Disposition b. Conduct of Proceedings;
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Trial 1563. Dismissal or nonsuit; directed verdict , Landlord and Tenant 291(16), 309 A summary
dispossession proceeding may be dismissed, or a nonsuit may be granted, where the plaintiff fails to
prove a condition precedent. A summary dispossession proceeding may be dismissed, or a nonsuit
may be granted, where the plaintiff fails to prove a condition precedent.[1] The action also may be
dismissed where the plaintiff fails to prove a material allegation made by him or her and denied by
the defendant.[2] A dismissal or nonsuit may and should be refused, however, where the plaintiff has
made out a prima facie case.[3] [FN1] N.C.Warren v. Breedlove, 219 N.C. 383, 14 S.E.2d 43
(1941). . As to conditions precedent to summary dispossession proceedings, generally, see 1541. .
[FN2] N.C.Sycamore Mills v. Hervey Veneer Co., 228 N.C. 115, 44 S.E.2d 531 (1947). . Ohio
Parrish v. Stranahan, 86 Ohio App. 178, 41 Ohio Op. 27, 54 Ohio L. Abs. 586, 88 N.E.2d 263 (2d .
Dist. Franklin County 1949). . [FN3] Neb.Hoerger v. City State Bank, 151 Neb. 321, 37 N.W.2d
393 (1949). . N.Y.Sosniak v. Marcus, 191 Misc. 927, 82 N.Y.S.2d 619 (App. Term 1948). . Wash.
Archer v. Archer Blower & Pipe Co., 32 Wash. 2d 246, 201 P.2d 191 (1948). .
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6. Landlord's Possessory Remedies b. Summary Possessory Actions (4) Defenses, Setoff, and
Counterclaims (c) Landlord's Retaliatory Conduct AmJur LLT 873. Generall The landlord-andtenant statutes of many states allow defenses in unlawful-detainer or summary-eviction actions based
on a statutory prohibition against unlawful retaliation.[FN1] Such a statute may provide that where
a tenant makes the required threshold showing[FN2] or prima facie case of retaliatory conduct,
[FN3] the trier of fact shall presume that retaliatory action was taken[FN4] unless the landlord proves
otherwise by clear and convincing evidence[ FN5] or satisfies the statutory grounds for rebuttal of the
presumptions.[FN6] In another jurisdiction, retaliatory conduct is not presumed, so the tenant retains
the burden of proving the affirmative defense of retaliatory conduct regarding an eviction or lease
nonrenewal.[FN7] [FN1] Van Buren Apartments v. Adams, 145 Ariz. 325, 701 P.2d 583 (Ct. App.
Div. 2 1984); Drouet v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 4th 583, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003);
Correa v. Ward, 91 Conn. App. 142, 881 A.2d 393 (2005); Miller v. District of Columbia Rental
Housing Com'n, 870 A.2d 556 (D.C. 2005); Jablonski v. Casey, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 744, 835 N.E.2d
615 (2005) (holding that a claim for unlawful retaliation did not lie); Hoffman v. Davenport-Metcalf,
851 A.2d 1083 (R.I. 2004) (finding no unlawful retaliation occurred); Criss v. Salvation Army
Residences, 173 W. Va. 634, 319 S.E.2d 403 (1984). [FN2] Borger Management, Inc. v. Sindram,
886 A.2d 52 (D.C. 2005). [FN3] Correa v. Ward, 91 Conn. App. 142, 881 A.2d 393 (2005). [FN4]
Correa v. Ward, 91 Conn. App. 142, 881 A.2d 393 (2005); Borger Management, Inc. v. Sindram, 886
A.2d 52 (D.C. 2005); Zimbovsky v. Tokar, 2005 Mass. App. Div. 100, 2005 WL 2219683 (2005). As
to the presumption of retaliation arising under the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, see
874. [FN5] Borger Management, Inc. v. Sindram, 886 A.2d 52 (D.C. 2005). [FN6] Correa v. Ward,
91 Conn. App. 142, 881 A.2d 393 (2005). The statutory presumption that a tenant's eviction was
retaliatory based on her report of code violations to the Health Department did not apply where the
tenant was evicted for nonpayment of rent. Zimbovsky v. Tokar, 2005 Mass. App. Div. 100, 2005
WL 2219683 (2005). [FN7] Houle v. Quenneville, 173 Vt. 80, 787 A.2d 1258 (2001).
CJS Statutory Dispossession Proceedings; Summary Proceedings 3. Defenses 1546. Limitation on
available defenses generally , Landlord and Tenant 290(3), 290(4), 298(1) Only claims bearing
directly on the right of immediate possession ordinarily are cognizable.[3] As such, affirmative
defenses are permissible only insofar as they would, if successful, preclude removal of the tenant
from the premises.[4] Thus, the tenant in a summary proceeding may interpose legal defenses[5
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[FN5] N.Y.Janks v. Central City Roofing Co., 271 A.D. 545, 67 N.Y.S.2d 355 (4th Dep't 1947). .]
that show that his or her occupancy is rightful.[6] Additionally, equitable defenses and counterclaims
implicating the right to possession are also available in a summary process proceeding.[7] [FN3]
IdahoCarter v. Zollinger, 146 Idaho 842, 203 P.3d 1241 (2009). . N.D.VND, LLC v. Leevers
Foods, Inc., 2003 ND 198, 672 N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 2003). . [FN4] Cal.Vella v. Hudgins, 20 Cal. 3d
251, 142 Cal. Rptr. 414, 572 P.2d 28 (1977). . As to the scope of remedy available in summary
proceedings for possession, generally, see 1531. . [FN5] N.Y.Janks v. Central City Roofing Co.,
271 A.D. 545, 67 N.Y.S.2d 355 (4th Dep't 1947). . [FN6] N.Y.Zraick v. Reyes, 204 Misc. 174, 123
N.Y.S.2d 775 (Mun. Ct. 1953). . OhioDavis v. Boyajian, Inc., 11 Ohio Misc. 97, 40 Ohio Op. 2d
344, 229 N.E.2d 116 (C.P. 1967). . Tex.Young Women's Christian Ass'n of Austin v. Hair, 165
S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App. Austin 1942), . writ refused w.o.m., (Nov. 25, 1942). . [FN7] Conn.19
Perry Street, LLC v. Unionville Water Co., 294 Conn. 611, 987 A.2d 1009 (2010). . Retaliatory
eviction. A landlord's retaliation against a tenant for the tenant's assertion or exercise of rights may be
a defense to eviction.[ 15] However, where the landlord rebuts a presumption of retaliation by
establishing a nonretaliatory motive for an eviction, there is no bar to issuance of a writ of possession.
[16] The retaliation defense to an eviction is not limited to situations where the landlord acts illegally
since a retaliatory motive may taint an action to evict tenants that would otherwise be lawful.[17]
[FN15] Cal.Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682, 693 P.2d 261 (1984),
judgment aff'd, 475 U.S. 260, 106 S. Ct. 1045, 89 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1986). . IdahoWright v. Brady,
126 Idaho 671, 889 P.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1995). . Assertion by month-to-month tenants Alaska
Vinson v. Hamilton, 854 P.2d 733 (Alaska 1993). Report of housing code violation Wis.Dickhut v.
Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297, 40 A.L.R.3d 740 (1970). . [FN16] Me.Perreault v.
Parker, 490 A.2d 203 (Me. 1985). . Not applicable upon termination of fixed-term lease Mich.
Frenchtown Villa v. Meadors, 117 Mich. App. 683, 324 N.W.2d 133 (1982). [FN17] D.C.Gomez v.
Independence Management of Delaware, Inc., 967 A.2d 1276 (D.C. 2009).
LEGAL DEFENSE :
Thus, the tenant in a summary proceeding may interpose legal defenses[5 [FN5] N.Y.Janks v.
Central City Roofing Co., 271 A.D. 545, 67 N.Y.S.2d 355 (4th Dep't 1947). .] that show that his or
her occupancy is rightful.
C. Statutory Dispossession Proceedings; Summary Proceedings 3. Defenses 1547. Payment of rent ,
Landlord and Tenant 290(3), 290(4), 298(1) Payment of rent, or a lawful excuse for nonpayment, may
be asserted as a defense in a summary proceeding based on a failure to pay rent. Equitable as well as
legal defenses asserting payment of rent, or absolution from payment in whole or in part, are available
to the tenant in a dispossess action and must be considered by the court.[1] In summary proceedings
based on a nonpayment of rent, a good defense may be raised by showing a payment, settlement,
release, or discharge of the liability for rent,[2] so that there is no rent due,[3] or there is a lawful and
sufficient excuse for its nonpayment.[ 4] However, under the particular statute providing for the
summary process, a failure on the part of the landlord may be irrelevant in assessing the propriety of
possessory relief since a tenant is not entitled to withhold rent based on any other asserted breach of
contract.[5] Tender of rent when due ordinarily is the equivalent of payment and constitutes a good
defense.[6] However, a tender of rent after the due date may not constitute a defense[7] unless strict
performance of the terms of the lease has been waived.[8] A tender or offer to pay does not constitute
a defense when made after the termination of the tenancy[9] if the proceeding is brought on the
ground of holding over rather than for nonpayment of rent[10] nor is the fact that the rent claimed is
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not due a defense to the proceedings based on a termination of the term of the lease although that fact
may be relevant to the landlord's right to terminate the lease.[11] [FN1] N.J.Marini v. Ireland, 56
N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526, 40 A.L.R.3d 1356 (1970). As to right of action based on nonpayment of rent,
see 1540. As to rights and liability for rents, generally, see 1077 to 1235. . [FN2] N.Y.
Galluccio v. Moscatiello, 74 N.Y.S.2d 897 (App. Term 1947). . OhioHoover v. Israel, 34 Ohio Op.
253, 45 Ohio L. Abs. 490, 68 N.E.2d 90 (Mun. Ct. 1946). . Acceptance of rent Ill.Gaskins v.
Ristich, 339 Ill. App. 493, 90 N.E.2d 232 (4th Dist. 1950). N.Y.Howard v. Major Aircoach
Systems, Inc., 118 N.Y.S.2d 607 (App. Term 1952). Dismissal upon payment of rent and costs N.J.
Community Realty Management, Inc. for Wrightstown Arms Apartments v. Harris, 155 N.J. 212, .
714 A.2d 282 (1998). . [FN3] N.Y.De Vita v. Pianisani, 127 Misc. 611, 217 N.Y.S. 438 (App.
Term 1926). . [FN4] Neb.Farmer v. Pitts, 108 Neb. 9, 187 N.W. 95, 24 A.L.R. 719 (1922). . Excuse
insufficient Wash.Young v. Riley, 59 Wash. 2d 50, 365 P.2d 769 (1961). Withholding of rent for
repairs La.Leggio v. Manion, 172 So. 2d 748 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1965). Unreasonable change in
renewal lease N.J.447 Associates v. Miranda, 115 N.J. 522, 559 A.2d 1362 (1989). . [FN5] D.C.
Pinzon v. A & G Properties, 874 A.2d 347 (D.C. 2005). .[FN8] Ga.Arnold v. Selman, 83 Ga. App.
145, 62 S.E.2d 915 (1951). Failure to present check Ga.Yates v. Farmer, 102 Ga. App. 570, 117
S.E.2d 211 (1960). . [FN9] Ala.Allen v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 205 Ala. 363, 87 So. 562
(1921). . N.Y.Finkelstein v. Fabyik, 107 N.Y.S. 67 (App. Term 1907). . [FN10] Ga.Shiflett v.
Anchor Rome Mills, 78 Ga. App. 428, 50 S.E.2d 853 (1948). . N.C.Seligson v. Klyman, 227 N.C.
347, 42 S.E.2d 220 (1947). . Vt.Canfield v. Hall, 121 Vt. 479, 160 A.2d 768 (1960). . As to holding
over as grounds for a summary dispossession proceeding, see 1537 to 1540. . [FN11] Conn.
Webb v. Ambler, 125 Conn. 543, 7 A.2d 228 (1939). . CJS LANDLORD 1547 XII. Reentry and
Recovery of Possession by Landlord C. Statutory Dispossession Proceedings; Summary Proceedings
2. Right of Action and Grounds a. Grounds 1538. Holding over , Landlord and Tenant 290(2),
296(1), 389 The statutes prescribing summary process for possession generally authorize such
proceedings to oust tenants holding over after the expiration or termination of their terms. The
statutes prescribing summary process for possession generally authorize such proceedings to oust
tenants holding over after the expiration or termination of their terms.[1] In the absence of a
contractual right to terminate the tenancy before its natural expiration date,[2] a tenant may not be
summarily removed under such a statute until the expiration or termination of the term within the
meaning of the statute.[3] [FN1] U.S.Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hansen & Rowland Corp.,
166 F.2d 258 (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1948). N.Y.Remedco Corp. v. Bryn Mawr Hotel Corp., 45 Misc. 2d
586, 257 N.Y.S.2d 525 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1965). Vt.Canfield v. Hall, 121 Vt. 479, 160 A.2d 768
(1960). Alternative remedies Commercial landlords possess three separate, yet somewhat
overlapping, remedies for removing a tenant who holds over after the expiration of a lease, including
the historic common-law remedy of ejectment, an unlawful-detainer action, and a tenant-removal
action. Fla.Pro-Art Dental Lab, Inc. v. V-Strategic Group, LLC, 986 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 2008).
[FN2] N.Y.Baumeister v. Casieri, 32 Misc. 2d 654, 228 N.Y.S.2d 339 (App. Term 1961). [FN3]
Conn.Feneck v. Nowakowski, 146 Conn. 434, 151 A.2d 891 (1959). N.Y.Baumeister v. Casieri,
32 Misc. 2d 654, 228 N.Y.S.2d 339 (App. Term 1961). Vt.Canfield v. Hall, 121 Vt. 479, 160 A.2d
768 (1960). CJS LANDLORD 1538
All the ambiguity in the lease agreement as to the lack of a defined termination date arguably
means that Merliss had not right to terminate the lease for no cause, ever, and further, that the lease
never expired (term is listed in Paragraph 2 of the lease as "no less than 12 months", which is far
different than "12 months"):
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Ambiguous provision requires nonsummary proceedings

Nev.Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212, 163 P.3d 405 (2007).
both legal and equitable defenses available: Where the lessees do not raise issues of title
through their affirmative defenses in a forcible entry and unlawful
detainer action brought by the lessor, and the issues they raise instead involve the question of whether
there has been
an unlawful detainer, both equitable and legal defenses may be litigated to resolve such issues.
[13[FN13] N.M.Wal-Go Associates v. Leon, 95 N.M. 565, 624 P.2d 507 (1981).
C. Statutory Dispossession Proceedings; Summary Proceedings 3. Defenses 1547. Payment of rent ,

Landlord and Tenant 290(3), 290(4), 298(1) Payment of rent, or a lawful excuse for nonpayment, may
be asserted as a defense in a summary proceeding based on a failure to pay rent. Equitable as well as
legal defenses asserting payment of rent, or absolution from payment in whole or in part, are available
to the tenant in a dispossess action and must be considered by the court.[1] I [FN1] N.J.Marini v.
Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526, 40 A.L.R.3d 1356 (1970).
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II. Appealable Matters

A. In General; Finality
2. Factors Considered in Determining Finality
a. In General
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Topic Summary Correlation Table References
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84. Effect of post-trial motion
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West's Key Number Digest

West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and Error k66, 76(3), 78(6)
Since an appeal will only lie from a final decision, the filing of a postjudgment motion ordinarily
suspends the appealability of the judgment until a decision is made on the motion.[FN1] The Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that if a party timely files in the district court any of the
following motions, as authorized the various provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
time to file an appeal runs for all parties from the entry of the order disposing of the last such
remaining motion:[FN2]
(1) Motion for judgment under Rule 50(b);
(2) Motion to amend or make additional factual findings under Rule 52(b), whether or not granting
the motion would alter the judgment;
(3) Motion for attorney's fees under Rule 54, if the district court extends the time to appeal under Rule
58;
(4) Motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59;
(5) Motion for a new trial under Rule 59; or
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(6) Motion for relief under Rule 60, if the motion is filed no later than 10 days after the judgment is
entered.
If a party files a notice of appeal after the court announces or enters a judgment, but before it
disposes of any of the foregoing motions, the notice becomes effective to appeal a judgment or order,
in whole or in part, when the order disposing of the last such remaining motion is entered.[FN3]
Under similar state rules, when a post-trial motion is pending before an appeal is taken, the
judgment or decision to which the motion is addressed is interlocutory until the trial court rules on the
motion, and if the nonmoving party appeals while the motion is pending, the ap
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peal is premature because the appeal was not taken from a final judgment.[FN4] Thus, finality
does not attach to any judgment in a civil proceeding, so as to invoke the jurisdiction of the state
supreme court over an appeal, while a timely filed motion for reargument is pending in the lower
court.[FN5] Likewise, a civil defendant's motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict will render the judgment nonappealable until the trial court enters an order disposing of
the motions, or the motions are deemed denied.[FN6]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
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Cases:
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A renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law following verdict is not allowed unless the
movant sought relief on similar grounds before the case was submitted to the jury. Exxon Shipping
Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 171 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2008).
Pendency of two motions in district court that sought permission to cash check that had already
been deposited in attorney's trust account and for which partial satisfaction of judgment had been filed
did not affect finality of other postjudgment orders for purposes of immediate appeal. Tweedle v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 527 F.3d 664 (8th Cir. 2008).
Case in which timely motion to alter or amend judgment has been filed lacks finality for appeal
because the motion tolls the time limitation for appeal in order to provide the trial court with
jurisdiction to resolve the motion. Tweedle v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 527 F.3d 664 (8th Cir.
2008).
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[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
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[FN1] Century Laminating, Ltd. v. Montgomery, 595 F.2d 563, 27 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
264 (10th Cir. 1979).
[FN2] Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A).
[FN3] Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i).
[FN4] IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d 621 (Iowa 2000).
[FN5] Bowen v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., Inc., 879 A.2d 920 (Del. 2005).
[FN6] Thompson v. TLAT, Inc., 205 Or. App. 518, 134 P.3d 1099 (2006). 2012 Thomson
Reuters. 33-34B 2012 Thomson Reuters/RIA. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. All rights
reserved. AMJUR APPELLATE 84
Tenants waived on appeal their argument that trial judge was required to find at least clear and
26
convincing proof of tenants' breach of a lease agreement, where they did not raise the issue in the trial
27
court in eviction proceedings. Koon v. Fares, 379 S.C. 150, 666 S.E.2d 230 (2008).
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Tenant failed to preserve on appeal argument that judge's alleged ex parte communications
with landlord warranted recusal, where tenant failed to raise issue in the trial court. Koon v. Fares,
379 S.C. 150, 666 S.E.2d 230 (2008).
The Justice Court never ruled on whether Couglhin could get a stay under NRS
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40.385, or upon the posting of a supersedeas bond pursuant thereto of $250. As such, finall appellate
jurisdiction as to such where there was no "decision in" the justice court as to those issues, does not
lie with the District Court, but, rather, it was the 1/11/12 Order in District Court denying Coughlin's
12/30/11 Motion for Stay pursuant to NRS 40.385 that was the first decision thereon, and as such was
a "decision in" or matter "arising in" the District Court and appealable to the Nevada Supreme Court.
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B. Appealability or Reviewability of Particular Types of Decisions, Proceedings, or Issues
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1. Preliminary Matters
b. Mode of Trial
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138. Stay of proceedings
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West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and Error k70(6), 870(2) West's Key Number Digest, Federal
Courts k572.1, 574, 576.1, 585.1
A.L.R. Library
Stay of civil proceedings pending determination of action in federal court in same state, 56
A.L.R.2d 335
Appealability of order granting or refusing stay or continuance under federal civil relief act
because of litigant's military service, 34 A.L.R.2d 1149
Stay of civil proceedings pending determination of action in another state or country, 19 A.L.R.2d
301
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Since the general policy of the law is to permit an appeal only from final judgments or decisions
in the absence of a statute or rule specifically providing otherwise, an order or decree staying, or
refusing to stay, a state civil action because another civil action is pending in state court generally is
not reviewable by appeal.[FN1] However, an appeal of a stay may be allowed on the ground that the
stay is, in effect, an injunction and thus immediately appealable under a statutory provision
authorizing review of the entry of an injunction.[FN2]
An order granting[FN3] or denying[FN4] a stay in federal civil cases likewise ordinarily is not a
final, appealable order. On the other hand, an order granting a stay in federal court pending resolution
of a state suit is final and appealable when the res judicata effect of the judgment in state court would
preclude further litigation in federal court,[FN5] the postponement of which renders the federal
plaintiff effectively out of court,[FN6] and is tantamount to a dismissal of the underlying suit,[FN7]
even where the language suggests the order is subject
to revision[FN8] or progress reports.[FN9]
In addition, a nontentative, final decision to stay federal litigation under the abstention doctrine is
immediately appealable, under the general federal appellate jurisdiction stat-ute,[FN10] where the
objective of the stay is to require all or an essential part of the federal suit to be litigated in a state
forum.[FN11] However, the federalism concerns posed by the abstention problem are not implicated
by a motion to stay in favor of an action in another federal district.[FN12]
A stay order is also appealable under 28 U.S.C.A. 1291 where
1.it effectively deprives the plaintiff of his or her day in court, as where a prisoner's suit is stayed until
his or her release from incarceration.[FN13]
2.it limits the stay to which a receiver is entitled under federal law.[FN14]
3.a delay results in a denial of justice, such as in a school desegregation case.[FN15]
4.a civil action alleging that a criminal prosecution would violate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights is
stayed pending trial of the criminal action.[FN16]
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A district court's stay order in a suit challenging the enforcement of a provision of a liquor code
prohibiting lewd, immoral, or improper entertainment in a facility holding a liquor license, and
implementing a regulation, did not finally resolve a disputed question or raise an important issue
distinct from the merits, but rather, it merely caused a delay, and, thus, was not appealable.[FN17]
Cases:
27
Although district court's first order granted Indian tribe partial summary judgment on IS-DEAA
claim for self-determination contract for reservation health services, and directed tribe and
Department of Health and Human Service (HHS) to draft form of injunctive relief, court's second
order in favor of HHS's approach as to contract start date and payment of contract support costs did
not expressly grant injunctive relief, as would allow review of second order, since second order was
merely step in litigation process stating that tribe was entitled to relief, but did not enter judgment on
merits specifying that relief. Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Leavitt, 564 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2009).
28
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
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[FN1] Almon v. R. H. Macy & Co., 103 Ga. App. 372, 119 S.E.2d 140 (1961); Richard's Buick, Inc.
v. Sease, 116 Ga. App. 232, 156 S.E.2d 365 (1967), judgment aff'd, 223 Ga. 754, 158 S.E.2d 402
(1967); Highfield Water Co. v. Washington County Sanitary Dist., 295 Md. 410, 456 A.2d 371
(1983).
[FN2] Washington Suburban Sanitary Com'n v. C.I. Mitchell and Best Co., 303 Md. 544, 495 A.2d
30 (1985).
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[FN3] Boushel v. Toro Co., 985 F.2d 406 (8th Cir. 1993); Rolo v. General Development Corp., 949
F.2d 695 (3d Cir. 1991). [FN4] Reise v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System, 957
F.2d 293, 73 Ed. Law Rep. 348, 21 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 927 (7th Cir. 1992); U.S. v. Georgia Pac. Corp.,
562 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1977); Anderson v. U.S., 520 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1975). [FN5] Burns v.
6
7
Watler, 931 F.2d 140 (1st Cir. 1991); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Madonna, 914 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir.
1990). [FN6] Rojas-Hernandez v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Authority, 925 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1991).
[FN7] Boushel v. Toro Co., 985 F.2d 406 (8th Cir. 1993); Cheyney State College Faculty v.
Hufstedler, 703 F.2d 732, 10 Ed. Law Rep. 66 (3d Cir. 1983). [FN8] General Reinsurance Corp. v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp., 853 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1988). [FN9] Burns v. Watler, 931 F.2d 140 (1st Cir. 1991).
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[FN10] 28 U.S.C.A. 1291, discussed generally in 79. [FN11] Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101 (3d
Cir. 1989). [FN12] Harmon Kardon, Inc. v. Ashley Hi-Fi, 602 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1979). [FN13]
McKnight v. Blanchard, 667 F.2d 477, 33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 999 (5th Cir. 1982). [FN14] Praxis
Properties, Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 947 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1991), as amended on denial of
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reh'g, (Nov. 13, 1991). [FN15] Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Ed. of Nashville and Davidson
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County, Tenn., 436 F.2d 856 (6th Cir. 1970). [FN16] McSurely v. McClellan, 426 F.2d 664, 13 Fed.
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R. Serv. 2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1970). [FN17] Conchatta, Inc. v. Evanko, 83 Fed. Appx. 437 (3d Cir.
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2003). 2012 Thomson Reuters. 33-34B 2012 Thomson Reuters/RIA. No Claim to Orig. U.S.
Govt. Works. All rights reserved. AMJUR APPELLATE 138
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1. Preliminary Matters
c. Jurisdiction and Process; Venue
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142. Jurisdiction
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West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and Error k70(.5), 870(2) West's Key Number Digest, Federal
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Courts k576.1, 585.1

A decision in the course of a trial, overruling an objection to the court's jurisdiction, is usually not
directly appealable, any error in the decision thereon being reviewed only on appeal from the final
judgment.[FN1] However, a trial court's declination to try a case on the ground that it lacks
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jurisdiction is not merely an interlocutory decision, but a final and therefore appealable decision.
[FN2]
A state court judgment affirming the denial of a defendant's motion to dismiss a complaint for want of
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personal jurisdiction, challenging the constitutionality of a long-arm statute, may constitute a final
judgment for the purpose of review in the United States Supreme Court.[FN3] Similarly, a decision
by a highest state court that the courts of that state have jurisdiction to adjudicate an action based
upon sequestration of the defendant's property in the state is a final judgment reviewable by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statute,[FN4] where, if an immediate appeal is not permitted, the
appellants would have the choice of suffering the entry of a default judgment or of entering a general
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appearance and defending on the mer-its.[FN5]

A federal district court's order in a civil rights case declining to retain supplemental jurisdiction over
the plaintiff's state law claims is an unappealable interlocutory order, rather than an immediately
11
appealable final order, where the order leaves intact the plaintiff's federal law claims.[FN6]
12
[FN1] Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 306 N.C. 324, 293 S.E.2d 182 (1982).
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[FN2] First American Nat. Bank of Iuka v. Alcorn, Inc., 361 So. 2d 481, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1240
14
(Miss. 1978); Southern Spindle and Flyer Co., Inc. v. Milliken & Co., 53 N.C. App. 785, 281 S.E.2d
734 (1981); Speer v. Stover, 685 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. 1985). [FN3] Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S.
15
Ct. 1482, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.
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Ct. 559, 62 LED 2d 490 (1980). [FN4] 28 U.S.C.A. 1257. [FN5] Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
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97 S. Ct. 2569, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1977). [FN6] Montano v. City of Chicago, 375 F.3d 593 (7th Cir.
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2004). 2012 Thomson Reuters. 33-34B 2012 Thomson Reuters/RIA. No Claim to Orig. U.S.
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5. Particular Types of Judgments
161. Summary judgment
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k576.1, 585.1, 595
An order granting a motion for summary judgment generally is appealable, since it is a final
decision,[FN1] at least when the motion is granted on the whole case.[FN2] An order granting partial
summary judgment from which no immediate appeal lies is merged into the final judgment and
reviewable on appeal from that final judgment.[FN3] An order granting partial summary judgment is
not appealable, despite a voluntary dismissal of the remaining claims without prejudice, even though
the dismissal order appears to be final on its face, where the parties have agreed to allow the plaintiff
to refile the dismissed claims at a later point in time.[FN4] Similarly, summary judgment granted to
fewer than all of the defendants in an action is not final as to all parties and therefore not immediately
appealable, where the remaining defendant or defendants did not join in the motion for summary
judgment and the district court does not certify the order as appealable.[FN5]
Ordinarily, a court of appeals has no jurisdiction to hear an immediate appeal from a district court
order denying summary judgment, because it is not a final decision.[FN6] The denial of a motion for
summary judgment generally is an interlocutory decision only, and therefore not directly appealable,
since such a denial is not an adjudication on the merits against the movant and he or she is not thereby
foreclosed from the possibility of prevailing in the case when the facts are developed.[FN7] If the
only order in the trial court is one overruling a motion for summary judgment, that order generally is
interlocutory and no appeal will lie.[FN8] The trial court's denial of summary judgment as to one
claim establishes that fact issues still remain for resolution at trial, and this denial, in turn, renders the
entire order interlocutory, thereby precluding appellate review.[FN9]
Observation:
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When an appeal from denial of summary judgment is raised in tandem with appeal of an order
granting a cross-motion for summary judgment, a United States Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to
review the propriety of the denial of summary judgment by a district court.[FN10]
Practice Tip:
The provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allowing certification of an appeal from an
order involving fewer than all claims or parties[FN11] is the proper vehicle for a motion to reconsider
a denial of summary judgment, because this type of order is interlocutory in nature.[FN12]
However, for purposes of the collateral order doctrine and the requirement, under the general
federal appellate jurisdiction statute,[FN13] of a final decision for immediate appealability from a
federal district court to a federal court of appeals, not every denial of summary judgment is
nonappealable.[FN14] A federal appellate court has jurisdiction of an appeal from the denial of a
summary judgment motion on the grounds of qualified immunity where it involves a purely legal
question,[FN15] and the district court's mere assertion that disputed factual issues exist is not enough
to preclude an immediate appeal of an order denying summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds.[FN16]
An order denying summary judgment ordinarily is immediately appealable where the motion is
made on the basis of the qualified immunity of a public officer or employee.[FN17] Likewise, denial
of a summary judgment motion based on absolute immunity is immediately appealable since it is an
issue of law, separable from the merits of the case, which once denied cannot be effectively preserved
for later review.[FN18] On the other hand, denial of a police officer's motion for summary judgment
on qualified immunity grounds in a civil rights action for false arrest and malicious prosecution is not
immediately appealable where the district court has ruled that a genuine issue of material fact existed
as to whether it was reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed for the arrest.
[FN19] In a case in which an individual, asserting that police officers have used excessive force by
beating the individual, brings a civil rights action against the officers, and the officers, who as
government officials are entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense to the action, move for
summary judgment as to the excessive force question on the basis of the argument that the record
lacks sufficient evidence that the officers beat the individual or were present when others did so, the
portion of a federal district court's order denying the summary judgment motion as to the evidence
sufficiency question, based on the district court's determination that the record raises a genuine issue
of fact concerning the officers' involvement in the alleged beating, is not a final decision that is
immediately appealable by the officers as a collateral order.[FN20]
A district court's denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, in an
arrestee's civil rights action, is an immediately appealable final decision within the meaning of the
statute providing for appeals from final decisions of district courts, even though the district court has
found genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment, where the defendant claims
in his or her brief to the court of appeals that he or she is entitled to qualified immunity even under
the arrestee's version of the facts.[FN21] Thus, for example, a court of appeals has jurisdiction to hear
an interlocutory appeal from a denial
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of summary judgment based on qualified immunity, where the appellant concedes the plaintiffappellee's version of the facts for purposes of appeal and contends that he or she is entitled to
qualified immunity as a matter of law on those facts.[FN22]
Summary judgment issues that are inextricably intertwined with the issue of the propriety of the
denial of a preliminary injunction, over which a United States Court of Appeals has interlocutory
appellate jurisdiction, can be addressed in an appeal from the denial of preliminary injunctive relief.
[FN23]
Caution:
The statute which grants the courts of appeals jurisdiction of appeals from certain interlocutory
orders, including those granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving injunctions, or
refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, does not authorize an appeal from orders denying motions
for summary judgment because of unresolved issues of fact.[FN24]
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Whether public officials have waived the defense of qualified immunity by failing to raise it until
they submitted a motion for summary judgment is an issue of law over which a court of appeals has
jurisdiction, under the collateral order doctrine, upon the officials' appeal of the denial of their motion
for summary judgment.[FN25]
Cases:
Defendant may not appeal order denying summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds after
full trial on merits; abrogating Goff v. Bise,173 F.3d 1068. Ortiz v. Jordan, 131
S. Ct. 884 (2011).
Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review district court's denial of motion to vacate denial of
defendants' non-qualified-immunity-based summary judgment motion, in 1983 political
discrimination action; defendants' appeal was not from final judgment. Guillemard-Ginorio v.
Contreras-Gomez, 490 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2007).
Generally, the denial of summary judgment is not a final order subject to appeal; however, it
becomes so when accompanied by an order granting a cross-motion for summary judgment.
Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 2503 (U.S. 2008).
In 1983 action by former county jail guards against other guards, alleging First Amendment
retaliation, defendants could appeal from order conclusively denying motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity, whether or not the guards appealed from a prior order denying a motion
to dismiss the complaint and whether or not the motion for summary judgment rested on new legal or
factual arguments. Fairley v. Fermaint, 482 F.3d 897 (7th Cir. 2007).
The court of appeals may not review a district court's denial of summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity, insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a
genuine issue of fact for trial. Alston v. Read, 663 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2011).
Ordinarily a denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final appealable order. 28
U.S.C.A. 1291. McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed
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(U.S. Aug. 17, 2010) and petition for cert. filed (U.S. Aug. 17, 2010). Ordinarily a denial of a motion
for summary judgment is not a final appealable order. 28
3
U.S.C.A. 1291. McComish v. Bennett, 605 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 2010). The law of the case doctrine does
4 not apply to a denial of summary judgment. Aycock Engineering, Inc. v. Airflite, Inc., 560 F.3d 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
5
As a general rule, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is neither reviewable nor
appealable, but that general rule does not apply where the refusal to grant a summary judgment
6
motion has the effect of determining that the appellant is not entitled to immunity from suit, as the
7 right of immunity from suit is effectively lost if a case is permitted to go to trial. City of Fayetteville
v. Romine, 373 Ark. 318, 284 S.W.3d 10 (2008).
8
appealable,
but that general rule does not apply where the refusal to grant a summary judgment
9
motion has the effect of determining that the appellant is not entitled to immunity from suit, as the
10 right of immunity from suit is effectively lost if a case is permitted to go to trial.. City of Fayetteville
v. Romine, 373 Ark. 318, 284 S.W.3d 10 (2008).
11
The general rule that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is neither reviewable nor
appealable does not apply where the refusal to grant a summary-judgment motion has the effect of
12
determining that the appellant is not entitled to immunity from suit, as the right of immunity from suit
13 is effectively lost if a case is permitted to go to trial. Arkansas River Educational Services v.
Modacure, 371 Ark. 466, 267 S.W.3d 595, 238 Ed. Law Rep. 918 (2007).
14
appealable. Arkansas River Educational Services v. Modacure, 371 Ark. 466, 267 S.W.3d 595, 238
15
Ed. Law Rep. 918 (2007).
A denial of a motion for summary judgment is not subject to review on appeal, even after a trial
16
on the merits. Get Rid Of It Arkansas, Inc. v. Hughes, 368 Ark. 535, 247 S.W.3d 838 (2007).
17
The denial of a summary judgment is not an appealable order and is not subject to review on
appeal, even after a trial on the merits. Flagstar Bank v. Gibbins, 367 Ark. 225, 238 S.W.3d 912
18
(2006).
In determining whether the parties' respective burdens were met on a defendant's motion for
19
summary judgment in an employment discrimination action, reviewing court must view the evidence
20 in the light most favorable to plaintiff, as the nonmoving party, liberally construing her evidence
while strictly scrutinizing defendant's. Scotch v. Art Institute of California-Orange County, Inc., 173
21
Cal. App. 4th 986, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 338, 244 Ed. Law Rep. 211 (4th Dist. 2009).
Statute requiring liberal construction of pleadings is irrelevant in the Court of Appeal's review of
22
the granting of a motion for summary judgment based on plaintiffs' failure to meet their burden to
23 establish a triable issue of material fact. Gomez v. Lincare, Inc., 173 Cal. App. 4th 508, 93 Cal. Rptr.
3d 388 (4th Dist. 2009), as modified, (Apr. 28, 2009) and review denied, (July 22, 2009).
24
Trial court's order denying employer's motion for summary judgment and granting its motion for
summary
adjudication only as to employee's claims for providing paystubs containing misstatements
25
and for failing to provide meal and rest periods was an appealable order, even though it did not
26 dispose of three of employee's causes of action, where trial court had certified subclasses on the
paystub and meal time claims; the order terminated all claims on behalf
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of the paystub and meal time subclasses. Brinkley v. Public Storage, Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 873
(Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2008), as modified, (Nov. 5, 2008) and review granted and opinion superseded, 87
Cal. Rptr. 3d 674, 198 P.3d 1087 (Cal. 2009).
The denial of a motion for summary judgment is ordinarily not an appealable final judgment;
however, if parties file cross motions for summary judgment and the court grants one and denies the
other, the appellate court has jurisdiction to consider both rulings on appeal. Hannaford v. Mann, 134
Conn. App. 265, 38 A.3d 1239 (2012).
Denial of a motion for summary judgment is not ordinarily appealable because it is not a final
judgment, but where the case has not gone to trial, summary judgments are appealable because the
rationale that a decision based on more evidence should preclude a decision based on less evidence is
not applicable in that situation. Papapietro v. Farmington Police Dept., 129 Conn. App. 695, 22 A.3d
634 (2011).
Although the denial of a motion for summary judgment ordinarily is not appealable because it is
not a final judgment, the denial of a motion for summary judgment on the basis of a claim of res
judicata is a final judgment for purposes of appeal because it invokes the right not to go to trial on the
merits. Sotavento Corp. v. Coastal Pallet Corp., 102 Conn. App. 828, 927 A.2d 351 (2007).
The grant of a motion for summary judgment in a multi-party case will not, standing alone,
necessarily authorize the initiation of a direct appeal therefrom by any party to the underlying case;
rather, an appeal must be filed by one who has standing to pursue it. Davis v. Deutsche Bank Nat.
Trust Co., 285 Ga. 22, 673 S.E.2d 221 (2009).
An order denying a motion for summary judgment is not an appealable order itself, nor is it
reviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Grover v. Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60, 205 P.3d 1196
(2009).
Supreme Court does not review the denial of summary judgment when there has been a trial on
the merits. Bybee v. Isaac, 145 Idaho 251, 178 P.3d 616 (2008).
Reviewing a summary judgment disposition, Supreme Court construes all evidence strictly
against the movant and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. Buenz v. Frontline Transp. Co., 227
Ill. 2d 302, 317 Ill. Dec. 645, 882 N.E.2d 525 (2008).
A ruling denying a motion for summary judgment merges into the judgment after trial, and the
ruling is not reviewable on appeal. Robinson v. Tellabs, Inc., 391 Ill. App. 3d 60, 329 Ill. Dec. 910,
907 N.E.2d 501 (1st Dist. 2009), appeal denied, 233 Ill. 2d 600, 335 Ill. Dec. 646, 919 N.E.2d 365
(2009).
In a review of summary judgment, all facts established by the designated evidence, and all
reasonable inferences from them, are to be construed in favor of the nonmoving party. (Per Boehm, J.,
with one judge concurring and one judge concurring in the result). Overton v. Grillo, 896 N.E.2d 499
(Ind. 2008).
On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court must construe all facts and
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Barnett v. Clark, 889 N.E.2d 281 (Ind. 2008).
Appellate court will affirm summary judgment unless there is a genuine issue as to a material fact
or the moving party is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Kopczynski v. Barger, 887
N.E.2d 928 (Ind. 2008).
The denial of a motion for summary judgment is no longer appealable once the matter proceeds to
a trial on the merits. Lindsay v. Cottingham & Butler Ins. Services, Inc., 763 N.W.2d
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568 (Iowa 2009).

On appeal from summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same rules as the trial court.
Potts v. Board of County Com'rs of Leavenworth County, 39 Kan. App. 2d 71, 176 P.3d 988 (2008).
Generally, a denial of a motion for summary judgment is, first, not appealable because of its
interlocutory nature and, second, is not reviewable on appeal from a final judgment where the
question is whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact; there is, however, an exception to
this rule that applies where: (1) the facts are not in dispute, (2) the only basis of the ruling is a matter
of law, (3) there is a denial of the motion, and (4) there is an entry of a final judgment with an appeal
therefrom. Hazard Coal Corp. v. Knight, 325 S.W.3d 290 (Ky. 2010).
In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court must determine whether the trial court
correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact, and that the moving party
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jones v. Board of Educ. of Laurel County, 2008 WL
4755327 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).
The denial of a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable on appeal from a final judgment
where the question is whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact; however an exception to
this rule is where: (1) the facts are not in dispute, (2) the only basis of the ruling is a matter of law, (3)
there is a denial of the motion, and (4) there is an entry of a final judgment with an appeal therefrom.
Gersh v. Bowman, 239 S.W.3d 567 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).
A denial of a motion for summary judgment, in whole or in part, is an interlocutory judgment that
is not appealable and cannot be certified as such; the same reasoning applies to the denial of
exceptions. (Per McClendon, J., with one judge concurring and one judge concurring in the result).
Ascension School Employees Credit Union v. Provost Salter Harper & Alford, L.L.C., 960 So. 2d
939 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2007).
Because denials of motions for summary judgment are interlocutory, generally they are not
immediately reviewable; when a denied motion for summary judgment addressed issues of privilege,
immunity, or both from suit, however, the Supreme Judicial Court will review such decisions based
on judicially created exceptions to the final-judgment rule. Morgan v. Kooistra, 2008 ME 26, 941
A.2d 447 (Me. 2008).
Court of Appeals only looks to the evidence submitted in opposition and support of the motion for
summary judgment in reviewing the trial court's decision to grant the motion. La Belle Epoque, LLC
v. Old Europe Antidue Manor, LLC, 406 Md. 194, 958 A.2d 269 (2008).
On appeal from summary judgment, if no material facts are placed in genuine dispute, the
appellate court must determine whether the trial court correctly entered summary judgment as a
matter of law. Anderson v. Council of Unit Owners of Gables on Tuckerman Condominium, 404 Md.
560, 948 A.2d 11 (2008).
In considering a trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment, the appellate court reviews
the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Council of Unit Owners
of Gables on Tuckerman Condominium, 404 Md. 560, 948 A.2d 11 (2008).
Partial summary judgment is permissible, utilizing the same criteria for a grant or denial of a
summary judgment and the same standard of review on appeal. Waggoner v. Williamson, 8 So. 3d
147 (Miss. 2009).
The denial of a motion for summary judgment is not subject to appellate review, even when an
appeal is taken from a final judgment and not from the denial of a motion for sum
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mary judgment. Brown v. Simmons, 335 S.W.3d 481 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 2010), transfer denied,
(Dec. 3, 2010) and reh'g and/or transfer denied, (Dec. 3, 2010).
On appeal from grant of summary judgment to defendant, Supreme Court views the facts in the
light most favorable to plaintiff. Livsey v. Mercury Ins. Group, 197 N.J. 522, 964 A.2d 312 (2009).
Facts as stated on appeal from summary judgment would be derived from evidence submitted by
the parties in support of and in opposition to defendant's summary judgment motion, viewed in a light
most favorable to plaintiff. Lebron v. Sanchez, 407 N.J. Super. 204, 970 A.2d 399, 244 Ed. Law Rep.
191 (App. Div. 2009).
For purposes of an appeal from a trial court's entry of summary judgment for the prevailing party,
the appealing party is not required to make assignments of error, for the reason that on appeal, review
is necessarily limited to whether the trial court's conclusions as to whether there is a genuine issue of
material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment, both questions of law, were
correct. Schenkel & Shultz, Inc. v. Hermon F. Fox & Associates, P.C., 362 N.C. 269, 658 S.E.2d 918
(2008).
Orders which deny summary judgment are ordinarily interlocutory and not appealable. Harbin
Yinhai Technology Development Co., Ltd. v. Greentree Financial Group, Inc., 677 S.E.2d 854 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2009).
An order granting summary judgment is not appealable. Farmers Union Oil Co. of Garrison v.
Smetana, 2009 ND 74, 764 N.W.2d 665 (N.D. 2009).
Denial of a motion for summary judgment is generally not a final appealable order. Sinnott
v. Aqua-Chem, Inc., 116 Ohio St. 3d 158, 2007-Ohio-5584, 876 N.E.2d 1217 (2007).
On appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the appellate court will review all
ambiguities, conclusions, and inferences arising in and from the evidence in a light most favorable to
the non-moving party below. USAA Property and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clegg, 377 S.C. 643, 661 S.E.2d
791 (2008).
Appellate court reviews the grant of a summary judgment motion under the same standard as the
trial court: summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Austin v. Beaufort County Sheriff's Office,
377 S.C. 31, 659 S.E.2d 122 (2008).
On appeal from summary judgment, the appellate court is required to review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and to draw all reasonable inferences favoring the
nonmoving party. Martin v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 271 S.W.3d 76 (Tenn. 2008).
Although the denial of summary judgment is normally not appealable, the Supreme Court may
review such a denial when both parties moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted one
and denied the other. Texas Mun. Power Agency v. Public Utility Com'n of Texas, 253 S.W.3d 184
(Tex. 2007).
There is no presumption of finality for summary judgment orders, for purposes of appeal. Ford v.
Exxon Mobil Chemical Co., 235 S.W.3d 615 (Tex. 2007).
A person can appeal not only the denial of summary judgment motion, but also the denial of a
motion to dismiss, if such a motion is based on an assertion of immunity by an individual who is an
officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state. V.T.C.A., Civil Practice &
Remedies Code 51.014(a), 101.106(e). University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston v.
Crowder, 349 S.W.3d 640, 272 Ed. Law Rep. 1033 (Tex. App.
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Houston 14th Dist. 2011), reh'g overruled, (Aug. 10, 2011).

A non-movant needs no answer or response to a motion for summary judgment to contend on
appeal that the grounds expressly presented to the trial court by the movant's motion are insufficient
as a matter of law to support summary judgment, because the trial court may not grant a summary
judgment by default for lack of an answer or response. Gary E. Patterson & Associates, P.C. v.
Holub, 264 S.W.3d 180 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2008), review denied, (Aug. 29, 2008).
Generally, a denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final determination on the merits
and, therefore, is not an appealable interlocutory order. Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 2007
UT App 382, 174 P.3d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 2007), cert. granted (Utah Mar. 7, 2008).
Appellate court may exercise its discretion and rule on a denied motion for summary judgment to
serve the interest of judicial economy where there are no genuine issues of material fact. Walters v.
A.A.A. Waterproofing, Inc., 151 Wash. App. 316, 211 P.3d 454 (Div. 1 2009).
An expert's qualifications and opinions are part and parcel of a summary judgment, and therefore
the Court of Appeals does not defer to the trial judge's rulings on evidence when passing on the
propriety of a summary dismissal, but rather decides whether evidence is sufficient or should have
been considered and to what extent. Hill v. Sacred Heart Medical Center, 143 Wash. App. 438, 177
P.3d 1152 (Div. 3 2008).
Where an order granting summary judgment to a party completely disposes of any issues of
liability as to that party, the absence of language prescribed by Rules of Civil Procedure indicating
that "no just reason for delay" exists and "directi[ng] entry of judgment" will not render the order
interlocutory and bar appeal provided that the appellate court can determine from the order that the
trial court's ruling approximates a final order in its nature and effect. Turner ex rel. Turner v. Turner,
223 W. Va. 106, 672 S.E.2d 242 (2008).
Supreme Court, when reviewing a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, determines whether
the complaint states an actionable claim. AccuWeb, Inc. v. Foley & Lardner, 2008 WI 24, 308 Wis.
2d 258, 746 N.W.2d 447 (2008).
Generally, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not an appealable final order;
however, an exception to the general rule arises when a district court refuses to dismiss a case on the
basis of qualified immunity. State, Dept. of Corrections v. Watts, 2008 WY 19, 177 P.3d 793 (Wyo.
2008).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
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25
[FN1] Ingalls v. Neidlinger, 70 Ariz. 40, 216 P.2d 387 (1950); Sligh v. Watson, 69 Ariz. 373, 214
P.2d 123 (1950) (overruled in part on other grounds by, Diamond v. Chiate, 81 Ariz. 86, 300 P.2d 583
(1956)); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99, 50 A.L.R.2d 246 (1954); Wright v. Wright,
154 Tex. 138, 274 S.W.2d 670 (1955).
26
[FN2] Bingham v. Kimbrell, 258 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. Austin 1953); Ware v. Wright, 252
S.W.2d 1003 (Tex. Civ. App. Dallas 1952).
27
[FN3] Lind v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 254 F.3d 1281, 51 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 614
28
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(11th Cir. 2001). [FN4] Adonican v. City of Los Angeles, 297 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2002). [FN5]
Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 566 (10th Cir. 1997). [FN6] Demoret v. Zegarelli, 451 F.3d 140 (2d
Cir. 2006). [FN7] Whitehead v. Baranco Color Labs, Inc., 353 So. 2d 793 (Ala. 1977); Madry v.
Sorel, 440 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1971); U.S. v. One Rockwell Intern. Commander 690
C/840, Serial Number 11627, 594 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.D. 1984), judgment rev'd on oth
er grounds, 754 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1985).
[FN8] Tobin v. Garcia, 159 Tex. 58, 316 S.W.2d 396 (1958).
10
[FN9] Acton v. City of Columbia, Mo., 436 F.3d 969 (8th Cir. 2006).
11
[FN10] Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 16 A.D.D. 653 (3d Cir. 1996).
12
[FN11] Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), discussed in 113.
13
[FN12] Young v. Murphy, 161 F.R.D. 61 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
14
[FN13] 28 U.S.C.A. 1291, discussed generally in 79.
15
As to the collateral order doctrine, generally, see 105.
16
[FN14] Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 116 S. Ct. 834, 133 L. Ed. 2d 773, 34 Fed.
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R. Serv. 3d 1 (1996). [FN15] Jemmott v. Coughlin, 85 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1996). [FN16] Rohman v.
New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), 215 F.3d 208 (2d Cir.
2000). [FN17] Moore v. Gwinnett County, 967 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1992); McGovern v. City of
20
Minneapolis, 475 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1991); City of Houston v. Kilburn, 838 S.W.2d
21
344 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1992), writ denied with per curiam opinion, 849 S.W.2d 810 (Tex.
22
1993). As to the appealability of orders denying claims of Eleventh Amendment immunity or
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qualified immunity, see 80. [FN18] Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 1996). [FN19] Marshall
v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1996). [FN20] Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 115 S. Ct. 2151, 132
L. Ed. 2d 238, 32 Fed. R.
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Serv. 3d 1 (1995).
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[FN21] Bultema v. Benzie County, 146 Fed. Appx. 28, 2005 FED App. 0715N (6th Cir.
2005).
[FN22] Sample v. Bailey, 409 F.3d 689, 2005 FED App. 0209P (6th Cir. 2005). [FN23]
Lamar Advertising of Penn, LLC v. Town of Orchard Park, New York, 356 F.3d 365 (2d Cir.
2004).
As to interlocutory appeals from orders denying, granting, or modifying injunctions,
see 110, discussing 28 U.S.C.A. 1292(a)(1). [FN24] Switzerland Cheese Ass'n, Inc. v. E.
Horne's Market, Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 87 S. Ct. 193, 17 L. Ed. 2d 23, 10 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1391
(1966) (referring to 28 U.S.C.A. 1292(a)).
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[FN25] Eddy v. Virgin Islands Water and Power Auth., 256 F.3d 204, 50 Fed. R. Serv.
3d 1173 (3d Cir. 2001). 2012 Thomson Reuters. 33-34B 2012 Thomson Reuters/RIA. No
Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. All rights reserved.
AMJUR APPELLATE 161
END OF DOCUMENT
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5. Particular Types of Judgments
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165. Consent judgment
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West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and Error k78(1) West's

Key Number Digest, Federal Courts k576.1, 585.1
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A consent judgment is not ordinarily reviewable,[FN1] because such a judgment is not the
judgment of the court, but of the parties, and is in the nature of a contract.[FN2] However, a consent
judgment may be reviewable on appeal where the public interest is affected by the judgment[FN3] or
where there is a claim of lack of actual consent[FN4] or lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.[FN5]
Furthermore, a district court's implementation of a settlement agreement via a consent judgment is a
final and appealable decision.[FN6]
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Although a party ordinarily may not appeal a consent judgment, if the party gave consent merely
to facilitate an appeal following an adverse determination of a critical issue, the party will not lose his
or her right to be heard on appeal.[FN7]
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[FN1] Dong v. Board of Trustees, 191 Cal. App. 3d 1572, 236 Cal. Rptr. 912, 39 Ed. Law Rep. 209
(6th Dist. 1987); Greenblatt v. Kaplan's Restaurant, 171 Cal. App. 3d 991, 217 Cal. Rptr. 746 (4th
Dist. 1985); Urbanczyk v. Urbanczyk, 634 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. App. Tyler 1982).
[FN2] Massell v. Daley, 404 Ill. 479, 89 N.E.2d 361, 13 A.L.R.2d 1356 (1949); State
v. Huebner, 230 Ind. 461, 104 N.E.2d 385 (1952); Sauer v. Rhoades, 338 Mich. 679, 62 N.W.2d 634
(1954).
[FN3] Massell v. Daley, 404 Ill. 479, 89 N.E.2d 361, 13 A.L.R.2d 1356 (1949).
[FN4] U.S. v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1981); Reimer v. Davis, 224 Kan.
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225, 580 P.2d 81 (1978).
[FN5] U.S. v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1981). [FN6] Sims v. EGA Products, Inc.,
475 F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2007). [FN7] Dong v. Board of Trustees, 191 Cal. App. 3d 1572, 236
Cal. Rptr. 912, 39 Ed.
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Law Rep. 209 (6th Dist. 1987); Gillum v. Republic Health Corp., 778 S.W.2d 558
(Tex. App. Dallas 1989). 2012 Thomson Reuters. 33-34B 2012 Thomson Reuters/RIA.
No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. All rights reserved. AMJUR APPELLATE 165 END OF
DOCUMENT
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7. Fees and Costs of Action
175. Decisions passing exclusively on fees and costs
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West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and Error k78(7), 82(4), 87(10)
West's Key Number Digest, Federal Courts k576.1, 585.1, 597
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Where the fees and costs award in an action is related to the merits of the underlying order which
gave rise to the fees and costs award, it is appropriate to withhold independent review of that award
until final resolution of the underlying substantive order.[FN1] However, this general rule is subject
to exceptions, such as where the power or right of the court to assess certain items of cost is in
dispute, or there is a claim that the trial court abused its discretion.[FN2]
An order which definitively resolves claims for attorney's fees and expenses payable out of a
common fund is severable from the decisions on the merits and sufficiently final to be separately
appealable.[FN3] Separate costs judgments likewise are regularly appealable as final judgments.
[FN4]
Caution:
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A separate order assessing costs is not a final decision if the exact amount has not been fixed by the
court.[FN5] If a separate claim is brought for administrative enforcement costs, the judgment is also
not final until a final determination is made on the separate claim.[FN6]
An order directing payment of witness fees and bills for psychiatric examinations is appealable
under the collateral order doctrine.[FN7] Orders denying applications for costs, expenses, and
attorney's fees also may be appealable under the collateral order doctrine.[FN8]
A defendant's motion for costs is not a claim for relief presented in an action, such as required by
the rule governing an appeal of fewer than all claims of fewer than all parties,[FN9] and, standing
alone, is not subject to appeal where the underlying action is still
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pending.[FN10]
Cases:
A trial court order taxing costs on appeal is appealable as an order after judgment, after a previous
judgment has been reversed on appeal but before a new judgment has been entered on remand, since
the relevant final judgment is the judgment of the Court of Appeal. West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. 904.1(a)
(2). Krikorian Premiere Theatres, LLC v. Westminster Central, LLC (Two Cases), 193 Cal. App. 4th
1075, 2011 WL 1051743 (4th Dist. 2011), opinion modified, 2011 WL 1344726 (Cal. App. 4th Dist.
2011).
An order awarding attorney fees is distinct and separately appealable from the judgment on the
merits. City of Colorado Springs v. Andersen Mahon Enterprises, LLP, 251 P.3d 536 (Colo. App.
2010), cert. denied, 2011 WL 532112 (Colo. 2011).
An appeal from an attorney fee decision does not bring up for review a separate judgment on the
merits unless a timely notice of appeal is filed from that judgment. Bushong v. Wilsbach, 151 Wash.
App. 373, 213 P.3d 42 (Div. 1 2009).
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[FN1] Gross v. G.D. Searle & Co., 738 F.2d 600, 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 510 (3d Cir.
1984); Ford v. Holden, 2 Haw. App. 549, 634 P.2d 1051 (1981). [FN2] Janicek v. Hinnen, 34 Colo.
App. 68, 522 P.2d 113 (1974); Walton v. Walton's Guardianship, 120 Ind. App. 656, 95 N.E.2d 301
(1950); Kasper v. State, 206 Tenn. 434, 333 S.W.2d 934, 92 A.L.R.2d 1081 (1960).
[FN3] State, Dept. of Citrus v. Griffin, 332 So. 2d 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1976); Atwood v.
Holmes, 229 Minn. 37, 38 N.W.2d 62, 11 A.L.R.2d 311 (1949).
[FN4] Massey v. David, 953 So. 2d 599 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2007). [FN5] Mekdeci By and
Through Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat. Laboratories, a Div. of Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 711 F.2d 1510, 37
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Fed. R. Serv. 2d 521 (11th Cir. 1983).
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[FN6] Dunlop v. Ledet's Foodliner of Larose, Inc., 509 F.2d 1387 (5th Cir. 1975). [FN7] U.S. v.
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Rogalsky, 575 F.2d 457 (3d Cir. 1978). As to the collateral order doctrine, generally, see 105.
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[FN8] U. S. Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, 456 F.2d 483 (3d Cir.
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1972). [FN9] Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), discussed in 113.
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[FN10] Norman v. Norman, 342 Ark. 493, 30 S.W.3d 83 (2000).

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Works. All rights reserved. AMJUR APPELLATE 175 END OF DOCUMENT
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7. Fees and Costs of Action
176. Attorney's fees
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West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and Error k78(7), 82(4), 87(10)
West's Key Number Digest, Federal Courts k576.1, 585.1
Even though a collateral matter, such as attorney's fees, is reserved in a judgment, the judgment is
final and appealable as far as the merits of the case are concerned.[FN1]
Attorney's fees issues are subject to the ordinary principles of finality.[FN2] Thus, the denial of a
request for attorney's fees is not a final judgment if the question of damages still remains.[FN3]
An award of attorney's fees which does not fix the amount of the award[FN4] or specify a formula
allowing the amount to be computed is not a final decision.[FN5] A judgment is final, for purposes of
appeal, insofar as it provides for indemnification for settlement costs and attorney's fees incurred in
the underlying antitrust litigation, where such sums have been quantified, but are not final to the
extent that they relate to unquantified attorney's fees awarded to reimburse the indemnitees for costs
incurred in defending the corporate indemnitor's declaratory judgment action regarding their right to
indemnification under the indemnitor's bylaws.[FN6]
On the other hand, an order awarding fees in an amount not yet determined can be consolidated
on appeal with a final judgment on the merits.[FN7] In the appropriate circumstances, such orders
allowing fees but failing to calculate the amount may constitute final, appealable judgments, such as
where the determination has turned upon the nature of the plaintiff's cause of action and the source of
the entitlement to attorney's fees.[FN8]
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A decision awarding or denying attorney's fees and expenses from a common fund, as opposed to
from an adverse party, is severable from the decision on the merits and separately appealable.[FN9]
However, orders awarding interim attorney's fees after a class action settle
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ment are not appealable as final orders, even if one of three funds established by the settlement for
payment of attorney's fees has been exhausted by the interim fee orders, where the total fee award has
not been established by the district court because the value of the settlement and benefits conferred on
class members remains unsettled, and distributions from the other funds are neither finite nor final.
[FN10]
A postjudgment order awarding attorney's fees and/or costs may be appealed as a special order
made after final judgment.[FN11]
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[FN1] Budinich v. Becton Dickinson and Co., 486 U.S. 196, 108 S. Ct. 1717, 100 L. Ed. 2d
178, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1 (1988).
Reservation of collateral matters is discussed in 83. [FN2] Apponi v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc.,
809 F.2d 1210, 22 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 561, 7 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 565 (6th Cir. 1987).
[FN3] Hain Pure Food Co., Inc. v. Sona Food Products Co., 618 F.2d 521 (9th Cir.
1980). [FN4] Confer v. Custom Engineering Co., 952 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1991); Echols v.
Parker, 909 F.2d 795, 17 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 901 (5th Cir. 1990); Hay v. City of Irving, Tex., 893
F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1990).
[FN5] Phelps v. Washburn University of Topeka, 807 F.2d 153, 36 Ed. Law Rep. 566
(10th Cir. 1986). [FN6] American Society for Testing & Materials v. Corrpro Companies,
Inc., 478 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 2007).
[FN7] Southern Travel Club, Inc. v. Carnival Air Lines, Inc., 986 F.2d 125, 25 Fed. R. Serv.
3d 335 (5th Cir. 1993); John v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 16 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 135 (7th Cir.
1990).
[FN8] Rodriguez v. Handy, 802 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1986).
[FN9] Overseas Development Disc Corp. v. Sangamo Const. Co., Inc., 840 F.2d 1319 (7th
Cir. 1988). [FN10] In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenflurammine) Products
Li
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ability Litigation, 401 F.3d 143, 61 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 79 (3d Cir. 2005). [FN11] Lee v. GNLV
Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 996 P.2d 416 (2000). As to appealability of orders of special
proceedings, see 116.
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13. Arbitration
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195. Grant or denial of stay of judicial proceedings due to arbitration agreement
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West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and Error k76(1), 78(1)

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Appealability of order staying, or refusing to stay, proceeding in federal district court pending
arbitration procedure, 110 A.L.R. Fed. 148
An order staying trial and directing arbitration may be deemed appealable as one that finally
determines a special proceeding which is considered distinct and separate from the arbitration
proceedings that follow.[FN1] According to some authority, however, an order granting a stay of a
pending judicial proceeding with direction for arbitration is interlocutory, not final, and so not
appealable until final judgment in the case, since such orders neither determine the respective actions
nor prevent judgments from eventually being entered.[FN2]
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An order denying an application to stay arbitration is not appealable where the applicable statute
provides that appeals may be taken from orders denying applications to compel arbitration and orders
granting applications to stay arbitration, but does not grant the right to appeal from an order denying
an application to stay arbitration.[FN3]
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Cases:
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Stay of discovery was warranted pending resolution of defendant's interlocutory appeal of order
denying its motion to compel arbitration. Combined Energies v. CCI, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.
Me. 2007).
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[FN1] Anthony v. Kualoa Ranch, Inc., 69 Haw. 112, 736 P.2d 55 (1987); Systems Const., Inc.
v. Worthington Forest, Ltd., 46 Ohio App. 2d 95, 75 Ohio Op. 2d 79, 345 N.E.2d 428 (10th
Dist. Franklin County 1975); Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d
475 (Utah 1986).
As to the appealability of orders terminating special proceedings, generally, see 116.
[FN2] Limbach Co. v. Gevyn Const. Corp., 544 F.2d 1104 (1st Cir. 1976); Bellaire City
Schools Bd. of Ed. v. Paxton, 59 Ohio St. 2d 65, 13 Ohio Op. 3d 58, 391 N.E.2d 1021, 6
A.L.R.4th 645 (1979).
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[FN3] Hodes v. Comprehensive Health Associates, P.A., 9 Kan. App. 2d 36, 670 P.2d 76
(1983).
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AMJUR APPELLATE 195
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14. Contempt
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197. Generally
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Appealability of contempt adjudication or conviction, 33 A.L.R.3d 448
Appealability of acquittal from or dismissal of charge of contempt of court, 24 A.L.R.3d 650
Appeals from judgments in contempt proceedings generally are permissible.[FN1] An appeal may
lie to review an order denying a charge of contempt, if the order affects a substantial right claimed by
the appellant.[FN2] According to some authority, however, the right of appeal of a contempt decision
applies only to those adjudged in contempt, and does not apply to those who have unsuccessfully
sought to have another held to be contemptuous.[FN3]
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A judgment for contempt may be appealable under statutes expressly authorizing an appeal from
judgments in contempt proceedings.[FN4]
Caution:
An appeal from a contempt order which is jurisdictionally valid does not entail review of a prior order
for the violation for which the contempt order was issued.[FN5]
Under federal law, criminal contempts are appealable, whether they arise as a part of other
litigation or as independent proceedings.[FN6] Civil contempts not arising during the trial of related
litigation likewise are appealable,[FN7] and civil contempts arising during the trial of related
litigation are appealable if adjudged against one who is not a party to the related litigation.[FN8] Civil
contempts arising during the trial of related litigation are not immediately ap
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pealable if adjudged against a party litigant,[FN9] but such contempts are reviewable on appeal
from the final judgment in the related litigation.[FN10]
In addition, while civil contempts are not ordinarily appealable if adjudged against a party litigant
during the course of related litigation, one who is a party may appeal from a civil contempt order in
connection with some other appealable order, such as a preliminary injunc-tion.[FN11]
Cases:
District court's contempt order is itself immediately appealable because it is a final judgment
imposing penalties on the willfully disobedient witness in what is effectively a separate proceeding.
28 U.S.C.A. 1291. In re Grand Jury, 680 F.3d 328 (3d Cir. 2012).
Criminal contempt sanctions are considered final and appealable in pending actions by parties and
non-parties. East End Taxi Services, Inc. v. Virgin Islands Taxi Ass'n, Inc., 411 Fed. Appx. 495 (3d
Cir. 2011).
Order holding a party in civil contempt is not a "final decision," for purposes of appeal. In re
Teknek, LLC, 512 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2007).
Denial of motion for order to show cause why party should not be held in contempt is final,
appealable order. Thomas v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass'n, 594 F.3d 814 (11th Cir. 2010).
Although plenary review of civil contempt orders extends to some issues that are not truly
jurisdictional, its emphasis on fundamental rights underscores the proposition that the grounds for any
appeal from a contempt order are more restricted than would be the case in an ordinary plenary appeal
from a civil judgment. In re Leah S., 284 Conn. 685, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007).
On review of a civil contempt order, if the appellate court concludes that the underlying court
order was sufficiently clear and unambiguous, the appellate court then determines whether the trial
court abused its discretion in issuing, or refusing to issue, a judgment of contempt, which includes a
review of the trial court's determination of whether the violation was wilful or excused by a good faith
dispute or misunderstanding. In re Leah S., 284 Conn. 685, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007).
No appeal lies from a consent decree. Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 935 A.2d 731 (2007).
As general rule, no appeal lies from a consent order. Barnes v. Barnes, 181 Md. App. 390, 956
A.2d 770 (2008).
Criminal contempt is a crime and, therefore, an order finding a party in criminal contempt of court
and sanctioning the party is a final order from which the contemnor may appeal as of right; however,
an order finding a party in civil contempt of court is not a final order for purposes of appellate review.
M.C.L.A. 7.202(6)(a, b), 7.203(A), 600.308(1, 2). In re Moroun, 295 Mich. App. 312, 814 N.W.2d
319 (2012), appeal denied, stay denied, 491 Mich. 855, 809 N.W.2d 148 (2012).
If incarceration occurs, the contemnor clearly knows that the judgment has been enforced and a
stayed contempt order is final and appealable. Carothers v. Carothers, 337 S.W.3d 21
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(Mo. 2011).
Appeal from contempt order that is jurisdictionally valid does not bring up for review the prior
order. North Tonawanda First ex rel. Kern v. City of North Tonawanda, 94 A.D.3d 1537, 943
N.Y.S.2d 357 (4th Dep't 2012).
Contempt order is immediately appealable. Ross v. Ross, 715 S.E.2d 859 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
The Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction over a direct appeal from a contempt order, even if the
contempt order is appealed along with a judgment that is appealable. Beeler v. Fuqua, 351 S.W.3d
428 (Tex. App. El Paso 2011), reh'g overruled, (Nov. 2, 2011).
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[FN1] Harris v. U.S., 382 U.S. 162, 86 S. Ct. 352, 15 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1965); Cleveland
v. Cleveland, 57 Haw. 519, 559 P.2d 744 (1977); In re Calhoun, 47 Ohio St. 2d 15, 1 Ohio Op. 3d 10,
350 N.E.2d 665 (1976).
[FN2] Piedmont Equipment Co., Inc. v. Weant, 30 N.C. App. 191, 226 S.E.2d 688 (1976).
As to the appealability of orders affecting substantial rights, generally, see 115.
[FN3] Tyler v. Baltimore County, 256 Md. 64, 259 A.2d 307 (1969); Gonzales v. Gonzales, 533
S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Civ. App. El Paso 1976).
A federal district court's order denying a motion for contempt filed by a class of indigent minors
diagnosed with severe emotional and mental disabilities, in which the court interpreted a disputed
provision of a consent decree between state officials and the minors, was not a final, appealable order.
Jeff D. v. Kempthorne, 365 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2004).
[FN4] Miller v. City of Albuquerque, 88 N.M. 324, 540 P.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1975); Wellman
Engineering Co. v. Calderon Automation, Inc., 2 Ohio App. 2d 385, 31 Ohio Op. 2d 591, 209 N.E.2d
172 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1965).
[FN5] St. Regis Mohawk Development Corp. v. Cook, 181 A.D.2d 964, 581 N.Y.S.2d 877 (3d Dep't
1992).
[FN6] New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1317, 99 S. Ct. 6, 58 L. Ed. 2d 25 (1978); U.S.
v. Miller, 588 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1978); Pabst Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No.
77, AFL-CIO, 555 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1977).
[FN7] U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 108 S. Ct. 2268,
101 L. Ed. 2d 69, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 463 (1988).
[FN8] U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 108 S. Ct. 2268,
101 L. Ed. 2d 69, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 463 (1988); New York Times
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Co. v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1317, 99 S. Ct. 6, 58 L. Ed. 2d 25 (1978). [FN9] U.S. Catholic
Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 108 S. Ct. 2268, 101 L. Ed. 2d
69, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 463 (1988); Marshall v. Whit
taker Corp., Berwick Forge & Fabricating Co., 610 F.2d 1141 (3d Cir. 1979); Latrobe Steel
Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, 545 F.2d 1336 (3d Cir. 1976). [FN10] U.S.
v. Spectro Foods Corp., 544 F.2d 1175 (3d Cir. 1976). [FN11] Latrobe Steel Co. v. United
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Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, 545 F.2d

1336 (3d Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Spectro Foods Corp., 544 F.2d 1175 (3d Cir. 1976). As to the
appealability of orders granting, denying, or modifying injunctions, see 110, discussing 28
U.S.C.A. 1291(a)(1).
Works. All rights reserved. AMJUR APPELLATE 197 END OF DOCUMENT
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15. Attorney Discipline
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The appealability or reviewability of a judgment or order of a trial court disciplining an attorney
generally is determined according to the general provisions governing appeals in civil cases.[FN1]
Since charges must be filed and a hearing had before an attorney may be disbarred, an order striking
an attorney's name from the roll of attorneys is appealable.[FN2] However, according to some
authority, there can be no appeal in a jurisdiction where the disciplinary proceeding against an
attorney at law is by way of an original action in the highest court of the state, or where that court
alone has the power to discipline attorneys at law.[FN3]
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When professional misconduct of an attorney at law is treated as contempt of court, the rules
determining appealability or reviewability in contempt-of-court cases are applicable.[FN4]
[FN1] Lenihan v. Commonwealth, 165 Ky. 93, 176 S.W. 948 (1915); Houtchens v.
Mercer, 119 Tex. 431, 29 S.W.2d 1031, 69 A.L.R. 1103 (Comm'n App. 1930). As to attorney
disciplinary proceedings, generally, see Am. Jur. 2d, Attorneys at Law 30 et seq.
[FN2] Howard v. Wilbur, 166 F.2d 884 (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1948).
[FN3] State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Niklaus, 149 Neb. 859, 33 N.W.2d 145 (1948). [FN4]
Haggard v. Superior Court, In and For Maricopa County, 26 Ariz. App. 162,
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547 P.2d 14 (Div. 1 1976); State v. Winthrop, 148 Wash. 526, 269 P. 793, 59 A.L.R. 1265
(1928).
As to the appealability of contempt orders, generally, see 197. 2012 Thomson Reuters.
33-34B 2012 Thomson Reuters/RIA. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. All rights reserved.
AMJUR APPELLATE 199
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16. Criminal Proceedings
b. Particular Matters
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205. Pleas and plea bargains
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According to some authority, a trial court order denying a criminal defendant's motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty is reviewable on appeal.[FN1] According to other authority, however, no
appeal lies from an order denying a defendant permission to withdraw his or her guilty plea.[FN2]
Unless a defendant is sentenced, there is no final judgment to support an appeal of a denial of a
motion to withdraw a plea.[FN3]
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A federal district court order denying a criminal defendant's motion to withdraw a criminal plea of
guilty is a nonappealable interlocutory order where the defendant has not yet been sentenced at the
time the appeal is filed.[FN4] A United States Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction, under the general
federal appellate jurisdiction statute,[FN5] to review a district court's order which denies a requested
hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea but does not rule on the merits of the motion.[FN6] A
court of appeals also lacks jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals involving plea bargain promises or
grants of immunity, or alleged violations of grants of immunity from prosecution, since the guaranty
afforded by immunity can be adequately protected by appeal after conviction.[FN7]
A district court's pretrial order rejecting a proposed plea bargain agreement under a provision of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure[FN8] is not a final decision, nor does it fit within the
collateral order doctrine; the defendant must wait to appeal the issue until after conviction and
sentencing.[FN9] Neither a defendant nor the government may appeal a preconviction order of the
district court denying a proposed plea bargain agreement.[FN10]
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Where the defendant and the government have a plea agreement with which the government
complains the defendant has not fully complied, denial of the government's motion for specific
performance of the plea agreement is final and appealable.[FN11] Where the portion
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of the plea agreement which the government claims the defendant has not complied with concerns
the disclosure of assets and the consequent forfeiture thereof, under such circumstances, the
government can never institute an action for forfeiture based upon the crimes for which the defendant
was convicted due to his or her guilty plea under the plea agreement, and the only avenue for its claim
to the disputed assets is a motion for specific performance of the plea agreement.[FN12]
An order denying a colorable claim to dismiss an indictment for violation of a prior plea
agreement is an appealable interlocutory order.[FN13]
Cases:
Defendant did not forfeit double jeopardy claim relating to withdrawn guilty plea and sentencing
credit, by failing to raise claim in his opening appellate brief, where defendant presented claim in
reply to State's assertion that defendant would not be entitled to any credit for the time he spent on
probation towards his prison sentence under any circumstances; it would have been unfair for to
require defendant, when writing his opening brief, to anticipate every argument that State might have
raised. People v. Whitfield, 228 Ill. 2d 502, 321 Ill. Dec. 233, 888 N.E.2d 1166 (2007), as modified
on denial of reh'g, (Apr. 23, 2008).
In general, a defendant may not challenge a guilty plea through direct appeal; rather, the path to
challenging the plea and conviction runs by way of a petition for post-conviction relief. St. Clair v.
State, 901 N.E.2d 490 (Ind. 2009).
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[FN1] Jurgenson v. State, 166 Neb. 111, 88 N.W.2d 129 (1958).

As to guilty pleas in criminal cases, generally, see Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law 645 et seq. [FN2]
People v. McDonough, 198 Cal. App. 2d 84, 17 Cal. Rptr. 643 (5th Dist. 1961);
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Stevens v. State, 208 S.W.3d 893 (Mo. 2006). [FN3] Stevens v.

