COMPUTATION OF LEGITIME

Branch II, Santa Cruz, Laguna, in Civil Case No. SC-894, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is affirmed, with the following modification: The entire house and lot on West Avenue, Quezon City, shall be divided as follows: One-half value of said house and lot to defendantappellant Canuta Pagkatipunan and her 13 codefendants-appellants children (now petitioners) to the extent of their respective proportional contributions as stated above; and The other one-half value of the said house and lot goes to the second conjugal partnership of the deceased husband and his second spouse Canuta Pagkatipunan to be partitioned one-fourth to Canuta Pagkatipunan and the other one-fourth appertaining to the deceased Jose Velasquez, Sr. to be divided equally among his 18 heirs as follows: 1/18 undivided portion to Canuta Pagkatipunan; 1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiff-appellee Lourdes Velasquez; 1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs-appellees Edgardo, Lolita, Minerva, Cynthia, and Jennifer, all surnamed Velasquez; 1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs-appellee Teresa Magtibay and her children, Ricardo, Lourdes, Celia and Aida, all surnamed Velasquez;

G.R. No. 70722 July 3, 1991 CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN, FLORA VELASQUEZ, BENJAMIN VELASQUEZ, RODOLFO VELASQUEZ, ALFREDO VELASQUEZ, NAPOLEON VELASQUEZ, MANUEL VELASQUEZ, JULIO VELASQUEZ, VICTORIA VELASQUEZ, CARLOS VELASQUEZ, LEONOR VELASQUEZ, ELENA VELASQUEZ, PATROCINIO VELASQUEZ, PATRICIA VELASQUEZ, SANTIAGO ZAPANTA, HERMINIGILDO SISON, ALFREDO AGAPITO, MOISES SANTOS, MAGDALENA PAGKATIPUNAN, AGAPITO MANALO, MIGUEL ANGELES, MATIAS ALVAREZ, PATRICIO LAYSA, TEOFILO DE LUNA, ISIDRO ANINAO, APOLINAR CASAL, MOISES GALLARDO, BONIFACIO PEREZ, DELFIN LAYBA, AND HERMOGENES FLORES, petitioners, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE R. VELASQUEZ, JR., LOURDES VELASQUEZ, EDGARDO VELASQUEZ, LOLITA VELASQUEZ, MINERVA VELASQUEZ, CYNTHIA VELASQUEZ, CESAR GONZALES, ADOLFO GONZALES, EVELYN GONZALES, AMELITA GONZALES, RUBEN GONZALES, AND CARMENCITA GONZALES, respondents. Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Ascuna & Bengson for petitioners. Tomas P. Aonuevo for private respondents. MEDIALDEA, J.:p This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-G.R. CV No. 68431 dated February 7, 1986, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna,

1/1 8 undivided portion to the plaintiffs-appellees Cesar, Adolfo, Evelyn, Angelita, Ruben, and Carmencita, all surnamed Gonzales; 1/18 undivided portion to each of the 13 defendantsappellants Flora, Leonor, Patrocinio, Benjamin, Rodolfo, Alfredo, Napoleon, Manuel, Julio, Elena, Patricia, Victoria, and Carlos, all surnamed Velasquez. SO ORDERED. (p. 55, Rollo) The facts from the records are as follows: The principal litigants in this case are the successors- in-interest of Jose Velasquez, Sr. who died intestate on February 24, 1961. Petitioner Canuta Pagkatipunan is the surviving spouse of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and the other 13 petitioners are their children namely: Flora, Leonor, Patrocinio, Julio, Benjamin, Rodolfo, Alfredo, Napoleon, Manuel, Elena, Patricia, Victoria and Carlos. On the other hand, the private respondents are the descendants of Jose Velasquez, Sr. with his first wife Victorina Real who died in 1920 at Santa Cruz, Laguna. Private respondents Jose Velasquez, Jr. (substituted after his death during the pendency of this suit by his surviving spouse Teresa Magtibay and their children Ricardo, Lourdes, Celia and Aida), and Lourdes Velasquez are two of the five children of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real. The other three, Amelia, Guillermo and Lutgarda, all surnamed Velasquez, all died before the commencement of this case. Amelia Velasquez died without any issue. Guillermo Velasquez was survived by private respondents Edgardo, Lolita, Minerva, Cynthia and Jennifer, all surnamed Velasquez, his children, forced heirs and lawful successors-in-interest. Lutgarda Velasquez was survived by private respondents Cesar, Adolfo, Evelyn, Amelita, Ruben and Carmencita, all surnamed Gonzales, likewise her children, forced heirs and successors-in-interest.

This case was judicially instituted by the private respondents against the petitioners in 1969 in a complaint entitled "accion reivindicatoria, annulment of deeds of sale, partition and damages." However, both the trial and the appellate courts considered that the real controversy in this case is the liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties acquired by the deceased Jose Velasquez, Sr. in his two marriages, one with Victorina Real, who predeceased him, and the other with Canuta Pagkatipunan, as well as the partition of the estate of said Jose Velasquez, Sr. among his heirs. It appears that after the death of Victorina Real in 1920, no dissolution of the first conjugal property has been made. Consequently, Jose Velasquez, Sr. enjoyed full possession, use, usufruct and administration of the whole conjugal property of the first marriage. In 1930, Jose Velasquez, Sr. took Canuta Pagkatipunan as his second wife although they cohabited as early as 1921, when she was 16, soon after his first wife's death. From this marriage, the other 13 co-petitioners were born. Neither had there been any liquidation of the second conjugal partnership after the death of Jose Velasquez, Sr. in 1961. This situation gave rise to the controversies in the instant case spawned by the parties' conflicting claims from both sides of the two marriages. The trial court appointed two sets of commissions one on January 31, 1975, for the purpose of making an inventory of the estate of Jose Velasquez, Sr., and the other on November 15, 1976, to determine which of the parcels of land listed in such inventory submitted by the first set of commissioners belong to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage or to the conjugal partnership of the second marriage. Based on the Report and Inventory submitted on May 29, 1975, the commissioners listed the following properties as acquired by the late Jose Velasquez, Sr. during his marriage with Victorina Real:

1. Tax Declaration No. 2718. A riceland, located in Luya and with an area of 93,662 square meters; 2. Tax Declaration No. 3125. A Secano land located in Luya and with an area of 12,540 square meters; 3. Tax Declaration No. 2623. A Cocal and Forestal, situated in Salang-Bato (Macasipac) and with an area of 500,000 square meters; 4. Tax Declaration No. 2096. A riceland, situated in Islang Munti and with an area of 40,328 square meters; 5. A Cocal and Forestal land situated in Bankang Bato containing an area of 240,000 square meters; 6. Tax Declaration No. 4251. A Cocal, Secano and Cogonal land situated in Cambuja and containing an area of 163,121 square meters; 7. Tax Declaration No. 1342. A parcel of land situated in Bagumbayan and containing an area of 80,258 square meters; 8. Tax Declaration No. 3541. A Cocal and Secano land, situated in Bagumbayan and containing an area of 20 hectares; (Total area as surveyed is 392,503 square meters. This includes the area of the land stated in Item 7 of the Inventory). 9. Tax Declaration No. 82. A Cogonal land situated in Tungkod (Ikalong Tumid), containing an area of 385,324 square meters;

10. Tax Declaration No. 1500. A riceland, situated in Pague, containing an area of 9,228 square meters; 11. Tax Declaration No. 5688 a) A parcel of land situated in NAPSE (Masinao), containing an area of 24,725 square meters; b) A parcel of land situated in NAPSE (Masinao), containing an area of 25,000 square meters; 12. Tax Declaration No. 543. A parcel of land situated in Gomez Street, containing an area of 755 square meters; 13. Tax Declaration No. 4139. A parcel of land situated in Caboan, containing an area of 367.2 square meters; 14. Tax Declaration No. 4139. A parcel of land situated in Caboan, containing an area of 367.2 square meters. 15. Tax Declaration No. 4139. A parcel of land situated in Caboan, containing an area of 367.2 square meters. 16. Tax Declaration No. 4139. A parcel of land situated in Caboan, containing an area of 367.2 square meters. 17. Tax Declaration No. 4139. A parcel of land situated in Caboan, containing an area of 1,275 square meters.

18. Tax Declaration No. 804-A. Three parcels of land situated in Salang Bato, containing an area of 450,000 square meters; 19. Tax Declaration No. 2560. A parcel of land situated in Salang Bato which area is included in item no. 18. 20. A parcel of land situated in Burgos St. (Papers cannot be located but subject lot is known to both parties). 21. A parcel of land situated in Burgos St., containing an area of 5,000 square meters. (Papers cannot be located but subject lot is known to both parties). 22. A parcel of land situated in Gomez St., containing an area of 300 square meters. (Papers cannot be located but subject lot is known to both parties). 23. A parcel of land situated in Gomez St., containing an area of 1,050 square meters. (Papers cannot be located but subject lot is known to both parties). 24. A parcel of land situated in Gomez St. (Papers cannot be located but subject lot is known to both parties). 25. A parcel of land situated in Zamora St., containing an area of 3,605. (Papers cannot be located but subject lot is known to both parties). 26. Tax Declaration No. 2412: A parcel of land situated in Caboan, containing an area of 12,867 square meters;

27. A parcel of land situated in Dra. Amelia St. On the other hand, the commissioners listed the following properties as acquired by Jose Velasquez, Sr. on February 11, 1921 or after the death of Victorina Real: 28. Tax Declaration No. 2547. A parcel of land situated in Barandilla, containing an area of 21,566 square meters; 29. A parcel of land situated in Barandilla, containing an area of 93.191 square meters. (Commissioner's Inventory, Rollo, pp. 355-360) Worth noting are the following findings of the commissioners: 3) That among the properties acquired by the late Jose Velasquez, Sr. during his lifetime, only the one mentioned in Item 7 of the Inventory (Annex "A") is still intact. It is situated in Bagumbayan, Sta. Maria, Laguna, and is containing an area of 80,258 square meters, more or less; 4) That Item 8 of the Inventory is only 200,000 square meters, more or less in Tax Declaration No. 3541, but as per Survey caused by the defendants (which is not yet approved) it contains an area of 330,345 square meters. That the Tax Declaration of said parcel of land is under the name of Canuta Pagkatipunan, but plaintiff Jose Velasquez, Jr. is the one in possession of said property. That the area as contained in the Survey includes the area of the land mentioned in Item 7 of the Inventory (80,258 sq. m.); 5) That the other properties of the late Jose Velasquez Sr. were disposed of by the said decedent during his lifetime and some were sold

and/or disposed of by the parties and heirs of the late Jose Velasquez, Sr.; 6) That the Barandilla properties, as evidenced by the Venta Absoluta dated February 11, 1921 executed by Pedro Villanueva in favor of Jose Velasquez Sr., were disposed of portion by portion. It was sold by the late Jose Velasquez who disposed of some portions and the rest by either the plaintiffs or defendants. An area of 11,200 square meters more or less was DONATED (donacion propter Nupcias) in favor of Canuta Pagkatipunan by the decedent Jose Velasquez, Sr. as evidenced by Kasulatan ng Panibagong Documento Donacion Propter Nupcias notarized under Inst. 135; Page 47; Book 1; Series of 1947 of Notary Public Bonifacio de Ramos; 7) That the parcels of land appearing in Items 5 and 6 of the Inventory (Annex "A") were DONATED by the late Jose Velasquez Sr. to Guillermo Velasquez; 8) That parcels of land mentioned in Items 18 and 19 of the Inventory (Annex "A") were DONATED by the late Jose Velasquez, Sr. to Jose Velasquez, Jr. Said properties were sold by the Donee to Sps. Santiago Recio and Filomena Dimaculangan; 9) The property mentioned in Item 27, page 3 of the Inventory was given by the late Jose Velasquez, Sr. to one of his daughters, Dra. Amelia Velasquez while she was still living and now owned by her heirs; 10) A residential lot at 7 West Avenue, Quezon City, titled in the name of Canuta Pagkatipunan, was acquired from the PHHC (People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, now National Housing

Authority) and presently occupied by the defendants. (Rollo, pp. 351-353) There is divergence of findings and opinion among the three members of the second set of commissioners with respect to the properties covered by Items 7 and 8 and the property in the unnumbered item relating to Lot 2-A West Avenue, Quezon City and the house thereon of the Inventory submitted by the first set of commissioners. They refuse to make findings as to the nature of the properties because the petitioners had caused the issuance of titles covering said properties. However, all the commissioners were in agreement that all the other properties listed in the Inventory belonged to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage. The records before Us will show that the properties covered by items 7 and 8 were originally declared for taxation purposes in the names of the spouses Real and Velasquez. This has been admitted by Canuta Pagkatipunan during the hearing before the Commissioner and is duly supported by documentary evidence. After the death of Jose Velasquez, Sr. the full possession of said property was acquired by Canuta Pagkatipunan. On March 4, 1967, she sold the same property to the spouses Moises Santos and Magdalena Pagkatipunan, her brother-in-law and sister, respectively (they were previously impleaded in the trial court as party-defendants). Subsequently, Tax Declaration No. 4843 was issued in the names of the said spouses who later resold the same property to Canuta Pagkatipunan. Thereafter, tax declaration covering said property was issued in her name, During the pendency of this suit, this property was subdivided and assigned by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her thirteen children. The latter caused the issuance of separate free patent titles in their favor covering the subdivided lots conveyed to them by their mother. Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-2000 to P-2012 were accordingly issued in their names.