State, 208 S.W.3d 893 (Mo. 2006). [FN4] U.S. v. Gottlieb, 817 F.2d
475 (8th Cir. 1987). [FN5] 28 U.S.C.A. 1291, discussed generally
in 79. [FN6] U.S. v. Mendoza, 554 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1977). [FN7]
U.S. v. Dederich, 825 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1987).
[FN8] Fed. R. Crim P. 11.
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[FN9] U.S. v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454 (10th Cir. 1985). As to the collateral order doctrine, generally,
see 105. [FN10] U.S. v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454 (10th Cir. 1985). [FN11] U.S. v. Alexander, 869
F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1989). [FN12] U.S. v. Alexander, 869 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1989). [FN13] U.S. v.
DiNapoli, 817 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1987). 2012 Thomson Reuters. 33-34B 2012 Thomson Reuters/
RIA. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. All rights reserved. AMJUR APPELLATE 205
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in 62337 the 12/14/12 FOFCOL is not appealable:
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100. Findings of fact or conclusions of law
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West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and Error k123
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As a general rule, no appeal lies from a court's findings of fact[FN1] and conclusions of law,
[FN2] or mere rulings.[FN3] Rather, findings of fact and conclusions of law must be reduced to a
judgment in compliance with applicable rules of appellate procedure.[FN4]
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Similarly, a refusal by the trial court to make separate findings of fact and conclusions of law is
not an appealable order.[FN5] Moreover, an appeal will not lie from an order denying a motion for
amended findings,[FN6] nor from an equivalent order denying a motion for additional findings of fact
and conclusions of law.[FN7]
However, a judgment contained in a document entitled Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment may be regarded as a final, appealable judgment, where the statutory requirement that
the judgment be set forth in a separate document is not jurisdictional.[FN8]
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Cases:
One does not appeal from a finding; one appeals from a judgment or from an order that the
Legislature has designated as appealable. In re S.B., 46 Cal. 4th 529, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 24, 207 P.3d
525 (2009).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
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[FN1] Legg v. Los Angeles County, Dept. of Charities, 175 Cal. App. 2d 637, 346 P.2d 472
(2d Dist. 1959); Corbett v. Derman Shoe Co., 338 Mass. 405, 155 N.E.2d 423, 80 A.L.R.2d
974 (1959); People ex rel. Cooke v. Cota, 5 A.D.2d 1000, 173 N.Y.S.2d 460 (2d Dep't 1958).
[FN2] In re Frickey's Estate, 280 A.D. 880, 114 N.Y.S.2d 270 (4th Dep't 1952); Jaster
v. Miller, 269 Wis. 223, 69 N.W.2d 265 (1955) (overruled in part on other grounds by,
Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 230, 163 N.W.2d 609 (1969)).
[FN3] Schnare v. Evans, 301 Mass. 343, 17 N.E.2d 192 (1938); City of St. Louis v. Pope, 68
S.W.2d 805 (Mo. 1934); McVay v. Board of Ed. of City of New York, 10 A.D.2d 705, 197
N.Y.S.2d 797 (1st Dep't 1960).
[FN4] Carter v. Aaacon Auto Transport, Inc., 286 Pa. Super. 547, 429 A.2d 658 (1981).
[FN5] Shore v. Chester, 40 Ohio App. 2d 412, 69 Ohio Op. 2d 368, 321 N.E.2d 614 (10th
Dist. Franklin County 1974).
[FN6] Tompkins v. Sandeen, 243 Minn. 256, 67 N.W.2d 405, 49 A.L.R.2d 1162 (1954);
Raymond v. McKenzie, 220 Minn. 234, 19 N.W.2d 423 (1945).
[FN7] Anderson v. Tuomi, 230 Minn. 490, 42 N.W.2d 204, 17 A.L.R.2d 744 (1950);
Raymond v. McKenzie, 220 Minn. 234, 19 N.W.2d 423 (1945).
[FN8] Gibson v. Benj. Franklin Federal Sav. and Loan, 294 Or. 702, 662 P.2d 703 (1983).
15
Works. All rights reserved.
16
AMJUR APPELLATE 100
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Judge Sferrazza's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Summary Eviction of
10/27/11, reads:
"FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER FOR SUMMARY EVICTION
This matter having come on regularly for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to NRS 40.254 and
NRS 40.253(6) on October 13, 2011, and continued on October 25,2011, before the Honorable Peter
J. Sferrazza, sitting without a jury; the plaintiff/landlord, Matt Merlis; ("Merliss"), having been
present, and represented by counsel, Richard G. Hill, Chartered and Casey D. Baker, Esq., and
defendant/tenant, Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq. ("Coughlin"), having been present and having
proceeded in proper person; the parties having offered evidence, called witnesses and having offered
argument; the matter having been submitted to the Court for a decision; the Court being fully
informed in the premises and good cause appearing therefor; the Court herewith enters its findings of
fact, conclusions of law and order for summary eviction:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court finds the following facts:
1. Merliss is the owner of the real property located at 121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada (the "Property").
2. The tenancy at issue commenced on March 1, 2010, and was for a term of 12 months.
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3. The rental agreement terminated by its terms on February 28, 2011. Thereafter, Coughlin became
a month to month tenant pursuant to NRS 118A.470 and paragraph 3 of the parties' rental agreement.
4. Coughlin became subject to the provisions of NRS 40.251 to 40.2516, inclusive, at the end of
the stated term of the rental agreement, whereupon he became a monthto-month tenant, as noted
above.
5. On August 22, 2011, Merliss properly and lawfully terminated Coughlin's month-to-month
tenancy pursuant to NRS 40.251, by serving the statutory No-Cause Termination Notice to
Vacate NRS 40.251(1) upon him, which notice was admitted into evidence at the hearing. The
court specifically finds that service of that notice was proper pursuant to, and for all purposes
contemplated under, NRS 40.280.
6. Coughlin failed to vacate the Property within 30 calendar days of being served with the notice to
vacate, and was therefore in unlawful detainer of the Property as of September 27, 2011, at the latest.
7. On September 27,2011, Merliss properly served Coughlin with a Five-Day Notice of Unlawful
Detainer For Failure to Vacate Rental Unit -NRS 40.251 (No-Cause Termination) and Notice of
Summary Eviction -NRS 40.254, which notice was admitted into evidence at the hearing. The court
specifically finds that service of that notice was proper pursuant to, and for all purposes
contemplated under, NRS 40.280. (NOTE: the Exhibit admitted at the hearing fails to include the
envelope from NCS, where such was included for the 8/22/11 Notice by NCS).
8. Merliss' claim for relief of possession of the premises was authorized by law.
9. Coughlin alleged, as a legal defense to the summary eviction, retaliatory conduct by Merliss under
various subsections of NRS 118A.510. Coughlin's alleged defense was further based, in part, on what
he identified as "habitability" issues, and his alleged complaints regarding same. Coughlin further
alleged that Merliss acted in a discriminatory manner toward him based on Coughlin's race, national
origin, and sex.
10. The court finds that Coughlin failed to present any evidence that Merliss acted in any
prohibited, discriminatory, or retaliatory fashion as alleged by Coughlin, or otherwise.
Specifically, the court finds:
10.1. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that he "complained in good faith of a violation
of a building, housing or health code applicable to the premises and affecting health or safety to a
governmental agency charged with the responsibility for the enforcement of that code" as required by
NRS 118A.510(1)(a).
10.2. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that he "complained in good faith to the
landlord or a law enforcement agency of a violation of [NRS Chapter 118A] or of a specific
statute that imposes a criminal penalty" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(b).
10.3 Coughlin failed to present any evidence that prior to being served with the referenced
termination and eviction notices, Coughlin had "instituted or defended against a judicial or
administrative proceeding or arbitration in which [he] raised an issue of compliance with the
requirements of [NRS Chapter 118A] respecting the habitability of dwelling units" as required by
NRS 118A.510(1)(e). (NOTE: here Baker attempts to mischaracterize the language of the statute to
get around the fact that Couglin, by defending against the non-payment summary eviction proceeding
following the 5 Day Non-Payment Notice of Unlawful Detainer purportedly served on Couglhin on
8/22/11, in RJC Rev11-1708, and therein arguing habitability issues, did, thereby, invoke the
protections of NRS 118A.510(1)(e), as, only thereafter did Merliss bring...an action for possession
in 1708. While Baker attempts to argue that Couglin need have instituted or defended against a
judicial...proceeding prior to being served with the referenced termination and eviction notices
the statute simply does not say that. Now, Baker can argue that his client did not thereafter bring
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and action for possession (and, given the unique nature of Nevada's approach, it is not entirely clear
at which point one can be said to bring an action...is it upon serving a 5 Day Notice of Unlawful
Detainer? Did the landlord bring an action upon his purportedly terminating Coughlin's month
to month tenancy on 8/22/11? Hard to imagine that qualifies (particularly where such Notice of
8/22/11 is deficient in that is incorrectly asserts that Coughlin's lease had expired, where, clearly,
such is not the case upon a close review of Paragraphs 2, 3, and 20 of the 2/24/10 Standard Rental
Agreement).
A close review of the FOFCOLOSE, particularly Findings of Fact 1-8 reveal something
curious....Baker's provided to Judge Sferrazza a proposed FOFCOLOSE that does not actually make
any indication as to the key inquiry with respect to the NRS 118A.510(e) analysis vis a vis just when
one can be said to bring an action for possession or have instituted or defended against a judicial ...
proceeding. It is likely that Nevada law will view the landlord to be said to bring an action for
possession either upon the service of the 9/27/11 5 Day No Cause Notice of Unlawful Detainer, or,
upon Couglin's filing his Tenant's Answer in response thereto on 10/6/11, and the landlord thereafter
communicating some intention to the Court to follow through with a hearing, and (or, perhaps, upon
nothing more than the Tenant filing a Tenant's Affidavit...that is, the landlord need not do anything
further thereafter to be said to have brought (bring) and action for possession). However, Baker's
attempt to characterize the mere service of some 30 Day Notice to Vacate as the bring(ing) of an
action for possession is simply unsupportable, in light of the fact that there is no legally operative
effect to Baker's doing so absent his then serving a 5 Day Notice of Unlawful Detainer, at which
point, should tenant Coughlin have failed to file a Tenan'ts Answer within 5 days thereof, Merliss
would be able to obtain a lockout Order from the court.
The thing is, Couglin argued that his Litigation Demand Letters to Merliss between MaySeptember of 2011 suffice to meet the instituted or defended against requirement (and there are
instances of such letters from Coughlin to the landlord that predate even a finding that the service of
the 30 Day Notice to Vacate of 8/22/11). Indeed, how is Baker's service upon Couglin of a 30 Day
Notice to Vacate bring(ing) an action for possession if Coughlin's litigation demand letters are
not instituting or defending against a judicial proceeding where habitability an issue (and
Coughlin's Litigation Demand Letters specifically invoke habitability issues and warn Merliss against
any anticipated retaliatory conduct by the landlord.
Further, the NRS 118A.510 inquiry is not limited to a comparision of the mere temporal
relation between the landlord's bring(ing) or threatening to bring an action for possession and the
tenant's:
The 10/27/11 FOFCOL was changed by Judge Sferrazza's 11/7/11 Amended Order, especially
where the 10/27/11 FOFCOL reads:
10.2. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that he "complained in good faith to the
landlord or a law enforcement agency of a violation of [NRS Chapter 118A] or of a
specific statute that imposes a criminal penalty" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(b).
10.3 Coughlin failed to present any evidence that prior to being served with the referenced
termination and eviction notices, Coughlin had "instituted or defended against a judicial
or administrative proceeding or arbitration in which [he] raised an issue of compliance
with the requirements of [NRS Chapter 118A] respecting the habitability of dwelling units"
as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(e).
Landlord Merliss violated NRS 118A.510 in retaliating against Coughlin.
NRS 118A.510 Retaliatory conduct by landlord against tenant prohibited; remedies;
exceptions.
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1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, the landlord may not, in retaliation, terminate
a tenancy, refuse to renew a tenancy,... or bring or threaten to bring an action for possession
if:...
(b) The tenant has complained in good faith to the landlord...of a violation of this chapter or of
a specific statute that imposes a criminal penalty...
(c) The tenant has organized or become a member of a tenants union or similar organization;
(e) The tenant has instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding or
arbitration in which the tenant raised an issue of compliance with the requirements of this chapter
respecting the habitability of dwelling units;
(f) The tenant has failed or refused to give written consent to a regulation adopted by the landlord,
after the tenant enters into the rental agreement, which requires the landlord to wait until the
appropriate time has elapsed before it is enforceable against the tenant; or
(g) The tenant has complained in good faith to the landlord,... (or) an attorney ... of a violation of
NRS 118.010 to 118.120, inclusive, or the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.,...
2. If the landlord violates any provision of subsection 1, the tenant is entitled to the remedies
provided in NRS 118A.390 and has a defense in any retaliatory action by the landlord for
possession.
3. A landlord who acts under the circumstances described in subsection 1 does not violate that
subsection if:
(b) The tenancy is terminated with cause;...
Coughlin also argued that Merliss's retatliating by terminating the lease immediately after
Coughlin sought to assert his rights under the lease as to the damage caused by Green Action Lawn
Service, was a violation of NRS 118A.510(1)(f). The public policy behind this is important, for,
otherwise, landlord's would simply use eviction as a coercive bargaining tactic to get tenant's to give
up their bargained for rights...and, arguably, such is tantamount to the criminal violation of extortion,
and therefore, protected under NRS 118A.510, where Coughlin's so asserting such rights is
tantamount to a violation of NRS 118A.510(1)(b) (extortion), and, arguably where NRS 118A.510(1)
(e) where Coughlin's reporting to the landlord the violations of the Reno Municipal Code's noxious
weed ordinance is covered by NRS 118A.290(1)(b),(e), and while Judge Sferrazza ruled that the
weeds were not a habitability issue, Coughlin did put on evidence that the Reno Municipal Code
prohibits weed growth of over eight inches, (see pictures of weeds well over thirty inches tall), and as
such, under NRS 118A.290(1)'s language, such violates provisions of housing or health codes
concerning the health, safety, sanitation or fitness for habitation of the dwelling unit.
It is interesting to note the differences between NRS 118A.510(b) and (e). Whereas (b) is
broad, covering where the tenant has complained in good faith to the landlord...of a violation of
this chapter or of a specific statute that imposes a criminal penalty NRS 118A.510(e) is more
narrow, applying only where the tenant has instituted or defended against a judicial or
administrative proceeding or arbitration in which the tenant raised an issue of compliance with the
requirements of this chapter respecting the habitability of dwelling units. A violation of this
chapter as referenced in NRS 118A.510(1)(b) could include a number of things beyond the more
narrow requirement in NRS 118A.510(1)(e) that habitability be the violation invoked where tenant
raised an issue, and further, the setting in which the complain(ing) to the landlord referenced in (b)
would seem to be more broad, as well, compared to (e)'s requirements that tenant raised and issue
of habitability under circumstances in which tenant has instituted or defended against a judicial or
administrative proceeding...but the scope of either of those subsections is not really all that clear or
defined...largely due to the use of the phrase instituted or defended against, especially considering
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the approach taken under Nevada law with respect to summary evictions (ie, where the tenant is
actually the first party to file anything with the court...which arguably should be characterized as the
tenant instituting an action such as 1492 or 1708.
NRS 118A.290 Habitability of dwelling unit.
1. The landlord shall at all times during the tenancy maintain the dwelling unit in a habitable
condition. A dwelling unit is not habitable if it violates provisions of housing or health codes
concerning the health, safety, sanitation or fitness for habitation of the dwelling unit or if it
substantially lacks:
(a) Effective waterproofing and weather protection of the roof and exterior walls, including
windows and doors.
(b) Plumbing facilities which conformed to applicable law when installed and which are
maintained in good working order.
(c) A water supply approved under applicable law, which is:.
(3) Connected to a sewage disposal system approved under applicable law and maintained in
good working order to the extent that the system can be controlled by the landlord...
(e) Electrical lighting, outlets, wiring and electrical equipment which conformed to applicable law
when installed and are maintained in good working order....
(g) Building, grounds, appurtenances and all other areas under the landlords control at the time
of the commencement of the tenancy in every part clean, sanitary and reasonably free from all
accumulations of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents, insects and vermin.
(h) Floors, walls, ceilings, stairways and railings maintained in good repair.
(i) Ventilating, air-conditioning and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, maintained
in good repair if supplied or required to be supplied by the landlord.
2. The landlord and tenant may agree that the tenant is to perform specified repairs,
maintenance tasks and minor remodeling...
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Baker's 8/22/11 No-Cause Termination Notice to Vacate (utilizing a pre-printed N. S. Ct. Form
#7 (with just a couple things changed by way of placing Xs over or terminated in a couple areas)
reads:
No-Cause Termination Notice to Vacate NRS 40.251(1) TO:....Date of Service: August 22nd, 2011
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that you must surrender and vacate the rental unit located at: 121
River Rock Street, Reno, Nevada 89503 You are entitled to a period of:
_X_ 2. Thirty (30) calendar days after service of this notice to vacate and leave the rental unit
(because you have a periodic tenancy which is not week-to-week). NRS 40.251(1)(a)(2). ...
(because your tenancy is subject to Chapter 118A of the Nevada Revised Statutes and your rental
agreement expired as of February 28, 2011. NRS 40.251(1)(b)(1)(11). (Applies to all other periodic
tenancies.)...
ATTENTION! If you fall to vacate the rental unit by September 23, 2011, you will be guilty
of an unlawful detainer (unlawful possession), and I will start eviction proceedings against you.
NOTE: If you are 60 years of age or older. or if you have a physical or mental disability, and
your tenancy is not week-to-week, you may make a written request to me to be allowed to continue
in possession of the rental unit for an additional 30 days past the time listed on this notice. You must
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provide me with proof of your age or disability with your written request. If I reject your request, you
have the right to petition the court to continue In possession of the rental unit for an additional 30
days. If the court denies your petition, you will be allowed to continue in possession of the rental unit
for five (5) calendar days following the date of entry of the order denying the petition.
ATTENTION! THIS NOTICE IS BEING GIVEN PURSUANT TO NEVADA REVISED
STATUTES. If you do not comply with this notice you will be In unlawful possession of the rental
unit. and you will be subject to the eviction procedures contained in NRS 40.254 or NRS 40.290 et
seq.
Baker's 8/22/11 No-Cause Termination Notice to Vacate (utilizing a pre-printed N. S. Ct.
Form #7 (with just a couple things changed by way of placing Xs over or terminated in a
couple areas) reads:
No-Cause Termination Notice to Vacate NRS 40.251(1) TO:....Date of Service: August 22nd, 2011
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that you must surrender and vacate the rental unit located at: 121
River Rock Street, Reno, Nevada 89503 You are entitled to a period of:
(because you have a periodic tenancy which is not week-to-week). NRS 40.251(1)(a)(2). ...
(because your tenancy is subject to Chapter 118A of the Nevada Revised Statutes and your rental
agreement expired as of February 28, 2011. NRS 40.251(1)(b)(1)(11). (Applies to all other periodic
tenancies.)...
ATTENTION! If you fall to vacate the rental unit by September 23, 2011, you will be guilty
of an unlawful detainer (unlawful possession), and I will start eviction proceedings against you.
NOTE: If you are 60 years of age or older. or if you have a physical or mental disability, and
your tenancy is not week-to-week, you may make a written request to me to be allowed to continue
in possession of the rental unit for an additional 30 days past the time listed on this notice. You must
provide me with proof of your age or disability with your written request. If I reject your request, you
have the right to petition the court to continue In possession of the rental unit for an additional 30
days. If the court denies your petition, you will be allowed to continue in possession of the rental unit
for five (5) calendar days following the date of entry of the order denying the petition.
ATTENTION! THIS NOTICE IS BEING GIVEN PURSUANT TO NEVADA REVISED
STATUTES. If you do not comply with this notice you will be In unlawful possession of the rental
unit. and you will be subject to the eviction procedures contained in NRS 40.254 or NRS 40.290 et
seq.
Baker attempts to argue (by way of the language he included in the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE)
that Merliss's patent, obvious retaliatory conduct was not violative of NRS 118A.510 because
Coughlin failed to present any evidence that prior to being served with the referenced termination
and eviction notices, Coughlin had "instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative
proceeding or arbitration in which [he] raised an issue of ... habitability. However, the statute
does not require Coughlin to show that he "instituted or defended against a judicial or
administrative proceeding prior to being
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NRS 118A.510 Retaliatory conduct by landlord against

tenant prohibited; remedies; exceptions. 1. ... the landlord
may not, in retaliation, terminate a tenancy, refuse to renew a
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tenancy, increase rent or decrease essential services required

by the rental agreement or this chapter, or bring or threaten
to bring an action for possession if:...(e) The tenant has
instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative
proceeding or arbitration in which the tenant raised an issue
of compliance with the requirements of this chapter
(Judge Sferrazza indicated Baker may prepare (Judge Sferrazza referred to such as a
judgment...which makes problematic the fact that Coughlin was not provided the 5 days to review
Baker's proposed judgment under JCRRT 17...see, also, NJCRCP 52)(Merliss's conduct is so
obviously retaliatory upon reviewing Exhibit 6 to Couglin's 10/11/11 Motion for Continuance, and
Couglin's Exhibit 6 of 10/25/11, the emails between Merliss and Coughlin) especially given the
extreme temporal connection between the very protected complaints by Coughlin under NRS
118A.510 and the 8/22/11 Notices, especially where Arizona, Texas, and Minnesota have statutes
listing time frames of 6 months as indicative of retaliation where such interval between the protected
complaint and act purported to be done in retaliation is that or less)
Further, if only by way of analogy (given JCRRT per Rule 2 do not apply to landlord tenant
matters) JCRRT Rule17.Preparation of findings, conclusions, and judgment.In a civil case,
where a judge directs an attorney to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment, the
attorney shall serve a copy of the proposed document upon counsel for all parties who have appeared,
or upon the party if a party has appeared in proper person at the trial and are affected by the judgment.
Five days after service counsel shall submit the same to the court for signature together with proof
of such service.
Where the proceeding/Trial ended on 10/25/11, it was simply inequitable to require Couglin to
receive an email with the proposed FOFCOL from Baker at noon on 10/27/11, where Judge Sferrazza
signed such FOFCOl by 4:39 pm that day. Indeed, even Judge Sferrazza, turns out, could have used
more time to review the proposed FOFCOL given the fact that an 11/7/11 hearing was necessitated to
vacate the portion of his ruling that awarded the $2,275 to the landlord, where Judge Sferrazza agreed
with Couglin at that hearing upon Couglin criticizing Baker for failing to faithfully reproduce Judge
Sferrazza's order as rendered (such absolutely did not indicate that the $2,275 rent escrow was the
property of the landlord, but rather, indicated that ... Baker and Hill continue to attach Judge
Sferrazza's 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE as though it was not amended substantially by Judge Sferrazza's
Order amending that FOFCOLOSE on 11/7/11 (rendered from the bench). Clearly, Judge Sferrazza
substantially distanced his final ruling on a variety of matters from the 10/27/11 FOFCOL in his
Amended Order as rendered on 11/7/11 in 1708.
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NRS 118A.510 Retaliatory conduct by landlord against

tenant prohibited; remedies; exceptions. 1. ... the landlord
may not, in retaliation, terminate a tenancy, refuse to renew a
tenancy, increase rent or decrease essential services required
by the rental agreement or this chapter, or bring or threaten
to bring an action for possession if:...(e) The tenant has
instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative
proceeding or arbitration in which the tenant raised an issue
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of compliance with the requirements of this chapter

10.4 Coughlin failed to present any evidence that he had "complained in good faith to the
landlord, a government agency, an attorney, a fair housing agency or any other appropriate body of a
violation of NRS 118.010 to 118.120, inclusive, or the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601
et seq., or ha[d] otherwise exercised rights which are guaranteed or protected under those laws" as
required by NRS 118A.510(1)(g).
11. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that the Property was at any time not habitable, as that
term is defined in NRS 118A.290, or otherwise, with respect to any of the alleged deficiencies
identified by him. Those alleged, but unproven, deficiencies included, but were not limited to, the
front and back steps, any broken window, any alleged mold, 2.any falling insulation, the garbage
disposal, and any weeds on the Property.
11.1. With respect to any weeds on the Property, the court further specifically finds that the
maintenance of the surrounding grounds, incl uding weed control, was th.. sole responsibility of
Coughlin under paragraph 22 of the parties' rental agreement.
12. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that he complied, or that Merliss failed to comply, with
any requirement set forth in NRS 118A.355 and NRS 118A.360, which statutes address the
withholding of rent for alleged "habitability" issues.
12.1. As such, the court finds that Coughlin was not entitled to withhold any rent based on any
alleged "habitability" issue, or otherwise, and that all sums heretofore deposited by Coughlin pursuant
to the Court's order dated October 13, 2011, rightfully belong to Merliss as and for past due rent.
13. If any finding of fact above is, in fact, a conclusion of law, it should be regarded as such, and its
validity should not be affected by where in this decision it is located.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court concludes the following as the controlling law in this case:
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this case. Venue is
appropriate in this court.
2. The ultimate issue before the court at the referenced hearing was the right of the landlord,
Merliss, to immediate possession of the Property. NRS 40.254. NRS 40.253(6).
3. The purpose of the hearing was to "determine the truthfulness and sufficiency of the tenant's
and the landlord's affidavits," to determine whether there is any "legal defense as to the alleged
unlawful detainer," and whether "the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer". NRS 40.253(6).
. 5. "[A]n order granting summary eviction under NRS 40.253(6) should be review..d on
appeal based upon the standard for review of an order granting summary judgm..nt under NRCP 56
because these proceedings are analogous." Anvui) LLC v. C.L. Dragoil) LLC) 123 Nev. 212, 215,
163 P.3d 405 (2007). 6. "To successfully defend against a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving
party must transcend the pleadings and, by affidavit or other admissible evidence, introduce specific
facts that show a genuine issue of material fact." Torrealba v. Kesmilis, 124 Nev. 95, 178 P.3d 716
(2008). 7. Coughlin failed to show that any genuine issue of material fact remains for trial. As such,
Coughlin failed to meet his burden of proof to establish any legal defense to the summary eviction.
Anvui. Torrealba. 8. As no issues of fact had yet been presented to the court to warrant a trial,
Coughlin was not entitled to have the summary eviction hearing heard by ajury. NJCRCP 38.
NJCRCP 39. NRS 40.310. Any demand by Coughlin for a jury was untimely, in any event. NJCRCP
38. 9. Pursuant to NRS 40.253(6), Merliss is entitled to immediate possession of the property.
ORDER FOR SUMMARY EVICTION
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Landlord, MATT MERLISS, having applied by Affidavit for an Order seeking summary
eviction of the above-named Tenant and it appearing from the record on file herein that the statutory
requirements have been met and that the Tenant, after notice, unlawfully detains and withholds the
rental unit, and the Court being fully advised and finding good cause, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
That the sheriff/constable of Reno Township, or one of their duly authorized agents be, and
hereby is, directed to remove each and every person found upon the rental unit at 121 River Rock,
Reno, Washoe County, Nevada, by no earlier than October 31, 2011 at 5 pm. Landlord is hereby
awarded the right of possession of the premises.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
The sums currently on deposit with the Court, in the amount of $2,275.00, are the property of
the landlord, Matt Merliss, but shall not be immediately released to him. Instead, those sums shall
serve as Coughlin's security for costs on appeal, pursuant to NJCRCP 73, in the event Coughlin
timely and properly appeals this order. In the event Coughlin fails to timely and properly appeal this
order, those sums shall be immediately released to Merliss or his counsel of record. These sums shall
not, in any event, operate to stay enforcement of this order and the surrender of the right of Coughlin
to possess the Property. Nothing in this order shall prevent this court or an appellate court from
releasing the deposited funds to Merliss or his counsel prior to or after any appeal is perfected, or
from increasing the amount of any security to be posted by Coughlin for any reason, or both, either
upon its own motion or upon motion by Merliss.
IT IS SO ORDERED."
In 03628, Baker's 1/20/12 filing:
SECOND MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff, MATTHEW MERLISS, through counsel, RICHARD G. HILL, LTD., and CASEY
D. BAKER, ESQ., moves the court pursuant to NRS 22.010(3) for an order requiring appellant,
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN ("COUGHLIN"), to appear and show cause why he should not
be held in contempt of this court for unlawfully resisting Merliss' efforts to comply with this court's
order of January 11, 2012. This is plaintiffs second motion for order to show cause, and is in addition
to the motion plaintiff filed in the Reno Justice Court on November 21, 2011. This motion is based on
the points and authorities below and all papers and pleadings on file herein.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
ADJUDICATED FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. Merliss is the owner of the real property located at 121 River Rock Street, Reno, Nevada
(the "PROPERTY").
2. On or about March 1, 2010, MerIiss rented the Property to Coughlin and his then-girlfriend.
3. On August 22, 2011, Merliss properly and lawfully terminated Coughlin's month-to-month
tenancy pursuant to NRS 40.251, by serving the statutory No-Cause Termination Notice to Vacate
NRS 40.251(1) upon him.
4. On September 27,2011, MerIiss properly served Coughlin with a Five-Day Notice of
Unlawful Detainer For Failure to Vacate Rental Unit -NRS 40.251 (No-Cause Termination) and
Notice of Summary Eviction -NRS 40.254.
5. On October 27,2011, after all due and proper notice and opportunity to be heard had been
given to Coughlin, this court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting
Summary Eviction. A true and correct copy of the referenced order is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 1.
FACTS SHOWING CONTEMPT OF COURT
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6. EXHIBIT 1 was served on Coughlin on November 1, 2011 by the Washoe County Sheriffs
Department in its customary manner, by posting same on the front door of the property in the manner
customary for evictions in Washoe County. The locks to the premises were changed at that time,
thereby ejecting and dispossessing Coughlin of possession of the Property.
7. Thereafter, Mr. Coughlin unlawfully, and without any right to do so, reentered upon, and
took possession of, the Property.
8. Specifically, on November 13, 2011, Mr. Coughlin was found to be living in the basement
of the Property. Coughlin was arrested and charged with trespassing at that time. A motion for order
to show cause relating to Coughlin's unlawful reentry on the Property is currently pending in the Reno
Justice Court. That reentry is not the subject of this motion, but is referenced here to give the court
some background of the events leading up to this motion.
9. On December 21, 2011, after a hearing on Coughlin's motion to contest Merliss' personal
property lien, Judge Sferrazza of the Reno Justice Court entered another order. A true and correct
copy of that court's order resolving motion to contest personal property lien is attached hereto as
EXHIBIT 2.
10. Also on December 21, 2011, this case was sent up to this court on appeal from the Reno
Justice Court.
11. Pursuant to EXHIBIT 2, Coughlin was provided access to the Property on Thursday,
December 22, 2011. That day, Coughlin sent an email to the undersigned and Judge Sferrazza, in
which he essentially announced that he was entitled to a stay, and to return to and continue in
possession of the Property. Judge Sferrazza quickly responded by email, and reminded Mr. Coughlin
that the stay had been denied. Coughlin removed very little of his property that day, and clearly
intended to simply re-take possession of the house, until Judge Sferrazza disabused him of that
notion.
12. On Friday, December 23, 2011, Coughlin had a crew of helpers, and made progress.
Nonetheless, Coughlin failed to remove all of his belongings from the Property. Coughlin failed to
remove his things despite having been given additional time to do so after the time set by the Reno
Justice Court in its order of December 1, 2011 (EXHIBIT 2) had expired.
13. On December 30, 2011, Coughlin moved this Court for a temporary restraining order to
prevent Merliss from disposing of the items he (Coughlin) had abandoned on the Property. Coughlin's
motion was fully briefed, and the Court entered its order denying the motion on January 11, 2012. A
true and correct copy of this Court's January 11,2012 order is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 3.
14. On Thursday, January 12, 2012, in accordance with EXHIBIT 2 and EXHIBIT 3, a
licensed contractor hired by Merliss began cleaning up the Property and disposing of the abandoned
items still remaining there.
15. Early that afternoon, while the contractor was hauling the first of several loads of
abandoned property to the transfer station (dump) for disposal, Coughlin stopped the contractor in
traffic and attempted to prevent him from carrying out his task.
16. Specifically, Coughlin stood in front of the contractor's vehicle in an effort to prevent him
from proceeding to the transfer station. Coughlin threatened to sue the contractor. Coughlin climbed
up on the contractor's vehicle. Coughlin then called the police and falsely told them that the contractor
had stolen his possessions, and that the contractor had tried to run him over. Coughlin's acts were
specifically calculated to prevent the contractor from disposing of the abandoned property, and to
frustrate and interfere with Merliss' compliance with this Court's January 11,
2012 order.
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17. When Mr. Hill of the undersigned's office was notified of the foregoing, he went to the
transfer station and presented EXHIBIT 2 and EXHIBIT 3 to the police. The contractor was then
allowed to proceed.
18. However, before the contractor could return to the River Rock Property, Coughlin was
there. He had his video camera and was walking up and down the street screaming and yelling at the
police, the contractor, and Mr. Hill, once Mr. Hill arrived. At the instruction of the police, Mr. Hill
then obtained a temporary protective order ("TPO") against Coughlin from the Reno Justice Court.
Coughlin ended up being arrested and taken to jail that day as a result of his antics at the transfer
station and the Property.
19. On the morning of Friday, January 13,2012, Coughlin sent an email to the office of the
undersigned. Attached to that email was a "Supplemental Reply" prepared and signed by Coughlin. A
true and correct copy ofthe email and attached "supplemental reply" are attached hereto as EXHIBIT
4.
20. The court is asked to note that on page 1 of his "supplemental reply," Coughlin identifies
himself as "Pro per appellant," which, together with his accompanying email, seems to indicate that
he intended to file the "supplemental reply" in this case. However, the caption of the document, as
well as most of its content, indicates that he perhaps intended to file it in the Carpentier v. Aames
Funding case (Case No. CV08-01709). On information and belief, the document ended up being
actually filed in the
Carpentier case.
21. Of particular note to this Court, however, is the first six pages of Coughlin's "supplemental
reply," wherein Coughlin describes, in some detail, the events of January 12, 2012.
22. On January 17, 2012, Coughlin filed two documents in this case. Each document was
entitled "Opposition to Motion for Attorney's Fees." There is not, and has never been, any motion for
attorney's fees filed in this case in this court. Coughlin's opposition is a fugitive document, it violates
Rule 11 and Nevada RPC 3.1 (meritorious contention), and should be stricken by the court. It is only
worth mentioning here because it contains the same 6-page rant about the events of January 12, 2012
as does his earlier"supplemental reply."
23. Reference is made to the declaration of Phillip Stewart, attached hereto as
EXHIBIT 5.
24. Reference is made to the Declaration of Richard G. Hill, Esq., attached hereto as
EXHIBIT 6.
LAW
1. Reference is made to NRS 22.010: "The following acts or omissions shall be deemed
contempts: ... 3. Disobedience or resistance to any lawful writ, order, rule or process issued by the
court or judge at chambers." (Emphasis added.)
2. Reference is made to NRS 22.030(2), which provides: "2. If a contempt is not committed in
the immediate view and presence of the court or judge at chambers, an affidavit must be presented to
the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt, or a statement of the facts by the masters or
arbitrators."
Analysis: On December 21,2011, Judge Sferrazza of the Reno Justice Court entered an order that,
among other things, allowed Merliss to dispose of anything left at the Property after 5:00 p.m. on
Friday, December 23, 2011. See EXHIBIT 2. On January 11, 2012, this Court denied Coughlin's
motion for a temporary restraining order, and, in so doing, affirmed Judge Sferrazza's previous order.
See EXHIBIT 3. When Merliss attempted to comply with the courts' orders, Coughlin attempted to
prevent him from doing so. Coughlin even attempted to fraudulently enlist the police to aid him in his
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efforts to thwart this Court's and the Reno Justice Court's directives. Coughlin's actions constitute
contempt of court under NRS 22.010(3). The affidavits contemplated by NRS 22.030(2) are attached
hereto as EXHIBIT 5 and EXHIBIT 6. The form of the order Merliss asks the court to enter is
attached hereto as EXHIBIT 7.
WHEREFORE, Merliss prays for an order of this court requiring defendant, ZACHARY
BARKER COUGHLIN, to appear and show cause why he should not be held in contempt of this
court under NRS 22.010(3) for his resistance to this court's lawfully entered order; and for such other,
further and additional relief as seems just to the court in the premises. DATED this 20th day of
January, 2012. /s/ Casey D. Baker, Esq.
EXHIBIT INDEX
DESCRIPTION PAGES
1. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Summary Eviction dated 10/27/11
2. Order resolving motion to contest personal property lien dated 12/21/11
3. Order dated 1/11/12 denying motion for temporary restraining order
4. Email and "supplemental reply" dated 1/13/12 27
5. Declaration of Phil Stewart 3
6. Declaration of Richard G. Hill
7. Proposed order
Exhibit 5 to that 1/20/12 Second Motion for Order to Show Cause reads:
DECLARATION OF PHILLIP STEWART PHILLIP STEWART, being first duly sworn, deposes
and under penalty of perjury avers:
1. I am a resident ofthe City of Reno, County ofWashoe, State of Nevada, and over 18 years
of age. This declaration is based on my personal knowledge, except those matters stated on
information and belief, and as to those items I believe them to be true. This declaration is made in
support of respondent's Motion/or Order to Show Cause, and represents my testimony if called on to
present same in court.
2. I am the owner of Nevada Building Industries, and a licensed contractor in the State of
Nevada. My contractor's license number is 15023.
3. Nevada Building Industries was hired by the law office of Richard G. Hill, Ltd. to clean out
the property left behind at 121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada after the mostrecent tenant was evicted.
4. On Thursday, January 12, 2012, we began work.
5. Early that afternoon, as I was taking the first load of debris to the Waste Management
transfer station, I was flagged down by Zach Coughlin. At first I thought it was a citizen trying to
alert me that debris was falling out of the truck, so I stopped. The driver approached me. I
immediately recognized Mr. Coughlin from a previous encounter with him at the River Rock
property, and from having seen him in court.
6. Mr. Coughlin was very confrontational. He accused me of stealing his things. He climbed
on my vehicle. He threatened to sue me if I disposed of my load at the transfer station. He tried to
prevent me from doing so by, among other things, standing in the street in front of my truck.
7. Mr. Coughlin threatened to call the police. I told him that if he didn't call them, I would. I
then called Mr. Hill. Mr. Hill told me to have Mr. Coughlin call him (Mr. Hill) to discuss terms to
release the load in my truck to Mr. Coughlin. Mr. Coughlin said he did not have a cell phone. I then
proceeded to the transfer station but not without being harassed along the way by Mr. Coughlin.
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8. When I arrived at the transfer station, Mr. Coughlin jumped in front of my truck to stop me
from entering the transfer station building. He produced a cell phone and was talking to somebody,
who I later learned was a female Sergeant with the Reno Police Department. Coughlin was falsely
screaming that I was running over him. He physically prevented me from proceeding. The police
arrived and I called Mr. Hill to come to the transfer station. Mr. Hill arrived at the transfer station a
short time later. After Mr. Hill showed some paperwork to the police officer, I was allowed to
proceed with dumping my load at the transfer station.
9. When I finished at the transfer station, I returned to the River Rock property. Mr. Coughlin
was already there. Mr. Coughlin was walking up and down the street with his video camera, yelling
and screaming at me, my crew, and, later, the police and Mr. Hill, when they arrived. The police told
Mr. Hill to go to the Reno Justice Court and get a TPO, which he did.
10. Mr. Coughlin continued videotaping and harassing me, my crew, and the police. Finally,
after he refused to comply with their requests, Mr. Coughlin was arrested and taken into custody.
11. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. DATED this (no
date was entered therein) day of January, 2012 /s/ Phillip Stewart, (Nevada Building Industries).
Exhibit 6 in 03628 to Baker's 1/20/12 Second Motion for Order to Show Cause reads:
DECLARATION OF RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ. RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ., being first duly sworn,
deposes and under penalty of perjury avers:
1. I am a resident ofthe City of Reno, County ofWashoe, State of Nevada, and over 18 years
ofage. This declaration is based on my personal knowledge, except those matters stated on
support of respondent's Motionfor Order to Show Cause, and represents my testimony if called on to
2. I am an attorney duly licensed as such by the State of Nevada to practice before all courts of
this State and maintain my office at 652 Forest Street, Reno, Nevada. I am also licensed to practice
before the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals
and the United States Supreme Court.
3. My office represents the respondent, Dr. Matthew Merliss, in this matter.
4. In accordance with the Reno Justice Court's order of December 21, 2011, on Thursday,
December 22, 2011, Mr. Coughlin was given full run of the River Rock property, starting at 9:00 a.m.
At about noon that day, he sent an email to the effect that because he had appealed the justice court's
order, he felt himself entitled to resume living in the property and would not leave. Later that day,
Judge Sferrazza sent out an email that Coughlin's stay had been denied. When we arrived at 5:00 p.m.
to lock the property up, it was apparent that Mr. Coughlin had done virtually nothing to remove any
possessions. This is relevant to the order to show cause, because it shows that Coughlin was more
interested in confrontation that in actually getting his possessions out of the house.
5. On Friday, December 23, 2011, we unlocked the house at 9:00 a.m. As ordered. We
overlooked the chain on the back gate. There was nobody at the house when we were there. At
approximately noon, my staff informed me that an enraged Mr. Coughlin had called the office
screaming that he could not get in the back yard. When I finished the meeting I was in, I immediately
went over and unlocked the back gate. Coughlin had a small crew. He charged at me and made
physical contact. He was enraged. We left. When we returned at 5:00 p.m., Mr. Coughlin was
screaming and yelling obscenities. He drove off in a small U -Haul. His crew remained. We walked
the property with them. The inside.ground floor was mostly cleared of all but a big TV. The basement
had been cleared somewhat, butthere was still a lot of"junk. " We could not access the attic. We went
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outside. I told Coughlin's crew they could remove anything and everything outside, if they would only
try to rehang the gate that Mr. Coughlin had taken off the hinges before we could get over to unlock
it. I told them I would lock the gates in the morning over to the River Rock property. When I returned
the next day, Coughlin's crew had not taken much of what had been outside the night before. I
secured the backyard, and nothing was moved until the events detailed herein.
6. On Thursday, January 12,2012, I met with Phil Stewart of Nevada Building Industries at the
River Rock property to make arrangements with him to remove and dispose of the abandoned
property left there by Mr. Coughlin. I then returned to my office.
7. Approximately four to five hours after returning to my office, I received a telephone call
from Mr. Stewart. Mr. Stewart informed me that Mr. Coughlin had flagged him down near the Waste
Management transfer station, where Mr. Stewart was attempting to dump his first load of debris
removed from the house that morning.
8. Mr. Stewart told me that Coughlin was accusing him (Mr. Stewart) of stealing his things,
threatening to sue Mr. Stewart, and generally trying to prevent Mr. Stewart from disposing of those
items by, among other things, standing in the street in front of Mr. Stewart's truck. I told Mr. Stewart
to have Mr. Coughlin call me, because I wanted to try to negotiate terms to release the contents of the
truck to Mr. Coughlin. Mr. Stewart told me Mr. Coughlin said he did not have a cell phone.
9. Shortly thereafter, I received another call from Mr. Stewart. He was at the transfer station.
Mr. Coughlin had stopped him from entering. Mr. Coughlin had called the police, and told them that
Mr. Stewart had stolen his (Coughlin's) possessions, and that they were in the truck.
10. I immediately drove to the transfer station. When I got there, Mr. Coughlin was present,
and being cordoned away by two Reno Police Department officers. After I presented the police
officers with the Reno Justice Court's December 21,2011 order, and this court's January 11, 2012
order, Mr. Stewart was allowed to proceed. I then returned to my office.
11. Approximately 15 minutes later, I received another call from Mr. Stewart, who informed
me that Mr. Coughlin was at the River Rock property. I immediately drove over to the River Rock
property.
12. When I got there, Mr. Coughlin was walking up and down the street and in the street with
his video camera, yelling and screaming at me, the police, and Mr. Stewart.
13. On the advice of the police officer on the scene, I then went to the Reno Justice Court and
obtained a temporary protective order against Mr. Coughlin to prevent him from returning to the
River Rock property or further harassing Mr. Stewart and his crew. I filled out the TPO paperwork
and returnedto River Rock. Mr. Coughlin was already in custody. He was in the back of a squad car.
When he saw me, he began swearing and yelling. He was screaming at the police and would not
cooperate with them. I received a call to return to the Reno Justice Court to retrieve the TPO, which I
subsequently gave to
an RPD officer, who said he would serve Mr. Coughlin at the jail.
14. I have personally reviewed exhibits 1-4 to the instant motion, and each exhibit is a true
and correct copy of what it purports to be.
15. Mr. Coughlin's behavior was calculated to disrupt the removal of debris from thehome. I
counted no less than 13 automobile seats in the basement, including what I am told is the front benchseat from a Chevrolet Blazer. Mr. Coughlin left significant quantities of trash and garbage at the
property.
16. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
DATED this 19th day of January, 2012. /s/ Richard G. Hill, Esq.
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Whether RPD Officer Carter or Sargent Lopez did any announcing pursuant to the knock and an
nounce requirement in connection with the criminal trespass arrest became a disputed issue, with
Coughlin contending that neither Merliss nor Hill (and they admit they did not announce themselves
in any way, but rather, called the police upon finding the door to the crawlspace/quasi basement under
the house locked from the inside; which is odd, considering later, in the very videos of the arrest that
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they filmed Hill and Merliss are caught lying in there assertion to the RPD that they warned Cough
lin to leave prior to the custodial arrest being made sufficient to meet the requirements for a criminal
trespass violation under RMC 8.10.010.
King's 8/23/12 Complaint puts it this way (largely copied and pasted from the filings of Hill's
14
associate Baker, much like Susich's 5/31/12 60975 SCR 117 Petition against Coughlin):
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10. Respondent was arrested on November 13, 2011 by Reno Police Department and charged
with trespassing, a misdemeanor, for which he was later convicted.
11. The circumstances leading to the above-mentioned arrest are as follows: at an hearing
Justice of the Peace Peter Sferrazza ordered that Respondent vacate the home he was renting
effective November 1, 2011. After the locks were changed and the notice was posted on the front
door the owner, Dr. Merliss, discovered that someone had broken into the home and was
barricaded in the basement. The Reno Police tried to coax whoever was in the basement to open
the door. Dr. Merliss was forced to kick open the door where the Reno Police found Respondent.
Respondent had broken into the home and living in the basement. Respondent was arrested for
criminal trespass and was subsequently convicted of that charge.
12. Respondent, representing himself as co-counsel, filed a 36-page motion to dismiss on
March 5, 2012. The motion was denied by Judge William Gardner and was determined to be without
merit. The motion, on its face, demonstrates that Respondent lacks competence to practice law.
13. Once Respondent was evicted, an order was obtained to remove his belongings from the
home. Respondent interfered with the contractor who was hired to remove Respondent's personal
belongings. The police were called and after talking with Respondent they recommended that he find
something else to do. Respondent refused to their advice and was subsequently arrested by the Reno
police.
Compare that account in King's 8/23/12 Complaint in NG12-0204 to NNDB Chiarman
Susich's in his 5/31/12 SCR 117(2) Petition in 60975:
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14. On November 13, 2011, Respondent was arrested by Reno Police Department and charged with
Trespassing, a misdemeanor. Respondent recorded his arrest and has posted the arrest video on YouTube. The internet address of the video is: http:www.youtube.com/watch?v=ssEOFWHFNEY
15. Respondent's trespass arrest arose after an eviction hearing before Justice of the Peace Peter
Sferrazza. Respondent was evicted from his residence per order of the court effective November 1,
2011. After being evicted, Respondent was later found living in the basement of the residence. The
locks on the residence had been broken. The Reno Police tried to convince Respondent to leave
the premises; but he would not voluntarily leave. The owner kicked a door open and Respondent
was arrested thereafter.
Respondent filed a 36-page "Notice of Appearance as Co-Counsel and Motion to Dismiss" the
trespass charge on March 5, 2012, in the Second Judicial District Court, bearing Case No. 11 CR
26405. A copy of the "motion" is attached as Exhibit 3 and incorporated by this reference. The
document is incoherent, confused and rambling.
Compare those two accounts to Hill's Declaration and Baker's filings of 11/21/11 in the
eviction case in their Motion for Order to Show Cause, and in the appeal in 03628 of the eviction in
1708, in their 1/20/12 filing...along with Hill and Baker's sworn testimony at the criminal trespass
trial on 6/18/12 in 26405, then Hill's testimony at the formal disciplinary hearing of 11/14/12, along
with Hill and RPD Officer Carter's written statements in the police report for the 11/13/11 criminal
trespass arrest, and the statements made by RPD Carter and Sargent Lopez, along with Coughlin, Hill,
and landlord Merliss in the videos Hill and Merliss themselves filmed before, during, and after the
criminal trespass arrest. Then, compare the statements Couglin videotaped Sargent Lopez admitting
to on 1/13/12, along with Sargent Lopez's testimony of 3/19/13 in 065630. Coughlin's 11/19/12 filing
in 61383 is particularly insightful in that regard, as is his 10/24/12 filing in 61901, and the 10/31/12
filing in the disciplinary matter NG12-0204 that the SBN has curiously failed to include in either
version of the ROA is filed, despite Coughlin having a file stamped copy and FHE14 demonstrating
such. (and as to King and Hill's allegation of Couglin simply filing his own filings multiple times but
merely changing the title, King's Complaint and Susich's SCR 117 Petition are merely reheated
versions of the filings by Hill's associate, Baker, and the FOFCOL is yet another carbon copy thereof,
with a generous helping of quotations from a few scattered, dubious orders.
Also, the duplicity of all involved here except Couglin is on display with respect to the
characterizations of the locks at the former home law office.
Also, it is instructive to look at Hill, King, Baker, RCA Hazlett-Stevens, RPD Carter, Sargent
Lopez, and Susich's characterization of the lockout order (all three attempt to make it read as much
more of a trespass warning than what it was, which was an eviction order that merely reads as
follows, in relevant part:
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 41:17 to 44:16) BY MR. KING: Q Did you end up getting an eviction
order removing Mr. Coughlin from Dr. Merliss's home? A We did. Q Subsequent to the eviction
order, was Mr. Coughlin removed from the home? A I'm sorry. There was an order issued in court
that gave Mr. Coughlin a week to vacate. I believe it was November 1 that my wife, my associate -and my associate, went to the home with the sheriff and conducted a lockout. The front door locks
were changed. The back door locks were changed. MR. COUGHLIN: Objection. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me. Objection what? MR. COUGHLIN: Hearsay. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Hearsay? Overruled. THE WITNESS: And the whole thing was videotaped. The next day I went to
the home to videotape the place to preserve what was there to prevent any arguments later, because by
that point in time we knew what we were dealing with. I get there, and the front door is locked, but
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almost all the windows are closed but unlocked, and the back door is unlocked. And I, of course, go
through, lock everything, make sure the place is secure, videotaped it. And I went back and read my
wife and my associate the riot act, and they both said no, the doors were locked. Okay. I go back the
next day, same thing. Back door's unlocked, windows are unlocked. This continues for the next two
weeks. Mr. Coughlin is sending out e-mails to us but will not, apparently, read the e-mails we're
sending to him saying we have to get your stuff out of here. No response. Two weeks after the
eviction on a Sunday Dr. Merliss comes to town and says, I want to see the house. I meet him about
10:30, 11:00 o'clock on a Sunday morning at the house. We go in. Back door is open. There's food
wrappers on the counter that've been there that weren't there the last time I was in. Windows are open
again, and it's a very exacerbating situation. And he says, I want to check the basement. I didn't know
there was a basement in the house. There's things piled in the stairwell to get down into the basement,
tool kits, and heavy stuff. We get it out of the way. We get down there. And I can see when he pushes
on the door, and he turns to me, and he says, "It's barricaded," from the inside. It wasn't locked, it was
barricaded. We know what's going on. So we call the police. The police come over. They try to get
Zach out of the basement, whoever was in there at that point. The police bang on the door, "Come on
out, Zach. Police. You have to go." No response. They turned to us and say, we're going to leave.
Wait a minute. I'm the owner. You have the authority to break the door down. "We don't do that." So
Dr. Merliss goes down to the bottom of the stairs. Dr. Merliss kicks the door open, and the police
officer sticks his head around the corner and pulls his gun out, and here's Mr. Coughlin down there.
Mr. Coughlin voluntarily came upstairs with his dog and was placed under arrest. After he left, we
went downstairs. Mr. Coughlin had a dwelling set up. He had water. He had food. He had a hot plate,
a microwave, had his computer set up down there. He had the dog. There was dog food, dog poop. He
had a bed and his computer system set up down there. He was arrested and was subsequently
convicted of criminal trespass. MR. COUGHLIN: Objection. Relevancy. If he's testifying about
trespass, that's one thing. But he's testifying about a lot of stuff beyond trespass. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Overruled.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 55:1 to 56:20) CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Mr.
Hill, did the Reno police identify themselves as law enforcement prior to your client kicking the door
down on November 13th? MR. KING: Objection. Relevance. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled. THE
WITNESS: I believe they did, sir. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Is that what you testified on June 18th
in your sworn testimony in the criminal trespass trial? A I believe it is. Q Did you testify to that
today? A I believe I just did. Q Just now, but not earlier when you were providing an answer to Mr.
King, and you went through what happened? A Mr. Coughlin, let me make it easy for you. I don't
recall what I testified to on direct from Mr. King. It is my clear recollection that before Dr. Merliss
kicked the door down in the basement, the police had identified themselves loudly and clearly. Q
Can you describe that in as much detail as possible? MR. KING: Objection. Relevance. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: The relevance, Mr. Coughlin, as to your competency or candor, which are the two
issues raised? MR. COUGHLIN: It goes to whether or not there was a criminal trespass, which I
believe -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: You were convicted of criminal trespass, true? MR. COUGHLIN: I
was. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sustained. MR. COUGHLIN: But a conviction under Claiborne is not
something you're entitled to just say, all right, conviction, and be done with it. Further, I'm not
offering it to prove whether or not there was conviction. I'm offering it to impeach Mr. Hill's
credibility, which is severely impeached by this in that he lied, and his client lied to get an arrest
made. MR. KING: Mr. Chairman, if I can respond? MR. COUGHLIN: That's been proven in my
filings.
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HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 57:16 to 62:4) MR. COUGHLIN: Sir, I'm not trying to retry it. I'm
trying to impeach Mr. Hill's credibility. MR. ECHEVERRIA: To that extent I'll allow that question.
MR. COUGHLIN: Thank you, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA: But you better have some evidence that -if you are going to ask questions, they better be based on fact. MR. COUGHLIN: They are. They're
based on video. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a -- propose a witness that will testify that the
police did not identify themselves? MR. COUGHLIN: I have a video of the sergeant -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a witness? MR. COUGHLIN: -- admitting to that. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a witness? MR. COUGHLIN: So you're telling me it has to come in
the form of a witness as evidence? MR. ECHEVERRIA: If you are intending to impeach him on
some facts, then I would require that you make an offer of proof as to what witness will impeach Mr.
Hill. MR. COUGHLIN: I would like to show Mr. Hill a video of Marsha Lopez, the sergeant with
him that day, admitting that Mr. Hill's account is wrong. MR. KING: I'm going to object to any video
or display of videos. And the reason I will object is, number one, they are irrelevant. Number two,
they're all edits. And number three, he's trying to show that something didn't occur by showing an
excerpt of a video. It would be totally irrelevant and immaterial. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'll address the
admissibility of the video when that appears. Right now Mr. Coughlin has asked Mr. Hill whether the
police identified himself. Mr. Hill said that they have. I think you've laid the groundwork. If you have
impeachment testimony that's admissible, when you offer it -- MR. COUGHLIN: I'll ask a more
clarifying question. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please proceed to another subject. BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q So when they identified themselves, how long between identifying themselves and kicking the
door down? A Three minutes. Two or three minutes. Q Which one of them identified themself? A
I believe there was a lady sergeant, and there was a male officer. And I believe he's the one who
banged on the door with his nightstick and identified himself as being with the police. And I believe
his words were, come on out, Zach. Q Was that it, come out Zach? Does that identify it as being the
police? A He identified himself as being with the Reno Police Department. Q In what words? A I
believe those were the words he used, sir. Q What words? A This is the police, please come out
Zach. Q Because previously all you said was, come on out Zach. A I believe you're mistaken, sir. Q
So you're saying that officer Chris Carter, Junior, three minutes before the door was kicked in by your
client, banged on the door with his nightstick, and said, this is the police. Come on out, Zach? A Mr.
Coughlin, three minutes is probably a long estimate. The process was we had cleared the stairwell -Q Did he say, this is the police? MR. KING: Objection. Argumentative. THE WITNESS: I believe
he did, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me. Let me -- I'm going to go ahead and overrule. Go
ahead. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Did he say, this is the police? A I believe he did, sir. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: You've asked that three times now. THE WITNESS: At least. BY MR.
COUGHLIN: Q Did Sergeant Lopez, the female sergeant? A She may have, but I don't recall. Q
Did you have a video camera with you? A We had Dr. Merliss's phone. Q Did you take 14 videos
that you propounded to the Reno city attorney that day? MR. KING: Objection. Relevance. THE
WITNESS: We gave them what we had. The number I don't recall. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Was
there some reason -- you seem to have video of every moment of that day, except for this announcing
themselves as law enforcement. Is that what you're testifying to right now? A Mr. Coughlin -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, the issue here is whether or not you're competent to be an attorney
and should continue in the practice of law. You're focusing on a rather minor detail, and I would like
you to focus on the broader issues. MR. COUGHLIN: It's not just competency, it's candor. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: You've indicated you want to impeach him. The issue is Mr. Hill has testified that
the police identified themselves. You say something different. I've asked you for an offer of proof.
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You've laid the foundation. Let's proceed. MR. COUGHLIN: It also goes to -- MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Please proceed, Mr. Coughlin. You would do yourself some good if you will focus on the issues, if
you will.
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From the transcript of the criminal trespass trial on 6/18/12, Hill's testimony:
January 13th, 2012 RPD Sargent Marcia Lopez and Officer Travis Warren and Officer Avila
respond to a call for help regarding a domestic disturbance from Zach Coughlin relating to the attacks
by his housemates, Christopher "Erin" Allaback and Laura Foreshee for which Coughlin ultimately
received two Orders of Protection in FV12-00187 and FV12-00188. Sargent Lopez subjected
Coughlin to a custodial arrest for criminal trespass in Reno Municipal Court case 11 CR 26405, on
November 13th, 2011 (which resulted in Coughlin being convicted for criminal trespass following the
June 18th, 2012 Trial wherein Richard Hill testified as follows:
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BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q By whom and when was either I, or anyone else, legally deemed to be the
tenant, warned to leave the premises? THE COURT: And then to the extent you can answer that, Mr.
Baker, answer it. If you can't, don't.
THE WITNESS: I can answer it, sir.
THE COURT: Okay, thank you.
THE WITNESS: The first two notices were served on you on August 22nd, 2011. One of those was a
5-day notice that warned you that if you did not pay your rent within five days you would be evicted.
MR. COUGHLIN: Objection, Your Honor, relevancy. When one has a legal right to be somewhere
THE
COURT: You asked the question. He's giving the answer. If you are going answer (sic) open ended
questions on cross-examination, you're stuck with the answer.
You can answer that question, Mr. Baker. Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
The second of those notices was a 30-day no cause that gave you 30 days. And what that notice did
was that it told you that your tenancy, your month-to-month tenancy, was being terminated as of that
time.
Page -87So,
you had through sometime in the middle to the end of
September to vacate under that notice.
The way it works is after the 30 days has run, then we serve you, and we served you with another 5day Notice of Unlawful Detainer. That was your third warning.
Then we had our hearings on October 13'h and October 2'h. At the end ofthat hearing, at
approximately 5:00 on October 25th, Judge Sferrazza told you, and told me and everyone else in the
Court, that the eviction had been granted, and that you had through October 31 at 5:00 p.m. That was
your fourth warning.
After that, well -that was your fourth warning. BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q So, when you're saying "warning," are you saying upon the original warning in August that failing
to leave at that time would have justified a criminal trespass prosecution at that time?
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MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Judge, it calls for a legal conclusion. Objection. THE COURT:
Sustained. This witness cannot answer that question. That does call for a legal conclusion.
THE WITNESS: You were also warned on October 27'h when I emailed you the proposed Order. BY
MR. COUGHLIN:
Q And when you say "warned," warned to do what and by when?
Page -88A
Your question was were you ever warned that you were going to be evicted, so I think that's why.
Q No, it wasn't. It was, "were you ever warned to leave the premises?" I keep referring to a
criminal trespass statute, and you keep referring to civil eviction statutes.
THE COURT: Listen, I don't want to have an engagement between the witness and the Defendant. I
want you to answer questions. I can figure this stuff out up here. I wasn't -I've been doing this for five
years.
You've asked some important questions, Mr. Coughlin. I don't know if you're going to really help
yourself anymore by asking any more questions from this witness. I think Mr. Baker has testified to
the best of his ability about what he knows, and I think that's all he can testifY to.
MR. COUGHLIN: Alright, thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You made some headway, and it's probably a good time to stop unless you have some
other direct, relevant questions related to his direct examination. (at page 88 of the Certified
Transcript of the June 18th, 2012 Trial in 11 CR 26405).
...
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...BY MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Q And what did happen when you got there on the 13th after you
inspected the property? A At that point in time, the client said, "Well, I want to check the basement."
I said, "Basement?"
And the basement entrance was outside the locked back door on the porch. And we went around out
the back door to go down the staircase, and there were tool boxes of -like small suitcases, boxes,
stacked in the stairwell that we had to pick up and move to get out of the way so we could get down
the stairs to go to see what was in the basement.
We finally got all that stuff out of the way, having to walk through all of the stuff that was on the
porch.
Anyway, the client gets down to the bottom ofthe stairs. I was 3 or 4 feet behind him, and he pushed
on the door, and I could see that the door was moving, but it was barricaded. And he turned to me and
said, "It's barricaded from the inside." I said, "Okay, that's it. Let's go upstairs."
We went upstairs. We called the police. They arrived about 10 minutes later. Told them what the
problem was. They went down. It was a lady sergeant. I believe her name was Lopez, and an officer. I
don't recall his rank. I believe it was Carter.
They went down, and banged on the door with their nightsticks. We were pretty sure who was inside.
Didn't know for sure. And I said, "Come on out, Zach." Nothing. "Come on out, Zach." Nothing.
And that went on for 2 or 3 minutes. And they specifically identified themselves as the police. They
said, "Well, that's it, we're going to leave." And both Dr. Merliss and I said, "What do you mean?
This guy is in here. Somebody is in here criminally trespassing. We need to know who it is and get
him out of here." And they said, "Well, we're not going to break down the door."
So, Dr. Merliss went down the stairs, and he's the one that kicked the door open. Broke the door in the
process. He then came up. One of the police officers went down with his gun drawn, flashlight turned
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down, and the first thing I heard was, "Show me your hands! Show me your hands! Come towards
me."
Page -93
Page -94
And I don't recall at that time whether Mr. Coughlin identified
himself or not. We then proceeded upstairs, and Mr. Coughlin then came upstairs on his own.
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BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Mr. Hill, at any time on that day, November 13th, did the owner of the
premises warn the arrestee to leave the property?
A
I think the message was communicated.
Q
Via what medium?
A
The fact that you were handcuffed and arrested. Didn't
you get the picture?
Q Okay, prior to the handcuffing and the arresting, did anybody say, "You need to leave the
premises?" A I didn't hear that. Q Nobody said that? A I did not hear that, sir. Q Did you say it? A
No. Q Did Dr. Merliss? A Not that I heard. Q Did the police? A No, not that I heard. Q So, nobody
that you heard of warned the person
arrested for trespassing?
Page -1 10
THE COURT: I think it's been asked and answered. I've heard
the question five times, and we're going nowhere by answering this. I think you asked the question
that's relevant. Mr. Hill answered it. Now, move on to your next relevant question if you have any.
MR. COUGHLIN: Alright, Your Honor. And this might not be relevant, but the other part of the
statute is someone failed to leave after being warned to do so.
We have testimony that there was no warning.
THE COURT: You can ask a question right now. This is all subject to argument later on. It's subject
to other testimony, but Mr. Hill has answered the questions that you seem to have answered (sic) that
are relevant to his direct testimony. BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Did the accused ever fail to leave the property after being warned to do so? A You were there. THE
COURT: To the extent you can answer that would be yes or no, Mr. Hill. Answer the question so we
don't drag this out.
THE WITNESS: I don't know that I can answer it yes or no.
THE COURT: If you can't answer it, that's fine.
MR. COUGHLIN: And then just quickly, and I'll wrap this up, Your Honor. BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Did the accused ever say anything to the police to the effect that, "Why would you arrest me
instead of telling me to leave?"
Page -1 11A
No.
Q
Warn me to leave?
A
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No.
Q Do the videos that you propounded to the City Attorney showed just that?
A I don't remember.
Q Have you reviewed the videos you propounded to the City Attorney?
A Not really.
Q Okay, did the police report that you filed indicate whether or not you warned the accused to leave?
A I'd have to see it.
Q Okay, did the police ever ask you whether or not you had indicated to the accused that you would
be charging him the full rental value of the property during this period of time?
MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Judge, I'm going to object.
THE COURT: It's irrelevant, sustained.
MR. COUGHLIN: Your Honor, I believe it THE
COURT: We're not -that doesn't help the Court with the issues at all. I'm just telling you right now
that's irrelevant in my opinion. MR. COUGHLIN: If the eviction is withdrawn? THE COURT:
Objection is sustained. You can ask your next
question. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. I think this is my last question, Your Honor.
Page -1 12BY
MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Mr. Hill, you say the police -you're testifying under oath that you're sure the police specifically
identified themselves as police prior to the door being kicked down?
A I am. Q And can you tell me specifically how MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Judge, I'm going to
object as to relevance. It's not relevant.
THE COURT: It's irrelevant to me, Mr. Coughlin, what the police identified -he's testified they've
identified themselves. They were officers on the premises. What relevance is it at this point to explore
any line of questioning related to that fact?
MR. COUGHLIN: Well, ifit's someone with authority to warn someone to leave, that's one thing. If
it's a crazy person outside on the street, saying, "Come on out."
THE COURT: Ask Mr. Hill a couple of questions related to the police, what they were dressed like,
what they asked when they showed up.
You can ask that.
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm sorry, I couldn't understand what THE
COURT:
Go ahead and ask some questions related
to that.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Can you tell me exactly what the police said when they identified themselves as police prior to the
door being kicked down?
Page -1 13A We told them that we were pretty sure you were there, so my best recollection is that they shouted,
"Come on out, Zach. Come on out, Zach." Words to that effect.
I recall hearing that, as well as, "Come on out, this is the
police." basement.
QA
When did you hear, "Come on out, this is the police." When they were down banging on the door of
the
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QA
Prior to the door being kicked down? Yes.
QA
You're sure? Positive.
QA
Were you videotaping during this period oftime? I wasn't.
QAQ
You were not videotaping? Nope. At any time on this date in question?
MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Judge, that misstates the question. He said, "Were you taping at this
time?"
He answered that question. He said, "No." THE COURT: Ask another question, Mr. Coughlin. I'm
not sure how relevant this is, to tell you the truth.
Again, I think I've made myself very clear. You are getting far afield. It's not necessarily helpful to
the Court, and you're making an ultimate conclusion regarding the trespass violation.
Page -114
MR. COUGHLIN: Here's my offer of proof, Your Honor, is that if Mr. Hill was taping, and he
has a tape of everything except a period where anybody warns the accused to leave, or a period
where the police actually identity themselves as police, prior to the door being kicked down,
then that would tend to indicate that those things didn't happen.
THE COURT: Okay, I'll note for the record.
ow deposit...not giving the 20 days to respond to a Complaint called for by JCRCP 109....basically
giving HIll and Merliss all the benefits of the quick and easy summary eviction proceeding (Coughlin
was precluded from making counterclaims or bringing in third party defendants like Dickson Realty
or NV Energy or Green Action Lawn Service, etc), and Coughlin none of the procedural protections
of a plenary unlawful detainer, while also attempting to affor HIll and Merliss the benefits of a
plenary unlawful detainer (awarding back rent, attorney's fees, landlord was able to bring a summary
eviction proceeding against a commercial tenant based only on a No Cause Notice, verboten under
NRS 40.253...). Further, and this is shown on the videos Hill and Merliss filmed, the RPD at no time
gave Coughlin a warning to leave where Coughlin could have heeded it and left, or otherwise been
issue a citation in lieu of a custodial arrest. The RPD wanted to make the big rich landlord and
attorney happy here, and neither the RPD (which was mad at Coughlin for filing a police misconduct
complaint incident to the wrongful August 20th, 2011 arrest of Coughlin that ain't lookin' good for the
State now that Coughlin got WCPD Jim Leslie booted from the case in RCR2011-063341) nor Hill or
Merliss were going to be satisfied with just issuing Coughlin a "warning" to leave the premises, as
they figure Coughlin would just heed any such warning....The RPD and Merliss/HIll were all jacked
up on revenge powder and wanted Coughlin arrested. Dr. Merliss is practically frothing at the mouth
(demanding "more eye contact!" from Coughlin in the video "Zach's arrest 0010" just before Dr.
Merliss commits a crime in lying to the RPD in response to Coughlin's querying those there as to who
warned him against trespassing and when, whereupon Dr. Merliss lies in order to get Coughlin
arrested, and Hill co-signs it:
Richard G. Hill, Esq. (opposing counsel in the civil eviction case from which this criminal trespass
trial stems) testified, under oath, that the Reno Police Department identified themselves as law
enforcement and issued a lawful order to leave prior to the RPD entering the door that Hill's client
Merliss kicked down after such identification and issuance of a lawful order or warning to leave the
premises was issued by the RPD.
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1.1 January 13th, 2012 RPD Sargent Marcia Lopez and Officer Travis Warren and Officer Avila
respond to a call for help regarding a domestic disturbance from Zach Coughlin relating to the attacks
by his housemates, Christopher "Erin" Allaback and Laura Foreshee for which Coughlin ultimately
received two Orders of Protection in FV12-00187 and FV12-00188. Sargent Lopez subjected
Coughlin to a custodial arrest for criminal trespass in Reno Municipal Court case 11 CR 26405, on
November 13th, 2011 (which resulted in Coughlin being convicted for criminal trespass following the
June 18th, 2012 Trial wherein Richard Hill testified as follows:
The admission by Sargent Lopez was captured on a high 8mm video camera that Coughlin
bought from a thrift store for five dollars after his then housemate ruined his digital smart phone
video recorder by throwing hot coffee on it an Coughlin. Coughlin then transferred the tape from that
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high 8mm to a digital version by filming a television with a digital video camera later obtained, while
it was playing that high 8mm tape. The file was name "0201 cropped Carter Lopez 26405.wmv, and
the following represents and accurate transcription thereof, in relevant part:
Coughlin: Sargent Lopez are you going to arrest Nevada court
services for trespass?
Lopez: I'm not going to arrest them for trespass.
Coughlin: but you arrested me for trespass.
Lopez: because you were squatting in the property.
Coughlin: why do you say that you have any evidence of that? (5
seconds of silence is Sargent Lopez's response) did you
announce that you were Reno PD prior to kicking the door in?
Lopez: I didn't kick the door in.
Coughlin: did you announce that you are Reno PD prior to
anybody kicking the door in?
Lopez: I didn't have to,
Coughlin: so nobody announced that they were Reno PD?
Lopez: because the guy who kicked it in had to kick in his own
door because you were squatting in his place.
Coughlin: so you are admitting that you guys didn't announce that
you were Reno PD.
Lopez: you are wearing my patience thin, Sir, okay. I am trying
to come here to help you, and I bring a specialized officer
(motioning to RPD Officer Travis Warren, whom has been
described as some sort of RPD Officer with some specialty in
"mental health" related areas).
Coughlin: that's interesting, you admit that you and Officer Carter
never announced that you are Reno PD, and that you never asked
me to leave, did you, prior to the door being kicked in?
Officer Travis Warren: She didn't have to do anything like that.
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Coughlin: you didn't have to! That's great, but that means you
didn't either.
Warren: hold on Zach. You asked us to come here because you
needed help now you are being confrontational.
Coughlin: no I'm not, no not. Anybody who asked you a question
is confrontational, I guess, huh?
Warren: Zach, let's try to stay on topic.
Coughlin: On topic? I'm not on the topic you want me to be on.
Warren: Zach the topic that I'm interested in...
Coughlin: Is the one that covers your ass!
Warren: No, it's not.
Coughlin: Yes, it is."
...
Coughlin: So, Sargent Lopez you have admitted that you did not
ask me to leave and you did not announce that you are Reno PD
either you or your partner either of those things when you
arrested me for trespass. Are you been arrest Nevada Court
Services for the trespass that there is video evidence of on
YouTube right now? Are you can a do that, Sargent? Sargent, are
you?
Warren: Zach, that's not the topic were on.
Coughlin: Are you going to do that, Sargent? Sargent, are you?
Lopez: are you going to fill out your statement?
Coughlin: sure. Are you going to do that?
Lopez: I am not going to arrest Nevada Court Services.
Coughlin: Why, are they your buddies?
Lopez: because they did their job.
Coughlin: wait a did their job by going behind my back fence and
banging on my windows for 45 minutes three times a time a day?
Interesting...
Lopez: Zach, we need you to fill out the paper.
Coughlin: Interesting how it works down there at the Reno PD.
You know, there is a lots of documentary filmmakers out there
these days, Sargent Lopez? Do you have anything you would
like to say?
Lopez: Zach, you need to finish your statement.
Warren: Zach, you call us here to help you, and now your are...
Coughlin: well apparently not because you arrest me for trespass
when you either didn't tell me to leave for announced that you
were the PD (police Department) and then you have video
evidence of Nevada Court Services doing trespassing harassing
banging on windows for 40 min. at a clip three times a day,
behind a back gate is obviously trespassing, and you are seeing
you are not going to do anything...
Lopez: have you had your day in court on that yet?
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Coughlin:That is coming up.