With regard to the West Avenue property it is not disputed that said residential lot was purchased on installments from People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (now National Housing Authority) by the spouses Jose Velasquez Sr. and Canuta Pagkatipunan. The installments were paid by the said spouses until Jose Velasquez, Sr. died on February 24, 1961. Canuta Pagkatipunan, with the help of some of her children, shouldered the payment of the remaining installments until said property was fully paid in 1965. On February 23, 1968, the PHHC executed a deed of absolute sale conveying the said house and lot to Canuta Pagkatipunan. On August 11, 1980, a judgment was rendered by the trial court: 1) Declaring the properties listed in the Inventory submitted by the Commissioners on May 9, 1975, as belonging to the estate of the conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real; 2) Confirming all the conveyances, either by way of sale or donation, executed by Jose Velasquez, Sr. during his lifetime; 3) Declaring null and void, sham and fictitious, the following sales, transfers, assignments or conveyances: (a) the sale executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her sister Magdalena Pagkatipunan in favor of Canuta Pagkatipunan (sic); (b) the deeds of assignments executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her children, covering the properties listed in Items 7 and 8 of the Inventory; and ordering defendants (petitioners) to reconvey in favor of the plaintiffs (private respondents) the parcels of land covered by Patent Titles Nos. P-2000 to P-2012;

4) Declaring as null, fictitious and fraudulent the sales by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her children and her sister Magdalena Pagkatipunan and brother-in-law Moises Santos, listed in paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint; declaring the plaintiffs owners of the said properties; and ordering the defendant Canuta Pagkatipunan and her childrendefendants to deliver possession of said properties to the plaintiffs; 5) Ordering the partition of the house and lot in West Avenue, Quezon City in the following manner: (a) One-half undivided portion to defendant Canuta Pagkatipunan; and the other half appertaining to Jose Velasquez, Sr. to be divided among his heirs, to wit: 1/18 undivided portion to Canuta Pagkatipunan; 1/18 undivided portion to Lourdes Velasquez; 1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs Edgardo, Lolita, Minerva, Cynthia and Jennifer, all surnamed Velasquez; 1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs Teresa Magtibay and her children Ricardo, Lourdes, Celia and Aida, all surnamed Velasquez; 1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs Cesar, Adolfo, Evelyn, Angelita, Ruben and Carmencita, all surnamed Gonzales;

1/18 undivided portion to each of the defendants Flora, Leonor, Patrocinio, Benjamin, Rodolfo, Alfredo, Napoleon, Manuel, Julio, Elena, Patricia, Victoria and Carlos, all surnamed Velasquez; Petitioners appealed to the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court. On February 7, 1985, the Intermediate Appellate Court, Third Civil Cases Division promulgated a decision, affirming the decision of the trial court, with the modification that the entire house and lot in West Avenue, Quezon City be divided into two; one-half value to the petitioners Canuta Pagkatipunan and her 13 children to the extent of their respective proportional contributions and the other half value, to the second conjugal partnership of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Canuta Pagkatipunan to be partitioned one-fourth to the wife and the other one-fourth appertaining to the deceased Jose Velasquez, Sr. to be divided equally among his heirs. Hence, this instant petition for review pointing out the following four (4) assignments of error, to wit: I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ENTIRE ESTATE LISTED IN THE INVENTORY SUBMITTED BY THE COMMISSIONERS ON MAY 9, 1975 AS BELONGING TO THE DECEASED SPOUSES JOSE VELASQUEZ, SR. AND VICTORINA REAL. II THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONFIRMING ALL THE CONVENYANCES EITHER BY WAY OF SALE OR DONATION EXECUTED BY JOSE VELASQUEZ, SR. DURING HIS LIFETIME.

III THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING NULL AND VOID, SHAM AND FICTITIOUS THE FOLLOWING SALES: a) THE SALE EXECUTED BY CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN IN FAVOR OF HER SISTER MAGDALENA PAGKATIPUNAN AND BROTHER-IN-LAW MOISES SANTOS; b) THE RESALE EXECUTED BY MOISES SANTOS AND MAGDALENA PAGKATIPUNAN IN FAVOR OF CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN; c) THE DEEDS OF ASSIGNMENT EXECUTED BY CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN IN FAVOR OF HER CHILDREN: COVERING THE PROPERTIES LISTED IN ITEMS 7 AND 8 OF THE INVENTORY; AND ORDERING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN AND HER CHILDREN DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS TO RECONVEY IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES THE PARCELS OF LAND COVERED BY PATENT TITLES NOS. P2-000 TO P-2012. IV THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PARTITION OF THE HOUSE AND LOT IN WEST AVENUE, QUEZON CITY, ONE-HALF UNDIVIDED PORTION TO DEFENDANTAPPELLANT CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN AND THE OTHER HALF TO JOSE VELASQUEZ, SR. (pp. 2122, Rollo) After a careful review of the records and the arguments presented by both parties, the Court finds that both the trial court and the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court failed to consider some basic principles observed in the law on succession Such an

oversight renders the appealed decision defective and hard to sustain. It is a basic rule that before any conclusion about the legal share due to the heirs may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. In the assailed decision, the respondent court affirmed the trial court's ruling, that Jose Velasquez, Sr. had already disposed of and exhausted his corresponding share in the conjugal partnership owned by him and Victorina Real, so that his heirs have nothing more to inherit from him, and that accordingly, whatever remaining portion of the conjugal property must necessarily appertain only to the private respondents as heirs of the deceased Victorina Real. Clearly, the trial court failed to consider among others, the following provisions of the Civil Code: Art. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will. To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them. Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. It is undeniable that numerous donations inter vivos were made by Jose Velasquez, Sr. in favor of some of his compulsory heirs. They include among others, the donation made in favor of Guillermo Velasquez on February 26,1953, consisting of 403,000 square meters (Items 5 and 6); the donation made in 1926 in favor

of Jose Velasquez, Jr., consisting of 450,000 square meters (Item No. 18); the donation in favor of Amelia Velasquez (Item No. 27); and the donation in favor of Canuta Pagkatipunan, consisting of 11,000 square meters (part of Item No. 29) (Commissioner's Report, Rollo, pp. 355-360). It appears that there was no determination whatsoever of the gross value of the conjugal properties of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real. Obviously it is impossible to determine the conjugal share of Jose Velasquez, Sr. from the said property relationship. Likewise, no collation of the donations he executed during his lifetime was undertaken by the trial court. Thus, it would be extremely difficult to ascertain whether or not such donations trenched on the heirs' legitime so that the same may be considered subject to reduction for being inofficious. Article 909 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 909. Donations given to children shall be charged to their legitime. Donations made to strangers shall be charged to that part of the estate of which the testator could have disposed by his last will. Insofar as they may be inofficious or may exceed the disposable portion, they shall be reduced according to the rules established by this Code. With the avowed specific provisions of the aforesaid laws respecting collation, which are ruled controlling even in intestate succession, this Court finds that the lower court's ruling adjudicating the remaining portion of the conjugal estate to the private respondents is purely speculative and conjectural. Relative to the sale executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan to the spouses Magdalena Pagkatipunan and Moises Santos; the resale of the same property to her; and the subsequent deeds of

assignment she executed in favor of her children, the trial court had clearly established that Canuta Pagkatipunan employed fraudulent acts to acquire title over the said properties. Hence, the trial court, as well as the respondent court are correct in ruling that the said sales and assignments are null and void, sham and fictitious. The pertinent portion of the trial court's decision reads as follows: From the evidence adduced by the parties during the hearing before this Court and before the Commissioners, these properties were acquired on November 19, 1918 by the spouses Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real from Estanislao Balasoto (Exh. H-5 Commissioner). Said property was originally declared for taxation purposes in the names of said spouses. (Exh. H Commissioner) On March 4, 1967, defendant Canuta Pagkatipunan sold the same property to the spouses Moises Santos and Magdalena Pagkatipunan (Exh. H-1Commissioner). The vendee Magdalena Pagkatipunan is the sister of the defendant Canuta Pagkatipunan. Subsequently, Tax Declaration No. 4843 (Exh. H-2 Commissioner) was issued in the names of the spouses Moises Santos and Magdalena Pagkatipunan resold (sic) the same property to Canuta Pagkatipunan (Exh. H-3 Commissioner). Thereafter, tax declaration covering said property was issued in the name of Canuta Pagkatipunan (Exhibit H-4 Commissioner). During the pendency of this suit, this property was subdivided and assigned by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her children, the defendants Flora, Leonor, Patrocinio, Benjamin, Rodolfo, Alfredo, Napoleon, Manuel, Elena, Patricia, Julio, Victoria and Carlos, all surnamed Velasquez. Said defendants-children of Canuta Pagkatipunan caused the issuance of free patent titles in their favor covering the subdivided

lots conveyed to them respectively by their mother (Exh. 2, 2-A to 2-L) It is evident that the parcels of land under Items 7 and 8 of the Inventory belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real. Canuta Pagkatipunan had no right to alienate the same. Her conveyance of the same property to her brother-in-law and sister is fictitious or simulated. Ten (10) days after she executed her sale, the same property was resold to her by the vendees. She utilized said conveyance and reconveyance only for the purpose of securing a tax declaration in her name over said property. Her subsequent subdivision of said lot and transfer of the subdivided lots to each of their children further show her fraudulent intent to deprive the plaintiffs of their rightful shares in the disputed property. (Rollo, pp. 606-607) Despite the several pleadings filed by the petitioners in this Court, they did not rebut the foregoing findings of the trial court but merely held on to their argument that since Free Patent Titles Nos. P-2000 to P-2012 were already issued in their names, their title thereto is indefeasible and incontrovertible. This is a misplaced argument. The fact that they had succeeded in securing title over the said parcels of land does not warrant the reversal of the trial court's ruling that the above mentioned sales and assignments were sham and fictitious. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration is a constructive notice of title binding upon the whole world. The legal principle is that if the registration of the land is fraudulent and the person in whose name the land is registered thus holds it as a mere trustee, the real owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the property within a period of ten years (Pajarillo

v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72908, August 11, 1969, 176 SCRA 340). Since petitioners asserted claims of exclusive ownership over the said parcels of land but acted in fraud of the private respondents, the former may be held to act as trustees for the benefit of the latter, pursuant to the provision of Article 1456 of the Civil Code: Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. But while the trial court has the authority to order the reconveyance of the questioned titles, We cannot agree that the reconveyance should be made in favor of the private respondents. The reason is that it is still unproven whether or not the private respondents are the only ones entitled to the conjugal properties of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victoria Real. It is to be noted that as the lawful heirs of Jose Velasquez Sr. the herein petitioners are also entitled to participate in his conjugal share. To reconvey said property in favor of the private respondents alone would not only be improper but will also make the situation more complicated. There are still things to be done before the legal share of all the heirs can be properly adjudicated. Relative to the last assignment of error, We find the ruling made by the respondent appellate court proper and in accord with law insofar as it adjudicated the one-half (1/2) portion of the house and lot situated at West Avenue, Quezon City, as belonging to the petitioners to the extent of their respective proportional contributions, and the other half to the conjugal partnership of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Canuta Pagkatipunan. We must modify it, however, as it readily partitioned the conjugal share of Jose Velasquez, Sr. (1/2 of the conjugal property or 1/4 of the entire house and lot) to his 18 heirs.

As already said, no conclusion as to the legal share due to the compulsory heirs can be reached in this case without (1) determining first the net value of the estate of Jose Velasquez, Sr.; (2) collating all the donations inter vivos in favor of some of the heirs; and (3) ascertaining the legitime of the compulsory heirs. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court as modified by the respondent appellate court is hereby SET ASIDE except insofar as it: (a) declared the properties listed in the Inventory submitted by the commissioners on May 9, 1975 as belonging to the estate of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real; (b) declared null and void, sham and fictitious, the following sales, transfers, assignments or conveyances: 1) the sale executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her sister Magdalena Pagkatipunan; 2) the resale of the same property executed in favor of Canuta Pagkatipunan; and 3) the deeds of assignments executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her 13 children; covering the properties listed in Items 7 and 8; (c) declared as null and void all the other conveyances made by Canuta Pagkatipunan with respect to Item No. 13 of the inventory; and d) dismissed the case against the other defendants except Canuta Pagkatipunan and her children and the

spouses Moises Santos and Magdalena Pagkatipunan. Civil Case No. SC-894 is hereby remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Laguna, for further proceedings and the same Court is directed to: a) follow the procedure for partition herein prescribed; b) expand the scope of the trial to cover other possible illegal dispositions of the first conjugal partnership properties not only by Canuta Pagkatipunan but also by the other heirs as can be shown in the records; c) include the one-fourth (1/4) share of Jose Velasquez, Sr. in the residential house in Quezon City with his conjugal share under his first marriage, if any, to determine his net estate at the time of his death. The trial court's pronouncement as to cost and damages is hereby deleted. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169454

December 27, 2007

THE HEIRS OF MARCELINO DORONIO, NAMELY: REGINA AND FLORA, BOTH SURNAMED DORONIO,Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF FORTUNATO DORONIO, NAMELY: TRINIDAD ROSALINA DORONIO-BALMES, MODING DORONIO, FLORENTINA DORONIO, AND ANICETA ALCANTARAMANALO, Respondents. DECISION REYES, R.T., J.: For Our review on certiorari is the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing that2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, in an action for reconveyance and damages. The CA declared respondents as rightful owners of one-half of the subject property and directed petitioners to execute a registerable document conveying the same to respondents. The Facts Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, now both deceased, were the registered owners of a parcel of land located at Barangay Cabalitaan, Asingan, Pangasinan covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 352.3The courts below described it as follows: Un terreno (Lote 1018), situada en el municipio de Asingan, Linda por el NE; con propriedad de Gabriel Bernardino; con el SE con propriedad de Zacarias Najorda y Alejandro Najorda; por el SO con propriedad de Geminiano Mendoza y por el NO con el camino para Villasis; midiendo una extension superficial mil ciento cincuenta y dos metros cuadrados.4
1

The spouses had children but the records fail to disclose their number. It is clear, however, that Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio, now both deceased, were among them and that the parties in this case are their heirs. Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino Doronio, while respondents are the heirs of Fortunato Doronio. On April 24, 1919, a private deed of donation propter nuptias5 was executed by spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante in favor of Marcelino Doronio and the latters wife, Veronica Pico. One of the properties subject of said deed of donation is the one that it described as follows: Fourth A piece of residential land located in the barrio of Cabalitian but we did not measure it, the area is bounded on the north by Gabriel Bernardino; on the east by Fortunato Doronio; on the south by Geminiano Mendoza and on the west by a road to Villasis. Constructed on said land is a house of light materials also a part of the dowry. Value 200.00.6 It appears that the property described in the deed of donation is the one covered by OCT No. 352. However, there is a significant discrepancy with respect to the identity of the owner of adjacent property at the eastern side. Based on OCT No. 352, the adjacent owners are Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro Najorda, whereas based on the deed of donation, the owner of the adjacent property is Fortunato Doronio. Furthermore, said deed of donation remained a private document as it was never notarized.7 Both parties have been occupying the subject land for several decades8 although they have different theories regarding its present ownership. According to petitioners, they are now the owners of the entire property in view of the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of their predecessors, Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico. Respondents, on the other hand, claim that only half of the property was actually incorporated in the said deed of donation

because it stated that Fortunato Doronio, instead of Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro Najorda, is the owner of the adjacent property at the eastern side. Respondents posit that the donors respected and segregated the possession of Fortunato Doronio of the eastern half of the land. They are the ones who have been possessing said land occupied by their predecessor, Fortunato Doronio. Eager to obtain the entire property, the heirs of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico filed, on January 11, 1993, before the RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinan a petition "For the Registration of a Private Deed of Donation"9docketed as Petition Case No. U-920. No respondents were named in the said petition10 although notices of hearing were posted on the bulletin boards of Barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen.11 During the hearings, no one interposed an objection to the petition.12 After the RTC ordered a general default,13the petition was eventually granted on September 22, 1993. This led to the registration of the deed of donation, cancellation of OCT No. 352 and issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 44481 in the names of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico.14 Thus, the entire property was titled in the names of petitioners predecessors. On April 28, 1994, the heirs of Fortunato Doronio filed a pleading before the RTC in the form of a petition in the same Petition Case No. U-920. The petition was for the reconsideration of the decision of the RTC that ordered the registration of the subject deed of donation. It was prayed in the petition that an order be issued declaring null and void the registration of the private deed of donation and that TCT No. 44481 be cancelled. However, the petition was dismissed on May 13, 1994 on the ground that the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 had already become final as it was not appealed. Determined to remain in their possessed property, respondent heirs of Fortunato Doronio (as plaintiffs) filed an action for

reconveyance and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction15 against petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio (as defendants) before the RTC, Branch 45, Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. Respondents contended, among others, that the subject land is different from what was donated as the descriptions of the property under OCT No. 352 and under the private deed of donation were different. They posited that spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante intended to donate only onehalf of the property. During the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated, among others, that the property was originally covered by OCT No. 352 which was cancelled by TCT No. 44481. They also agreed that the issues are: (1) whether or not there was a variation in the description of the property subject of the private deed of donation and OCT No. 352; (2) whether or not respondents had acquired one-half of the property covered by OCT No. 352 by acquisitive prescription; (3) whether or not the transfer of the whole property covered by OCT No. 352 on the basis of the registration of the private deed of donation notwithstanding the discrepancy in the description is valid; (4) whether or not respondents are entitled to damages; and (5) whether or not TCT No. 44481 is valid.16 RTC Decision After due proceedings, the RTC ruled in favor of petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio (defendants). It concluded that the parties admitted the identity of the land which they all occupy;17 that a title once registered under the torrens system cannot be defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession or by prescription;18 that the deed of donation in consideration of the marriage of the parents of petitioners is valid, hence, it led to the eventual issuance of TCT No. 44481 in the names of said parents;19 and that respondent heirs of Fortunato Doronio (plaintiffs) are not entitled to damages as they are not the rightful owners of the portion of the property they are claiming.20 The RTC disposed of the case, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment DISMISSING the herein Complaint filed by plaintiffs against defendants.21 Disagreeing with the judgment of the RTC, respondents appealed to the CA. They argued that the trial court erred in not finding that respondents predecessor-in-interest acquired one-half of the property covered by OCT No. 352 by tradition and/or intestate succession; that the deed of donation dated April 26, 1919 was null and void; that assuming that the deed of donation was valid, only one-half of the property was actually donated to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico; and that respondents acquired ownership of the other half portion of the property by acquisitive prescription.22 CA Disposition In a Decision dated January 26, 2005, the CA reversed the RTC decision with the following disposition: WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated June 28, 2002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Declaring the appellants as rightful owners of one-half of the property now covered by TCT No. 44481, the appellees are hereby directed to execute a registerable document conveying the same to appellants. SO ORDERED.23 The appellate court determined that "(t)he intention to donate half of the disputed property to appellees predecessors can be gleaned from the disparity of technical descriptions appearing in the title (OCT No. 352) of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante and in the deed of donation propter nuptias executed on April 24, 1919 in favor of appellees predecessors."24 The CA based its conclusion on the disparity of the following technical descriptions of the property under OCT No. 352 and the deed of donation, to wit:

The court below described the property covered by OCT No. 352 as follows: "Un terreno (Lote 1018), situada en el municipio de Asingan, Linda por el NE; con propriedad de Gabriel Bernardino; con el SE con propriedad de Zacarias Najorda y Alejandro Najorda; por el SO con propriedad de Geminiano Mendoza y por el NO con el camino para Villasis; midiendo una extension superficial mil ciento cincuenta y dos metros cuadrados." On the other hand, the property donated to appellees predecessors was described in the deed of donation as: "Fourth A piece of residential land located in the barrio of Cabalitian but we did not measure it, the area is bounded on the north by Gabriel Bernardino; on the east by Fortunato Doronio; on the south by Geminiano Mendoza and on the west by a road to Villasis. Constructed on said land is a house of light materials also a part of the dowry. Value 200.00."25 (Emphasis ours) Taking note "that the boundaries of the lot donated to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico differ from the boundaries of the land owned by spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante," the CA concluded that spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante donated only half of the property covered by OCT No. 352.26 Regarding the allegation of petitioners that OCT No. 352 is inadmissible in evidence, the CA pointed out that, "while the OCT is written in the Spanish language, this document already forms part of the records of this case for failure of appellees to interpose a timely objection when it was offered as evidence in the proceedings a quo. It is a well-settled rule that any objection to the admissibility of such evidence not raised will be considered waived and said evidence will have to form part of the records of the case as competent and admitted evidence."27 The CA likewise ruled that the donation of the entire property in favor of petitioners predecessors is invalid on the ground that it

impairs the legitime of respondents predecessor, Fortunato Doronio. On this aspect, the CA reasoned out: Moreover, We find the donation of the entire property in favor of appellees predecessors invalid as it impairs the legitime of appellants predecessor. Article 961 of the Civil Code is explicit. "In default of testamentary heirs, the law vests the inheritance, x x x, in the legitimate x x x relatives of the deceased, x x x." As Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante died intestate, their property shall pass to their lawful heirs, namely: Fortunato and Marcelino Doronio. Donating the entire property to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico and excluding another heir, Fortunato, tantamounts to divesting the latter of his rightful share in his parents inheritance. Besides, a persons prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations, one of which is that he cannot give by donation more than what he can give by will (Article 752, Civil Code). If he does, so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious and the donation is reducible to the extent of such excess.28 Petitioners were not pleased with the decision of the CA. Hence, this petition under Rule 45. Issues Petitioners now contend that the CA erred in: 1. DECLARING ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 352 DESPITE OF LACK OF TRANSLATION THEREOF. 2. (RULING THAT) ONLY HALF OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY WAS DONATED TO THE PREDECESSORSIN-INTEREST OF THE HEREIN APPELLANTS. 3. (ITS) DECLARATION THAT THE DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS IS INNOFICIOUS, IS PREMATURE, AND THUS IT IS ILLEGAL AND UNPROCEDURAL.29

Our Ruling OCT No. 352 in Spanish Although Not Translated into English or Filipino Is Admissible For Lack of Timely Objection Petitioners fault the CA for admitting OCT No. 352 in evidence on the ground that it is written in Spanish language. They posit that "(d)ocumentary evidence in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino."30 The argument is untenable. The requirement that documents written in an unofficial language must be accompanied with a translation in English or Filipino as a prerequisite for its admission in evidence must be insisted upon by the parties at the trial to enable the court, where a translation has been impugned as incorrect, to decide the issue.31 Where such document, not so accompanied with a translation in English or Filipino, is offered in evidence and not objected to, either by the parties or the court, it must be presumed that the language in which the document is written is understood by all, and the document is admissible in evidence.32 Moreover, Section 36, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides: SECTION 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made. Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent. An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court.

In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified. (Emphasis ours) Since petitioners did not object to the offer of said documentary evidence on time, it is now too late in the day for them to question its admissibility. The rule is that evidence not objected may be deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment.33 This is true even if by its nature, the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time.34 As a matter of fact, instead of objecting, petitioners admitted the contents of Exhibit "A," that is, OCT No. 352 in their comment35 on respondents formal offer of documentary evidence. In the said comment, petitioners alleged, among others, that "Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F and G, are admitted but not for the purpose they are offered because these exhibits being public and official documents are the best evidence of that they contain and not for what a party would like it to prove."36 Said evidence was admitted by the RTC.37 Once admitted without objection, even though not admissible under an objection, We are not inclined now to reject it.38 Consequently, the evidence that was not objected to became property of the case, and all parties to the case are considered amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the said evidence.39 Issues on Impairment of Legitime Should Be Threshed Out in a Special Proceeding, Not in Civil Action for Reconveyance and Damages On the other hand, petitioners are correct in alleging that the issue regarding the impairment of legitime of Fortunato Doronio must be resolved in an action for the settlement of estates of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. It may not be passed upon in an action for reconveyance and damages. A probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is the best forum to ventilate

and adjudge the issue of impairment of legitime as well as other related matters involving the settlement of estate.40 An action for reconveyance with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding. Special proceedings require the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.41 As explained by the Court in Natcher v. Court of Appeals:42 Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this wise: x x x a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action. xxxx c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact. As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of ones right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special

proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion. Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further: It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions x x x. A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice. Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction. Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may," it is nevertheless clear that the same provision contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings." Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 71075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55, was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher. We likewise find merit in petitioners contention that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first.43 The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only then can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.44 Declaration of Validity of Donation Can Be Challenged by an Interested Party Not Impleaded in Petition for Quieting of Title or Declaratory Relief or Where There is No Res Judicata. Moreover, This Court Can Consider a Factual Matter or Unassigned Error in the Interest of Substantial Justice. Nevertheless, petitioners cannot preclude the determination of validity of the deed of donation on the ground that (1) it has been impliedly admitted by respondents; (2) it has already been

determined with finality by the RTC in Petition Case No. U-920; or (3) the only issue in an action for reconveyance is who has a better right over the land.45 The validity of the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of petitioners predecessors was one of the issues in this case before the lower courts. The pre-trial order46 of the RTC stated that one of the issues before it is "(w)hether or not the transfer of the whole property covered by OCT No. 352 on the basis of the private deed of donation notwithstanding the discrepancy in the description is valid." Before the CA, one of the errors assigned by respondents is that "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PRIVATE DEED OF DONATION DATED APRIL 26, 1919 WAS NULL AND VOID."47 The issue of the validity of donation is likewise brought to Us by petitioners as they stated in their Memorandum48that one of the issues to be resolved is regarding the alleged fact that "THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE DONATION INVALID." We are thus poised to inspect the deed of donation and to determine its validity. We cannot agree with petitioners contention that respondents may no longer question the validity of the deed of donation on the ground that they already impliedly admitted it. Under the provisions of the Civil Code, a void contract is inexistent from the beginning. The right to set up the defense of its illegality cannot be waived.49 The right to set up the nullity of a void or non-existent contract is not limited to the parties as in the case of annullable or voidable contracts; it is extended to third persons who are directly affected by the contract.50 Consequently, although respondents are not parties in the deed of donation, they can set up its nullity because they are directly affected by the same.51 The subject of the deed being the land they are occupying, its enforcement will definitely affect them.

Petitioners cannot also use the finality of the RTC decision in Petition Case No. U-92052 as a shield against the verification of the validity of the deed of donation. According to petitioners, the said final decision is one for quieting of title.53 In other words, it is a case for declaratory relief under Rule 64 (now Rule 63) of the Rules of Court, which provides: SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance, may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder. An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this rule. SECTION 2. Parties. All persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration; and no declaration shall, except as otherwise provided in these rules, prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the action. (Emphasis ours) However, respondents were not made parties in the said Petition Case No. U-920.1wphi1 Worse, instead of issuing summons to interested parties, the RTC merely allowed the posting of notices on the bulletin boards of Barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen, Pangasinan. As pointed out by the CA, citing the ruling of the RTC: x x x In the said case or Petition No. U-920, notices were posted on the bulletin boards of barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen, Pangasinan, so that there was a notice to the whole world and during the initial hearing and/or hearings, no one interposed objection thereto.54

Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem.55 The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.56 Thus, respondents are not bound by the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 as they were not made parties in the said case. The rules on quieting of title57 expressly provide that any declaration in a suit to quiet title shall not prejudice persons who are not parties to the action. That respondents filed a subsequent pleading58 in the same Petition Case No. U-920 after the decision there had become final did not change the fact that said decision became final without their being impleaded in the case. Said subsequent pleading was dismissed on the ground of finality of the decision.59 Thus, the RTC totally failed to give respondents their day in court. As a result, they cannot be bound by its orders. Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.60 Moreover, for the principle of res judicata to apply, the following must be present: (1) a decision on the merits; (2) by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the decision is final; and (4) the two actions involve identical parties, subject matter and causes of action.61 The fourth element is not present in this case. The parties are not identical because respondents were not impleaded in Petition Case No. U-920. While the subject matter may be the same property covered by OCT No. 352, the causes of action are different. Petition Case No. U-920 is an action for declaratory relief while the case below is for recovery of property. We are not persuaded by petitioners posture that the only issue in this action for reconveyance is who has a better right over the land; and that the validity of the deed of donation is beside the

point.62 It is precisely the validity and enforceability of the deed of donation that is the determining factor in resolving the issue of who has a better right over the property. Moreover, notwithstanding procedural lapses as to the appropriateness of the remedies prayed for in the petition filed before Us, this Court can brush aside the technicalities in the interest of justice. In some instances, this Court even suspended its own rules and excepted a case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so demanded.63 Moreover, although respondents did not directly raise the issue of validity of the deed of donation at the commencement of the case before the trial court, it was stipulated64 by the parties during the pre-trial conference. In any event, this Court has authority to inquire into any question necessary in arriving at a just decision of a case before it.65 Though not specifically questioned by the parties, additional issues may also be included, if deemed important for substantial justice to be rendered.66 Furthermore, this Court has held that although a factual issue is not squarely raised below, still in the interest of substantial justice, this Court is not prevented from considering a pivotal factual matter. The Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision.67 A rudimentary doctrine on appealed cases is that this Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary at arriving at a just decision of the case.68 Also, an unassigned error closely related to an error properly assigned or upon which the determination of the question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as an error.69 Donation Propter Nuptias of Real Property Made in a Private Instrument

Before the New Civil Code Took Effect on August 30, 1950 is Void We now focus on the crux of the petition, which is the validity of the deed of donation.1avvphi1 It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable to it and not the later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect.70 Accordingly, the Old Civil Code applies in this case as the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1919, while the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described.71 Article 1328 of the Old Civil Code provides that gifts propter nuptias are governed by the rules established in Title 2 of Book 3 of the same Code. Article 633 of that title provides that the gift of real property, in order to be valid, must appear in a public document.72 It is settled that a donation of real estate propter nuptias is void unless made by public instrument.73 In the instant case, the donation propter nuptias did not become valid. Neither did it create any right because it was not made in a public instrument.74 Hence, it conveyed no title to the land in question to petitioners predecessors. Logically, then, the cancellation of OCT No. 352 and the issuance of a new TCT No. 44481 in favor of petitioners predecessors have no legal basis. The title to the subject property should, therefore, be restored to its original owners under OCT No. 352. Direct reconveyance to any of the parties is not possible as it has not yet been determined in a proper proceeding who among the heirs of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante is entitled to it. It is still unproven whether or not the parties are the only ones entitled to the properties of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. As earlier intimated, there are still things to be done before the legal share of all the heirs can be properly adjudicated.75

Titled Property Cannot Be Acquired By Another By Adverse Possession or Extinctive Prescription Likewise, the claim of respondents that they became owners of the property by acquisitive prescription has no merit. Truth to tell, respondents cannot successfully invoke the argument of extinctive prescription. They cannot be deemed the owners by acquisitive prescription of the portion of the property they have been possessing. The reason is that the property was covered by OCT No. 352. A title once registered under the torrens system cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession; neither can it be defeated by prescription.76 It is notice to the whole world and as such all persons are bound by it and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.77 The torrens system is intended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of registration, but it cannot be used for the perpetration of fraud against the real owner of the registered land.78 The system merely confirms ownership and does not create it. Certainly, it cannot be used to divest the lawful owner of his title for the purpose of transferring it to another who has not acquired it by any of the modes allowed or recognized by law. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of another.79 Where such an illegal transfer is made, as in the case at bar, the law presumes that no registration has been made and so retains title in the real owner of the land.80 Although We confirm here the invalidity of the deed of donation and of its resulting TCT No. 44481, the controversy between the parties is yet to be fully settled. The issues as to who truly are the present owners of the property and what is the extent of their ownership remain unresolved. The same may be properly threshed out in the settlement of the estates of the registered owners of the property, namely: spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is entered: (1) Declaring the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of petitioners predecessors NULL AND VOID; and (2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to: (a) CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44481 in the names of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico; and (b) RESTORE Original Certificate of Title No. 352 in the names of its original owners, spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. SO ORDERED.