...
Warren: Zach, we really need to stay on topic, okay?
Coughlin: What is the topic? Nevada Court Services? The
buddies of Sargent Lopez?
Warren: No...
...
Coughlin: are you guys going to do anything on this call because
the last time you didn't run anybody's priors and if you had it
would have been interesting what you would have found, what
did you say? Is that proper procedure children somebody's priors?
Lopez: The priors for who?
Coughlin: because you guys didn't do that... Well who would I be
talking about?
Lopez:(smirking) Yourself, maybe? The priors for yourself?
Coughlin: Oh, is that a...do you think you are funny?
Lopez: I think it is funny, yeah. I think everything is funny,
actually. I am amused by a lot of stuff.
Coughlin: Really? Do you think it's funny when your partner
says that Richard Hill pays him a lot of money to arrest whom he
says to?
Lopez: I am pretty sure he didn't..
Coughlin: and you were there? And you didn't follow up with the
questions of whether Richard Hill had given me a bill for rent that
month and yet you still arrested me for trespass?
Lopez: 5 min. Zach.
Coughlin: I think that's funny, that you think it's funny.
Lopez: 4 min. Zach
...
Lopez:, did the management give you an eviction notice?
Coughlin: what are you getting involved in civil matters now?
You are going above and beyond, Sargent Lopez, getting
involved in civil matters...
Lopez: Zach did they give you an eviction notice or not?
Coughlin: wow you are working of the storm over there aren't
you
Lopez: Yes or no:
Warren: you could say no comment, Zach.
Coughlin: thank you, counselor. I appreciate your advice. Now,
what criminal matter were you investigating here?
Lopez: I am asking you a question.
Coughlin: About a what? A civil matter?
Lopez: Zach, did you get an eviction notice from these guys
(Sargent Lopez is referring to Western Nevada Management
posting a John Doe 30 day eviction notice, allegedly, on the door
of the 1422 E. 9th St. #2 town home that WNM (which, like
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NCS, commits the unauthorized practice of landlord tenant law)

had agreed to some deal with Coughlin's housemates (or maybe
they were his sublessors? Coughlin rented a room from them off
of Craigslist, but to some extent they were held out to be
employees or partners of WNM, and WNM did testify at a
February 23rd, 2012 hearing after Coughlin filed an interruption
of essential services complaint against WNM, Gayle Kern, Esq.,
LTD, and Park Terrace Townhomes that former WNM manager,
Robyn Batalado received approval from the Park Terrace Town
Homes Homeowners Associattion to allow Coughlin's sublessors
to live their in exchange for some handyman work (and perhaps
in light of the lessened insurance costs associated with not having
the unit vacant incident to some scenario where the PTTHOA
bought the unit at a foreclosure sale).
Warren: We will take that as a yes or no, or a maybe, who
knows? All right, Zach? You are not going to be able to bait us
into saying things?
Coughlin: Well, I've been listening to you here whether you've
been baited or not, you have said a whole lot today.
...
Coughlin:... What if Richard Hill sent me a Bill for rent for the month of November, should
you follow phone that before you make it trespass arrest? And what did you say to that? You
say no we are not going to that Richard Hill pays us a lot of money, and we are going to arrest
whom he says to arrest, did you hear that Sargent Lopez?
Warren: Zach, let's stay on topic.
Coughlin: this could be your star turn... This could be your star
turn.
Lopez: you need some help, brother.
Coughlin: really?
Lopez: Yeah, you do.
...(Sargent Lopez and Officers Warren and Avila then leave
shortly thereafter, and Coughlin has the following exchange with
his housemate's/abusers teenage daughter):
Coughlin: look someday, you are trying to support yourself and
someone steals your license plate, and slashes your tires, and
locks you out after you have given them the last money you had...
Teenage Girl's Friend: well, someday we won't be an assh*le like
you
Coughlin:What is an "assh*le" about that?
Teenage Girl: you are f*cking r*tarded, you are being r*tarded,
you're making my dad not like you, you steal his knives. His
steak knives, like seriously?
Coughlin: You mean the one of he held while chasing me up the
stairs with saying he was gonna kill me?
Teenage Girl: He didn't f*ckin' chase you up the stairs and tell
you he was gonna kill you. Why would he say that, he's not like
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that. And if he say's it, it doesn't mean he means it. You make
him say that, you f*ckin' pr*ck."
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Additionally, the custodial trespass arrest of Coughlin on 11/13/11 invokes the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine as well, as the RPD trespassed onto Coughlin's property, in violation of the
Fourth Amendment (whether or not the landlord kick down the door to the crawlspace/quasi-
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basement under the house, and Hill testified that the Officer entered the quasi-basement, but
regardless, the property was completely fenced and the officers entered the quasi-basement by a route
through the house, where such was trespassing in light of NRS 40.385 and NRS 40.360(3) and the
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fact that any eviction order in RJC Rev2011-001708 was void in light of the lack of presence of a
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variety of jurisdictional prerequisites (no landlord's affidavit filed, no twenty days to file an
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answer after being served a summons and complaint a la NJCRCP Rule 109, anything purported to
satisfy the requirements of NRS 40.254 being deficient, particularly in light of the verification
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requirement in NRS 40.XX, and the patent inconsistency between Baker's arguments and assertions
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and landlord Merliss's testimony with respect to what the lease indicated with respect to the term of
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the tenancy and the patent incongruities reveal by an inspection of paragraphs 2, 3, and 20 therein in
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comparision to the 8/22/11 and 9/27/11 Notices posted on Coughlin's door admitted at the 10/25/11
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hearing as exhibits.
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C. Standing
State v. Dennis, 182 Ohio App. 3d 674, 2009-Ohio-2173 Police responded to the report of a tres
passer at an apartment complex. Believing apartment had been abandoned, officer entered and found
the defendant in a recliner and a crack pipe in a potato chip bag. (1) Defendant had standing to assert
a Fourth Amendment violation. While trespassing for purposes of criminal law does not strictly fol
low civil law, he retained an expectation of privacy in the premises even though he had received
eviction notices. Though he had been gone for a while, he was present when the officers entered and
the state failed to prove the eviction process had been completed. (2) Good faith does not save the
search. Good faith mainly applies in warrant cases. Court does not reach whether it should be exten
ded here. The officers could not have reasonably believed the apartment was vacant based on the in
formation they had.
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Similarly, on search and seizure issues involving law enforcement access to a premises, the power to
consent or object depends on who has privacy rights. In Vincennes v. Emmons, #42S02-0504-CVnd
131, 817 N.E. 2 155 (Ind. 2006), the court stated that a city's ordinance authorizing warrantless in
spections of rental units unless tenants object did not violate the constitutional rights of landlords, as
landlords had no reasonable expectation of privacy in units rented to either residential or commercial
tenants. In instances where the landlords are themselves the tenants, the ordinance would be inter
preted as also requiring their consent or a warrant.
In Harvey v. Plains Township, #04-1148, 421 F. 3rd 185 (3d Cir. 2005), the court held that a po
lice officer who ordered a landlord to open a door to an apartment so that a woman's ex-boyfriend
could retrieve his possessions was not entitled to qualified immunity on a woman's claim that he viol
ated her Fourth Amendment rights by becoming actively involved in an ex parte private repossession.
In this case, after a woman's relationship with her boyfriend deteriorated, she obtained an order of
protection granting her exclusive right of possession of their apartment. Pursuant to that order, the
boyfriend was required to immediately retrieve all of his belongings. The trial court denied a request
that he be allowed to return to pick up furnishings and other items that would be difficult to remove
during his first trip.
The man's attorney sent a letter to the woman informing her that he would go to the apartment at a
particular time to retrieve his remaining belongings. A copy of the letter was sent to the woman's
landlord and to the local police department. A police officer was sent to the apartment at the time des
ignated in the letter in order to keep the peace at the repossession, and the landlord was also present
at that time. The woman, who claimed never to have received the letter, was not there.
The officer allegedly directed the landlord to unlock the door so that the man could retrieve his
property. After this was done, and when the woman returned, she found the apartment in
disarray, and claimed that many items were missing, including some not included in the ex-boy
friend's list of his property.
On appeal, the federal appeals court reversed the summary judgment in favor of the officer,
holding that a police officer actively involved in an ex parte private repossession of property
may be engaged in state action in violation of the Fourth Amendment. It agreed, however, that
the landlord, who opened the door at the direction of the officer, was not engaged in state action, and
upheld the result as to the remaining defendants.
The appeals court rejected the officer's argument that his conduct was not state action and that he
was merely present at a private repossession. There was evidence, including the testimony of the
landlord, that the officer directed the opening of the door, and that she never would have opened it
without the officer's instructions. If this was true, the officer played a principal role in the entry and
seizure of the property, and a reasonable jury could conclude that he used his public authority to help
the ex-boyfriend gain entry and take the property from the apartment. The record supported a finding
that he was not a mere spectator.
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Additionally, the law was unquestionably clear at the date of the incident, September 1999, that the
Fourth Amendment prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures of a person's home by the police
without a warrant. The court also found that if the officer concluded that the woman had consented to
the repossession merely on the basis of a copy of the letter, to which the woman did not respond (and
which she claimed she never got) that was not reasonable. A reasonable officer at least would have
refused to assist with opening the door until he was satisfied that consent was given.
from AELE article attached as Exhibit 1 to Coughlin's 6/5/12 Motion to Dismiss/Suppress in
26405:
When officers respond to a complaint about the presence of a trespasser, they should inquire as to
the reason the person is there. The answer to that question may provide probable grounds for an ar
rest. Many laws concerning trespass, however, require that, prior to an arrest, a person is asked to
leave and is given an opportunity to comply. Make sure officers are familiar with state statutes and/or
local ordinances bearing on this question.
It is very telling that RCA Hazlett-Stevens, despite sending Coughlin notice of the subpoena
on WCSO Machen (which shoudl have then been filed within 2 days in the ROA, yet was not) failed
to put into evidence the 11/7/11 Affidavit of Service by WCSO Machen in rev11-1708, the eviction
matter connected to the tresppas case in 26405. Further, Hill did not, and did not testify that he at any
point provided the RPD with an proof of service of the eviction order upon Coughlin, neither by way
of a mailed Notice of Entry to Coughlin from Hill's Officer, or anything from the RJC, much less the
WCSO 11/7/11 Affidavit of Service. That is telling, adn goes to whether the RPD had a reasonable
basis for believing the reports of trespassing and or probable cause to make the arrest, and to enter the
building in any event. Further, the fact that so much of Coughlin's property remained at his former
home law office certainly weighs against the abandonment analysis that arose in Dennis. Coughlin
cited to Higgins v Penobscot at the 6/18/12 Trial in 26405. State v. Dennis, 182 Ohio App. 3D 674 is
perhaps the most applicable case:
{ 17} Denniss first assignment of error states:
{ 18} The trial court erred in determining that appellant was a trespasser and lacked
standing to suppress the entry into his apartment and subsequent search of the premises.
{ 19} Dennis claims that the trial court erred in determining that he was a trespasser and in
concluding that he lacked standing to challenge the entry into the apartment. He argues that he could
not be considered a trespasser at his apartment until a court entered an order of restitution of
the PREMISES TO THE LANDLORD IN A CIVIL ACTION, PURSUANT TO R.C. CHAPTER 1923. DENNIS FURTHER
ASSERTS THAT the circumstances of this case are distinguishable from State v. Little, Montgomery App.
No. 19976,
2004-Ohio-1814, and State v. Fleming, Clark App. No. 2003 CA 71, 2004-Ohio-5278, upon which
the trial court relied to support its conclusion that Dennis was a trespasser and lacked standing to
object to the officers entry into the apartment.
{ 20} In reviewing the trial courts ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, this court must
accept the findings of fact made by the trial court if they are supported by competent, credible
evidence. See also State v. Morgan (Jan. 18, 2002), Montgomery App. No. 18985, 2002 WL 63196.
However, the reviewing court must independently determine, as a matter of law, whether the facts
meet the appropriate legal standard. Id.
///The individual must have a subjective expectation of privacy in the placed searche, and that
expectation must be objectively reasonable and justifiable. Rakas at 143; State v. Buzzard, 112 Ohio
St.3d 451, 2007-Ohio-373, 14.
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{ 22} It is well established that a tenant has an expectation of privacy in his or her rented
apartment. Because the right to exclude others is one of the main rights attaching to property,
TENANTS IN LAWFUL POSSESSION OF A HOME OR APARTMENT GENERALLY HAVE A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY BY VIRTUE OF HAVING A PROPERTY INTEREST IN A SPECIFIC PIECE OF REAL ESTATE.
HIGGINS V.
Penobscot Cty.. Sheriffs Dept. (June 2, 2005), D.Maine No. 04-157-B-W. See also Copley v.
Voorhies (Aug. 27, 2007), S.D.Ohio No. 2:06-cv-847, 2007 WL 2462651, citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at
143, 99 S.CT. 421, 58 L.ED.2D 387, FN.12 (AN INDIVIDUAL HAS A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
AND, THEREFORE, STANDING TO CHALLENGE LAW ENFORCEMENTS WARRANTLESS SEARCH ON PROPERTY THAT THE
INDIVIDUAL LAWFULLY POSSESSES).
{ 23} IN EVALUATING WHETHER DENNIS HAD A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE APARTMENT,
THE TRIAL COURT RELIED UPON LITTLE AND FLEMING, IN WHICH WE HELD THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAD NO
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE PREMISES, BECAUSE THEY WERE TRESPASSERS AT THE TIME OF THE
OFFICERS ENTRY. ...
{ 25} Although the defendants in Little and Fleming were not former or current tenants of
an apartment, such as Dennis, both cases instruct that once an individual becomes a trespasser, the
individual loses any legitimate expectation of privacy that he once had in the premises. However, as
neither a social guest nor a hotel guest has the statutory protections against eviction that a tenant has,
Little and Fleming are not controlling for determining whether Dennis had become a trespasser.
{ 26} WE THEREFORE TURN TO WHETHER DENNIS RETAINED A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN
APARTMENT F WHEN THE OFFICERS ENTERED WITHOUT A WARRANT ON AUGUST 17, 2007. DENNIS CLAIMS THAT
THE evidence was insufficient to establish that he was a trespasser and, consequently, that he
no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy because he was still in lawful possession
of the apartment since there was no evidence that the proper legal procedures for eviction had
been completed under R.C. Chapter 1923.
{ 27} [C]oncepts of state property law are relevant, but not necessarily dispositive, for
deciding the question whether there was a legitimate privacy interest for [F]ourth [A]mend
ment PURPOSES. UNITED STATES V. SLEDGE (C.A.9, 1981), 650 F.2D 1075, 1082.
{ 28} [I]T IS UNNECESSARY AND ILL-ADVISED TO IMPORT INTO THE LAW SURROUNDING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES SUBTLE DISTINCTIONS,
DEVELOPED AND REFINED BY THE COMMON LAW IN EVOLVING THE BODY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY LAW WHICH,
MORE THAN ALMOST ANY OTHER BRANCH OF LAW, HAS BEEN SHAPED BY DISTINCTIONS WHOSE VALIDITY IS
LARGELY HISTORICAL.
9
JONES V. UNITED STATES (1960), 362 U.S. 257, 266, 80 S.CT. 725, 4 L.ED.2D 697, OVERRULED ON OTHER
GROUNDS BY UNITED STATES V. SALVUCCI (1980), 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.CT. 2547, 65 L.ED.2D 619. SEE
ALSO
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GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH (2006), 547 U.S. 103, 110, 126 S.CT. 1515, 164 L.ED.2D 208 (STATING THAT
FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS ARE NOT LIMITED BY THE LAW OF PROPERTY).
{ 29} AT THE SAME TIME, [A]LTHOUGH PROPERTY [LAW] CONCEPTS ARE NOT NECESSARILY
DETERMINATIVE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS, THEY ARE NONETHELESS HELPFUL IN ASSESSING WHICH
EXPECTATIONS SOCIETY IS PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE AS LEGITIMATE. IN PARTICULAR, A TENANTS EXPECTATION
OF PRIVACY IN HIS APARTMENT CEASES TO BE OBJECTIVELY JUSTIFIABLE WHEN HIS OCCUPANCY CEASES TO BE
LAWFUL, AS DETERMINED BY THE TERMS OF HIS LEASE AND THE PROVISIONS OF HIS STATES LANDLORD-TENANT
LAW.
(CITATIONS OMITTED.) UNITED STATES V. ROSS (C.A.6, 2002), 43 FED.APPX. 751, 757.
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{ 30} UNDER OHIO LAW, A LANDLORD MUST FOLLOW A THREE-STEP PROCESS TO EVICT A TENANT. FIRST,
the landlord must serve the tenant with a notice to terminate the tenancy. R.C. 5321.17. Second,
a
TIMELY NOTICE TO VACATE THE PREMISES MUST BE SERVED ON THE TENANT. R.C. 1923.04. THIRD, THE
LANDLORD must file a complaint in forcible entry and detainer. R.C. 1923.05. Steiner v.
Minkowski (1991), 72
OHIO APP.3D 754, 761.
{ 31} IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT DENNIS HAD BEEN A TENANT OF 1719 RADIO ROAD, APARTMENT F, AND
HE WAS FOUND AT THE APARTMENT ON AUGUST 17, 2007. THE RECORD ESTABLISHED, HOWEVER, THAT DENNIS
HAD RECEIVED TWO EVICTION NOTICES, ONE OF WHICH (THE THREE-DAY NOTICE) HAD BEEN SEEN BY KINSTLE IN
the apartment. Dennis acknowledged that he had received both a 30-day eviction notice and a
threeday eviction notice, and he stated to the officers that he had been evicted. According to
Denniss landlord, the apartment had not been cleaned and the locks had not been changed
simply because the LANDLORD WAS ON VACATION. THE UNOFFICIAL CARETAKER HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO
CALL THE POLICE IF DENNIS RETURNED.
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{ 32} IN OUR VIEW, DENNIS MET HIS BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING THAT HE HAD LAWFUL POSSESSION OF
THE APARTMENT. WHILE THE EVIDENCE INDICATED THAT DENNIS WAS A TENANT OF APARTMENT F AND THAT HE
HAD BEEN ORDERED TO LEAVE THE APARTMENT BY THE LANDLORD, HE DIDNT SAY ANYTHING ABOUT WHEN HE WAS
SUPPOSED TO LEAVE. DENNISS STATEMENT THAT HE HAD BEEN EVICTED IS SIMPLY HIS VERNACULAR
acknowledgment that he had been served with eviction notices. There was no evidence before the
court demonstrating that his tenancy had expired. The fact that Dennis had a tenancy interest in the
APARTMENT WAS SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE HAD LAWFUL POSSESSION OF THE APARTMENT AND, THUS, A
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY.
{ 33} ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT DENNIS HAD BEEN SERVED WITH EVICTION NOTICES, THIS
evidence was insufficient to rebut the evidence that Dennis had lawful possession of the apartment
and retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. Ohio landlord-tenant law does not
allow for self-help by a landlord. As stated above, a landlord is required to successfully bring a
forcible entry and detainer action against Dennis in order to effectuate an eviction. Without a
judgment of restitution in the landlords favor, Dennis could continue to lawfully possess the
PREMISES. SEE STATE EX REL. JENKINS V. HAMILTON CTY. COURT, AREA NO. EIGHT (1961), 114 OHIO APP.
231, 233 (FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER ACTION DETERMINES THE RIGHT TO IMMEDIATE POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY); R.C. 1923.09, 1923.11, 1923.13, AND 1923.14.
{ 34} THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT A TENANT HAS THE RIGHT IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES TO REMAIN IN AN
APARTMENT AND TO ENJOY A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY THAT SOCIETY IS PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE
ONCE HE HAS BEEN SERVED WITH THE REQUIRED NOTICES AND PAPERS. RATHER, ALTHOUGH THERE IS A PAUCITY OF
OHIO LAW ON THIS SUBJECT, IT IS TO HOLD THAT IT IS CERTAINLY NOT THE PREROGATIVE OF A LANDLORD,
UNILATERALLY,
BY THE SIMPLE DELIVERY OF CIVIL NOTICES AVAILABLE AT ANY CONVENIENCE STORE OR OVER THE INTERNET, TO
REMOVE A TENANTS REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY. A TENANT, HAVING RECEIVED SUCH PAPERS, MAY
11
THINK THAT HE CAN PAY BACK RENT (IF THAT IS THE REASON FOR THE NOTICES) AND STAY, MAY REALIZE THAT HIS
LAWFUL PRESENCE IN THE APARTMENT WILL SOON BE TERMINATED, OR MAY DECIDE JUST TO LEAVE ON HIS OWN, BUT
HE DOES NOT REASONABLY EXPECT THAT HE HAS IMMEDIATELY BEEN TRANSFORMED INTO A TRESPASSER AND THAT THE
LANDLORD OR THE POLICE OR ANYONE ELSE CAN ENTER HIS APARTMENT.
EVIDENCE THAT
ACCORDINGLY, IN ORDER TO REFUTE
DENNIS WAS A LAWFUL TENANT, THE STATE WAS REQUIRED TO PRESENT SOME EVIDENCE THAT
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DENNIS WAS LEGALLY A TRESPASSER. NO SUCH EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED.

{ 35} WHILE DENNISS PROPERTY RIGHTS ARE NOT DETERMINATIVE OF HIS FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS,
WE CONCLUDE THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THAT HE HAD BEEN LAWFULLY EJECTED FROM THE APARTMENT,
DENNIS COULD NOT PROPERLY BE CONSIDERED A TRESPASSER IN HIS APARTMENT SOLELY DUE TO HIS RECEIPT OF
EVICTION NOTICES. SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, SCHNEIDER V. STATE (SEPT. 3, 2003), ARK.APP. NO. CACR 02-771,
2003 WL 22052832 (holding that under state law, the defendant-tenant retained an expectation of
PRIVACY IN THE RESIDENCE, EVEN THOUGH LEASE HAD EXPIRED, WHEN LANDLORD HAD NOT EVICTED THE TENANT BY
the statutorily required legal process subsequent to the expiration of the lease).
{ 36} Moreover, the facts that Dennis had some possessions in the apartment and he was
found sitting there indicate that Dennis also subjectively retained an interest in the apartment.
{ 37} The state asserts that Dennis nevertheless had no legitimate expectation of privacy in
this apartment, because he abandoned the property prior to August 17, 2007. As we stated in State
v. Russell, Montgomery App. No. 21458, 2007-Ohio-137:
{ 38} It has long been settled that [a] defendant has no standing under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution to object to a search and seizure of property that he has
voluntarily abandoned. State v. Freeman (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 291, 414 N.E.2d 1044, paragraph
two of the syllabus. As the Ohio Supreme Court has reiterated:
{ 39} Abandonment is primarily a question of intent, and intent may be inferred from
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words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts. United States v. Cowan (C.A.2, 1968), 396 F.2d
83, 87. All relevant circumstances existing at the time of the alleged abandonment should be
considered. United States v. Manning (C.A.5, 1971), 440 F.2d 1105, 1111. The issue is not
abandonment in the strict property-right sense, but whether the person prejudiced by the search had
voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the property in question so
that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of the
search. United States v. Edwards, supra, 441 F.2d at 753; Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S.
347, 83 S.Ct. 507. Id. at 297, quoting United States v. Colbert (C.A.5, 1973), 474 F.2d 174, 176.
Russell, 2007-Ohio-137, at 21-22.
{ 40} Stated simply, once a tenant has surrendered or abandoned his or her apartment, the
tenant no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. See Russell. If the tenant
subsequently returned, his status would be that of a trespasser.
{ 41} The government bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the defendant abandoned the property at issue. State v. Dubose, 164 Ohio App.3d 698, 2005Ohio-6602, 43.
{ 42} At the suppression hearing, the state presented the landlords statements, through
Officer Kinstle, that Dennis had cleaned out the apartment and had not been seen at the apartment for
a week. Kinstle had also testified that the apartment was typical of what youd expect in a vacant
apartment. No moving boxes were present and a few random pieces of furniture remained. The
landlord assumed that all remaining property had been abandoned.
{ 43} We do not find that the facts support the conclusion that Dennis abandoned the
apartment. Significantly, Dennis was found inside the apartment sitting in a La-Z-Boy chair. This
fact alone suggests that Dennis did not intend to abandon the apartment and the property within it.
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Even accepting that Dennis had not been seen at Apartment F for a week, a brief absence from a
residence does not constitute abandonment, particularly when the resident returns. Moreover, the
fact that Dennis had moved most of his possessions to another apartment did not establish that he no
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longer had an expectation of privacy in the apartment, particularly when he continued to have a
lawful possessory interest in the property.
{ 44} The trial court erred in concluding that Dennis was a trespasser in his apartment when
the officers entered on August 17, 2007. Accordingly, Dennis was entitled to contest the officers
entrance into and search of the apartment under the Fourth Amendment.
{ 45} Denniss first assignment of error is sustained.
III
{ 46} Denniss second assignment of error states:
{ 47} The opening of appellants door and entrance into his apartment violated his Fourth
Amendment constitutional rights.
{ 48} In his second assignment of error, Dennis claims that the officers entry into his
apartment violated his Fourth Amendment rights, because the officers lacked a justifiable basis for
entering the apartment without a warrant. The state responds that the officers entry into the
apartment was based on an objectively reasonable belief that the apartment was vacant and, thus, the
evidence seized did not need to be suppressed.
{ 49} The trial courts decision dealt mainly with standing and with the officers actions
once they entered the apartment, but the question of the lawfulness of the entry was clearly before the
court by way of the original motion, the evidence, and the arguments. For example, the defense
counsel stated that even if the court finds they had reason to enter the apartment and the prosecutor
argued that these officers acted reasonably in entering that apartment to pursue the trespass
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complaint.
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Woods v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1115 Ind.App.,1998 Evidence that health club member remained on club
premises after being informed by manager, based on erroneous computer records, that her member
ship had expired, and after being asked to leave, was insufficient to support conviction for criminal
trespass, where member had fair and reasonable belief that she was entitled to be present on club
property and in fact had undisputed bona fide contractual interest in being present on club property,
evidenced by her membership contract. West's A.I.C. 35-43-2-2(a)(2).
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The 12/14/12 FOFCOL in NG12-0204 includes the following:

19. State Bar Counsel called attorney Richard Hill to testify at the hearing of this matter: Mr. Hill
has been a member in good standing with the State Bar of Nevada for 33 years. See Transcript of
Proceedings of Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 36, L 22 P 37 L 4. Mr. Hill was retained by Dr.
Merliss to assist Dr. Merliss in a landlord tenant dispute with his tenant Coughlin. See Transcript of
Proceedings of Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 37, L14 -20. Mr. Hill represented Dr. Merliss in
Reno Justice Court and Washoe County District Court and two appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court
in the matters involving Dr. Merliss and Coughlin. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November
14,2012,P 39, L 13 -24. Mr. Hill has also reviewed filings in of a case in which Coughlin is involved
with Washoe Legal Services. See Transcript of Proceedings Wednesday, November 14,2012, P 39, L
25 P 40, L 3.
20.
In the eviction proceeding between Dr. Meriiss and Coughlin, Mr. Hill's firm obtained
an eviction order allowing Coughlin one week to vacate the premises. Ultimately, Coughlin failed to
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comply with the eviction order and was convicted of criminal trespass. See Transcript of Hearing
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 41, L 18 -P 44, L 12.
21.
On behalf of his client Dr. Merliss, Mr. Hill sought and obtained an order in favor of
Dr. Merliss and against Coughlin awarding Dr. Merliss attorney's fees in the amount of $42,065.50.
Washoe District Court Judge Patrick Flanagan entered the order on June 25, 2012. See Transcript of
Proceedings of Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 47, L 3-7. -See Hearing Exhibit 2, P 3, L 10-11.
The motion seeking attorney's fees was based on Coughlin's conduct in the defense of the eviction
matter, which conduct was characterized as frivolous and vexatious and presumably so found by
Judge Flanagan. See Hearing Exhibit P 2, L 8-13; P 3, L 4-11.
22.
Based on Mr. Hill's experience and background, his review of the pleadings in the
litigation between Dr. Merliss and Coughlin and his review of the pleadings in Coughlin's litigation
with Washoe Legal Services, Mr. Hill is of the opinion that Coughlin is not competent to practice
law. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 39, L 1 -12.
23.
Based on Mr. Hill's experience in litigating with Coughlin, Coughlin was not truthful with
either counsel or the court. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 53, L 6 -16.
Mr. Hill felt that Coughlin's filings were abusive, at one point calling Mr. Hill's associate a lichen.
Coughlin has accused Mr. Hill of bribing the Reno Police Department to have Coughlin arrested. Mr.
Hill's staff is terrorized by Coughlin. See Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 54, L 4 -15...
Meritorious Claims and Contentions
(U) RPC 3.1 in pertinent part states "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in .law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous,
which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law."
(V) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin continuously and
repetitively files irrelevant pleadings. pleadings unrelated to the issue at hand and continuously and
repetitively injects irrelevant matters into proceedings.
(W) Judge Nash Holmes found, for example, that Coughlin repeatedly injected allegations of
bribery, perjury and police retaliation in a simple traffic case involving the failure to stop at a stop
sign. Supra 7 She also found that Coughlin repeatedly injected attorney Richard Hill into questions
and statements when Mr. Hill was in no way involved in the traffic citation trial. Supra 7 She also
found that pleadings filed subsequent to Coughlin's incarceration were lengthy (more than 200 pages)
contained scant discussion of, or relevance to, the matter and contained irrelevant discussion of facts
unrelated to the proceedings at hand. Supra. 10
(X) The record establishes that in the Merliss eviction action, Coughlin's conduct was so
vexatious and frivolous as to result in substantial sanction of attorney's fees. Supra 21 See Hearing
Exhibit 2, P 2, L 8 -13; P3, L 4 -11.
(Y) The Pleading Docket in this matter establishes also that Coughlin's filings, even in his
own defense of the disciplinary matter, inject lengthy, irrelevant facts and legal issues into this
proceeding.
Candor to the Tribunal
(Z) RPC 3.3(a)(1) states "A lawyer shall not knowingly: (m)ake a false statement of fact or
law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement .of material fact or law previously made to the
tribunal by the lawyer."
(AA) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin violated RPC 3.3(a)(l)
when he lied to Judge Nash Holmes as to whether or not he was surreptitiously and without
permission to record the proceeding. Supra 7 Of note, Coughlin did not deny that he had lied to
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Judge Nash Holmes. Instead, his cross examination of Judge Nash Holmes focused on how she had
learned of the true facts. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 139, L
(BB) Attorney Richard Hill testified that based on his experience in litigating with Coughlin,
Coughlin was not truthful with either counsel or the Court. Supra Paragraph 23.
...Respect for the Rights of Third Persons
(RR) RPC 4.4(a) states '"In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no
substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person... " (uh...like Hill's
allegations of finding a "crack pipe and a bag of weed" or a "vial of something" and "a large quantity
of pills"?).
(SS) The record establishes clearly and convincingly that in the Merliss eviction action,
Coughlin conducted himself in a manner that was abusive, vexatious and for purposes of delay. The
matter was a simple eviction action that apparently lasted through several proceedings at the
Municipal Court level, an appeal to the District Court and two appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court
and which also resulted in Coughlin's conviction for criminal trespass. Supra 19 and 20
Coughlin's conduct in the proceedings was so egregious that Judge Flanagan ordered Coughlin to pay
Dr. Merliss $42,065.50, an amount that is still unpaid. Supra 21
(TT) The record also establishes that Coughlin habitually prolongs proceedings unnecessarily;
files lengthy, irrelevant, nonsensical pleadings requiring court, staff and counsel to spend unnecessary
effort in evaluating and/or responding to the pleadings. Supra 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 21, 23, 25, 27,
39 and 40
Disciplinary matter
(UU) RPC 8.1(b) provides, in pertinent part, " ... a lawyer ... in connection with a disciplinary
shall not: (b) ... knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an
(VV) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin knowingly failed to
respond to the State Bar's request for information in the disciplinary proceeding and failed to timely
file a required verified responsive answer or pleading to the Complaint.
(WW) First, Coughlin asked for an extension of time to respond to the letter of February 14,
2012...
Misconduct
(DDD) RPC 8.4 provides (in pertinent parts):
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to :
(a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct...
(b) Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
(EEE) The Pleadings, Hearing Exhibits and Transcript of these proceedings overwhelmingly,
clearly and convincingly establish a repeated, unrelenting and obstinate pattern of misconduct by
Respondent Coughlin evincing numerous and repeated violations of several provisions of RPC 8.4 in
violation of RPC 8.4(a). (So, would that not be something not noticed or plead in the Complaint, and
therefore, only appropriate in some future disciplinary hearing, if any? Otherwise, is that not
transmogrifying what is required to be a plenary hearing into one of a summary nature?).
(FFF) Coughlin was convicted of petit larceny on November 30, 201 1, a violation of RPC
8.4(b). Such violation is sufficient alone to trigger application of SCR 111 . The Nevada Supreme
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Court referred the matter to the appropriate disciplinary panel for a determination of the extent of
punishment that should follow from the conviction. Supra 5
(GGG) The record also establishes that Coughlin was convicted of criminal trespass in the
prolonged eviction proceedings involving Dr. Merliss, a violation of RPC 8.4(b). Supra 20 ..
Misconduct
(DDD) RPC 8.4 provides (in pertinent parts):
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to :
(a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct...
(b) Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
(EEE) The Pleadings, Hearing Exhibits and Transcript of these proceedings overwhelmingly,
clearly and convincingly establish a repeated, unrelenting and obstinate pattern of misconduct by
Respondent Coughlin evincing numerous and repeated violations of several provisions of RPC 8.4 in
violation of RPC 8.4(a). (So, would that not be something not noticed or plead in the Complaint, and
therefore, only appropriate in some future disciplinary hearing, if any? Otherwise, is that not
transmogrifying what is required to be a plenary hearing into one of a summary nature?).
(FFF) Coughlin was convicted of petit larceny on November 30, 201 1, a violation of RPC
8.4(b). Such violation is sufficient alone to trigger application of SCR 111 . The Nevada Supreme
Court referred the matter to the appropriate disciplinary panel for a determination of the extent of
punishment that should follow from the conviction. Supra 5
(GGG) The record also establishes that Coughlin was convicted of criminal trespass in the
prolonged eviction proceedings involving Dr. Merliss, a violation of RPC 8.4(b). Supra 20
(HHH) The Complaint in this matter alleges that Coughlin has been arrested and is awaiting
trial on a larceny charge involving a cell phone and on a charge of abusing 911 emergency
procedures. However, no evidence was presented on these charges but as a matter of default the
allegations may be deemed admitted and would constitute additional violations of RPC 8.4(b).
(JJJ) The record, as described at length above, establishes several violations of RPC 8.4(c).
See (AA), (BB), (CC), (AAA), (BBB) and (CCC).....
(Candor to the Tribunal
(Z) RPC 3.3(a)(1) states "A lawyer shall not knowingly: (m)ake a false statement of
fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement .of material fact or law previously
made to the tribunal by the lawyer."...
(BB) Attorney Richard Hill testified that based on his experience in litigating with
Coughlin, Coughlin was not truthful with either counsel or the Court. Supra Paragraph 23.
(23. Based on Mr. Hill's experience in litigating with Coughlin, Coughlin was not truthful
with either counsel or the court. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012,
P 53, L 6 -16. (HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 53:5 to 53:16) BY MR. KING: Q Let me restate
the question. The question is: As an attorney, having a responsibility to be truthful and to
have candor with opposing counsel, was Mr. Coughlin truthful, and did he use candor with
you? A No. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. King, wrap it up, please. You're limited to 15
minutes. BY MR. KING: Q Specifically relating to Mr. Coughlin's candor to the court, did
he show candor to the courts? A No.) Mr. Hill felt that Coughlin's filings were abusive, at
one point calling Mr. Hill's associate a lichen. Coughlin has accused Mr. Hill of bribing the
Reno Police Department to have Coughlin arrested. Mr. Hill's staff is terrorized by Coughlin.
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See Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 54, L 4 -15...) (HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 54:3 to
54:15) BY MR. KING: Q With regard to a person perhaps -- to the extent that Mr. Coughlin
may have exhibited these bad behaviors, was he otherwise kind in his dealings with you and
Dr. Merliss? Could you explain, just briefly, to the panel his actual demeanor with regard to
his dealings with you and your client? A His e-mails, his filings were abusive, to say the
least. Calling my -- he called my associate a lichen. I'll admit we all had to retreat to the
dictionary on that one. Name calling. He's accused me of bribing the Reno Police Department
to have him arrested. My staff is absolutely terrorized by this man.))...
(KKK) The entire record in this matter is replete with instances demonstrating that
Coughlin's conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Coughlin has been
repeatedly sanctioned monetarily and by way of incarceration for his conduct, has repeatedly
filed lengthy, irrelevant and nonsensical pleadings requiring staffs, courts and counsel to
expend needless and unnecessary time in responding to such pleadings, has repeatedly
disrupted proceedings and failed to follow instructions and admonitions of the courts. The
record establishes that the pattern of conduct continues despite the severe sanctions
administered and continues up to and during the disciplinary process and hearing of this
matter.
SBN King's FHE6, a letter misaddressed to Couglin (it lacks the #2 unit number for the
rented town home Coughlin was then utilizing as a home office (after having rented a room off
Craigslist with his last $200 from two individuals from whom Coughlin, on 1/23/12, in FV12-00187,
and 188 received temporary protection orders against from 2JDC Master Edmondson) reads:
February 14, 2012
Zach Coughlin. Esq.
1422 E. 9th Street Reno, NV
89512
RE: Grievance File #NG12-0204 Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Dear Mr. Coughlin:
The Office of Bar Counsel has received the enclosed correspondence from Richard G. Hill,
Esq., which alleges professional misconduct on your part. As such, a grievance file has been opened.
Please respond in writing to this grievance within ten (10) days from the date of this letter and kindly
direct your response to the State Bar's Reno office. Your response should address each allegation
contained within Mr. Hill's grievance and, whenever possible. all applicable documentation in support
of your response should be included.
If you intend to supplement your response, please indicate an expected date of receipt for the
same in your response. If you have any questions. please do not hesitate to contact me.
Sincerely, Patrick O. King Assistant Bar Counsel POK/lp Enclosure
Coughlin has obtained what might be the letter King reference (but failed to include
therewith) in his FHE6, which might read (and, its important to note, such letter is neither signed nor
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sworn, nor made under penalty of perjury, such as one would have to so assert were they to make a
Complaint with the Commission on Judicial Discipline and the same David Sarnwoski that RMC
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Judge Holmes listed as a reference in here 2007 application for the then open Reno Justice Court
Justice of the Peace position...further, Hill's grievance was, also, apparently, only emailed to the
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SBN (although the SBN does hold such manner of transmission out to the public as an acceptable
means of so submitting such a grievance or complaint...however, the Commission on Judicial
Discipline demands that all Complaints be submitted through the mail, curiously...it hardly seems
equitable or without a violation of the equal protection clause for judges to be shielded by negligent,
spurious complaints such as that purportedly made by Hill were attorneys receive no such protections.
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The strength of the judiciary and legal system in general absolutely depends on the strength of a
single attorney. Were it is the case that a solo attorney can be snuffed out with minimal effort by a
few judges or a corrupt bar counsel, or some other concerted duplicity, the legal system will
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inevitably fail at far too high an error rate):
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January 14, 2012
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VIA EMAIL ONLY patrickk@nvbar.org

Patrick King, Esq.
Assistant Bar Counsel
State Bar of Nevada
9456 Double R. Blvd.
Reno, Nevada 89521
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Re:
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Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq.

Nevada Bar No. 9473
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Mr. King:
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You and I have previously discussed Mr. Coughlin. Mr. Coughlin, due to his mental
instability, lack of integrity, and complete incompetence, constitutes a danger to the public if he is
allowed to continue to practice law. This letter is written to discharge my and my associate's reporting
obligations under RPC 8.3. Please consider the following:
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1. Rissone v. Gessin, CVIO-01341. Although not among Mr. Coughlin's most

significant ethical violations, it presents a good microcosm of his derelictions. Mr. Gessin was a client
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of our office. He defrauded the plaintiff, as is his modus operandi in dealing with women.
Approximately one year after judgment was entered and the case concluded, Mr. Coughlin interjected
himself in the case on behalf of Gessin, trying to collect on a sanction award against opposing
counsel. It turns out that because he had filed bankruptcy, Gessin no longer owns this claim. If you
look at the file, you will see that Coughlin appeared and then filed a bizarre "partial withdrawal"
document on December 8, 2011.
Subsequent to that time, Coughlin has been ghostwriting documents that purport to be
from Gessin, individually, and e-filing them for Gessin. He is using the "/s/" for Gessin's signature.
These are clearly not docunlents that are signed or prepared by Mr. Gessin, and the fact that
somebody (Coughlin) e-files them confirms he is ghostwriting without the required disclosure. In
addition, it appears that Coughlin has facilitated the of what nlay be a fraudulent bankruptcy on behalf
of Gessin. Coughlin's lack is demonstrated in the Gessin case by the fact that he does not effect on the
ownership of Gessin's potential claims from Gessin having filed a bankruptcy, (Le., the claims now
belong to the bankruptcy trustee, not Gessin.)
As with all of the matters referenced below, I strongly suggest that you contact the Second
Judicial District Court and get e-filing access to the cases mentioned so you can look at the
documents yourself. Glade Hall, Esq., is opposing counsel in that case and may be of help to you.
2. I am informed and believe that Mr. Coughlin was recently convicted of a theft crime in Reno
Municipal Court. I am further informed that the matter arises out of shoplifting at Walmart. That case
is presently on appeal to the district court in case number CR11-2064. Mr. Coughlin is representing
himself.
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'3. Mr. Coughlin is presently facing criminal charges regarding the theft of an iPod. That is pending in
Reno Justice Court as case number RCR2011-063341. I have reviewed the file. Mr. Coughlin got into
some sort of argument with his public defender. As a result, he was referred out for a competency
evaluation.
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4. We represent Dr. Matthew Merliss, a physician from Chico, California. Dr. Merliss owns the
property at 121 River Rock Street, Reno, Nevada. Beginning in March 2010, the property was leased
to Mr. Coughlin and his then-girlfriend. The lease expired in February 2011. The girlfriend left the
community in approximately May 2011. Dr. Merliss contacted us in approximately August 2011 to
assist in evicting Mr. Coughlin. Coughlin had not paid rent or utilities since May. He contended that
there were habitability issues with the property that justified his withholding rent. All of his claims
were decided adversely to his position at the eviction hearing. Justice of the Peace Peter Sferazza
ordered Coughlin evicted from the premises effective November 1, 2011. On that date, the Washoe
County Sheriffs Department performed their normal eviction procedure: locks were changed and the
eviction notice was posted on the front door. We videotaped the home and its contents at that time.
Upon inspection over the next few days, it became apparent that "somebody" was breaking into the
home on a regular basis.
On Sunday, November 13, 20 11, Dr. Merliss came to town, and I met him at the home on
River Rock Street. As we walked through the home, it was obvious that someone had been in there
since I had last been in several days before. Dr. Merliss discovered that the basement door was
barricaded (not locked) from the inside. The Reno Police Department was summoned. They tried to
coax whoever was in the basement out, without success. After Dr. Merliss had to kick the door down,
it "was discovered that Mr. Coughlin had broken in and was in the basement. He was arrested and is
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presently facing criminal trespass charges in Reno Municipal Court. See case no. 11 CR 26405 21. He
is also facing a contempt motion in front of Judge Sferazza in the eviction case. Judge Sferazza has
stayed that matter pending the resolution of the criminal trial. That was scheduled for January 10,
2012, but was continued at the request of Mr. Coughlin's new attorney.
5. The eviction order is now on appeal to the Second Judicial District Court. See case CVl1-o3628,
pending in Department 7. As part of the eviction process, a lien was asserted against the personal
property that Coughlin left behind at the home. On November 16, 2011, Coughlin filed a motion to
contest the landlord's lien in the Reno Justice Court. The court tried to promptly set a hearing, but
Coughlin refused to cooperate in setting the matter, and the court took it off calendar. Coughlin then
reinitiated that process and a hearing was held in December, at which time the court heard evidence of
Coughlin's lack of cooperation in setting the November hearing. You may also want to contact Reno
Justice Court staff, and in particular, chief clerk Karen Stancil, about Mr. Coughlin's abusive
treatment of her and her staff. After the hearing, the court issued an Order granting Coughlin a twoday time window to remove his personal property. The first day was Thursday, December 22, 20 11.
After Coughlin was allowed into the home that first day, he sent out an e-mail to the effect that
because he had appealed Judge Sferazza's order, he was entitled to a stay of proceedings and was to
resume in the home. As a result, he did very little to remove any of his personal property that day. On
Friday, December 23, 2011, after he learned, again, that his stay had been denied, Coughlin
assembled a small crew and they were able to remove a substantial amount of his personal property.
(You need to understand that Mr. Coughlin is a hoarder. We have the photos and videos if you would
like to see them.) However, Mr. Coughlin did not get all of his property out. For example, I counted
13 car seats that he had somehow managed to get down into the basement.
Having failed to remove all of his belongings, Mr. Coughlin then moved before Judge
Flanagan for a temporary restraining order to prevent the disposal of his abandoned property in
accordance with Judge Sferazza's order. Attached is Mr. Coughlin's motion, my office's opposition,
and Mr. Coughlin's reply. These documents demonstrate Mr. Coughlin's complete and utter
incompetence as an attorney. On January 11, 2012, Judge Flanagan denied Mr. Coughlin's request for
a temporary restraining order. On January 12, 2011, the contractor hired to clean the house
commenced work. Mr. Coughlin flagged the contractor down in traffic when he (the contractor) was
on his way to the dump with the abandoned property from the home. Coughlin called the police, who
arrived at the transfer station. Coughlin was falsely asserting that the contractor had tried to run hin1
over. He also told the police that the contractor had stolen his possessions. After I presented the court
orders to the police, the contractor was allowed to proceed. At their instruction, I have now had a
TPO issued against Coughlin by Reno Justice Court.
However, before the contractor could get back to the River Rock house, Coughlin was there.
He had his video camera and was walking up and down the street screaming and yelling at police, at
the contractor, and at me, when I arrived. Mr. Coughlin ended up bemg arrested and taken to jail. The
police informed me that because of the number and types of contacts they have had with him, he is no
longer eligible for citations in the event of infractions.
Enclosed you will find a copy of a supplemental document filed by Mr. Coughlin on January
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attorney designation on the first page indicates that it is being filed by Coughlin as appellant. You
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will note that the caption is from a different case. It is unclear in which case Mr. Coughlin intended to
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file this document, although, because of the case number and the caption, it appears to have ultimately
been routed to the Carpentier case (CVOB-01709) and not the eviction appeal case (CV11-0362B). I
am told that counsel in the captioned case may also be in the process of filing a bar complaint against
Coughlin.
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6. When the house was secured after Coughlin's arrest, we found a crack pipe and a bag of what
appeared to be marijuana. The contractor also reported finding a box of pills and a vial of some sort.
We understand Coughlin has unsuccessfully tried the Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers program, and
that he has a history of substance problems.
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7. Mr. Coughlin has filed two lawsuits against his former employer, Washoe Legal Services. He has
sued all of the board of directors and the management of the company. Both cases have now been
dismissed. Both cases demonstrate his lack of competence. I suggest you contact Joseph Garin, Esq.,
in Las Vegas, as he was counsel for the defendants in that case. You may want to contact Paul
E1cano, Esq., the director of Washoe Legal Services.
8. Mr. Coughlin has a habit of initiating cases and asking to proceed in forma pauperis. He has done
so in cases against me, my office, my client, and Washoe Legal Services. You will find them if you
run a search for Coughlin Z on the Second Judicial District Court website. The courts that have
reviewed the documents have generally denied his requests. What is of note is that his representations
in the applications to proceed in forma pauperis are inconsistent \vith and contrary to the
representations that he has Inade to Judge Flanagan in the context of seeking a teinporary restraining
order. On the one hand, he tells the court he is broke and has no property, and on the other hand, he is
telling the court that he has a great deal of valuable property at the home that needs to be protected.
This demonstrates a gross lack of candor with the tribunals with which he deals.
9. Coughlin has also tried to file a case against me, Iny associate, my client, and others, including the
Reno Justice Court. It is also to be found on the website. Judge Steinheimer has ruled that he did not
comply with NRCP 8.
10. Coughlin's behavior was unusual to start, and has become more and more bizarre during the we
have been dealing with him. He serves papers he does not file, and files does not serve. He
consistently signs certificates of service that he has mailed to us, but we have never received from
him by mai1. He has posted videos of the eviction service attempts and parts of the trial on YouTube,
including some recordings he secretly made in court with his cellphone.
11. Another example of his incompetence is that he does not understand what orders are, and are not,
appealable. He does not understand that filing a notice of appeal divests the lower court of
jurisdiction. I am confident that once you look into this matter, you will agree that Mr. Coughlin
should not be practicing law. He is a danger to the community. Sincerely, /S/ Richard G. Hill
RGH:kn
Enclosures:
-Coughlin Amended Emergency Motion for Restraining Order
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-Merliss Opposition to Motion for TRO

-Coughlin Reply to Opposition to Motion for TRO
-Suppleinental Reply to Opposition dated 1/13/12
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In 1708, Baker's 11/21/11 Opposition to Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien; Joinder in Motion
to Set Aside or Vacate Attorney Fee Award, reads:
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO CONTEST PERSONAL PROPERTY; JOINDER IN MOTION
TO SET ASIDE OR VACATE ATTORNEY FEE AWARD
Plaintiff/landlord, MATT MERLISS, through counsel, RICHARD G. HILL, CHARTERED
and CASEY D. BAKER, ESQ., opposes defendant's motion to contest personal property lien.
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Defendant has been given every opportunity to retrieve his belongings, but is simply refusing to pay
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the statutorily permitted storage fees. Plaintiff joins in defendant's motion to set aside or vacate
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attorney fees award entered on November 9, 2011, and asks the court to vacate the entire award.
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This opposition and joinder are based on the points and authorities below and all papers and
pleadings on file herein.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES FACTS
1. Merliss is the owner of the real property located at 121 River Rock Street,
Reno, Nevada (the "PROPERTY").
2. On or about March 1, 2010, Merliss rented the Property to Coughlin and his
then-girlfriend.
5.On August 22, 2011, Merliss properly and lawfully terminated Coughlin's month-to-month tenancy
pursuant to NRS 40.251, by serving the statutory No-Cause Termination Notice to Vacate NRS
40.25i(1) upon him.
6.On September 27, 2011, Merliss properly served Coughlin with a Five-Day Notice of Unlawful
Detainer For Failure to Vacate Rental Unit - NRS 40.251 (No-Cause Termination) and Notice of
Summary Eviction - NRS 40.254.
7.On October 27, 2011, after all due and proper notice and opportunity to be heard had been given to
Coughlin, this court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Summary
Eviction. A true and correct copy of the referenced order is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 1.
8.EXHIBIT 1 was served on Coughlin on November 1, 2011 by the Washoe County Sheriffs
Department, by posting same on the front door of the property in the manner customary for evictions
in Washoe County. The locks to the premises were changf;d at that time, thereby ejecting a,nd
dispossessing Coughlin of possession of the Property. Mr. Coughlin was not present, but the notice
was posted and the locks were changed.
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7. Thereafter, Mr. Coughlin unlawfully, and without any right to do so,

reentered upon, and took possession of, of the Property.
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8. Specifically, on November 13, 2011, Mr. Coughlin was found to be living in the basement of the
Property. Coughlin was arrested and charged with trespassing at that time.
Reference is made to plaintiffs Motion for Order to Show Cause, filed herewith and incorporated
herein by this reference, for further particulars regarding the discovery and arrest of Mr. Coughlin on
that date.
9. Beginning on November 2,2011, plaintiffs counsel, RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ., began sending
emails to Coughlin on an almost daily basis, asking Coughlin to contact Mr. Hill's office to make
arrangements to retrieve Coughlin's belongings from the property. See Declaration of Richard G. Hill,
Esq., attached hereto as EXHIBIT 2. Copies of the referenced emails are authenticated in.and attached
to.Mr. Hill's declaration.
10. Mr. Coughlin would not respond directly to Mr. Hill's emails, claiming that he did not receive
them. Coughlin first claimed that he was having "technical difficulties" and that "some emails appear
blank or black". Now, Coughlin claims that he did not receive those emails because he had added Mr.
Hill's email address to his "blocked senders list". Coughlin eventually responded directly to Mr. Hill's
em ails, but still has not proposed any plan for paying the storage fees he owes and retrieving his
belongings.
11. On November 10, 2011, the undersigned sent three emails to Mr. Coughlin, one of which included
a letter regarding Mr. Coughlin's debt to Dr. Merliss. See Declaration of Casey D. Baker, Esq.,
attached hereto as EXHIBIT 3. Copies of the referenced emails are authenticated in, and attached to,
Mr. Baker's declaration.
12. Mr. Coughlin claims that the undersigned's letter dated November 10, 2011 somehow authorized
him to remain living at the property after the eviction. He is simply wrong. See EXHIBIT 1 to Mr.
Baker's declaration. Nowhere in that letter is there any authorization for Mr. Coughlin to trespass and
squat at Dr. Merliss' property.
13. Coughlin did not attempt telephone contact with Mr. Hill's office until approximately 11:00 p.m.
on Saturday, November 12, 2011, at which time he left two voice messages.
14. Thereafter, Coughlin placed several telephone calls to Mr. Hill's office, during which he harassed
Mr. Hill and his staff. On November 15, 2011, Coughlin showed up at Mr. Hill's office unannounced,
and barged in and created a scene, interrupting a deposition in the process.
LAW
provide property the end collect before property nghtfully
1. Reference is made to NRS 118A.460(1)(a), which provides in pertinent part
as follows:
1. The landlord may dispose of personal property abandoned on the premises by a former tenant or
left on the premises after eviction of the tenant without incurring civil or criminal liability in the
following manner:
(a) The landlord shall reasonably for the safe storage of the for 30 days after abandonment or
eviction or the of the rental period and may charge and the reasonable and actual costs of inventory,
moving and storage
releasing !he t the tenant or his or her authonzed representatIve claImmg the property within that
period. The landlord is liable to the tenant only for the landlord's negligent or wrongful acts in storing
the property.
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NRS n8AA60(1)(a) (emphasis added). See also the official Nevada Supreme Court Form #15, entitled
Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien and For Return of Personal Property, attached hereto as
EXHIBIT 5, at paragraph 4 ("I understand that the landlord may charge and collect the reasonable and
actual costs of inventory, moving and storage of my personal property before releasing it to me ... ")
ANALYSIS
The second and final day of the summary eviction hearing in this matter was Tuesday, October 25,
2011. At the conclusion of that hearing, the court announced its findings of fact, and specifically
granted the eviction, all on the record. Coughlin was present in court, and knew, at that moment, that
he had until October 31, 2011 to vacate the
property, or he would be locked out. In fact, Coughlin even asked the court for an
opportunity to prepare and submit his own version of the court's findings, but, predictably, failed to
do so. Then, on October 27, 2011, the court entered its written order, a copy of which is attached
hereto as EXHIBIT 1. That order was served on Coughlin by the Washoe County Sheriffs
Department on Tuesday, November 1, 2011, a full week after the hearing in which Coughlin was first
given notice, on the record, that an eviction had been granted. The order was posted to the front door
in the customary manner of evictions performed in
Washoe County, and the locks on the front and back doors were changed at that time. 4 !
Even though he had a week to do so, Coughlin did not remove his personal belongings from the
property prior to the lockout. In fact, he did not even remove himself from the property. Unbeknownst
to Merliss or his counsel, Coughlin continued to live in the basement of the property until he was
discovered squatting there on November 13, 2011 nearly two weeks after he was legally locked out. Coughlin had barricaded himself, his dog, and some
of his presumably more cherished possessions in the basement. When Coughlin refused to emerge
from the basement after being ordered to do so by the police, Merliss was forced to kick down the
door to gain access to his own property. Coughlin was arrested and charged with trespassing. Due to
Coughlin's criminal activities, the security
of the house was compromised. As a result, Merliss was forced to incur costs in the amount of
$1,060.00 to secure the property in order to protect it and Coughlin's belongings. A true and correct
copy of the bill from the contractor is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 2.
Now, unbelievably, Coughlin asks the court to exercise its equitable powers to
reduce or eliminate Merliss' statutory right to recover the reasonable costs of storing
Coughlin's property. Under no circumstances should Coughlin be granted any relief at this juncture,
equitable or otherwise.
Coughlin continued to illegally live in the basement, without permission, after he was evicted. He had
a bed set up, food, water, computers, televisions, and even a pet (which was defecating on the floor).
The walls were (and are) lined with bags and boxes of
A. Merliss is Entitled to Charge and Collect a Reasonable Fee for Storage of Coughlin's Property
Before Releasing it.
NRS 118A.460(1)(a) controls. Coughlin was evicted and the locks were changed. Coughlin had
known for an entire week that he would be getting locked out, but he left the main level of the house
essentially full and untouched, as though he never intended to leave (in fact, he never did leave).
Photographs showing a "lived in" and fully furnished residence, which was obviously not in the
process of being vacated, will be provided at the November 21, 2011 hearing. 5
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what can only be described as "junk". Every nook and cranny of the space was, and is, taken up with
some thing or another. In addition to the main living area and the basement,
Coughlin has managed to literally stuffthe attic full of even more junk. Photographs of the basement
and attic will be provided at the November 21, 2011 hearing. Mr. Coughlin's personal property did,
and does, fully occupy the entire house.
Under NRS 118A.460, Merliss is obligated to store Coughlin's belongings for 30 days before he can
lawfully dispose of them. Under normal circumstances, it might be cost effective to inventory and
move a household full of goods to a storage unit for those 30 days. But here, it is simply not
economical. Coughlin has filled the house with so much trash and other worthless debris, that to
inventory, pack, and move it, together with Coughlin's belongings that may have some value, would
not only require a herculean effort, it would be a colossal waste of resources. By leaving the
Coughlin's property in the house and charging him the fair rental value for storage ($900.00 per
month), Merliss is actually mitigate the costs Coughlin is statutorily required to bear. Coughlin should
be thanking Merliss, not stalking and harassing his attorneys.
Mr. Hill and the undersigned, have made numerous efforts to coax Mr. Coughlin into arranging to
retrieve his belongings. See EXHIBIT 3 and EXHIBIT 4, hereto. Instead of responding to those
efforts in a civilized, reasonable, or even rational manner, Coughlin has instead chosen to resort to his
usual game-play, pretending to have never received counsel's communications. Except this time, Mr.
Coughlin has elevated his antics to include threatening and stalking behavior toward Mr. Hill and his
staff. Why Mr. Coughlin feels it is necessary to video-record the license plates of Mr. Hill's staff
members is beyond the grasp of this writer. Perhaps Mr. Coughlin will be able to explain this tactic at
the hearing. In any event, it is painfully obvious that the reason Mr. Coughlin never responded to Mr.
Hill's inquiries regarding the removal of his personal belongings before
November 13, 2011, is because Coughlin was illegally living in the property the whole time.
Only now, after the property has been secured, and Mr. Coughlin released from jail without 6
his wallet, cell phone, or computer, does he even approach what can be considered a sincere request
to remove his things from the house. Unfortunately for Mr. Coughlin, he has fully committed himself
to his gamesmanship. He cannot seem to bring himself to deal with the reality of the situation: that he
must pay those costs Merliss was forced to incur as a direct result of his prior bad decisions, before he
can retrieve his belongings. NRS 118A-460. Instead, Coughlin continues to pretend that he is not
receiving Mr. Hill's emails, even though he obviously has, and he has now filed yet another
unsupported motion for sanctions against Hill and Baker. Despite all of this, Mr. Hill has repeatedly
offered to retrieve Mr. Coughlin's wallet and his "client files" for him without any requirement for
payment in advance. For some reason, Coughlin would rather argue with Mr. Hill than take him up on
that offer.
Coughlin's abuse of this court's processes must be stopped. He continues to file baseless and frivolous
motions and other papers, even though he has appealed this case to the district court. He continues his
pattern of sending late-night email rants to counsel, which serve only to drive up fees for Merliss and
further destroy whatever shred of credibility Coughlin may still possess. He has harassed, cursed at,
and abused Mr. Hill's staff, and, on one occasion, barged into Hill's office unannounced, creating a
scene and interrupting a deposition. Enough is enough. It is time for Mr. Coughlin to face facts and
move on. This court must not tolerate any further ravings from Mr. Coughlin, and should order hill),
once and for all, to comply with the law.
B. The Attorney's Fee Award Should be Vacated.
Although there is no case-law on the matter in Nevada, Coughlin may be right
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about one thing. Based on the language of the statute, NRS 69.030 may not authorize attorney's fees
and costs to a prevailing party in a summary eviction action. Merliss does not concede the point, but
simply does not wish to deal with the matter on appeal. Merliss has offered to stipulate with Coughlin
to vacate the award, but, despite having sought the same relief from the court by filing this motion,
Coughlin has failed to respond to that offer. Merliss joins in Coughlin's request to vacate the award
of fees and costs entered herein on November 9, 2011 . CONCLUSION Merliss is entitled to charge
and collect a reasonable storage fee from Coughlin before releasing his property to him. NRS
118A.460. Counsel for Merliss have gone out of their way to make the process easy on Coughlin, and
to let him know what he needs to do to get his belongings, despite Coughlin's constant harassment of
counsel and their staff. Coughlin refuses to cooperate, and only wants to fight. His gamesmanship and
criminal behavior should prevent this court from awarding him any equitable or other relief
whatsoever. If Coughlin want his things, he needs to pay as required under the statute.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that the Coughlin take nothing by way of his motion to contest
personal property lien; that same be denied in its entirety; and that Coughlin be required to pay
storage fees under NRS 118A.460 in the amount of $30.00 per day from November 1, 2011, plus
$1,060.00 for costs incurred to secure the property, before he be allowed to retrieve his belongings;
that, in the event Coughlin pays as required, that he be ordered to remove and properly dispose of all
of his belongings at the property; that the court's order awarding attorney's fees and costs entered
herein on November 9, 2011 be vacated; and for such other, further and additional relief as seems just
to the court in the premises. AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030 The undersigned does
hereby \ affirm that the preceding document does not contain the social security number of any
person. DATED this 21st day of November, 2011. /s/ Casey D. Baker, Esq.
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Him and him and her and opposition Hill him and him as part a motion to conclude contempt citation
work title in that that the. Shall I, do that at the order resolving motion to contest personal property
lien is ported to him and him and him and him the something memorializing a situation where the
parties agreed to allow the court enter an order based upon the evidence presented for going back he
also the settlement put in more than a settlement in a motion to conclude contempt citation also like
there was a template page and we denied concluded is based upon those motions show cause is just
laughable motion show cause alter an order requiring copy of the hearing adulation being held in
contact recursion his contractor whatever the hell got his order by Judge Flanagan required Coughlin
of pay for thousand dollars to secure property work already had a baseline $80 per moving and
inventorying and storage at where had already admitted the storage cost was bein with Richard Hill
this trigger a she continue unabated and his recent September 11, 2012 request for submission of ex
parte motion to conclude contents is citation contents of the contempt citation in that the ex parte
motion to concludes contempt citation that a filed on same day would be cause for submission thereof
and why it needs to be an ex parte motion is unclear of fact that Richards lies in misconduct is finally
catching up with him perhaps hopefully it's not to conclude contempt citation Richard g $1000 it was
taken did that thousand dollar poster contractor bill board up the property and storage thing to anyway
on the and him and routing Hill and November 21, 2011 declaration oh neglect to punish is that the
letter went on to testify to its validity of Coughlin to or and Coughlin permeates my beloved is during
a January 2012 11 filing call to attend her a copy secured I might: that Sargent Lopez admit that
neither she nor officer Carter and out the daily me with law enforcement or proceeding under color of
law during these moments wearing Hill reports that agency to coax Coughlin out a basement and is
November 3 November 21 declaration was held in Cyrillic letter on they needed and that allegation of
the especially in June 18, 2000 PASS trial at which he'll shut up looking and walkie he transcript of
the trespass to the judge Garner in a a but back to the and his declaration of November 21 at seven on
pace to a .4 L Writes the Court, Sunday summary eviction order to try seven 2011 this summary
eviction order on November 1, 2001 wash at church departments are that order notice at the notice
was posted on the door the home by the Los Angeles Department of matter customary was County
privations blocking or changed on its it's a failure to demonstrate handed to the tribunal for held to
suggested posting that eviction order on the door when no one was Thomas tantamount to serving that
order not tantamount serving our not in the legal sense engaged in getting nasty P5 be to an RCP 60
not then officer Carter the Reno Police Department would deem "what is involved in the service of
civil order eviction criminal law is notorious for having much more lax use of what defendants are
entitled to a search service requirements indeed the deadline file a notice of appeal in criminal while
runs from the rendition of an order nine notice of entry of order is that an salon rendition of order
under NRS 189.030 is essentially is when somebody's in court the just stated that order out loud even
if the order was made in absentia on proton exchange later and in this case eviction order for held to
purported Coughlin served dated October 25 when it was rendered from the bench is nonsense is not
criminal trial further will ultimately wind up in that order the find that includes a lot of sign October
27 is so far departed from from anything judge Sferrazza said the conclusion of the trial on October
25 this is nonsense to suggest Coughlin was certain that order from those with respect what contain
October 25 rather the Sheriff's Department Hill umbrellas are stuck with the fact that nobody bothered
to mail Coughlin the order until November 1 as the proof of service on the notice of entry of order to
show filed on October on November 1 shows were in his office assistant and her proof of mailing or
certificate of service and David only on November 1 she plays that order in the mail and the notice of
entry of order back to the police work in the November 13 trespass arrest and the the him attention to
him that his words and health declaration of November 21 on pace to same .4 indicates that there was
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cashier certainly order on by and that the notice was quote posted on the door, Washoe shows up in
their customer and Washoe County privations. However in his witness statement of November 30,
2011 incident to the custodial arrest called for trespass Bill O'Malley notice of the papers were posted
by the Washoe County Sheriff's Department on November 1, 2011 unclear why the police report
contains mentioned that Dr. merciless notice people or somebody was in the house and weeks
preceding the rest in the week preceding the arrest with those declaration failed to mention that Dr.
Marlys was there knowing that Hill was there in the center shows going to opposing counsel's office
personal fixing computers and in fact there is evidence to show that while Coughlin's hard drives
were held possession new video drivers loaded on them on December 6 at a time which only Hill as
to her possession of those hard drives was tense just so made copies the hard drives pages so
completely unfathomably improper to describe them in a criminal complaint filled signed on
November 13 he notes that I am on November 13 the defendant at that at the 121 River Rock St. the
defendant was found probably have to be convicted on November 1, 2011 and that's not as a set of
facts that support the trespass charge trespass requires one to remain in place with a how lawful right
to be after being warned to leave a even if that eviction notice was properly served and even if that
order was not illegal nullity or stellar board rescinded or otherwise and even if Hill's indications to
Coughlin that he was charging in the fair rental value of the property don't entitle Coughlin to the 40s
and access the property and even if NRS 40.760 were somebody's making a storage Iranian a storage
unit provides that eviction to the proper remedy at one feel someone is using a storage facility is a
resident further Coughlin getting charge for storage use of its impermissible suggest that he had no
right to be there is a him and him and him officer Carter's arrest report and declaration of probable
cause from November 13 Carter writes that own the defendant was found inside the house after being
served an eviction notice to be convicted on November 1, 2011. Is not efficient officer Carter has any
idea what it means for something be served incident the celebration case therefore he lacks the
knowledge even know what area of probable cause make cited a citation my fuzzy again custodial
arrest this is nonsense further Coughlin was completely cheated out of due process and 61 night
counsel where Reno me defender Steve S refused to subpoena officer Carter uses and detective Lopez
refused. Dr. Marlys refused pretty much do anything Keith Loomis is a joke of an attorney is the best
prosecutor the Reno Municipal Court has an key behaviors and Pauline court wanted defender in card
amounts no that didn't likelihood that the defendant would chart return he did not qualify for citation
Carter's for elementary declaration goes a lot further than that in fact what killed testified for trial on
June 18 and what Carter writes the supplementary declaration is completely contradicted I did the
damn hit videos health of himself even despite the fact that upon information believed till throughout
her failed to the video detective Carter and Lopez failing to identify themselves as proceeding under
color of law are in any way associated with law enforcement or identifying themselves any way at all
besides just being random voices asking Coughlin account mom prior to Dr. Miller's ignore them so
Hill wide committed perjury under oath when he suggested that the Reno Police Department identify
themselves prior to and during down and that Coughlin reviews amount upon any such voices saying
they were acting under color of law are with the police department or whatever simply not the case
Coughlin swears under penalty of perjury that he is determined.going through his mind that the
voices: to him indicated that they were with law enforcement that he would probably have to go to the
door and come out but that was not the case the doors kicked down part anybody indicating who the
hell they were what the voices were whether there was Nevada court services seeking to break lost
more or whether they were with a realtor with Dr. Marlys or whether there were some old friends of
Coughlin's or what
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the very court approach by the Reno PD and it's telling indicated that they needed to work on risky
ground and probably in the wrong and not did not have her putting in and attack they were taking
probably violation of sold-out he could County US record case 1992 wherein 42 USC section 1983
cause cause of action for deprivation once property rights other civil rights was set forth by is a spring
core incident to a landlord matter where landlord without utilizing the proper eviction proceedings at
the police come to mobile home lot and active they I guess civil standby or something to keep the
peace while landlord drive somebody's mobile home awful lot absent getting that actual diction to do
it mobile home resident the police arrest rent landlord for trespass the police refusing indicated they
were just there to keep these and having canceled out he could County were in the place and the gang
were where held liable for failing to respond to the defense indication that his towel along with
content that can not destroy while the landlord had a drag that are in a officer Carter's narrative he
writes that Richard is global attorney is representing homeowner Matthew Marlys Rose publishing
papers on his tenant Coughlin at 121 River rock last month and is served at the home by leaving them
on the door. The eviction paper said that Zachary was to vacate the property on November 1, 2011.
Carter failed to mention when they were served or how they researched it stake sales workprint that
there were served and in doing so basically looks like somebody who's on Richard Hill's Pero whether
or not that's actually the case and certainly Carter was Carter and Sargent Tarter the Reno PD were
not have a copy repeated the indication officer Carter made in response to Coughlin's query as to
whether you to Richard Hill for off plan officer Carter stated that yes he was on Richard Hill's Pero
because Richard Hill pays him a lot of money so even where Richard Hill said that there arrested to
Richard Hill's of the arrest Carter may have been sarcastic or joking but it was hardly a situation to
the joking i.e. where you're going to Attorney for Sgt. Carter Goes on to Lien Is Pleased for When He
Writes That Sargent Lopez and I'm Not Done the Basement Door and Announced Loudly Reno
Police and Called out for Zachary to Open the Door We Are Met with No Response That He Decided
He Would Kick the Door Open and Did Stuff That Is Simply Not True That Is a Blatant out Right Lie
and It It It That Did Take Place He Can Be Sure That Hill Would Have Video Editing with
Propounded City Attorney Instead Hill Had a Video of Everything That Happened That Day Seem
the besides That Moment Where Allegedly the Reno Police Not on the Basement Door and out While
the Reno Plays There Just Simply Didn't Happen at Carter's Maricopa That I Answered the Door with
the Basement and Found Zachary Staying at the Rear of the Room Holding a Small BBQ Ted
Incident Come out and Eventually Gets up That Came Upstairs and Seamless regarding His Legal
Standing in House Asking Me Hypothetically Speaking That Question Tina and Told Me I Was
Making a False Rest of the Fact That I'm on Richard Hill's Pero and He Was Consuming. I Try to
Explain Zachary That He Was Served Eviction Papers He Asked Me What I Can Do about It the
Hypothetically Didn't Get Them Even Told Me That He Had Worked a Deal with Matthew to
Continue Paying Rent and That the Legal Eviction Was No Longer Valid. Then Officer Carter
Seemingly Referring to the Fact That Hill Had Sent a Car Finally Hill And/or His Associate Had
Indicated to Coughlin That They Were Charging Him $900 the Same Price Prepare a Value Which
Would Tend to Suggest That They Visited and Withdrawn and That Coughlin Was Free to Do Far
More Property Than Just North Stuff There Is Descended the Same Price or for Use and Access Was
Was Being Charged Carter Doesn't Write the Letter and That Narrative of November 13 Does 11
Again Attorneys Linda Second That Judge Signed an Order Forcing Him to Leave the Property and
All He Did Was State Civil Case Possibly I'm Unsure If Any of the Cases He Was Rambling on about
Even Exist and Tell Me That I Was Making a Bad Arrest While Radcliffe Officer Carter's Unaware
That This Case Is a Good Message to Tenuous Grasp of Concepts and Serve. Serve Withdrawing of It
of Innovation and or Even Morality and Point of Law Judges Lack of Jurisdiction or Claim Arising
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under Etc. Perhaps He Shouldn't Be so Quick to Place an Attorney and As. Carter Concludes by
Stating That Due to Zachary Marbling Is Anything Wrong That Effectively Ceased Us Standing
There Is Reasonable Possibly Zachary Will Return House Therefore Do Not Qualify for a
Misdemeanor Citation. Today Is the Hill Propounded to the Reno City Attorney Clearly Show That
That's Not the Case in the Videos Coughlin Can Be Heard Asking Carter Wise to Cite Coughlin Issue
a Citation Ask Emily and Coughlin Indicates Vehemently They Would Say Legislating and Give
Wouldn't Be Further Problem There Seems to Be Clear Indication Officer Carter at Vested Interest
and Affecting a Custodial Arrest of Coughlin Had Contacted Someone Indicates That Any Statement
Carter Said the Affected Richard Hill Paying Him Money and May Fact Be True Given How Eager to
Arrest Coughlin Carter Was the State Which He Lied in a Police Report and the Fact That There Is
Reno Municipal Court by Way of Its Public Vendors Sought to Obstruct Justice and Prevent Coughlin
from Having a Due Process Here Is Particularly Troubling Why Was That Dr. Marlys Who There at
the Time Had Have Richard Complete Statement on His Behalf and Signed a Criminal Complaint Is
Not Clear Again Limits Refused It Subpoena Any of These Witnesses and Complaint Has Been Filed
with the State Bar Density Limits and Him and He Is Frankly Disgusting Attorney's
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If Richard Hill this trigger a she continue unabated and his recent September 11, 2012 request for
submission of ex parte motion to conclude contents is citation contents of the contempt citation in that
the ex parte motion to concludes contempt citation that a filed on same day would be cause for
submission thereof and why it needs to be an ex parte motion is unclear of the fact that Richards lies
in misconduct is finally catching up with him perhaps hopefully it's not to conclude contempt citation
Richard you can say you want at their request for submission of your motion for order to show cause
but all that thing asked for was for a hearing or an order actually for an order requiring Coughlin of
year-end a hearing show cause why shouldn't the back contempt it's not you know you're skipping
past the hearing part of a larger Richard Waring on your Moore's a motion for show cause of
November 21, 2011 on page 3 that reads were former {for an order of this court requiring defendant
Zachary Barker Coughlin appear show cause why should not become contempt this court under NRS
22.010 subsection 3 purchases since the scores lawfully enter order and under NRS 20.2 overs illegal
reentry onto the subject property after eviction for an order that often been grossly caustic register the
property after the break and by Coughlin as a condition of his papers is contempt court and hurt so
what is that mean of is being purged so now instead of asking the have Coughlin pay you some
money in exchange for not I guess be fine contempt court as would being purged of it means now
build may be because he started gone an order giving him the money for the break-in that he alleges
occurred on top of the storage fees the $480 was ordered after the court system or 21st 2012 order on
top of the and order granting held memorandum of costs which included thousand dollars he wants
for securing the property even though on December 14 Hill's efforts in securing the property didn't
prevent it from being robbed of approximately $8000 a pop personalty outlines the cost is clear the
property rent into some activity Coughlin undertook in the first 14 days of November and that the
thousand dollars there and after that his contractor Phil Stewart claims to have billed pelican that
invoice mentioned fixing a leak in the basement which certainly that included under NRS 118 80460
in the lowest cost a security worker after any alleging trespass by Coughlin honored on November 13
despite spending apparently ever granted secure the property didn't prevent property being robbed on
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December 14 at 12 or 14 the shall administer interestingly upon review of the police report entered
into that criminal trespass matter of some interesting stuff is revealed particularly when one views the
video that Hill took of the arrest of Coughlin which curiously do not include the most pivotal moment
of the arrest or that their action between Coughlin and the Reno Police Department I would be when
officer Lopez Sgt. Michael Lopez and officer Chris Carter Junior were gathered with murder listen
Hill Hill with his video camera and tact which matched him everything else a day at the door to the
Klondike basement height thing that never had a lock on it at Coughlin former law office in his
affidavit in his order to show cause illness and statements about that on page 3 of that exhibited hills
of Exhibit 2 to Hill's motion for order show cause the declaration Richard Hill Hill alleges on page.
They are point heading eight on the please read the agreement does that is very likely someone was
printed in the basement the please try to cut the person come out but without success. Nine. When the
police declined or ignored number listed seven leaflets inciting discover the defendant Zachary
Coughlin was thought offering him obviously much as an will place an arrest but please for
trespassing going a Hill but declares under penalty perjury when the police arrived agreed with those
that is very likely Samoans work in the basement the police take of the person come out but without
said that important because Hill to it who never misses an opportunity to slander Coughlin or distort
the facts on their it is on page 2.8 does not indicated the police announced who they were or indicated
that they were the Reno Police Department that the vital fact right there and it goes to deal men
criminal trespass charge that Coughlin faced upon individual custodial arrest on November 13 on till
later testified at trial in the attached transcript that the police did and after they were is curious
because in this declaration on the more contemporaneous with the activities and. The June 18 trial on
that Reno Municipal Court matter 11 CR 2645 Hill doesn't mention anything about please announcing
that they were there under color of law the place he just mentioned that they try to coax Coughlin out
on day being not anyone apparently is identify themselves to Coughlin at that point Coughlin's. Then
in that closet basement in not known when the hell was calling for him or whether they were
proceeding under some claim of rider color of law are or what or whether they were just another
Nevada court services style noon squad attempting to break into Coughlin's property where he
arguably had a lawful right to be and therefore could not be deemed to be trespassing the Sedgewick
often I lawful right to be there hinges on several key issues legal notions of service being chief among
them as ineffective the justice court had failed to or or that Coughlin had yet to receive the money the
justice court forced him to deposit from the justice court that he was forced to deposit percentile rent
escrow deposit is that was not permissible under Nevada law on which judge Sferrazza later rule was
converting the court that probably taken the party suggests court converted J legal in the justice in a
note that apparently the Reno Municipal Court have a problem faxing Hill police reports and that
things of that sort and naturally clear upon reviewing Hill second motion for order to show cause
which he filed in CV 11 03628 upon review of the fax headers is filled with passionate clear that the
Reno Municipal Court has no problem faxing Hill documentation related Coughlin conviction for
trespass led Reno Municipal Court steadfastly refused back Coughlin I bank and apparently refuses to
accept a big problem by faxing clearly knows of appeal in this just trespass case on that Coughlin
faxed just hours before being arrested again by the Reno PD error by the Washoe Sheriff's office
incident to the June 28, 2012 wrongful arrest which arguably involve some errors on the civil division
of the Reno justice court part entered into a fairly complex landlord-tenant matter between Coughlin
and Northwind apartments wherein Northlands or Coughlin is a five eviction notice on that listed the
wrong forum and that listed Sparks justice court while the property was in Reno Coughlin did file a or
submitted for filing a tenant affidavit to Sparks justice court and he communicated the Reno justice
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court as to the possibility of confusion and that Ms. stamp on the court should should be aware that of
the problems associated with the notice NRS 40 0253 requires the notice to list the court of the tenant
filed affidavit in Coughlin was justified in relying on that an Coughlin should not be subjected a
situation restaurant around a different course Amel filing fees did because Nevada court services
which is committing not rise press law committed either error some sort or worse further the
declaration of personal service by Nevada court services license process server Robert Ray WR a Y
for the June 14, 2012 five a notice of unlawful detainer for some apparent breach of contract that they
felt specify with a. With very that declaration service was fraudulent and likely I am perjury and that
tested personal service where Coughlin hearing now that that Ray did nothing more than post or post
the notice on the door by wedging in your crack in the door and that the rental upon which he did that
had no windows and the door was closed raid and Northwind apartment manager Duane Jacob did
attempt to break into the rental though and it might be the case that there the video of that wherein the
other thread made under cause I are purport color of law in Nevada court services are made including
calling the fire department all sorts of other nonsense and him and him and him and him and him
which is that in hills motion for order show cause in the declaration Richard Hill if*that .5 .4 rather on
page 2 Hill goes on to say for. On October 27, 2011 the course on the summary eviction order in on
November 1, 2011 the Washoe County Sheriff's Department served that order. The notice was posted
on the door of the home the Washoe County Sheriff's Department in that customer in the wash
County privations. Lots of the door front backward your changing and we retain all cases home. Five.
After the date again and that is the question the thinking is, approximately November 4, 2011 I
became concerned about, contents. I entered and was able from this somebody had been getting it I
somebody I thought I had secured the means of entry being used by whoever it was that was getting
and however only the later visits, was clear that the facility surreptitiously access. Six. On November
13 Dr. Rose came to Reno because he wanted to inspect, countries is evading taxes. This is likely that
Hill and Marlys were the ones committing trespass on November 14 and that hinges upon Hill
statement that Coughlin was served on that day a license attorney and he can be expected to be aware
the NRS 4400 makes a football at RCP to landlord-tenant matters including summary eviction and the
and RCP five subsection B subsection 2 and FRCP six subsection he made clear that where personal
service is not affected one must post and mail such a summary eviction order allow three days for
mailing to the extent that the posting admittedly by have lost County Sheriff's office including the
civil division supervisor listed Salina and February e-mail to Coughlin whom admitted that the
affidavit of November 7 by (Sheriff's office deputy John action is a fraudulent or at least incorrect to
the extent that it says that personal service by that Coughlin was personally served the lockout order
where no such thing took place rather social mix-and-match and told her e-mail posted order on the
door and nobody was home to change locks. Docket of service issue upon a review of the way to go
back to Hill's assertions of noticing somebody and how that differs from within the police report
curiously the police report and it mentions that Dr. Merle is notice that somebody within the house
that appears to be a cover-up by Hill perhaps because Hill realizes that you know there might be
something wrong Richard with going into opposing counsel's former home law office particularly
where the issue of whether or not service was correct so it appears that Hill was attempting to cover
that fact that by alleging that his client was the one who is going into the home however or rather the
right rather. That's incorrect bill does admit to going in the house and affidavit it in the police report
that officer Carter seems to mention that it was Marlys who was there the week prior to the arrest
noticing this somebody was going and him so it is likely that if it is odd and it might be in the state by
Carter but clearly on in the police report incidents that November 13 arrest and Hill's written
statement he knows that we represent property owner we evicted Coughlin the papers were posted by
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Washoe County Sheriff's Department on November 1 we have observed evidence that he was coming
going today we found him buried in the basement called Reno PD on that interesting that Hill
mentioned that he is the papers were posted rather than served bill does not use the legal term served
and that Kelly and his witness statement however that does not prevent error Reno Police Department
officer Chris Carter from getting loose with the definition of legal service and further in videos the
hell take of the arrest on November 13 which again curiously do not contain any video of the
moments where the police are going to the door where the thing Coughlin is barricaded then and
allegedly according to officer Carter and depending upon when you ask Hill according to Hill given
that in his declaration of November and him and him and him earn his declaration and him and him
and him and him and him and him and him and him and him and him and him and him and him him
him him him him him him and his declaration is due January 2012 a scant six weeks or so or or a over
two months after the arrest on November 13 for trespass Hill rather strike that that that the different
duration by Hill and his second motion for order to show cause of the more contemporaneous
separation by Hill is found him and him and him and him and his November 21, 2011 declaration
which obviously was extremely contemporaneous with the November 13, 2011 arrest and is way
more reliable than Richard Hill's coach dubbed crept of testimony at June 18, 2012 trespass trial of
Coughlin and the Reno media court in that November 21 declaration on page 2 a Bill right that .8
8.08. When the police arrived agreed with is that it was very likely with them is barricaded in the
basement lease had a person come out but without excess there is no mention that the police
announced that they were the police that Coughlin at that time prior to a wireless allegedly kicking
the door at on page 2 a .990. Nine. When the police declined to break down the door list Dr. relisted
so the police Liechtenstein discovered the defendant Zachary Coughlin was thought. 10. Coughlin
cannot peacefully went upstairs was placed under arrest but please for trespassing at particularly
curious and that there's nothing in this declaration by by Hill that suggested the police ever on and out
of the with police at any time Coughlin was in the basement and I goes to the elements of the trespass
criminal trespass charge which included failing to leave the premises where one does not have a
lawful right to be after being given a warning to do so five, the authority to do that there's nothing in
this declaration by Hill is extremely contemporaneous with the arrest and indicate that anyone of
color of law identify themselves as having color of law or that it even anyone with a with of a right to
tell Coughlin to leave the property told Coughlin only property prior to Coughlin deflation arrest for
the
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FACTS
1.When Coughlin was in the quasi-"basement" (it isn't a room fit for habitation or use under the
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Housing Code (only one exit, ceiling are about 5 feet high in most places, floor was dirt when
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Coughlin first rented it, but he fixed it up very nicely over time and it certainly looked like someone
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could have been living in there well prior to the eviction, but Judge Gardner ruled all that stuff about
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"using it as a residence" was irrelevant, except for the fact he mentioned it in his Order and Hazlett let
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it creep into his closing arguments....) there was not any voices calling to him (certainly the videos
filmed by Hill and Merliss, propounded to the City and the court appointed defenders who refused to
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subpoena Merliss despite Hill's and the RPD's obvious motive and bias...show that neither Hill nor
Merliss, as confirmed by Hill's Trial testiony, made any verbal incantations to Coughlin, but rather,
retreated upstairs to wait for the RPD...) prior to what was ultimately revealed to be the RPD arriving.
As shown with a lot more indicia of reliability than Hill's lie filled June 18th, 2012 sworn testimony at
trial, in his November 21st, 2011 Declaration, Hill fails to assert that the RPD "identified themselves
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as law enforcement" and issued a lawful order to emerge from the basement (which is not necessarily
lawful, even if they identify themselves as law enforcement, if they were not given the authority to
issue it by someone having such authority, and its not clearl that either Merliss or Hill did...).
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Regardless, the RPD definitely DID NOT "identify themselves as law enforcement" prior to Merliss
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kicking the door down. Rather, it is telling that in HIll's November 21st, 2011 Declaration he merely
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mentions the RPD attempting to (see this dissected in glorious detail in the attached Bar grievance)
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"coax Coughlin to emerge from the basement". And the RPD did just that. Only, they didn't identify
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themselves as law enforcement at any time prior to the door being kicked down. So, if you are
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Coughlin, and you have a real strong claim of right defense to any allegation of trespass, then just
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hearing some random voices "coaxing" him to talk to them like they are therapists or some other crap
21
like that is not tantamount to a "lawful order to emerge from the basement" or warning to leave the
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premises else be cited or arrested for criminal trespass. (Hill told Coughlin he was billing him the
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same $900 a month as when Coughlin was there under a lease allowing for "full use an occupancy";
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any eviction order was void for lack of jurisdiction, Coughlin was entitled to a stay Coughlin had yet
26
to receive back from the RJC the "rent escrow" $2,275 that Judge Sferrazza, on October 27t, 2011,
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announced would be held onto by the RJC as Coughlin's "bond on appeal" (meaning the supersedeas
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bond, as appeal bond's are set statutorily at $250 in such matters and supersedeas bond's are the ones
teh RJC typically makes in an amount worth "three month's rent" (ie, the RJC can't keep the money
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for the stay, and call it that, and deny the stay...its like calling it a summary eviction hearing, but
ruling on more than possession, then ruling Coughlin established a genuine issue of material fact and
noticing the October 27th, 2011 date as a "Trial" in writing (Baker says on the record in that case "the
use of the term "Trial" was unfortunate, Your Honor....", then ordering an impermissible rent escrow
deposit...not giving the 20 days to respond to a Complaint called for by JCRCP 109....basically giving
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HIll and Merliss all the benefits of the quick and easy summary eviction proceeding (Coughlin was
precluded from making counterclaims or bringing in third party defendants like Dickson Realty or
NV Energy or Green Action Lawn Service, etc), and Coughlin none of the procedural protections of a
13
plenary unlawful detainer, while also attempting to affor HIll and Merliss the benefits of a plenary
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unlawful detainer (awarding back rent, attorney's fees, landlord was able to bring a summary eviction
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proceeding against a commercial tenant based only on a No Cause Notice, verboten under NRS
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40.253...). Further, and this is shown on the videos Hill and Merliss filmed, the RPD at no time gave
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Coughlin a warning to leave where Coughlin could have heeded it and left, or otherwise been issue a
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citation in lieu of a custodial arrest. The RPD wanted to make the big rich landlord and attorney
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happy here, and neither the RPD (which was mad at Coughlin for filing a police misconduct
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complaint incident to the wrongful August 20th, 2011 arrest of Coughlin that ain't lookin' good for the
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State now that Coughlin got WCPD Jim Leslie booted from the case in RCR2011-063341) nor Hill or
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Merliss were going to be satisfied with just issuing Coughlin a "warning" to leave the premises, as
25
they figure Coughlin would just heed any such warning....The RPD and Merliss/HIll were all jacked
26
up on revenge powder and wanted Coughlin arrested. Dr. Merliss is practically frothing at the mouth
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(demanding "more eye contact!" from Coughlin in the video "Zach's arrest 0010" just before Dr.
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Merliss commits a crime in lying to the RPD in response to Coughlin's querying those there as to who
warned him against trespassing and when, whereupon Dr. Merliss lies in order to get Coughlin
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arrested, and Hill co-signs it:

Richard G. Hill, Esq. (opposing counsel in the civil eviction case from which this criminal trespass
trial stems) testified, under oath, that the Reno Police Department identified themselves as law
enforcement and issued a lawful order to leave prior to the RPD entering the door that Hill's client
Merliss kicked down after such identification and issuance of a lawful order or warning to leave the
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premises was issued by the RPD. Additionally, beyond the impermissible extent to which RMC D2
Judicial Assistant Lisa Wagner failed to file Coughlin's June 28th, 2012 Notice of Appeal (fax filing
allowable under RMC Rules, any Order by Judge Gardner to the contrary spoke to pre-trial Motions
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only), the Washoe County Detention Center impermissibly refused to timely file Coughin's additional
14
Notice of Appeal in a timely fashion while Coughlin was wrongfully incarcerated incident to a
15
wrongful arrest by the RPD, buttressed upon an impermissible bail increase (supported in Judge
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Gardner's rationale by a "public health and safety" rationale not providing a basis for bail under
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Nevada Law), at an unnoticed impromptu bail hearing on July 5th, 2012 wherein the RMC and court
19
appointed defender Keith Loomis, Esq. coerced from Coughlin an impermissible invasion of
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Coughlin's medical records under extremely coercive circumstances made worse by the fraud
21
committed upon the court by RPD Sargent Dye and Officer Weaver (the arrest in that matter 12 CR
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12420 was pretextual and fraudulent, and compounded by Sargent Oliver Miller and Officer Weaver
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subsequent misconduct incident to another Soldal v. Cook County violation on their part involving
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Coughlin and Superior Mini Storage in an RJC eviction matter stemming from police misconduct by
26
Miller and Weaver on or about September 22nd, 2012.
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There was an Order For Competency Evaluation by Judge Clifton in RCR2012-065630
entered February 27th, 2012, and the Order in CR12--0376 adjudging Coughlin competent and
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remanding jurisdiction back to the lower court was not entered until May 9th, 2012, yet Loomis and
Hazlett-Stevens persisted in seeking to ramrod the criminal trespass case in RMC 11 CR 26405
through...and both were well aware of the February 27th, 2012 Order for Competency Evaluation and
the import of NRS 178.405, requiring the suspension of all proceedings during the pendency of such
an Order, made applicabel via NRS 5.010 and the various rationale set forth in the attached materials.
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Further, the RMC failed to file the timely Notice of Appeal I submitted for filing on June 28th, 2012,
and which was served by delivering to the City Attorney's Office on June 27th, 2012 (timely within
10 days under NRS 189.010) resulting in the dismissal of the appeal. The fraud of the WCSO, RPD,
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City Attorney and others prevented Coughlin from having an appropriate chance to file as complete
14
and thorough a Motion for New Trial as he intended, including a wrongful arrest on June 28th, 2012,
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the WCDC denying Coughlin even a phone call for no reason for 20 hours, until after the RMC had
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closed on Friday, June 29th, 2012, and then another wrongful arrest on July 3rd, 2012 by the RPD,
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with an impermissibly bail increase by the same Judge William Gardner whom should have recused
19
himself from the June 18th, 2012 Trial in 11 CR 26405 in the RMC, violating of most provision
20
found in the NRS related to bail.
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Transcript of video taken by Hill and Merliss propounded to City Attorney: Zach's arrest
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RPD Officer Carter (Carter): Come on, get on up here, this is stupid. Come on, okay, well
bring your dog with you. (Carter and Sargent Lopez walk from the stairway to the
"basement", up the stairs through the back door of the house, through the kitchen, past
Hill, whom is filming with his handheld video camera, followed by Coughlin holding his
Pekingnese dog (featured in the December 2012 Nevada Lawyer Animal Law issue) where
a sitting landlord Merliss is on the couch in the living room, whereupon Coughlin is
directed to sit in the chair next to the couch and the police begin questioning Coughlin as
Hill joins them in the living room.
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Carter: Why are we going through all this headache? Huh? This is where you say
something!
Coughlin: What do you want to know?
Carter: Why are you still here?
Coughlin: I don't agree to be filmed, Rich.
Richard HIll (Hill): Nobody asked you.
Carter: Why are you still here?
Coughlin: I'll have to talk to my lawyer
Sargent Lopez: Do you have some place or body to take the dog?
Coughlin: Yeah.
Lopez: somebody we can call for the dog?
Coughlin: Why?
Lopez: Because, you are gonna probably go to go to jail.
Coughlin: Why? For what?
Lopez: Trespassing.
Coughlin: Where?
Carter: Here.
Lopez: Here, you have been evicted.
Coughlin: hhhhhmmnf.
Carter: hhhhmmmnf.
Hill: You also have breaking and entereing...
Carter:No...we have trespassing, that's all we have.
Coughlin: Well, if you feel I am trespassing, couldn't you just tell me to leave?
Carter: We tried....we actually feel that your are playing games...
Lopez: You were told not to come back....um, uh RETURN!, uh, um..and that's ,
that's ....when, um, you were told to leave and not to come back
Hill: I told you.
Coughlin: Who told me to leave?
Hill: Me.
Coughlin: When?
Merliss: We told you to leave, Zach! I deserve some eye contact, Zach!
Carter: You sittin' over there splittin' hairs? (to Coughlin).
Hill: We changed the locks!
Merliss: You sorry about all of this?
Coughlin: I am sorry that you are upset, Dr. Merliss.
Merliss: You are sorry, Zach? You know how much you have cost me, for nothing?
$20,000! You are going to be arrested!
Hill: You're gonna be arrested!
Coughlin: Excuse me, I'm sorry, I don't believe that they have established that I was
warned or served...
Carter: I don't believe that we need to establish that...we are not in court anymore! M'kay?
Coughlin: Well, you have to have probable cause to arrest me...
Carter: I do have probable cause to arrest you, and if you don't like it my name will be on
your arresting sheet..
Coughlin: I understand, sir.
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Carter: Okay, why don't you stand up and put your hands behind your back.
Lopez: What can we do with the dog (refering to Coughlin's dog, Jackson Pawluck).
Merliss: I have two dogs, Zach.
Coughlin: What are you talking about taking him back to Chico?
Merliss: Yeah.
Coughlin:I would rather just my family get the dogs.
Merliss: Okay, then call your family from jail! This isn't your dog's fault, Zach! You did
this! Your dog is not responsible for this!
Carter: (whispering in the background to Richard Hill while Merliss hold Coughlin's
Pekingnese dog in his hands, standing two feet from Coughlin's face) breaking and
entering is (unintelligible)
Hill: No, breaking and entering would be better because its a felony...
Carter: Look, Rich, come on...he's trespassing...
Hill: Alright, let's start with that...
Carter: That's all we have...
Hill: Well, you can't blame a guy for trying...I don't do any criminal work...
Sargent Lopez gets caught trying to play along with the lie that Merliss and Hill try to get
over, and all of this is reiterated by Carter's statement that "we actually feel that you are playing
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games"...which suggests that Merliss, Hill, and the RPD are playing a game of their own...And
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Carter's other statement to Coughlin ("you're sittin' over there splittin' hairs" certainly betrays the fact
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that Carter knows Coughlin has a point here, ie, that the RPD is making a very, very suspect arrest for
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trespassing where neither the RPD, nor Hill, nor Merliss told Coughlin to leave or warned him against
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a trespass charge at any time on that day, and that they only other "warnings" Hill or Merliss could
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possibly argue here relate to civil eviction notices that were not served appropriately, and that do no
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warn one against a criminal trespass charge (and Hazlett's reinterpretation of the October 27th, 2011
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Order attempts to mislead the court in his tortuous effort to make the language therein say something
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it simply does not) one where they want to arrest an attorney who has either angered them by
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complaining of police misconduct recently (Coughlin filed a complaint with the RPD on September
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7th, 2011, and more shortly thereafter) or by contesting a summarey eviction of a commercial tenant
where the non-payment of rent was not plead (for good reason, Merliss's case was really bad on
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retaliation, habitability issues, and all the set-offs or fix and deducts that had acrued, not to mention
the property damage caused by his negligence in agreeing to a weed maintenance arrangment with
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Coughlin (that Coughlin chose to address through articial grass coverings of the dirt lawn) while also,
apparently, agreeing to a deal with Green Action Lawn Care (which came to the law office and tore
up the articifical grass installation Coughlin had spent at least 3 days and hundreds of dollars
meticulously installing, and threw it in the street, then refused to put it back, all of which Merliss is
responsible for under paragraph 23 of the Standard Rental Agreement, which, by the way, allows for
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Coughlin's commercial use of the premises, and given the Hill failed to plead the non-payment of rent
(because there was advantages to proceeding that way, or so Hill thought) the whole summary
eviction order that Merliss had just apparently paid Hill $20,000 to procure was likely void in light of
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the fact that the RJC mixed too many plenary unlawful detainer hallmarks in favor of the landlrod
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into what it later remixed as a "summary eviction proceeding" sufficient to make void for lack of
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jurisdiction the October 25th, and October 27th, 2011 Orders, and further, the October 13th, 2011
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Order was void under NRS 40.253(6) to the extnet is purported to rule on more than possession (ie, it
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ordered a rent escrow deposit of the last $2,275 Coughlin had to his name, then held on to that, and
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proceeded to expect Coughlin to hire a team of movers and rent a u-Haul and pay for a new place, or
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at least storage, all within days of the conclusion of an exhausting six weeks of preparation for what
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was essentiall y an unlawful detainer Trial-lite, rather than a mere summary eviction proceeding.
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Additionally, Coughlin's filing of a notice of appeal on October 18th, 2011 divested the RJC of
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jurisdiction, even further making suspect the October 27th, 2011 Order Hill and Merliss so cling to.
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Add to that the fact that the "receipt" of the Order beyond the "within 24 hours" allowable under the
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statute, by the WCSO, in relation to the November 1, 2011 4:30 pm lockout (Baker testified to
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October 28th, 2011, though some clarification may be in order there (not that a relevancy objection
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wouldn't have been sustained by Judge Gardner anywhere that Coughlin sought to inquire into aspects
of civil landlord tenant law bearing on service, notice, constructive service, and void for lack of
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jurisdiction or claim of right issues (however, City Attorney Hazlett got the green light on anything he
wanted or needed to poach from civil eviction law during the criminal trespass trial, and even where
Coughlin's objection to Hazlett's tacky "you were living there" type questions was sustained, that
didn't prevent Judge Gardner from relying on the "you were living there" accusations in his order, nor
did it stop Hazlett from going there on closing argument, all misconduct requiring a new trial (and
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timeliness of the motions arguments are undone by the RPD and WCSO two frauduluent arrests of
Coughlin shortly after the June 18th, 2012 trial in RMC 11 CR 26405, compounded by a bail increase
by Judge Gardner that is just not supportable.
Further evidence of the fraud the RPD, Merliss and Hill were successful in perpetrating this
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wrongful arrest is Hill's statement: "we changed the locks!" in response to Coughlin querying him as
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to who warned him against a trespass charge and when? To the extent the RPD, Merliss and Hill then
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(in sworn testimony, Carter's Supplemental Declaration, and other materials, including Hill's
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November 21st, 2011 Declaration and Baker's Opposition to Motion to Contest Personal Property
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Lien that Declaration is an exhibit to) fraudulently assert that they identified themselves as law
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enforcement and issued a lawful order or warning to leave prior to the door being kicked down, they
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should face criminal prosecution. Its either them or, some might say, somebody else here should be
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facing some misconduct allegations...And please be sure to remember that Reno City Attorney
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Hazlett-Stevens had all these videos and still put on all that perjured testimony....And, a review of
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Coughlin's Motion to Dismiss and the Criminal Complaint signed by Hill reveal that the information
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in the Complaint does not support a probable cause analysis to satisfy Hazlett's RPC 3.8 duty, and
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should have been dismissed. There is no mention of an "warning" legally sufficient to support a
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criminal trespass prosecution. That Complaints rads "That said defendant on or about Nov. 13, 2011
in the City of Reno, State of Nevada at 121 River Rock st. the def. found on the properly after being
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evicted, all of which is a violation of 8.1 of the Reno Municipal Code. I therefore request that said
Defendant be dealt with according to law. I hereby declare upon information and belief under penalty
of perjury pursuant to NRS 171.102, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge". And it is signed by Richard Hill, Esq., oppossing counsel in a summary eviction matter
that was then on appeal in CV11-03628. Why didn't RPD Carter or Lopez sign it, especially if what
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Carter asserts in his unsworn Supplemental Declaration is true? Regardless, Carter nevers avers that
he issued Coughlin a warning to leave, and the City Attorney's certainly did not want Carter or Lopez
showing up to be cross-examined, for they would have been completely exposed. Upon information
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and belief, the licensed attorney had served on Carter and Lopez an attorney's subpoena, that was or
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should have been served upon them by Coughlin having it delivered to the front desk of the RPD
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downtown headquarters. Coughlin moved for a continuance upon their failure to show, and one
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should have been granted. Regardless, the fact that RPD Carter had Richard Hill sign the Complaint
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says it all... Carter and Lopez know they did not issue Coughlin as lawful order to leave, or provide
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Coughlin any such chance to heed such a warning, nor did they identify themselves as law
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enforcement prior to Merliss kicking the door down ("we think you are playing games" "you're
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splitting hairs over there" and the fact that these RPD knew they weren't on solid enough ground to be
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kicking anything down says it all). Further, Carter's probable cause sheet lies where it indicates
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"Defendant was found inside the house after being serve". Coughlin was "under" the house in an
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enclosure that never had a lock and that is not technically even a "basement" given the 5 foot ceiling
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and the fact that it has one exit door, and had a dirt floor before Coughlin laid a vapor barrier and
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carpet down there (there was a bed there, a nice Tempurpedic one for over a year, the whole things
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was decked out, and HIll admits as much, there was 14 luxury sedan 14 way power car seats,
Coughlin is a tinkerer patent attorney and its nobody's business what he collects, and he is no more a
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"hoarder" than Richard Hill with his fourteen Porsches). Further, upon information and belief,
prosecutorial misconduct was committed by the City failing to turn over exculpatory dispatch logs,
audio tapes of dispatch calls and 911/rpd calls by Hill and between teh officers and
dispatch/emergency services, particularly to the extent they shed light on Hill and Merliss' lies
regardin their having warned Coughlin to leave that day.
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Let's compare Hill's assertions in the video above, with his written witness statement in
the police report, and Hill's November 21st, 2012 Declaraton (attached to Baker's equally
suspect Opposition to Coughlin's Personal Property Lien of that date in RJC Rev2011-001708,
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and with Hill's January 14th, 2012 grievance letter against Coughlin to the SBN:
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-1/14/12 greivance against Coughlin in Letter to Patrick King, Esq. January 14, 2012 Page 3:
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"Someone had been in there since I had last been in several days before. Dr. Merliss discovered
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that the baselnent door was barricaded (not locked) fronl the inside. The Reno Police
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Department was summoned. They tried to coax whoever was in the basement out, without
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success. After Dr. Merliss had to kick the door down, it "vas discovered that Mr. Coughlin had
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broken in and was in the basement. He was arrested and is presently facing criminal trespass
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charges in Reno Municipal Court. See case no. 11 CR 26405 21."
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Transcript of video: Zach's arrest 011.mp4:

Carter: (continuing his conversation with Hill) Rich, when and where was he served the
paperwork?
Hill: Um...on November 1st, I believe...
Coughlin: Where was I served?
Hill: They put it on the front door because you ran away (odd, given Baker testified Hill
was not there on November 1st with the WCSO Deputies conducting the lockout, and
Coughlin was at the Washoe County Law Library)
Carter: The paper was left on the 1st?
Coughlin: Sir, Officer, I don't believe you've established that I was served...
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Carter: That doesn't matter.

Coughlin: Or that I received any Lockout Order.
Hill: (chortle, chortle) Note taken.
Carter: So, October 1st, you believe?
Hill: No, November 1st.
Coughlin: By who?
Hill: Washoe County Sheriff...
Coughlin: Was it in person?
Lopez; It doesn't need to be in person, actually...
Hill: You knew you were evicted! You were in Court!. You heard what the Judge said!
Carter: They just tape this stuff to the front door...
Hill: And you took it down off the front door!
Carter: Allegedly...
Coughlin: I am not corroberating anything you are accusing me of.
Hill: That's fine,
Carter you don't need to....When was he supposed to be out?
Hill: by the 1st...(at this point Dr. Merliss takes the video camera from Rich and starts
doing some weird zoom in close up camera work of Coughli's wrists and hands in
handcuffs, with an inescapable homeoerotic bondage type physician control freak air to it
all)
Carter: (to Hill) come on, we'll do that in the car....
Carter: Hey, Rich, do you have his social security number?
Hill: Yeah, out in my car. (Coughlin then makes a phone call by having Sargent Lopez
hold a phone up to his head, trying to arrange for someone to care for his dog)
Merliss: You need to call her, Zach, about the dog!
Coughlin: You aren't an Officer, are you Dr. Merliss?
Merliss: I am not going to take care of your dog?
Coughlin: (to Carter) its kind of disrespectful for him to be jumping in where an officer...
Carter: Well it's disrespectful for you to be here. You are not the victim, here!
Hill: Ha!
But, actually, the United States Supreme Court, in Soldal v. Cook County, might beg to differ
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with Judge Carter's analysis...Russell v. Kalian, 414 A.2d 462 R.I.,1980 Where execution, which
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was issued on May 23, specified that it was valid for 20 days, landlord and constable acted
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unlawfully in evicting tenant on the execution on June 13, and landlord and constable had
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thereby subjected themselves to liability for trespass.State v. Fanger, 665 A.2d 36 Vt.,1995 There
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was sufficient evidence to prove that defendant, an apartment manager, entered tenant's residence
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knowing he was not licensed or privileged to do so to sustain trespass conviction, although defendant
stated he entered tenant's residence to make sure heat was on, given tenant's testimony that
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defendant's only acts with respect to the heat was to disconnect the heat, defendant made clear he was
there to evict tenant, and defendant pushed open door while tenant was attempting to keep it shut,
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knocking over her child in the process.

And it is in Officer Carter's Supplemental Declaraton where his lying really shines through,
especially after viewing the videos filmed by Merliss and Hill, which form a nice counterpoint to the
remixed chronology of events and statements (with a tough of just flat out imagining things by
Carter) found in that writing of Carters, which reads in relevant part: "Matthew has been to the house
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several times over the past week and has observed evidence of someone coming and going. Today he
was at the house and found the basement door to be locked from inside. Matthew contacted Richard
who responded and called the police. Sgt Lopez and I knocked on the basement door and announced
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loudly "Reno Police" and called out for Zachary to open the door. We were met with no response.
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Matthew decided he would kick the door open, and did so. I entered the doorway of the basement and
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found Zachary standing at the rear of the room holding a small dog. He was hesitant to come out and
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eventually did so. Zachary came upstairs and instantly started arguing his legal standing in the house,
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asking me "hypothetically speaking" type questions. He then told me I was making a false arrest due
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to the fact that I am on Richard Hill's payroll and he was going to sue me. I tried to explain to Zachary
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that he was served eviction papers and he asked me what I could do about it if he hypothetically didn't
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get them. He then told me that he had worked a deal with Matthew to continue paying rent and that
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the legal eviction was no longer valid. I again tried to explain to Zachary that a judge had signed an
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order forcing him to leave the property and all he did was cite civil case law to me (I'm unsure if any
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of the cases he was rambling on about even exist) and tell me that I was making a bad arrest. Due to
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Zachary not believing he has done anything wrong that the fact he believes he still has standing there
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is reasonable grounds to believe Zachary will return to the house. Therefore he did not qualify for a
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misdemeanor citation. Richard completed a statement on Matthews' behalf and signed a criminal
complaint."
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State v. Lovins, 2009 WL 4723392, City Attorney Hazlett managed to find just about the only
one case in American jurisprudence that found an evicted tenant guilty of trespass, but that case is
inapplicable to this one, becuase in the instant case, no express indication exists in the record that
tenant was "told not to return to the property", which was a requirement in Lovins, and where the
City's citation and Judge Gardner's reliance thereupon is predicated upon more than mere service or
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"constructive service" (and while Judge Gardner's Order specifically found Coughlin had
"constructive service" of the eviction order, and, apparently, therefore, sufficient warning to support
a criminal trespass charged (despite Judge Gardner ruling irrelevant Coughlin's evidence, testimony,
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and legal argument directed to just what rules apply in order to figure out if one has been
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"constructively served" an eviction order in Nevada in light of AB226, the testimony before the
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Committee on the Judiciary on March 31st, 2011, etc., etc. and the dicates of NRS 40.400, NRCP
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6(e), and NRCP 5(b)(2) vis a vis NRS 40.253(5). Tenn.Crim.App.,2009 Sufficient evidence
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supported defendant's conviction for criminal trespass. The evidence showed that defendant worked
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and lived on the homeowner's farm property. The homeowner's termination of defendant and
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subsequent eviction notice ordering him off the property indicated that the homeowner's did not want
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the defendant on their property. Defendant indicated he knew that he was not welcome on the
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property. Thus, when the defendant repeatedly drove onto the homeowner's property yelling at them,
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he had already been expressly told not to return to the property. State v. Lovins, 2009 WL 4723392.
But any timeliness arguments are further undone by the newly discovered evidence
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aspect, and here is one part of it. RPD Officer Travis Warren was there in January 2012 at a
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RPD response to Coughlin's 911 call regarding domestic violence against him by his then
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housemates on E. 9th St.. Warren was there to witness Coughlin video record Lopez and goad
her into admitting that the RPD neither identified themselves as law enforcement or issued
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Coughlin a lawful warning or order to leave. And Sargent Lopez has some integrity, so it is and
was difficult for her to play along with Hill and Merliss' fraudulent non-sense. But, add on to
the the fact that Coughlin only just discovered this weekend that RPD Warren and another
officer, and two social worker types met secretly with Coughlin's father, local family
practionern at Coughlin's medical practice's office at some point in the last six months or so.
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This likely violates Palmer v. Pioneer, and further underscores the impermissible conflicts that
exist here, made worse by the violations of NRS 178.405 where convenient for various parties
involved here. Further, Dr. Coughlin is Reno City Attorney John Kadlic's longtime personal
13
physician and Dr. Coughlin (known as "the Judge Whisperer" in some circles for being
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involved in interventions with numerous local judges over the last 25 years(in addition to his
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work with the Impaired Physicians Committee and other diversion programs) has in the past
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demonstrated a complete and utter incapability to grasp the concept of boundaries when it
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comes to his son, Zach Coughlin, calling up Deans of law schools (Coughlin was deposed by the
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State Bar of California regarding an ill advised call by Dr. Coughlin to then Dean of UNLV"s
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Boyd School of Law, Richard Morgan, in 2007), State Bars, etc., etc., and offering his various
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contradictory diagnosis, all of which tend to border on Munchausen by Proxy at times (a slight
22
exaggeration, perhaps), though he is a wonderful father otherwise, and a very good man,
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however, he is, like all doctors, deeply jealous of any lawyer and wishing he could be one, as is,
25
apparently, Dr. Merliss (who tried to take over Judge Sferrazza's court room with an
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impromptu cross examination of Coughlin while Merliss was on the witness stand). And,
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needless to say, they are both complete and utter control freaks of the highest order. Dr.
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Coughlin married the daughter of the neurosurgeon in Morelli v. Morelli (Dr. Coughlin's sister
in law is a lawyer who sued her physician father, and that published opinion is oft cited for
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some third party beneficiary point of law incident to marital settlement agreements in Nevada).
So, adding up the behind the scenes sabotage of Coughlin's life, his ability to defend in this
matter (or even get to trial with the video exhibits or proof of subpoenaing the various material
witness (Merliss, Sargent Lopez, Officer Carter, the latter two being under supboena by the
City of Reno and therefore, Coughlin arguably deserved a continuance in response to his
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request given their failure to appear, to the extent Coughlin's attempts at subpoenaing them did
not technically comply with applicable rules (which Coughlin si not even sure of given the
arrest, bail, withhold medications, violat Soldal v. Cook Co., get no love from the Justice Court,
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rinse and repeat Washoe County and the City of Reno, WCSO, RPD, RMC, RJC, City
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Attorney's Office, SBN, Richard Hill, and WCDA Office have had Coughlin on in the last 14
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months or so....
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Regardless, justice dictates at least a hearing on this Motion for New Trial, and or to
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Vacate Judgement, or Arrest Judgment, etc... RPD Officer Carter, Sargent Lopez, Officer
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Warren and a few others (Officer Weaver, Sargent Dye, Sargent Miller) need to answer some
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question, under oath...and Richard Hill and Casey Baker have a lot of 'splainin' to do...and add
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to that Dr. Merliss. Otherwise...Some of the "peculiarities" attendant to this and other trials
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involving Coughlin in the RMC shall, perhaps, get a bit more retrospection...
Bagwell v. Jamison, 25 S.C.L. 249, S.C.App.L.,1840 In trespass against a bailiff, for
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levying under a distress warrant alleged to be void, defendant justified by plaintiff's admissions
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that rent was due. Acknowledgments by the landlord, deceased, of partial satisfaction, were
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admitted in reply. State v. Riddell, 21 P.3d 128 Or.App.,2001 In prosecution for criminal
trespass in the second degree, defendant should have been allowed to attack underlying
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exclusion order that precluded him from appearing in courthouse square, which defendant
contended was invalid on ground that it prohibited his constitutionally protected activity of
expressive freeze modeling in a public area. Hayes v. State, 79 S.E. 761 Ga.App.,1913 A
tenant who in good faith claims possession of land under a bona fide claimant of title and right
of possession cannot be convicted of trespass. O'Banion v. Com., 519 S.E.2d 817 Va.App.,1999
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The statutory offense of criminal trespass requires a willful trespass; thus, one who enters or
stays upon another's land under a bona fide claim of right cannot be convicted of
trespass.O'Banion v. Com., 519 S.E.2d 817 Va.App.,1999 A bona fide claim of right, which
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may serve as a defense to a trespass charge, is a sincere, although perhaps mistaken, good faith
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belief that one has some legal right to be on the property; the claim need not be one of title or
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ownership, but it must rise to the level of authorization.
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The proposed amendment was not the type of an amendment which should have been
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allowed under Section 157 of the Justice Court Act. A summary proceeding is a statutory
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remedy and the petition must be strictly construed. The service of a proper notice against a
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tenant holding over, is a jurisdictional fact, which must be properly *805 pleaded and proved. If
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the notice is defective or insufficient, the proceeding falls. The notice cannot be amended upon
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the trial and no facts can be included as a jurisdictional ground for the proceeding, which are
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not included in the original notice. Under the Emergency Housing Rent Control Law Section
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8585 of the Unconsolidated Laws as amended by the Laws of 1951 and the regulations of the
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Temporary State Housing Rent Commission thereunder, the facts constituting the nuisance are
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additional requirements of a notice to a tenant holding over. The facts upon which the landlord
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bases his claim of nuisance, are jurisdictional and a summary proceeding cannot be successfully
maintained without full compliance with the statute. A jurisdictional defect cannot be cured by
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amendment. Ferber v. Apfel, 113 App.Div. 720, 99 N.Y.S. 215. If the judgment in this case
rested upon a verdict of a jury, I would consider the reception of the evidence of loud and
profane language by the tenants and the submission of that issue to a jury under the present
circumstances, reversible error. However, the Trial Court, in his decision finds, that the tenants
maintained a clothesline approximately five feet from the ground across the rear of the
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premises in such a position that it was hazardous and dangerous to the landlords and to the
members of his family who were obliged to pass this clothesline in walking from the garage to
the rear entrance of the portion of the premises occupied by the landlords. He also finds, that
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the tenants persisted in maintaining the clothesline in this location contrary to the wishes of the
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landlords. In his decision, the Trial Court calls attention to the... N.Y.Co.Ct. 1952 Blozevich v.
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Tasber 116 N.Y.S.2d 801
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Tenant's failure to raise notice issue in his initial dismissal motion or to plead it with
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specificity in his answer did not relieve landlord of its trial burden to establish compliance with
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statutory requirements for notice to cure in summary eviction
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proceeding.N.Y.Sup.App.Term,2006. W 54-7 LLC v. Schick 14 Misc.3d 49, 829 N.Y.S.2d 399,
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2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 26499
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Is was reversible error to rule as irrelevant Coughlin's materials on a "claim of right"
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defense: License from the owner to access the premises, within meaning of statutory affirmative
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defense against prosecution for criminal trespass, is satisfied by showing license from any
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owner or other person authorized to license access to the premises. West's Neb.Rev.St. 28
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522. State v. McCave, 282 Neb. 500, 805 N.W.2d 290 (2011). Further, see NRS 40.760 and
108.475.
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At the time of Coughlin's arrest, he was a licensed attorney. It would not be reasonable
to expect one to litigate, basically, a plenary unlawful detainer Trial (remixed and
recharacterized as a summarey eviction proceeding over half way through) then expect them to
move out practially overnight, and expect a USPS change of address to adequately allay any
concerns about that attorney's mail being forward in time to avoid any damage to his client's
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cases. It is unreasonable to suggest that the RPD can then tackle some attorney stepping foot on
the property to get his mail. And where Judge Garner ruled all the nonsense about pajamas
(don't look like pajamas in the videos to me, Chris, or Rich) and slippers and "you were living
13
there (in a civil pleading HIll admits that the stuff in the basement was probably there well
14
before the eviction, then HIll goes on to ponder about Coughlin preferring to "spider hole"
15
himself in the basement, even prior to the eviction...Hill has continually demeaned Coughlin
16
throughout these matters and caused his client to needlessly incur fees).
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Further, Judge Gardner's Order of Conviction was so thin, he almost immediately
19
started to reach for guidance given by the legistlature or city counsel of something regarding
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posting at intervals of this or that...there was zero testimony or evidence about the posting of no
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trespassing signs...and zero testimony or citation to the effect that post an eviction notice is
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tantamount to posting a no trespassing sign. They are legally distinct.
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VIOLATIONS OF NRS 178.405 AND NRS 5.010 BY RENO CITY ATTORNEY AND
WASHOE COUNTY PROSECUTORS AND RMC AND WCPD COURT APPOINTED
DEFENDERS
September 8th, 2011 Order for Competency Evaluation by Judge Schroeder in RCR2011063341
September 9th, 2011: Coughlin arrested at Wal-Mart in RMC 11 CR 22176 for petty larceny
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October 10th, 2011: Coughlin arraigned in RMC 11 CR 22176 for petty larceny charge
October 26th, 2011 (or a short time after depending upon entry of order) Judge Sferrazza
declares Coughlin competent in RCR2011-063341
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February 27th, 2012: file stamped at 1:31pm in RCR2012-065630 Judge Clifton signs an Order
for Competency evaluation of Coughlin
-February 27th, 2012: despite being present at the "clandestine status conference" (Dogan's client
Coughlin was noticed, in writing, that it had been reset to March 29th, 2012) DDA Young filed an
Opposition to Motion to Continue Trial Date and Motion to Appoint Co-Counsel on 2/27/12 at 2:55
pm in a companion case that he was also prosecuting, RCR2011-063341 in violation of NRS 178.405.
In her March 13th, 2012 grievance against Coughlin, Judge Nash Holmes admits to communications
in this regard between her and the Washoe County Public Defender's Office.
-February 27th, 2012: At 3:00 pm, despite the communications she admits to with the WCPD, Judge
Nash Holmes holds a trial where Coughlin is forced to appear as an indigent criminal defendant
proceeding with self representation in 11 TR 26800, which is suspened upon Judge Nash Holmes
finding Coughlin in "summary criminal contempt" seconds after he testifies that RPD Sargetn Tarter
lied in connection with a retaliatory traffic citations incident to Tarter telling Coughlin to leave the
law office of Richard G. Hill, Esq. on November 15th, 2012 after Coughlin was released from 3 days
in jail incident to a criminal trespass custodial arrest upon Hill lying to officers and signing a criminal
complaint in 11 CR 26405 for criminal trespass on November 13th, 2012. Tarter ordered Coughlin to
leave after Hill refused to give Coughlin his state issued drivers license or identification, his hard
drives/client's files, his keys, or his wallet.
-Judge Nash Holmes proceeds to file numerous Orders
-March 5th, 2012: in RMC 11 CR 26405, the criminal trespass case from Coughlin's former home law
office the Certified Copy of Docket done by the Judicial Assistant, D2's Lisa Wagner, who couldn't
quite seem to find or remember the fact that Coughlin faxed in a Notice of Appeal on June 28th,
2012, and her failure to docket that led to the dismissal of Coughlin's appeal in CR12-1262, despite
Coughlin having electronic confirmation of receipt of that fax delivering his Notice of Appeal to the
RMC and to City Attorney Hazlett-Stevens (whom coyly tries to assert he didn't get it or the paper
copy Coughlin personally delivered to the offices of the City Attorney within the 10 days set forth in
NRS 189.010) Trial date set for April 10, 2012 by Court.
-05 March 2012: Notice Of Appearace As Co-Counsel And Motion To Dismiss filed defendant. 20
March 2012: Order #1 denying defendant's motion filed 13,February 2012 signed Judge William
Gardner. RMC 11 CR 26405
-21 March 2012: Order #2 denying defendant's motion filed 5, March 2012 signed by Judge William
Gardner. RMC 11 CR 26405
-21 March 2012: Motion To Strike Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Complaint filed by Deputy City
Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens. RMC 11 CR 26405
-10 April 2012: Defendant appeared for trial with counsel Keith Loomis, Judge William Gardner
presiding. Present on behalf of the City was Christopher Hazlett-Stevens. Several pre-trial motions
were heard. An Order Suspending Proceedings was signed. All proceedings suspended until the
question of competence is determined. Case Status Hearing scheduled for 8, May 2012. RMC 11 CR
26405. See attached emails demonstrating the knowledge of and complicity between the Washoe
County Public Defenders, the court appointed Reno Municipal Court defenders, the City of Reno
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Prosecutors, Washoe County District Attorney's Office, RMC, RJC, and both court's filing office's
staff and administrators respecting the existence of these Orders for Competency Evaluation and the
brazen violation of NRS 178.405 and NRs 5.010 by these individuals. Further, on April 19th, 2012,
DDA Young again violated NRS 178.405 where he moved to have Coughlin remanded to custody
(whereupon Coughlin could again have his medication suddenly withheld from him, all while RMC
Judge Nash Holmes seeks to leverage jail staff to get Coughlin to sign some waiver of his medical
records privacy rights and where WCPD Biray Dogan announces confidential HIPAA protected
medical information relating to his client Coughlin into the public record, in front of 40 members of
the public gathered in D10, a transgression which WCPD Jeremy Bosler later refused to seek to
ameliorate or strike from the record in any manner whatsoever).
-May 7th, 2012 in RCR2011-063341 WCPD Goodnight and DDA Young violate NRS 178.405 by
attempting TO HOLD A TRIAL in that matter during the pendency of an Order for Competency
directored towards Goodnight's client, Coughlin. Goodnight manages to jam Coughlin into an illadvised Mental Health Court sign-up in MH12-0032, which ends badly when the MHC's Reno
Biondo commits fraud in asserting that Coughlin was removed from the MHC for "failing to
following MHC policies" similar to the arguments put forth by Sharon Dollarhide, despite the MHC,
and perhaps Goodnight too, having given Coughlin a list of medications it prohibits, and a contract
for entry into the MCH, after having informed Coughlin he was accepted into the MCH upon entering
the contract. The MCH subsequently threatened Coughlin with incarceration for taking a medication
is only after the fact objected to, then, upon having the bargained for consieration, offer and
acceptance pointed out to it, the MCH lied and disparaged Coughlin to the RJC and others, causing
Coughlin reputational damage, and Coughlin's case was remanded to the RJC at a later date. During
this period of time, D10 Judge Elliot forced Coughlin back into custody at the WCDC, where
Coughlin has been denied his medication every single one of his 10 trips to jail this year, with no
titration down of dosing whatsoever, even where Coughlin was willing and able to arrange for
delivery of the medication at his own expense, etc.
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-08 May 2012: Case Status hearing held before Judge William Gardner. Present on behalf of the City
was Deputy City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, for the defense Keith Loomis and defendant
Zachary Coughlin. Defendant was found to be competent. Defendant's motion to remove Keith
Loomis as counsel granted. Trial date set by the court for June 18,2012. RMC 11 CR 26405.
Strangely, despite Coughlin still being subject to an as yet to be ruled upon Order For
Competency evaluation and despite Coughlin having just the previous day been accepted into
Mental Health Court and the RJC case RCR2011-063341 transferred there, RMC Judge
William Gardner jammed Coughlin both into proceeding without the Sixth Amendment Right
To Counsel and into some trial setting, even though NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010 forbids it, and
even though Judge Gardner admitted to being aware of Judge Nash Holmes, his fellow RMC
Judge, seeking to have Coughlin's law license taken away based upon a SCR 117 Disability
Petition (Judge Nash Holmes, in her March 14th, 2012 letter/grievance to the State Bar of
Nevada, wherein she purports to speak for Judge William Gardner and managed to pass on to
the SBN the April 2009 Order For Sanctions by Judge William Gardner's sister Family Court
Judge Linda Gardner, that Judge William Gardner passed to Judge Nash Holmes after
receiving from his sister sometime in the first quarter of 2012). Incidentally, Coughlin was
previously a domestic violence attorney at Washoe Legal Services until Family Court Judge
Linda Gardner's April 2009 Order sanctioning Coughlin $1,000 personally for the arguments
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he made in representing a domestic violence victim in a divorce trial were cited by WLS
Executive Director Paul Elcano as the "sole reason" for Coughlin being fired. Coughlin filed a
Petition for Writ of Mandamus in respone to that Order with the Nevada Supreme Court in
54844. Coughlin filed a Notice of Appeal of the dismissal for insufficient service of process of
his wrongful termination case against Washoe Legal Services on February 27th, 2012, and that
matter is currently on appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court in 60302. Oh, and Reno City
Attorney John Kadlic is a patient of Zach Coughlin's father, Dr. Timothy Coughlin, and the
City of Reno and or the RPD have sought to pressure Coughlin's parents into having him
"committed", despite the fact that the numerous (about 8-10 ish) wrongful arrests Coughlin has
been subjected to this year (most of which violate Soldal v. Cook County and have been
captured on video tape, amazingly) all kind of give Mr. Kadlic a bit motivation to quiet and or
discredit Coughlin (and and arrest on June 28th, 2012 by the WCSO and various instances this year
where fraudulent Affidavits of Service by the WCSO have been involved in arrests of Coughlin give
the WCDA Office its own motivations).
Given that this trial setting and denial of Coughlin's Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel occurred
during the pendency of an Order for Competency Evaluation of Coughlin that the RMC, Judge
William Gardner, court appointed defender Keith Loomis, Esq. and City Attorney's Christopher
Hazlett-Stevens, Esq. were well aware of, the following are void: O5 June 2012: Notice Of
Appearance As Counsel ; Motion To Dismiss; Motion To Suppress; Motion For A Continuance Of
Trial And Transfer To Mental Health Court filed by defendant. 18 June 2012: Defendant appeared for
trial pro-per, Judge William Gardner presiding. Present on behalf of the City was Christopher HazlettStevens. Several pre-trial motions were heard. Motion to Continue filed by defendant denied. Motion
to Dismiss filed by defendant denied. Motion to Suppress denied. Motion to Recuse denied. Motion
to Transfer to Mental Health Court denied. Case tried on its merits and the Defendant was found
guilty of the charge of Trespass, a violation of R.M.C 08.10.010. .."'Y25'2012 The Defendant was
sentenced as follows: Trespass, a violation of R.M.C 08.10.0 10. : Time Served (3 days at usual $100
a day, and a $310.00 fine for a total of $610 raked in by the RMC on a first offense trespass charge
where typically the fine is $305. Also, Richard G. Hill, Esq. lied under oath at that June 18th, 2012
criminal trespass Trial where he testified that the RPD identified themselves as law enforcement and
issued a lawful order or warning for Coughlin to leave the premises prior to the landlord kicking
down a door to a quasi "basement" under the former law office. The videos of the arrest filmed by
Hill demonstrate that Coughlin was never given an opportunity to heed any warning to leave given
that day prior to a custodial arrest being effectuated, contrary to the Supplemental Declaration by
RPD Officer Chris Carter, Jr. RPD Sargent Marcia Lopez subsequently admitted that the RPD neither
identified themselves as law enforcement nor issued a lawful order to emerge from the basement prior
to landlord Merliss kicking down the basement door on November 13th, 2012. WCSO Civil
Supervisor Liz Stuchell has admitted in an email to Coughlin that Deputy Machen's November 7th,
2011 Affidavit of Service swearing to have "personally served" the RJC REV2011-001708 Summary
Eviction Order on November 1st, 2011 was "incorrect" in that to Machen "personally served" means
"posting it to the door when no one is home. However, given NRS 40.400 makes applicable NRCP
5(b)(2) and 6(e) to summary evictions (even those that are noticed by the RJC, in writing, as a "Trial"
and even where, at the October 13th, 2011 "summary eviction proceeding" the RJC ruled that
Coughlin "had met his burden of establishing there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning his
retaliatory eviction defense" and the matter was then "set for trial on October 25th, 2011 provided
Coughlin deposits $2,275 into the court's rent escrow account", all of which violates JCRCP Rule 109
and NRS 40.253(6)) the lockout Deputy Machen oversaw on November 1st, 2011 was based upon a
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void Eviction Order and Decision of October 25th, 2011 and an October 27th, 2011 Findings of
Fact...that Hill's associate Baker testified as to having apparently provided receipt thereof to the
WCSO on October 28th, 2011, and which RJC Chief Civil Clerk Karen Stancil indicates were
transmitted to the WCSO via fax according to the usual custom and practice of the RJC...meaning, the
WCSO failed to effectuate a lockout "within 24 hours" of "receipt" of either of those
Orders...meaning Hill and Merliss were trespassing on November 13th, 2011, not Coughlin, and they
brought the RPD along for the ride, whereupon the RPD effected a wrongful arrest (based upon lies
by neurologist Merliss and his attorney Hill to the effect that they warned Coughlin to leave that day
prior to the RPD showing up, which is clearly show to be false by the videos filmed by Hill and
Merliss themselves and Hill's subsequent testimony at the June 18th, 2012 criminal trespass trial in 11
CR 26405).
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May 9th, 2012: Order finding Coughlin competent in CR12-0376, by Judge Elliot of
Department 10 resolving the February 27th, 2012 Order for Competency Evaluation signed by
RJC Judge Clifton and file stamped at 1:31 pm on that date.
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September 5th, 2012: Order for Competency Evaluation of Coughlin by Judge Sferrazza in
RCR2011-063341
October 2, 2012: WCPD Leslie and Dogan and DDA Young violate NRS 178.405 by swapping the
October 15th, 2012 Trial continuation/Competency Hearing Date in RCR2011-063341 with
RCR2012-065630, and setting/stipulating to a new hearing on October 22nd, 2012, and resetting the
Trial date to November 19th, 2012, but not before attempting to cram RCR2012-067980 onto the
calendar with RCR2012-063341 for October 22nd, 2012 (and Leslie and Dogan lied to Coughlin
about whether "mandatory status conference" was held on August 6th, 2012 in RCR2012-065630,
and RCR2012-067980, the latter at which Leslie set a Trial date of September 18th, 2012 despite his
legal assistant Linda Gray admitting to Coughlin that Coughlin was provided no notice whatsoever of
the August 6th, 2012 hearing date in those cases. Also, Dogan and Leslie again violated NRS
178.405 on October 2nd, 2012 where tehy reset for October 30th, 2012 a Motion Hearing on DDA
Young's impermissible Motion to Amend the Complaint in RCR2012-065630 (six months after the
arrest, no specific facts pled in either to support either charge, really). Further, Dogan failed to alert
Coughlin in any way to the fact that, in his July 31st, 2012 Motion to Amend Criminal Complaint,
DDA Young attempted to, in violation of RPC 3.8, amend the "misue of emergency services" charge
(where Coughlin is accused of using 911 to report police misconduct) to a charge that would provide
the District Attorney more leverage against Coughlin, a retaliatory prosecution, for a crime that would
damage Coughlin's law license given the import of SCR 111(6), despite DDA Young lacking
probable cause to so amend his charge. Dogan and Young previously conspired to retaliate against
Coughlin incident to their "clandestine status conference" of February 27th, 2012, which just so
happened to be the date that Coughlin filed a Notice of Appeal in his case against Washoe Legal
Services 60302 and the date that Judge William Gardner transferred jurisdiction from RMC D1 Judge
Dilworth to RMC D3 Judge Nash Holmes in 12 CR 000696, a case where Coughlin was subject to a
custodial arrest for jaywalkign on January 12th, 2012 incident to Coughli's peacefully filming Richard
G. Hill, Esq.'s contractor's crew from a public sidewalk, disposing of property left at Coughlin's
former home law office due to Hill locking a gate thereto during the time Coughlin was afforded to
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remove such property and where Hill had boarded up on of the entrances to the property as well, in
addition to remove the only ladder to the upstairs attic/storage space at the property. On February
27th, 2012 in 11 TR 26800 Judge Nash Holmes told Coughlin she would have him thrown in jail if he
mentioned Richard G. Hill's name one more time. On January 31st, 2012, at an extension hearing on
the TPO Richard Hill received against Coughlinf or Coughlin's alleged jaywalking on January 12th,
2012, RJC Judge Schroeder roared at Coughlin "do you want to go to jail!" when Coughlin broached
the subject of Hill's abuse of process. Judge Schroeder is listed in the RJC docket as presiding over
the February 27th, 2012 "clandestine status conference" that ultimately resulted in Judge Clifton
signing the Order for Competency Evaluation. It is unclear if any actual hearing before a judge even
took place that day, however.
LAW AND ARGUMENT
NEW TRIAL OR MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT: NRS 176.515 ARREST OF
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JUDGMENT NRS 176.525 Arrest of judgment: NRS 176.565 Clerical mistakes. Clerical
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mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the record arising from
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oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as
the court orders. The RMC failed to file Coughlin June 28th, 2012 Notice of Appeal, and that
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resulted in the appeal cr12-1262 being dismissed. NRS 178.589 Use of facsimile machine. The Reno
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Municipal Court has sought to apply rules to Coughlin it does not apply to others, even where NRS
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178.608 and NRS 178.610 forbid it from doing so. Further, Coughlin's rights to file the best Motion
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for New Trial that he could and to ensure that the RMC did in fact file his June 28th, 2012 Notice of
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Appeal were prejudiced by an impermissibly bail increase by Judge Gardner, unnoticed (Coughlin did
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not have an attorney of record at the time and was not appropriately noticed as to the July 5th, 2012
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impromptu bail hearing at which the RPD committed fraud, and further, the "safety of other persons
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and of the community" argument does not accord the RPD the right to violate Soldal v. Cook County.
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NRS 178.498 Amount. If the defendant is admitted to bail, the bail must be set at an amount which in
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the judgment of the magistrate will reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant and the safety
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of other persons and of the community, ...having regard to: 1. The nature and circumstances of the
offense charged; 2. The financial ability of the defendant to give bail; 3. The character of the
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defendant; and 4. The factors listed in NRS 178.4853. NRS 178.499 Increase in amount. 1. At any
time after a district or Justice Court has ordered bail to be set at a specific amount, and before
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acquittal or conviction, the court may upon its own motion or upon motion of the district attorney and
after notice to the defendants attorney of record or, if none, to the defendant, increase the amount of
bail for good cause shown. 2. If the defendant has been released on bail before the time when the
motion to increase bail is granted, the defendant shall either return to custody or give the additional
amount of bail A 2012 published and publicly disseminated Reno Municipal Court Bail Schedule
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indicates criminal trespass under teh RMC 8.10.010 Trespassing carries a fine of $ 305. Coughlin's
first offense criminal trespass charge incident to a civil eviction was fined $610 by Judge William
Gardner, twice the normal amount, considering the three days of incarceration Coughlin served
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(typically credited at $100 a day) and the $310 "fine" that Judge Gardner kept from Coughlin's cash
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bail for the RMC. Another indication of the impropriety of failing to recuse himself.
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Further, Loomis and Puentes deprived me of my right to supboena witnesses to defend myself
in RMC 11 CR 26405, a criminal trespass matter resulting in a criminal trespass conviction on June
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18th, 2012, which I reported to Bar Counsel in compliance with SCR 111. SBN Bar Counsel King
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has the audio from two of the pre-trial hearings and I am attaching the audio of the trial or linking to it
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herein. It demonstrates the fact that Dr. Merliss was a percipient, material eye witness (in fact Dr.
Merliss lied to the RPD in effectuating this wrongful arrest, and Sargent Marcia Lopez has admitted
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to me, contrary to RPD Officer Chris Carter's police report and Richard Hill's June 18th, 2012 sworn
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testimony and Casey Baker, Esq's (whom was not even there on November 13th, 2011) NRCP Rule
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11 violating (given he possessed the video's taken by Dr. Merliss and his supervisory attorney,
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Richard G. Hill, Esq, which were propounded to the Reno City Attorney's Office and which both
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Loomis and Puentes had, which further demonstrate their culpability. There is a suggestion that these
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"contract" court appointed defenders put their own profit motive above their client's rights to
subpoena witnesses and gather evidence to defende their cases (similar to the refusals by WCPD Jim
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Leslie, Loomis refused to procure and provide the audio of two extremely relevant court proceedings
in the RJC, necessary to the defense of RMC case, which led to 18 days wrongful incarceration of me
from July 3, 2012 to July 21st, 2012 in RMC 12 CR 12420. The two RJC matters are the Milan
Krebs TPO hearing in RJC RCP2012-000287 (particularly necessary to the defense of that matter, in
addition to the matter Leslie represent me on incident to a wrongful June 28th, 2012 arrest by the
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WCSO in RCR2012-067980, incident to a fraudulently procurred Summary Eviction Order

(stemming from the fraudulent Declaration of Personal Service by license process server Robert Wray
for Nevada Court Services, which was committing the unauthorized practice of law (deeming
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themselves an "eviction consulting and process service company" in RJC rev2012-001048, where
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Wray lied about "personally serving" me a June 14th, 2012 5 day unlawful detainer notice (he tried to
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break and enter my rental #29, which had not windows and which had a locked front door at the time
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that he and Northwind Apartments Manager Duane Jakob attempted to break and enter and committ
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another trespass (as they had done previously, when they failed to get the City of Reno Code
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Enforcement to do their bidding in seeking to subvert the summary eviction process, and where the
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RPD, though making threats to arrest me for criminal trespass violative of Soldal v. Cook County,
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was taking too long to "help" Northwind out. WCPD Leslie failed to inform me or notify me in any
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way as to the fact that the WCDA filed, on August 23rd, 2012, a document listing Jakob as a witness
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it intends to call in its prosecution of me in RCR2012-067980. Further, WCPD Biray Dogan failed to
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inform me in any way of the fact that, on July 31st, 2012, DDA Young filed a Motion to Amend
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Criminal Complaint wherein he, lacking a RPC 3.8 probable cause basis to do so, seeks to amend his
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charge in RCR2012-065630 to a charge that would invoke, upon a conviction, the reporting
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requirements of SCR 111(6), rather than maintain the difficult task of prosecuting one for "misue of
911" where 911 was allegedly utilized to report police misconduct, whereupon 911 operators
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purportedly efused to document such a complaint or report in any way. Additionally, Henry Sotelo,
similar to Loomis, refused to procure and provide to his client, Coughlin (once Loomis received his
second Order granting his withdrawal as court appointed counsel for Coughlin, once in RMC 11 CR
26405 (now a SCR 111(4) petition, filed by Bar Counsel against Coughlin on October 15th, 2012)
and again in RMC 12 CR 12420 (Loomis also refused to send a request for discovery or subpoena
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duces tecum to the City of Reno or RPD for the various police reports Sargent Dye and Officer
Weaver reference during an impermissible, unnotice, impromptu bail hearing (wherein Jill Drake,
Esq. committed professional misconduct) on July 5th, 2012 (at which RMC Judge Gardner again
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failed to recuse himself despite the pending grievances filed on his behalf by Judge Nash Holmes,
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NG12-0434 and NG12-0435, the latter of which resulted from Judge W. Gardner's sister passing to
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him, her brother, her April 2009 Order After trial sanction Coughlin, to RMC Judge Nash Holmes,
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whom filed it on March 14th, 2012 with Bar Counsel, along with her admission to to communications
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with the WCPD's Office, which the WCPD'S Office, including Bosler, Dogan, and Leslie, have
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refused to comment on to Coughlin in any way, aside from Leslie's dubious assertion that he is
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completely unaware of such.
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Regardless, given the import of NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010, the June 18th, 2012 Trial in
RMC 11 CR 26405 should have never taken place, should have never been set on May 8th, 2012
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(particularly where the 2/27/12 Order for Competency Evaluation in RCR2012-065630, to which
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Loomis admits to have been aware of, was not ruled upon by D10 ("Tiburon" prinout sua sponte
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gathered by Judge Gardner aside, where Loomis didn't manage to get one, though he did argue that an
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unofficial online "docket" was somehow capable of providing judicial notice of an Order Finding
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Coughlin competent on May 8th, 2012, which is clearly violative of NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010).
Additionally, it is preposterous to find that Coughlin was able to make the decision to proceed
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without Loomis or other court appointed, Sixth Amendment satisfying representation, on May 8th,
2012, given the Order by D10 in CR12-0376 finding Coughlin competent did not get signed and
entered until May 9th, 2012. This is reminiscent of DDA Young filing an Opposition to Coughlin's
Motion to Appear as Co-Counsel in RCR2011-063341 after the entry of the 2/27/12 Order for
Competency Evaluation by Judge Clifton in RCR2012-065630 (though the docket lists Judge
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Schroeder as presiding over that "clandestine" status conference, so deemed in light of Coughlin
being notice in writing that it had been vacated to March 29th, 2012, in light of the scheduling
conflict presented by the RMC 11 TR 26800 traffic citation trial set for 1:00 pm on 2/27/12 before
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Judge Nash Holmes, which she held anyways, despite the dictates of NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010
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and the communicatiosn Judge Nash Holmes admits to in the March 14th, 2012 grievance she filed
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on behalf of all RMC Judges (including pro tempore ones) on March 14th, 2012, and for which Judge
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William Gardner admits to being aware of, as does City Attorney Hazlett-Stevens, whom makes
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ridiculously mincing arguments respecting the difference in being "competent" to practice law versus
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being "competent" to stand trial, even where he was aware of RCR2012-065630 and CR12-0376.
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Further, upon information and belief, Hazlett-Stevens demonstrates a lack of candor to tribunals
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where he argues he was not "served" documents that he recieved via email and or fax where the RMC
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Rules allow for such transmissions to constitute service upon "governmental attorneys". I reserve my
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right to supplement this grievance further at a later date. Additionally, Mr. Sotelo violated NRS
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178.405 and NRS 5.010 on September 30th, 2012 where he filed a Motion to Withdraw as Coughlin's
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Counsel of Record in 12 CR 12420 during a period in which a September 5th, 2012 (though it might
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be file stamped September 7th, 2012) Order for Competency Evaluation of Coughlin in RCR2011-
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063341 was entered (and which the RMC, City Attorney Sooudi, and RMC defender Sotelo
recognized as requiring a stay of a Motion Hearing in 12 CR 12420 on September 18th, 2012...).
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Sotelo compounds his misconduct by making spurious and vague allegations against his then client
Coughlin in that Motion alluding to some "repugnant" course he alleges Coughlin wishes to maintain,
though, predictably, Sotelo fails to provide any support for his egregiously prejudicial statement,
damaging of his client's interests and defense, all while violating NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010.
Further, given the correspondences admitted to between Puentes and Loomis with the Washoe
County Public Defender's Office, and in light of the fact that both Loomis and Puentes are employed
by the RMC, the various Orders for Competency Evaluation filed since the first one of September
8th, 2011 regarding Coughlin, in RCR2011-063341, vitiate the import of all subsequently void Orders
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predicated upon any part of any proceeding not stayed during the pendency of such an Order for
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Competency Evaluation. That means, the conviction in RMC 11 CR 22176 underpinning the SCR
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111(6) petition in 60838 resulting in Coughlin's current temporary suspension of his law license, is
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necessarily void, particularly where the arraignment took place at a time (October 10th, 2011) when
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Coughlin's competency was put into question, particularly where RMC defender Lew Taitel,
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appointed at Coughlin's court ordered defense counsel beginning on November 19th, 2011, was aware
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of the pending Order for Competency Evaluation in RJC RCR2011-063341 at the time of the
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November 30th, 2011 Trial in RMC 11 CR 22176. resulting in Coughlin's conviction for petty
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larceny. Included in such misconduct is Pamela Robert, Esq., City of Reno prosecutor as well, in
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addition to her coworker Allison Ormaas, particularly where she appeared and offered argument both
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at the 2/27/12 Trial in 11 TR 26800 in the RMC, but as well as the February 12th, 2012 continuation
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of that Trial. In that regard, all of Judge Nash Holmes purported Orders, including those finding
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Coughlin "by clear and convincing evidence" to be guilty of "summary criminal contempt" and other
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violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct incident to the traffic citation trial in 11 TR 26800 on
2/27/12 that Judge Nash Holmes, despite the mandates of NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010,
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transmogrified into a disciplinary proceeding against a pro se attorney indigent criminal defendant
denied his Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel in a proceeding wherein jail time was ultimately
ordered, are also void, to the extent they are not already void given the divesting of her jurisdiction
incident to Coughlin filing, on March 7th, 2012, a Notice of Appeal of that summary contempt order
as rendered (especially where the March 28th,2 2012 written Order by Judge Nash Holmes was
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mailed to an address for Coughlin that the RMC knew was no longer good).
The Summary Eviction Order incident to a "Trial" (that's what the notice says it is, and that is
what Judge Sferrazza characterized it as on both October 13th, and October 25th, 2011, contrary to
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Baker's assertions, in addition to Baker's misrepresenting the fact that Judge SFerrazza also ruled that
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Coughlin met the "summary judgment" standard required of him already at the October 13th, 2011
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"proceeding", and thereby, with the filing of a Notice of Appeal by Coughlin on Octobe 18th, 2011,
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the RJC was divested of jurisdiction to hold a "Trial" on October 25th, 2011, to the extent it lacked
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jurisdiction to begin with in failing to comply with JCRCP 109 respecting the number of days to
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respond to a "Complaint" incident to an unlawful detainer "Trial" and the notice requirements
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incident thereto, much less the unlawful forced rent escrow depositing, or the denial of a stay, even
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where the RJC held onto the $2,275 "rent escrow" deposit" under the auspices of holding is as
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Coughlin's 'bond on appeal" (necessarily meaning the "superseadeas bond, given the appeal bond is
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statutorily set as $250 and only a supersedeas can be adjudicate in such a manner to be "three times
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the monthly rent"...never mind the fact that, given Coughlin's monthly rent was under $1,000, NRS
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118A.385 dictates such a "supersedeas bond" be $250, unless the Court find's Coughlin a commercial
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tenant, but in that case, given the non-payment of rent was not pled, a summary eviction is verboten
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under NRS 40.253 anyways, so...NRCP 60(b)(4) void for lack of jurisdiction, and therefore, to the
extent the criminal trespass conviction does not falter on any of these numerous other grounds...it
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shall there as well.

2. Coughlin submitted for filing with the RMC, both in person in June 27th, 2012 and by fax
on June 28th, 2012 a Notice of Appeal, timely under NRS 189.010, which Coughlin also timely
served on the City of Reno via personally delivering it to their office and emailing and faxing to the
City Attorney as well, all timely. Coughlin in person attempt to file on June 27th, 2012 was rejected,
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though he beat the "on a timer" locking of the door to the court house prior to 5:00 pm attested to by
the WCSO. Coughlin fax filed the Notice Appeal to Judge Gardner's fax number as held out to the
public by the RMC and on the www.nvbar.org website (and has electronic confirmation of a
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successful transmission thereof) on June 28th, 2012 (Coughlin was prevented from filing in person on
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June 28th, 2012 a Notice of Appeal due to a wrongful arrest in RCR2012-067980 by the WCSO
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based upon a fraudulent affidavit of service by Nevada Court Services (which is partners with RMC
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defender Lew Taitel, Esq.) licensed process server Robert Wray, and a defective 5 day unlawful
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detainer notice, violative of NRS 40.253 (which required such a notice to list the court to file a
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Tenant's Affidavit) in that it listed the wrong court to file a Tenant's Affidavit in the 6/14/12 Notice
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by citing Sparks Justice Court (to which Coughlin submitted such a Tenant's Affidavit, along with
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several "heads up" calls to the RJC and a 6/26/12 email to the WCSO and RJC alerting them to the
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jurisdictional deficiencies and concomitant voidness of any RJC lockout order stemming from such a
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defective notice. (see Exhibit 1), Hill also testified that Merliss had not been at the 121 River Rock
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property in the week preceding the arrest, despite Officer Carter's report indicating Hill or Merliss
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told him otherwise. Coughlin was prevented from presenting his case at the June 18th 2012 trial in
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light of fraud by the Mental Health Court (which went back on a written contract with Coughlin), an
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wrongful imprisonment by Judge Elliot incident to an April 19th, 2012 hearing in CR12-0376
(incident to fraud by Lake's Crossing's psychologists Sally Farmer, Ph.D. and Bill Davis, Ph.D. in an
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April 18th, 2012 letter filed with D10 in that matter, in addition to the fraud committed by the MHC's
Reno Biondo in lying about the reasoning for Coughlin's being removed from the MHC in MH120032. Regardless, Coughlin was denied his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel by City Attorney
Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, and RMC contract court appointed defenders Lew Taitel (whom
violated RMC rules in failing to specify the rationale for his withdrawal, in addition to failing to own
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up to his professional misconduct in taking on Coughlin's representation at a time when conflict

existed in light of Coughlin filing suit against Taitle's business partners, Nevada Court Services, in
CV11-03051 on October 19th, 2011), Roberto Puentes and Keith Loomis, with Loomis and the RMC
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D2 violating NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010 in failing to abide by statutory dictates respecting the
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staying of proceeding during the pendency of an Order for Competency Evaluation (the RMC and
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D2, in addition to Loomis were well aware of the clandestine status conference between WCPD Biray
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Dogan and DDA Zach Young, communicated to and or joined in on by RMC Judge Nash Holmes, as
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admitted to in her March 14th, 2012 grievance to the State Bar of Nevada, filed on behalf of D2's
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Judge William Gardner and his sister Judge Linda Gardner (whom's April 2009 Order for Sanctions
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now forms the basis for an SCR 105 Complaint against Coughlin in NG12-0435, which was filed by
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Judge Nash Holmes on behalf of Judge William Gardner and his sister, Washoe District Family Court
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Judge Linda Gardner along with the NG12-0434 grievance RMC Judge Nash Holmes filed on behalf
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of all RMC Judges against Coughlin on March 14th, 2012.
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3. Further Washoe County Sheriff's Office filed false affidavit, by Deputy Machem, alleging
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Coughlin was "personally served" eviction Sorder, however WCSO IA Supervisor Liz Stuchell has
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admitted in writing (see her email to Coughlin in Exhibit 1) that "personally served", to the WCSO
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civil division, means just taping a notice to a door when no one is home, and Stuchell confirmed in
writing that WCSO Deputy Machem indicated to her that no one was home at 121 River Rock when,
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on November 1, 2011, he performed a lockout on Coughlin's law office and alleges he posted the
Order for Summary Eviction on Coughlin's door.
Nevada Revised Statutes Section 176.515 - Procedure in Criminal Cases New trial
NRS 178.394
No person to be compelled to be witness against himself or herself in
criminal action, or to be unnecessarily restrained. By the RMC in Judge Nash Holmes and possibly
through Judge Gardner refusing to provide Coughlin appropriate court appointed counsel, and then
refusing to allow Coughlin to self represent without making everything he says as a defense attorney
or on his own behalf subject to being declared testimonial, and necessarily sworn under oath,
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Coughlin ws deprived his rights under the Fifth Amendment and the above statute. Regardless, it is
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unreasonable to expect Coughlin to feel anything other than terrified to make arguments on his own
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behalf (particularly those exposign this police misconduct) where the two previous RMC trial he was
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forced to appear pro se in resulted in summary contempt convictions and incarcerations (which he had
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to report the USPTO and SBN).

The City failed to put on any evidence that anybody (not the Reno Justice Court, not the
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WCSO, not opposing counsel Hill or Baker, etc) actually mailed Coughlin a copy of the Order of
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Summary Eviction prior to the illegal lockout of November 1, 2011, therefore making any such
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lockout a legal nullity, and void, and a trespass, actually, done under color of state law 42 USC Sec
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1983, see Lynn v Desiderio....however, NRCP is made applicable to landlord tenant matters in
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Nevada, and therefore, substituted or constructive service is required (ie, 3 days for mailing where
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personal service is not done). Therefore, Richard Hill and Merliss were the trespassers, in addition to
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the Reno Police Department Officer Chris Carter and Sargent Marcia Lopez, whom admitted to
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Coughlin that RPD Officer Chris Carter and Richard Hill and Dr. Merliss lied when they allege that
she and Officer Carter identified themselves as law enforcement and issued Coughlin a lawful order
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or warning to leave prior to Merliss kicking the "basement" door down on November 13th, 2011, and
where Hill and Officer Carter allege Coughlin was given any chance to leave in response to any such
warning or that Coughlin indicated he was refusing to take the RPD upon on any such chance to heed
any such warning. This is clearly proven by the videos Hill and Merliss took, propounded to City
Attorney Hazlett-Stevens, indicative of professional misconduct on his part in offering perjured
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testimony at trial that he knew to be false, and further failing to propound exculpatory dispatch and
911/RPD recordings revealing the extent to which Hill and Merliss are shown lying in the videos
propounded wherein they lie in asserting that they warned Coughlin of a criminal trespass charge
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prior to Coughlin's arrest on November 13th, 2011. Further, where both RJC Civil Division
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Supervisor Karen Stancil and Casey Baker (in his June 18th, 2012 sworn testimony at Trial) indicate
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that pursuant to Baker's admitted October 28th, 2011 transaction with the WCSO and Stancil's
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admission as to the "usual pattern and practice" of the RJC vis a vis the transmission and, therefore,
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receipt of the Eviction Decision and Order of October 25th, 2011 and the Findings of Fact,
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Conclusions of Law and Order of Summary Eviction of October 27th, 2011 in REV2011-001708
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(City's Exhibits 1 through 3) by the wCSO occurred too soon here, and therefore these "Lockout
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Orders" were stale, invalid, void, and ineffective for all purposes. A claim of right defense is
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particularly prevailing in this regard, and the admission by Hill at Trial that he communicated to
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Coughlin that he was charging the same "fair market value for full use and occupancy", some $900
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per month, to Coughlin that was regularly charged under the Standard Rental Agreement makes clear
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reversible error occurred where a relevancy objection was sustained directed to such a claim of right
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defense. Further, Hazlett-Steven's and Baker demonstrated a lack of candor to the tribunal where they
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assert the October 27th, 2011 Order indicated "shall" or some other language sufficient to support
their contentions where it did not.
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Judge William Gardner of the Reno Municipal Court refused to recuse himself despite having
worked for the Reno City Attorney's Office just 2 years prior to this case, and despite his own sister,
Second Judicial District Court Family Judge Hon. Linda Gardner being involved in a State Bar
grievance against Coughlin based upon her Order for Sanctions against Coughlin three years prior in
a divorce trial. Coughlin filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus challenging Judge Linda Gardner's
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Order for Sanctions. Coughlin was fired from his job at Washoe Legal Services, according to WLS
Executive Director Paul Elcano, strictly because of Judge Linda Gardner's sanctions against
Coughlin. http://caseinfo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/caseView.do?csIID=22746
Please see attached the May 2009 letter from WLS informing Coughlin of his firing in light of
Judge Linda Gardners April 2009 Order for sanctisn in the Joshi divorce case.
Hazlett misleads the court in citing to State v. Nichols 106 Nevada 651, 790 9P. 2D 550
(1990) was purely dicta and should not of been relied upon by this court in reaching its decision to
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issue a conviction here that case, McNichols, dealt with the lawfulness of a search by the state and
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involve a criminal conviction for possession of a controlled substance it simply did not involve
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trespass incident to a civil eviction of a tenant by landlord any discussion of addiction and McNichols
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related to a foreclosure was dicta no actual trespassers statute (in fact, there is nothing in the opinion
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to distinguish between whether a civil trespass or criminal trespass is distinguished in that dicta) was
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cited to and use of the term trespass was as a term of art there was no distinction whether it was a
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civil trespass or criminal trespass and McNichols and no real discussion by the court as to whether the
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service requirements are met ,
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Further grounds for new trial are revealed in the extent to which Judge Gardner is bullying
Coughlin throughout the trial to avoid key areas of inquiry, to shorten, limit, and narrow every aspect
of everything, and in going back on his pre lunch attestations about limiting the scope of cross, after
"giving you an hour to think about it", Judge Gardner commences the post lunch resumption of th
Trial with an entirely new stance on the matter, wherein he is clearly attempting to prevent Coughlin
from putting testimonial evidence on the record with the threat of yet another summary contempt
incarceration or worse (and clearly, given Judge Nash Holmes hit piece in 11 TR 26800 and the work
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put in by Judge Howard, the RMC Judges are willing to put on a real show just in case their message
hasn't been heard loud enough.
This is a formal Complaint against all three of the RMC public defenders I had represent me
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on that matter, Taitel, Puentes, and Loomis. Please place a copy of this in their
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employment/personnel/independent contractor files and indicate whether the court appointed counsel
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the RMC contracts with must pay out of pocket (or out of their $7k a month from the RMC for
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subpoena fees, as none of my court appointed counsel so far have complied with a single request on
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my part to procure and provide to me audio recordings of hearings (please produce to me the audio
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from the entire morning of July 5th, 2012 (I was called up several times) for 12 CR 12420, actually,
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please produce the audio for any and all court dates I have ever had at the RMC, including the one on
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November 14th, 2011 where I was brought to court while in custody, but not brought in for the Trial
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in 11 CR 22176, through no fault of my own, but for which Judge Howard later relied upon in
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denying my Motion to Continue the November 30th, 2011 Trial date in that matter, which was
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denied, the same day Department 2 granted the City's request to continue the criminal trespass matter
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in 11 CR 26405 because Richard G. Hill, Esq., was going to be on vacation for six weeks (Taitel
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never told me about the Motion to Continue, then violated RMC Rules by failing to specifiy, in a
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written motion, the reason for his withdrawal...though it was likely because when Taitel took on my
case and got my social security number in my file on or around November 19th, 2011...I had filed an
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IFP and proposed Complaint against Taitel's business partners, Nevada Court Services, on October
19th, 2011 in CV11-03051....though Taitel's replacement, Puentes, admitted he has similar conflicts.
Regardless, all of these court appointed defenders have continually refused to subpoena ANY
witnesses on my behalf, including PERCIPIENT EYE WITNESSES TO MATERIAL FACTS IN
DISPUTE. Such as whether the RPD identified themselves as law enforcement and or issued a
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lawful order or warning to leave the property prior to the landlord kicking the door down to the
"basement" and the RPD arresting me, and whether, subsequent to the door being kicked down,
whether the RPD or landlord issued a warning to leave and or sought to issue a citation in lieu of a
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custodial arrest, which they did not, though Officer Carter lied about it in his police report (though the
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video Hill filmed of the incident betrays that), and Hill and Merliss lied about it on the video, though
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Hill didn't lie in his November 21st, 2011 Declaration in the eviction matter, but Hill went on to lie on
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the stand on June 18th, 2012 at the Trial in 11CR26405. 1833 Associates v. Frying Carpets Co., Inc.,
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594 N.Y.S.2d 121 N.Y.City.Civ.,1992 Summary proceeding is intended as speedy means of
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recovering possession of real property because either rent has not been paid or tenant is holding over
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after expiration or termination of lease term and is not an alternative to plenary action for money nor
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is it a substitute for proper application for provisional remedy or declaratory judgment, not available
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in civil court. Guidetti v. Moroze, 423 N.Y.S.2d 140 N.Y.Co.,1979 Although action seeking recovery
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of possession of leased property for nonpayment of rent and to collect said rent was properly inserted
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as summary action, the owner's sale converted the summary proceeding for collection of unpaid rent
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into a plenary action for same. RPAPL 701 et seq. Velazquez v. Thompson, 451 F.2d 202
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C.A.2.N.Y.,1971 Primary purpose of summary eviction proceedings is to enable landlords to regain
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possession quickly and inexpensively and thereby avoid plenary action for ejectment and its incident
delays which prompted landlords to short circuit judicial process by resort to self-help
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continuance and my files?
12/09/11
To: puenteslaw@aol.com
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Zach Coughlin
From:
Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
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Sent:
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Fri 12/09/11 1:11 AM
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To:
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puenteslaw@aol.com
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Dear Mr. Puentes,
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I would like for you to subpoena both Officers present at the arrest of November 13, 2011 to testify at
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the trial. I would like for you to subpoena (by subpoena duces tecum, I suppose) all recordings,
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dispatch reports, written documentation, reports in any way connected to, or other materials, whether
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admissible or not, in any way connected to the arrest of November 13, 2011 or the charges against
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which I am defending in conjunction with your representation. I wish for you to email me these
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materials to the extent possible, and where that is not possible, please mail them to me at my address
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of record at www.nvbar.org, and found below at the end of this letter. Email is better for me than fax,
as it is free whereas I have to pay for faxes by the page, whether local or not. I prefer email too over
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having to take time out of what is an extremely busy and trying schedule of mine currently.
RPD Officer Carter made a statement at the scene of the arrest that Mr. Richard Hill paid him a lot of
money and therefore he does what Mr. Hill says to do and arrest who Mr. Hill says to arrest. This has
been reported to several RPD Officers, including Sargent Tarter, who responded by retaliating against
me with several traffic citations and made incorrect assertions about whether one would be turning
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into oncoming one way traffic to get to Mr. Hills 652 Forest St. address from the intersection of
Forest and St. Laurence in justifying his retalitatory citation (for which he apparently called in
another officer to write out, curiously). I DO NOT WANT YOU TO DISCUSS MY CASE WITH
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ANYONE OUTSIDE OF MY PRESENCE, INCLUDING VERBAL AND OR WRITTEN
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COMMUNICATIONS. THIS INCLUDES ANY COMMUNICATIONS, VERBAL OR WRITTEN
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WITH THE RENO MUNICIPAL COURT AND ANYONE IN ANY WAY CONNECTED WITH
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THE RENO POLICE DEPARTMENT OR RENO CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, AS WELL AS
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LEW TAITEL.
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Please email or fax me a complete copy of my file, including all pleadings, correspondences, and any
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other documentation or media at all connected with my case. Please further disclose any conflicts of
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interest you might have in representing me. I did not agree to a continuance, and I believe it is my
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right as a client to control the means and objectives of the litigation and or defense, and that, to me,
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does not include waiving my right to contest any motion for a continuance or making things nice and
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easy for Richard G. Hill, Esq. Further, I would like to know who agreed to thecontinuance and why it
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is Mr. Taitel is no longer attorney of record (nothing against you, please believe that).
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Further, ifMr. Taitel isno longer attorney of record in this matter, please explain why, in detail, in
writing. Ifhe haswithdrawn, and if you did so based on some conflict of interest, how is it that that
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conflict of interest did not preclude him from apparently agreeing to a continuance or failing to file an
opposition or alerting me to the situation at all? Please note my new address and contact information
below. Additionally, please indicate, in writing, the extent to which you have an established
procedure to check for conflicts prior to taking on cases and prior to obtaining confidential client files
and information. Please indicate in writing any deviation from such a procedure or failing of your
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office's practices to prevent such prejudice to my case in your taking on my representation. Please
copy me on any and all correspondences and or documentation or discovery in any way related to this
matter.
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Sincerely,
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/S/ ZACH COUGHLIN, SIGNED ELECTRONICALLY
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Zach Coughlin
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817 N. Virginia St. #2
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Reno, NV 89501
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tel: 775 338 8118
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fax: 949 667 7402
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continuance and my files?
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12/09/11
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Zach Coughlin
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From:
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Sent:
Fri 12/09/11 3:53 AM
To:
puenteslaw@aol.com
1 attachment
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12 8 11 fax to Puentes.pdf (63.6 KB)

Mr. Puentes, please find attached my signed written request for you to file certain motions. I want to
review the final drafts prior to your filing them and have tried hard to do most of the work for you.
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Further, you might find the following documentary that someone posted on youtube.com helpful in
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understanding this case:
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http://www.youtube.com/user/25teddyjames?feature=watch
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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Reno, NV 89501
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Tel: please only communicate in writing
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Fax: 949 667 7402
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Dear Mr. Puentes,
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I would also like for you to subpoena Dr. Matt Merliss, the owner of the property who was present at
the scene of arrest. Further, I would like for you to depose both RPD Officers (Carter and the female
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Officer). I would like a copy of the probable cause sheet and all witness statements and Officer's
Supplemental Declarations as soon as possible, please, in addition to all the other materials I set forth
in my previous written correspondence to you.
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I would like a Motion in Limine to be filed to exclude anything discovered upon the RPD illegal
search of the property, including any videos by Richard Hill or anyone else that the Reno City
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Attorney seeks to have admitted. I want a Motion to Dismiss filed seeking to dismiss this case based
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upon a number of arguments, including the fact that any underlying Summary Eviction Order was
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void for lack of jurisdiction (please see my recent filing, attached, in Reno Justice Court case
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rev2011-001708, in that this was noticed as a No Cause Eviction against a commercial lessee. As
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such, any Summary Eviction Order is void for lack of jurisdiction given the express prohibition in
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both NRS 40.253 and the Nevada Supreme Court's explanation in the Landlord Tenant
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Handbook? found on the Supreme Court's website and elsewhere where it is made explicitly clear
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that landlord's may not use Summary Eviction Proceedings to evict commercial lessees or tenants
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where non payment of rent is not alleged or where the Notice of Eviction or Unlawful detainer is a No
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Cause notice, as was the case in Rev2011-001708. As such, no trespassing could have occurred.
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Beyond that, I am requesting you file a Motion to Dismiss based upon the fact that any lockout
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occurring on November 1, 2011 necessarily occurred too early and prior to any lawful notice or
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service of any Summary Eviction Order only signed on October 27th, 2011, especially where no
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personal service of such an ordered was alleged or shown. I detailed this in the email pasted below.
Further, a Motion to Dismiss I request you file due to Casey Baker's November 11, 2011 letter to me
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wherein he sends me a bill for the full rental value of the property where the commercial lease was
located for the entire month of November 2011, a period after the alleged illegal lockout. As such, no
trespass could have occurred because such a bill for rent is tantamount to rescinding any void eviction
order or otherwise indicative of an invitation, entrapment, or assent to the addressee of such a letter or
bill being able to go onto the property, allegedly. In his letter mailed to Coughlin of November 10,
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2011, Casey Baker, Esq wrote In addition to the sums identified by Dr. Merliss in his affidavit,
your debt now also includes fees for storage of your personal possessions left at the property, which
accrue daily at the fair rental value of the property. Your debt further includes actual costs for
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inventorying and moving your possessions from the property. See NRS 118A.460. Those sums will
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be provided to you once they have been fixed. Enclosed you will also find a notice of entry of the
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court's order awarding costs and attorney's fees against you. The court's award of cost in the amount
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of $421.75, and attorney's fees in the amount of $1,500.00, has now been reduced to judgment. You
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are responsible for those sums. Further, as you know, in his Memorandum of Costs and
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Disbursements filed on October 27,2011, Dr. Merliss actually sought $607.24 in costs and $17,938.75
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in attorney's fees against you. We believe you are responsible for those amounts, plus any and all fees
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and costs that have accrued, and continue to accrue, since Letter to Zachary Coughlin Re: Verification
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of Debt November 10, 2011 Page 20f2 that date, in the matters currently pending before the courts as
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an item of damages. Dr. Merliss win seek recovery of those sums, and an future fees and costs
incurred, through the appropriate channels...?
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As such, Baker and Hill sent Coughlin a bill for the full rent of the property. $900 a month was the
rent for the property under the commercial lease. Baker and Hill wrote telling Coughlin they were
continuing to charge him that even after the alleged illegal lockout of November 1, 2011. Further,
Baker and Hill flagrantly wrote to Coughlin in the same letter that the impermissible $1,500 in
attorney's fees ordered by Judge Sferrazza was not enough for them, and that they fully intended to
continue to pursue recovery of the nearly $20,000 in attorney's fees they sought in their Memorandum
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of Fees and Costs of October 27th, 2011, despite the res judicata effect of Judge Sferrazza's
November 9, 2011 Order granting them $1,500 in attorney's fees, and despite the fact that NRS
69.030 only allows for prevailing party attorney's fees in civil actions?, while JCRCP 3
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specifically provides that there are three types of matters in Nevada's Justice Court, and expressly
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separates landlord tenant matters? from civil actions?, and, as such, the prevailing party
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attorney's provisions of NRS 69.030 do not apply and there exists no other basis for an attorney's fees
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award under any of the arguments Baker or Hill put forth. There conduct is tantamount to extortion
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while leveraging their law licenses and degrees.
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Further, I would like for you to seek a continuance of the trial in this matter as this case is going to
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require extensive discovery, settlement negotiations, and other complex legal work and there is not
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enough time for that as the schedule is currently set. I am attaching a collection of written materials
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the landlord/property owner at 121 River Rock St 89501 (where the trespass arrest occurred sent me),
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including some letters that inform me they were charging me the full rent of the property for the
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entire month of November 2011 (the illegal lockout allegedly occurred on November 1, 2011, though
there has been no proof of service or "receipt" pursuant to NRS 40, and given that the lockout was
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apparently signed by Judge Sferrazza on October 27th, 2011, that day does not count for service of
the Order, the Reno Justice Court is closed on Fridays, non judicial weekend days don't count for the
3 days for service under NRCP 4-6, etc. As such, the earliest service by mail could have been affected
for the Order for Summary Eviction would have been November 2, 2011. It is alleged the lockout
occurred prior to that time, and further, no emails were received from Richard Hill's email address,
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rhill@richardhillaw.com at any point between August 17th, 2011 and November 18th, 2011, period.
Whether any emails from Hills rhill@richardhillaw.com address were "bounced back" to him or
whether that address was added to my "blocked sender" list is a matter for Mr. Hill to sludge his way
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through, but I can attest under penalty of perjury that I did not receive any emails from that
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rhill@richardhillaw.com email address between that time period. I can further attest that I made calls
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and written correspondences to both Hill's rhill@richardhillaw.com email and his associate Casey
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Baker, Esq.'s email, electroencephalographic addresses that went unresponded to with regard to my
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numerous requests to be allowed access to remove my property, commercial and otherwise.
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These included, but were not limited to, the following:
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From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
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Sent: Wed 11/09/11 12:43 PM
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To: Casey Baker (cdbaker@richardhillaw.com)
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Don't ignore my calls about my possessions. You potentially conducted an illegal lockout of a law
office an inspection outside my presence. The lease requires my presence. It also makes your guy
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responsible for the electric bill, read it carefully. Show your proof of any "receipt" of any lockout
order 24 hours prior to your actions. My possessions better be safe and afforded all legal protections
and I want updates one whatf is being done with them and an opportunity to clean or otherwise put
the premises in the condition I intended to leave it in prior to the illegal lockout. I want my
possessions that are in the house and all privacy rights respected. There is a motion for stay in district
court right now.
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Re: Verification of Your Debt? 11/10/11
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To Casey Baker
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(Sent: Thu 11/10/11 12:24 PM
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To: Casey Baker (cdbaker@richardhillaw.com)
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You guys are way over the days for providing verification under the FDCPA. Can you say treble
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damages? I habe not received a single email such as those you refer to from richard hill. I dont
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consent to service of anything via email from your shop. I know you want everything to be at warp
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speed, but you have to serve me through the mail or some non electronic means. Make sure rich isnt
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getting "unnsuccessful email transmission" messages....i can certainly prove i have not received any
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such emails from Dick. I want my stuff its important client materials etc. You guys have not returned
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my messages about that, its wrong to try to charge me rent when you are ducking me.
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From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com Sent: Fri 11/11/11 12:49 AM To: Casey Baker

(cdbaker@richardhillaw.com); rhill@richardhillaw.com (rhill@richardhillaw.com) Hi Guys, I have
been having some technical difficulties, some emails appear blank or black, kind of like your client
described in response to some of my emails. Hey, ever heard of a litigation hold notice? That is what
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this is ,please retain and failure messages you recieve in your own email which might prove that an
email you sent me just didn't quite make it. You know just producing a copy of some email you sent
me (even though i have repeatedly told you i dont consent to service electronically in any form and
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am not a registered efiler like you two legal eagles) is not going to be good enough when i break out
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the old litigation hold notice and anything elese that might tend to show any emails you sent could
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not have made it to me....why such a rush, Boys? You are doing your patented and typical bang up
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milking job on thos headstrong rich client of yours...smell the flowers a little. For instance, you don't
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want to do an illegal lockout and illegal inspection, particularly where the lease calls for my presence
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at any inspection and then if you did not make sure the "receipt" requirement was met for any lockout
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order then went ahead and violated someone's constitutional rights to boot. Plus you are way late on
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the FDCPA stuff, and the prevailing party atty fee statute is for cicil actons, which jcrcp 3 separates
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justice court matters into 3 types, and the civil actions mentioned in seller's prevailing party fee
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statute is mentioned as different from landord tenant cases and small claims cases..So where is your
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good faith basis for moving for atty fees, much less for $20k worth of them. Why did you cite the
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controlled substances manufacture statute to support your atty fee motion? I pulled every eviction
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y'all ever done... RJC has been like swinging the bat in the on deck circle with 5 donuts on the bat for
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me, gentlemen. For you, its been the polar opposite. But we gettin' called up to the show! You never
know when you are on tape or film guys. And my bat speed is lookin' tremendous. I have tried again
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and again to get some response from you guys about accesing my important files and keeping my
very valuable possesions safe but have yet to here back feom you, in the event you have done a
lockout. Mr. Baker said he did some filmmaking or something when he broke in to any attorneys
office, it was hard to hear through all the cooing. Anyways, I aren't that smart, but dontcha have to
like store my possessions after movin' them somewhere safe, the make a reasonably diligent attempt
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to rent the place out to mitigate and damages or lost rent, plus provide me my deposit within like 10
days or something? I know mighty Casey likes to give me lil research projects, but I am busy fleshing
out some motion work right now, so maybe you get on that and let me know when and where I can
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get my things and valuable client files, hopefully you two points of light haven't done nuthhin' to 'em.
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Now, I dont want to come between you and Casey...I know he is probably getting a little tired of you
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keeping most of the profit while he gets dirty doing the gutters, but you guys have a nice lil batman
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robin thing going and it would be a shame to see it end, so let's just try and make this work."
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From the alleged date of the illegal lockout of November 1, 2011 until Casey Baker's November 10,
2011 written bill to me for full rent for the month of November 2011 (ie, after the alleged illegal
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lockout and therefore extinguishing the eviction and creating a new lease or rescinding the eviction
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order and, perhaps making extortionate threats to apply an unlawful rent distraint in contravention of
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NRS 40.460, and NRS 40. 520, etc.) I received two written correspondences of any sort from anyone
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connected with the landlord Matt Merliss (a neurosurgeon graduate of Beverly Hills HS) and the law
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office of Richard G. Hill, Esq. (including Hill and Baker, etc.). These two written correspondences
from Casey Baker are attached and pasted below:
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subject: Verification of Your Debt?

11/10/11
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Casey Baker
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To zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
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From: Casey Baker (cdbaker@richardhillaw.com)
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Sent: Thu 11/10/11 11:13 AM
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To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
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1 attachment
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LT Coughlin (verif of debt)(11-10-11).pdf (146.0 KB)
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Mr. Coughlin:
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Attached please find my letter to you dated November 10, 2011.
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Sincerely,
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Casey D. Baker, Esq.
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Richard G. Hill, Chartered
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652 Forest Street
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Reno, Nevada 89509
Phone: (775) 348-0888
Fax: (775) 348-0858
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Email: cdbaker@richardhillaw.com
CONFIDENTIAL: ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT; ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
This e-mail may contain legally privileged or confidential information. If you are not the intended
recipient, please do not read, copy, use, or disclose this communication to anyone other than the
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intended recipient. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender and delete the
14
email message from your system. Thank you.
15
Circular 230 Notice.
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To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inform you that any U.S. federal tax
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advice contained in this communication (including any attachments) is not intended or written to be
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used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of (i) avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or
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(ii) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any transaction or matter addressed
21
herein.
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RE: request for 30 days additional to stay in possession disability?
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11/04/11
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Casey Baker
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To zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
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From: Casey Baker (cdbaker@richardhillaw.com)
Sent: Fri 11/04/11 12:36 PM
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Mr. Coughlin:
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We have never been served with any paper entitled Motion to Continue in Possession.? If you
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have proof to the contrary, please provide it.
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With respect to your request for another 30 days?, please identify the legal and factual basis for
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your request, including any specific statute you are purporting to invoke.
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Casey Baker
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Below for your convenience is a copy of the email I recently sent you as my, Zach Coughlin's,
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counsel of record, Mr. Puentes:
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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Subject: continuance and my files
Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2011 01:11:35 -0800
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Dear Mr. Puentes,
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I would like for you to subpoena both Officers present at the arrest of November 13, 2011 to testify at
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the trial. I would like for you to subpoena (by subpoena duces tecum, I suppose) all recordings,
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dispatch reports, written documentation, reports in any way connected to, or other materials, whether
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admissible or not, in any way connected to the arrest of November 13, 2011 or the charges against
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which I am defending in conjunction with your representation. I wish for you to email me these
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materials to the extent possible, and where that is not possible, please mail them to me at my address
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of record at www.nvbar.org, and found below at the end of this letter. Email is better for me than fax,
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as it is free whereas I have to pay for faxes by the page, whether local or not. I prefer email too over
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having to take time out of what is an extremely busy and trying schedule of mine currently.
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RPD Officer Carter made a statement at the scene of the arrest that Mr. Richard Hill paid him a lot of
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money and therefore he does what Mr. Hill says to do and arrest who Mr. Hill says to arrest. This has
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been reported to several RPD Officers, including Sargent Tarter, who responded by retaliating against
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me with several traffic citations and made incorrect assertions about whether one would be turning
into oncoming one way traffic to get to Mr. Hills 652 Forest St. address from the intersection of
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Forest and St. Laurence in justifying his retalitatory citation (for which he apparently called in
another officer to write out, curiously). I DO NOT WANT YOU TO DISCUSS MY CASE WITH
ANYONE OUTSIDE OF MY PRESENCE, INCLUDING VERBAL AND OR WRITTEN
COMMUNICATIONS. THIS INCLUDES ANY COMMUNICATIONS, VERBAL OR WRITTEN
WITH THE RENO MUNICIPAL COURT AND ANYONE IN ANY WAY CONNECTED WITH
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THE RENO POLICE DEPARTMENT OR RENO CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, AS WELL AS

LEW TAITEL.
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Please email or fax me a complete copy of my file, including all pleadings, correspondences, and any
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other documentation or media at all connected with my case. Please further disclose any conflicts of
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interest you might have in representing me. I did not agree to a continuance, and I believe it is my
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right as a client to control the means and objectives of the litigation and or defense, and that, to me,
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does not include waiving my right to contest any motion for a continuance or making things nice and
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easy for Richard G. Hill, Esq. Further, I would like to know who agreed to the continuance and why it
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is Mr. Taitel is no longer attorney of record (nothing against you, please believe that).
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Further, if Mr. Taitel is no longer attorney of record in this matter, please explain why, in detail, in
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writing. If he has withdrawn, and if you did so based on some conflict of interest, how is it that that
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conflict of interest did not preclude him from apparently agreeing to a continuance or failing to file an
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opposition or alerting me to the situation at all? Please note my new address and contact information
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below. Additionally, please indicate, in writing, the extent to which you have an established
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procedure to check for conflicts prior to taking on cases and prior to obtaining confidential client files
and information. Please indicate in writing any deviation from such a procedure or failing of your
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office's practices to prevent such prejudice to my case in your taking on my representation. Please
copy me on any and all correspondences and or documentation or discovery in any way related to this
matter.
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Sincerely,
/S/ ZACH COUGHLIN, SIGNED ELECTRONICALLY
Zach Coughlin
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Reno, NV 89501
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tel: 775 338 8118
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fax: 949 667 7402
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Sincerely,
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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faxed signed letter attached?
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12/14/11
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Zach Coughlin
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From:
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Sent:
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Wed 12/14/11 12:35 AM
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To:
puenteslaw@aol.com
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2 attachments
12 14 11 faxed letter to Puentes 11 CR 26405 2I.pdf (55.0 KB) , Coughlin IFP and Financial Inquiry
Application RMC 11222011 11 CR 26405 2I.pdf (381.9 KB)
Mr. Puentes,
Please find my faxed signed letter attached. Also, if I am supposed to file an updated Financial Status
Application, please find that attached.
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December 13th, 2011
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Dear Mr. Puentes,
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Hello, I received a package from you in the mail today. It did not contain a letter from you or any
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indication of whether you will subpoena Dr. Merliss to attend the January Trial date, which is fast
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approaching, whether you will depose him or Richard Hill, etc. Please respond in writing regard the
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various written requests and questions I posed to you in my recent written correspondences,
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including,
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but not limited to, whether you will comply with my requests to file a Motion in Limine, Motion to
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Dismiss, Depose Dr. Merliss and Richard Hill, file a Motion to Set Aside the Continuance, for which
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was never appropriately provided a chance to contest, or served the Original Motion for Continuance.
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I want to be copied, in writing, on every single thing related in any way to this case. RMC Rules
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require the attorney, such as you and Lew Taitel to file a Notice of Appearance and to file a Motion to
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Withdraw. Please provide a copy of the docket in this case. I do not see where Mr. Taitel ever filed a
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Motion to Withdraw or where an Order Granting such a withdrawal was granted. It is my
understanding, though, that an Order Granting a Motion to Dismiss was likely entered. I want for you
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to file a Motion To Set Aside that Order if it was based on Richard Hill citing some lame reason, like
he
was going to be Porsche shopping in Florida or otherwise on vacation for some extended stretch or
that
Richard Hill was the only person able to testify about whatever it is Richard Hill may want to testify
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about. Dr. Merliss can take time out of raking in millions of dollars being a Beverly Hills HS graduate
neurosurgeon. I want him subpoenaed and deposed for the upcoming trial. I want a subpoena duces
tecum served on Richard Hill for any evidence related to this case, including any videos. Further, I
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want you to make an inquiry and take appropriate action to discern whether I was appropriately
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served
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any Notice Setting Hearing documents in this case, ascertaining exactly who (including which
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Marshal)
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may have served me anything, the manner and place in which is was served, whose signature is there,
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etc., whether the signature bears a date that is PRIOR in time to the Print Date? on the Notice
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Setting
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Hearing, etc.
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Further, I want you to subpoena or obtain a copy of (and provide one to me) of the video of the
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November 14th, 2011 arraignment?, the entire video, start to finish (not just my appearance), I
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will pay
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any charge if I have to, but I believe an IFP was granted that would cover such a charge in this matter.
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I do not believe it would be accurate for the Reno Municipal Court to state or write, with respect to
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my
and the November 14, 2011 arraignment, that DEFENDANT APPEARED, WAS EXPLAINED
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HIS/HER RIGHTS BY THE JUDGE AND INDICATED THAT HE/SHE UNDERSTOOD THEM
COMPLETELY...? If the RMC has made that assertion in writing I want you to file something in
writing contesting that assertion. I do not believe I have been told that there is any possibility that I
will
be required to pay you or the RMC any fees in connection with your representation. If that is not the
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case, please explain in writing.

Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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Reno, NV 89501
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tel: 775 229-6737
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fax: 949 667 7402
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ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
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Nevada Bar No: 9473
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client controls means and objectives of litigation under Rules of Professional Conduct?
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12/14/11
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Zach Coughlin
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From:
Sent:
Wed 12/14/11 12:52 AM
To:
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puenteslaw@aol.com
Dear Mr. Puentes,
Please let me know when we can discuss my case, the trial is very soon. I received a mailing from
13
you, but it did not have a signed letter from you stating what was in the package. Please email me or
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fax me any document production in the future and redact my personally identifiable information from
15
all documentions coming in or out of your office.
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In the mailing I received from you was:
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1. WCSO Mugshot Profile booking no: 1119876, one page
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2. Criminal Complaint 11-22185, one page, signed by Richard Hill, not filestamped
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3. ARrest Report and Declaration of Probable Cause rpd 1101921 C r650225 , Declarant RPD Officer
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Carter, no Magistrate signature (please find out why), one page
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4. RPD, 3 pages 11-22185 Adminstrative Information, etc. (please subpoena and depose both RPD
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Officer's Lopez and Carter, asking them whether they verbally identified themselves prior to,
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according to Hill, kicking the door down, and further questions them concerning the accuracy of Hill's
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written statement and whether Officer Carter said to the accused that Richard Hill pays him, Officer
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Carter, a lot of money and therefore Carter arrests who Hills says to arrest and does what Hill says to
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do. Further, please depose both officers, asking whether the accused requested they take any action or
ask Hill any questions and whether the Officers did so. Please subpoena the RPD for any recordings,
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calls, documentation relating to this matter, or RPD Sargent Tarter's alleged retaliation against me and
the traffic citations he called in another RPD officer to write against me on or around November 15th,
2011. Please file a counterclaim alleged 42 USC 1983 violations againt the City of Reno and the
RPD, in addition to other appropriate counterclaims. Please depose Hill to verify his written account
that he actually walked into the Basement, that Merliss himself kicked the door down, whether the
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RPD Officers verbally identified themselves prior to the door being kicked down, whether the
accused hesitated at all upon the RPD identifying themselves, etc....
Sincerely,
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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Reno, NV 89501
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tel: 775 229-6737
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fax: 949 667 7402
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Nevada Bar No: 9473
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CORRECTION FW: client controls means and objectives of litigation under Rules of Professional
Conduct?
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12/14/11
Zach Coughlin
From:
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Sent:
Wed 12/14/11 1:19 AM
To:
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puenteslaw@aol.com
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Dear Mr. Puentes,
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Please amend the list below to include the following:

5. RPD Statement by Richard Hill 11-22185
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Further, please note I mistakenly noted in paragraph 4 below, that Hill was attributed as making a
written stament about entering the basement. Please, instead, ask the same questions of Officer Carter,
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as to whether he "entered the doorway of the basement and found..." and what exactly he means by
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"He was hesitant to come out and eventually did so". IE, what exactly does "eventually" mean? Like,
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one second, ten minutes? What? Whether Officer Carter ever actually stepped foot in the basement, or
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whether by writing that he "entered the doorway" Officer Carter is actually stating that he peeked his
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head in or otherwise peered in. Please inquire as to whether the RPD refused to kick the door down or
whether someone else did, etc. PLEASE ASK OFFICER CARTER WHETHER HIS WRITTEN
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STATMENT IS ENTIRELY ACCURATE WHERE IT ATTRIBUTES A QUOTE TO THE

ACCUSED THAT CARTER IS OR WAS "ON RICHARD HILL'S PAYROLL..." and further what
exactly was allegedly said about "working a deal". Please ask Carter and Lopez whether the accused
asked why they didn't just issue a citation and whether one would be arrested for getting their mail
after an eviction and why exactly an incarceration was necessary compared to a citation. Please
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further inquire as to whether these Officers refused to make any arrests or investigation requested by
the accused and whether Carter indicated that he would never arrest anyone based on anything said by
the person he is arresting at the time such accusations, or counter accusations, are made. Please
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further send Merliss and Hill subpoena duces tecum/interrogatories/request for production/ and
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request for admission seeking specific, written indication and evidence supporting all contentions in
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any of the materials upon which this arrest or this case is based, including, but not limited to Hill's
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written statement that "We have observed evidence that he was coming and going."
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Sincerely,
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Zach Coughlin
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Subject: client controls means and objectives of litigation under Rules of Professional Conduct
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Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 00:52:25 -0800
27
Dear Mr. Puentes,
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Please let me know when we can discuss my case, the trial is very soon. I received a mailing from
you, but it did not have a signed letter from you stating what was in the package. Please email me or
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4
5
6
fax me any document production in the future and redact my personally identifiable information from
all documentions coming in or out of your office.
In the mailing I received from you was:
1. WCSO Mugshot Profile booking no: 1119876, one page
2. Criminal Complaint 11-22185, one page, signed by Richard Hill, not filestamped
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11
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3. ARrest Report and Declaration of Probable Cause rpd 1101921 C r650225 , Declarant RPD Officer
Carter, no Magistrate signature (please find out why), one page
4. RPD, 3 pages 11-22185 Adminstrative Information, etc. (please subpoena and depose both RPD
13
Officer's Lopez and Carter, asking them whether they verbally identified themselves prior to,
14
according to Hill, kicking the door down, and further questions them concerning the accuracy of Hill's
15
written statement and whether Officer Carter said to the accused that Richard Hill pays him, Officer
16
Carter, a lot of money and therefore Carter arrests who Hills says to arrest and does what Hill says to
17
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do. Further, please depose both officers, asking whether the accused requested they take any action or
19
ask Hill any questions and whether the Officers did so. Please subpoena the RPD for any recordings,
20
calls, documentation relating to this matter, or RPD Sargent Tarter's alleged retaliation against me and
21
the traffic citations he called in another RPD officer to write against me on or around November 15th,
22
2011. Please file a counterclaim alleged 42 USC 1983 violations againt the City of Reno and the
23
24
RPD, in addition to other appropriate counterclaims. Please depose Hill to verify his written account
25
that he actually walked into the Basement, that Merliss himself kicked the door down, whether the
26
RPD Officers verbally identified themselves prior to the door being kicked down, whether the
27
accused hesitated at all upon the RPD identifying themselves, etc....
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Sincerely,
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
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tel: 775 229-6737

fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
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THIS COULD WIN THE CASE IN 11 CR 26405 2I?
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12/14/11
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Zach Coughlin
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From:
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Sent:
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Wed 12/14/11 5:02 AM
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To:
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puenteslaw@aol.com
5 attachments
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11 1 2011 Affidavit of Service, Notice of Entry of Order, and Order for Summary Eviction Rev2011001708.pdf (7.8 MB) , Affidavit of Service Sheriff's Machen 4 30 pm 11 1 2011.pdf (555.1 KB) , 12
14 11 fax to Puentes ISSUES THAT CAN WIN THE CASE.pdf (144.2 KB) , 11 21 11 Declaration of
Richard Hill attach to his M for OSC (11-21-11) Compare to Police Reports and deposition of RPD's
Carter and Lopez and Merliss.pdf (791.4 KB) , 11 21 2011 REV2011-00178 RICHARD HILL'S M
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11
12
for OSC (11-21-11).pdf (711.7 KB)

Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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Reno, NV 89501
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Tel: please only communicate in writing
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Fax: 949 667 7402
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Licensed in Nevada, NV Bar No: 9473
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December 14th, 2011
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Dear Mr. Puentes,
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Mr. Puentes,
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Please find attached the Affidavit of Service, filed November 7th, 2011 in the eviction case in RJC
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(REV2011-0017808) from which the trespass case you are Attorney of Record for (RMC 11 CR
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26405 2I) stems. TURNS OUT, THE AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE FILED BY THE WASHOE
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COUNTY SHERIFF'S AUTHORIZED AGENT, JOHN MACHEN ADMITS, IN WRITING, THAT
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THE EVICTION ORDER AND LOCKOUT WERE SERVED AND CONDUCTED PRIOR TO
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THE TIME AND DATE CALLED FOR BY THE EVICTION ORDER (WHICH WAS NOT EVEN
PUT INTO THE MAIL WITH A PROOF OF SERVICE UNTIL NOVEMBER 1, 2011...AND NRCP
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4-6 APPLY TO STATUTORY UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTIONS, THEREFORE, THE RJC IS

CLOSED FRIDAYS AND OTHER NON JUDICIAL DAYS DO NOT COUNT, NOR DOES THE
DAY THE ORDER IS SIGNED COUNT). PLEASE ALSO FIND ATTACHED RICHARD HILL,
ESQ'S DECLARATION ATTACHED TO A MOTION TO SHOW CAUSE HE FILED IN
REV2011-001708, WHICH I BELIEVE MAY PROVIDE FERTILE GROUND FOR IMPEACHING
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THE WRITTEN STATEMENTS AND FUTURE TESTIMONY OF RPD OFFICER'S CARTER,

LOPEZ, LANDLORD MERLISS, HILL HIMSELF, ETC. PLEASE DO NOT DISCUSS THIS
VERBALLY OR IN WRITING WITH ANYONE OTHER THAN MYSELF ABSENT MY
EXPRESS WRITTEN CONSENT PRIOR TO DOING SO.
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I prefer to discuss this with you prior to your taking any action in relation to this illegal lockout or
insufficient service of process or early lockout or however it is described. The Sheriff's server,
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Machen, might try to argue that he served the Eviction Order at 4:30 pm, then waited around until
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after 5 pm (as required by the Eviction Order) to perform the actual lockout. I think it would be best
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to get Machen admitting, by tricking him into admitting, if necessary, that he performed the lockout
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within minutes of serving the Eviction Order.
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Further, the law in our State does not seem exceptionally clear with regard to the service and process
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requirements and timelines, and manner of calculating time with respect to the "receipt" of Lockout
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Orders. The Affidavit of Service by Machen states that he "personally served the described
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documents upon" my, Zach Coughlin...However, I can attest by Affidavit that I was not "personally
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served" to the extent that "personally served" means or implies that I was there, that Machen saw me
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or identified me, or any of the other indicators of something, such as a Complaint, being "personally
served" such as I understand the phrase to me. NRCP 5(b)(2)(A)(i-iii). Further, as Baker and Hill
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have so often pointed out, I cannot, according to them, receive any attorney's fee award for appearing
as pro se attorney, as such, NRCP 5(b)(2)(A)(i-iii), should apply to me only as a party, and not as a
party's attorney, and, therefore, according to NRCP 5, Service: "(2) Service under this rule is made
by: (A) Delivering a copy to the attorney or the party by: (i) handing it to the attorney or to the party;
(ii) leaving it at the attorneys or partys office with a clerk or other person in charge, or if
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there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place in the office; or (iii) if the office is closed
or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the persons dwelling house or usual place of
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion residing there..." So, either it was my office, in
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which case a No Cause Eviction Notice makes impermissible a Summary Eviction Proceeding under
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NRS 40.253, and therefore, the Order of Summary Eviction is void for lack of jurisdiction, or, the
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Affidavit of Service was on my home, and was not "handed" to me, or "personally served" (despite
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the Affidavit attesting to having "personally served" me), nor was the Order of Summary Eviction
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served in accordance with NRCP 5(b)(2)(A)(iii), which requires: "if the office is closed or the person
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to be served has no office, leaving it at the persons dwelling house or usual place of abode with
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some person of suitable age and discretion residing there.."
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Further, I believe posting an Order on one's residence door, particularly in the context of serving a No
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Cause Notice of Eviction or Unlawful Detainer, is only valid if the document being served is also
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placed in the mail and 3 non judicial days are accorded for service to be complete. See NRCP 6(e). I
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do not believe they can prove that at all, not even close. NRCP applies to Summary Eviction Actions,
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according to the following:
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"NRS 40.380 Provisions governing appeals. Either party may, within 10 days, appeal from the
judgment rendered. But an appeal by the defendant shall not stay the execution of the judgment,
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unless, within the 10 days, the defendant shall execute and file with the court or justice the
defendants undertaking to the plaintiff, with two or more sureties, in an amount to be fixed by
the court or justice, but which shall not be less than twice the amount of the judgment and costs, to
the effect that, if the judgment appealed from be affirmed or the appeal be dismissed, the appellant
will pay the judgment and the cost of appeal, the value of the use and occupation of the property, and
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damages justly accruing to the plaintiff during the pendency of the appeal. Upon taking the appeal
and filing the undertaking, all further proceedings in the case shall be stayed.?
Actually, a lot of people seemed confused regarding the 24 hours? lockout thing. The only
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appearance in either NRS 118A or NRS 40, in the provisions applicable to Summary Eviction
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Proceedings of anything related to 24 hours? is in NRS 40.253(5), which only speaks to a
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situation where the Tenant does not file a Tenant's Answer or Tenant's Affidavit, which is clearly
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inapplicable here, as the Tenant did file such a Opposition to the No Cause Eviction Notice: 5.
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Upon noncompliance with the notice:
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(a) The landlord or the landlords agent may apply by affidavit of complaint for eviction to the
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justice court of the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises
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are located or to the district court of the county in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or
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commercial premises are located, whichever has jurisdiction over the matter. The court may
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thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within
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24 hours after receipt of the order. The affidavit must state or contain...?
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So, absent some statutory provision allowing the Order of Summary Eviction to result in a lockout by
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the Washoe County Sheriff's Office prior to the 3 days for mailing where personal service of the
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Order of Summary Eviction was not effectuated, despite what WCSO employee may have incorrectly
(or falsely) asserted in the WCSO's John Machem's Affidavit of Service from, file stamped November
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7, 2011 (especially where it is timestamped 4:30 pm, November 1, 2011, especially where the Order
of Summary Eviction explicitly reads that no such lockout shall occur prior to 5:00 pm on November
1, 2011). See, NRCP 5(b)(2)(A)(i-iii), NRCP 6(e).
Interestingly, Richard Hill knows his case is toast under NRCP 5(b)(2)(A)(i-iii), NRCP 6(e), in
addition to NRCP 11. That is why in Richard Hill's November 21, 2011 Motion for Order To Show
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Cause, on page 2, Hills resorts to literally grasping at straws, imagining that what the Washoe County
Sheriff's Office customarily does is somehow automatically codified into mandatory precedent black
letter law. To wit, Richard Hill wrote in his Motion For Order To Show Cause that: FACTS
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SHOWING CONTEMPT OF COURT 6. EXHIBIT 1 was served on Coughlin on November " 2011
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by the Washoe County Sheriffs Department, by posting same on the front door of the property in the
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manner customary for evictions in Washoe County. The locks to the premises were changed at that
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time, thereby ejecting and dispossessing Coughlin of possession of the Property.? Further, therein
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Richard Hill admits that the lockout occurred at 4:30 pm, as indicated in writing in the WCSO's
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Machem's Affidavit of Service, contra to the mandate of Judge Sferrazza's Order of Summary
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Eviction requiring any lockout to occur after 5:00 pm, November 1, 2011.
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NRS 40.385 Stay of execution upon appeal; duty of tenant who retains possession of premises to pay
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rent during stay. Upon an appeal from an order entered pursuant to NRS 40.253:
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1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay of execution may be obtained by filing with
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the trial court a bond in the amount of $250 to cover the expected costs on appeal. In an action
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concerning a lease of commercial property or any other property for which the monthly rent exceeds
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$1,000, the court may, upon its own motion or that of a party, and upon a showing of good cause,
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order an additional bond to be posted to cover the expected costs on appeal. A surety upon the bond
submits to the jurisdiction of the appellate court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of that court as the
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suretys agent upon whom papers affecting the suretys liability upon the bond may be served.
Liability of a surety may be enforced, or the bond may be released, on motion in the appellate court
without independent action.
2. A tenant who retains possession of the premises that are the subject of the appeal during the
pendency of the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount provided in the underlying
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contract between the tenant and the landlord as it becomes due. If the tenant fails to pay such rent, the
landlord may initiate new proceedings for a summary eviction by serving the tenant with a new notice
pursuant to NRS 40.253.
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NRS 40.390 Appellate court not to dismiss or quash proceedings for want of form. In all cases of
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appeal under NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, the appellate court shall not dismiss or quash the
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proceedings for want of form, provided the proceedings have been conducted substantially according
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to the provisions of NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive; and amendments to the complaint, answer or
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summons, in matters of form only, may be allowed by the court at any time before final judgment
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upon such terms as may be just; and all matters of excuse, justification or avoidance of the allegations
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in the complaint may be given in evidence under the answer.
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NRS 40.400 Rules of practice. The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure and Nevada
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Rules of Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals and new trials, so far as they are not
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inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings
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mentioned in those sections.?
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So, considering that NRS 40.400 requires that NRCP apply to Summary Eviction Proceedings under
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NRS 40.253, then service, process, and time calculations of such must comport with the dictates of
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NRCP 5-6: "RULE 5. SERVICE AND FILING OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER PAPERS
(a) Service: When Required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, every order required by its
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terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to the original complaint unless the court otherwise
orders because of numerous defendants, every paper relating to discovery required to be served upon
a party unless the court otherwise orders, every written motion other than one which may be heard ex
parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, designation of record on
appeal, and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. No service need be made on parties
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in default for failure to appear except that pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief
against them shall be served upon them in the manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4.
(b) Same: How Made.
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(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented
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by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney unless the court orders that service be
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made upon the party.
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(2) Service under this rule is made by:
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(A) Delivering a copy to the attorney or the party by:
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(i) handing it to the attorney or to the party;
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(ii) leaving it at the attorneys or partys office with a clerk or other person in charge, or if
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there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place in the office; or
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(iii) if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the persons
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dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion residing there.
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(B) Mailing a copy to the attorney or the party at his or her last known address. Service by mail is
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complete on mailing; provided, however, a motion, answer or other document constituting the initial
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appearance of a party must also, if served by mail, be filed within the time allowed for service; and
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provided further, that after such initial appearance, service by mail be made only by mailing from a
point within the State of Nevada.
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(C) If the attorney or the party has no known address, leaving a copy with the clerk of the court.
(D) Delivering a copy by electronic means if the attorney or the party served has consented to service
by electronic means. Service by electronic means is complete on transmission provided, however, a
motion, answer or other document constituting the initial appearance of a party must also, if served by
electronic means, be filed within the time allowed for service. The served attorneys or
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partys consent to service by electronic means shall be expressly stated and filed in writing with
the clerk of the court and served on the other parties to the action. The written consent shall identify:
(i) the persons upon whom service must be made;
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(ii) the appropriate address or location for such service, such as the electronic-mail address or
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facsimile number;
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(iii) the format to be used for attachments; and
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(iv) any other limits on the scope or duration of the consent.
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An attorneys or partys consent shall remain effective until expressly revoked or until the
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representation of a party changes through entry, withdrawal, or substitution of counsel. An attorney or
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party who has consented to service by electronic means shall, within 10 days after any change of
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electronic-mail address or facsimile number, serve and file notice of the new electronic-mail address
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or facsimile number.
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(3) Service by electronic means under Rule 5(b)(2)(D) is not effective if the party making service
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learns that the attempted service did not reach the person to be served.
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(4) Proof of service may be made by certificate of an attorney or of the attorneys employee, or
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by written admission, or by affidavit, or other proof satisfactory to the court. Failure to make proof of
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service shall not affect the validity of service...
RULE 6. TIME
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(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the local
rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or
default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of
the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a nonjudicial day, in
which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
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nonjudicial day, or, when the act to be done is the filing of a paper in court, a day on which weather
or other conditions have made the office of the clerk of the district court inaccessible, in which event
the period runs until the end of the next day which is not one of the aforementioned days. When the
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period of time prescribed or allowed is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and
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nonjudicial days shall be excluded in the computation except for those proceedings filed under Titles
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12 or 13 of the Nevada Revised Statutes...
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(e) Additional Time After Service by Mail or Electronic Means. Whenever a party has the right or is
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required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a
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notice or other paper, other than process, upon the party and the notice or paper is served upon the
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party by mail or by electronic means, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.
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Subdivision (a) is revised to extend the exclusion of intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and
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nonjudicial days to the computation of time periods less than 11 days consistent with the 1985
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amendments to the federal rule. Additionally, the inaccessibility of the court provision
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found in subdivision (a) of the federal rule is added to Rule 6(a). Subdivision (a) is further amended,
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by adding language referring to proceedings filed under Titles 12 or 13 of the Nevada Revised
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Statutes, to avoid any changes to current procedures in probate, guardianship and trust
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proceedings....
Subdivision (e) is amended to provide an additional 3 days to act in response to a paper that is served
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by electronic means under new paragraph (2)(D) added to Rule 5(b)."

NRS 40.253 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and exclusion of tenant
for default in payment of rent.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 10, in addition to the remedy provided in NRS 40.2512
and 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive, when the tenant of any
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dwelling, apartment, mobile home, recreational vehicle or commercial premises with periodic rent
reserved by the month or any shorter period is in default in payment of the rent, the landlord or the
landlords agent, unless otherwise agreed in writing, may serve or have served a notice in writing,
requiring in the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the premises...
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4. If the tenant files such an affidavit at or before the time stated in the notice, the landlord or the
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landlords agent, after receipt of a file-stamped copy of the affidavit which was filed, shall not
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provide for the nonadmittance of the tenant to the premises by locking or otherwise.
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5. Upon noncompliance with the notice:
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24 hours after receipt of the order..
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6. Upon the filing by the tenant of the affidavit permitted in subsection 3, regardless of the
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information contained in the affidavit, and the filing by the landlord of the affidavit permitted by
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subsection 5, the justice court or the district court shall hold a hearing, after service of notice of the
hearing upon the parties, to determine the truthfulness and sufficiency of any affidavit or notice
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provided for in this section. If the court determines that there is no legal defense as to the alleged
unlawful detainer and the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary
order for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant. If the court
determines that there is a legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer, the court shall refuse to
grant either party any relief, and, except as otherwise provided in this subsection, shall require that
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any further proceedings be conducted pursuant to NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive. The issuance of a
summary order for removal of the tenant does not preclude an action by the tenant for any damages or
other relief to which the tenant may be entitled....
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7. The tenant may, upon payment of the appropriate fees relating to the filing and service of a
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motion, file a motion with the court, on a form provided by the clerk of the court, to dispute the
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amount of the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118.207 or 118A.460 for the
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inventory, moving and storage of personal property left on the premises. The motion must be filed
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within 20 days after the summary order for removal of the tenant or the abandonment of the premises
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by the tenant, or within 20 days after:
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(a) The tenant has vacated or been removed from the premises; and
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(b) A copy of those charges has been requested by or provided to the tenant,
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whichever is later.
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8. Upon the filing of a motion pursuant to subsection 7, the court shall schedule a hearing on the
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motion. The hearing must be held within 10 days after the filing of the motion. The court shall affix
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the date of the hearing to the motion and order a copy served upon the landlord by the sheriff,
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constable or other process server. At the hearing, the court may:
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(a) Determine the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118.207 or 118A.460 and
any accumulating daily costs; and
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(b) Order the release of the tenants property upon the payment of the charges determined to be
due or if no charges are determined to be due.?
Landlord Merliss filed only a No Cause Notice of Eviction in REV2011-001708 on Commercial
Tenant Zach Coughlin, Esq.'s law office. As such, a Summary Eviction Proceeding is impermissible
given the requirement of NRS 40.253 that the Notice alleged non-payment of rent to allow the
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landlord to proceed under the Summary Eviction Proceeding section, NRS 40.253. Further, Judge
Sferrazza was precluded from ruling on anything other than possession of the premises pursuant to
NRS 40.253(6), Anvui, and Glazier. Further, the tenancy did not terminate under the Lease
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Agreement, it ws renewed.
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NRS 40.254 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and exclusion of tenant
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from certain types of property. Except as otherwise provided by specific statute, in addition to the
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remedy provided in NRS 40.251 and in NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive, when the tenant of a
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dwelling unit which is subject to the provisions of chapter 118A of NRS, part of a low-rent housing
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program operated by a public housing authority, a mobile home or a recreational vehicle is guilty of
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an unlawful detainer, the landlord is entitled to the summary procedures provided in NRS 40.253
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except that:
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1. Written notice to surrender the premises must:...(e) A statement that the claim for relief was
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authorized by law.
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As such, the too early lockout brings into play the following:
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NRS 118A.390 Unlawful removal or exclusion of tenant or willful interruption of essential
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services; procedure for expedited relief.
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1. If the landlord unlawfully removes the tenant from the premises or excludes the tenant by blocking
or attempting to block the tenants entry upon the premises or willfully interrupts or causes or
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permits the interruption of any essential service required by the rental agreement or this chapter, the
tenant may recover immediate possession pursuant to subsection 4, proceed under NRS 118A.380 or
terminate the rental agreement and, in addition to any other remedy, recover the tenants actual
damages, receive an amount not greater than $1,000 to be fixed by the court, or both.
2. In determining the amount, if any, to be awarded under subsection 1, the court shall consider:
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(a) Whether the landlord acted in good faith;

(b) The course of conduct between the landlord and the tenant; and
(c) The degree of harm to the tenant caused by the landlords conduct.
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3. If the rental agreement is terminated pursuant to subsection 1, the landlord shall return all prepaid
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rent and security recoverable under this chapter.
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4. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 5, the tenant may recover immediate possession of the
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premises from the landlord by filing a verified complaint for expedited relief for the unlawful removal
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or exclusion of the tenant from the premises or the willful interruption of essential services.
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5. A verified complaint for expedited relief:
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(a) Must be filed with the court within 5 judicial days after the date of the unlawful act by the
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landlord, and the verified complaint must be dismissed if it is not timely filed. If the verified
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complaint for expedited relief is dismissed pursuant to this paragraph, the tenant retains the right to
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pursue all other available remedies against the landlord.
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(b) May not be filed with the court if an action for summary eviction or unlawful detainer is already
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pending between the landlord and tenant, but the tenant may seek similar relief before the judge
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presiding over the pending action.
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6. The court shall conduct a hearing on the verified complaint for expedited relief within 3 judicial
days after the filing of the verified complaint for expedited relief. Before or at the scheduled hearing,
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the tenant must provide proof that the landlord has been properly served with a copy of the verified
complaint for expedited relief. Upon the hearing, if it is determined that the landlord has violated any
of the provisions of subsection 1, the court may:
(a) Order the landlord to restore to the tenant the premises or essential services, or both;
(b) Award damages pursuant to subsection 1; and
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(c) Enjoin the landlord from violating the provisions of subsection 1 and, if the circumstances so
warrant, hold the landlord in contempt of court.
7. The payment of all costs and official fees must be deferred for any tenant who files a verified
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complaint for expedited relief. After any hearing and not later than final disposition of the filing or
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order, the court shall assess the costs and fees against the party that does not prevail, except that the
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court may reduce them or waive them, as justice may require.?
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NRS 118A.090 Exclude? defined. Exclude? means to evict or to prohibit entry by
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locking doors or by otherwise blocking or attempting to block entry, or to make a dwelling unit
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uninhabitable by interrupting or causing the interruption of electric, gas, water or other essential
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services.?
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ALL PAPERS AND PLEADINGS AND CORRESPONDENCS PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED TO
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THE RENO JUSTICE COURT AND OR ITS EMPLOYEES IS HEREBY INCORPORATED BY
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REFERENCE INTO THIS FILING.
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NRS 118A.190: Notice: Definition; service.
1. A person has notice of a fact if:
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(a) The person has actual knowledge of it;

(b) The person has received a notice or notification of it; or
(c) From all the facts and circumstances the person reasonably should know that it exists.
2. Written notices to the tenant prescribed by this chapter shall be served in the manner provided by
NRS 40.280.
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3. Written notices to the landlord prescribed by this chapter may be delivered or mailed to the place of
business of the landlord designated in the rental agreement or to any place held out by the landlord as
the place for the receipt of rental payments from the tenant and are effective from the date of delivery
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or mailing.?
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NRS 40.280 Service of notices to quit; proof required before issuance of order to remove.
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1. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 40.253, the notices required by NRS 40.251 to 40.260,
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inclusive,
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may be served:
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(a) By delivering a copy to the tenant personally, in the presence of a witness;
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(b) If the tenant is absent from the tenants place of residence or from the tenants usual place
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of business, by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age and discretion at either place and mailing
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a copy to the tenant at the tenants place of residence or place of business; or
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(c) If the place of residence or business cannot be ascertained, or a person of suitable age or discretion
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cannot be found there, by posting a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased property, delivering a
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copy to a person there residing, if the person can be found, and mailing a copy to the tenant at the
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place where the leased property is situated.?
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I did not receive any of the emails allegedly sent to my from Richard Hill's email address,
rhill@richardhillaw.com between August 18th, 2011 to November 17th, 2011, and certainly none
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from rhill@richardhillaw.com during the period between the illegal lockout at 4:30 pm November 1,
2011 and the trespass arrest of November 13th, 2011 which allegedly spoke to my being provided
access to the property for the purpose of my removing my belongings, despite my numerous calls and
written requests, which outlined the exigencies inherent to my being precluded access to my client
files incident to an unlawful and improperly notice and too early occurring lockout by the WCSO. I
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and my business have been damaged greatly by these acts. Further, I had repeatedly sent both Baker
and Hill notice, in writing, that I did not consent to service or notice of anything via electronic means.
Further NRS 118A.190 does not speak to notice of? a legal finding, but rather to notice of a
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fact?. As such, I was not appropriately served notice of the Order of Summary Eviction, and an
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illegal lockout occurred, as such no criminal trespass charge can stand.
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NRS 118A.260 Disclosure of names and addresses of managers and owners; emergency
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telephone number; service of process.
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1. The landlord, or any person authorized to enter into a rental agreement on his or her behalf, shall
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disclose to the tenant in writing at or before the commencement of the tenancy:
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(a) The name and address of:
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(1) The persons authorized to manage the premises;
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(2) A person within this State authorized to act for and on behalf of the landlord for the purpose of
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service of process and receiving notices and demands; and
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(3) The principal or corporate owner.
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(b) A telephone number at which a responsible person who resides in the county or within 60 miles of
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where the premises are located may be called in case of emergency.
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2. The information required to be furnished by this section must be kept current, and this section is
enforceable against any successor landlord or manager of the premises.
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3. A party who enters into a rental agreement on behalf of the landlord and fails to comply with this
section is an agent of the landlord for purposes of:
(a) Service of process and receiving notices and demands; and
(b) Performing the obligations of the landlord under law and under the rental agreement.
4. In any action against a landlord which involves his or her rental property, service of process upon
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the manager of the property or a person described in paragraph (a) of subsection 1 shall be deemed to
be service upon the landlord. The obligations of the landlord devolve upon the persons authorized to
enter into a rental agreement on his or her behalf.
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5. This section does not limit or remove the liability of an undisclosed landlord.?
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NRS 40.310 Issue of fact to be tried by jury if proper demand made. Whenever an issue of fact is
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presented by the pleadings, it shall be tried by a jury, if proper demand is made pursuant to the
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Actually, a lot of people seemed confused regarding the 24 hours? lockout thing. The only
appearance in either NRS 118A or NRS 40, in the provisions applicable to Summary Eviction
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Proceedings of anything related to 24 hours? is in NRS 40.253(5), which only speaks to a
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situation where the Tenant does not file a Tenant's Answer or Tenant's Affidavit, which is clearly
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inapplicable here, as the Tenant did file such a Opposition to the No Cause Eviction Notice: 5.
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Upon noncompliance with the notice:
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24 hours after receipt of the order. The affidavit must state or contain...?
So, absent some statutory provision allowing the Order of Summary Eviction to result in a lockout by
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the Washoe County Sheriff's Office prior to the 3 days for mailing where personal service of the
Order of Summary Eviction was not effectuated, despite what WCSO employee may have incorrectly
(or falsely) asserted in the WCSO's John Machem's Affidavit of Service from, file stamped November
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7, 2011 (especially where it is timestamped 4:30 pm, November 1, 2011, especially where the Order
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of Summary Eviction explicitly reads that no such lockout shall occur prior to 5:00 pm on November
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1, 2011). See, NRCP 5(b)(2)(A)(i-iii), NRCP 6(e).
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Interestingly, Richard Hill knows his case is toast under NRCP 5(b)(2)(A)(i-iii), NRCP 6(e), in
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addition to NRCP 11. That is why in Richard Hill's November 21, 2011 Motion for Order To Show
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Cause, on page 2, Hills resorts to literally grasping at straws, imagining that what the Washoe County
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Sheriff's Office customarily does is somehow automatically codified into mandatory precedent black
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letter law. To wit, Richard Hill wrote in his Motion For Order To Show Cause that: FACTS
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SHOWING CONTEMPT OF COURT 6. EXHIBIT 1 was served on Coughlin on November " 2011
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by the Washoe County Sheriffs Department, by posting same on the front door of the property in the
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manner customary for evictions in Washoe County. The locks to the premises were changed at that
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time, thereby ejecting and dispossessing Coughlin of possession of the Property.? Further, therein
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Richard Hill admits that the lockout occurred at 4:30 pm, as indicated in writing in the WCSO's
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Machem's Affidavit of Service, contra to the mandate of Judge Sferrazza's Order of Summary
Eviction requiring any lockout to occur after 5:00 pm, November 1, 2011.
Sincerely,
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
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tel: 775 229-6737

fax: 949 667 7402
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Nevada Bar No: 9473
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Sincerely,
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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FW: THIS COULD WIN THE CASE IN 11 CR 26405 2I?
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12/14/11
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Zach Coughlin
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From:
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Sent:
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Wed 12/14/11 5:39 AM
To:
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puenteslaw@aol.com
5 attachments
11 1 2011 Affidavit of Service, Notice of Entry of Order, and Order for Summary Eviction Rev2011-
001708.pdf (7.8 MB) , Affidavit of Service Sheriff's Machen 4 30 pm 11 1 2011.pdf (555.1 KB) , 12
14 11 fax to Puentes ISSUES THAT CAN WIN THE CASE.pdf (144.2 KB) , 11 21 11 Declaration of
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Richard Hill attach to his M for OSC (11-21-11) Compare to Police Reports and deposition of RPD's
Carter and Lopez and Merliss.pdf (791.4 KB) , 11 21 2011 REV2011-00178 RICHARD HILL'S M
for OSC (11-21-11).pdf (711.7 KB)
Hi Mr. Puentes,
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What is inconsistent in the discovery you provided me and Hill's Motion to Show Cause? I am
interested to see what you come up with and who you would want to ask what questions. I went to the
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University of Washington too, for awhile at least, year round from 9/95 to 12/96.
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Hill's Declaration in his 11 21, 2011 Motion to Show Cause indicates that:
"DECLARATION OF RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ. RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ., being first duly sworn,
deposes and under penalty of perjury avers:
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1. I am a resident of the City of Reno, County of Washoe, State of Nevada, and over 18 years
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of age. This declaration is based on my personal knowledge, except those matters stated on
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support of plaintiffs Motion for Contempt Citation, and represents my testimony if called on to
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2. I am an attorney duly licensed as such by the State of Nevada to practice before all courts of
this State and maintain my office at 652 Forest Street, Reno, Nevada. I am also licensed to practice
before the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
and the United States Supreme Court.
3. My office represents the plaintiff, Dr. Matthew Merliss, in this matter.
4. On October 27, 2011, this court signed a summary eviction order, and on November 1,
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2011, the Washoe County Sheriff's Department served that order. The notice was posted on the door
of the home by the Washoe County Sheriff's Department in the manner customary in Washoe County
for evictions. The locks on the front door and back door were changed, and we retained all keys to the
home.
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5. After that date, I began to notice that it looked like somebody had been getting into the
home. On approximately November 4, 2011, I became concerned about the home and its contents. I
entered it and was able to confirm that "somebody" had been getting in. I thought I had secured the
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means of entry being used by whoever it was that was getting in. However, on later visits to the
home, it was clear that the home was still being surreptitiously accessed.
6. On November 13, 2011, Dr. Merliss came to Reno because he wanted to inspect the home.
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Upon entry, it was clear that somebody had again accessed the home.
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7. We tried to enter the basement and found the door was barricaded, not locked, from the
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inside. We were concerned that whoever had been accessing the home was inside, so we called the
police.
8. When the police arrived, they agreed with us that it was very likely that somebody was
barricaded in the basement. The police tried to coax the personto come out, but without success.
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9. When the police declined to break down the door, Dr. Merliss did so. The police looked
inside and discovered the defendant, Zachary Coughlin, and his dog.
10. Coughlin came out peacefully, went upstairs and was placed under arrest
by the police for trespassing.
11. After Coughlin was taken to jail, Dr. Merliss and I tried to videotape the contents ofthe
basement where Coughlin had been hiding. It was too dark to effectively videotape, but we were able
to ascertain that Coughlin and his dog have been living. in the basement of the home for quite some
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time, likely even before the lockout. I observed that Coughlin had a bed set up. He had several
computer monitors. He had a store of both food and water. He had electric space heaters.
12. Since the eviction order was served, my associate, Mr. Baker, and I had sent numerous
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emails to Coughlin, in which we both repeatedly made it clear to him that he was not to be at the
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home without our prior permission. No such permission was given. Mr. Coughlin had no reason to
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possibly think he was permitted on the property. We had tried to coax him to cooperate on getting his
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possessions out, without success, or even a response.
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13. As a result of Mr. Coughlin's break-ins, Dr. Merliss has incurred a bill of $1,060 with a
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licensed contractor to secure the premises. That does not include the cost of the door that was broken
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in order to get Coughlin out. That does not include the numerous hours of me and my staff to deal
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with Mr. Coughlin's repeated break-ins at the home.
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14. I am no expert, but I believe Mr. Coughlin is what is called a "hoarder." He has many car
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seats throughout the house. He has many dead televisions. He has a box of car window servo motors.
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The attic, which can only be accessed through a very narrow opening, is full of items, including dead
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electronic devices.
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15. We have found drugs at the home. We found a bag of what looks like marijuana on the
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kitchen counter. I found a crack pipe. The contractor found what he said was a large quantity of pills.
16. Mr. Coughlin has been harassing and stalking me, and possibly, my staff. On November
15, 2011, he burst intomy office and created a scene. Then, he was parading up and down the
sidewalk across the street with a video camera screaming obscenities at me and my staff.
17. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct...Dated this 21st day
of November, 2011 /s/ Richard G. Hill, Esq."
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The 11/13/11 Criminal Complaint against Coughlin for criminal trespass in RMC 11 CR
26405 reads: I Richard G. Hill, on behalf of Matthew Merliss, hereby complain and say that Zachary
B. Coughlin has committed the crime of trespass to wit: That said defendant on or about November
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13, 2011, in the City of Reno, State of Nevada, at 121 River Rock St., the Def found on the property
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after being evicted. All of which is in violation of 8.10.010 of the Reno Municipal Code. I therefore
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request that said Defendant be deale with according to law. I hereby declare upon information and
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belief under penalty of perjury pursuant to NRS 171.102, that the foregoing is true and correct to the
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best of my knowledge. /s/ Richard G. Hill, Esq., Complainant 11/13/11.

RPD Officer Chris Carter, Jr.'s 11/13/11 Arrest Report and Declaration of Probable Cause
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reads: On the above date, time and location the defendant was found inside the house after being
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served an eviction noticed and being evicted on 11/1/11. The TP state he believes the defendant has
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beein and out of the house since being evicted. Due to the likelihood that the def. Would return he
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did not qualify for a citation. (reviewing supervisor RPD Sargent Marcia Lopez) (no warrant
indicated).
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Hill's Written Statement of 11/13/11 is included in the Police Report and reads: We
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represent the property owner. WE evicted Coughlin. The papers were posted by WCSO on 11/1/11.
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We have observed evidence that he was coming and going. Today we found him barricaded in the
basement. Called RPD. /s/ Richard G. Hill, Esq.
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But RPD Officer Carter wrote in his Supplemental Declaration to his 11/13/11Police Report:
"On November 13, 2011 at approximately 1200 hours I responded to 121 River Rock St, Reno, on a
report of an unwanted subject in the home. I arrived on scene with Sgt Lopez and we met with the
RIP. Richard Hill, who told us the following:Richard is a local attorney who is representing the home
owner, Matthew Merliss. Matthew filed eviction papers on his tenant, Zachary Coughlin, at 121 River
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Rock St last month and they were served at the home by leaving them on the door. The eviction
papers stated that Zachary was to vacate the property on November 1, 2011 .
Matthew has been to the house several times over the past week and has observed evidence of
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someone coming and going. Today he was at the house and found the basement door to be locked
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from inside.Matthew contacted Richard who responded and called the police.
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Sgt Lopez and I knocked on the basement door and announced loudly "Reno Police" and
called out for Zachary to open the door. We were met with no response. Matthew decided he would
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kick the door open, and did so. I entered the doorway of the basement and found Zachary standing at
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the rear of the room holding a small dog. He was hesitant to come out and eventually did so. Zachary
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came upstairs and instantly started arguing his legal standing in the house, asking me "hypothetically
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speaking" type questions. He then told me I was making a false arrest due to the fact that I am on
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Richard Hill's payroll and he was going to sue me. I tried to explain to Zachary that he was seNed
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eviction papers and he asked me what I could do about it if he hypothetically didn't get them . He then
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told me that he had worked a deal with Matthew to continue paying rent and that the legal eviction
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was no longer valid. I again tried to explain to Zachary that a judge had signed an order forcing him
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to leave the property and all he did was cite civil case law to me (l'm unsure if any of the cases he was
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rambling on about even exist) and tell me that I was making a bad arrest. Due to Zachary not
believing he has done anything wrong that the fact he believes he still has standing there is reasonable
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grounds to believe Zachary will return to the house. Therefore he did not qualify for a misdemeanor
citation.
Richard completed a statement on Matthews' behalf and signed a criminal complaint. Zachary
was transported and booked into the Washoe County Jail without incident for Trespassing."
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Further, Richard Hill's own Written Statment of 11 13, 2011, provided to the RPD writes that
"We evicted Coughlin. The papers were posted by WCSO on 11/1/11 We have observed evidence
that he was coming and going...."
Why didn't Merliss make a Written Statement. Was Merliss really in Reno during the time
frame to observe what Hill asserts Merliss observed in Hill's Declaration of 11 21, 2011? What other
holes do you see?
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Hills 11 21, 2011 Declaration states that:

"6. On November 13, 2011, Dr. Merliss came to Reno because he wanted to inspect the home.
Upon entry, it was clear that somebody had again accessed the home.
7. We tried to enter the basement and found the door was barricaded, not locked, from the
inside. We were concerned that whoever had been accessing the home was
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inside, so we called the police.

8. When the police arrived, they agreed with us that it was very likely that somebody was
barricaded in the basement. The police tried to coax the person to come out, but without success.
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9. When the police declined to break down the door, Dr. Merliss did so. The police looked
inside and discovered the defendant, Zachary Coughlin, and his dog.
10. Coughlin came out peacefully, went upstairs and was placed under arres by the police for
trespassing."
However, RPD Officer Carter's Narrative, on page 3 of 3 from his November 14th, 2011
Report writes that: "Matthew has been to the house several times over the past week and has observed
evidence of someone coming and going. Today he was at the house and found the basement door to
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be locked from inside.