DISINHERITANCE

child was still an infant, she and Villareal separated. Without means to support the said child, Pacita Chua gave her away to acomadre in Cebu. March 28, 1969 Sometime in May 1958 Bartolome Cabangbang and his wife, a childless couple, acquired the custody of the child Betty who was then barely four months old. They have since brought her up as their own. They had her christened as Grace Cabangbang on September 12, 1958. 1 There is some testimonial conflict on how the Cabangbang spouses acquired custody of the girl Betty (or Grace), Pacita Chua avers that in October 1958, while she and Villareal were still living together, the latter surreptitiously took the child away and gave her to the Cabangbangs, allegedly in recompense for favors received. She supposedly came to know of the whereabouts of her daughter, only in 1960 when the girl, who was then about three years old, was brought to her by Villareal, who shortly thereafter returned the child to the Cabangbangs allegedly thru threats intimidation, fraud and deceit. The Cabangbang spouses assert in rebuttal that Mrs. Cabangbang found the child, wrapped in a bundle, at the gate of their residence; that she reared her as her own and grew very fond of her; and that nobody ever molested them until the child was 5- years of age.lwphi1.et At all events, it is the lower court's finding that the child was given to the Cabangbang spouses by Villareal with the knowledge and consent of Pacita Chua. By letter dated June 6, 1963 addressed to the Cabangbang spouses, with copy furnished to Villareal, Pacita Chua thru counsel demanded the surrender to her of the custody of the child. Failing to secure such custody, Pacita Chua (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) filed on June 14, 1963 a petition for habeas corpuswith the Court of First Instance of Rizal, praying that the court grant her custody of and recognize her parental authority over the girl. Named respondents in the petition were Villareal and the spouses Cabangbang.

G.R. No. L-23253

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR BETTY CHUA SY ALIAS "GRACE CABANGBANG" FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. PACITA CHUA, petitionerappellant, vs. MR. & MRS. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG ET AL., respondents-appellees. Francisco R. Sotto and Associates for petitioner-appellant. Teofilo F. Manalo for respondents-appellees Mr. & Mrs. Cabangbang. Enrico R. Castro for respondent-appellee Victor T. Villareal. CASTRO, J.: This is an appeal direct to this Court from the decision of May 21, 1964 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing Pacita Chua's petition for habeas corpus directed against Bartolome Cabangbang and his wife Flora Cabangbang. Pacita Chua, when still in the prime of youth, supported herself by working in nightclubs as a hostess. And sexual liaison she had with man after man without benefit of marriage. She first lived with a certain Chua Ben in 1950 by whom she had a child who died in infancy. She afterwards cohabited with Sy Sia Lay by whom she had two children named Robert and Betty Chua Sy. The latter child was born on December 15, 1957. Shortly after the birth of Betty, Pacita Chua and Sy Sia Lay separated. Finding no one to fall back on after their separation, Pacita Chua lingered in and around nightclubs and gambling joints, until she met Victor Tan Villareal. In due time she became the latter's mistress. In 1960 another child, a girl, was born to her. In 1961 when this last

On June 15, 1963 a writ was issued commanding the provincial sheriff of Rizal or any of his deputies to produce the body of Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang before the court a quo on June 17, 1963, at 8:30 a.m. However, for reasons not stated in the record, the child was not produced before the lower court as ordered. On June 21, 1963 Villareal filed his answer to the petition. The Cabangbangs filed their answer the next day. After due trial, the lower court on May 21, 1964 promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court has come to the conclusion that it will be for the welfare of the child Betty Chua Sy also known as Grace Cabangbang to be under the custody of respondents Mr. and Mrs. Bartolome Cabangbang. Petition dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs. In this appeal now before us, the petitioner tenders for resolution two issues of law which, by her own formulation, read as follows: "The lower court erred when it awarded the custody of petitioner's daughter Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang, who is less than seven (7) years old, in favor of respondents Mr. and Mrs. Bartolome Cabangbang, and [2] illegally deprived petitioner of parental authority over her daughter." We resolve both issues against the petitioner. I. Stated succinctly, the petitioner's thesis is that pursuant to the mandate contained in article 363 of the Civil Code she cannot be separated from her child who was less, seven years of age, and that she cannot be deprived of her parental authority over the child because not one of the grounds for the termination, loss,

suspension or deprivation of parental authority provided in article 332 of the same Code obtains in this case. Whether the petitioner can be legally separated from her child, Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang, is an issue that is now moot and academic. Having been born on December 15, 1957, the child is now 11 years of age. Consequently, the second paragraph of art. 363 of the Civil Code, which prohibits the separation of a child under seven years of age from her mother, "unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure," has no immediate relevance. The petitioner correctly argues, however, that the reasons relied upon by the lower court i.e., "petitioner is not exactly an upright woman" and "it will be for the welfare of the child" are not strictly speaking, proper grounds in law to deprive a mother of her inherent right to parental authority over her child. It must be conceded that minor children be they legitimate, recognized natural, adopted, natural by legal fiction or illegitimate, other than natural as specified in art. 269 of the Civil Code are by law under the parental authority of both the father and the mother, or either the father or the mother, as the case may be. But we take the view that on the basis of the aforecited seemingly unpersuasive factual premises, the petitioner can be deprived of her parental authority. For while in one breath art. 313 of the Civil Code lays down the rule that "Parental authority cannot be renounced or transferred, except in cases of guardianship or adoption approved by the courts, or emancipation by concession," it indicates in the next that "The courts may, in cases specified by law deprive parents of their [parental] authority." And there are indeed valid reasons, as will presently be expounded, for depriving the petitioner of parental authority over the minor Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang. It is the lower court's finding that the child was given to the Cabangbangs by Villareal with the knowledge and consent of the petitioner. In support of this finding, it cited the facts that the petitioner did not at all not ever report to the authorities the alleged disappearance of her daughter, and had not taken any step to see the child when she allegedly discovered that she was

in the custody of the Cabangbangs. It discounted the petitioner's claim that she did not make any move to recover the child because the Cabangbangs are powerful and influential. The petitioner is bound by the foregoing findings of fact. Having taken her appeal directly to this Court, she is deemed to have waived the right to dispute any finding of fact made by the trial court. 2 Art. 332 of the Civil Code provides, inter alia: The courts may deprive the parents of their authority or suspend the exercise of the same if they should treat their children with excessive harshness or should give them corrupting orders, counsels, or examples, or should make them beg or abandon them. (emphasis supplied) Abandonment is therefore one of the grounds for depriving parents of parental authority over their children. Was the petitioner's acquiescence to the giving by Villareal of her child to the Cabangbangs tantamount to abandonment of the child? To our mind, mere acquiescence without more is not sufficient to constitute abandonment. But the record yields a host of circumstances which, in their totality, unmistakably betray the petitioner's settled purpose and intention to completely forego all parental response possibilities and forever relinquish all parental claim in respect to the child. She surrendered the custody of her child to the Cabangbangs in 1958. She waited until 1963, or after the lapse of a period of five long years, before she brought action to recover custody. Her claim that she did not take any step to recover her child because the Cabangbangs were powerful and influential, does not deserve any modicum of credence. A mother who really loves her child would go to any extent to be reunited with her. The natural and normal reaction of the petitioner once informed, as she alleged, and her child was in the custody of the Cabangbangs should have been to move heaven and earth, to use a worn-out

but still respectable cliche, in order to recover her. Yet she lifted not a finger. It is a matter of record being the gist of her own unadulterated testimony under oath that she wants the child back so that Sy Sia Lay, the alleged father, would resume providing the petitioner the support which he peremptorily withheld and ceased to give when she gave the child away. A woman scorned, she desires to recover the child as a means of embarrassing Villareal who retrieved the jeep he gave her and altogether stopped living with and supporting her. But the record likewise reveals that at the pre-trial conducted by the court a quo, she expressed her willingness that the child remain with the Cabangbangs provided the latter would in exchange give her a jeep and some money. The petitioner's inconsistent demands in the course of the proceedings below, reveal that her motives do not flow from the wellsprings of a loving mother's heart. Upon the contrary, they are unmistakably selfish nay, mercenary. She needs the child as a leverage to obtain concessions financial and otherwise either from the alleged father or the Cabangbangs. If she gets the child back, support for her would be forthcoming so she thinks from the alleged father, Sy Sia Lay. On the other hand, if the Cabangbangs would keep the child, she would agree provided they gave her a jeep and some money. Indeed, the petitioner's attitude, to our mind, does nothing but confirm her intention to abandon the child from the very outset when she allowed Villareal to give her away to the Cabangbangs. It must be noted that the abandonment took place when the child, barely four months old, was at the most fragile stage of life and needed the utmost care and solicitude of her mother. And for five long years thereafter she did not once move to recover the child. She continuously shunned the natural and legal obligations which she owed to the child; completely withheld her presence, her love, her care, and the opportunity to display maternal affection; and totally denied her support and

maintenance. Her silence and inaction have been prolonged to such a point that her abandonment of the child and her total relinquishment of parental claim over her, can and should be inferred as a matter of law. 3 Note that this was not the only instance when she gave away a child of her own flesh and blood. She gave up her youngest child, named Betty Tan Villareal, to her comadre in Cebu because she could not support it. Of incalculable significance is the fact that nowhere in the course of the petitioner's lengthy testimony did she ever express a genuine desire to recover her child Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang or, for that matter, her other child Betty Tan Villareal because she loves her, cares for her, and wants to smother her with motherly affection. Far from it. She wants Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang back so that the alleged father would resume giving her (the petitioner) support. She wants her back to humiliate and embarrass the respondent Villareal who, with her knowledge and consent, gave the child to the Cabangbangs. But "most unkindest cut of all"! she nevertheless signified her readiness to give up the child, in exchange for a jeep and some money. We therefore affirm the lower court's decision, not on the grounds cited by it, but upon a ground which the court overlooked i.e., abandonment by the petitioner of her child. 4 Contrast the petitioner's attitude with that of the respondents Cabangbang especially the respondent Flora Cabangbang who, from the moment the child was given to them, took care of her as if she were her own flesh and blood, had her baptized, and when she reached school age enrolled her in a reputable exclusive school, for girls. Ironically enough, the real heart-rending tragedy in this case would consist not in taking the child away from the Cabangbangs but in returning her to the custody of the petitioner.

For, by her own admission, the petitioner has no regular source of income, and it is doubtful, to say the very least, that she can provide the child with the barest necessities of life, let alone send her to school. There is no insurance at all that the alleged father, Sy Sia Lay an unknown quantity, as far as the record goes would resume giving the petitioner support once she and the child are reunited. What would then prevent the petitioner from again doing that which she did before, i.e., give her away? These are of course conjectures, but when the welfare of a helpless child is at stake, it is the bounden duty of courts which they cannot shirk to respect, enforce, and give meaning and substance to a child's natural and legal right to live and grow in the proper physical, moral and intellectual environment. 5 This is not to say that with the Cabangbang spouses, a bright and secure future is guaranteed for her. For life is beset at every turn with snares and pitfalls. But the record indubitably pictures the Cabangbang spouses as a childless couple of consequence in the community, who have given her their name and are rearing her as their very own child, and with whom there is every reason to hope she will have a fair chance of normal growth and development into respectable womanhood. Verily, to surrender the girl to the petitioner would be to assume quite incorrectly that only mothers are capable of parental love and affection. Upon the contrary, this case precisely underscores the homiletic admonition that parental love is not universal and immutable like a law of natural science. II. The petitioner assails as illegal and without basis the award of the custody of Grace Cabangbang or Betty Chua Sy to the Cabangbang spouses upon the grounds, first, that the couple are not related by consanguinity or affinity to the child, and second, because the answer of the spouses contains no prayer for the custody of the child.

The absence of any kinship between the child and the Cabangbangs alone cannot serve to bar the lower court from awarding her custody to them. Indeed, the law provides that in certain cases the custody of a child may be awarded even to strangers, as against either the father or the mother or against both. Thus, in proceedings involving a child whose parents are separated either legally or de facto and where it appears that both parents are improper persons to whom to entrust the care, custody and control of the child, "the court may either designate the paternal or maternal grandparent of the child, or his oldest brother or sister, or some reputable and discreet person to take charge of such child, or commit it to and suitable asylum, children's home, or benevolent society." 6 Parenthetically, sections 6 and 7 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court belie the petitioner's contention that the first sentence of art. 363 of the Civil Code, which states that In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount..... applies only when the litigation involving a child is between the father and the mother. That the policy enunciated, in the abovequoted legal provision is of general application, is evident from the use of the, adjectiveall meaning, the whole extent or quantity of, the entire number of, every one of. 7 It is, therefore, error to argue that if the suit involving a child's custody is between a parent and a stranger, the law must necessarily award such custody to the parent. Sec 7, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, precisely contemplates, among others, a suit between a parent and a stranger who, in the words of the provision, is "some reputable resident of the province." And under the authority of the said rule, the court if it is for the best interest of the child may take the child away from its parents and commit it to, inter alia, a benevolent person.