Matthew contacted Richard who responded and called the police. Sgt Lopez and I knocked on
the basement door and announced loudly "Reno Police" and called out for Zachary to open the door.
We were met with no response. Matthew decided he would kick the door open, and did so.
I entered the doorway of the basement and found Zachary standing at the rear of the room
holding a small dog. He was hesitant to come out and eventually did so."
Hill's Declaration contains nothing about this "reluctance" RPD Officer Carter mentions.
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Further, Hill's Declaration makes no mention of Merliss's noticing anything at the property or any
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trips by Merliss to the property, in marked contrast to RPD Officer's Carter writing that "Matthew has
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been to the house several times over the past week and has observed evidence of someone coming
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and going." Additionally, Merliss picked up my dog and held it in his hands close to his body and
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demanded that I let him have it, and the RPD Officers did nothing about it, further, Merliss was
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taunting me during the arrest demanding I give him "some more eye contact", accusing me of costing
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him $20,000 for the informed consent wrong site legal surgery that was Hill's billing of $20K in a
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Summary Eviction Proceeding where JCRCP 3 and NRS 69.030 preclude an award of fees, etc.
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Notice Hill's Declaration only writes that "the police tried to coax the person out" but clearly does not
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corroborate RPD's Carter's assertion that the RPD announced itself as police prior to the door being
kicked down. Hills Written Statement that the eviction papers were "served" by the WCSO "leaving
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them on the door" is a violation of NRCP 11 and leaves him and his client liable for the wrongful
arrest and defamation that occurred incident to RPD's actions.
Zach Coughlin, Esq. 817 N. Virginia St. #2
The closing arguments and ruling or opinion in the criminal trespass case in 26405 follows:
BY MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS:
This case, I'll tell you, has been, frankly by the testimony
presented today, proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The charge of Trespass
was proven by at least two different avenues in this case.
Mr. Coughlin was warned not to trespass, not to go on 121
River Rock, which is in the City o f Reno, and he was warned at least five
times by these people in all kinds of different manner.
He was warned originally when he was sent a 5-day and a 30day notice. They didn't want him on the property. They wanted him to quit.
They wanted him to leave the property. They sent those notices.
Page - 126He was noticed again on an additional 5-day notice sometime
later before the 0/25 proceeding where they sent another notice asking him
to leave the property.
Most importantly in this case, Your Honor, is the 1 0/25
hearing where Judge Sferrazza - where Judge Sferrazza announced in open
Court where Mr. Coughlin was present, that the eviction is granted.
And I draw Your Honor's attention to City's 1 . IfI could find
that, I would THE COURT: Do you need a copy of it? I have it right here in
evidence.
MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: No, it's in evidence, Your Honor.
And I'll draw your attention to the part that says, "Decision."
And it also says, "Matthew Merliss present, Casey Baker - represented by
Casey Baker," and then it also indicates Zachary Coughlin present.
And then I'll draw your attention to the decision where it says
"eviction granted effective October 3 1 st, 20 1 1, at 5 :00 p.m."
That's what Judge Sferrazza announced in open Court with
Mr. Coughlin, according to Mr. Baker, listening, actively listening to the
Judge. He wasn't writing anything down, but he was actively listening to
the Judge when he announced that decision in open Court.
And you have the Order granting eviction right there.
Now, there was another issue whether or not the proceedings
were stayed pending some sort of appeal, but that Motion to Stay was also
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denied in the October 25th, 20 1 1 , hearing. And you'll see in City's 1, it

Page -1 27actually says, "Tenant's verbal motion to stay, denied." The case was over
at that point.
Then, Mr. Baker drafted up the Findings of Facts, Conclusions
of Law, and Order of Summary Eviction. That was provided to you as
City's 2. That was also emailed to Mr. Coughlin. There's another notice
that they don't want him here. They want him off the property. They
warned him to be off the property as of October 3 1 st at 5 :00 p.m.
This Order of Eviction specifies that Mr. Coughlin, excuse me,
the tenant of the property or anyone thereon, is to be out of the property no
earlier than October 3 1 st, 20 1 1 , at 5:00 p.m., just as announced in open Court
on 1 0125.
So, Mr. Baker emailed that document to Mr. Coughlin as a
courtesy, I imagine. And then what happens next? On November 1, 20 1 1,
1 2 days before the trespass in this case, Mr. Hill executes a Notice of Entry
of Order and sends that to Mr. Coughlin's last known address, as he would
normally do in his course of business, i s send a Notice of Entry of Order.
And what does he attach to that? The Findings of Facts,
Conclusions of Law, and Order of Summary Eviction.
What does Mr. Coughlin do in response to that? 1 2 days, 1 3
days after Mr. Coughlin was evicted from that property, pursuant to Judge
Sferrazza's Order of Eviction, he's found on the property by Mr. Hill.
In fact, Mr. Hill testifies he sees him walk up the stairs from
the basement, walk in the living room into - or in the kitchen into the living
room. He's at the house after he's been evicted from the property. That is a
criminal trespass, Your Honor.
Page -1 28He's been warned many times that they do not want him there,
and yet, he's there on the property after being formally evicted, after going
through all of the Court proceedings, and that doesn't keep him out. He
goes back after all of this.
There's another issue here too, Your Honor. The City argues
that anyone that goes on the property and "lives in the property" was found
in his pajamas, his night - a shirt, slippers, his dog downstairs, is living at
that property with the intent of vexing or annoying the owners of that
property. Because that is vexing and annoying after they go through all the
legal proper procedures, pursue this case in Court, finally after days of test or after a full day of testimony and argument. And then on 1 0/25, finally
getting an Order of Eviction, he goes back to the house.
That is indicia of vexing or annoying the owners of that
property after this huge legal battle. That's not even enough.
Then you have Mr. Baker testify that well, he was at the Court
proceeding, or excuse me, he was at the eviction, the lockout he called it, on
November 1 st, 201 1 , where he saw the Sheriff, the Washoe County Sheriff,
tape onto the front door, City's 2, Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law,
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Order of Eviction. They tape it onto the front door.

But that's not all that happens. There's a locksmith there as
well. The locksmith goes about to change or rekey the locks, both the front
door and the back door, so that no one can enter that property.
In fact, his testimony was that after a question, "Could the
person with the key previously have entered that after he rekeyed?" "No."
That's the idea. You lock them out.
Page -129And so he recalls that he was given the new set of keys. There
was no way in that property other than some kind of forced entry, or illegal
entry at that point, frankly. That's enough of a warning right there. We
don't want you. We're locking you out. The Court says we can lock you
out. We're locking you out.
How many warnings does Mr. Coughlin need? That was a
huge warning. He has to enter some other way. His key wouldn't work
anymore, so in order to get in that property, he had to enter that property
having been locked out. That shows an intent to vex or annoy the owners, as
well, of the warning, not to trespass, not to be on that property, and being on
that property.
Now, there isn't a lot of case law as you might imagine in
Nevada, Your Honor, with regard to reentering property after being evicted,
and whether that's a criminal trespass. There is that one case I did
announce, and that was State v. Nichols, 1 06 Nev. 6 5 1 , where the Court did
say, "Reentry after eviction is a trespass." It's a trespass. They can't be any
clearer than that. It's a trespass. That's what the Court said. And we agree.
It's a trespass.
There is case law in other jurisdictions, most of it unpublished,
Your Honor, because as you might imagine, these are pretty benign matters
that go through the criminal justice process.
But there was one case out in Nashville, Tennessee, the Court
of Criminal Appeals. This was a published decision, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App.
Lexus 1 002, where the Court did find that after being served a Notice of
Eviction after remaining on the property after being evicted, the person was
Page -130subject to criminal trespass penalties. The jury had sufficient evidence to
actually find that person criminally trespassed.
So, this isn't anything new. This is actually what's happening
out in the country, and this is just one case that I could find that was a
published opinion on just this. Here, I'll just provide it to you.
THE COURT: And just for the record, is there a cite or a name
on that Tennessee case?
MR. HAZLETI-STEVENS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Just because we've run into this.
MR . HAZLETI-STEVENS: Certainly, it's Tennessee v. Lovins
(inaudible), L-O-V-I-N-S, and I'll say it slowly, it's 2009, Tenn., T-E-N-N,
period, Crim, period, App., A-P-P, period, Lexus, 1002.
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THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

BY MR. HAZLETI-STEVENS:
And, Judge, I think based on all of the evidence presented with
Mr. Hill having authority provided to him by Mr. Merliss to evict, to have
Mr. Coughlin leave that property, and going through all the proper channels
to have him leave that property - they didn't use self-help in this case. They
went through the summary eviction proceeding as they were supposed to do.
And yet, after they've noticed him, they've warned him,
they've asked him not to be on the property by many different avenues, he
still is on the property. And I think they were left to no other remedy than to
call the police and have him arrested for criminal trespass, and that's
pursuant to 8 1 0.01 0, trespassing statute of the Reno Municipal Code.
Thank you, Judge.
Page - 1 3 1 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hazlett-Stevens. Mr. Coughlin,
closing argument?
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir, Your Honor.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
I actually came across that Lovins case, too. I don't know that
it quite says what Mr. Hazlett-Stevens purports it to say, but it's impressive
that he found that nonetheless.
I fo und a number of cases that do speak to just this situation.
I'll quickly cite to them. Not all of them, I believe, are entirely positive from
my point of view, but I believe the vast majority of them are given the public
policy behind.
I'm trying to avoid situations where you're evicting someone,
and that's tough enough, but then when you go and you pile on criminal
prosecution on top of it, and maybe like in this case, you pile on a forced
rent escrow deposit that's contrary to Nevada law, and the Court failing to
give back that money, while at the same time, apparently requiring the
commercial tenant who was evicted in a summary proceeding for nonpayment of rent was not alleged, contrary to Nevada law again. I know I'm
running on with this sentence, but there's just a lot o f stuff that went on here
that adds up to a pretty tough set of circumstances that the Legislature
actually enacted laws to prevent, but unfortunately, maybe it's due to my
poor legal work, maybe it's due to Judge Sferrrazza's court having limited
jurisdiction having to deal with too broad of a subject matter. God knows it
would be difficult to do all the work that he does do.
Page -132But Steele v. State, Steele with an "E" on the end, 1 32 - and
Your Honor, I can give this to the Court so to avoid anyone - if you need to
write it down. But for the record, Steele v. State, 1 32, N.E. 739 at 740.
State v. Peers, 4 1 7 A.2d 1 085. Reed v. Comm, 366 S.E. 2d
275. There is an Am. Jur. Section, 75 Am. Jur. 2d trespass, section 87,
that's fairly relevant.
The case Lynn v. Desiderio, 1 59. Fed. App. 382. Dawson v.
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State, 52 Indiana 478. Myers v. State, 1 30 N.E. 1 16. Charles S. Downy v.

S&D Liquor, 880 N.E. 2d 322. And just quickly, Houston, 647 N.E. 2d 16.
State v. Johnson, Higgins v. Penoscot, In The Matter of Maricopa, 942 P.2d
477, and finally Ken v. Wood, 275 S.2d. 60.
Those cases largely speak to what the public policy rationale
underlining my position that wherever possible a criminal eviction statute
should not be applied incident to a civil eviction, the criminal trespass
incident to a civil eviction.
Now, obviously, there's got to be some reasonable place to
draw the line. Some (inaudible) will not leave. They just keep (inaudible)
the Court's authority. I guess a contempt order could be issued, a Motion to
Show Cause.
There's a number ofthings, and maybe somewhere way down
the line, sure a criminal trespass arrest, or a citation. I would hope not what
happened here, three days in jail, a custodial arrest, and all that's attendant to
that.
Mr. Hazlett-Stevens, in his closing argument, cited to a lot of
emails that I don't believe were introduced into the record. At least not
Page -133today. I could be wrong. They might have been somewhere in there, but it
was kind of curious because he mentioned a number ofthese warnings
occurred in these emails, yet, they are not introduced as exhibits herein.
Perhaps that's due to the fact that the opposing attorneys were
warned that email would not be a valid means of serving notice of anything.
And that was done because the speeding nature of these
summary eviction proceedings is fast enough as is. Mr. Hill's law firm
seemed to continually attempt to speed it up even more by serving things
through email.
The Legislature in NRS 40.253 has explicitly provided that for
commercial tenants it is against the law to use a summary eviction
proceeding to evict them unless the non-payment of rent is alleged.
I take that to mean the Legislature saying look, it's hard.
We're a pro-business state. It's hard enough to succeed in business. We
don't want people being summarily evicted unless they're just not paying
their rent.
If they're paying their rent, and they have - and the landlord
just wants them out for some other reason, well, they're going to have to do
it a little bit slower.
Now, there was testimony today that the rent was being - was
not being paid. However, that's not what was served. That's not what was
ftIed. That's not what was litigated.
Mr. Hill and his client chose to litigate it a certain way for
legitimate reasons. They chose not to allege the non-payment of rent. They
could say it's because I'm making up stuff. They could say it's because I'm
Page -1 34- what was the term he used? I forget, but Mr. Baker used a term, and I
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queried him on it. They could say all that, and they've said that about just
about everything I've ever uttered.
You know, I'm kind of a Yosemite Sam cartoon villain as far
as they put it. Everything I do or say is just ridiculous, I'm crazy, I'm a
charlatan, fraud, and all this. Well, that's their position, but to me, it dilutes
itself. They don't ever mix in a little bit of ''well you got a point there" once
in a while.
There was a lot of evidence put on in this summary eviction.
They spent $60 grand litigating this so to say it was totally baseless and I put
on no evidence, yet their fees of $60 grand were legitimate and appropriate
and they should be compensated for them is to me, trying to have it both
ways.
If my case was so baseless and groundless and vexatious, I
would think they could have brought it home for something less than $60
grand.
In Nevada, under - and I know this isn't speaking to the real
reason we're here, the criminal trespass, but in Nevada there's a case called
Aitkens in the landlord/tenant context which provides that the procedural
notice requirements, and it's A-I-T-K-E-N-S, the procedural notice
requirements within the context of eviction proceedings, particularly within
summary eviction proceedings, must be strictly adhered to.
The policy rationale underlying, that is that given the privacy
of one's home ,or business, and in my case, both the home office, is so
important that the law really needs to strictly adhere to them. Similar to
Page - 1 35what the Nevada Supreme Court has reinterpreted the Foreclosure Mediation
Statute to be whereas the Legislature might have said you need substantial
compliance with it, and the Nevada Supreme Court said, "No, we're going
to say you need strict compliance with it." Well, that's somewhat of an
analogy in what goes on in these eviction matters.
I believe there is a couple quasi 60(b) basis for challenging the
validity of any - to the extent this Court views the Eviction Order as a
warning, which I think is kind of the big inquiry here. Maybe not, but to me,
it seems like it's possibly what the case could come down to.
To the extent the Court does consider a valid Eviction Order
appropriately served, a warning sufficient to satisfY the criminal trespass
statute, I believe there is a couple 60(b) like basis to challenge that Order.
One is brought up by Mr. Loomis, who so astutely pointed out
that under the McManley case there was a Notice of Appeal filed in the
interim between the initial October 1 3th hearing, and then the October 25th
trial.
MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Judge, this is getting into
testimony - or evidence that's not in testimony, testimony that's not in
evidence rather. It's not there about any appeal taken.
THE COURT: Mr. Coughlin?
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THE COURT: Your argument is limited to the facts that were

produced today at trial.
MR. COUGHLIN: Just today, not what Mr. Loomis Page -136THE COURT: That's correct, today's trial. So to that extent,
the objection - and I try to give parties a great deal of leeway in closing
argument, but when you start getting far afield of what was argued,
presented via facts of the trial, that's not proper argument.
MR. COUGHLIN: Okay, and I thought it was part of the record at
this point. And ifit's not too late, I'd object to the notice by email that was
introduced. THE COURT: Okay, go ahead.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Beyond that 60(b) basis, I believe there is an additional basis
in that - there is a couple. I think under the ANVUI, A-N-V-U-I-E A-N-V-U-I, which is kind of the main Nevada case on summary evictions of
commercial tenants. That was a restaurant in Vegas doing a lot of business,
like $500K a month or something, and they got evicted, and it went to the
Nevada Supreme Court, and a lot of litigation was done over that.
And the holding, the take home holding from that was that it's
basically a summary judgment standard in the summary eviction
proceedings. The tenant merely needs to present a material issue of law or
fact to beat a summary judgment motion. If they do that, the Court may do
nothing further, and it has to go on to a (inaudible) unlawful detainer
approach. Served, 20 days to respond, discovery, all that.
So, my position would be that there's a 60(b) basis for viewing
this - any summary eviction order, as void in that I was a licensed attorney,
at that time, at least, and I held that out as my law office. I filed a tenant's
affidavit that I was a commercial tenant. I pled that. Mr. Hill testified today
that he wasn't aware of that, and he didn't consider it a particular
Page - 1 3 7consideration, for his neurosurgeon client who had spent $60 grand on this.
That's where I'm at the analogy of the wrong side legal surgery, because I
think it could wind up potentially being fairly important to his client if it's
proven that a wrongful eviction occurred.
If it's proven that yes, I did present a (inaudible) issue of
material fact, that this was a commercial tenancy, and to the extent judicial
notice could be taken that it was merely a No-Cause Eviction Notice that
was pursued and that non-payment of rent was not alleged, then this could
be problematic, and Mr. Hill might wish he had considered that point
whether this was a commercial tenancy, and I ' m not subject to summary
eviction proceedings in 40.253, and (inaudible) pay my rent as alleged as
being in fact very important.
Just some ancillary factual considerations. The main summary
eviction statute in Nevada is NRS 40.253. It's about this long. It's 8 to 9
subsections, and that's just kind of the procedural mechanisms of that. It's
mixed in there with the construction defect and Chapter 40 and some other
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stuff.
THE COURT: Mr. Coughlin, how does this all relate to the
case? We're getting really far afield on these eviction issues when we're
here on a trespassing case. So let's try to keep our focus limited to this
criminal case, and the trespassing issues raised in this hearing.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes, Your Honor. I guess the reason I'm going into this one,
my position is I'm not guilty. But if you are reading some guilt into this, I
think there are some mitigating factors that the Court might consider.
Page - 1 38If that's appropriate, I could go into those briefly.
THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to - I just want you to limit
your argument to testimony that was presented here this morning on the
trespassing statute. That's what Mr. Hazlett-Stevens did, and that's what
I'm asking you to do.
MR. COUGHLIN: Okay.
THE COURT: It doesn't mean you have to be up here for an
hour talking, and necessarily more isn't necessarily better. But if you focus
in on the legal issues and identify them during your closing argument and
why they support your position that you're not guilty, that would be helpful.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Okay, the charge is RMC 8 1 0.040. I believe that the specific
language THE COURT: Section 8 1 0.010.
MR. COUGHLIN: Oh, it's 010, okay.
THE COURT: Just for the record.
MR. COUGHLIN: Okay, I believe that the exact language is failure
to leave the premises after being warned to do so.
It doesn't say failure to leave the premises after kind of having
an Eviction Notice served, according to the procedures ofthe Washoe
County Sheriff, maybe, but maybe not according to the NRCP that's ruled
expressly applicable to civil evictions under NRS 40.258.
It doesn't say that. It says, "Failure to leave the premises after
being warned to do so." So, what do we have when we have somebody
evicted, and they need to go get their mail for a couple days? Are we going
Page - 1 39to go arrest them when they go into their mailbox and get that social security
check? Are we going to charge them with criminal trespass there? Or are
we going to say, "Hey you need to leave," and if they don't leave, then
maybe consider that because that's what the precedent would be here today
is anybody who is evicted who's found on the property and is unfortunate
enough to have Richard Hill roll up and call the police and do what took
place here, is going to not only be facing an eviction, wherein they might
have also been subject to an impermissible rent/escrow deposit, in that the
Reno Justice Court is not allowed to do that, unless they pass a rule like Las
Vegas Justice Court Rule 44.
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In order to do so, they have to publish it and get it approved by

the Nevada Supreme Court. The Nevada Supreme Court let Las Vegas
implement such a rent/escrow requirement i n their Justice Court Rules
because it's Las Vegas. It's crazy. I went to law school there. They have to
make some crazy rules to deal with the transiency of that community. I love
Las Vegas. Don't get me wrong. But I can understand why the Court would
say, "Alright, normally, we're not going to allow these forced rent escrow
deposits to tenants in a summary eviction setting."
But because it's Las Vegas, and otherwise it would be too hard
to be a landlord, we're going to let you implement Rule 44.
Now, Justice Court Rule 84 says before a Justice Court can
implement such a rule like that, they have to get it approved by the Nevada
Supreme Court.
THE COURT: Mr. Coughlin, we're getting way out again.
MR. COUGHLIN: Alright.
Page -140THE COURT: I mean, (inaudible) State v. McNichols, the
Nevada Supreme Court case in 1990 clearly indicated that someone who has
been evicted from the property and subsequently reenters the property is
guilty of trespass.
MR. COUGHLIN: Is that a casino case though?
THE COURT: A resident where someone lost their home in
foreclosure, went back on the property, eviction was served, and then there
was ultimately an arrest made on the property for the crime of narcotics.
MR. COUGHLIN: For a crime of narcotics?
THE COURT: Although the Supreme Court has said subsequent
. reentry is a trespass.
MR. COUGHLIN: After the eviction?
THE COURT: After being evicted.
MR. COUGHLIN: The eviction was -THE COURT: After being evicted and having the owners
change the locks.
MR. COUGHLIN: After the eviction was served you said.
THE COURT: Then why don't you focus in - no, I didn't say
that. I said after an eviction. Why don't you focus in on the relevant issues
so we're not here for the next three hours talking about things that are
irrelevant.
MR. COUGHLIN: Okay, but I did, Your Honor, hear you say the
word "served."
THE COURT: I said subsequent reentry was a trespass after an
eviction process. Three and four days notices of an unlawful detainer were
Page -141served as present order of summary eviction. So, if you think that there's a
defense there, that's what you should focus in on.
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. I do think there is, and especially under
the A itken case that I mentioned earlier requiring that strict adherence.
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There was not appropriate service here. And, in fact, Mr. Hill
in his pleadings struggles to point to some rule somewhere that says, "Yeah,
that's appropriate. That satisfies the standard having the Sheriff post it on
the door."
In fact, if one really looks into the Anvui restaurant summary
eviction case, there is a strong argument that Hill, et aI., were not allowed to
effectuate this lock out for at least five days.
Furthermore, and the Court was holding $2,275.00 of my
money. Given that under 1 1 8(a).380, a supercedes bond is only $250.00.
There is a very strong argument that this THE COURT: What does that have to do with this case? You
are going nowhere with helping the Court when you get off on these
tangents about the specifics of the Justice Court. You do make some
headway when you talk about the service of the eviction proceedings, so if
you want to focus on that and limit i t to that, that would be fine. But you are
just getting way out there, and it's also, I think, outside the course and scope
of the evidence presented today at the trial.
MR. COUGHLIN: So, is it not something this Court considers
whether or not something is void under 60(b)4?
THE COURT: I'm not going to give any legal advice during
closing argument, Mr. Coughlin. You know as a lawyer that's inappropriate.
Page -142I'm just saying that you are getting far afield on your arguments based on the
evidence.
MR. COUGHLIN: Well, I fe el I'm trying to make relevant
arguments that point out that -THE COURT: I'm telling you they're not that relevant, at least
to this Judge.
MR. COUGHLIN: Well, but I didn't get to say much about the
supercedes bond, and the fact that the Court took 1 0 times what it was, and
didn't give me a stay.
MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: And, Judge, I'm going to object to
that because that's not testimony that's presented here at trial today.
THE COURT: That's not even the testimony. I didn't even hear
anything about a supercedes bond until just about two seconds ago.
MR. COUGHLIN: It's in my motions on file in the record.
MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS:
I'm going to object.
Those are not evidence, Judge.
THE COURT: Let's move forward with the argument, Mr.
. Coughlin. Mr. Hazlett-Stevens' objection is sustained.
MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. I believe it is NRS 40.280, but it is
somewhere in NRS 40 that specifically incorporates NRCP or applies NRCP
to service requirements, just in general, to these landlord/tenant matters to
the extent the subject matter has been spoken to already in the
landlord/tenant statute.
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So, when you want to know how you serve somebody, it's not
set forth in the landlord/tenant statute, which it's not, you go to NRCP,
Page - 1 43Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure. And if you can't serve somebody in
person, personally served, and I ask that you take judicial notice that
personally served means handing something to someone in person. Because
the Washoe County Sheriff doesn't view it that way. They think posting
something on the door, and they've told me this.
MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Judge, I'm going to object. Him
telling - it's hearsay that wasn't even provided in testimony.
THE COURT: Mr. Coughlin, I don't know if you're hearing
what I'm saying here. You are getting so far afield that it's undermining and
eroding your argument.
MR. COUGHLIN: Well, I heard you say that I should focus on -THE COURT: I'm not tell you what to say. You need to stay
focused and comment only on evidence that was related this morning.
MR. COUGHLIN: Okay.
THE COURT: And when you rehash it for the fifth and sixth
time, it loses it's value and punch. I mean, after awhile you make your
argument, there's nothing else to be said. I mean, a good lawyer knows
when to sit down after making an argument instead of droning on and
droning on, I mean, forever.
At some point, the argument is made and the information is
digested, and then it becomes to be noise.
THE COURT: You've made some valid points. I've heard
them. But I don't need to hear them ten times. I heard a lot of stuff this
morning over and over and over.
Page -144MR. COUGHLIN : Yes, Your Honor, and I'll just conclude with
stating that there was no warning to leave the premises.
There was no failure to heed a warning to leave the premises.
Perhaps it's a matter of Mr. Hill just jumped the gun and called the police a
little too soon, and he would have been better off saying, "You need to
leave," and then getting that refusal to leave, and then call the police.
But as it occurred, there simply was no warning to leave the
premises. An Eviction Order, even if appropriately served, and I don't
believe it was here, prior to the lockout, is not a warning under all those
cases, or at least a majority of those cases that I cited to you, sufficient to
sustain a criminal trespass prosecution.
Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, and I appreciate you zooming in on
that because I think that's a good issue.
Mr. Hazlett-Stevens, would you like to finish up?
BY MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS:
That's right, Your Honor. That's the crux of the issue in this
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case.
Mr. Coughlin restates or limits RMC 8.10.010 just a little bit,
and improperly. There' s many ways to get a trespass under the law, Your
Honor.
Mr. Coughlin said you had to be warned and remain on the
property in order to get a trespass, but that's not the only way to have a
criminal trespass under statute. There are three ways under Subsection A.
Page -145If you go on the property with the intent to vex or annoy
someone, you've committed a criminal trespass. That's it, right there.
There's another part of the statute that says if you go or remain
on the property after being warned not to trespass, you are guilty of a
trespass.
So, it is the case that sometimes, and we see these all the time
in casino cases, where the casino security is saying, "You leave the
property." And they say, "No, I'm not leaving the property," or they do
some other gesture that indicates they're refusing to leave the property.
That's a criminal trespass.
But if you go onto the property after being warned not to go on
the property, that's also a trespass. He was warned so many times by them
personally, by Mr. Hill and Mr. Baker, through notices, through Judge
Sferrazza that he was evicted from the property, and then through a Notice
of Entry of Order.
I don't know how many other ways they could have possibly
done this. Are they required to warn him when they actually go on the
property 1 3 days later, and he's still living on the property? I don't think so.
I think they're well within their rights to call the police, and say, "Hey, we
got this guy evicted, and he's still on our property." That's a valid arrest.
Now, we're not here to talk about the public policy, Your
Honor, about whether it's advisable, whether it's a good idea to arrest
someone who's been evicted from the property. That's not why we're here.
We're not here to have you decide whether that's good public policy or not.
Page -146We're here to have you decide whether there was a criminal
trespass under RMC. You might not think so, or you might think so, but
that's why we're here. We're not here to set public policy precedent about
trespassing people who have been evicted for various reasons, or foreclosed
upon, or anything like that. We're not here to do that.
With regard to all of the issues Mr. Coughlin brought up in
regard to commercial residence, commercial property, notices, whether or
not they can take summary eviction proceedings against a commercial
tenant, this is not the proper forum to decide that issue.
That, Mr. Coughlin, had an opportunity to address in front of
Judge Sferrazza, in his appeal in front of Judge Flanagan, which you actually
did hear in evidence today. That matter is appealed, and Judge Flanagan
already denied the appeal.
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That issue should have been litigated in the proper jurisdiction.

The issue here is simple. He was evicted from his property as announced in
open Court by Judge Sferrazza. He was provided a copy of the Notice.
Regardless, it was announced by Judge Sferrazza, "You are evicted as of
October 31st at 5:00 p.m."
That's enough right there. Right there. If he was on that
property after October 3 1 st, 2011 , after 5 :00 p.m., he is criminally
trespassing on that property either by an intent to vex or annoy the other
litigants in that party, or by being warned not to come on that property, and
going on that property pursuant to statute.
I think the City has proven its case based on those two
theories, and I'll submit it beyond that. Thank you.
Page - 147THE COURT: Thank you very much. Alright -MR. COUGlllJN: Your Honor, could I?
THE COURT: No, we're done. That's it. You know how it
works. The prosecutor goes first, you go second, they finish up. They have
the burden of proof. That's it. No more argument. That's very clear.
Alright, let me just make a couple comments here. Both
parties have identified - there's numerous issues here. The big issue is the
warning. Under our statute, both 207.200, and RMC 810.0lD, the party - it
doesn't even talk about the vex or annoy, the party who goes or remains,
either one, Mr. Hazlett-Stevens pointed that out, into any building after
being warned by the owner or the occupant, and the owners and occupants
can be agents with ostensible, actual or implied authority, and certainly Mr.
Hill and Mr. Baker had that authority. That's clearly established by the
evidence.
I f you go back onto that property after having been warned,
you are guilty of a trespass, and I guess the question is what is a warning?
And unlike many areas in the law, it's not defined under the trespassing
ordinance, or the trespassing statute. It's a notice requirement.
And the real issue in this case - there's a number of issues, but
I do - there's no question, Mr. Coughlin, that you were on property that
belonged to another at 1 2 1 River Rock on November 1 3th, and that's in the
City of Reno, and there's no question about that.
The question is, what type of warning did you have? You had
so many types of warnings, it's hard to figure out which one is the best.
Page - 148First of all, the first warning - and by the way, when we talk
about warning here, when you look at the statute under state law or the
Municipal Code, both the Legislature and the City Council have given some
guidance that indicate for some occupants they've got sufficient warning if
the property is posted in a conspicuous manner in intervals of not less than
700 feet.
So, something as broad as that is sufficient warning under our
trespass statute. And the statute goes on to say it's prima facia evidence of a
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trespass if the property is posted or fenced on a property. That's prima facia.

So, the question is did you have notice? Did you have some
sort of warning not to be on that property, and here's what the Court has
determined.
You received some kind of mild notice, and a warning when
you were given a 5-day notice and a 30-day notice. Probably in and of itself,
probably not enough to support a trespassing finding.
But at two separate hearings in October of 20 1 1 , on the 1 3th
and the 25th, where you were present in Court, there can be no question that
the issue is whether or not the owner of that property wanted you on that
property more, or should you be on that property.
Then, right in open Court, Judge Sferrazza evicted you from
the property. He followed that up with a written Eviction Decision and
Order clearly indicating that you were evicted, and that the stay was denied.
So, I don't know what - that would be what I call super notice, or super
warning, coming from the Judge himself.
Page -149It's often the situation we never get that kind of warning. So
not only did you get a warning, you got an Order fr om the Judge that you
were evicted from the property. That was then posted on the front door of a
property that you had been in and returned to on November pt, 2012 (sic)
the day it was posted.
There was a copy left on a coffee table later at some point in
time after Mr. Hill had entered the property and realized that there had been
someone in the property.
You were emailed. Whether or not you received that email, I
don't know, but there was at least another attempt to email you at an address
to which you had responded, and to an address, an email address, to which
you had responded that you would not accept emails on your - as notice.
Finally, you were mailed a Notice of Entry o f Judgment to 1 2 1
River Rock. I'm sure - I would guess you didn't get that, but the parties
here did everything possible to provide you notice, to provide you warning,
and you had actual notice, you had constructive notice, that you shouldn't be
on that property.
The State of Nevada and the Supreme Court decision which
Mr. Hazlett-Stevens quoted this morning and I have in front of me, State v.
McNichols, \ 06 Nev. 6 5 1 , clearly, clearly, says that after someone has been
evicted, a subsequent reentry in the property is a trespass.
A trespass reentry is what the Supreme Court called it, did not
create an objective of that expectation of privacy.
So, that's just the first section. That's been proved beyond any
doubt. There's no question that portion of the statute has been proved.
Page -1 50And I would also submit that Mr. Hazlett-Stevens is correct.
And after going back on that property numerous occasions, setting up a
residence with your pet in the basement, constitutes a separate basis
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independent from the notice requirement that you went on to that property
with the intent to vex or annoy the owner.
So, under any theory set fo rth by the City, I find you guilty of
the charge of Trespassing. We can proceed to sentencing.
Mr. Hazlett-Stevens?
MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS:
you know, I think the -Thank you, Your Honor. I'll let
THE COURT: I've indicated before there will be no jail. There
will be no suspended sentence. That's been part o f my ruling and that will
not happen in today's case.
MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: And I've already announced that
on the record, too, that the City is not going to be pursuing any sort of jail
time, whether suspended or actual in this case. I don't think it's appropriate.
I think we all should know the value of our different cases that we have.
I'm going to ultimately submit sentencing to you, Judge,
because I'll tell you, from the City's perspective, the problem is (inaudible)
by Mr. Coughlin's arrest.
So, based on that, I'm submitting to you. Whatever you decide
in this case, and putting time served, would be okay with the City.
THE COURT: I don't believe there has been any other issue
since this issue. This problem is not recurring, and we have no reason to
believe Mr. Coughlin is headed back to that property, correct?
Page - 1 5 1 MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: That's exactly right, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Coughlin, anything you'd like to say? I
noticed you have $3 1 0 cash bail posted. As I indicated, a suspended
sentence or any jail sentence at all will not be issued by this Court.
So, anything you'd like to say in terms of sentencing?
MR. COUGHLIN: Well, Your Honor, I mean, there's things I'd like
to point to as mitigating factors, but to the extent - by sentencing, maybe I
don't THE COURT: I can sentence you. I'm telling you right now,
part of my jurisdiction is up to 6 months in jail, up to a $2,000, strike that, up
to a $ 1 ,000 fine, up to two years probation, and up to 200 hours community
service.
I will not be putting you on probation. That means there will
be no jail. I'm not putting you on probation anyway, but with a suspended
sentence of a fine, there will be no jail. So, we're looking at a fme and/or
community service and/or time served.
So, we have $310 posted, and the question is what sentence
should I impose? Should I give you community service? Should I not?
Should I fine you in excess of up to $1 ,000? Should I not? What would be
the appropriate sentence? There are mitigating circumstances, as pointed
out by the prosecutor, that you have not been back to the property and I
consider that a very mitigating circumstance. I'm open to any areas in terms
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of what sentence you think would be appropriate here.

MR. COUGHLIN: Well, Your Honor, things that I consider
mitigating circumstance, and if this Court doesn't, I don't.
Page - 1 52THE COURT: Well, I don't know what they are until you
mention them to me, but I'm all ears.
MR. COUGHLIN : Okay, Nevada law does not allow for for ced
rent/escrow deposit that is ten times the amount - at all to a summary
eviction litigant, much less one that is ten times the amount one would need
to put up to get a stay of eviction where the rent is less than a grand.
THE COURT: How would that relate to what I just said, in
terms of what I could impose, whether it's community service or fm es?
How would that relate to that argument?
MR. COUGHLIN: Because this wrecked my life.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. COUGHLIN: In avery real way. And not just my life. It
wrecked a lot of people's lives in my fa mily.
THE COURT: So, what do you think is an appropriate
sentence? Mr. Hazlett-Stevens is asking the Court to determine it, and
unless you have anything you 'd like to offer up, I do find a mitigating fa ctor
that upon the arrest, there have been no further problems, and that's a very
large mitigating fac tor.
MR. COUGHLIN: Then I'd consider the pain someone has gone
through a mitigating fa ctor, and also, any sort of mistakes made by the
judicial system a mitigating fa ctor. I don't consider these events to take
place in a vacuum .
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. COUGHLIN: I think if the Court looked at it, it would agree
with me that this rent/escrow deposit was not allowable by the law.
Page -153THE COURT: I'm not going to look into and buy into whether I
agree with you or not on anything that has to do with the landlord and tenant.
I'm trying to decide if! should give you more than a $3 10 fine,
up to $ 1 ,000 fine, or give you some community service. Or is a fine
enough? Or the jail time you spent in jail, is that enough to wrap this thing
up?
MR. COUGHLIN: Your Honor, I'd ask that the $310, and I say this
respectfully, sir, and I'd ask that it be given back to me. I'm flat broke. I've
had my law license taken away. I went through a divorce just immediately
preceding this.
So, this has been a pretty difficult period of time. I don't
know.
THE COURT: Alright.
MR. COUGHLIN: With respect to other mitigating factors, I think
that - I mean, there was three days served in jail, first off, you know.
I believe the bond was -- 259/366 -
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THE COURT: It was a cash bail. There was no bond.

MR. COUGHLIN: There was no bond?
THE COURT: You posted a cash bail. There was no bond.
And it's been on the books since you posted it to get out of jail.
MR. COUGHLIN: Yeah, yeah. I don't know if it's a mitigating
factor is the misconduct of Mr. Hill or others in this.
THE COURT: Well, I don't find any misconduct presented
today. I'm more interested in what I - I don't think that's a mitigating
factor.
Page - 1 54Here 's the Court's Order. There 's been no further issues, Mr.
Coughlin. You've conducted yourself professionally in this trial. I
appreciate that.
The fines and fees in this case of $3 1 0 will be imposed as the
fine, and time served, and that will close the case. Time served plus $3 10.
Alright, that's it. Thank you, gentlemen.
MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Thank you for your time, Judge.
THE COURT: Alright, we'll be in recess.
(Court adjourned at 1 :59:27 p.m.)
Page - 1 55-
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BY MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: This case, I'll tell you, has been, frankly by the testimony presented
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today, proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The charge of Trespass was proven by at least two different
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avenues in this case. Mr. Coughlin was warned not to trespass, not to go on 121 River Rock, which is
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in the City o f Reno, and he was warned at least five times by these people in all kinds of different
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manner. He was warned originally when he was sent a 5-day and a 30- day notice. They didn't want
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him on the property. They wanted him to quit. They wanted him to leave the property. They sent
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those notices. Page - 126- He was noticed again on an additional 5-day notice sometime later before
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the 0/25 proceeding where they sent another notice asking him to leave the property. Most
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importantly in this case, Your Honor, is the 1 0/25 hearing where Judge Sferrazza - where Judge
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Sferrazza announced in open Court where Mr. Coughlin was present, that the eviction is granted. And
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I draw Your Honor's attention to City's 1 . IfI could find that, I would - THE COURT: Do you need a
copy of it? I have it right here in evidence. MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: No, it's in evidence, Your
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Honor. And I'll draw your attention to the part that says, "Decision." And it also says, "Matthew
Merliss present, Casey Baker - represented by Casey Baker," and then it also indicates Zachary
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Coughlin present. And then I'll draw your attention to the decision where it says "eviction granted
effective October 3 1 st, 20 1 1, at 5 :00 p.m." That's what Judge Sferrazza announced in open Court
with Mr. Coughlin, according to Mr. Baker, listening, actively listening to the Judge. He wasn't
writing anything down, but he was actively listening to the Judge when he announced that decision in
open Court. And you have the Order granting eviction right there. Now, there was another issue
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whether or not the proceedings were stayed pending some sort of appeal, but that Motion to Stay was
also denied in the October 25th, 20 1 1 , hearing. And you'll see in City's 1, it Page -1 27- actually
says, "Tenant's verbal motion to stay, denied." The case was over at that point. Then, Mr. Baker
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drafted up the Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Summary Eviction. That was
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provided to you as City's 2. That was also emailed to Mr. Coughlin. There's another notice that they
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don't want him here. They want him off the property. They warned him to be off the property as of
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October 3 1 st at 5 :00 p.m. This Order of Eviction specifies that Mr. Coughlin, excuse me, the tenant
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of the property or anyone thereon, is to be out of the property no earlier than October 3 1 st, 20 1 1 , at
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5:00 p.m., just as announced in open Court on 1 0125. So, Mr. Baker emailed that document to Mr.
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Coughlin as a courtesy, I imagine. And then what happens next? On November 1, 20 1 1, 1 2 days
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before the trespass in this case, Mr. Hill executes a Notice of Entry of Order and sends that to Mr.
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Coughlin's last known address, as he would normally do in his course of business, i s send a Notice of
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Entry of Order. And what does he attach to that? The Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and
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Order of Summary Eviction. What does Mr. Coughlin do in response to that? 1 2 days, 1 3 days after
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Mr. Coughlin was evicted from that property, pursuant to Judge Sferrazza's Order of Eviction, he's
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found on the property by Mr. Hill. In fact, Mr. Hill testifies he sees him walk up the stairs from the
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basement, walk in the living room into - or in the kitchen into the living room. He's at the house after
he's been evicted from the property. That is a criminal trespass, Your Honor. Page -1 28- He's been
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warned many times that they do not want him there, and yet, he's there on the property after being
formally evicted, after going through all of the Court proceedings, and that doesn't keep him out. He
goes back after all of this. There's another issue here too, Your Honor. The City argues that anyone
that goes on the property and "lives in the property" was found in his pajamas, his night - a shirt,
slippers, his dog downstairs, is living at that property with the intent of vexing or annoying the
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owners of that property. Because that is vexing and annoying after they go through all the legal
proper procedures, pursue this case in Court, finally after days of test - or after a full day of testimony
and argument. And then on 1 0/25, finally getting an Order of Eviction, he goes back to the house.
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That is indicia of vexing or annoying the owners of that property after this huge legal battle. That's
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not even enough. Then you have Mr. Baker testify that well, he was at the Court proceeding, or
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excuse me, he was at the eviction, the lockout he called it, on November 1 st, 201 1 , where he saw
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the Sheriff, the Washoe County Sheriff, tape onto the front door, City's 2, Findings of Facts,
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Conclusions of Law, Order of Eviction. They tape it onto the front door. But that's not all that
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happens. There's a locksmith there as well. The locksmith goes about to change or rekey the locks,
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both the front door and the back door, so that no one can enter that property. In fact, his testimony
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was that after a question, "Could the person with the key previously have entered that after he
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rekeyed?" "No." That's the idea. You lock them out. Page -129- And so he recalls that he was given
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the new set of keys. There was no way in that property other than some kind of forced entry, or illegal
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entry at that point, frankly. That's enough of a warning right there. We don't want you. We're locking
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you out. The Court says we can lock you out. We're locking you out. How many warnings does Mr.
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Coughlin need? That was a huge warning. He has to enter some other way. His key wouldn't work
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anymore, so in order to get in that property, he had to enter that property having been locked out. That
shows an intent to vex or annoy the owners, as well, of the warning, not to trespass, not to be on that
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property, and being on that property. Now, there isn't a lot of case law as you might imagine in
Nevada, Your Honor, with regard to reentering property after being evicted, and whether that's a
criminal trespass. There is that one case I did announce, and that was State v. Nichols, 1 06 Nev. 6 5 1
, where the Court did say, "Reentry after eviction is a trespass." It's a trespass. They can't be any
clearer than that. It's a trespass. That's what the Court said. And we agree. It's a trespass. There is case
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law in other jurisdictions, most of it unpublished, Your Honor, because as you might imagine, these
are pretty benign matters that go through the criminal justice process. But there was one case out in
Nashville, Tennessee, the Court of Criminal Appeals. This was a published decision, 2009 Tenn.
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Crim. App. Lexus 1 002, where the Court did find that after being served a Notice of Eviction after
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remaining on the property after being evicted, the person was Page -130- subject to criminal trespass
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penalties. The jury had sufficient evidence to actually find that person criminally trespassed. So, this
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isn't anything new. This is actually what's happening out in the country, and this is just one case that I
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could find that was a published opinion on just this. Here, I'll just provide it to you. THE COURT:
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And just for the record, is there a cite or a name on that Tennessee case? MR. HAZLETI-STEVENS:
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Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Just because we've run into this. MR . HAZLETI-STEVENS:
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Certainly, it's Tennessee v. Lovins (inaudible), L-O-V-I-N-S, and I'll say it slowly, it's 2009, Tenn.,
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T-E-N-N, period, Crim, period, App., A-P-P, period, Lexus, 1002. THE COURT: Okay, thank you.
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BY MR. HAZLETI-STEVENS: And, Judge, I think based on all of the evidence presented with Mr.
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Hill having authority provided to him by Mr. Merliss to evict, to have Mr. Coughlin leave that
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property, and going through all the proper channels to have him leave that property - they didn't use
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self-help in this case. They went through the summary eviction proceeding as they were supposed to
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do. And yet, after they've noticed him, they've warned him, they've asked him not to be on the
property by many different avenues, he still is on the property. And I think they were left to no other
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remedy than to call the police and have him arrested for criminal trespass, and that's pursuant to 8 1
0.01 0, trespassing statute of the Reno Municipal Code. Thank you, Judge. Page - 1 3 1 - THE
COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hazlett-Stevens. Mr. Coughlin, closing argument? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes,
sir, Your Honor. BY MR. COUGHLIN: I actually came across that Lovins case, too. I don't know
that it quite says what Mr. Hazlett-Stevens purports it to say, but it's impressive that he found that
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nonetheless. I fo und a number of cases that do speak to just this situation. I'll quickly cite to them.
Not all of them, I believe, are entirely positive from my point of view, but I believe the vast majority
of them are given the public policy behind. I'm trying to avoid situations where you're evicting
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someone, and that's tough enough, but then when you go and you pile on criminal prosecution on top
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of it, and maybe like in this case, you pile on a forced rent escrow deposit that's contrary to Nevada
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law, and the Court failing to give back that money, while at the same time, apparently requiring the
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commercial tenant who was evicted in a summary proceeding for non- payment of rent was not
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alleged, contrary to Nevada law again. I know I'm running on with this sentence, but there's just a lot
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o f stuff that went on here that adds up to a pretty tough set of circumstances that the Legislature
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actually enacted laws to prevent, but unfortunately, maybe it's due to my poor legal work, maybe it's
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due to Judge Sferrrazza's court having limited jurisdiction having to deal with too broad of a subject
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matter. God knows it would be difficult to do all the work that he
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does do. Page -132- But Steele v. State, Steele with an "E" on the end, 1 32 - and Your Honor, I can
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give this to the Court so to avoid anyone - if you need to write it down. But for the record, Steele v.
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State, 1 32, N.E. 739 at 740. State v. Peers, 4 1 7 A.2d 1 085. Reed v. Comm, 366 S.E. 2d 275. There
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is an Am. Jur. Section, 75 Am. Jur. 2d trespass, section 87, that's fairly relevant. The case Lynn v.
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Desiderio, 1 59. Fed. App. 382. Dawson v. State, 52 Indiana 478. Myers v. State, 1 30 N.E. 1 16.
Charles S. Downy v. S&D Liquor, 880 N.E. 2d 322. And just quickly, Houston, 647 N.E. 2d 16. State
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v. Johnson, Higgins v. Penoscot, In The Matter of Maricopa, 942 P.2d 477, and finally Ken v. Wood,
275 S.2d. 60. Those cases largely speak to what the public policy rationale underlining my position
that wherever possible a criminal eviction statute should not be applied incident to a civil eviction, the
criminal trespass incident to a civil eviction. Now, obviously, there's got to be some reasonable place
to draw the line. Some (inaudible) will not leave. They just keep (inaudible) the Court's authority. I
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guess a contempt order could be issued, a Motion to Show Cause. There's a number ofthings, and
maybe somewhere way down the line, sure a criminal trespass arrest, or a citation. I would hope not
what happened here, three days in jail, a custodial arrest, and all that's attendant to that. Mr. Hazlett-
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Stevens, in his closing argument, cited to a lot of emails that I don't believe were introduced into the
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record. At least not Page -133- today. I could be wrong. They might have been somewhere in there,
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but it was kind of curious because he mentioned a number ofthese warnings occurred in these emails,
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yet, they are not introduced as exhibits herein. Perhaps that's due to the fact that the opposing
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attorneys were warned that email would not be a valid means of serving notice of anything. And that
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was done because the speeding nature of these summary eviction proceedings is fast enough as is. Mr.
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Hill's law firm seemed to continually attempt to speed it up even more by serving things through
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email. The Legislature in NRS 40.253 has explicitly provided that for commercial tenants it is against
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the law to use a summary eviction proceeding to evict them unless the non-payment of rent is alleged.
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I take that to mean the Legislature saying look, it's hard. We're a pro-business state. It's hard enough
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to succeed in business. We don't want people being summarily evicted unless they're just not paying
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their rent. If they're paying their rent, and they have - and the landlord just wants them out for some
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other reason, well, they're going to have to do it a little bit slower. Now, there was testimony today
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that the rent was being - was not being paid. However, that's not what was served. That's not what
was ftIed. That's not what was litigated. Mr. Hill and his client chose to litigate it a certain way for
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legitimate reasons. They chose not to allege the non-payment of rent. They could say it's because I'm
making up stuff. They could say it's because I'm Page -1 34- - what was the term he used? I forget,
but Mr. Baker used a term, and I queried him on it. They could say all that, and they've said that about
just about everything I've ever uttered. You know, I'm kind of a Yosemite Sam cartoon villain as far
as they put it. Everything I do or say is just ridiculous, I'm crazy, I'm a charlatan, fraud, and all this.
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Well, that's their position, but to me, it dilutes itself. They don't ever mix in a little bit of ''well you got
a point there" once in a while. There was a lot of evidence put on in this summary eviction. They
spent $60 grand litigating this so to say it was totally baseless and I put on no evidence, yet their fees
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of $60 grand were legitimate and appropriate and they should be compensated for them is to me,
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trying to have it both ways. If my case was so baseless and groundless and vexatious, I would think
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they could have brought it home for something less than $60 grand. In Nevada, under - and I know
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this isn't speaking to the real reason we're here, the criminal trespass, but in Nevada there's a case
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called Aitkens in the landlord/tenant context which provides that the procedural notice requirements,
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and it's A-I-T-K-E-N-S, the procedural notice requirements within the context of eviction
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proceedings, particularly within summary eviction proceedings, must be strictly adhered to. The
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policy rationale underlying, that is that given the privacy of one's home ,or business, and in my case,
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both the home office, is so important that the law really needs to strictly adhere to them. Similar to
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Page - 1 35- what the Nevada Supreme Court has reinterpreted the Foreclosure Mediation Statute to
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be whereas the Legislature might have said you need substantial compliance with it, and the Nevada
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Supreme Court said, "No, we're going to say you need strict compliance with it." Well, that's
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somewhat of an analogy in what goes on in these eviction matters. I believe there is a couple quasi
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60(b) basis for challenging the validity of any - to the extent this Court views the Eviction Order as a
warning, which I think is kind of the big inquiry here. Maybe not, but to me, it seems like it's possibly
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what the case could come down to. To the extent the Court does consider a valid Eviction Order
appropriately served, a warning sufficient to satisfY the criminal trespass statute, I believe there is a
couple 60(b) like basis to challenge that Order. One is brought up by Mr. Loomis, who so astutely
pointed out that under the McManley case there was a Notice of Appeal filed in the interim between
the initial October 1 3th hearing, and then the October 25th trial. MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Judge,
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this is getting into testimony - or evidence that's not in testimony, testimony that's not in evidence
rather. It's not there about any appeal taken. THE COURT: Mr. Coughlin? MR. COUGHLIN: Well, I
believe Mr. Loomis - THE COURT: Your argument is limited to the facts that were produced today
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at trial. MR. COUGHLIN: Just today, not what Mr. Loomis - Page -136- THE COURT: That's
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correct, today's trial. So to that extent, the objection - and I try to give parties a great deal of leeway in
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closing argument, but when you start getting far afield of what was argued, presented via facts of the
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trial, that's not proper argument. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay, and I thought it was part of the record at
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this point. And ifit's not too late, I'd object to the notice by email that was introduced. THE COURT:
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Okay, go ahead. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Beyond that 60(b) basis, I believe there is an additional basis
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in that - there is a couple. I think under the ANVUI, A-N-V-U-I-E - A-N-V-U-I, which is kind of the
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main Nevada case on summary evictions of commercial tenants. That was a restaurant in Vegas doing
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a lot of business, like $500K a month or something, and they got evicted, and it went to the Nevada
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Supreme Court, and a lot of litigation was done over that. And the holding, the take home holding
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from that was that it's basically a summary judgment standard in the summary eviction proceedings.
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The tenant merely needs to present a material issue of law or fact to beat a summary judgment
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motion. If they do that, the Court may do nothing further, and it has to go on to a (inaudible) unlawful
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detainer approach. Served, 20 days to respond, discovery, all that. So, my position would be that
there's a 60(b) basis for viewing this - any summary eviction order, as void in that I was a licensed
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attorney, at that time, at least, and I held that out as my law office. I filed a tenant's affidavit that I was
a commercial tenant. I pled that. Mr. Hill testified today that he wasn't aware of that, and he didn't
consider it a particular Page - 1 3 7- consideration, for his neurosurgeon client who had spent $60
grand on this. That's where I'm at the analogy of the wrong side legal surgery, because I think it could
wind up potentially being fairly important to his client if it's proven that a wrongful eviction occurred.
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If it's proven that yes, I did present a (inaudible) issue of material fact, that this was a commercial
tenancy, and to the extent judicial notice could be taken that it was merely a No-Cause Eviction
Notice that was pursued and that non-payment of rent was not alleged, then this could be problematic,
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and Mr. Hill might wish he had considered that point whether this was a commercial tenancy, and I '
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m not subject to summary eviction proceedings in 40.253, and (inaudible) pay my rent as alleged as
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being in fact very important. Just some ancillary factual considerations. The main summary eviction
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statute in Nevada is NRS 40.253. It's about this long. It's 8 to 9 subsections, and that's just kind of the
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procedural mechanisms of that. It's mixed in there with the construction defect and Chapter 40 and
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some other stuff. THE COURT: Mr. Coughlin, how does this all relate to the case? We're getting
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really far afield on these eviction issues when we're here on a trespassing case. So let's try to keep our
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focus limited to this criminal case, and the trespassing issues raised in this hearing. BY MR.
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COUGHLIN: Yes, Your Honor. I guess the reason I'm going into this one, my position is I'm not
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guilty. But if you are reading some guilt into this, I think there are some mitigating factors that the
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Court might consider. Page - 1 38- If that's appropriate, I could go into those briefly. THE COURT:
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Well, I'm not going to - I just want you to limit your argument to testimony that was presented here
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this morning on the trespassing statute. That's what Mr. Hazlett-Stevens did, and that's what I'm
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asking you to do. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. THE COURT: It doesn't mean you have to be up here for
an hour talking, and necessarily more isn't necessarily better. But if you focus in on the legal issues
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and identify them during your closing

argument and why they support your position that you're not guilty, that would be helpful. BY MR.
COUGHLIN: Okay, the charge is RMC 8 1 0.040. I believe that the specific language - THE
COURT: Section 8 1 0.010. MR. COUGHLIN: Oh, it's 010, okay. THE COURT: Just for the record.
MR. COUGHLIN: Okay, I believe that the exact language is failure to leave the premises after being
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warned to do so. It doesn't say failure to leave the premises after kind of having an Eviction Notice
served, according to the procedures ofthe Washoe County Sheriff, maybe, but maybe not according to
the NRCP that's ruled expressly applicable to civil evictions under NRS 40.258. It doesn't say that. It
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says, "Failure to leave the premises after being warned to do so." So, what do we have when we have
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somebody evicted, and they need to go get their mail for a couple days? Are we going Page - 1 39- to
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go arrest them when they go into their mailbox and get that social security check? Are we going to
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charge them with criminal trespass there? Or are we going to say, "Hey you need to leave," and if
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they don't leave, then maybe consider that because that's what the precedent would be here today is
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anybody who is evicted who's found on the property and is unfortunate enough to have Richard Hill
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roll up and call the police and do what took place here, is going to not only be facing an eviction,
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wherein they might have also been subject to an impermissible rent/escrow deposit, in that the Reno
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Justice Court is not allowed to do that, unless they pass a rule like Las Vegas Justice Court Rule 44.
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In order to do so, they have to publish it and get it approved by the Nevada Supreme Court. The
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Nevada Supreme Court let Las Vegas implement such a rent/escrow requirement i n their Justice
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Court Rules because it's Las Vegas. It's crazy. I went to law school there. They have to make some
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crazy rules to deal with the transiency of that community. I love Las Vegas. Don't get me wrong. But
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I can understand why the Court would say, "Alright, normally, we're not going to allow these forced
rent escrow deposits to tenants in a summary eviction setting." But because it's Las Vegas, and
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otherwise it would be too hard to be a landlord, we're going to let you implement Rule 44. Now,
Justice Court Rule 84 says before a Justice Court can implement such a rule like that, they have to get
it approved by the Nevada Supreme Court. THE COURT: Mr. Coughlin, we're getting way out again.
MR. COUGHLIN: Alright. Page -140- THE COURT: I mean, (inaudible) State v. McNichols, the
Nevada Supreme Court case in 1990 clearly indicated that someone who has been evicted from the
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property and subsequently reenters the property is guilty of trespass. MR. COUGHLIN: Is that a
casino case though? THE COURT: A resident where someone lost their home in foreclosure, went
back on the property, eviction was served, and then there was ultimately an arrest made on the
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property for the crime of narcotics. MR. COUGHLIN: For a crime of narcotics? THE COURT:
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Although the Supreme Court has said subsequent . reentry is a trespass. MR. COUGHLIN: After the
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eviction? THE COURT: After being evicted. MR. COUGHLIN: The eviction was -- THE COURT:
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After being evicted and having the owners change the locks. MR. COUGHLIN: After the eviction
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was served you said. THE COURT: Then why don't you focus in - no, I didn't say that. I said after an
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eviction. Why don't you focus in on the relevant issues so we're not here for the next three hours
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talking about things that are irrelevant. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay, but I did, Your Honor, hear you say
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the word "served." THE COURT: I said subsequent reentry was a trespass after an eviction process.
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Three and four days notices of an unlawful detainer were Page -141- served as present order of
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summary eviction. So, if you think that there's a defense there, that's what you should focus in on.
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MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. I do think there is, and especially under the A itken case that I mentioned
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earlier requiring that strict adherence. There was not appropriate service here. And, in fact, Mr. Hill in
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his pleadings struggles to point to some rule somewhere that says, "Yeah, that's appropriate. That
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satisfies the standard having the Sheriff post it on the door." In fact, if one really looks into the Anvui
restaurant summary eviction case, there is a strong argument that Hill, et aI., were not allowed to
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effectuate this lock out for at least five days. Furthermore, and the Court was holding $2,275.00 of my
money. Given that under 1 1 8(a).380, a supercedes bond is only $250.00. There is a very strong
argument that this - THE COURT: What does that have to do with this case? You are going nowhere
with helping the Court when you get off on these tangents about the specifics of the Justice Court.
You do make some headway when you talk about the service of the eviction proceedings, so if you
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want to focus on that and limit i t to that, that would be fine. But you are just getting way out there,
and it's also, I think, outside the course and scope of the evidence presented today at the trial. MR.
COUGHLIN: So, is it not something this Court considers whether or not something is void under
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60(b)4? THE COURT: I'm not going to give any legal advice during closing argument, Mr. Coughlin.
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You know as a lawyer that's inappropriate. Page -142- I'm just saying that you are getting far afield
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on your arguments based on the evidence. MR. COUGHLIN: Well, I fe el I'm trying to make relevant
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arguments that point out that -- THE COURT: I'm telling you they're not that relevant, at least to this
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Judge. MR. COUGHLIN: Well, but I didn't get to say much about the supercedes bond, and the fact
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that the Court took 1 0 times what it was, and didn't give me a stay. MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS:
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And, Judge, I'm going to object to that because that's not testimony that's presented here at trial today.
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THE COURT: That's not even the testimony. I didn't even hear anything about a supercedes bond
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until just about two seconds ago. MR. COUGHLIN: It's in my motions on file in the record. MR.
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HAZLETT-STEVENS: I'm going to object. Those are not evidence, Judge. THE COURT: Let's move
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forward with the argument, Mr. . Coughlin. Mr. Hazlett-Stevens' objection is sustained. MR.
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COUGHLIN: Okay. I believe it is NRS 40.280, but it is somewhere in NRS 40 that specifically
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incorporates NRCP or applies NRCP to service requirements, just in general, to these landlord/tenant
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matters to the extent the subject matter has been spoken to already in the landlord/tenant statute. So,
when you want to know how you serve somebody, it's not set forth in the landlord/tenant statute,
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which it's not, you go to NRCP, Page - 1 43- Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure. And if you can't serve
somebody in person, personally served, and I ask that you take judicial notice that personally served
means handing something to someone in person. Because the Washoe County Sheriff doesn't view it
that way. They think posting something on the door, and they've told me this. MR. HAZLETT-
STEVENS: Judge, I'm going to object. Him telling - it's hearsay that wasn't even provided in
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testimony. THE COURT: Mr. Coughlin, I don't know if you're hearing what I'm saying here. You are
getting so far afield that it's undermining and eroding your argument. MR. COUGHLIN: Well, I
heard you say that I should focus on -- THE COURT: I'm not tell you what to say. You need to stay
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focused and comment only on evidence that was related this morning. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. THE
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COURT: And when you rehash it for the fifth and sixth time, it loses it's value and punch. I mean,
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after awhile you make your argument, there's nothing else to be said. I mean, a good lawyer knows
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when to sit down after making an argument instead of droning on and droning on, I mean, forever. At
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some point, the argument is made and the information is digested, and then it becomes to be noise.
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MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. THE COURT: You've made some valid points. I've heard them. But I
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don't need to hear them ten times. I heard a lot of stuff this morning over and over and over. Page
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-144- MR. COUGHLIN : Yes, Your Honor, and I'll just conclude with stating that there was no
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warning to leave the premises. There was no failure to heed a warning to leave the premises. Perhaps
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it's a matter of Mr. Hill just jumped the gun and called the police a little too soon, and he would have
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been better off saying, "You need to leave," and then getting that refusal to leave, and then call the
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police. But as it occurred, there simply was no warning to leave the premises. An Eviction Order,
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even if appropriately served, and I don't believe it was here, prior to the lockout, is not a warning
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under all those cases, or at least a majority of those cases that I cited to you, sufficient to sustain a
criminal trespass prosecution. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you, and I appreciate
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you zooming in on that because I think that's a good issue. Mr. Hazlett-Stevens, would you like to
finish up? BY MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: That's right, Your Honor. That's the crux of the issue in
this case. Mr. Coughlin restates or limits RMC 8.10.010 just a little bit, and improperly. There' s
many ways to get a trespass under the law, Your Honor. Mr. Coughlin said you had to be warned and
remain on the property in order to get a trespass, but that's not the only way to have a criminal
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trespass under statute. There are three ways under Subsection A. Page -145- If you go on the property
with the intent to vex or annoy someone, you've committed a criminal trespass. That's it, right there.
There's another part of the statute that says if you go or remain on the property after being warned not
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to trespass, you are guilty of a trespass. So, it is the case that sometimes, and we see these all the time
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in casino cases, where the casino security is saying, "You leave the property." And they say,
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"No, I'm not leaving the property," or they do some other gesture that indicates they're refusing to
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leave the property. That's a criminal trespass. But if you go onto the property after being warned not
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to go on the property, that's also a trespass. He was warned so many times by them personally, by Mr.
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Hill and Mr. Baker, through notices, through Judge Sferrazza that he was evicted from the property,
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and then through a Notice of Entry of Order. I don't know how many other ways they could have
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possibly done this. Are they required to warn him when they actually go on the property 1 3 days
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later, and he's still living on the property? I don't think so. I think they're well within their rights to
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call the police, and say, "Hey, we got this guy evicted, and he's still on our property." That's a valid
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arrest. Now, we're not here to talk about the public policy, Your Honor, about whether it's advisable,
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whether it's a good idea to arrest someone who's been evicted from the property. That's not why we're
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here. We're not here to have you decide whether that's good public policy or not. Page -146- We're
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here to have you decide whether there was a criminal trespass under RMC. You might not think so, or
you might think so, but that's why we're here. We're not here to set public policy precedent about
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trespassing people who have been evicted for various reasons, or foreclosed upon, or anything like
that. We're not here to do that. With regard to all of the issues Mr. Coughlin brought up in regard to
commercial residence, commercial property, notices, whether or not they can take summary eviction
proceedings against a commercial tenant, this is not the proper forum to decide that issue. That, Mr.
Coughlin, had an opportunity to address in front of Judge Sferrazza, in his appeal in front of Judge
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Flanagan, which you actually did hear in evidence today. That matter is appealed, and Judge Flanagan
already denied the appeal. That issue should have been litigated in the proper jurisdiction. The issue
here is simple. He was evicted from his property as announced in open Court by Judge Sferrazza. He
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was provided a copy of the Notice. Regardless, it was announced by Judge Sferrazza, "You are
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evicted as of October 31st at 5:00 p.m." That's enough right there. Right there. If he was on that
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property after October 3 1 st, 2011 , after 5 :00 p.m., he is criminally trespassing on that property
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either by an intent to vex or annoy the other litigants in that party, or by being warned not to come on
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that property, and going on that property pursuant to statute. I think the City has proven its case based
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on those two theories, and I'll submit it beyond that. Thank you. Page - 147- THE COURT: Thank
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you very much. Alright -- MR. COUGlllJN: Your Honor, could I? THE COURT: No, we're done.
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That's it. You know how it works. The prosecutor goes first, you go second, they finish up. They have
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the burden of proof. That's it. No more argument. That's very clear. Alright, let me just make a couple
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comments here. Both parties have identified - there's numerous issues here. The big issue is the
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warning. Under our statute, both 207.200, and RMC 810.0lD, the party - it doesn't even talk about the
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vex or annoy, the party who goes or remains, either one, Mr. Hazlett-Stevens pointed that out, into
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any building after being warned by the owner or the occupant, and the owners and occupants can be
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agents with ostensible, actual or implied authority, and certainly Mr. Hill and Mr. Baker had that
authority. That's clearly established by the evidence. I f you go back onto that property after having
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been warned, you are guilty of a trespass, and I guess the question is what is a warning? And unlike
many areas in the law, it's not defined under the trespassing ordinance, or the trespassing statute. It's a
notice requirement. And the real issue in this case - there's a number of issues, but I do - there's no
question, Mr. Coughlin, that you were on property that belonged to another at 1 2 1 River Rock on
November 1 3th, and that's in the City of Reno, and there's no question about that. The question is,
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what type of warning did you have? You had so many types of warnings, it's hard to figure out which
one is the best. Page - 148- First of all, the first warning - and by the way, when we talk about
warning here, when you look at the statute under state law or the Municipal Code, both the
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Legislature and the City Council have given some guidance that indicate for some occupants they've
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got sufficient warning if the property is posted in a conspicuous manner in intervals of not less than
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700 feet. So, something as broad as that is sufficient warning under our trespass statute. And the
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statute goes on to say it's prima facia evidence of a trespass if the property is posted or fenced on a
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property. That's prima facia. So, the question is did you have notice? Did you have some sort of
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warning not to be on that property, and here's what the Court has determined. You received some kind
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of mild notice, and a warning when you were given a 5-day notice and a 30-day notice. Probably in
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and of itself, probably not enough to support a trespassing finding. But at two separate hearings in
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October of 20 1 1 , on the 1 3th and the 25th, where you were present in Court, there can be no
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question that the issue is whether or not the owner of that property wanted you on that property more,
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or should you be on that property. Then, right in open Court, Judge Sferrazza evicted you from the
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property. He followed that up with a written Eviction Decision and Order clearly indicating that you
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were evicted, and that the stay was denied. So, I don't know what - that would be what I call super
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notice, or super warning, coming from the Judge himself. Page -149- It's often the situation we never
get that kind of warning. So not only did you get a warning, you got an Order fr om the Judge that
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you were evicted from the property. That was then posted on the front door of a property that you had
been in and returned to on November pt, 2012 (sic) the day it was posted. There was a copy left on a
coffee table later at some point in time after Mr. Hill had entered the property and realized that there
had been someone in the property. You were emailed. Whether or not you received that email, I don't
know, but there was at least another attempt to email you at an address to which you had responded,
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and to an address, an email address, to which you had responded that you would not accept emails on
your - as notice. Finally, you were mailed a Notice of Entry o f Judgment to 1 2 1 River Rock. I'm
sure - I would guess you didn't get that, but the parties here did everything possible to provide you
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notice, to provide you warning, and you had actual notice, you had constructive notice, that you
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shouldn't be on that property. The State of Nevada and the Supreme Court decision which Mr.
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Hazlett-Stevens quoted this morning and I have in front of me, State v. McNichols, \ 06 Nev. 6 5 1 ,
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clearly, clearly, says that after someone has been evicted, a subsequent reentry in the property is a
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trespass. A trespass reentry is what the Supreme Court called it, did not create an objective of that
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expectation of privacy. So, that's just the first section. That's been proved beyond any doubt. There's
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no question that portion of the statute has been proved. Page -1 50- And I would also submit that Mr.
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Hazlett-Stevens is correct. And after going back on that property numerous occasions, setting up a
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residence with your pet in the basement, constitutes a separate basis independent from the notice
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requirement that you went on to that property with the intent to vex or annoy the owner. So, under
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any theory set fo rth by the City, I find you guilty of the charge of Trespassing. We can proceed to
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sentencing. Mr. Hazlett-Stevens? MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: you know, I think the -- Thank you,
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Your Honor. I'll let THE COURT: I've indicated before there will be no jail. There will be no
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suspended sentence. That's been part o f my ruling and that will not happen in today's case. MR.
HAZLETT-STEVENS: And I've already announced that on the record, too, that the City is not going
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to be pursuing any sort of jail time, whether suspended or actual in this case. I don't think it's
appropriate. I think we all should know the value of our different cases that we have. I'm going to
ultimately submit sentencing to you, Judge, because I'll tell you, from the City's perspective, the
problem is (inaudible) by Mr. Coughlin's arrest. So, based on that, I'm submitting to you. Whatever
you decide in this case, and putting time served, would be okay with the City. THE COURT: I don't
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believe there has been any other issue since this issue. This problem is not recurring, and we have no
reason to believe Mr. Coughlin is headed back to that property, correct? Page - 1 5 1 - MR.
HAZLETT-STEVENS: That's exactly right, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Coughlin, anything
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you'd like to say? I noticed you have $3 1 0 cash bail posted. As I indicated, a suspended sentence or
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any jail sentence at all will not be issued by this Court. So, anything you'd like to say in terms of
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sentencing? MR. COUGHLIN: Well, Your Honor, I mean, there's things I'd like to point to as
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mitigating factors, but to the extent - by sentencing, maybe I don't - THE COURT: I can sentence
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you. I'm telling you right now, part of my jurisdiction is up to 6 months in jail, up to a $2,000, strike
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that, up to a $ 1 ,000 fine, up to two years probation, and up to 200 hours community service. I will
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not be putting you on probation. That means there will be no jail. I'm not putting you on probation
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anyway, but with a suspended sentence of a fine, there will be no jail. So, we're looking at a fme and/
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or community service and/or time served. So, we have $310 posted, and the question is what sentence
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should I impose? Should
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I give you community service? Should I not? Should I fine you in excess of up to $1 ,000? Should I
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not? What would be the appropriate sentence? There are mitigating circumstances, as pointed out by
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the prosecutor, that you have not been back to the property and I consider that a very mitigating
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circumstance. I'm open to any areas in terms of what sentence you think would be appropriate here.
MR. COUGHLIN: Well, Your Honor, things that I consider mitigating circumstance, and if this
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Court doesn't, I don't. Page - 1 52- THE COURT: Well, I don't know what they are until you mention
them to me, but I'm all ears. MR. COUGHLIN : Okay, Nevada law does not allow for for ced
rent/escrow deposit that is ten times the amount - at all to a summary eviction litigant, much less one
that is ten times the amount one would need to put up to get a stay of eviction where the rent is less
than a grand. THE COURT: How would that relate to what I just said, in terms of what I could
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impose, whether it's community service or fm es? How would that relate to that argument? MR.
COUGHLIN: Because this wrecked my life. THE COURT: Okay. MR. COUGHLIN: In avery real
way. And not just my life. It wrecked a lot of people's lives in my fa mily. THE COURT: So, what do
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you think is an appropriate sentence? Mr. Hazlett-Stevens is asking the Court to determine it, and
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unless you have anything you 'd like to offer up, I do find a mitigating fa ctor that upon the arrest,
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there have been no further problems, and that's a very large mitigating fac tor. MR. COUGHLIN:
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Then I'd consider the pain someone has gone through a mitigating fa ctor, and also, any sort of
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mistakes made by the judicial system a mitigating fa ctor. I don't consider these events to take place in
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a vacuum . THE COURT: Okay. MR. COUGHLIN: I think if the Court looked at it, it would agree
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with me that this rent/escrow deposit was not allowable by the law. Page -153- THE COURT: I'm not
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going to look into and buy into whether I agree with you or not on anything that has to do with the
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landlord and tenant. I'm trying to decide if! should give you more than a $3 10 fine, up to $ 1 ,000
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fine, or give you some community service. Or is a fine enough? Or the jail time you spent in jail, is
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that enough to wrap this thing up? MR. COUGHLIN: Your Honor, I'd ask that the $310, and I say
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this respectfully, sir, and I'd ask that it be given back to me. I'm flat broke. I've had my law license
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taken away. I went through a divorce just immediately preceding this. So, this has been a pretty
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difficult period of time. I don't know. THE COURT: Alright. MR. COUGHLIN: With respect to other
mitigating factors, I think that - I mean, there was three days served in jail, first off, you know. I
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believe the bond was -- THE COURT: It was a cash bail. There was no bond. MR. COUGHLIN:
There was no bond? THE COURT: You posted a cash bail. There was no bond. And it's been on the
books since you posted it to get out of jail. MR. COUGHLIN: Yeah, yeah. I don't know if it's a
mitigating factor is the misconduct of Mr. Hill or others in this. THE COURT: Well, I don't find any
misconduct presented today. I'm more interested in what I - I don't think that's a mitigating factor.
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Page - 1 54- Here 's the Court's Order. There 's been no further issues, Mr. Coughlin. You've
conducted yourself professionally in this trial. I appreciate that. The fines and fees in this case of $3 1
0 will be imposed as the fine, and time served, and that will close the case. Time served plus $3 10.
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Alright, that's it. Thank you, gentlemen. MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Thank you for your time,
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Judge. THE COURT: Alright, we'll be in recess. (Court adjourned at 1 :59:27 p.m.) Page - 1 55-
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FW: 121 River Rock?
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12/17/11
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To: ballardd@reno.gov, howardk@reno.gov, robertsp@reno.gov, renomunirecords@reno.gov,
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hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov, puenteslaw@aol.com
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Zach Coughlin
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From:
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Sent:
Sat 12/17/11 12:15 AM
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To:
ballardd@reno.gov; howardk@reno.gov; robertsp@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov; hazlettstevensc@reno.gov; puenteslaw@aol.com
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Unbelievable. The idea that exculpating evidence is being withheld under some "lien" is transmitted
into the universe, next thing I know, my law office is broken in to and the Richard B. Hill gang is stil
asserting a lien on property that was stolen, in my opinion,as a result of their own negligence, leaving
a window air conditioner unit in a window, without even putting a window jam between the top of the
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sill and lower pain, facing a sidewalk a block from the Lakemill Lodge and across from City Center
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Apartments, great. Great. And I still have not been faxed or appropriately served the Order and
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Contempt OrderI was told would be faxed to me.
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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Reno, NV 89501
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tel: 775 229-6737
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fax: 949 667 7402
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Nevada Bar No: 9473
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To: cdbaker@richardhillaw.com; knielsen@richardhillaw.com; sgallagher@richardhillaw.com
Subject: RE: 121 River Rock
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Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 15:43:38 -0800

Dear Mr. Baker,
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I drove by the property recently and saw you had added boarding up the front door on very, very
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recently. Unfortunately, your client and your firm, despite billing up some $1,060 for "securing" the
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property on top of charging $900 for storage for what could fit inside a 10x20 foot storage shed, never
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once providing an inventory, and contributing to a wrongful arrest and defamation causing me and
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my clients great damage, failed to take even basic steps to secure the property, despite my making
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numerous written requests that you do so, including, but not limited to, taking the damn window unit
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air conditioner out of the window facing the sidewalk on the side of the house very close to the damn
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Lakemill Lodge, or even putting a strong stick in between the bottom sliding window pain and the top
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of the sill to prevent someone from simply pushing in the window unit air conditioner and pushing the
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window up to gain access. Further, a blanket that was on the orange circular couch is clearly in the
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flower bed in front of the house. Additionally, there are reports that someone with your office gave
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someone a mattress from the inventory of Coughlin Memory Foam (a Nevada licensed business
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located at the property) and an expensive mattress platform has clearly been damaged and placed in
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the flower bed as well, in addition to one of the wooden porch shades being removed from the front
porch. You and your client are, of course, liable for all of this.
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Sincerely,
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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Reno, NV 89501
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
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From: cdbaker@richardhillaw.com
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CC: rhill@richardhillaw.com
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Subject: 121 River Rock
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Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 13:50:02 -0800
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Mr. Coughlin:
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The River Rock property has been broken into. We believe the break-in occurred sometime on
Monday, December 12, 2011. There appear to be items missing, including the TV in the living room,
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perhaps a computer monitor, and perhaps some stereo equipment. I cant tell what else. The
contents of the residence appear to have been rifled through.
I am providing you with this information as a courtesy. This email does NOT constitute permission
for you to go to the River Rock property.
Casey D. Baker, Esq.
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Richard G. Hill, Chartered

652 Forest Street
Reno, Nevada 89509
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Phone: (775) 348-0888
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Fax: (775) 348-0858
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Email: cdbaker@richardhillaw.com
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CONFIDENTIAL: ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT; ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
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This e-mail may contain legally privileged or confidential information. If you are not the intended
19
recipient, please do not read, copy, use, or disclose this communication to anyone other than the
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intended recipient. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender and delete the
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email message from your system. Thank you.
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Circular 230 Notice.
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To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inform you that any U.S. federal tax
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advice contained in this communication (including any attachments) is not intended or written to be
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used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of (i) avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or
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(ii) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any transaction or matter addressed
herein.
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need to communicate with you regarding my requests?