The petitioner's contention that the answer of the spouses Cabangbang contains no prayer for the retention by them of the custody of the child, is equally devoid of merit. The several moves taken by them are clear and definitive enough. First, they asked for her custody pendente lite. Second, they sought the dismissal of the petition below for lack of merit. Finally, they added a general prayer for other reliefs just and equitable in the premises. Surely the above reliefs prayed for are clearly indicative of the Cabangbangs' genuine desire to retain the custody of Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang. III. Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that "Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The petitioner has not proven that she is entitled to the rightful custody of Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang. Upon the contrary, by wantonly and completely shunting aside her legal and moral obligations toward her child, she must be deemed as having forfeited all legitimate legal and moral claim to her custody. The lower court acted correctly in dismissing her petition. ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

LEGACIES AND DEVISES

G.R. No. L-2386

April 16, 1906

MIGUEL FUENTES, ET AL., appellants-appellee, vs. JUANA CANON Y FAUSTINO, ET AL., defendant-appellant. Ramon Salinas, for appellants. Aguedo Velarde, for appellee. WILLARD, J.: The twentieth clause of the will of Josefa Faustino y Mendoza, who died on the 1st day of April, 1887, is as follows: Vigesima. Mando se entreguen a los conyuges Don Miguel de la Fuente y Doa Potenciana Medrano tres mil pesos para invertirlos en compra de buenos terrenos de labor quedandose con una tercera parte y repartiendo las dos restantes la una a la viuda e hijo de Don Eriberto de la Fuente y la otra a los hijos y herederos de Don Honorio de la Fuente. The plaintiffs herein, Miguel de la Fuente and Potenciana Medrano, brought this action against the twenty heirs of Josefa to recover the 3,000 pesos mentioned in this legacy. Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs in the court below. Defendants excepted to the judgment, and have brought the case here by bill of exceptions. No motion for a new trial was made in the court below. The first claim of the appellants is that the plaintiffs are required to give a bond before they are entitled to the delivery of the 3,000 pesos, the legacy here in question being defined in law 21, title 9, partida 6, and known as alegado modal. There is nothing in this

claim. As far as the heirs of the testatrix are concerned, there is no condition whatever attached to the legacy. With the rights of the beneficiaries mentioned in the said twentieth clause the defendants in this case have nothing to do. As to them there was an absolute gift of 3,000 pesos, and the plaintiffs have the right to receive that from the heirs, and they are under no obligation to give security to the heirs before the money is paid. The court below ordered judgment against the defendants for 3,000 pesos and interest from January 1, 1894. The appellants claim that this was error. It was proved that in November, 1893, the plaintiffs commenced an action against the heirs of the testatrix to recover this legacy. For some reason that case was not brought to trial. It, however, amounted to a judicial demand for the payment of the money, and the interest commenced to run from that date. The case shows that upon the death of Josefa her property was divided among two nephews and a niece. One of the nephews afterwards died, and his property was divided among heirs of two other nephews who had died before Josefa and the nephew and niece who had survived her. The court ordered judgment against the twenty defendants for the payment of 3,000 pesos and interest, without any statement as to how much each defendant was to pay. The judgment as it stands must be construed as imposing an equal pro rata liability, and for this reason we think it is erroneous. The liability imposed upon the heirs to pay this legacy is pro rata (mancomunada) and in proportion to the amount of the estate to which each one was entitled. The judgment of the court below is modified, and judgment is rendered against the defendants for the following amounts, to wit: Maria Josefa Canon Faustino, 1,250 pesos; Cipriana Pilar Faustino, Lazaro Faustino, Filomena Faustino, and Francisco Faustino, 62.50 pesos each; Emerenciano Faustino, Jose Faustino, Exequiel Faustino, Trinidad Faustino, Pedro Faustino, Jose Faustino, and Manuel Faustino, 35.71 pesos each; Juana Canon Faustino, Fernanda Canon Faustino, Marciana Canon Faustino, and Fernando Canon Faustino, 250 pesos each; Concepcion Suarez y Canon Faustino,

Alfredo Suarez y Canon Faustino, Adolfo Suarez y Canon Faustino, and Alfonso Suarez y Canon Faustino, 62.50 pesos each. Judgment is also rendered against each one of the defendants for interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the 1st day of January, 1894, on the sum for which judgment is herein entered as above set forth. With this modification the judgment of the court below is affirmed. No costs will be allowed to either party in this court. After the expiration of twenty days let final judgment be entered herewith and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court below for proper procedure. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 3459

March 22, 1907

court, on the 6th day of May, 1906, made another order or judgment which as afterwards modified directed as follows: And the court hereby orders that the administrator shall immediately pay over the said to the Joc-Soy the sum of 30,000 pesos, Mexican currency, or its equivalent in Conant money, at this day's price, fixed by the court, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent annum from the date of the presentation of the claim, or that is, from the 6th of February, 1905. From this order both the petitioner, Chiong Joc-Soy, and the administrator and some of the heirs have appealed. No appeal was taken by any one from the order probating the will. I. As to the appeal of the administrator and the heirs: It is alleged as the first assignment of error that the will was not executed in accordance with the law; that the legacy therein did not, therefore, exist and consequently that the court erred in ordering the administrator to pay the amount thereof of the petitioner. The complete answer to this claim is that the validity of the will was conclusively established by the order of the court admitting it to probate. The question as to whether in the execution of the will the requirements of the law were complied with was then submitted to that court for decision. It had jurisdiction to decide that question. The heirs who have now appealed were parties to that proceeding. After a hearing, the court decided the question and from that decision none of the heirs appealed. The judgment of the probate court in such case stands like any other decision of a court of competent jurisdiction. Its judgments are binding upon the parties interested and their validity, in the absence of any proof of fraud or accidents, or mistakes, can be called in question only by an appeal. In this case there is no suggestion of the existence of any of those things. There is no claim made that the heirs were not properly notified of the hearing upon the probate of the will and nothing to indicate that they were not present and took part in that hearing. Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure

CHIONG JOC-SOY, petitioner-appellant, vs. JAIME VAO, ET AL., respondents-appellants. Levering & Wood for petitioner. Del-Pan, Ortigas & Fisher for respondents. WILLARD, J.: Genoveva Rosales, a resident of Cebu, made her will on the 26th day of October, 1903. The third clause is in part as follows: 3. Of the third part of the estate, which is at my free disposal, I bequeath to the Chinaman Chiong Joc-Soy, the sum of 50,000 pesos, Mexican currency, of which amount 20,000 pesos are for the aforesaid Chiong Joc-Soy, and the balance of 30,000 pesos for the expenses of interment etc. of my late husband Don Nicasio Veloso, . . . . The rest of her property, which amounted in all to upward of 800,000 pesos, she left to her children. After her death the will was presented for probate in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Cebu and was duly proved and allowed on the 24th of November, 1903, and an administrator with the will annexed was appointed. By order of the court he was allowed one year from the 24th of November, 1903, in which to pay the debts and legacies of the deceased. On the 6th of February, 1905, the petitioner, Chiong Joc-Soy, the legatee named in the will, filed a petition in the said proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased, Genoveva Rosales, asking that the administrator be directed to pay him the 50,000 pesos mentioned in the will. An order was made by consent on the 28th of February, 1905, directing the administrator to pay to the petitioner the 20,000 pesos expressed in the first part of the legacy. As to the remainder of the amount therein expressed, the

provides that "the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution." The second error assigned is that the court below ordered the payment of the 30,000 pesos without requiring the petitioner to give a bond conditioned that he would dispose of the money as indicated in the will. Article 797 of the Civil Code is as follows: The statement of the object of the designation or of the legacy or the application to be given to what has been left by the testator, or the charge imposed by the same, shall not be considered as a condition, unless it appears that such was his will. What has been left in this manner may be immediately claimed and is transmissible to the heirs who give security for the fulfillment of the orders of the testator and the repayment of what they may have received, with its fruits and interest, should they fail to comply with this obligation. From the first paragraph of this article it is apparent that there is a presumption in cases of this kind that the legacy is not conditional, and unless it clearly appears in the will that it was the intention of the testratrix in this case to make the legacy conditional, the words used must be considered as not imposing any condition. We think under all the circumstances of the case that the testratrix did not intend to impose upon the legatee any condition in making this gift of 30,000 pesos. It is true, as claimed by the heirs, that it is very evident that she intended the 20,000 pesos to be the absolute property of the petitioner and that as to the 30,000 pesos she had a different intention, but this does not resolve the question presented. That she wished and desired the petitioner to expend the 30,000 pesos as indicated in the will is apparent, but the question is, did she intent to make her gift conditional, or did she rely upon her confidence in the petitioner that he would carry out her suggestion without the necessity of imposing a condition upon

him? It appears that the husband of the testratrix was a Chinaman; that she was a Filipina, and that the legatee was Chinaman. The manner in which persons of Chinese descent spend money to perpetuate the memory of a deceased person of their race does not appear, nor the amount that they are accustomed so to expend, nor the time during which it may be expended. All these circumstances were doubtless known to the testratrix and we believe that knowing them she intentionally selected a person of Chinese birth to carry out her purposes in these regard. We hold, therefore, that they legacy is not conditional. When the legacy is not conditional, there may, however, be cases which do not fall under the provisions of said article 797. Scaevola says in his Commentaries on the Civil Code, volume 13, page 646: It is doubtful if the definite directions of the testator, not imposed in the sense of a duty, are embraced in the quoted expression of the purpose of the legacy, with the consequences provided in paragraph 2 of the said article 797. Examples of this class of instructions: "I bequeath to Luis my property and desire him to expend in good works all in excess of that which is necessary for his support. I name him my heir so that he may as in duty bound attend to the better education of his children." In these cases, capable of infinite variety, attention must be paid to the true intention of the testator, and if it appears that there was no wish to impose a definite condition, but merely to express a desire or personal opinion as to the best disposal of the estate, then article 797 would not be applicable. We do not find it necessary to decide whether the legacy in question comes within the provisions of the said article or not, for we are satisfied that, even if it does, the judgment of the court below may be affirmed. A fair construction of the second paragraph of the article indicates that the heirs of the legatee are

the only ones who are required to give security, and that such security is not required of the legatee himself. In the case of Fuentes vs. Canon,1 No. 2386, decided April 16, 1906 (4 Off. Gaz., 379), the will there in question contained the following clause: Twentieth. I order the sum of 3,000 pesos to be delivered to the spouses Don MIguel de la Fuente and Doa Potenciana Medrano to be expended in the purchase of good agricultural land, one-third of which shall belong to them, and of the remaining two-thirds, one third shall be given to the widow and son of Don Eriberto de la Fuente and the other third to the sons and heirs of Don Honorio de la Fuente. We held that the heirs were bound to pay the full 3,000 pesos to the legatee named in the will and that the court could not require such legatee to give security that they would deliver to the other persons named in the will the parts corresponding to them. The testratrix in that case, however, died prior to the enactment of the Civil Code. The third assignment of error made by the heirs is that the court erred in ordering the payment of interest from the date of the presentation of the petition. The petitioner in his appeal has also assigned as error the failure of the court to order the payment of interest from the date of the death of the testratrix, or at least from the expiration of the period of one year granted to the administrator for the purpose of paying the debts. Article 882 of the Civil Code provides that when the legacy relates to a specific article the legatee is entitled to the income and rents from the death of the deceased, but article 884 is as follows: If the bequest should not be of a specific and determined thing, but generic or of quantity, its fruits and interest from

the death of the testator shall belong to the legatee if the testator should have expressly so ordered. In this case the testratrix did not expressly provide that the legatee should be entitled to interest from her death. In the case of Fuentes vs. Canon, above cited, the same question was presented and we there held that the legatee was entitled to interest from the date of his demand for payment. We follow the rule laid down in that case and hold that the court committed no error in ordering the judgment of interest from the date of presentation of the petition by the legatee. II. As to the appeal of the petitioner, what has been said disposes of all the assignments of error made by him except one. After the court below had made its order of March 6, 1906, in which it directed the payment of 30,000 Mexican pesos, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at that day's price fixed by the court, the petitioner made a motion that the court fix the rate at 100 pesos, Mexican currency, for 100 pesos and 25 centavos, Philippine currency, and presented an affidavit to the effect that was the market price of Mexican currency on the 6th day of March. The court below, in its order of the 28th of April, which was not made by the same judge who made the order of the 6th of March, held that it was improper at that time to receive evidence as to the market value of the two kinds of money; that no evidence had been presented at the trial as to such market value, and that consequently the court, in making the order, must have intended to apply the rate fixed by the Executive Order then in force. We can not agree with the court's construction of the order of the 6th of March. We think that order means that the rate of exchange should be the rate which actually existed in Cebu on the 6th day of March, 1906, and the court, not having determined that in his order, left it to the parties to ascertain and determine it when payment was made. That price is a matter which can be easily determined at any time, and we hold that it is the duty of the administrator, if he pays in Philippine currency, to pay at the

market price of Mexican currency at Cebu on the 6th day of March, 1906. The judgment of the court below is affirmed, without costs to either party in this court. After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court from whence it came for proper action. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Tracey, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-34480

February 16, 1932

In re Estate of the late Mrs. R. H. Frankel. PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY, administrator-appellee, vs. CLARA WEBBER, ET AL., appellants. FERMA FISCHLER, appellee. Gibbs & McDonough for appellant Clara and Gertrude Webber. J. A. Wolfson for appellants Anna Hartske and Charles Albert Robinson. Harvey & O'Brien for appellant Fred Frankel. Feria & La O for administrator-appellee. Ross, Lawrence & Selph for appellee Fischler. Benj. S. Ohnick for Peoples Bank and Trust Co. as amicus curiae. ROMUALDEZ, J.: This appeal has been taken from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila entered in the course of the present proceedings, and providing as follows: In view of the foregoing (1) the item of two thousand pesos (P2,000) for attorney's fees in the final account submitted by the administrator is hereby approved; but the scheme of partition must be amended so as to charge this sum proportionally to the estate of each of the spouses, Herman Frankel and Mrs. Frankel. In other words, this sum must be taken from the value of the estate of the husband and of the wife pro rata. (2) The opposition of Anna Hartske, her son Charles Robinson, Clara Webber and her daughter, Gertrude Webber, to the scheme of partition is disallowed, together with every other opposition to the final account based upon the amount of the interest due on the sum of forty thousand eight hundred three pesos and seventy-three centavos (P40,803.73). To this sum, however, must be added the

interest for the month of May, 1930, which, according to the report, amounts to eighty-three pesos and twenty-three centavos (P83.23), and the interest thereon at the same rate from the date last mentioned until these funds are finally delivered. (3) Clara Webber's opposition in the matter of the jewels is also overruled. (4) Lastly, Frema Fischler's opposition with reference to the payment of interest upon the principal of her legacy is also overruled. The judicial administrator shall fine a scheme of partition, amended in accordance with this order, within five (5) days after it becomes final under the law. (Pp. 54 and 55, Bill of Exceptions.) The appellants, through counsel, assign the following alleged errors as committed by the trial court: 1. In overruling the oppositions of the appellants to the final account and project of partition filed on May 19, 1930, and to the report filed on June 26, 1930. 2. In overruling Mrs. Clara Webber's additional objection to the project of partition with reference to the jewelry. These proceedings deal with a final account, a report, and a scheme of partition filed by the administrator of the estate of the late R. H. Frankel. The appellants objected to said final account, scheme of partition, and report, upon the following grounds: (1) That the value of the estate belonging to the conjugal partnership of Herman Frankel and his wife, at the time of the latter's death, is not shown; (2) that the additional item of P2,000

for the administrator's services is improper, unlawful, and exorbitant; (3) that the administrator did not invest the funds belonging to the estate adequately and advantageously; and (4) that the interest earned, according to the report filed by the administrator on June 26, 1930, is not accurate, and the statement of the income and the expenses cannot be understood by the parties. The value of the conjugal estate has been finally decided by a competent court, and is now res judicata. To grant an additional allowance for the services rendered by the judicial administrator was discretionary with the trial court, and we find no reason for holding that said court abused that discretion or made improper use of it, in view of the importance and duration of the work in question. With reference to the investment of the inheritance funds, we find that the trial court rightly held such investment to be in no way exceptionable or contrary to any law. The conduct of the administrator of an inheritance who deposits the funds entrusted to his care in a current account with a solid and responsible bank, instead of depositing them in fixed account at a higher rate of interest, with a view to having them subject to withdrawal at a moment's notice, is not unlawful or even improper, but rather worthy of approval; and he is not answerable for the low rate of interest thus obtained, because, generally speaking and there is no reason for applying any special rule in default of instructions to the contrary, a judicial administrator of an inheritance is not called upon to speculate with funds in his custody or to place them where they may not be withdrawn at once at the order of a competent court, but rather to manage them in accordance with the law, keeping them subject to the orders of the proper court. (Sec. 643, Code of Civil Procedure.) To this end when the administrator happens to be a trust company engaged in banking, as in this case, there is nothing wrong in its depositing the inheritance funds in its own banking department rather than in