12/26/11
Zach Coughlin
From:
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Sent:
Mon 12/26/11 3:52 PM
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To:
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puenteslaw@aol.com
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Dear Mr. Puentes,
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I called you just now and left a message. I have received nothing from you in regard to my written
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requests for action on your part and for information in connection with the matter for which you are
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attorney of record RMC 11 CR 22185 2I.
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Please respond in writing.
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Sincerely,
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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- 284/366 -
Reno, NV 89501
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tel: 775 229-6737

fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
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scope of representation?
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12/30/11
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Zach Coughlin
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From:
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Sent:
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Fri 12/30/11 10:36 PM
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To:
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puenteslaw@aol.com
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Dear Mr. Puentes,
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Please move for a continuance immediately in this matter, set for trial on January 10th, 2011. You
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assured me in person at our meeting at your office that you would be able to get one, and I definitely
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want and need one, and RMCR indicates there are certain deadlines for moving for one, which I have
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already asked you to do in writing.
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I am upset that you slammed down the telephone ended our telephone conversation abruptly when we
spoke yesterday, immediately after I asked you to provide something in writing outlining the scope of
your representation of me. I wish for you to prepare and file (after receiving express prior written
authorization from me upon review of your drafts) the Motion to Supress and Motions in Limine I
previously request that you file, in addition to subpoening Dr. Merliss, Richard Hill, both RPD
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Officers at the scene of the trespassing arrest, and a subpoena duces tecume to the Law Office of
Richard Hill, the RPD, and Dr. Merliss demanding any and all documentation and or media at all
connected with this matter in any way. Further you indicated that you had not even attempted to view
13
the discovery produced by the Reno City Attorney, nor did you have any interest in seeing anything I
14
might have to show you. That was enormously upsetting to me, as any sentient human being might
15
reasonably be expected to anticipate. Please note my new address. Please file a conflict motion
16
seeking to make the Reno City Atty recuse itself in light of the conflicts of interest incident to the
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various arrests and torts against me committed by the RPD and Reno City Attorney.
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Sincerely,
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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1422 E. 9th St.
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Reno, NV 89501
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tel: 775 338 8118
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- 286/366 -
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
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new address for me?

12/31/11
Zach Coughlin
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From:
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Sent:
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Sat 12/31/11 1:32 AM
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To:
puenteslaw@aol.com
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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1422 E. 9th St. #2
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RENO, NV 89512
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tel: 775 338 8118
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- 287/366 -
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
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Pendency of Criminal Prosecution as Ground for Continuance or Postponement of Civil Action

Involving Facts or Transactions upon which Prosecution Is PredicatedState CasesPendency of
Criminal Prosecution as Ground for Continuance or Postponement of Civil?
12/31/11
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Zach Coughlin
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From:
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Sent:
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Sat 12/31/11 8:14 PM
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To:
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puenteslaw@aol.com
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2 attachments
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jail time counsel sixth amendment possibility misdemeanor.pdf (3.1 MB) , fifth amendment right civil
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proceeding parallel.pdf (2.6 MB)
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Pendency of Criminal Prosecution as Ground for Continuance or Postponement of Civil
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Action Involving Facts or Transactions upon which Prosecution Is PredicatedState
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Cases...37 A.L.R.6th 511 (Originally published in 2008)
;please find that ALR attached, perhaps it speaks to the res gestae and or stay during the pendency of
the civil appeal we discussed vis a vis the criminal trespass charge
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
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tel: 775 338 8118

fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
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more motivation for you?
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12/31/11
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zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
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From:
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zachcoughlin@hotmail.com You moved this message to its current location.
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Saved:
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Sat 12/31/11 8:28 PM
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To:
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puenteslaw@aol.com
6 attachments
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public defender liability.pdf (2.2 MB) , Public Defender's Immunity from Liability for
Malpractice.pdf (4.0 MB) , conflicts with PUBLIC DEFENDER EMPLOYEES.pdf (2.0 MB) ,
Construction and effect of statutes providing for office of public defender.pdf (5.7 MB) ,
Legal_malpractice_in_defense_of_criminal_prosecution[1].pdf (6.7 MB) ,
tolling_60b_motions_attorney_malpractice[1].pdf (2.8 MB)
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Continue writing
|
Delete
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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1422 E. 9th St. #2
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RENO, NV 89512
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tel: 775 338 8118
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fax: 949 667 7402
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Nevada Bar No: 9473
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Is Roberto Puentes on Youtube.com? also more motivation for you in this case?
12/31/11
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Zach Coughlin
From:
Sent:
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Sat 12/31/11 9:19 PM

To:
puenteslaw@aol.com
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10 attachments
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Legal malpractice in defense of criminal prosecution.pdf (6.7 MB) , Public Defender's Immunity from
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Liability for Malpractice.pdf (4.0 MB) , process server fraud harass trespass.pdf (3.1 MB) ,
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f_Circumstances giving rise to prejudicial conflict of interests between criminal defendant.pdf (2.7
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MB) , public defender liability.pdf (2.2 MB) , conflicts with PUBLIC DEFENDER
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EMPLOYEES.pdf (2.0 MB) , Civil liability of attorney for abuse of process process server trespass
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fraud.pdf (1925.1 KB) , process server abuse harass trespass.pdf (1816.6 KB) , Trespass state
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prosecution for unauthorized entry or occupation, for public demonstration purposes, of business,
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industrial, or utility premises.pdf (339.6 KB) , SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY AT A HEARING OR
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TRIAL IN A CRIMINAL CASE.pdf (281.9 KB)
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Hi Mr. Puentes,
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I know you have repeatedly told me you could care less to watch any youtube.com videos, regardless
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of whether they prove my innocence or whatever, however, I think you might need to watch some of
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these:
http://www.youtube.com/results?
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search_query=nevada+court+services&oq=nevada+court+services&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&gs_sm=e&gs
_upl=18l3308l0l3556l19l15l0l9l0l1l311l1375l0.1.4.1l6l0
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It seems Nevada Court Services, which shares an office and a receptionist with the former appointed
public defender for this case representing me, Lew Taitel, Esq, who departed from RMC Rules by
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failing to file a Motion to Withdraw when he sought to and failed to disclose the conflict of interest
that he failed to prevent his taking on my case and reviewing ultra personal information, that is
directly connected to the subject matter of the litigation from which the conflict arises as well as the
13
defense of the suit you and he have both appeared as attorney of record in, this trespass case. I don't
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think you are on any of the videos, but there are so many ultra zealous documentary filmmakers these
15
days that I cannot be sure.
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Anyways, Lew Taitel, as I have indicated to you in writing, is listed as "associated with" Nevada
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Court Services, on their website, with his picture. They share and office and a receptionist, and
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perhaps others staff, in the office across from the former Chocolate Bar. PERHAPS MOST
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IMPORTANTLY OF ALL, AND SOMETHING I WANT YOU TO LITIGATE AGGREsSIVELY
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(CLIENT CONTROLS MEANS AND OBJECTIVES OF A LITIGATION, WHETHER
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APPOINTED ATTORNEY LIKES IT OR NOT) IS THAT NEVADA COURT SERVICES,
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INCLUDE ITS PROCESS SERVER JOEL DURDEN, CAN BE SEEN TRESPASSING ONTO MY
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PROPERTY AND OTHERWISE ASSAULTING, HARASSING, AND VEXING ME, BEHIND
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MY BACK GATE, NO LESS IN THE VIDEOS FOUND AT THE LINK ABOVE.
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PLEASE DISCLOSE ANY CONFLICTS OR PREVIOUS WORKING RELATIONSHIPS YOU

HAVE WITH ANY OF THE RENO CITY ATTORNEY, RPD, RENO MUNICIPAL COURT
STAFF, RICHARD HILL, OR ANY OTHER INDIVIDUALS WITH WHOM YOU HAVE HAD
PRIOR DEALINGS AND THEREFOR MAY PRESENT A SITUATION WHERE A CONFLICT
OF INTEREST ARISES.
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Sincerely,
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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1422 E. 9th St. #2
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RENO, NV 89512
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tel: 775 338 8118
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fax: 949 667 7402
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Nevada Bar No: 9473
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Zach Coughlin has shared a folder with you.?
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1/05/12
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Zach Coughlin
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From:
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Sent:
Thu 1/05/12 8:22 AM
To:
puenteslaw@aol.com
Dear Mr. Puentes, Please let me know, in writing, the status of the Motion For Continuance you
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indicated you would both file and which you felt sure would be obtained, either through written
stipulation with opposing counsel of by Order of the RMC
Zach has 14 files to share with you on SkyDrive. To view them, click the links below.
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zach's arrest 001.avi
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Download all
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Share your files with

video of trespass arrest?
1/05/12
Zach Coughlin
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From:
Sent:
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Thu 1/05/12 8:43 AM
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To:
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puenteslaw@aol.com
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1 attachment
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zach's arrest 009.flv (10.4 MB)
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https://skydrive.live.com/redir.aspx?cid=43084638f32f5f28&resid=43084638F32F5F28!
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1050&parid=43084638F32F5F28!117&authkey=!ACPUJSqi94trtcY
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Dear Mr. Puentes,
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Please provide an indication, in writing, as to the status of the continuance of the upcoming trespass
27
trial, which you indicated would be obtained.
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1
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Sincerely,
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
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tel: 775 338 8118

fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
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another video of the arrest which lacks anyone telling Coughlin to leave or seeking to issue a citation
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in lieu of custodial arrest?
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1/05/12
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Zach Coughlin
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From:
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Sent:
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Thu 1/05/12 3:26 PM
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To:
puenteslaw@aol.com
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1 attachment
zach's arrest 011.flv (16.2 MB)
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.

1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
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tel: 775 338 8118
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fax: 949 667 7402
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Nevada Bar No: 9473
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ARRESTED FOR JAYWALKING BY RENO PD?

1/13/12
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To: peteeastman@gmail.com, tcoughlinmd@hotmail.com, marybarkbark@yahoo.com,
25
carcoughster@gmail.com, melissa.l.ulloa@gmail.com, tjhlaw@eschelon.com,
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geofgiles@hotmail.com, teddyjames25@gmail.com, jgoodnight@washoecounty.us,
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puenteslaw@aol.com
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- 297/366 -
Zach Coughlin
From:
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Sent:
Fri 1/13/12 7:49 AM
To:
peteeastman@gmail.com; tcoughlinmd@hotmail.com; marybarkbark@yahoo.com;
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carcoughster@gmail.com; melissa.l.ulloa@gmail.com; tjhlaw@eschelon.com;

geofgiles@hotmail.com; teddyjames25@gmail.com; jgoodnight@washoecounty.us;
puenteslaw@aol.com
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1 attachment
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY TO OPPOSITION CV08-01709 1 13 12.pdf (162.9 KB)
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Nevada Courts Services CEO Jeff Chandler drove by the scene while I was in the patrol car. I am
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suing Nevada Court Services incident to their trespassing into my backyard and banging on windows
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and ringing doorbells in teams for 40 minutes at a clip three times a day on Richard HIlls behalf. Mr.
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Puentes, as my court appointed defender in the trespass action against me (arrested at Richard Hill's
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behest by an RPD Officer would said Hill pays him money) you recently informed me you have ties
21
to Nevada Court Services and Lew Taitel, the court appointed defender whom mysteriously was able
22
to withdraw from my representation prior to your involvement despite not filing a motion in
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compliance with Reno Municipal Court Rules, nor any Order granting such a withdrawal being filed.
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Can you clarify your, in your words "extremely close relationship with Lew Taitel" and your
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"business relationship" with Nevada Court Services?
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Sincerely
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.

1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
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fax: 949 667 7402

Nevada Bar No: 9473
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request for memorandum of services provided?
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2/03/12
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Zach Coughlin
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From:
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Sent:
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Fri 2/03/12 12:40 AM
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To:
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puenteslaw@aol.com
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Dear Mr. Puentes,
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Could you please provide me with a Memorandum detailing what work you did on my case and
provide me with a complete copy of my file, including any work product that you created.
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Sincerely,
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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1422 E. 9th St. #2
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RENO, NV 89512
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tel: 775 338 8118
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fax: 949 667 7402
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Nevada Bar No: 9473
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NOTICE OF APPEAL MOTION TO SET ASIDE WITHDRAWAL?
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2/15/12
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To: puenteslaw@aol.com, drakej@reno.gov
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Zach Coughlin
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From:
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Sent:
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Wed 2/15/12 3:21 AM

To:
puenteslaw@aol.com; drakej@reno.gov
1 attachment
2 13 12 nOTICE OF APPEAL PUENTES DEAL WITH ATTACHED EXHIBIT 1.pdf (415.9 KB)
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.

1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
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tel: 775 338 8118
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fax: 949 667 7402
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Nevada Bar No: 9473
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On February 27th, 2012, while awaiting trial before Judge Nash Holmes in 11 TR 26800, and in a
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private meeting with Reno City Attorney Allison Ormaas in one of the private conference/meeting
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rooms outside the interior doors to the court room, RMC Marshal Harley entered the room and
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purported to personally serve Coughlin a document in the appeal of the eviction from Coughlin's
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former home law office, in CV11-03628, apparently at the direction of Richard G. Hill, Esq., on
25
behalf of his client Merliss (the landlord, whom all three of the appointed defenders provided by the
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RMC to Coughlin refused to subpoena, apparently because it would cut into their $7K fee from the
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RMC and because of an apparent desire to torpedo Coughlin's defense, despite Merliss being a
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material witness. Further, it is believed OFficer Carter and Sargent Lopez were subpoened by the
City, and perhaps by Coughlin, though a continuance was denied upon their faling to appear).
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Washoe County Sheriff's Deputy John Machen filed a false Affidavit of Service on November 7th,
2011, in RJC Rev2011-001708 alleging to have "personally served" Coughlin at the time the WCSO's
Deputy Machen effectuated the lockout on November 1st, 2011 at 4:30 pm (by which time the
ORders of October 25th and October 27th, 2011 made exhibits in this Trial by the City had become
stale, invalid, perhaps void, etc. given, as admitted to, apparently, by both the RJC's Chief Civil
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Clerk/Supervisor Karen Stancil (to be clear, I mean this only to the extent that Ms. Stancil has
represented to the undersigned the "usual custom and practice" of the RJC is to fax over Orders such
as those mentioned above to the WCSO the day they are file stamped, or at the latest by the next
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day...plus Baker testified, apprently to receipt of the ORder by the WCSO on October 28th, 2011...all
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making the WCSO's "receipt" of the Orders outside the statutorily dictate that the lockout occur
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"within 24 hours" thereof under NRS 40.253. Regardless, back to RMC Marshal Harley (whom
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RMC Judge Nash Holmes, in her March 12, 2012 rendition of some Order finding Coughlin guilty of
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every RPD in the book, incident to a traffic citation matter that Judge Nash Holmes had
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transmogrified into a hearing before the NNDB, apparently (see In Re Kunstler), Judge Nash Holmes
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alleged that Marshal Harley, apparently, followed Coughlin into the bathroom during the restroom
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break just prior to Judge Nash Holmes incarcerating Coughlin, whereupon Harley apparently played
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peeping tom on Coughlin the bathroom stall and averred to Judge Nash Homes that Coughlin
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"disassembled his smart phone" (Martin Crowley is laughing somewhere)...the thing is, "summary
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contempt" (even "misdemeanor summary criminal contempt", ie, some law Judge Nash Holmes
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appears to have legislated on the spot, and which does not require her to comply with the dictates of
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NRS 189.010-060, as she refuses to transmit the record and order the production o the transcript (and
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its illegal for the RMC to force criminal indigents to pay Pam Longoni, and only Pam Longoni,
ANYTHING, up front, in some application of a civil statute related thereto. Regardless, Judge Nash
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Holmes "summary criminal contempt" Orders relies upon allegations of conduct allegedly committed
OUTSIDE the presence of the Court, so whichever Marshal went playing peeping' Tom on Coughlin
in a restroom stall needs to sign their name on an Affidavit and stand behind it like a grown up rather
than right some insipid letter to the State Bar of Nevada criticizing Coughlin's fashion sense, then
proceeding to lie and lie and lie about Coughlin whilst also demonstrating a disturbing extent to
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which the City of Reno Marshals behave as a coordinated crew of intimidators and coerces towards
the citizens of Reno attempting to access justice, and to which these Marshals themselves obstruct
justice on a regular basis. Right in line with that behavior was that demonstrated by RMC Marshal
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Harley in barging into a plea bargaining session between City Attorney Ormaas and Coughlin and
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undertaking the legally questionable task (but certainly an intimidating, coercive, and inappropriate
15
action by Harley) of "personally serving" Coughlin and Order to Show Cause in CV11-03628 (despite
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Coughlin already having been served it via his electronic filer status, something Richard Hill and
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Casey Baker, E Sq knew full well) . Harley personally served Coughlin some document, then
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WCSO Machen filed an Affidavit of Service on 3 8 12 saying he himself personally served Coughlin.
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The RMC puts people in jail for less than that every single day. Then Harley got real uncomfortable
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with Coughlin asking him questions related to the propriety of what Harley just did. Then Harley
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starts whispering in City Attorney Ormaas's ear during the trial in 11 TR 26800, held after that on the
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same day, despite the RMC, apparently, in light of Judge Nash Holmes March 14, 2012
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letter/grievance against Coughlin to the SBN indications therein, being aware that an Order For
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Competency Evaluation of Coughlin was entered at 1:31pm on 2/27/12 in RCR2012-065630, as
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Judge Nash Holmes admits to communications with the WCPD regarding Coughlin. The RMC
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Marshals, especially Marshal Menzel like to bark menacingly at defendants that they have to sign
some acceptance of service or waiver of service of various documents in some apparent effort to cost
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cut postage expenses of the RMC in affording others due process. But worse than that is Marshal
Harley taking it upon himself to personally serve Coughlin documents on behalf of Richard G. Hill,
Esq. especially where RPD Sargent Tarter came to testify that day about the 3 traffic citations he
issued for Hill against Coughlin, and Tarter put his feet up on Judge Nash Holmes bench (ie, where
the Judge might set her gavel) while the RMC staff served Sargent Tarter bottled water. Avoiding an
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appearance of impartiality or impropriety is a cannon or something, some might say. This is true
especially incident to a trial appearance related to 3 retaliatory traffic citations issued by the RPD
after they told Coughlin to leave the sidewalk near Hill's law Office, and where Judge Nash Holmes
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told Coughlin she would "put you in jail if you say Richard Hill's name one more time"... See some of
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the materials in Exhibit 1 that show Also, there may be some clerk failure or misconduct where
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Michelle Purdy and or Lori Matheus appear to have refused a filign by Coughlin on October 19th,
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2011 which arguably could have functioned as a Motion for STay in CV11-03051 - ZACH
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COUGHLIN VS. MATT MERLISS ET AL (D1) Filing Date:
Wednesday, October 19th, 2011 .
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And City Attorney allison Ormaas and Dan Wong both told Coughlin the were not going to
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investigate, follow up on, notate, or in any way document the fact that Coughlin repeated to them the
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exact words that RPD Officer Chris Carter said to Coughlin on November 13th, 2011 when the
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following exchange occurred between Coughlin and RPD Officer Carter after Carter subjected
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Coughlin to a custodial criminal trespass arrest where Hill and Sargent Lopez both admit that nobody
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issued Coughlin a warning to leave the premises that day and that the RPD did not identifiy
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themselves as law enforcement or issue a lawful order to leave to Coughlin prior to landlord Merliss
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kicking in a "basement" door:
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Coughlin: (speaking to RPD Officer Carter) Are you on Richard G. Hill's

payroll, too?
RPD Officer Chris Carter, Jr: "Yes, I am. Richard Hill pays me a lot of
money so I arrest who he says to arrest and I do what he says to do".
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Officer Carter said it. I reported it. Period. Now the SBN's Patrick King has failed to subpoena
Marshal Harley or City Attorney Ormaas (maybe he is afraid they will start whispering in each other's
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ears again during some hearing the SBN wants to violate Coughlin's due process rights in holding on
November 14th, 2012), and instead Pat King has listed his old friend and coworker from the Attorney
Generals Office to come testify at the hearing and also listed Marshal Coppa (instead of Harley?) to
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testify as the hearing? Hhmmmmmn......Its just wrong for a smirking and chortling RMC Marshal
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Harley to be perpetuating the fraud of WCSO Machen and the Rambo charlatan litigation tactics,
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attempts at intimidation, and creation of the appearance of impropriety that Richard HIll and Casey
Baker cultivate so well in everything they do.
Besides, why does Hill need to have the wCSO and
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RMC serving Coughlin notices of Orders to Show cause when the following is documented: 02-08-
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2012 Court
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02-08-2012 Court
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2012 Court
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Proof of Electronic Service Filed by or in behalf of: Court Proof of Electronic Service
Ord to Show Cause Filed by or in behalf of: Court Ord to Show Cause...02-10-
Proof of Electronic Service Filed by or in behalf of: Court Proof of Electronic Service
02-10-2012 Defendant
Notice of Entry of Ord Filed by or in behalf of: RICHARD HILL,
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ESQ. Notice of Entry of Ord - Continuation (if not for some impermissible purpose?).
1. All of the allegations herein also relate to "irregularities" in the proceedings and
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prosecutorial misconduct" justfying the relief requested herein. Coughlin's ability to get this
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excuplatory video wherein Sargent Lopez admits RPD Officer Carter and Richard Hill, Esq. and
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Casey Baker, Esq. lied, under oath (in Hill's case) at the June 18th, 2012 Trial and in violation of
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NRCP Rule 11 (in Baker's case in his November 21st, 2011 Opposition to Coughlin's Motion to
Contest Personal Property Lien) was severaly compromised, to an excusable neglect extent, and to a
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good cause standard, by the various fraudulent, retaliatory arrests and incarcerations (which have seen
attendant deprivations of Coughlin's medication or medications, some of which may be, by some,
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considered "pyschotropic" by the WCDC), and the fraudulent attempts by RPD Officer Warren and
others to alienate Coughlin from his family and any other type of a support system, all in the name of
covering up wrongful arrests by the WCPD, and or WCSO and or wrongful "summary contempt"
findings, including those in 11 TR 26800, RCR 2012-065630 ( ARgent Sifre's order to arrest Couglin
on January 14th, 2012 for "misue of emergency communciations", in addition to WCSO Deputy
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Machen's fraudulent arrest of Coughlin on June 28th, 2012, including the fraudulent "Sixth
Amendment representation by WCPD Jim Leslie and Biray Dogan (in RCR 2012-065630 and
RCR2012-067980) in those matters)) (if Marshal Harley is going to follow Coughlin into the
13
restroom, then peer through a restroom stall and, as alleged by Judge Nash Holmes in her 3/12/12
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Order following a hearing that Coughlin was not appropriately noticed on by the RMC, despite it
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being aware of Coughlin's then current address at the time it mailed a 2/28/12 Order in 11 TR 26800
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to Coughlin...and Judge Nash Holmes is going to enter and Order finding Coughlin to be guilty of
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"summary criminal contempt" (which isn't even an actual charge under NRS), then Marshal Harley
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and or Judge Nash Holmes need to sign affidavits to the extent those Ordes explicitly reference
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alleged conduct in a bathroom stall, ie, not, allegedly "committed in the court's presence" under any
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section of NRS 22)), then Marshal Harley needs to sign an affidavit, which he has not done. And
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RMC Marshal Coppa should perhaps focus less on critiquing Coughlin's alleged wearing of "pajama
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bottoms" to the RMC filing office coutner while checking a traffic citation, and more on whether he
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violated the Fourth Amendment and other laws incident to his conduct on February 27th, 2012 in
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pulling into a back room in the sally bay at the WCDC WCSP Deputy Cheung and seeking to, upon
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information and belief, commit some misconduct (and the RMC Marshals coming back to the WCDC
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on June 28th, 2012 and retrieving Coughlin's smart phone, phone, and micro sd card is not a "search
incident to arrest", and a warrant needs to be produced to show how the RMC and or the Marshal did
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not violate the Fourth Amendment. Further, the RMC needs to answer for why it has flouted Nevada
law in failing to transmit the appropriate materials in response to Coughlin's filing, on March 7th,
2012, of a NOtice of Appeal (see NRS 189.010-.050) in 11 TR 26800). Further, if any "recording
device" was "dissassembled" during a bathroom break, then how could Coughlin's answers to Judge
Nash Holmes sua sponte interrogation, incident to improper suggestions made to her by the Reno
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Marshals and or City Attorney Allison Ormass, possibly be appropriate? Further, in CR12-0376
Coughlin's rights were raped by the court system, and WCPD Biray Dogan and Jeremy Bosler, and
Judge Elliot's incarcerating Coughlin on April 19th, 2012 until April 26th, 2012 (incident to a
13
fraudulent filed letter by Lake's Crossing of April 18t, 2012, signed by Dr. Bill Davis, and Dr.Farmer,
14
though Davis disclaims and connection to that letter, amazingly) provides a further excusable neglect
15
basis, as does the fraudulent conduct of the RJC and or the WCSO (including Deputy Machen) of
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June 28th, 2012 in the custodial arrest (with impermissible denial of a phone call, for now reason at
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all, thanks to the misconduct of Deputy Van der Wall and "Nurse Katherine", and Deputy Beatson, in
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denying Coughlin a phoen call for 20 hours, for no reason whatsoever (despite WCDC policy and or
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the law requiring one within 3 hours), in addition to the fraud of Nevada Court Services (partners
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with RMC court appointed defender Lew Taitel, whom represented Couglin in this very matter, 11
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CR 26405, despite an obvious conflict).
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for exhibit 1 materials please find a courtesy copy
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Also, the fraud by Ltn. Kevin Brown, Sargent Oliver Miller, Officer Alan Weaver, and Sargent Dye
of the RPD in connection with the incarceration of Coughlin from July 3rd, 2012 to July 21st, 2012
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contributed to preventing Coughlin from (as did the fraud by the WCDC in refusing to timely file
Coughlin's court filings so submitted, including one's in this case and in the sister case appeal in cv11-
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03628 wherein during his incarceration Coughlin was prevented from opposing or otherwise
addressing an outrageous $40,050 attorney's fees award to Richard G. Hill, Esq. incident to the appeal
of the wrongful summary eviction in RJC Rev2011-001708 by Richard. G. HIll, ESq., and further
curious is RMC Judge Gardner's 11/30/11 transferring of the ridiculous wrongful arrest for
"jaywalking" of Coughlin on January 12th, 2012 incident to Coguhlin's peacefully filming Hill's crew
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loading up personalty from Coughlin's former home law office to take to the town dump, wherein HIll
lied to RPD Officer Alan Hollingsworth, i na criminal violation by Hill, eventually leading to a
wrongful custodial arrest of Coughlin for jaywalking in RMC 12 CR 00696 (the case "Administrative
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Judge" William Gardner of the RMC just so happened to transfer to Judge Nash Holmes (to go along
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with all the work she was puttin' in for thr RMC on 11 TR 26800, the triple traffic citation incdient to
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Coughlin seeking the return of his client's files and state issued indentification from Richard G. Hill,
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ESq. on NOvember 125th, 2011, following Coughlin's relesae from 3 days incarceration incident to
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the fraudulent and wrongful custodial arrest of Coughlin on NOvember 13th, 2011 in 11 CR 26405 by
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RPD Officer Carter and Sargent Lopez.. Everytime, Coughlin has been wrongfully arrested (which is
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everytime Coughlin has been arrested) the WCDC has impermissibly withheld Coughlin's
21
medications from him while the WCDA's Office and REno City attorney and or the RMC and RJC
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have sought to violate NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010 in plowing ahead with Trials and settings during
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the pendency of an Order for Competency Evaluation (including the one's detailed in Coughlin's
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previous filing in this regard). Add to that the fraud of Northwinds in RJC reve2012-001048, the
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fraud of GAyle Kern and WNM's Sue King in the Coughlin v. Park Terrace Town Homes HOA in the
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RJC and that of Jeff Nichols in Couglhin v NIchols (another landlrod tenant matter in the RJC) and its
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excusable neglect any extent to which Coughlin did not previously produce this exculpatory video,
particularly where it was wrongfully withheld from his under an unlawful rent distraint or other
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impermissilbe action by a landlord, and how that is excusable neglect is obvious, no matter what
RMC Judge Howard's lack of appreciation of what being a tenant subjected to fraud by a landlord
may have revealed in 11 CR 22176 or the misconduct of Pam Roberts, Esq., City attorney in that
matter (and all the fallout of the decisions and action by those two therein).
1.1
January 13th, 2012 RPD Sargent Marcia Lopez and Officer Travis Warren and Officer
Avila respond to a call for help regarding a domestic disturbance from Zach Coughlin relating to the
attacks by his housemates, Christopher "Erin" Allaback and Laura Foreshee for which Coughlin
ultimately received two Orders of Protection in FV12-00187 and FV12-00188. Sargent Lopez
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subjected Coughlin to a custodial arrest for criminal trespass in Reno Municipal Court case 11 CR
14
26405, on November 13th, 2011 (which resulted in Coughlin being convicted for criminal trespass
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following the June 18th, 2012 Trial wherein Richard Hill testified as follows:
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The admission by Sargent Lopez was captured on a high 8mm video camera that Coughlin
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bought from a thrift store for five dollars after his then housemate ruined his digital smart phone
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video recorder by throwing hot coffee on it an Coughlin. Coughlin then transferred the tape from that
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high 8mm to a digital version by filming a television with a digital video camera later obtained, while
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it was playing that high 8mm tape. The file was name "0201 cropped Carter Lopez 26405.wmv, and
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the following represents and accurate transcription thereof, in relevant part:
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Coughlin: Sargent Lopez are you going to arrest Nevada court

services for trespass?
Lopez: I'm not going to arrest them for trespass.
Coughlin: but you arrested me for trespass.
Lopez: because you were squatting in the property.
Coughlin: why do you say that you have any evidence of that? (5
seconds of silence is Sargent Lopez's response) did you
announce that you were Reno PD prior to kicking the door in?
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Lopez: I didn't kick the door in.

Coughlin: did you announce that you are Reno PD prior to
anybody kicking the door in?
Lopez: I didn't have to,
Coughlin: so nobody announced that they were Reno PD?
Lopez: because the guy who kicked it in had to kick in his own
door because you were squatting in his place.
Coughlin: so you are admitting that you guys didn't announce that
you were Reno PD.
Lopez: you are wearing my patience thin, Sir, okay. I am trying
to come here to help you, and I bring a specialized officer
(motioning to RPD Officer Travis Warren, whom has been
described as some sort of RPD Officer with some specialty in
"mental health" related areas).
Coughlin: that's interesting, you admit that you and Officer Carter
never announced that you are Reno PD, and that you never asked
me to leave, did you, prior to the door being kicked in?
Officer Travis Warren: She didn't have to do anything like that.
Coughlin: you didn't have to! That's great, but that means you
didn't either.
Warren: hold on Zach. You asked us to come here because you
needed help now you are being confrontational.
Coughlin: no I'm not, no not. Anybody who asked you a question
is confrontational, I guess, huh?
Warren: Zach, let's try to stay on topic.
Coughlin: On topic? I'm not on the topic you want me to be on.
Warren: Zach the topic that I'm interested in...
Coughlin: Is the one that covers your ass!
Warren: No, it's not.
Coughlin: Yes, it is."
...
Coughlin: So, Sargent Lopez you have admitted that you did not
ask me to leave and you did not announce that you are Reno PD
either you or your partner either of those things when you
arrested me for trespass. Are you been arrest Nevada Court
Services for the trespass that there is video evidence of on
YouTube right now? Are you can a do that, Sargent? Sargent, are
you?
Warren: Zach, that's not the topic were on.
Coughlin: Are you going to do that, Sargent? Sargent, are you?
Lopez: are you going to fill out your statement?
Coughlin: sure. Are you going to do that?
Lopez: I am not going to arrest Nevada Court Services.
Coughlin: Why, are they your buddies?
Lopez: because they did their job.
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Coughlin: wait a did their job by going behind my back fence and
banging on my windows for 45 minutes three times a time a day?
Interesting...
Lopez: Zach, we need you to fill out the paper.
Coughlin: Interesting how it works down there at the Reno PD.
You know, there is a lots of documentary filmmakers out there
these days, Sargent Lopez? Do you have anything you would
like to say?
Lopez: Zach, you need to finish your statement.
Warren: Zach, you call us here to help you, and now your are...
Coughlin: well apparently not because you arrest me for trespass
when you either didn't tell me to leave for announced that you
were the PD (police Department) and then you have video
evidence of Nevada Court Services doing trespassing harassing
banging on windows for 40 min. at a clip three times a day,
behind a back gate is obviously trespassing, and you are seeing
you are not going to do anything...
Lopez: have you had your day in court on that yet?
Coughlin:That is coming up.
...
Warren: Zach, we really need to stay on topic, okay?
Coughlin: What is the topic? Nevada Court Services? The
buddies of Sargent Lopez?
Warren: No...
...
Coughlin: are you guys going to do anything on this call because
the last time you didn't run anybody's priors and if you had it
would have been interesting what you would have found, what
did you say? Is that proper procedure children somebody's priors?
Lopez: The priors for who?
Coughlin: because you guys didn't do that... Well who would I be
talking about?
Lopez:(smirking) Yourself, maybe? The priors for yourself?
Coughlin: Oh, is that a...do you think you are funny?
Lopez: I think it is funny, yeah. I think everything is funny,
actually. I am amused by a lot of stuff.
Coughlin: Really? Do you think it's funny when your partner
says that Richard Hill pays him a lot of money to arrest whom he
says to?
Lopez: I am pretty sure he didn't..
Coughlin: and you were there? And you didn't follow up with the
questions of whether Richard Hill had given me a bill for rent that
month and yet you still arrested me for trespass?
Lopez: 5 min. Zach.
Coughlin: I think that's funny, that you think it's funny.
Lopez: 4 min. Zach
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...
Lopez:, did the management give you an eviction notice?
Coughlin: what are you getting involved in civil matters now?
You are going above and beyond, Sargent Lopez, getting
involved in civil matters...
Lopez: Zach did they give you an eviction notice or not?
Coughlin: wow you are working of the storm over there aren't
you
Lopez: Yes or no:
Warren: you could say no comment, Zach.
Coughlin: thank you, counselor. I appreciate your advice. Now,
what criminal matter were you investigating here?
Lopez: I am asking you a question.
Coughlin: About a what? A civil matter?
Lopez: Zach, did you get an eviction notice from these guys
(Sargent Lopez is referring to Western Nevada Management
posting a John Doe 30 day eviction notice, allegedly, on the door
of the 1422 E. 9th St. #2 town home that WNM (which, like
NCS, commits the unauthorized practice of landlord tenant law)
had agreed to some deal with Coughlin's housemates (or maybe
they were his sublessors? Coughlin rented a room from them off
of Craigslist, but to some extent they were held out to be
employees or partners of WNM, and WNM did testify at a
February 23rd, 2012 hearing after Coughlin filed an interruption
of essential services complaint against WNM, Gayle Kern, Esq.,
LTD, and Park Terrace Townhomes that former WNM manager,
Robyn Batalado received approval from the Park Terrace Town
Homes Homeowners Associattion to allow Coughlin's sublessors
to live their in exchange for some handyman work (and perhaps
in light of the lessened insurance costs associated with not having
the unit vacant incident to some scenario where the PTTHOA
bought the unit at a foreclosure sale).
Warren: We will take that as a yes or no, or a maybe, who
knows? All right, Zach? You are not going to be able to bait us
into saying things?
Coughlin: Well, I've been listening to you here whether you've
been baited or not, you have said a whole lot today.
...
Coughlin:... What if Richard Hill sent me a Bill for rent for the month of November, should
you follow phone that before you make it trespass arrest? And what did you say to that? You
say no we are not going to that Richard Hill pays us a lot of money, and we are going to arrest
whom he says to arrest, did you hear that Sargent Lopez?
Warren: Zach, let's stay on topic.
Coughlin: this could be your star turn... This could be your star
turn.
Lopez: you need some help, brother.
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Coughlin: really?
Lopez: Yeah, you do.
...(Sargent Lopez and Officers Warren and Avila then leave
shortly thereafter, and Coughlin has the following exchange with
his housemate's/abusers teenage daughter):
Coughlin: look someday, you are trying to support yourself and
someone steals your license plate, and slashes your tires, and
locks you out after you have given them the last money you had...
Teenage Girl's Friend: well, someday we won't be an assh*le like
you
Coughlin:What is an "assh*le" about that?
Teenage Girl: you are f*cking r*tarded, you are being r*tarded,
you're making my dad not like you, you steal his knives. His
steak knives, like seriously?
Coughlin: You mean the one of he held while chasing me up the
stairs with saying he was gonna kill me?
Teenage Girl: He didn't f*ckin' chase you up the stairs and tell
you he was gonna kill you. Why would he say that, he's not like
that. And if he say's it, it doesn't mean he means it. You make
him say that, you f*ckin' pr*ck."
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January 12th, 2012 custodial arrest (in RMC 12 CR 00696, which was transffered by RMC Judge
William Gardner on 2/27/12, to RMC Judge Nash Holmes in D3, from D1, the same day Judge Nash
Holmes violated NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010 in proceeding with a traffic citation trial despite the
communications from the Washoe County public defender's Officer and or Biray Dogan in
connection with the clandestine status conference (that Dogan told his client Coughlin, via a written
notice of February 24th, 2012 had been reset, but which Dogan and WCDA DDA Zach Young, Esq.
held anyway, and procurred an Order for Competency Evaluation of Coughlin RCR2012-065630
filestamped at 1:31pm, whereupon RMC Judge Nash Holmes stil held the 11 TR 26800 traffic
citation trial, at which she found Coughlin in "summary criminal contempt", and despite her march
14th, 2012 grievance to the SBN alleging such concern for Coughlin's client's she denied any stay
whatsoever to Coughlin to arrange for alternatives to avoid such prejudice to Coughlin's client's cases
(some might say, because the RMC really wanted to, despite the pretextual "summary criminal
contempt" basis asserted at the time, conduct a search incident to arrest of Coughlin, an attorney
appearing for himself, self representation...whereup the RMC felt entitled to search Coughlin's
smartphone, micro sd card, flip phone, and other property as a "search incident to arrest" except the
RMC and its Marshall Scott Coppa did not do so at the time Coughlin was booked on February 27th,
2012, and the RMC and its Marshals only retrieving those materials, later, after the period to conduct
a search INCIDENT to arrest had definitely passed, upon the RMC and its Marshals retrieving those
materials (with some subterfuge attempts by the WCSO, WCDC, and, perhpas, WCDA) on February
28th, 2012, was impermissilble, to say nothing of the fact that the smart phone and data on the micro
sd ard were wiped from those items or otherwise destroyed prior to there being returned to Coguhlin
some 37 days later (at which time WCSO Deputy Beatson threatened Coughlin with yet another
fraudulent arrest, citing some made up non-sense involving front desk Deputy "Maddy"). WCSO
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Beaston later contributed to Coughlin being denied a phone call for no reason whatsoever, for over 20
hours, incident to the fraudulent and wrongful arrest of Coughlin on June 28th, 2012 in RCR2012067980. (from which her ORder of 2/28/12 and the various Orders she entered thereinafter, incuding
those steming from the 3/12/12 hearing which Coughlin was unaware of and did not attend, all of
which form the predominant basis for the State Bar of Nevada's current SCR 105 Complaint against
Coughlin in NG12-0204 (the Richard G. Hill, Esq, grievance letter to Pat King of 1/14/12) and
NG12-0434 (RMC Judge Nash Holmes March 14th, 2012 grievance against Coughlin on behalf of all
RMC Judges, even where RMC Judge Gardner attempts to assert he was unaware of it incident to a
hearings on 4/10/12 and 5/8/12 in RMC 11 CR26045) and NG12-0435 (the grievance that Judge Nash
Holmes filed for RMC Judge William Gardner and his sister Family Court Judge Linda Gardner (by
submitting the April 2009 Order sanctioing Coughlin which Coughlin attacked via a Petition for Writ
of Mandamaus in 54844, the Joshi divorce case that Washoe Legal Services cited as the sole basis for
firing Coughlin in May 2009 in WLS Executive Director Paul Elcano's May 14th, 2012 termination
letter to Coguhlin)for "pedestrian failing to use sidewalk where available" (aka, jaywalking) in front
of Coughlin's former home law office at 121 River Rock St., Reno, NV 89501.
(in the video Coughlin begins filiming from the parking lot in
fron of his former home law office and walks towards the
property, where Hill's contractor Phil Stewart is already there (for
some reason Hill kept making a deal about how Coughlin was
"already at the property" when Stewart returned their from the
transfer center, but that is not true, Coughlin actually took almost
30 minutes to get to the River Rock Property after the talks at the
transfer center, as Coughlin had to go retrieve his hi 8mm video
camera from his E. 9th St. address on that date.
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Coughlin: What would the contractor's board say about you

submitting fraudulent bills? (said to Hill's contractor, Phil
Stewart, owner and operator of Nevada Building Industries
(NBI), whose bill for $1,060 for "securing" the property was
submitted as an attachment in Hill's Memorandum of Costs and
in Hill's Opposition to Coughlin's Motion to Contest Personal
Property Lien under a personalty lien theory citing to NRS
118A.460, which allows for reasonable costs for "moving,
storage, and inventorying" a tenant's personal property). Would
they be okay with that? Neck carpet right there that's Dr. Merliss's
property if you throw it away, you are throwing away the carpet,
so you are on notice and you should tell Richard Hill, if he tries
to sue me for the carpet, and you throw it away, I will sue you for
fraud.
...
(Coughlin is seen in the video walking a few feet off the sidewalk
in light of the fact that Hill's contractor's crew have taken up the
whole of the sidewalk (Stewart's white dumptruck is parked so as
to extend from the drive way out onto the street so as to
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completely block the sidewalk, and beyond that, the sidewalk is

dotted with various items Stewart's crew is in the process of
moving from the former home law office) on the southern facing
side of the property in furtherance of their efforts to load up the
rest of Coughlin's personalty and take it to the dump (as there was
apparently an incredibly urgent need to do something with the
property, despite the fact that, to this day, over one year later, it
still remains un-rented).
Coughlin: gentlemen, you are under notice this is my property
and I want it. I believe I might have some legal recourse against
you for destroying my property. I could be wrong. You are
certainly welcome to listen to your boss. You know what is
interesting is that I have proof right here that you used my own
plywood to board up the property and then you try to charge a
thousand dollars for it and for fixing a leak that's my plywood
Phil or whatever your name is, guy with a contractor's license.
(Coughlin is saying this while in the parking lot of the studio
apartments that abuts the backyard fence to his former home law
office (ie, not on the sidewalk even. One of Stewart's laborers
walk up to Coughlin within about 8 feet of him and snaps a flash
photo):
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John Doe: What's up?. (snaps another photo of Coughlin in the

parking lots of the Mill Place studio apartments)
Coughlin: Hi, how are you doing? What's your name?
John Doe: John Doe.
Coughlin: John Doe, really?
Doe: Don't get mouthy, buddy.
Coughlin: What's that?
Doe: I said don't get crowley, buddy.
Coughlin: What's "crowley"?
Doe: "Crowley" means like "Crowley Lake".
Coughlin: I don't know what you mean. Anyways Phil what do
you have to say about the fact that you fraudulently submitted a
Bill for thousand dollars for boarding up the property to fix a leak
yet you used my plywood to do it, Phil?
John Doe: Hey, can you stay away from him (motioning to Phil
Stewart)?
Coughlin: I am on a public spot right here (actually, Coughlin is
still standing in the Mill Place studio apartment's parking lot at
this time). I am not bothering him you guys just expect people to
watch you use their own property to board up a place?
Phil Stewart: do you have a receipt for that?
Coughlin: yeah I do. It was submitted into evidence guy. You
guys submitted it into evidence as a bill. (Coughlin then walks
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out of the Mill Place parking lot and around Stewart's white dump
truck (which was completely blocking the sidewalk) and out a
few feet into the road on Court St west of River Rock, where the
camera's view reveals Stewart's crew has set a couch and some
other personalty on the sidewalk, where Stewart and John Dow
walk onto towards the front of the property on River Rock St. to
talk with Richard G. Hill, Esq.) are you going to ask Richard
about that? I even ask Richard about the fact they used my own
property to board up the property and charged with thousand
dollars for it this gotta be an easier way to make money was and
ain't that easy to be an attorney as you can see, Phil.
Stewart: you obviously need to start taking your medication.
Coughlin:(Coughlin has retreated back to the Mill Place parking
lot at this point) what did you say? Are you making some sort of
accusation or insult about taking medication? Is that what you are
doing? You know it is funny because a lot of this property
could've been used to feed families in need. Phil are you going to
throw away the carpet and then try to bill before it is that what
you are going to do some pretty sure that that would be fraud
Phil. Sir, I am putting you on notice that carpet belongs to Dr.
Merliss (a couple members of Stewart's crew are now seen
picking up the rolled up bundles of carpet that Coughlin, whom
has now walked around to the front of the property to River Rock
St. walking just off the sidewalk (though a large tan/brown
Silverado style pickup truck parked on the North Side of Court
Street, that Coughlin recalls seeing a large manilla folder in with
the notation, in hand writing, "Sargent Bradshaw" is an obstacle
Coughlin must walk around, especially where Stewart himself is
utilizing the sidewalk, and given John Doe's very recent request
that Coughlin "stay away" from Stewart, it would seem cautious
of Coughlin not to attempt to walk on the same small patch of
sidewalk off Court Street as Stewart and his laborers.) Hey, Phil?
Phil? The carpet, there was also some more of it right around
there... Hopefully you haven't thrown it away already...
Hopefully, you do not try to bill me for it Phil....
(Coughlin is now standing on the sidewalk on the western side of
River Rock, parallel with the northern boundardy line of the
property, when John Doe appears from around the corner off of
Court Street and snaps another flash bulb photograph at
Coughlin).
Coughlin: Sir, this is a public street. This is a public street you do
not on the sidewalks are have you ever heard of a documentary?
You know there's a lot of guys making documentaries these days
about the bad things people do.
(up rolls RPD Officer Hollingsworth on his motorcycle, and RPD
dispatch chatter can be heard describing a "suspect in a larceny".
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Officer Hollingsworth has been called to the scene by Richard G.

Hill, Esq. and Phil Stewart. Hill shows up seconds after
Hollingsworth. Now, neither Hill nor Stewart were charged with
"misuse of emergency services like Coughlin was in RCR2012065630. So in this video Stewart talks with officer Hollingsworth
for a few moments until Richard Hill arrives...)
Coughlin: hey Rich how are you doing?
Hill: Great, Zach, thank you buddy.
Coughlin: would you prefer of psychology Mr. Hill?
Hill: I would, Zach.
Coughlin: Mr. Hill, how are you doing? Hey that is a cool
"skulls" shirt, Mr. Hill (Hill is wearing a black Ed Hardy style
bowling shirt with flaming red skulls on it.. Hill begins doing his
Reno PD thing with Officer Hollingsworth, Coughlin stands back
about 12 feet from their communique).
Hill: (to Officer Hollingsworth) can we get him out of here? (and
therein, besides calling 911/RPD dispatch in the first place where
no legitimate reason existed to, Hill proceeds to leverage law
enforcement acting with color of law to prevent opposing counsel
from collectin evidence for a wrongful eviction damages
analysis).
Hollingsworth: first of all of gotta figure out if I have legal
authority to do so.
Hill: Re: court order evicting him from the property, subsequently
we had him arrested for trespass is lost his appeal (which was
totally not true when Hill made that false statement to a police
officer seeking to have Coughlin arrested, on January 12th, 2012,
given that the appeal would not be decided for months), he's
lost.... Now we have been talking to our workers
Hollingsworth: Have you tried to get a protection order?
Hill: no but we do have an order from the court disposition of the
premises (unintelligible...)
Coughlin: what about the sidewalk bridge you on the sidewalk?
Hill: is been over to the transfer station Sargent Bradshaw I just
left from there is Sargent Bradshaw who is been on
(unintelligible)... These over here just generally being a pain in
the ass
Coughlin: freedom of the press, Rich. (Hill starts making some
big gesticulating motions to Officer Hollingsworth like a child
whom is not being given the toy he wanted for Christmas or
Veruca Salt throwing a fit in Charley's Chocolate Factory). They
have important things to do rich they are busy. (Helen Stewart
continued talking the Hollingsworth by this time Officer Del
Vecchio is showed up, it looks like Officer McQuattie is there
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(actually, that might be then trainee Officer Leedy, Officer Look

is there now too)
RPD Officer Travis Look: hey how are you doing (note, RPD
Officer Travis Look, in early May 2012, refused to investigate or
take a report, and claimed that no police report existed regarding,
the theft of Coughlin's red Gary Fisher mountain bike on October
4th, 2012 at the time that NV Energy came and, unnoticed, shut
off the power to Coughlin's former home law office on the last
day to file a Tenan'ts Answer in the eviction Richard G. HIll and
Casey Baker, ESq. were opposing counsel on, and Casey Baker,
Esq. showed up within hours of the power being shut off with a
videographer seeking to "inspect" the former home law office.
Coughlin found his stolen red mountain bike in May 2012 and a
smirking and smug RPD Officer Look responded to a call to
dispatch by Coughlin with a refusal to investigate the matter).
Coughlin: Hi, Sir, good to see you again. I didn't catch your
name last time I recognize you from the the day..
Look: with officer look
Coughlin nice to see you again I think I saw you the other day
when came out on a call with Officer Gannon, for a domestic
disturbance a run East-Sage
look: I honestly don't remember
Coughlin: Yeah, I think you guys are up in my bedroom...
Look: Right on Scottsdale
Coughlin: Satan E. 9th St., Park Terrace Town homes... Freedom
of the press, Rich.
Look what you guys have going on today?
Hill: contempt of court Mr. Coughlin!
Coughlin: well, that carpet belongs to your client, Mr. Hill if you
try to throw it away and then build me for it
Hollingsworth: (comes over to talk to Coughlin) can you turn that
off, Sir, for a second stuff over here on over on the sidewalk
(Coughlin was already on the sidewalk, but Hollingworth leads
them further North along the River Rock side walk's western
side). Okay so what's the deal today why are we here?
Coughlin: I don't know, sir.
Hollingsworth did used to live here?
Coughlin: I prefer to just keep my privacy as a private citizen.
But I mean you no disrespect Sir.
Hollingsworth no problem, I can respect that here's the deal you
understand here in the sidewalk no problem you on it student run
tape no problem but you can't interfere with them doing their job
and they're probably enough apply for temporary station order
against you in which he/she can be within 100 yards of there or
them. (Hill gets into his $100,000 Porsche Carrera where he goes
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off the Reno Justice Court and gets a TPO signed by Judge
Schroeder within 40 minutes of the application being stamped in.
Behind Hill's Porsche is Officer Look's patrol car and the patrol
car being utilized by Officer Leedy and his training, tenured
Officer, Officer Del Vecchio. These vehicles are in addition to
the motorcycle ridden by Officer Hollingsworth. Richard Hill's
wife/legal assistant Sheri Hill is parked in the lot on the east side
of River Rock in her maroon Lexus SUV. Contractor Stewart is
seen jaywalking across River Rock to the lot where Sheri Hill is
parked, but he is not arrested.). All they are trying to do is get
their business or taking care of
Coughlin: I'm trying to take care of my business, too.
Hollingsworth: okay is there something we can help you with?
Coughlin: I don't believe so, sir. I called the police recently I told
them somebody threatened my life the the day that in six see fit to
arrest anybody so apparently Richard Hill is a national treasure.
Hollingsworth: Okay, well, I don't know who that is, all I know
is I'm here today and you are here with the camera and you're not
breaking any laws that I can see but they're gonna try to get it to
where you are violating a temporary protection order
Coughlin I understand it threatening abuse of process and
malicious prosecution
Hollingsworth: so it would be helpful if maybe you could find
something else to do this afternoon because I have been listening
on the radio and we've had two or three calls for service for you
already today and would like to be evidence of do some other
work today, no one I mean
Coughlin okay well I hear what you're saying
Hollingsworth is basically a second help you with
Coughlin: if you wouldn't mind telling me your last name
Hollingsworth: Hollingsworth
Coughlin thank you, Sir, Goodbye Officer Look, good to see you
again, Sir.(Coughlin then proceeds to walk back towards the mill
place parking lot Western Lane along court street he does not
walk in the street but rather uses the sidewalk which is now
cleared of Stewart's laborers and any of the personalty they are
seeking to take to the dump however the white dump truck belong
to Stewart is still blocking the sidewalk. Coughlin Fox all the
way back to the area in the Mill's Place parking lot immediately
to the west of the fenced, gated backyard to his former home law
office, and can view Officer Hollingsworth pull away on his
motorcycle heading north on River Rock. Footage of contractor
Stewart's white dump truck reveals how extremely implausible
Stewart sworn testimony was at the February 23, 2012 Order to
Show Cause hearing (which Hill had Coughlin personally served
Notice of by WCSO Deputy Machen (by way of RMC Marshal
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Harley) incident to Coughlin arriving and waiting at the RMC for

the traffic citation Trial in 11 TR 26800 stemming from the three
traffic citations RPD Sargent John Tarter had issued to Coughlin
incident to the November 15 incident at Hill's law office where
Coughlin ventured upon being released from three days
incarceration following the November 13, 2011 criminal trespass
rests at Coughlin's former law office Coughlin went to Hill's
office to retrieve his keys state issued drivers license and or
identification his wallet and his client's files, which Hill refused
to release. It took until November 22nd, 2011 before Hill turned
over Coughlin's wallet and driver's license to Coughlin. It took
until December 22nd, 2011 before Hill turned over Coughlin's
client's files, causing Coughlin to incur great expense in arranging
for alternatives. Coughlin starts to make his way back towards the
front of the property and decides to walk along the edge of the
parked Tan Brown pickup truck instead of venture near it be
laborers working for Stewart who are now utilizing the sidewalk
on the north side of court street once again. Coughlin notices the
large manila envelope and the dashboard of the track with a large.
Written note indicating Sargent Bradshaw on the outside of of the
folder. Coughlin then crosses the street in a straight continuation
from the northern sidewalk on Court St. to the parking lot on the
east side of River Rock, just as any pedestrian would (except
Contractor Stewart actually just walked out in the middle of the
road when he crossed River Rock earlier, rather than in a straight
continuation of the sidewalks. Coughlin notices Contractor
Stewart milling about on the west sidewalk of River Rock just
north of his former law office. This group includes Stewart, Del
Vecchio, Leedy, and Look, whom are now joined by Sargent
Sifre. Officer Hollingsworth has left to do some real police work
by this time. Sheri Hill is still watching on from her maroon
Lexus SUV in the parking lot).
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Coughlin: (talking vaguely in the direction of Contractor Stewart

who is approximately 30 feet away) you might when I try to
make sure you don't throw away that carpet over there because I
will dispute it if you guys try to bill me for it. (Coughlin then
positions himself to get a shot of the interior of the former home
law office where a he sees a very sentimental item to him that he
forgot to grab at the last second during the mad rush to move his
property out to whatever extent possible by the 5 PM deadline
December 23 this item is a 5" x 16" caricature of his former
domestic partner of the preceding four and a half years from a
relationship that ended in late May 2011 and himself done during
the early stages of their relationship. This was amongst
Coughlin's most treasured possessions and was only left atop a
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crown molding during the move with the idea that it would be the
last thing Coughlin would grab, and therefore he would be able to
place it in a safe place on his U-Hauls dash board or somewhere
else where it would be safe. However, the chaos incident to
Richard Hill's showing up in demanding everyone be off the
property by exactly 5 PM under the threat of arrest caused
Coughlin to overlooked grabbing this treasured sentimental item.
This caricature is visible in the video)
Coughlin: that is that sentimental picture that I told them about of
Melissa and I. the caricature... And I believe the dolphin
windchime mobile, one of the last things my grandmother gave
me before she died is in there...oh, and look at that there is $150
appliance. (to Contractor Stewart). Sir I season sentimental
heirloom keepsakes in their that I guess you are just going to
throw it away you don't care, the last thing my grandmother gave
me before she died very sentimental thing (at this point
Contractor Stewart turns to the camera an makes a revolting
gesture). Sir when you put a padlock on the back fence? (Hill's
placing a padlock on the back fence only just about the time that
it was Coughlin's right to remove his property resulted in
Coughlin's progress in moving all his personalty being severely
impeded.).
...
(At this point in the video Coughlin returns to the parking lot of
Mill's Place, private property, behind the fenced back yard of his
former home law office. Like a couple of goons approaching,
Officer's Leedy and Officer Look venture into that private
property, the Mill's Place parking lot:
Officer Leedy: Mr. Coughlin could talk to for second?
Coughlin: I mean neither confirming that that's my name, Sir, but
you are the law under asking to speak to somebody so.
(at this point Officer Look approaches Coughlin very rapidly and
immediately grabs Coughlin's wrist, Couglin holding his video
camera, which is, obviously, still filming, as Officer Leedy and
Officer Look immediately jump straight to applying excessive
force to Coughlin's wrists. Officer Look jumps at Coughlin from
Coughlin's left side and Officer Leedy sneeks around behind
Coughlin and grabs Coughlin's camera out of his right hand and
turns it off)
Officer Look: video camera down, put your camera down.
Coughlin:Whoa! Whoa! Why are you touching me! (Officer
Look is captured on video breaking back Coughlin's left wrist and
wrenching Coughlin's left arm behind his back, prior to any sort
of attempt to peaceably approach Coughlin, a license attorney,
whatsoever, but then accidentally turns it back on a second later,
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a fact to which he is unaware. Officer Leedy places both of his

hands on Coughlin's right side and right arm and wrist in a
display of excessive use of force.)
Officer Leedy: We don't want your camera....
Coughlin why are you touching me this is not their properties,
Sir? (the camera goes black for a moment)
Coughlin: Owww!. You are breaking my wrist!! Oww! Owww!!
Help!!! Help!!! My wrist hurts, somebody call 911. Owww!!
Owww!!! Somebody help!!! Somebody help!!! Sir, there is no
need to break my wrist like that, Sir. Oww!!!. Oww!!!Why are
you handcuffing me, Sir?
Officer Leedy: You are being placed under arrest.
Coughlin: For what? For what?
Sargent Paul Sifre: They'll explain everything to you in a little bit
(but, actually, Coughlin would not be told what he was charged
with for over an hour and a half, and in the intervening period
while he was handcuffed and placed in the Officer Leedy's patrol
car, with tenured training Officer Del Vecchio (whom had
handcuffed Coughlin, and placed him in the back of his patrol car
on night in July 2011 incident to Del Vecchio drawing his
weapon, or appearing to, on both Coughlin (whom was walking
his bike at the time) and another bicyclist in front of Coughlin's
former home law office at approximately 10 pm at night, all
because Officer Del Vecchio felt the light on Coughlin's bike was
"not up to code").
Sargent Sifre: I am going to shut your camera off so the battery
will not run down.(Officer Del Vecchio can be seen in the video
at this point walking around in his acid wash jeans).
Coughlin: I don't wan't it shut off, Sir. You are obstructing
justice if you shut it off! (Sargent Paul Sifre then shuts off the
video camera whereupon Officer's Look and trainee Officer
Leedy continuing applying the wrongful use of excessive force to
Coughlin's arms and wrists as they pin him face down to the
concrete with a smug, nauseating Californian transplant name
Sargent Paul Sifre (whom incident to another wrongful detention
of Coughlin on March 29th, 2012 told Coughlin he doesn't like
Nevada or Reno, but the job he has pays him so much, and he has
so little chance of finding such an arrangement in any local more
to his liking, that he essentially has a pair of "golden handcuffs"
tying him to Northern Nevada, which he detests, before going on
to tell Coughlin about how he lead his little league team in both
home runs and strike outs, then proceeding to ramble on
unconvincingly about how he was "trying to get you the help you
need", in a tone that was more suggestive of a veiled threat to
Coughlin, the import of which was clear, ie, that Coughlin better
not complain anymore about the RPD's police misconduct, such
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as Coughlin did in his written complaints to the RPD on

September 7th, 2011 and January 8th, 2012 wherein Coughlin
complained of the police misconduct by RPD Officers Nick
Duralde and Ron Rosa during the wrongful arrest of Coughlin on
August 20th, 2011in RCR2011-063341 (written complaint
submitted to the RPD on September 7th, 2011 and supplemental
on January 8th, 2012, at which time a written complaint against
Nevada Court Services, RPD Officer Chris Carter, Jr., and
Sargent Marcia Lopez incident to their police misconduct during
the November 13th, 2011 wrongful arrest of Coughlin in RMC 11
CR 26405. Sargent Sifre would again order Coughlin arrested
less than 48 hours later in RCR2012-065630 for "misue of
emergency communications services". In between these two
arrests RPD Officer Duralde would get a chance to retaliate
against Coughlin incident to pulling Coughlin over in his car in
the early morning hours of January 13th, 2012, after Coughlin
bailed himself out of jail and use a combination of a cab ride and
walking to get to his car in 20 degree whether on a very windy
night. Coughlin instantly recognized Sifreon January 14th, 2012
from seeing him on January 12th, 2012 as on both days fact that
Sifre was wearing a short sleeves uniform shirt emphasizing his
tribal armband tatoos, and body builder biceps.
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...
See attached in Exhibit 1 the videos from all of these varius
wrongful arrests by local law enforcemtn of Coughlin
While it may be expendient for some in local law
enforcement to discredit Coughlin or have him "committed", it
does not make it legal, and it does not vitiate the import of law
enforcement misconduct in all of the wrongful arrests of
Coughlin since August 19th, 2011.
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Coughlin was just informed by his mother that this same Officer Travis Warren, along with
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another RPD Officer and "two social worker types" met with Coughlin's mother, Very Special Arts of
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Nevada (VSAN) Program Director Mary Barker, and Coughlin's father, Dr. Timothy D. Coughlin,
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MD, of Reno Family Physicians at Dr. Coughlin's medical office in an purported attempt to have
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Coughlin "committed" sometime in approximately February 2012. Such a meeting is conveniently
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and suspiciously close in time to the video transcribed above wherein Sargent Lopez essentially
admits that she and Officer Carter lacked probable cause for a criminal trespass arrest of Coughlin
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(and, upon information and belief, the RPD was served a subpoena by Coughlin requiring Carter and
Lopez's presence at Trial, though neither managed to show up, despite the City Attorney's having
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previously subpoenaed at least one of them for that purpose as well...It seems to City Attorney's
Office got wind of how terribly fraudulent Officer Carter's probable cause sheet was (and Carter did
tell Coughlin, in the "Zach's arrest 010.mp4" video that Carter would put his name on the "arrest sheet
if you have any problem with that" in response to Coughlin mentioning to Officer Carter that the
police did need to have probable cause to make such an arrest. Further troubling is the fact that RPD
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Sargent Sifre had Coughlin arrested just over 24 hours after Sargent Lopez put her foot in her mouth
her, bringing 5 other RPD Officers with him on January 14h, 2012 to respond to a 911 call by
Coughlin reporting the disappearance of his Pekingese dog, Jackson Pawluck, and the menacing
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statements connected thereto by the house mates against whom Coughlin would eventually be
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awarded two different TPO's.
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Just about 12 hours prior to Sargent Lopez and Officer Warren and Officer Avila arriving at
Coughlin's E. 9th St. rental in response to a call by Coughlin reporting a domestic dispute (two of
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Coughlin's tires had been slashed and his license plate had turned up missing), just after Coughlin
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spent his last $160 bailing himself out of jail incident to the January 12th, 2012 "jaywalking" arrest
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ordered by RPD Sargent Paul Sifre, Coughlin was pulled over while driving home his vehicle after
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making his way to it from the Washoe County Detention Center (which had seen fit to release
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Coughlin exactly a couple minutes after the last RTC bus had left for the night (on a night where the
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temperature was a balmy 25 degrees, with a considerable wind chill on top of that) by the same RPD
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Officer Nick Duralde (whose wife is an emergency communications dispatcher, Jessica Duralde,
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which complicates matters considering that the petty larceny of an iPhone case, RCR2011-063341
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stemming from Duralde's wrongful August 20th, 2011 arrest of Coughlin has involved an inquiry
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wherein Duralde's basis for alleging he was justified in conducting a Terry Stop "weapons check pat
down" and or a search incident to arrest was largely premised upon some purported "information he
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received from dispatch" of a "disturbance or possible fight", despite the fact that none of the
discovery, 911 logs, dispatch reports, etc. propounded to Coughlin mention a "possible fight", but
they do mention a "disturbance" and "possible larceny of a cell phone" and the "RP (reporting party)
screaming at the accused". DDA Young may need to answer for just where this whole notion of
Duralde being dispatched mention of a "possible fight" comes from exactly, other than the
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prosecutors wish list of things he wishes there was documentation of to support his hopes of proving
Coughlin's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by an Officer eager to show up the lawyer in
front of some teen-agers and early twenty-somethings. To be fair, those youths did a fair amount of
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lying that night in their fraudulent attempts to cover up the conduct of Cory Goble, which may be
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tantamount to having abandoned (and if Goble did not abandon it, then anyone whom claimed it in
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response to the "man holding a six-pack" offering it up and threatening to "throw it in the river if
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someone doesn't claim it right away", arguably "saved" the iPhone from being destroyed in
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connection with Goble's alleged negligence or abandonment of it, and thereby, the iPhone was no
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longer Goble's, if it was, indeed, his to begin with (which is unclear given Goble's contradictory
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statements in that regard where he alleges that he himself bought it three years previously, according
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to Duralde in his Supplemental Declaration incident to his arrest report, in comparison to Goble's
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testimony on the August 29th, 2012 Trial date in RCR2011-063341, wherein Goble alleges his
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brother bought it for him three years previously, not that WCPD Jim Leslie would undertake any
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investigation or issue a subpoena to clarify such a thing, mind you) his three year old iPhone 3G
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(Goble's friend testified that Goble set it down on the concrete ground at around 11:00 pm or so on a
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Saturday evening in the downtown Reno skate plaza in front of City Hall (and Goble's statements in
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his Witness Statement, that he was "skateboarding 15 feet away from the phone" conflicting sharply
with both Goble's statements on the audio tape of his 911 calls (wherein he admits to having been at
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his Jeep at the relevant time, which was, apparently, according to Goble's friend Nathaniel Zarate's
testimony, parked on the west side of the skate plaza, on Virginia Street, whereas some still
unidentified "man holding a six-pack" whom Zarate alleges picked up the phone off the ground and
held it aloft (and Zarate's friend Nicole Watson admitted on a video filmed by Coughlin upon his
being released from 7 days in WCDC, where this lifelong resident of Reno, an attorney, whose entire
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immediate family lives here, who had no criminal record previous convictions aside from a January
2003 "dry" reckless driving conviction, was denied an OR release by a retaliatory WCDC staff for 7
days, and where Coughlin's bail was impermissibly inflated by Duralde's fraudulent overcharging as
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felony grand larceny for the purported theft of an item that was three years old and on worth "between
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$250 and $300" when it was bought new three years previously. The RMC impermissibly violated
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NRS 5.011 when Judge Gardner held Coughlin's arraignment in 11 CR 22716 on October 10th, 2012
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during the pendency of the Order for Competency Evaluation of Coughlin in RCR2011-063341. So,
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Officer Duralde and five other RPD Officers just happened to be hanging around Coughlin's car when
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he finally made his way to it upon his release from jail in the early morning hours of January 13th,
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2012. Coughlin had previously filed a written complaint against RPD Officer Duralde and Officer
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Ron Rosa on September 7th, 2011 and January 8th, 2012, making such a large show of force incident
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to that pull over (for a license plate that just so happened to all the sudden turn up missing", and the
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main suspects would be the RPD, or Coughlin's then house mates, or, finally, some stranger). A
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video of the wrongful arrest was taken by Coughlin, and here is the transcript (of the video Coughlin
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took of the August 20th, 2011 petty larceny arrest in RCR2011-063341):
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RETALIATORY ARREST: "Let him do his job or we will call the Nevada Bar and tell them
how you cooperated with our investigation. How's that runnin' for ya?" and "Now, your're
under arrest ofr larceny. Now we can search you incident to arrest. How's that?"
On the video/audio recording of the arrest ( VID_20110820_232801) the file name of which
represent an accurate time stamping of the time at which the video file began recording on 8/20/11 at
11:28:01 pm incident to the petty larceny charge Coughlin is currently facing in RCR2011-063341)
(3 second mark)
Coughlin: I am scared of you young kids...you have nothing to lose, of course I'm
scared of you...please don't hurt me...you have clearly scared me"
(at approximately the 22 second mark RPD Officer Duralde arrives on the scene)
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Austin Lichty: We saw it light up in his pocket. He won't give it back.

Robert Dawson: He won't give us the phone he stole.
(27 second mark)
Zarate: I saw the whole thing.
(28 second mark)
Duralde: Do you have the phone?...Is it in your pocket?"
Coughlin: What?
Colton Templeton: The iPhone!
Lichty: Don't play dumb, just give it to us!
Duralde: The iPhone.
(41 second)
Coughlin: Don't I have a right not to answer an Officer when he inquires as to
what is in my pockets? Unless this is a Terry Stop, but I don't think this is a
reasonable cause to do a pat down...
Duralde: It is a reasonable cause to do one.
Coughlin: Perhaps, you might be right.
(54 second mark)
Templeton: And if he calls it and it lights up in his pocket, will that prove it?
Duralde: Set your bike down on the ground, and move over there for a pat down.
(1:00 minute mark)
Coughlin: This dog likes to run away, Officer, can I tie it to something?
Duralde: Tie it to your bike.
Coughlin: Okay.
Austin Lichty: Corey, We can call it. Let's call it.
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(1:02 mark).
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Duralde: Dude, I am going to be real with you right now, the kid will probably be
fine if you give him the phone back, if not, we are going to get it out of your
pocket and you are going to go to jail.
(From the 1:08 mark to the 1:28 mark Coughlin ties his dog to his bike and moves
several feet south towards the Siena in response to D's direction.)
Templeton: You want to go to jail over a iPhone that's not yours?
Lichty: You have a touch screen phone
Goble: Seriously, I don't get it, you just said iPhones are played out...
(1:28 mark)
Duralde: Face that way, other hand on the back of your head...this hand on the
back of your head, there you go...
(1:32 mark)
Coughlin: Can, I say one thing Officer? I'm a lawyer.
(1:36 mark)
Duralde (startled): Okay! (strange slipping/click sound emitted on video of arrest
at this point)
Coughlin: You just touched my junk! Officer, I don't appreciate you touching my
penis. I am a lawyer, and you haven't even asked me a question yet and you are
handcuffing me. I don't see how this is a Terry Stop. I wish you would tell me
why you are proceeding like this.
(2:00 minute mark)
Alaksa: You are a suspect in a larceny of a phone. You have been identified by a
victim as a suspect in a larceny of a phone. We are conducting an investigational
stop. We checked you for weapons to make sure that you do not have any
weapons,.
Zach: Those young men assaulted me, I do not see them being handcuffed.
(2:35 mark)
Duralde: Dude, you are the one who is accused of the frickin' crime.
Coughlin: I am accusing them of assaulting me.
Duralde: Okay, and I am saying that is unfounded how are you injured.
Coughlin: Uh, assault isn't injury, its apprehension of imminent bodily harm.
Duralde: Okay, so what did they do?
Coughlin: They grabbed me, they pushed me, they reached into my pocket, and
they pulled my dog from me,
Duralde: If they touched you its not assault.
Coughlin: ...As a gang of skaters, twenty of them backed me up into oncoming
traffic.
(3:05 mark)
Duralde: Citizen's arrest. They wouldn't have been coming after you if you hadn't
stolen the kids phone.
Coughlin: Officer, let me tone this down a little bit, okay. I have respect for you.
Duralde: What is your name?
Coughlin: Zachary Coughlin, Nevada Bar number 9473.
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Duralde: I don't care what your bar number is, what is that? How does that bare
on this?
Coughlin: Well, maybe it bares towards...okay, you seem to not respect or be
willing to hear anything an attorney says, yet a group of skaters you believe
wholeheartedly.
Duralde: Do you have the phone?
Coughlin: I'm not an...well, let me think about that....Do I have the phone? Do I
have a right not to answer your question?
(3:41 mark)
Duralde: Just don't talk anymore.
Coughlin: Okay.
(3:45)
Coughlin: Do you have a right to search my pockets right now?
Duralde: What is your last name, how do you spell it?
(3:55 mark)
Coughlin: Am I under arrest?
Duralde: Dude, you are detained for a crime we have every right to identify you.
Coughlin: So, I think its under the Hiibel case where the guy refused to give the
police officer his name?
Rosa: Its called 171.123, Terry Stop. You can provide your name or be arrested
for obstruction.
Coughlin: You know what I'm talking about.
RPD Officer Rosa: Yeah, I know what your are talking about.
Coughlin: Search incident to arrest.
RPD Officer Rosa: That's not what your being...you are being detained, dude.
Duralde: You are not under arrest.
Coughlin: Okay.
(4:15 mark)
RPD Officer Rosa: Provide your name or go to jail for obstruction, and we
will call the Nevada Bar and let them know how you cooperated with our
investigation, how is that runnin' for ya? We are tired, and we are busy
tonight, we have got better things to do tonight than be out here and debate the
law with you. Give the man your name and let him do his job. Is there anything
wrong with that?
Coughlin: Well, can I ask you a question?
RPD Officer Rosa: No! You can't, just provide your name and information or go
to jail. Those are your options, we are done discussing the law.
(4:40 mark)
Coughlin: Am I under arrest?
RPD Officer Rosa: How many times do I have to tell you, your are being
detained.
(4:42 mark, dispatch radio traffic can be heard in the background from the
Officer's radio saying "3994", the State failed to produce any dispatch recordings
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despite being served with a subpoena and despite the fact that such radio traffic is
recorded under RPD policies).
RPD Officer Alaksa: A decision has not been made
(4:46 mark, off in the distance)
Skater voice, likely Templeton's: It will either light up or vibrate.
Coughlin: Okay, Can I just ask a question?
RPD Officer Rosa: What is your question.
Coughlin: I have total respect for you, believe me, I do.
(4:51 mark off in distance)
Goble: He might have switched it over and or flipped it over.
(4:52 mark)
RPD Officer Rosa: Well then give the man your name, show him a little respect.
(4:54 mark)
Goble: He might have flipped it over to the right if it isn't in there then.
Licthy: Yeah, that is what he did.
(4:58 mark)
Coughlin: Can you ask these kids to back off so we can tone down this situation..
RPD Officer Alaksa: You guys can you leave us along! Back off! I said I would
help you out. Okay, allow me to do my job, okay?
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(5:02 mark, radio dispatch traffic remains audible)
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(5:07 mark)
Duralde: Now, you are under arrest for larceny. Now, we can search you incident
to arrest. How's that?
Coughlin: Well, I mean, I wish you had asked me some questions prior to
arresting me, I mean, it might look better for you.
Duralde: Stand up!
(5:39 mark)
RPD Officer Alaksa: Who do you live with, Sir.
Coughlin: At this point Officer, though I respect you, if you guys want to play so
hardcore with me, you know...
RPD Officer Alaksa: I want to try to help you with your dog and your bike, who
can take care of your dog?
Coughlin: I live alone.
(5:52 mark, RPD Officer Duralde removes Coughlin's HTC G2 smartphone from
Coughlin's right side short's pocket, looks at the screen light up after touching it,
and presses the red recording button to stop the video recording).
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The RPD and or Reno City Attorney's Office misconduct justifies a tolling of any deadline to
file a Motion for New Trial, or Arrest Judgment, or any other deadline given the many instances of
such wrongful conduct, including the following January 14th, 2012 arrest of Coughlin in RJC
RCR2012-065630 for "misuse of emergency services" (and add to that the repeated fraud by the pretrial services staff at the WCDC in lying and committing misconduct incident to their retaliatory
dealings with Coughlin). Here is a transcript, in relevant part, of at least some of the video and or
audio recordings of the momenets prior to the arrest in RCR2012-065630 (and ECOMM and DDA
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Young and the RPD/State's misconduct in refusing to turn over excuplatory recordings and materials
in that matter further provides a good cause, tolling, excusable neglect basis for granting the relief
requested herein).
TRANSCRIPT OF RECORDING OF RPD INTERACTIONS, IN PART, OF COUGHLIN
INCIDENT TO CUSTODIAL ARREST FOR MISUSE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES
INCIDETN TO CUSTODIAL ARREST OF COUGHLIN ON JANUARY 14TH, 2012 IN
RCR2012-065630:
RPD OFFICER SCHAUR: how are you doing over here?
Coughlin: not so good.
Schaur: What's wrong.
Coughlin: My dog is gone.
Schaur: What kind of dog do you have?
Coughlin: Pekingese.
Schaur: Peningese? I didn't see a Pekingese when we were comin' in here...do you have a tracker on
it or somethin' on it, one of those little scanners?
Coughlin: Like a microchip? You have six cops here? Why? I recognize this guy over here
(referencing RPD Sargent Paul Sifre, whom admits to having ordered Coughlin be subjected to a
custodial arrest for "jaywalking" which obstructed justice incident to Coughlin collecting evidence for
a wrongful eviction lawsuit against landlord Merliss and his counsel, Richard G. Hill, Esq. and Casey
Baker, Esq. stemming from RJC Rev2011-001708.) You arrested me for jaywalking the other day.
RPD Sargent Paul Sifre: No, I didn't arrest you for jaywalking but I was on the scene.
Coughlin: what was your name?
Sargent Sifre: Here's the deal...what do you need today?
Coughlin: My dog is gone, threatening statements and smirks were made by the two women or girls
in here and the man...
...
Sifre: are these your roommates?
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Coughlin: she wasn't (referring to the teenage daughter of one of Coughlin's domestic abusers) she
moved in afterwards, it's my understanding she is supposed to be living with her mother. Can I go in
there and hera what they are saying (motioning to the RPD interviewing Laura Foreshee and
Stephanie Allaback)?
Sifre: No, you have to stay here, we have to figure out if you even have a domestic relationship.
Coughlin: So, you didn't arrest me the other day?
Sifre: No, I was on the scene, though.
Coughlin: So, who did arrest me?
Sifre: its on the paperwork.
Coughlin: Who did arrest me? Officer Leedy (RPD Officer WESLEY LEEDY), the trainee, or
Officer Del Vecchio (RPD Officer Alfred Del Vecchio), the observer?
Sifre: Officer Leedy, the trainee,.
Coughlin: So Leedy was the trainee but he was making the arrest?
Sifre, Yeah, but he was still sworn personnel. How long have you been livin' here, man?
Coughlin: why wouldnt' you tell me what the arrest was for?
Sifre: Yeah, they told you.
Coughlin: What was it?
Sifre: Pedestrian in a roadway.
Coughlin: is that normally necessitate a custodial arrest?
Sifre: It can be.
Coughlin: Why did it need to be a custodial arrest, Sir?
Sifre: That one, because I said it was?
Coughlin: Why did you make that choice?
Sifre: Because we had several incidents involving you yesterday, or, uh, Thursday.
Coughlin: And just because they involved me, it necessitated a custodial arrest?
Sifre: Yeah, you didn't qualify for a citation?
Coughlin: Why was that?
Sargent Sifre: I just told you, we had several incidents involving you...
Coughlin: But, what if I was the victim in each incident?
RPD Sargent Sifre: then you shouldn't keep putting yourself in that situation.
Coughlin: Oh, okay. (Coughlin previously worked as a domestic violence attorney/advocate at
Washoe Legal Services and is well familar with the "blaming the victim" methodology employed here
by RPD Sargent Sifre)/
Sargent Sifre: That is why you got served with the TPO (temporary protection Order filed by Richard
G. HIll, Esq., incident to his abuse of process and successful attempts to obstruct justice in
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The cases wherein Coughlin was a victim of opposing party and or law enforcement
misconduct justifying the relief sought herein, include, but are not limited to
REV 2012-001082 Northwind Apts. Vs Zach Coughlin
REV 2012-001083 Northwind Apts. Vs Zach Coughlin
REV 2012-075658 Zach Coughlin vs Jeff Nichols
RJC 2012-076746 Zach Coughlin vs Northwind Apts.
REV 2012-00374 Park Terrace Townhomes vs Zach Coughlin
REV 2012-074408 Zach Coughlin vs Park Terrace Townhomes
REV 2012-001048 Northwind Apts vs Zach Coughlin
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RJC RCP2012-000287 Milan Krebs (Northwinds maintenance man) v. Zach Coughlin (another TPO
the RPD fraudulently induced a landlord to procure against Coughlin, thanks to RPD Officer Alan
Weaver, Sargent Oliver Miller, and Ltn. Kevin Brown).
REV 2011-001492 Matt Merliss vs Zach Coughlin
REV 2011-001708 Matthew Merliss vs Zachary Coughlin
RJC RCP2012-000018 Richard G. Hill, Esq. v. Zach Coughlin (temporary protection order
application that Hill claims the RPD told him to file, shortly after Hill lied to RPD Officer
Hollingsworth on January 12th, 2012 by asserting that Coughlin has "lost his appeal" of a summary
eviction matter in CV11-03628, that would not even be decided for months...Hill refences a
reoccurring figure throughout all these wrongful arrest, RPD Sargent Kimberly Bradshaw (whom
ordered the July 3, 2012 wrongful arrest of Coughlin in RMC 12 CR 12420, and perhpas, despite
Sargent Sifre taking credit for it, the January 12th, 2012 "jaywalking" arrest of Coughlin in RMC 12
CR 00696, and may have played some role in the arrests in 11 TR 26800, RCR2012-067980, and the
wrongful, Soldal v. Cook County violations by RPD Sargent Oliver Miller and Officer Alan Weaver
on or around september 22nd, 2012 incident to the Superior Mini STorage matter. The RPD,
especialy via Sargent Miller, Sargent Sifre, Sargent Dye, Officer Weaver, Sargent Marcia Lopez, and
others have demonstrated a menacing and smug attitude toward co-opting "concern for your 'mental
health issues'" via some pretextual guise meant really to cover up their own police misconduct and
pursue violations of Soldal v. Cook County (often with City of Reno Code Enforcement showing up
later, as they did in the Superior Storage and Northwinds Matters) to collect a little sugar for their
bowl, in suspiciously close connection in time to the "efforts" by the RPD to make these landlords
happy (which typically has resulted in their being able to, or effectively being able to, to subvert the
lawful civil eviction process put into law by the legislature, which RJC Judge Pearson willfully failed
to follow anyways in RJC rev2012-001048 in allowing, in violation of NRCP 11 (made applicaable
via NRS 40.400) those guilty of the unauthorized practice of law, Jeff Chandler and Nevada Court
Servies, to cross the bar and make arguments at a legal hearing, and to prepare and file legal work on
behalf of a corporate client that does busines in ten states as a monolithic apartment complex
behemoth, Northwinds Apartments Associates, LLC (www.acg-ampi.com) where NCS lied about
"personally serving" the 6/14/12 5 day ud notice (process server r. wray falsified his Declaration of
Service after attempting to break and enter Coughlin's rental $29 on that date), where Chandler and
NCS listed the wrong court for the tenant to file and Answer (they listed Sparks Justice Court rather
than the RJC, in violation of NRs 40.253...though Judge Pearson made Coughlin pick up the tab for
their criminal law violations and "malpractice". Judge Pearson spent the first 12 years of his career as
a prosecutor in the Washoe County District Attorney's Office, and seems to have done some good
work in creating the Mandatory Status Conferences therein, though WCPD Dogan and DDA Young
pretty much treat those like a joke (as does WCPD Jim Leslie, failing to notice his client on
them...which isn't as bad as Dogan, who on 2/27/12 actually lied to his client Coughlin and told him
the court date on 2/27/12 was cancelled, only to reatliate against Coughlin's 2/21/12 filing in rcr2012065630 by moving for and getting a 2/27/12 ORder for Competency Evaluation against Coughlin on
that date, file stamped at 1:31 pm, which proves that DDA Youngs filing an Opposition to Coughlin's
Motion to Appear as Co-counsel at 2:55 pm, on that same date, in RR2011-063341, violated NRS
178.405. Further, Young made an even worse transgression against that statutory dictate where he
attempted to hold a TRIAL in RCR2011-063341 on May 7th, 2012 where the Order finding Coughlin
competent (and thus resolving the February 27th, 2012 Order for Competenecy Evaluation in 650630)
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was not signed and file stamped until May 9th, 2012...this is made worse by the WDC's D10 Judge
Elliot coercing out of Coughlin a waiver of his HIPAA rights in CR12-0376 (especially where Dogan
later compounded that by entering, seemingly willfully, private medical information into the open,
public record, in open court, on April 26th, 2012...after the WCDC had denied Coughlin his, arguably
"psychotropic" medication during that completely unnecessary 8 day incarceration...only to be release
and have WCPD Goodnight and DDA Young attempt to ramrod through a may 9th, 2012 trial date in
rcr2011-063341 of Coughlin, despite Goodnight admitting minutes before the trial that he had not
even viewed or listened to extremelely material exculpatory media gathered by Coughin during the
investigation into defending against those charges).
RJC 2012-078432 Zachary Barker Coughlin vs Superior Mini Storage (in this matter, on
approximately September 22nd, 2012, besides RPD Officer Weaver calling up Coughlin's mother an
attempt to coerce her into assisting him and the RPD In violating Soldal v. Cook County, the RPD
and Officer Weaver and Sargent Oliver Miller also attempted to induce Superior's Matt Grant to file
another fraudulent "distrubing the peace" charge against Coughlin shortly after Weaver swaggeringly,
and in a smug manner, threatened to fraudulently arrest Coughlin again for another "failure to secure
a load" citation and conduct another impermissible "search incident to arrest" or "inventorying" of
Coughlin's vehicle. RPD Sargent Dye and Officer Weaver had also violated criminal laws in
attempting to dissuade Couglin from testifying at to their misconduct in RMC 12 CR 12420 on
September 5th, 2012 (SArgent Dye tracked Coughlin down while he was deliverying materials
incident to his part time job, shortly after midnight on September 5th, 2012 to attempt to intimidate
Coughlin in a Scolari's desolate parking lot, and Officer Weaver made menacing gesticulations to
Coughlin in court while they waited for the 12 CR 12420 case to be called, wherein Reno City
Attorney committed professional misconduct in violating RPC 3.8 in amending the criminal
complaint in that matter to charge Coughlin with trespassing, and RMC "defenders" Keith Loomis,
Esq. and Henry Sotelo both violated NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010 at various times by failing to abide
by the stay required therein and in obtaining orders allowing their withdrawal (of course, the kept
their monthly, princely $7K "side gig" payment from the RMC, which for all purposes seems to be
made in exchange for their selling their criminal indigent client's down the river and or subjecting
them to impromptu cross examination demanding answers to which they are not entitled, especially in
Loomis's case, and otherwise withholding from criminal indigent defendant's the few inviolable rights
they have, including, the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, the right to subpoena or call
witnesses, and the decision on whether or not to testify.
Storage. Loomis also committed fraud in assisting in having Coughlin incarcerated wrongfully for
nearly 20 days in July 2012, including his failure to forward to the RMC the proof of insurance
Coughlin provided Loomis (which had already been provided to charlatan police officer's Weaver and
Dye anyways), and in coercing wrongfully from Coughlin some purported consent to view Coughlin's
HIPAA protected medical records (something WCDC social worker Jan Guidetti also sought to do
on behalf of RMC Judge Nash Holmes)
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Coughlin also took a video of the January 12th, 2012 "jaywalking" arrest in RMC 12 CR
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00696, and Coughlin also took a video of at least part of the January 14th, 2012 arrest for "misuse of
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emergency services" (a gross misdemeanor) in RCR2012-065630. Both arrests were ordered by
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Sargent Sifre, as admitted by Sifre himself in the video Coughlin took of at least part of the January
14t, 2012 arrest. And, curiously, the RPD, ECOMM, and DDA YOung, despite having been loaded
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up with visible cameras and audio recorders (amongst the various 6 officers dispatched in response to
Coughlin's 911 call of that night) have so far failed to propound (despite WCPD Dogan purporting to
have made such requests and or served the appropriate subpoenas...though everything with Dogan has
been rather "murky", with his supervisor Jim Leslie hovering around the case exacting a similar toll
upon Coughlin's defense as that Leslie has done to two other cases wherein he purports to be
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"defending" Coughlin (in RCR2011-063341, the iPhone petty larceny case, which Coughlin finally
managed to get Leslie booted from on October 22nd, 2012, leaving Coughlin little time to prepare for
the November 19th, 2012 resumption of that Trial, particularly where Leslie has still failed to comply
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with an Order in that matter requiring him to digitally transmit various materials from Coughlin's file
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to Coughlin; and in RCR2012-067980, the "false statement to a public officer" retaliatory prosecution
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that DDA Young is bringing against Coughlin incident to a wrongful arrest by ol' WCSO Deputy
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Machen on June 28th, 2012, stemming from a Summary Eviction Order that Judge Schroeder of the
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RJC managed to sign despite numerous written correspondences to the RJC and the Sparks Justice
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Court providing a "heads up" that the 5 day unlawful detainer served by ol' Northwind Apartments
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Associates, LLC (a corporation, and therefore, not entitled to appear without an attorney under NRCP
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hiring "eviction consulting and process services" firm Nevada Court Services, in RJC REV2012-
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001048, whose licensed process service Robert Wray (or maybe it is Ryan Wray?) filed a fraudulent
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declaration of service alleging he personally served Coughin on June 14th, 2012 a 5 day unlawful
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detainer notice incident to Wray and Northwind's Manager Duane Jakob attempting to break into
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Coughlin's rental #29 at Northwind's Apartments on that date, a rental with no windows whose door
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was closed and locked, though Wray alleges to have "personally served" the notice (and thereby cut
short by 3 days the amount of time the tenant had to file a Tenant's Affidavit...though Coughlin did
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submit just that to the court listed as having jurisdiction on the Nevada Court Services prepared June
14th, 2012 5 day notice (which "mistakenly" listed Sparks Justice Court" as the forum to file such a
Tenant's Answer or Affidavit), Sparks Justice Court, on June 26th, 2012 (and the SJC faxed as much
over to the RJC on June 28th, 2012). Deputy Machen arrested Coughlin on June 28th, 2012, alleging
it did
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Officer Warren To be fair, Officer Travis Warren did a rather professional and admirable job
recently in coordinating, with RPD Officer Wilson, a "civil standby" of sorts at Northwind
Apartments, on or about October 10th, 2012 when Coughlin went there to retrieve what remained of
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his personalty after he was unable to remove it all from his three different rentals at Northwinds on
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during the 16 hours allotted on August 13th-14th, 2012. A Northwind's apartment maintenance man
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was able to assist his employer in subverting the civil eviction process along with some inspiration
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and coaxing by Reno Police Department officer Alan Weaver and Sargent Dye by obtaining a
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temporary order protection against Coughlin on July 5, 2012 in RJC RCP2012-000287 (Milan Krebs
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v. Zach Coughlin). Officer Weaver and Sargent Dye had arrested Coughlin on July 3, 2012 (in RMC
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12CR12420, which has now seen granted two different Motion to Withdraw by Coughlin's court
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appointed Counsel in that matter: Keith Loomis, Esq. (and Loomis scored a similar Order allowing
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him to depart from his purported Sixth Amendment fulfillment after continuing to do little while
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unfailingly collecting his "side gig" $7K a month as a contracted court appointed counsel for the
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RMC, gotta pay for that new white BMW somehow, right, Keith) and Henry Sotelo, Esq. (also
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pulling in a princely "side gig" as one of the RMC's many, many McGeorge School of Law alumni
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former prosecutors turned court appointed prosecutor's helpers, er, indigent criminal defendant
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herders, er, defense counsel, to go along with the various McGeorge School of Law alumni sitting
judges at the RMC (some, of whom, like RMC Judge Kenneth Howard, have been close personal
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friends with Loomis since their days playing on the law school basketball team back at McGeorge;
Judge Howard, McGeorge 1981, another judge at the RMC, McGeorge, 1985, Judge Nash Holmes,
McGeorge 1977, court appointed defender former prosecutor Keith Loomis, McGeorge 1982; court
appointed defender former prosecutor Henry Sotelo, McGeorge 1987; Loomis has been busy puttin'
in work for the RMC of late with respect to Coughlin, managing to torpedo Coughlin's defense in the
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criminal trespass matter before Judge William Gardner in 11 CR 26405 by flat out refusing to
subpoena either Sargent Lopez or Officer Carter, or landlord Merliss, despite all three being the only
other eye witnesses to the events to the November 13th, 2011 arrest scene (besides the seemingly
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conveniently edited videos Hill and Merliss filmed, which Hill seemingly never bothered to view as
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they expressly contradict his sworn testimony at the June 18th, 2012 Trial in that matter) incident to
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pulling him over for a minor traffic violation and alleged in plastic tub had fallen off his vehicle
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wherein they charged him with failure to secure load and failure to maintain proof of insurance,
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despite the fact that Coughlin provided proof of his vehicles and should current insurance in the form
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of a PDF high-resolution image of his insurance card on his 5 inch smart phone screen to which
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officer Weaver declared that the proof needed to be on actual paper at which point officer Weaver
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arrested Coughlin for disturbing the peace incident to some alleged statement by Coughlin that
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morning at Northwind apartments wherein Milan Krebs asserts Coughlin said something all along the
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lines of "don't mess with my locks again or else you'll be sorry" (which Coughlin did not even say,
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though Coughlin did arrive at his rental at Northwind's on that July 3rd, 2012 morning to find
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"someone" had placed some sort of glue in the key slot of the lock on his rental's door), though
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Krebs's statements in his application for an order of protection compared to those he makes in his
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witness statement incident to the July 3 arrest of Coughlin contains some glaring inconsistencies
particularly with respect to the protection order going into some alleged propensity of Coughlin to
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carry around large butcher knives where is the witness statement in connection with the July 3
disturbing the peace arrest fails to mention such a minor detail. Krebs also makes an allegation that
Coughlin burglarized his truck despite the fact that Coughlin has a video of the incident Krebs refers
to wearing Krebs admits under of at the extension hearing on his application for a temporary
protection order that he was not present during incident wherein his coworker Luke idea and his
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manager Dwayne Jakob indicated him that they caught Coughlin attempting to burglarized his truck.
Coughlin also has a video of the incident wherein Krebs alleges Coughlin was following him for 5
minutes and screaming out threats and inciting in the violence. Also may be critical of Coughlin's
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propensity to film things one might ask himself where Coughlin would be had he not all these
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exculpatory videos proving the perjury of various individuals including Officer Weaver, Northwind's
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Apartment's Associates, LLC (part of the monolithic ACG-AMPI, Inc., doing business in ten states
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operating enormous apartment complexes that are known for cheating it's tenants out of their damage
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deposits by asserting especially spurious rationale in support for failing to so return such deposits)
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Manager Dwayne Jakob (who lied under oath at the July 31st, 2012 Hearing related to various
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Motions Coughlin filed in connection with a wrongful arrest of June 28th, 2012, wherein the Washoe
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County Sheriff's Office's Deputy Machen (the same deputy whose fraudulent affidavit of service filed
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November 7, 2011 asserted that it personally served Coughlin the lockout order on November 1, 2011
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incident the eviction from Coughlin's former home law office despite the fact. Mansions supervisor
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Washoe County Sheriff's office civil division supervisor Liz digital admits and had February 2012 e-
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mail to Coughlin that matching merely posted. Summary eviction order on the door to Coughlin's
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former law office when no one was home and proceeded to then effectuate a lockout, and thereby
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failed to comply with the dictates of NRS 40.400 (which incorporate the Nevada Rules of Civil
Procedure into landlord tenant summary eviction proceedings and unlawful detainer actions under
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NRS 40. Arrested Coughlin (and, yes, that arrest was captured on video tape as well, and is providing
another basis for DDA Zach Young to further hone his retaliatory prosecution chops) an idea
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There may be an inference that the RJC and perhaps the 2JDC have attempted to cover up or
purposefully ignore the fact that Coughlin filed a Notice of Appeal both on 12/26/12 and 2/2/12 in
1708 as to the 12/20/11 Order Resolving his 11/16/11 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien in
1708 where the various iterations of the Docket from the RJC demonstrates that the two entries for
February appear to have been removed, where the most recent fax of 12/20/12 by the RJC's Cheryl
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lacked those two February 2012 entries, though Coughlin's repeated trips to the RJC and requesting
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and retaining various iterations of that Docket reveal that at one point there were the following entries
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noting Coughlin's filing of a Notice of Appeal on 2/2/12 (and a tolling motion prior thereto would
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have made that timely to whatever extent Coughlins 12/26/11 Notice appealing that 12/20/11 Order is
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not accorded legal significance.

Further, as to the allegations of Coughlin's own alleged violations of RPC 3.1 (Meritorious
Claims), Rule 3.2 (Expediging), Rule 2.3. (Cando to Tirbunal), and especially Rule 3.4 (Fairness to
Opposing Partny and Counsel) HIll and Baker's filings and letters to Coughlin in relation to
Coughlin's 11/16/11 filing of a Motion to Contest Personal Property lien, through their 11/21/11
Opposition thereto and the 12/19/11 Opposition to Coughlin's Second Motion to Contest Personal
Property Lien reveal an extremnely troubling and fraudulent (coercive to boot...even Judge Sferrazza
at one point had to point out to Baker that "its the law" in rebuffing Baker's contention that he and
Hill should be allowed to place all sorts of ridiculous restrictiosn on Coughlin's right to retrieve his
property (insisting upon a showing by Coughlin of various things, like renting a uhaul, a crew,
etc.,etc. to avoid Coughlin's "cherry picking" only those items he wanted to from the property and
leaving the rest to be disposed of and litigated in whatever manner permissible under the law...NRS
118.460 was not to their liking, so Hill and Baker coercively and fraudulently attempted to legistlate
on their client's behalf).
Further, that same older style RJC docket, on page 5 of 6, in the two different entries for
12/27/11 (one by Cheryl E.) indicate a distrubingly lax approach taken by both the Clerk and by
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Senior Judge Dannan that resulting in a 3/30/12 Order by Judge Flanagan that failed to address
Coughlin's appealing the 12/20/11 Order Resolving Coughlin's 11/16/11 Motion to Contest Personal
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Property Lient...combined with a very suspect practice by Judge Sferrazza of calling clerk's as the
court's own witness as to whether Couglin allowed the RJC to schedule in a timely manner the
hearing required by NRS 40.253(8).
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Such an anticipated SBN v Coughlin SCR 105 Complaint, according to King, will be based largely
upon Coughlin allegedly wearing "pajama bottoms" to the Reno Municipal Court filing counter one
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day while inquiring about a parking ticket or some other non-sensensical high school jibberish, will
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contain more of the same reckless and lacking in foundation mentions of "breaking into" the former
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law office and "broken locks" despite the fact that no factual support exists for such an allegation,
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there were no "broken locks" ever mentioned by anyone (and if Hill is willing to make up finding a
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"bag of weed and crack pipe" along with describing what Hill's own videos show to be vitamins as a
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"large quantity of pills", then you know Richard G. Hill, Esq. would have been all over any "broken
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locks" at the former home law office, yet, there simply were none, not that that would stop Pat King
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or J. Thomas Susich from cobbling together such an allegation in the SCR 117 Petition in 60975)
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along with something about Coughlin being subject to a custodial arrest for "jaywalking" by the
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Reno Police Department while Coughlin was filming Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s contractor's crew
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loading up a dump truck with items of personal property then located in Coughlin's former home law
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office (the arrest occurred shortly after Coughlin discovered that Hill's contractor, Phil Stewart, had
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used Coughlin's own distinctive plywood to "secure" or "board up the property" in December 2011,
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for which the landlord was ultimately awarded costs, $1,060 of which were based upon Stewart's
invoice for "securing the property", which included the cost of plywood, and "fixing a leak in the
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basement" despite NRS 118A.460 only allowing costs for "moving, storing, and inventorying" a
tenant's personal property), which Coughlin was unable to remove during the scant 13 hours he was
afforded to do so by the Reno Justice Court's Order following a Hearing on Coughlin's November
16th, 2011 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien (the Hearing was not set or conducted with the
"10 days" required by NRS 40.253(7)-(8) because Richard G. Hill, Esq. needed to go on a six-week
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vacation shortly after Coughlin's November 16th, 2011 filing (in a matter now on appeal in SCR
60331 and 61838, wherein, somehow, a commercial tenant, Coughlin (whom was both running a law
practice and Coughlin Memory Foam, a foam mattress business from his home, which was
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previously utilized for commercial purposes by a drug and alcohol rehabilitation counseling business
14
and is zone for mixed use purposes) was summarily evicted based upon a No Cause Eviction Notice
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only (ie, the non-payment of rent was neither noticed, pled, nor argued by the landlord) despite the
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clear dictate against the use of summary eviction proceedings against commercial tenants not based
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upon the non-payment of rent (Bench Book stuff) set forth in NRS 40.253. The December 21st,
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2011 Order "Resolving" Coughlin's Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien actually required
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Coughlin to pay the exact same amount of rent for 17 days (November 1 to November 17th, 2011),
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$480 (ie, pro-rated from the $900 per month rental agreement) as Coughlin would have under a "fair
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rental value", for the "full use and occupancy of the premises" despite the fact that Hill somehow
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signed a Criminal Complaint for Trespass Against Coughlin, on November 13th, 2011 despite any
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Summary Eviction Order not being served in accordance with NRS 40.400 (and therefore NRCP 5
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and 6(e) vis a vis the "within 24 hours" of "receipt" of the lockout order, and, therefore, any such
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lockout that had occured being rendered a nullity or pursuant to a void Order) and where the Washoe
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County Sheriff's Office Civil Process Service Supervisor Liz Stuchell has admitted in writing that the
Affidavit of Service filed November 7th, 2011 by Deputy Machen, attesting to having "personally
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served" the Summary Eviction Order on November 1st, 2011, was, in fact, purportedly merely posted
to the door of Coughlin's former law office while Coughlin was not home, at which point a Soldal v.
Cook County violating illegal lockout occurred. In a February 7th, 2012 written correspondence to
Coughlin, Stuchell wrote: "Mr. Coughlin, Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that
day was personally served by Deputy Machen by posting a copy of the Order to the residence. The
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residence was unoccupied at the time. Liz Stuchell, Supervisor WCSO Civil Section".
The text of
NRS 40.253 speaks to service of Lockout Orders: The court may thereupon issue an order directing
the sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the
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order... is inapplicable to this situation, where an Order Granting Summary Eviction was signed by
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October 27th, 2011 (though not mailed to Coughlin until after the November 1, 2011 lockout had
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allegedly already occured). That language is only found in situations inapplicable to the one incident
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that in the summary eviction from Coughlin's former home law office. NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2), and
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NRS 40.253(5)(a) are the only sections of NRS 40 where this within 24 hours language occurs, and
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those situations only apply where, in: 40.253(3)(b)(2): 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1
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or 2 must: ...(b) Advise the tenant: . (2) That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an
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unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order
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providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or constable of the county to
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remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order and, 40.253(5)(a): 5. Upon
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noncompliance with the notice: (a) The landlord or the landlords agent may apply by affidavit of
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complaint for eviction to the justice court of the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile
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home or commercial premises are located or to the district court of the county in which the dwelling,
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apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever has jurisdiction over the
matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of the county to
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remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order. The way these summary eviction
proceedings are being carried out in Reno Justice Court presently shocks the conscience and violates
Nevada law. There is not basis for effectuating a lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did in
this case. The requirements attendant to serving Summary Eviction Orders and conducting lockouts
are found in NRS 40.253 in two sections containing the within 24 hours of receipt language are
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inapplicable, as those situations do not invoke the present circumstances, where the Tenant did file
an Affidavit and did contest this matter to a degree not often seen. To require Nevada's tenants to get
up and get out within 24 hours of receipt of the order (what does that even mean? The use of
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terms like rendition, rendered, notice of entry, pronounced, is absent here, and this receipt
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of the order language is something rarely found elsewhere in Nevada law-see attached DMV
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statutory citations, and in employment law litigations where one must file a Complaint within 90
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days of receipt of a Right To Sue Letter, a situation which follows NRCP 5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in
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imputing receipt of such a letter, when actual receipt is not shown, by applying a constructive
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notice standard that relies upon the days for mailing extension of time for items served in the
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mailing, etc.). In Abraham v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the
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record did not reflect when the plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter. The letter was issued on
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November 24, 2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period commenced on November 30, 2006,
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based on three days for mailing after excluding Saturdays and Sundays. In order to bring a claim
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under either Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies and sue within 90
26
days of receipt of a right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome
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Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) (granting plaintiff an
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additional three days for mailing pursuant to Rule 6).... Further, as seen in the Anvui case, there is
some argument respecting not effecting a lockout for at least 5 days where a lease has not expired by
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its terms, as Coughlin's arguably had not.

However, in his January 20th, 2012 Second Motion for Order to Show Cause, Richard G.
Hill, Esq. did not get all bogged down in legal research and stuff, instead he just pointed out:
"FACTS SHOWING CONTEMPT OF COURT 6. EXHIBIT 1 (the Summary Eviction Lockout
Order) was served on Coughlin on November 1, 2011 by the Washoe County Sheriffs Department
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in its customary manner, by posting same on the front door of the property in the manner
customary for evictions in Washoe County. The locks to the premises were changed at that time,
thereby ejecting and dispossessing Coughlin of possession of the Property." Hill went on to lie again
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in that January 20th, 2012 Motion when he equated his offer to let Coughlin get some of the
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personalty Coughlin was unable to remove, due largely to Hill failing to remove the chain link
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padlock from the backyard gate that Hill had only just installed in time for the 13 hours Coughlin had
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to remove his property in exchange for Coughlin waiving his rights to the $700 damage deposit
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Coughlin provided upon moving in, where Hill spins it: "12. On Friday, December 23, 2011,
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Coughlin had a crew of helpers, and made progress. Nonetheless, Coughlin failed to remove all of
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his belongings from the Property. Coughlin failed to remove his things despite having been given
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additional time to do so after the time set by the Reno Justice Court in its order of December 21,
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2011 (EXHIBIT 2) had expired." Apparently, to Hill, at least one has " failed to remove all of his
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belongings from the Property. Coughlin failed to remove his things despite having been given
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additional time to do so" where Hill threatens to have one arrested for criminal trespass or larceny (of
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their own stuff, arguably) if one is on the property one minute past 5 p.m., unless one waives any
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right to their damage deposit (which neither Hill nor the Landlord eve did return, nor did they
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comply with the requirement that they provide an itemized statement indicating an application
thereof justifying such a failure to return such deposit within 30 days....and Hill does not want to get
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into whether his conduct is violative of the FDCPA or whether he is licensed a as debt collector). In
that Motion, Hill continued on: "13. On December 30, 2011, Coughlin moved this Court for a
temporary restraining order to prevent Merliss from disposing of the items he (Coughlin) had
abandoned on the Property. Coughlin's motion was fully briefed, and the Court entered its order
denying the motion on January 11, 2012. A true and correct copy of this Court's January 11,2012
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order is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 3. 14. On Thursday, January 12, 2012, in accordance with
EXHIBIT 2 and EXHIBIT 3, a licensed contractor hired by Merliss began cleaning up the Property
and disposing of the abandoned items still remaining there. 15. Early that afternoon, while the
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contractor was hauling the first of several loads of abandoned property to the transfer station (dump)
14
for disposal, Coughlin stopped the contractor in traffic and attempted to prevent him from carrying
15
out his task. 16. Specifically, Coughlin stood in front of the contractor's vehicle in an effort to
16
prevent him from proceeding to the transfer station. Coughlin threatened to sue the contractor.
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Coughlin climbed up on the contractor's vehicle. Coughlin then called the police and falsely told
19
them that the contractor had stolen his possessions, and that the contractor had tried to run him over.
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Coughlin's acts were specifically calculated to prevent the contractor from disposing of the
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abandoned property, and to frustrate and interfere with Merliss' compliance with this Court's January
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11, 2012 order. 17. When Mr. Hill of the undersigned's office was notified of the foregoing, he went
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to the transfer station and presented EXHIBIT 2 and EXHIBIT 3 to the police. The contractor was
25
then allowed to proceed. 18. However, before the contractor could return to the River Rock Property,
26
Coughlin was there. He had his video camera and was walking up and down the street screaming and
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yelling at the police, the contractor, and Mr. Hill, once Mr. Hill arrived. At the instruction of the
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police, Mr. Hill then obtained a temporary protective order ("TPO") again~t Coughlin from the Reno
Justice Court. Coughlin ended up being arrested and taken to jail that day as a result of his antics at
the transfer station and the Property."
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The thing is, and Coughlin would sure like to get the 911 tapes (or, more likely, with Hill, any
recordings that may exist of Hill calling somebody in particular he may have had in mind with the
RPD) of calls by Coughlin (and if Wal-Mart can call 911 over a candy bar, or a skater board over an
iPhone he seems to have set down on the concrete ground in downtown Reno, then skaterboarded off
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some 100 yards away for sufficiently long period of time to seem to have been pretty much the only
person not to have heard somebody who picked it up threaten to throw it is in the river if it went
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unclaimed can call 911 (and make up a bunch of lies on the spot for the purpose of manipulating the
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police into assuages the skateboarders own negligence vis a vis the iPhone) is it unreasonable for
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Coughlin to call 911 upon happening, totally by chance, to cross paths with Hill's contractor while
driving, catching site of a huge dump truck full of Coughlin's personal property headed towards the
town dump? Hill admits the Order denying Coughlin's Motion for a TPO (and hey, family heirlooms
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are pretty fungible, right? Who needs a TPO for that? And its not like the landlord could just accept
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rent in the meantime, or that the property still remains unrented to this day, some 11 months after the
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lockout, and apparently, some $60,000 worth of attorney's fees paid to Hill for a two bedroom home
that appraises at around $90,000 currently, if that. And Hill's fantastic legal work ("wrong site
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surgery" and all) was surely worth the risk of a wrongful eviction lawsuit (and check out those
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potential damages under Winchell v. Schiff, 124 Nev. 938, 193 P.3d 946 (2008), not that the loss of a
25
patent attorney's career could amount to all that much). Regardless, its not all that colorable for Hill
26
to allege Coughlin was violating some Order entered on January 11th, 2012 by Coughlin's conduct of
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January 12th, 2012 when NRCP 6(e) provides that 3 days for mailing is to be accorded to account for
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the service of filings, even filings electronically served on registered efilers like Coughlin. Its
similar to Hill wanting a criminal trespass arrest where NRCP 6(e)'s three days for mailing where no
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personal service was accomplished (by way of NRS 40.400) and Hill's et al did not even comply with
the constructive service requirements of mailing the summary eviction lockout order prior to Hill's
breaking into Coughlin's former home law office on November 1st, 2011, with the help of the
WCSO, in violation of Soldal v. Cook County where Coughlin was not accorded the "24 hours"
cushion after Coughlin's "receipt" of the lockout order mentioned in this Court's own packets on the
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service of Lockout Orders, which Hill himself attached as a subsequent exhibit recently...It gets
funnier. The civil division of the Justice Court and the Sheriff's Office think that whole "within 24
hours" language in NRS 40.253 means "within 24 hours" of the Sheriff's "receipt" of the Order from
13
the Justice Court...While other's think it is "within 24 hours" of the tenant's receipt of the Order from
14
the Sheriff...and this Court's official forms and instructions seem to imply that "at least 24 hours"
15
from "receipt" of the lockout Order must be accorded to a tenant. Who knows? But, it is not clear,
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as Hill suggests, that the "usual custom and practice of the Washoe County Sheriff's Office" is black
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letter law upon which Bar grievances, custodial criminal trespass arrests, multiple Motion for Order
19
To Show Cause, tens of thousands of dollars in attorney's fees sanctions against a pro se appellant,
20
etc. are warranted. Somehow the District Court found a way to sanction Coughlin with $40,050
21
worth of attorney's fee in that appeal of the summary eviction without holding a single hearing, well,
22
other than the Hearing on Hills Order to Show Cause, which was denied when Coughlin destroyed
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Hill's contractor Phil Stewart on cross-examination. (Really, Phil? Really? You could fell "a
25
depression" in your 2 ton loaded to capacity dump truck upon Coughlin allegedly "climbing up on
26
it", though you indicated you had already "alighted from the vehicle", but, wait, you could see
27
Coughlin's head above the tailgate walls in your rear view mirror (which doesn't seem to be there on
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any the many videos of the events of that day. And even if such a mirror where present on Stewart's
truck, that doesn't really explain how all the personalty stacked up so high in the truck bed (replete
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with specialized add-on high stack retaining walls) wouldn't obscure any purported view of
Coughlin's head high above the area above the specialize hydraulic dump truck's tailgate, confirming
Stewart's mere suspicion that Coughlin climbed on his truck. Coughlin swears under oath he did not
climb on Stewart's truck. Hill needed a little "fact" to spice up his Motion to Show Cause just
enough, and "Coughlin climbed up on the truck" was "just the ticket", and Stewart did not mind
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going along for the ride, so long as... And none of the many videos from that day actually show any
of the Yosemite Sam cartoon villian type behavior Hill attributes to Coughlin in his wonderfully
imaginative Motion for Order to Show Cause and or Application for Order of Protection concerning
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the events involved in the jaywalking custodial arrest Hill had Coughlin subjected to on January
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12th, 2012.
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Much like Hill's contractor, Phil Stewart, flat out lying in an affidavit when he swore
Coughlin "climbed up on" his truck, Hill similarly lied in an affidavit about Coughlin, apparently
18
while "engraged" making "physical contact" with Hill. On Page 2 of Hill's Affidavit attach to his
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Motion for Order to Show Cause, January 20th, 2012, Hills attests: "5. On Friday, December 23,
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2011, we unlocked the house at 9:00 a.m. as ordered. We overlooked the chain on the back gate.
There was nobody at the house when we were there. At approximately noon, my staff informed me
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that an enraged Mr. Coughlin had called the office screaming that he could not get in the back yard.
24
When I finished the meeting I was in, I immediately went over and unlocked the back gate. Coughlin
25
had a small crew. He charged at me and made physical contact. He was enraged. We left. When we
26
returned at 5:00 p.m., Mr. Coughlin was screaming and yelling obscenities. He drove off in a small U
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-Haul. His crew remained. We walked the property with them. The inside .ground floor was mostly
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cleared of all but a big TV. The basement had been cleared somewhat, but there was still a lot of
"junk. " We could not access the attic. We went outside. I told Coughlin's crew they could remove
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anything and everything outside, if they would only try to rehang the gate that Mr. Coughlin had
taken off the hinges before we could get over to unlock it. I told them I would lock the gates in the
morning.
That is really interesting. Compare the above to the following excerpt from page 3 of Hills
January 3rd, 2012 Opposition in CV11-03628, the appeal of the summary eviction Order: "12. While
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at the property to remove the padlock, Coughlin, on more than one occasion, screamed profanities at
Merliss' counsel, and, at one point, charged Mr. Hill and attempted to physically intimidate him.
12
At least the audio of this incident was captured on tape. 13. Nevertheless, at 5:00 p.m. on Friday,
13
December 23,2011, counsel granted Coughlin and his agents additional, unfettered, and
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unlimited access to the outside of the property to remove any remaining items." Whereas in his
January 20th, 2012 sworn Declaration Hill goes so far as to indicate Coughlin "made physical
contact" (which is a damn lie anyways), in Hill's then associate Casey Baker, Esq.'s NRCP 11 signed
18
January 3rd, 2012 Opposition, HIll's associate Baker will only go so far as to say that Coughlin, "at
19
one point, charged Mr. Hill and attempted to physically intimidate him." Baker was standing directly
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next to Hill during the interacation wherin Hill swore, under penalty of perjury, that Couglhin "made
physical contact" with Hill). Sounds like Casey Baker, Esq. was not quite willing to "spice up" the
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story line as Hill himself was. Casey probably did not have enough reason to sign on to the lies
24
about Coughlin "climbing on" the contractor's truck. In Hill's Application for a Protection Order
25
against Coughlin Hill slips up and claims that Coughlin was "climbing on the contractor's truck,
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picking through the contents" back at Couglin's former home law after the interaction at the "transfer
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station" (town dump), whereas Hill's contractor indicated in his Affidavit that the alleged "climbing"
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on his truck occurred at the "transfer station". However, both Hill and his contractor, Phil Stewart
indicate that the Reno Police Department "requested" that Hill filed a Protection Order Application
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against Coughlin. If that is true, its improper. The RPD can provide individuals information about
seeking one, but when the RPD goes a step further and starts urging individuals to file protection
order applications, or, as has recently been the case with RPD Officer Alan Weaver and Sargent
Oliver Miller, whom, upon information and belief, urged Northwind's apartment maintenance man
Milan Krebs to sign a fraudulent criminal complaint against Coughlin for "disturbing the peace" on
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July 3rd, 2011, and again urged Superior Mini Storage's Matt Grant to sign a similar baseless
"disturbing the peace" criminal Complaint against Coughlin on approximately September 21st, 2012
then there is more than a little indication that the RPD is out of control and attempting to incite
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members of the public to sign fraudulent criminal complaints based upon a retaliatory animus by the
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RPD towards Coughlin. Officer Weaver and Sargent Dye showed up to an unnoticed July 5th, 2012
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bail hearing for Coughlin, presided over by Judge Linda Gardner's brother RMC Judge William
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Gardner (whom received Coughlin's timely Notice of Appeal of the criminal trespass conviction,
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under NRS 189.010, yet failed to forward it on to the District Court, which somewhat recently
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dismissed Coughlin's appeal in that matter, wherein Sargent Dye and Officer Weaver testified under
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oath, with City Attorney Jill Drake singing backup, the the effectd that, despite bail only being valid
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based upon one reason in Nevada (to secure the defendant's attendance at trial) the "public health and
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safety" dictated increasing the cash required to bail out Couglin TENFOLD, from a bondable $1,415
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to a CASH ONLY $3,000. Consequently, upon Judge Gardner so impermissibly raising Coughlin's
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bail, alleging a "public health and safety" rationale for so doing, Couglin was forced to spend 18 days
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in jail, wherein the opportunity to timely contest the $40,050 attorney fees award to Richard Hill
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incident to the summary eviction appeal ran, all while Coughlin was denied any opportunity to access
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justice or file documents from jail, and where Coughlin sustained signficant damages, financial and
otherwise, and where the jail refused to transport Coughlin to a hearing on a landlord tenant matter
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wherein he was a named party. The extent to which local law enforcement is willing to play "kick
the can" with an attorney, particularly where Bar Counsel Pat King is so willing to join the chorus, is
troubling, and indicates the judiciary need issue a clarion call out to announce the extent to which
such misconduct can not, and will not, be tolerated. Such a retaliatory animus towards Coughlin by
the RPD is likely due to his September 7th, 2011 Complaint with respect to a wrongful, retaliatory,
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and fraudulent arrest by RPD Officer Nicholas Duralde, which was accompanied by extortionate
threats by RPD Officer Ron Rosa that if Coughlin didn't cooperate they would "call the Nevada Bar
and let them know how you cooperated with our investigation. How's that runnin' for ya?" While
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Duralde testified that he did not hear or recall Rosa's coercive threats to Coughlin just prior to the
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arrest, the fact that Duralde echoed those threats by saying "Now, I can arrest you for larceny. Now,
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I can do a search incident to arrest. How's that?" tends to undermine Duralde's contention that "he
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doesn't recall" hearing anything like what Officer Rosa was capture on tape saying to Coughlin just
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prior to the arrest. Upon making a Fourth Amendment violating arrest completely lacking in
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probable cause, and smugly "joking" to Coughlin about the "benefits" associated with charging
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Coughlin with a "felony", (at the time of the August 20th, 2011 arrest, the felony larceny amount
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limit was $250 and above) compared to a misdemeanor (under some half baked "grand larceny" of an
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allegedly lost or mislaid or abandoned three year old iPhone 3G that the alleged victim testified was
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only then worth "about $80-100" on eBay or Craigslist), ie, search incident to custodial arrest
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possible where probable cause lacking to arrest, or even reasonable suspicion missing to do a pat
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down, where alleged crime occured outside officer's presence, after 7 p.m., and no citizens arrest
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immediately effectuated, particularly where Coughlin himself made a 911 call prior to Officer's
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arriving and where video from minutes prior to officer arriving reveal Coughlin suggesting the 8-12
hostile late teens to early twenties skater boarders relax, stay peaceful, refrain from assaulting and
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battering Couglin, and wait for the police arrive so a lawful, peaceful resolution could be attained
(with Coughlin even cautioning the youths about a then recent tragic death occurring not far from
that location).
Further Hill just flat out lies in his January 3rd, 2012 Opposition to Amended Motion for
Emergency Restraining Order. Well, he did tell the truth when he wrote, on page 3: "11. On Friday,
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December 23,2011, counsel for Merliss neglected to remove the padlock to the back gate of the
property." That is true, he did do that, and it did prevent Coughlin from removing all his property
12
during the scant 13 hours Coughlin had to move it. But, when Hill swears, on page 3, that:
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"Coughlin's access to the house itself was never hindered.:" he is just "sippin' drank" or something,
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as, obviously failing to remove a lock on a gate gonna tend to have that effect, now...and when Hill
swears: " 13. Nevertheless, at 5:00 p.m. on Friday, December 23,2011, counsel granted Coughlin and
his agents additional, unfettered, and unlimited access to the outside of the property to remove any
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remaining items. The only condition placed on that access was that Coughlin's helpers agreed to
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replace the gate on its hinges as best they could. Coughlin and his agents failed to remove the
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remainder of Coughin's property from the yard that night, and failed to put the gate back on the
hinges." Coughlin was never made aware of any such "offer" by Hill, and, even if he had been, hey,
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it's the "outside of the property", Rich, people generally put their valuables inside, you know?
Then the HIll prevarication and obfuscation express kicks into overdrive, when, in his
January 3rd, 2012 Opposition he continues on: "C. Coughlin is Not Entitled to A Stay Coughlin
claims to have deposited $250 with the justice's court pursuant to NRS 40.385, although he has not
provided any proof in support of his claim. Attached hereto as EXHIBIT 10 is a true and correct
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copy of the justice's court's docket as of December 19, 2011. That docket shows that Coughlin paid a
filing fee for his appeal on December 12, 2011, in the amount of $216.00." Well, actually, Judge
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Sferrazza waived the Justice Court's $24.00 filing fee, and the $216.00 represents the District Court's
filing fee, and its not really clear whether that date is when the check was cashed by the District
Court, or whether the Justice Court held on to the check for quit4e awhile before shipping it along
with the ROA to the District Court, etc., etc. Hill continues: "It is entirely unclear from the following
entries of that docket whether or when Coughlin ever paid an additional $250.00 under NRS 40.385."
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That might, technically be true, Rich, to the extent that you wrote it on January 3rd, 2012, and are
sneakily indicating that you are looking at an old docket from the Justice Court from December 19th,
2012, even though Coughlin made a big deal to you and the Justice Court, in writing, that he was
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depositing the $250.00 supersedeas bond mentioned in NRS 40.385, on December 22nd, 2011, a fact
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which Hill himself mentions in his own filings...So, kind of a lack of candor to the tribunal there to
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make all this argument based upon some old docket and the extent to which it fails to reveal or
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"make clear" matters to which Hill had ready written notice of via his own e-Flex account and
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service of filings upon him connected thereto, in addition to Coughlin's faxes, emails, and there
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might have even been a service of a Notice of Posting Supersedeas Bond (need to check on that
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more), etc. in connection with the depositing on December 22nd 2012, the $250 required for a stay
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during appeal of a summary eviction in NRS 40.385. And, actually, Hill slipped up a bit there, in
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light of the following: And, actually, Hill, in his January 20th, 2012 filing, admitted that Coughlin
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sent him that December 22nd, 2011 email notifying him of the posting of the $250 supersedeas bond
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seeking a stay, when he admits, on page 3: "11. Pursuant to EXHIBIT 2, Coughlin was provided
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access to the Property on Thursday, December 22, 2011. That day, Coughlin sent an email to the
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undersigned and Judge Sferrazza, in which he essentially announced that he was entitled to a
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stay, and to return to and continue in possession of the Property. Judge Sferrazza quickly
responded by email, and reminded Mr. Coughlin that the stay had been denied." Found in
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Exhibit 1 is the December 22nd email to Hill's Office that alerts them to the posting of $250 ,
specified as a "supersedeas bond", with a citation to NRS 40.385:
Hill's January 3rd, 2012 Opposition continues, on page 8: "Even if Coughlin eventually paid
some amount toward an appeal bond, it was not in time to stay the eviction during this appeal. To do
that, a proper motion must be made and granted, and the bond posted, prior to the lockout. The
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lockout here occurred on November 1, 2011. By the time Coughlin managed to find that statute and
pay any money to the court, he had been locked out of the property for six weeks. As such, any
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request for a stay was, and is, moot. At this point, Coughlin does not have any rights in either the real
13
or personal". Oddly, Anvui saw a stay granted after a lockout was conducted, and Hill (RPC 3.1
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"meritorious contention" issues) cites to no legal authority for his contention that "to stay the eviction
during this appeal...a proper motion must be made and granted, and the bond posed, prior to the
lockout." Citation? None.
Despite Hill's strange approach of not actually indicating that his office did not get an
December 22nd, 2011 email notifying them of the posting of $250 for a supersedeas bond seeking a
stay under NRS 118A.385 (but rather, Hill focuses on what one cannot glean from looking at a dated
docket...), Hill's Office was made aware of such matters, in writing, in the following December 22nd
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email to Hill's Offiee: "...Further, this is all moot at this point as I have filed a Supersedeas Bond of
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$250, and according to NRS 40.385, I automatically get a stay of eviction and am entitled to
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return to the property and continue in possession. The statute sets the Supersedeas Bond
(which yields a stay) at $250 if rent is under $1000, unless the Court wishes to rule that I am a
commercial tenant. However, if the court does rule that I am a commercial tenant, the No
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Cause Eviction Notice in this case, under NRS 40.253 makes a Summary Eviction Proceeding
impermissible, as Summary Eviction Proceedings are not allowed against commercial tenants
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where only a No Cause Eviction Notice is filed. Its one or the other, but Mr. Hill and Baker
cannot have it both ways. Further, the Courts Order of December 21, 2011 is just that, and
Order, its not an agreement, its not a settlement, etc, etc. and the audio record clearly reflects
that. NRS 40.385 Stay of execution upon appeal; duty of tenant who retains possession of
premises to pay rent during stay. Upon an appeal from an order entered pursuant to NRS
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40.253: 1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay of execution may be obtained
by filing with the trial court a bond in the amount of $250 to cover the expected costs on
appeal. In an action concerning a lease of commercial property or any other property for which
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the monthly rent exceeds $1,000, the court may, upon its own motion or that of a party, and upon a
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showing of good cause, order an additional bond to be posted to cover the expected costs on appeal.
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A surety upon the bond submits to the jurisdiction of the appellate court and irrevocably appoints the
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clerk of that court as the surety's agent upon whom papers affecting the surety's liability upon the
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bond may be served. Liability of a surety may be enforced, or the bond may be released, on motion
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in the appellate court without independent action. 2. A tenant who retains possession of the premises
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that are the subject of the appeal during the pendency of the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in
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the amount provided in the underlying contract between the tenant and the landlord as it becomes
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due. If the tenant fails to pay such rent, the landlord may initiate new proceedings for a summary
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eviction by serving the tenant with a new notice pursuant to NRS 40.253. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin,
Esq.".
Oh, and Hill and Stewart admit to this in a video. Richard Hill's contractor, for some strange
reason, removed a ladder Coughlin owns from the property, preventing Coughlin's access to the attic
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upon his being allowed that scant 13 hours to remove his property (and the attic had been renovated
to allow for storage of a considerable amount of property. If Coughlin was Hill he would have called
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the RPD to report the "larceny" of his ladder by Hill, in a RICO thing with his contractor. But Hill
escaped prosecution that time, over they whole ladder deal. It never was made clear why the
contractor removed the ladder from the property, other than, perhaps, like the applying of a lock to
the backyard gate, make it even more unlikely that Coughlin would be able to remove all he needed
to, especially given the limited funds for moving vehicles and hired help, in the scant 13 hours
allowed under the December 21st, 2012 Order.
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The fact that the criminal trespass custodial arrest occurred at a time when Coughlin still had not
12
received back the $2,275 "rent escrow" the Reno Justice Court forced Coughlin to deposit with the
13
RJC in that very summary eviction proceeding/"Trial" (all while Coughlin was, at least according to
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Hill, supposed to hire movers and rent a U-Haul and otherwise have sufficient funds to conduct a
large scale move of a home law office after having just gone from zero to expert on landlord tenant
law litigating a "Trial" for a law office tenant in a matters of days...). Coughlin made such a deposit
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or $2,275 "rent escrow" with the RJC on October 17th, 2011 (after the October 13th, 2011 summary
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eviction hearing in Rev2011-001708 wherein the RJC Judge ruled that Coughlin "had established a
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material issue of fact" as to retaliation and habitability (and perhaps discrimination, that is not clear)
and set a "Trial" (but only if Coughlin deposited $2,275 in a "rent escrow" account with the RJC by
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October 17th, 2011) for October 25th, 2011 (despite a "Trial" under JCRCP 109 requiring 20 days to
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respond to a Complaint, under NRS 40.251, ie, a plenary unlawful detainer action with all the
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attendant due process trimmings). Further, the Summary Eviction Order stemming from the October
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25th, 2011 "Trial" (it was noticed as a "Trial" in writing by the Court, referred to as a Trial by the
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Court) and the accompanying criminal trespass conviction stemming therefrom are likely void do to
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the fact that Coughlin filed, on October 18th, 2011 a Notice of Appeal (on a form that, by the way,
indicated McLaughlin's exposure for any attorney's fee award would be limited to $15.00, much less
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the $40,050 ultimately entered against Coughlin in an attorney's fee sanction in CV11-03628 by
Judge Patrick Flanagan. That Notice of Appeal form was provided to Coughlin by a Clerk of the
RJC in response to a specific request by Coughlin for the form to appeal the Order stemming from
his October 13th, 2011 summary eviction proceeding, and the forms on the RJC web site at the time,
under a heading of "Notice of Appeal" linked to that same form, and did not in any way specify such
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form to only apply to appeals of small claims actions). Coughlin's filing of a Notice of Appeal of
that October 13th, 2011 Order following the summary eviction proceeding, under Mack v. MackManley, divested any jurisdiction of the RJC to hold such a "Trial" on October 25th, 2011, and any
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such "Trial" was void for lack of jurisdiction anyway, NRCP 60(b)(4) in light of the dictates of NRS
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40.253(6) ("shall make no further Order" upon the Justice Court finding tenant had established a
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genuine issue of material fact, which Judge Sferrazza indicated Coughlin had in his Order following
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the October 13th, 2011 summary eviction proceeding, and again, on the record, during the October
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25th, 2011 Trial, Judge Sferrazza again stated that he set the matter for "Trial" upon his making a
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"finding that Coughlin established a genuine issue of material fact", which, under Anvui, and NRS
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40.253(6), prevented Judge Sferrazza from making any further order, and the lack of a corollary to
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Las Vegas Justice Court Rule 44 in the RJC, along with the dictates against unwritten/not approved
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by the Nevada Supreme Court and counter to express statutory mandates in NRS 118A and NRS 40
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"house rules" set forth in JCRCP 83 should have prevented forcing Coughlin to make any "rent
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escrow" deposit of $2,275 right in the middle (actually after it should have ended) of a summary
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eviction proceeding.
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JCRCP RULE83.RULES BY JUSTICE COURTS
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Each justice or justice court in a township with more than one justice, by
action of a majority of the justices thereof, may from time to time make and
amend the rules governing its practices not inconsistent with these rules.
Copies of rules and amendments so made by any justice court shall upon
their promulgation be furnished to the Supreme Court, but shall not
become effective until after approval by the Supreme Court and
publication. In all cases not provided for by these rules the justice
courts may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with
these rules.
Further, any "Trial" in that summary eviction matter, and therefore any
criminal trespass arrest based upon any failure to properly adhere to some
improperly served Lockout Order stemming therefrom, is also void in light
of the noncompliance with JCRCP 109: SETTING OF TRIAL IN
ACTIONS
"(a)In no case shall a trial on the merits be set less than 20 calendar
days after service of summons and complaint."
To continue the temporary suspension of Coughlin's constitutionally protected
(under the Fourteenth Amendment, a law license is a "property right") law license
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based upon conjecture, hearsay, Pat King's "innocent" mistakes about "facts" and
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various orders so terribly subject to being found void under NRCP 60(b)(4), etc. and a
16
criminal trespass conviction similarly suspect, particularly where Coughlin's filings
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Further, Judge Sferrazza admitted that the RJC did not have a rule for forcing
Coughlin to make such a "rent escrow" deposit at the time such was ordered on
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October 13th, 2011 in the summary eviction proceeding. And even if the RJC did
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have such a rule speaking to "deposits" with the RJC, JCRRT Rule 2 makes clear that
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such a rule does not apply to "landlord tenant matters":
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JCRRT Rule 2. Application of Rules. Except as otherwise provided by

statue, these rules apply to all civil proceedings filed in Reno Township
except small claims and landlord tenant matters.
Oh, and Hill still managed to get Coughlin subject to the November 13th, 2011 custodial
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arrest (ie custodial have someone with color of law make you strip naked and spread your buttocks
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search incident to arrest, and even apparently allow a complete copying and, some times "erasing" of
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one's smart phone, separate micro sd data card, or laptop pursuant to such a "search incident to
arrest"...like what occurred on February 27th, 2012 incident to the traffic citation trial before RMC
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Judge Nash Holmes (whom told Coughlin she would have him arrested if he said Richard G. Hill's
name one more time) in 11 TR 26800 2I stemming from the three traffic citations RPD Sargent John
Tarter called in a different RPD Officer to issue Coughlin incident to Coughlin being told to leave
Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s law office where Coughlin had gone (upon being released from jail on
November 15th, 2011) to retrieve his keys, wallet, state issued identification and client's files from
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Hill, whom refused to provide such items to Coughlin, upon Coughlin being bailed of jail after
spending three days there in connection with the criminal trespass arrest connected to the criminal
Complaint signed by Richard G. Hill, Esq. At that February 27th, 2012 traffic citation Trial in RMC
13
11 TR 26800 (and not even some juicy reckless driving thing, just a plain old "failure to come to a
14
complete stop at a stop sign/California Roll/Boulevard Stop traffic ticket"), Coughlin was sentenced
15
to five days jail, denied a stay (despite being a practicing attorney with actual clients depending upon
16
him) by RMC Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes seconds after Coughlin testified that RPD Sargent Tarter
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"lied" during his testimony concerning what Coughlin's purported to be a retaliatory issuance of
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multiple traffic citations incident to Coughlin repeating to Tarter what may have been a sarcastic
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repose to Coughlin by RPD Officer Chris Carter during the criminal trespass arrest from Coughlin's
21
former home law office just days prior, when Coughlin queried Carter if he, too, was on Hill's
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payroll.
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.Coughlin did report to City Attorney Allison Ormaas during a brief plea bargaining session
25
immediately before the Trial that RPD Officer Carter made a statement (perhaps said sarcastically
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while arresting an attorney for criminal trespass where the RPD refused to issue a citation or identify
27
themselves as law enforcement prior storming in Coughlin's former law office's "basement", where a
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stay is mandated under NRS 118A.380, where one's rent is less than $1,000 and damages awarded
are nil, for no more than a $250 deposit, at a time when Coughlin had yet to be returned the $2,275
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impermissible "rent escrow" deposit forced upon him in a summary eviction) that "Richard Hill pays
me a lot of money so I arrest who he says to arrest and do what he says to do" upon Coughlin asking
Carter if he, too, was on Richard G. Hill's payroll. It appears that at some point, perhaps while they
were whispering in each other's ears (as Coughlin noted on the record during the Trial in 11 TR
26800) during the Trial that Marshal and City Attorney Ormaas were afraid Coughlin may have
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some evidence of Ormaas's admitting to Coughlin that she was in no way going to following up on
an statements by an RPD Officer that may tend to present and admission of accepting some improper
benefit in exchange for committing official misconduct under color of law, or otherwise document
13
such information. The RMC's Marshal Harley seemed to be upset about the possibility that
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Coughlin may have some evidence of Harley purporting to personally serve Coughlin the Order to
15
Show Cause in CV11-03628 (and Machen's Affidavit of Service filed March 8th, 2012 indicates
16
Machen "personally served" Coughlin, which not the case, as apparently Machen did not want to
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wait around for a few minutes for Coughlin's bargaining session with City Attorney Ormaas to end,
19
which means Machen was cutting a corner, which is something courts and local law enforcement
20
punish ordinary citizens for every day in Washoe County. When Marshal Harley began to realize
21
Coughlin's questions to him were revealing some questionable issue (so, you don't know whoat
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WCSO Deputy handed you this Order to Show Cause? You have no idea? You didn't recognize him
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at all? Did he "personally serve" me it, or did you, Marshal Harley? Why is this even being
25
personally served? And why while I am attending court on a totally unrelated matter? Is that
26
proper? Is that somewhat hostile and done in an attempt to embarass Coughlin at the courthouse? Is
27
that appropriate?
Is there even a rule requiring such an "Order to Show Cause" be personally
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served"? Have not found one yet...Especially where Coughlin was a registerd efiler at the time, and
therefore, likely had already been deemed served. Where the subsequent Affidavit of Service thefore
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indicated it was actually the same WCSO Deputy Machen having "personally served" such Notice on
Coughlin, along with some impromptu questioning of Harley as to whether such service was being
done bas To the extent City of Reno Marshal Harley barged in to that bargaining session purporting
to personally serve Coughlin Notice of a Hearing and or Order to Show Cause in connection with
Hill's Motion for Order to Show Cause in the appeal of the summary eviction matter (which resulted
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in a quadruple jeopardy cocktail courtesy of Hill, based largely upon the same acts which resulted in
Coughlin being arrested for "jaywalking", and Hill getting a TPO, and Bar Counsel Pat King making
a federal case of Hill's January 13th, 2012 grievance against Coughlin submitted to the SBN, wherein
13
Hill leads off with an allegation that Coughlin was "ghostwriting for" someone for whom Coughlin
14
was listed as attorney of record. Huh? Then Hill went to "comply with his RPC 8.3 obligation" by
15
reporting the conviction underpinning the current temporary suspension (something Coughlin
16
himself reported in compliance with SCR 111 prior to any knowledge of Hill's having done so, not
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that Bar Counsel bothered to mention that in its SCR 111 Petition, something this Court made note of
a lack thereof in its June 7th, 2012 Order).
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Incidentally, RPD Sargent Monica Lopez admitted during a videotaped interview that neither
21
she nor her fellow office, Carter, identified themselves as law enforcement while calling to Coughlin
22
at the basement door prior to the landlord opening it, nor requested or warned Coughlin to leave the
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property prior to arresting him from criminal trespass from Coughlin's former home law office on
25
November 13th, 2011...despite Hill testifying under oath that they did so identify themselves prior to
26
the landlord opening the "basement" door and that the RPD Officer did issue a warning to leave to
27
Coughlin or otherwise provide Coughlin a chance to heed such a warning prior to effecting a
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custodial arrest. What makes that even more troubling is the fact that Hill provided the City of Reno
prosecutors video of pretty much all events other than the "knock and identify themselves" as law
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enforcement Hill purports the RPD did (even where RPD Sargent Lopez indicates neither she nor
Officer Carter did so identify themselves prior to the basement door being opened by the landlord).
Amongst the videos that Hill filmed on November 13th, 2011 that Hill did manage to provide to City
of Reno prosecutors was a video of Coughlin asking Officer Carter and Sargent Tarter, prior to the
point of arrest, why, if they felt he was trespassing, they wouldn't simply issue a citation in lieu of
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making a custodial arrest. Hill's own video establishes that Hill's testimony during the criminal
trespass matter is extremely problematic respecting whether the RPD identified themselves prior to
the landlord opening the door and whether the RPD issued Coughlina warning to leave and
13
opportunity to heed it prior to effecting a custodial criminal trespass arrest. Hill had Coughlin
14
arrested for criminal trespass, even where Coughlin had to pay for "storage" the same amount, $480
15
as the Lease Agreement required for "full rental value for full use and occupancy of the premises"
16
for 17 days of "storage" of Coughlin's personal property, and even where NRS 108.475 and NRS
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40.760 indicate a summary eviction is required where one is "using a storage facility as a residence"
19
(if that was the case, which has not been established), not a criminal trespass arrest, particularly
20
where RPD Officer Chris Carter, in violating Soldal v. Cook County, expounded to Coughlin upon
21
his learned views on "service" of eviction orders like some modern day Friedenthal. Then there is
22
the fact that Coughlin's former home law office was robbed of approximately $8,000 worth of
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personalty on December 12th, 2011 (during the six week wait for a Hearing on Coughlin's Motion to
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Contest Personal Property Lien, again, because, according to Hill, the RJC was going to postpone
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setting any such hearing until Hill's six week vacation was over, despite the statutory dictate that
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such a hearing be set within 10 days of Coughlin's November 16th, 2011 filing of a Motion to
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Contest Personal Proeprty Lien). The December 21st, 2011 Order on Coughlin's Motion to Contest
Personal Property Lien required Coughlin to rush into his former home law office, and take in the
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specter of it having been torn asunder and robber, with a chortling Richard G. Hill, Esq. standing on
filming the occasion, and quickly throw together an "inventory of anything lost, stolen or damaged",
then hop over to Kinko's or some wi-fi and email the RJC with such an inventory, copying Hill in the
process. Even though the statutes in Nevada are amongst the harshest towards tenants compared to
the other 49 states, the RJC, Washoe County Sheriff's Office, Reno Police Department, and landlords
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like Dr. Matthew Joel Merliss, MD (a Chico, Ca. based neurosurgeon whom graduated from Beverly
Hills HS) and their attorney (or, their unauthorized practice of law committing "eviction consulting
and process service" company, like Nevada Court Services) really go the extra mile in making
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Nevada a very dangerous, and perhaps, lethal, place to be a tenant. Oh, and the Judge finding
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Coughlin guilty of the Reno Municipal Code's version of criminal trespass, RMC Judge William
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Garnder, found support for the "when on property with an intent to vex and annoy" the owner of a
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property version of criminal trespass where the Judge and prosecution also maintained that Coughlin
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was "secretly" going on the property (apparently Coughlin was haunting the subconscious of the
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property owner where the prosecution did not have support for the "failed to leave after being warned
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to do so" version of criminal trespass in RMC 8.10.010 is also the brother of the Family Court Judge
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Linda Gardner whose April 2009 Order for Sanctions of Coughlin incident to Coughlin's service for
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legal aid organizations Washoe Legal Services as a domestic violence attorney was cited as the "sole
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reason" for Washoe Legal Service firing Coughlin, and which formed the basis for Coughlin's
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Petition for Writ of Mandamus challenging said Order for Sanctions in 54844 and whom admitted,
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on the record, in the case flowing from Coughlin's criminal trespass arrest, in RMC 11 CR 26405,
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that he "passed along" to his fellow RMC Judge Nash Holmes "his own sister's" over three years old
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Order for Sanctions ($1,000 attorney's fee award personally payable by Coughlin under NRS 7.085
despite Coughlin's citing to an ALR article demonstrating the position he maintained to be the
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majority viewpoint in Amercian jurisprudence, ie, no setting off "duty" such as alimony for
unsecured third party credit card debt where other spouse is sole signatory. A far flung doctrine of
the necessaries threat by various unsecured debt holders, where none of the debts are likely large
enough to engender much litigation, hardly makes vexatious a failure to agree to John Springgate's
proposed marital settlement agreement
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. RMC Judge William Gardner refused to recuse himself from Coughlin's criminal trespass trial
despite acknowleding that he was aware that his passing on his sister's 2009 Order for Sanctions to
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Judge Nash Holmes had resulted in a grievance being filed with the SBN, based upon his sister's
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Order for Sanctions, upon Judge Nash Holmes forwarding said Order onto the SBN. Bar Counsel
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King issued that "grievance" based upon Judge Linda Gardner's 2009 Order for Sanctions its own
case number, yet has continued to refuse to specify how that case came to be, who filed the grievance
based upon that Order, or in any other way indicated that such grievance came to be other than an
immaculate conception of sorts.
CONCLUSION
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Please expunge this SCR 111(4) petition and the SCR 105 Complaint currently stemming
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from this wrongful eviction and or grant this Motion for New Trial or Vacate the Judgement of
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Conviction and or reinstate Coughlin's appeal and apprise D10 in CR12-1262 of Coughlin's timely
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filing a notice of appeal on June 28th, 2012 and timely serving the City Attorney.
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Defendant/Appelant Coughlin hereby respectfully requests all Orders, Convictions, Judgments,

Contempt Findings, etc, be amended, set aside, etc.
AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
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The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain
the social security number of any person. And I declare the bit about RPD Offier Travis Warren and
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others is true to the best of my knowledge under NRS 53.045. The rest? Well, one, tape dont lie.
Two, if Hazlett don't have to sign a declaration in putting in all his unsworn hearsay pajama-centric
tacky testimony, I shouldn't have ta.
DATED this October 24th, 2012
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_/s/ Zach Coughlin

Zach Coughlin
Defendant
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Proof of Service:
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On this date, I, Zach Coughlin electronically served a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to all registered electronic filers or those otherwise consenting to electronic service in a
waiver of the application of NRCP as set forth in SCR 109, and to those whom are not I placed a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document in the USPS mail on this date and or complied with all
service requirements set forth in SCR 109:
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Patrick O. King, Esq. Assistant Bar Counsel

9456 Double R. Blvd Suite B
Reno, NV 89521
David A Clark, Esq., Bar Counsel
State Bar of Nevada
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Address: 600 East Charleston Blvd.
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Las Vegas , NV 89104
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Phone Number: 702-382-2200
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Fax number: 702-385-2878

J. Thomas Susich, Esq., Chairman NNDB
Nevada Employment Security Division
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Address: 1675 E. Prater Way, Suite 103
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Sparks , NV 89434
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Phone Number: 775-284-9533
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Fax number: 775-284-9513
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Dated this 5 13 13
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/s/ Zach Coughlin

Zach Coughlin
Pro Per Attorney
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- 366/366 -

6 13 13 0204 61383 Declaration of Coughlin Concernign Trespass Conviction and Hill&#39;s Sworn Testimony 13-17328

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6 13 13 0204 61383 Declaration of Coughlin Concernign Trespass Conviction and Hill&#39;s Sworn Testimony 13-17328

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1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OFElectronically

Jun 13 2013 09:09 a.m.

DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

hatley 231 se 2d 633, 634-35. in re ak 628 se 2d 753, 755.

pluas waugh is called in to doubt by kjb 2jdc 103 nev 473

DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

NRAP Rule 3(d)Serving the Notice of Appeal.

NEFR Rule9.Electronic service.

(a)Applicability.Electronic service of documents is limited to those documents permitted to be

DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

26. 3336 - Ord Deny

DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

Right now Mr. Coughlin has asked Mr. Hill

DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

THE WITNESS: At least.

So to compare in closer detail:

DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

Q Is that what you testified on June 18th in

HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 59:10 to 60:19)

" Q So when they identified themselves, how long

between identifying themselves and kicking the door down?

DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

A Three minutes. Two or three minutes.

Q Which one of them identified themself?

A I believe there was a lady sergeant, and there

Q Was that it, come out Zach? Does that

A I believe those were the words he used, sir.

A This is the police, please come out Zach.

Q Because previously all you said was, come on

Junior, three minutes before the door was kicked in by

your client, banged on the door with his nightstick, and

said, this is the police. Come on out, Zach?

A Mr. Coughlin, three minutes is probably a long

THE WITNESS: I believe he did, sir.

MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me. Let me -- I'm

going to go ahead and overrule. Go ahead.

DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

to have been involved with, in terms of candor to the

court, candor to counsel, candor to witnesses, competency

HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 72:2 to 75:5)

assert to this panel that I completely lack competency,

asked for, and the $42,000 you were ultimately awarded in

that appellate court?

DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

his credibility to the extent that he's saying, well,

Mr. Coughlin is so baseless and vexatious, yet I was able

to bill 60 grand for it.

To me it's like, well, at some point if

MR. KING: Mr. Chairman, if I could respond by

which has been admitted, suggests that that was -- that

those fees were generated because of Mr. Coughlin's

DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

years later? Am I here today on Judge Flanagan's

sanction? Is he a grievant and accorded a case number

6 13 13 0204 61383 Declaration of Coughlin Concernign Trespass Conviction and Hill's Sworn Testimony 13-17328

6 13 13 0204 61383 Declaration of Coughlin Concernign Trespass Conviction and Hill's Sworn Testimony 13-17328