another bank, if there is no evidence that its own bank is lacking in security. No question is raised regarding the rate of interest earned by such funds, but the computation of interest is said to be inaccurate. There is no merit in this contention, considering the administrator's report covering the period from August, 1926, to April 25, 1930. Furthermore, with reference to the deposit and the rate of interest obtained, we consider the following remarks of the administratorappellee just and sound: The Philippine Trust Company has had at all time and still now has sufficient lawful money of the Philippine Islands to pay all the cash of said estate on deposit with it. It has not invested the funds of the estate because it considers that in view of the will, the action of the residuary legatees, and the nature of its duties, and such investment would make the funds unliquid, and would violate the duties of its trust, which were to assemble the assets, in order to distribute as this Honorable Court may decree. (Pp. 9 and 10 Brief of the administrator-appellee.) As to the second assignment of error with reference to Mrs. Clara Webber's objection, we find no merit in it, considering the proposed adjudication of the jewelry according to the scheme of partition, and the grounds upon which the trial court overruled this additional objection, to wit: Mrs. Clara Webber filed an additional opposition to the scheme of partition in so far as it gives her one-half of the jewelry. She contends that inasmuch as the will gives her one-half of said jewelry, and as it value has depreciated considerable, being hardly worth P500 at present, it is a serious error and a manifest lack of equity to appraise its value at P2,995.50, adjudicating to her one-half thereof. She proposes that the jewelry be sold and the proceeds divided equally between her and the other legatee. This contention is not well taken; first, because the will of the

testratrix must be carried out where it provides that onehalf of the jewelry itself is to be given to this opponent; and secondly, because there is no need of selling the jewelry; as for the value, that is reasonable because it was fixed by the committee of appraisal, and no proper objection was entered in due time. This additional opposition must be rejected. The last opposition is that filed by Frema Fischler, who claims the legal interest upon her legacy of P10,000. It is argued that since this sum of money has been in the administrator's hands for many years, this legatee is entitled to the legal interest upon it from the time of the testratrix's death. There is no merit in this opposition. While it is true that under article 882 of the Civil Code the legacy of a specific determinate thing vests in the legatee upon the testator's death, as well as any pending fruits or income, inasmuch as we are here concerned with a generic or a socalled legacy of quantity, article 884 of the Code must be applied, which provides that interest from the time of the testator's death shall be given the legatee if the testator has expressly so provided. With reference to the present opponent, it appears that the testratrix has not clearly and expressly provided for the payment of the interest upon the P10,000 legacy; according to the last-named article it is clear that the opponent is not entitled to the interest claimed. In Fuentes vs. Canon (6 Phil., 177), and Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vao (8 Phil., 119), the Supreme Court ruled that generic legacies or legacies of quantity, like the one adjudicated to the opponent, do not draw legal interest until a demand is made for them; and a legacy cannot be legally demanded before the scheme of partition is duly approved by the probate court. And in the case cited by counsel for Fred Frankel (Ongpin vs. Rivera, 44 Phil., 808), the Supreme Court held that a cash legacy does not earn interest until the person bound to deliver it in this case the judicial administrator is in default. The administrator in the present case is not in default, for the scheme of

partition not only has not yet been approved, but is actually the subject matter of many opposition filed by the legatees and the heir. (Pp. 52, 53, and 54, Bill of Exceptions.) Finding the order appealed from to be justified by the merits of the case, we hereby affirmed it, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION A.M. No. 190 October 18, 1977 RE: CLAIMS FOR BENEFITS OF THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO, FIDELA B. CHANLIONGCO, MARIO B. CHANLIONGCO II, MA. ANGELINA C. BUENAVENTURA and MARIO C. CHANLIONGCO, JR., This matter refers to the claims for retirement benefits filed by the heirs of the late ATTY. MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO an attorney in this Court, under the provisions of R.A. No. 1616, as amended by R.A. No. 4986, which was approved by this Court in its resolution of August 19, 1976, effective on July 12, 1976 it a g from the records that at the time of his death on July 12, 1976, Atty. Chanliongco was more than 63 years of age, with more than 38 years of service in the government. He did not have any pending criminal administrative or not case against him, neither did he have any money or property accountability. The highest salary he received was P18,700.00 per annum. The above named flied the appellants for benefits with the accruing and with the Government Service System. Aside from his widow, Dra. Fidel B. Chanliongco and an only Intimate Mario it appears that there are other deceased to namely, Mrs. Angelina C. , Jr., both born out of wedlock to Angelina R Crespo, and duly recognized by the deceased. Except Mario, Jr., who is only 17 years of age, all the claimants are of legal age. According to law, the benefits accruing to the deceased consist of: (1) retirement benefits; (2) money value of terminal leave; (3) life insurance and (4) refund of retirement premium. From the records now before US, it appears that the GSIS had already the release the life insurance proceeds; and the refund of rent to the claimants.

What, therefore, to be settled are the retirement benefits and the money value of leave, both of which are to be paid by this court as the deceased's last employer. The record also shows that the late Atty. Chanliongco died ab intestato and that he filed or over to state in his application for membership with the GSIS the beneficiary or benefits of his retirement benefits, should he die before retirement. Hence, the retirement benefits shall accrue to his estate and will be distributed among his Legal heirs in with the benefits on intestate s , as in the caw of a fife if no benefit is named in the policy (Vda. de vs. GSIS, L-28093, Jan. 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 315, 325). Insofar therefore as the retirement benefits are WE adopt in toto, for being in accordance with law, the GSIS determination of the amount of the retirement the kill heirs and their e shares as indicated in its letter to US, dated March 15, 1977, to wit: +.wph!1 (a) Amount of retirement grautity:
1

. Total creditable service 2. Highest rate of salary 3. Gratuity in terms of months 4. Amount of gratuity (highest salary) x (No. of grautity months) (b) Legal heirs:

37.57169 years

Pl,558.33333/mo.

50.14338 months

P78,140,10

. Fidela B. Chanliongco.

widow legitimate son illegitimate child illegitimate child

P1,416.66/mo. 10% salary adj. for July 1-12, 1976 Money value of terminal leave for the period from July 13, 1976 to September 14,1977 @ P1,558.33

P228.49 54.84

2. Mario B. Chanliongco II. 3. Ma. Angelina C. Buenaventura 4. Mario Chanliongco Jr.

(c) Distribution 21,962.54 P22,9245.87 (1) 8/16 share to Mario II (2) 4/16 share to the widow, Fidela B. Chanliongco (3) 2/16 share, or P9,767.5125 each to the two illegitimate children Ma. Angelina C. Buenaventura and Mario Chanliongco, Jr. TOTAL P39,070.050 Sub-Total 19,535.025 Less: Withholding Tax 19 535 25 Supreme Court Savings & Loan Association P78.140.100 NET PROCEEDS 7,340.42 8.740.42 P13,505.45 P1,400.00

Coming now to the money value of the terminal leave, unpaid salary and 10% adjustment pursuant to Budget Circular No. 240, dated July 22, 1974, this Court's Finance Officer, in a memorandum dated March 23, 1977, indicated the breakdown of these items as follows: Unpaid salary for July 8-12, 1976 @

It further appears that at the time of his death the late Atty. Chanliongco had an outstanding account with the Supreme Court Savings & Loans Association in the sum of P7,340.42. Deduction this amount plus another sum of P1,400.00, representing withhold tax due from him, or a total of P8,740.42, from above sub-total sum of P22,245.87. WE have at the net sum P13,505.45, available for distribute to the claimants as follows:

. Fidela B. Chanliongco a. As her conjugal share b. As a legal heir 2. Mario Chanliongco II 3. Ma. Angelina C. Buenaventura 4. Mario Jr. TOTAL It will be seen from the f distribution that the money value of the unused vacation and sick leave, unpaid will and 10% adjustment due to the has been treated as conjugal property. Accordingly, one-half (l/2) goes to the widow as her share in the conjugal hip and the other half P6,752.725 is to be distributed to the deceased's kill him, using the same one WE used in distributing the retirement benefits. This is so because "Vacation with pay is not a gratuity but is compensation for services rendered." (Ramey vs. State, 296 NW 323, 296 Mich. 449). WHEREFORE, THE CLAIMS ARE HEREBY APPROVED. THE FINANCE AND/OR DISBURSING OFFICER OF THIS COURT IS ORDERED To pay IMMEDIATELY TO EACH AND EVERY CLAIMANT HE VARIOUS SUMS HEREUNDER INDICATED OPPOSITE THEIR NAMES, AS FOLLOWS:
1

GRATUITY B. HER SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TEAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT: (1) AS HER CONJUGAL SHARE (2) AS A LEGAL HEIR TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HER 2. MARIO CHANLIONGCO II 844.09 P13,505.45 A. HIS 8/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY B. HIS SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TERMINAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HIM 3. MA. ANGELINA C. BUENAVENTURA: A. HER 2/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY B. HER SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TERMINAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HER 4. MARIO CHANLIONGCO JR. TO BE PAID THROUGH HIS MOTHER AND NATURAL P19,535.025 GUARDIAN, ANGELINA CRESPO):

P 6,752.72

P 1,688.18 P 3,376.36 844.10

. FIDELA B. CHANLIONGCO

A. HER 4/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT

A. HIS 2/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY B. HIS SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TERMINAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HIM SO ORDERED. Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Mu;oz Palma, Concepcion, Jr., Martin, Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.1wph1.t Fernando, J., is on leave. Separate Opinions

The legitimate child gets one-half of the estate as his legitime P9,767.51 which is regarded as his share as a legal heir Art 888, Civil Code). The widow's legitime is one-fourth of the estate. That represents 844.10 also her share as a legal heir (Art. 892, 1st sentence, Civil Code). The remaining one-fourth of the estate, which is the free portion, goes to the illegitimate children in equal shares, as their legitime, P10,611.61 Pursuant to the provision that 'the legitimate of the illegitimate children shall be taken from the portion of the estate at the free disposal of the testator, provoked that in no case shall the total legitime of such illegitimate children exceed that free portion, and that the legitime of the surviving spouse must first be fully satisfied par., art. 895, Civil Code). The rule in Santillon vs. Miranda, L-19281, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 563, that when the surviving spouse concurs with only one legitimate child, the spouse is entitled to one-half of the estate and the gets the other half, t to article 996 of the Civil Code, does not apply to the case because here intimate children concur with the surviving spouse and the intimate child. In this case, to divide the estate between the surviving spouse and the ligitemate child that deprive the illegitimate children of their legitime. So, the decendent's estate is distributed in the proportion of 1/2 for the legitimate child, 1/4 for the widow and 1/8 each for the two illegitimate children. Also not of possible application to this case is the rule that the legal of an acknowledge natural child is 1/2 of the legitime of the legitimate child of that the of the spurious child is 2/5 of that of the of the intimate child or 4/5 of that of that of the acknowledged natural child.

AQUINO, J., concurring: I concur. The provisions on legitime are found under the rubric of testamentary succession. That does not mean that the legitime is taken into account only in testamentary succession. The legitime must also be taken into consideration in legal succession. There may be instances, like the instant case, where in legal succession the estate is distributed according to the rules on legitime without applying the rules on intestate ion. The reason is that sometimes the estate is not even sufficient to satisfy the legitimes. The legitimes of the primary compulsory heirs, like a child or descendant, should first be satisfied. In this case the decedent's legal heirs are his legitimate child, his widow and two intimate children. His estate is partitioned among those heirs by giving them their respective time.

The rule be applied because the estate is not sufficient to cover legitimes of all compulsory heirs. That is one of the flaws of the law of succession. A situation as in the instant case may arise where the illegitimate children get less than their legitime. With respect to the decendant's unpaid salary and the money value of his leave, the same are conjugal properties because of the rule that property "obtained by the or work, or as salary of the spouses, or either of them", is conjugal in character (Art. 153[2], Civil Code).

G.R. No. 140975, Promulgated December 8, 2000 OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU, Petitioner. vs. PASTORA PIEDAD, Respondent. On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete publications of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. The trial court denied the motion, prompting petitioners to raise her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up on appeal only involving nothing else but questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 thereof and consistently with Circular 2-90 of the Court. In a well-written resolution, the Court of Appeals belabored the distinctions between questions of law and questions of fact, thus: "There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. There is question of fact when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation."1

Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, speaking for the appellate court, ratiocinated that whether or not the RTC erred in denying the intervention considering (1) that the intervenor-appellant had a prima facie interest over the case (2) that the jurisdiction over the person of the proper parties was not acquired in view of the deficient publication or notice of hearing, and (3) that the proceedings had yet to be closed and terminated, were issues which did not qualify as "questions of fact" as to place the appeal within the jurisdiction of the appellate court; thus; "The issues are evidently pure questions of law because their resolution are based on facts not in dispute. Admitted are the facts that intervenor-appellant is a collateral relative within the fifth degree of Augusto H. Piedad; the she is the daughter of the first cousin of Augusto H. Piedad; that as such, intervenor-appellant seek to inherit was published for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation; that there was no order of closure of proceedings that has been issued by the intestate court; and that the intestate court has already issued an order for the transfer of the remaining estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitionerappellee. "These facts are undisputed. "In this case, there is no doubt nor difference that arise as to the truth or falsehood on alleged facts. The question as to whether intevenor-appellants as a collateral relative within the fifth civil degree, has legal interest in the intestate proceeding which would justify her intervention; the question as to whether the publication of notice of hearing made in this case is defective which would amount to lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and the question as to whether the proceedings has already been terminated when the intestate court issued the order of transfer of the estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee, in spite the absence of an order of closure of the intestate court, all call for the application and interpretation of the proper law is applicable on a certain undisputed state of facts.

"The resolution of the issues raised does not require the review of the evidence, nor the credibility of witnesses presented, nor the existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances. Resolution on the issues may be had even without going to examination of facts on record."2 Still unsatisfied, petitioner contested the resolution of the appellate court in the instant petition for review oncertiorari. The Court finds no reversible error in the ruling of the appellate court. But let us set aside the alleged procedural decrepitude and take on the basic substantive issue. Specifically, can petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree? Elsewise stated does the rule of proximity in intestate succession find application among collateral relatives? Augusto H. Piedad without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent. The various provisions of the Civil Code on succession embody an almost complete set of law to govern, either by will or by operation of law, the transmission of property, rights and obligations of a person upon his death. Each article is construed in congruity with, rather than in isolation of, the system set out by the Code. The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code provides: "ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.

"Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between the paternal and maternal lines." By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded. "ART. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited." "ART. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded." "ART. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited." "ART. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded." In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts.

"ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending. "In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood. "ART. 974. Whenever there is succession by representation, the division of the estate shall be made per stripes, in such manner that the representative or representatives shall not inherit more than what the person they represent would inherit, if he were living or could inherit." "ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions." The right of representation does not apply to "others collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction. "Article 966. xxx

who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin and so forth." AccordinglyRespondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding an intestato to the estate of the decedent. The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the Civil Code "Article 1009, Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate. "The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood." "Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth degree of relationship in the collateral line." Invoked by petitioner do not at all support her cause. The law means only that among the other collateral relatives (the sixth in the line of succession), no preference or distinction shall be observed "by reason of relationship by the whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half blood but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-degree relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority in succession to a fifth-degree relative. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

"In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made ancestor and then descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle,

G.R. No. L-26699 March 16, 1976 BENITA SALAO, assisted by her husband, GREGORIO MARCELO; ALMARIO ALCURIZA, ARTURO ALCURIZA, OSCAR ALCURIZA and ANITA ALCURIZA, the latter two being minors are represented by guardian ad litem, ARTURO ALCURIZA, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. JUAN S. SALAO, later substituted by PABLO P. SALAO, Administrator of the Intestate of JUAN S. SALAO; now MERCEDES P. VDA. DE SALAO, ROBERTO P. SALAO, MARIA SALAO VDA. DE SANTOS, LUCIANA P. SALAO, ISABEL SALAO DE SANTOS, and PABLO P. SALAO, as successorsin-interest of the late JUAN S. SALAO, together with PABLO P. SALAO, Administrator, defendants-appellants. Eusebio V. Navarro for plaintiffs-appellants. Nicolas Belmonte & Benjamin T. de Peralta for defendantsappellants.

1914. After her death, her estate was administered by her daughter Ambrosia. It was partitioned extrajudicially in a deed dated December 29, 1918 but notarized on May 22, 1919 (Exh. 21). The deed was signed by her four legal heirs, namely, her three children, Alejandra, Juan and Ambrosia, and her grandson, Valentin Salao, in representation of his deceased father, Patricio. The lands left by Valentina Ignacio, all located at Barrio Dampalit were as follows: Nature of Land (1) One-half interest in a fishpond which she had inherited from her parents, Feliciano Ignacio and Damiana Mendoza, and the other half of which was owned by her co-owner, Josefa Sta. Ana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,700 (2) Fishpond inherited from her parents . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,418 (3) Fishpond inherited from her parents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,989

AQUINO, J.: This litigation regarding a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran, Hermosa, Bataan involves the law of trusts and prescription. The facts are as follows: The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal begot four children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in 1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only child. Valentin Salao. There is no documentary evidence as to what, properties formed part of Manuel Salao's estate, if any. His widow died on May 28,

(4) Fishpond with a bodega for salt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,469 (5) Fishpond with an area of one hectare, 12 ares and 5 centares purchased from Bernabe and Honorata Ignacio by Valentina Ignacio on November 9, 1895 with a bodega for salt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,205 (6) Fishpond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,000 (7) One-half interest in a fishpond with a total area of 10,424 square meters, the other half was owned by A. Aguinaldo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,217 (8) Riceland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,454

(9) Riceland purchased by Valentina Ignacio from Eduardo Salao on January 27, 1890 with a house and two camarins thereon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,065 (10) Riceland in the name of Ambrosia Salao, with an area of 11,678 square meters, of which 2,173 square meters were sold to Justa Yongco . . . . . . . . . .9,505 TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 179,022 square

By virtue of the partition the heirs became "dueos absolutos de sus respectivas propiedadas, y podran inmediatamente tomar posesion de sus bienes, en la forma como se han distribuido y llevado a cabo las adjudicaciones" (page 20, Exh. 21). The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of Valentina Ignacio her two children, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao, secured a Torrens title, OCT No. 185 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in their names for a forty-sevenhectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran, Lubao, Pampanga (Exh. 14). It is also known as Lot No. m 540 of the Hermosa cadastre because that part of Lubao e later became a part of Bataan. t e The Calunuran fishpond is the bone r of contention in this case. s Plaintiffs' theory is that Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and his sister Ambrosia had engaged in the fishpond business. Where they obtained the capital is not shown in any documentary evidence. Plaintiffs' version is that Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao were included in that joint venture, that the funds used were the earnings of the properties supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao, and that those earnings were used in the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond. There is no documentary evidence to support that theory. On the other hand, the defendants contend that the Calunuran fishpond consisted of lands purchased by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao in 1905, 1906, 1907 and 1908 as, shown in their Exhibits 8, 9, 10 and 13. But this point is disputed by the plaintiffs. However, there can be no controversy as to the fact that after Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao secured a Torrens title for the Calunuran fishpond in 1911 they exercised dominical rights over it to the exclusion of their nephew, Valentin Salao. Thus, on December 1, 1911 Ambrosia Salao sold under pacto de retro for P800 the Calunuran fishpond to Vicente Villongco. The

To each of the legal heirs of Valentina Ignacio was adjudicated a distributive share valued at P8,135.25. In satisfaction of his distributive share, Valentin Salao (who was then already fortyeight years old) was given the biggest fishpond with an area of 50,469 square meters, a smaller fishpond with an area of 6,989 square meters and the riceland with a net area of 9,905 square meters. Those parcels of land had an aggregate appraised value of P13,501 which exceeded Valentin's distributive share. So in the deed of partition he was directed to pay to his co-heirs the sum of P5,365.75. That arrangement, which was obviously intended to avoid the fragmentation of the lands, was beneficial to Valentin. In that deed of partition (Exh. 21) it was noted that "desde la muerte de Valentina Ignacio y Mendoza, ha venido administrando sus bienes la referida Ambrosia Salao" "cuya administracion lo ha sido a satisfaccion de todos los herederos y por designacion los mismos". It was expressly stipulated that Ambrosia Salao was not obligated to render any accounting of her administration "en consideracion al resultado satisfactorio de sus gestiones, mejoradas los bienes y pagodas por ella las contribusiones (pages 2 and 11, Exh. 21).

period of redemption was one year. In the deed of sale (Exh19) Ambrosia confirmed that she and her brother Juan were the dueos proindivisos of the said pesqueria. On December 7, 1911 Villongco, the vendee a retro, conveyed the same fishpond to Ambrosia by way of lease for an anual canon of P128 (Exh. 19a). After the fishpond was redeemed from Villongco or on June 8, 1914 Ambrosia and Juan sold it under pacto de retro to Eligio Naval for the sum of P3,360. The period of redemption was also one year (Exh. 20). The fishpond was later redeemed and Naval reconveyed it to the vendors a retro in a document dated October 5, 1916 (Exh. 20-a). The 1930 survey shown in the computation sheets of the Bureau of Lands reveals that the Calunuran fishpond has an area of 479,205 square meters and that it was claimed by Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao, while the Pinanganacan fishpond (subsequently acquired by Juan and Ambrosia) has an area of 975,952 square meters (Exh. 22). Likewise, there is no controversy as to the fact that on May 27, 1911 Ambrosia Salao bought for four thousand pesos from the heirs of Engracio Santiago a parcel of swampland planted to bacawan and nipa with an area of 96 hectares, 57 ares and 73 centares located at Sitio Lewa, Barrio Pinanganacan, Lubao, Pampanga (Exh. 17-d). The record of Civil Case No. 136, General Land Registration Office Record No. 12144, Court of First Instance of Pampanga shows that Ambrosia Salao and Juan Salao filed an application for the registration of that land in their names on January 15, 1916. They alleged in their petition that "han adquirido dicho terreno por partes iguales y por la compra a los herederos del finado, Don Engracio Santiago" (Exh. 17-a). At the hearing on October 26, 1916 before Judge Percy M. Moir, Ambrosia testified for the applicants. On that same day Judge

Moir rendered a decision, stating, inter alia, that the heirs of Engracio Santiago had sold the land to Ambrosia Salao and Juan Salao. Judge Moir "ordena la adjudicacion y registro del terreno solicitado a nombre de Juan Salao, mayor de edad y de estado casado y de su esposa Diega Santiago y Ambrosia Salao, de estado soltera y mayor de edad, en participaciones iguales" (Exh. 17-e). On November 28, 1916 Judge Moir ordered the issuance of a decree for the said land. The decree was issued on February 21, 1917. On March 12, 1917 Original Certificate of Title No. 472 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga was issued in the names of Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao. That Pinanganacan or Lewa fishpond later became Cadastral Lot No. 544 of the Hermosa cadastre (Exh. 23). It adjoins the Calunuran fishpond (See sketch, Exh. 1). Juan Y. Salao, Sr. died on November 3, 1931 at the age of eighty years (Exh. C). His nephew, Valentin Salao, died on February 9, 1933 at the age of sixty years according to the death certificate (Exh. A. However, if according to Exhibit 21, he was forty-eight years old in 1918, he would be sixty-three years old in 1933). The intestate estate of Valentin Salao was partitioned extrajudicially on December 28, 1934 between his two daughters, Benita Salao-Marcelo and Victorina Salao-Alcuriza (Exh. 32). His estate consisted of the two fishponds which he had inherited in 1918 from his grandmother, Valentina Ignacio. If it were true that he had a one-third interest in the Calunuran and Lewa fishponds with a total area of 145 hectares registered in 1911 and 1917 in the names of his aunt and uncle, Ambrosia Salao and Juan Y. Salao, Sr., respectively, it is strange that no mention of such interest was made in the extrajudicial partition of his estate in 1934.

It is relevant to mention that on April 8, 1940 Ambrosia Salao donated to her grandniece, plaintiff Benita Salao, three lots located at Barrio Dampalit with a total area of 5,832 square meters (Exit. L). As donee Benita Salao signed the deed of donation. On that occasion she could have asked Ambrosia Salao to deliver to her and to the children of her sister, Victorina, the Calunuran fishpond if it were true that it was held in trust by Ambrosia as the share of Benita's father in the alleged joint venture. But she did not make any such demand. It was only after Ambrosia Salao's death that she thought of filing an action for the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond which was allegedly held in trust and which had become the sole property of Juan Salao y Santiago (Juani). On September 30, 1944 or during the Japanese occupation and about a year before Ambrosia Salao's death on September 14, 1945 due to senility (she was allegedly eighty-five years old when she died), she donated her one-half proindiviso share in the two fishponds in question to her nephew, Juan S. Salao, Jr. (Juani) At that time she was living with Juani's family. He was already the owner of the the other half of the said fishponds, having inherited it from his father, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli) The deed of denotion included other pieces of real property owned by Ambrosia. She reserved for herself the usufruct over the said properties during her lifetime (Exh. 2 or M). The said deed of donation was registered only on April 5, 1950 (page 39, Defendants' Record on Appeal). The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of Victorina Salao in a letter dated January 26, 1951 informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a one-third share in the two fishponds and that when Juani took possession thereof in 1945, he refused to give Benita and Victorina's children their one-third share of the net fruits which allegedly amounted to P200,000 (Exh. K).

Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951 categorically stated that Valentin Salao did not have any interest in the two fishponds and that the sole owners thereof his father Banli and his aunt Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles issued in 1911 and 1917, and that he Juani was the donee of Ambrosia's one-half share (Exh. K-1). Benita Salao and her nephews and niece filed their original complaint against Juan S. Salao, Jr. on January 9, 1952 in the Court of First Instance of Bataan (Exh. 36). They amended their complaint on January 28, 1955. They asked for the annulment of the donation to Juan S. Salao, Jr. and for the reconveyance to them of the Calunuran fishpond as Valentin Salao's supposed one-third share in the 145 hectares of fishpond registered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao. Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer pleaded as a defense the indefeasibility of the Torrens title secured by his father and aunt. He also invoked the Statute of Frauds, prescription and laches. As counter-claims, he asked for moral damages amounting to P200,000, attorney's fees and litigation expenses of not less than P22,000 and reimbursement of the premiums which he has been paying on his bond for the lifting of the receivership Juan S. Salao, Jr. died in 1958 at the age of seventy-one. He was substituted by his widow, Mercedes Pascual and his six children and by the administrator of his estate. In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate the two fishponds in question were adjudicated to his seven legal heirs in equal shares with the condition that the properties would remain under administration during the pendency of this case (page 181, Defendants' Record on Appeal). After trial the trial court in its decision consisting of one hundred ten printed pages dismissed the amended complaint and the counter-claim. In sixty-seven printed pages it made a laborious recital of the testimonies of plaintiffs' fourteen witnesses, Gregorio Marcelo, Norberto Crisostomo, Leonardo Mangali Fidel de la

Cruz, Dionisio Manalili, Ambrosio Manalili, Policarpio Sapno, Elias Manies Basilio Atienza, Benita Salao, Emilio Cagui Damaso de la Pea, Arturo Alcuriza and Francisco Buensuceso, and the testimonies of defendants' six witnesses, Marcos Galicia, Juan Galicia, Tiburcio Lingad, Doctor Wenceslao Pascual, Ciriaco Ramirez and Pablo P. Salao. (Plaintiffs presented Regino Nicodemus as a fifteenth witness, a rebuttal witness). The trial court found that there was no community of property among Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao when the Calunuran and Pinanganacan (Lewa) lands were acquired; that a co-ownership over the real properties of Valentina Ignacio existed among her heirr after her death in 1914; that the co-ownership was administered by Ambrosia Salao and that it subsisted up to 1918 when her estate was partitioned among her three children and her grandson, Valentin Salao. The trial court surmised that the co-ownership which existed from 1914 to 1918 misled the plaintiffs and their witnesses and caused them to believe erroneously that there was a co-ownership in 1905 or thereabouts. The trial court speculated that if valentin had a hand in the conversion into fishponds of the Calunuran and Lewa lands, he must have done so on a salary or profit- sharing basis. It conjectured that Valentin's children and grandchildren were given by Ambrosia Salao a portion of the earnings of the fishponds as a reward for his services or because of Ambrosia's affection for her grandnieces. The trial court rationalized that Valentin's omission during his lifetime to assail the Torrens titles of Juan and Ambrosia signified that "he was not a co-owner" of the fishponds. It did not give credence to the testimonies of plaintiffs' witnesses because their memories could not be trusted and because no strong documentary evidence supported the declarations. Moreover, the parties involved in the alleged trust were already dead. It also held that the donation was validly executed and that even if it were void Juan S. Salao, Jr., the donee, would nevertheless be

the sole legal heir of the donor, Ambrosia Salao, and would inherit the properties donated to him. Both parties appealed. The plaintiffs appealed because their action for reconveyance was dismissed. The defendants appealed because their counterclaim for damages was dismissed. The appeals, which deal with factual and legal issues, were made to the Court of Appeals. However, as the amounts involved exceed two hundred thousand pesos, the Court of Appeals elevated the case to this Court in its resolution of Octoter 3, 1966 (CA-G.R. No. 30014-R). Plaintiffs' appeal. An appellant's brief should contain "a subject index index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the argument and page references" to the contents of the brief (Sec. 16 [a], Rule 46, 1964 Rules of Court; Sec. 17, Rule 48, 1940 Rules of Court). The plaintiffs in their appellants' brief consisting of 302 pages did not comply with that requirement. Their statements of the case and the facts do not contain "page references to the record" as required in section 16[c] and [d] of Rule 46, formerly section 17, Rule 48 of the 1940 Rules of Court. Lawyers for appellants, when they prepare their briefs, would do well to read and re-read section 16 of Rule 46. If they comply strictly with the formal requirements prescribed in section 16, they might make a competent and luminous presentation of their clients' case and lighten the burden of the Court. What Justice Fisher said in 1918 is still true now: "The pressure of work upon this Court is so great that we cannot, in justice to other litigants, undertake to make an examination of the voluminous transcript of the testimony (1,553 pages in this case, twenty-one witnesses having testified), unless the attorneys who desire us to make such examination have themselves taken the trouble to read the record and brief it in accordance with our rules" (Palara vs. Baguisi 38 Phil. 177, 181). As noted in an old case, this Court

decides hundreds of cases every year and in addition resolves in minute orders an exceptionally considerable number of petitions, motions and interlocutory matters (Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308, 395; See In re Almacen, L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562, 573). Plaintiffs' first assignment of error raised a procedural issue. In paragraphs 1 to 14 of their first cause of action they made certain averments to establish their theory that Valentin Salao had a onethird interest in the two fishponds which were registrered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli) and Ambrosia Salao. Juan S. Salao, Jr. (Juani) in his answer "specifically" denied each and all the allegations" in paragraphs I to 10 and 12 of the first cause of action with the qualification that Original certificates of Title Nos. 185 and 472 were issued "more than 37 years ago" in the names of Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia under the circumstances set forth in Juan S. Salao, Jr.'s "positive defenses" and "not under the circumstances stated in the in the amended complaint". The plaintiffs contend that the answer of Juan S. Salao, Jr. was in effect tin admission of the allegations in their first cause of action that there was a co-ownership among Ambrosia, Juan, AIejandra and Valentin, all surnamed Salao, regarding the Dampalit property as early as 1904 or 1905; that the common funds were invested the acquisition of the two fishponds; that the 47-hectare Calunuran fishpond was verbally adjudicated to Valentin Salao in the l919 partition and that there was a verbal stipulation to to register "said lands in the name only of Juan Y. Salao". That contention is unfounded. Under section 6, Rule 9 of the 1940 of Rules of Court the answer should "contain either a specific dinial a statement of matters in accordance of the cause or causes of action asserted in the complaint". Section 7 of the same rule requires the defendant to "deal specificaly with each material allegation of fact the truth of wihich he does not admit and, whenever practicable shall set forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support his denial". "Material averments

in the complaint, other than those as to the amount damage, shall be deemed admitted when specifically denied" (Sec. 8). "The defendant may set forth set forth by answer as many affirmative defenses as he may have. All grounds of defenses as would raise issues of fact not arising upon the preceding pleading must be specifically pleaded" (Sec. 9). What defendant Juan S. Salao, Jr. did in his answer was to set forth in his "positive defenses" the matters in avoidance of plaintiffs' first cause of action which which supported his denials of paragraphs 4 to 10 and 12 of the first cause of action. Obviously, he did so because he found it impracticable to state pierceneal his own version as to the acquisition of the two fishponds or to make a tedious and repetitious recital of the ultimate facts contradicting allegations of the first cause of action. We hold that in doing so he substantially complied with Rule 9 of the 1940 Rules of Court. It may be noted that under the present Rules of Court a "negative defense is the specific denial of t the material fact or facts alleged in the complaint essential to plaintiff's cause of causes of action". On the other hand, "an affirmative defense is an allegation of new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint, expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff." Affirmative defenses include all matters set up "by of confession and avoidance". (Sec. 5, Rule 6, Rules of Court). The case of El Hogar Filipino vs. Santos Investments, 74 Phil. 79 and similar cases are distinguishable from the instant case. In the El Hogar case the defendant filed a laconic answer containing the statement that it denied "generally ans specifically each and every allegation contained in each and every paragraph of the complaint". It did not set forth in its answer any matters by way of confession and avoidance. It did not interpose any matters by way of confession and avoidance. It did not interpose any affirmative defenses.

Under those circumstances, it was held that defendant's specific denial was really a general denial which was tantamount to an admission of the allegations of the complaint and which justified judgment on the pleadings. That is not the situation in this case. The other nine assignments of error of the plaintiffs may be reduced to the decisive issue of whether the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao. That issue is tied up with the question of whether plaintiffs' action for reconveyance had already prescribed. The plaintiffs contend that their action is "to enforce a trust which defendant" Juan S. Salao, Jr. allegedly violated. The existence of a trust was not definitely alleged in plaintiffs' complaint. They mentioned trust for the first time on page 2 of their appelants' brief. To determine if the plaintiffs have a cause of action for the enforcement of a trust, it is necessary to maek some exegesis on the nature of trusts (fideicomosis). Trusts in Anglo-American jurisprudence were derived from thefideicommissa of the Roman law (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abadilla, 46 Phil. 642, 646). "In its technical legal sense, a trust is defined as the right, enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in another, but the word 'trust' is frequently employed to indicate duties, relations, and responsibilities which are not strictly technical trusts" (89 C.J.S. 712). A person who establishes a trust is called the trustor; one in whom confidence is reposed as regards property for the benefit of another person is known as the trustee; and the person for whose benefit the trust has been created is referred to as the beneficiary" (Art. 1440, Civil Code). There is a fiduciary relation between the trustee and the cestui que trust as regards certain property, real,

personal, money or choses in action (Pacheco vs. Arro, 85 Phil. 505). "Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being by operation of law" (Art. 1441, Civil Code). "No express trusts concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proven by parol evidence. An implied trust may be proven by oral evidence" (Ibid, Arts. 1443 and 1457). "No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended" (Ibid, Art. 1444; Tuason de Perez vs. Caluag, 96 Phil. 981; Julio vs. Dalandan, L-19012, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 543, 546). "Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust" (89 C.J.S. 72). "Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction asmatters of intent, or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matter of equity,independently of the particular intention of the parties" (89 C.J.S. 724). They are ordinarily subdivided into resulting and constructive trusts (89 C.J.S. 722). "A resulting trust. is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created by the act or construction of law, but in its more restricted sense it is a trust raised by implication of law and presumed to have been contemplated by the parties, the intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their transaction, but not expressed in the deed or instrument of conveyance (89 C.J.S. 725). Examples of resulting trusts are found in articles 1448 to 1455 of the Civil Code. (See Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, L-31569, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 168, 179; Martinez vs. Grao 42 Phil. 35).

On the other hand, a constructive trust is -a trust "raised by construction of law, or arising by operation of law". In a more restricted sense and as contra-distinguished from a resulting trust, a constructive trust is "a trust not created by any words, either expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intension to create a trust, but by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice." It does not arise "by agreement or intention, but by operation of law." (89 C.J.S. 726-727). Thus, "if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes" (Art. 1456, Civil Code). Or "if a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment, courts of equity will impress upon the title a socalled constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party". Such a constructive trust is not a trust in the technical sense. (Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the P. I., 49 Phil. 244). Not a scintilla of documentary evidence was presented by the plaintiffs to prove that there was an express trust over the Calunuran fishpond in favor of Valentin Salao. Purely parol evidence was offered by them to prove the alleged trust. Their claim that in the oral partition in 1919 of the two fishponds the Calunuran fishpond was assigned to Valentin Salao is legally untenable. It is legally indefensible because the terms of article 1443 of the Civil Code (already in force when the action herein was instituted) are peremptory and unmistakable: parol evidence cannot be used to prove an express trust concerning realty. Is plaintiffs' massive oral evidence sufficient to prove an implied trust, resulting or constructive, regarding the two fishponds? Plaintiffs' pleadings and evidence cannot be relied upon to prove an implied trust. The trial court's firm conclusion that there was no

community of property during the lifetime of Valentina; Ignacio or before 1914 is substantiated by defendants' documentary evidence. The existence of the alleged co-ownership over the lands supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao in 1885 is the basis of plaintiffs' contention that the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao. But that co-ownership was not proven by any competent evidence. It is quite improbable because the alleged estate of Manuel Salao was likewise not satisfactorily proven. The plaintiffs alleged in their original complaint that there was a co-ownership over two hectares of land left by Manuel Salao. In their amended complaint, they alleged that the co-ownership was over seven hectares of fishponds located in Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal. In their brief they alleged that the fishponds, ricelands and saltbeds owned in common in Barrio Dampalit had an area of twenty-eight hectares, of which sixteen hectares pertained to Valentina Ignacio and eleven hectares represented Manuel Salao's estate. They theorized that the eleven hectares "were, and necessarily, the nucleus, nay the very root, of the property now in litigation (page 6, plaintiffs-appellants' brief). But the eleven hectares were not proven by any trustworthy evidence. Benita Salao's testimony that in 1918 or 1919 Juan, Ambrosia, Alejandra and Valentin partitioned twenty-eight hectares of lands located in Barrio Dampalit is not credible. As noted by the defendants, Manuel Salao was not even mentioned in plaintiffs' complaints. The 1919 partition of Valentina Ignacio's estate covered about seventeen hectares of fishponds and ricelands (Exh. 21). If at the time that partition was made there were eleven hectares of land in Barrio Dampalit belonging to Manuel Salao, who died in 1885, those eleven hectares would have been partitioned in writing as in the case of the seventeen hectares belonging to Valentina Ignacio's estate.

It is incredible that the forty-seven-hectare Calunuran fishpond would be adjudicated to Valentin Salao mere by by word of mouth. Incredible because for the partition of the seventeen hectares of land left by Valentina Ignacio an elaborate "Escritura de Particion" consisting of twenty-two pages had to be executed by the four Salao heirs. Surely, for the partition of one hundred forty-five hectares of fishponds among three of the same Salao heirs an oral adjudication would not have sufficed. The improbability of the alleged oral partition becomes more evident when it is borne in mind that the two fishponds were registered land and "the act of registration" is "the operative act" that conveys and affects the land (Sec. 50, Act No. 496). That means that any transaction affecting the registered land should be evidenced by a registerable deed. The fact that Valentin Salao and his successors-in-interest, the plaintiffs, never bothered for a period of nearly forty years to procure any documentary evidence to establish his supposed interest ox participation in the two fishponds is very suggestive of the absence of such interest. The matter may be viewed from another angle. As already stated, the deed of partition for Valentina Ignacio's estate wag notarized in 1919 (Exh. 21). The plaintiffs assert that the two fishponds were verbally partitioned also in 1919 and that the Calunuran fishpond was assigned to Valentin Salao as his share. Now in the partition of Valentina Ignacio's estate, Valentin was obligated to pay P3,355.25 to Ambrosia Salao. If, according to the plaintiffs, Ambrosia administered the two fishponds and was the custodian of its earnings, then it could have been easily stipulated in the deed partitioning Valentina Ignacio's estate that the amount due from Valentin would just be deducted by Ambrosia from his share of the earnings of the two fishponds. There was no such stipulation. Not a shred of documentary evidence shows Valentin's participation in the two fishponds. The plaintiffs utterly failed to measure up to the yardstick that a trust must be proven by clear, satisfactory and convincing

evidence. It cannot rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations (De Leon vs. MoloPeckson, 116 Phil. 1267, 1273). Trust and trustee; establishment of trust by parol evidence; certainty of proof. Where a trust is to be established by oral proof, the testimony supporting it must be sufficiently strong to prove the right of the alleged beneficiary with as much certainty as if a document proving the trust were shown. A trust cannot be established, contrary to the recitals of a Torrens title, upon vague and inconclusive proof. (Syllabus, Suarez vs. Tirambulo, 59 Phil. 303). Trusts; evidence needed to establish trust on parol testimony. In order to establish a trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as if the act giving rise to the trust obligation were proven by an authentic document. Such a trust cannot be established upon testimony consisting in large part of insecure surmises based on ancient hearsay. (Syllabus, Santa Juana vs. Del Rosario 50 Phil. 110). The foregoing rulings are good under article 1457 of the Civil Code which, as already noted, allows an implied trust to be proven by oral evidence. Trustworthy oral evidence is required to prove an implied trust because, oral evidence can be easily fabricated. On the other hand, a Torrens title is generally a conclusive of the ownership of the land referred to therein (Sec. 47, Act 496). A strong presumption exists. that Torrens titles were regularly issued and that they are valid. In order to maintain an action for reconveyance, proof as to the fiduciary relation of the parties must be clear and convincing (Yumul vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17-18).

The real purpose of the Torrens system is, to quiet title to land. "Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land" (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 593). There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any intention on the part of Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao to create any trust. There was no constructive trust because the registration of the two fishponds in the names of Juan and Ambrosia was not vitiated by fraud or mistake. This is not a case where to satisfy the demands of justice it is necessary to consider the Calunuran fishpond " being held in trust by the heirs of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. for the heirs of Valentin Salao. And even assuming that there was an implied trust, plaintiffs' action is clearly barred by prescription or laches (Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872, December 3, 1974, 61 SCRA 284; Quiniano vs. Court of Appeals, L-23024, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 221; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, 9, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503; Alzona vs. Capunitan and Reyes, 114 Phil. 377). Under Act No. 190, whose statute of limitation would apply if there were an implied trust in this case, the longest period of extinctive prescription was only ten year (Sec. 40; Diaz vs. Gorricho and Aguado, 103 Phil. 261, 266). The Calunuran fishpond was registered in 1911. The written extrajudicial demand for its reconveyance was made by the plaintiffs in 1951. Their action was filed in 1952 or after the lapse of more than forty years from the date of registration. The plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Salao, slept on their rights if they had any rights at all. Vigilanti prospiciunt jura or the law protects him who is watchful of his rights (92 C.J.S. 1011, citing Esguerra vs. Tecson, 21 Phil. 518, 521). "Undue delay in the enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of a lack of merit in the claim, since it is human nature for a person

to assert his rights most strongly when they are threatened or invaded". "Laches or unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce a right is not only persuasive of a want of merit but may, according to the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself." (Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435, 440-441). Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond, it is no longer n to Pass upon the validity of the donation made by Ambrosia Salao to Juan S. Salao, Jr. of her one-half share in the two fishponds The plaintiffs have no right and personality to assil that donation. Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any successional rights to Ambrosia's share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would have been also her legal heir, together with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin, could not represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral line, representation takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters whether they be of the full or half blood is (Art 972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or great-gandnephews like the plaintiffs Alcuriza (Pavia vs. Iturralde 5 Phil. 176). The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. Defendants' appeal. The defendants dispute the lower court's finding that the plaintiffs filed their action in good faith. The defendants contend that they are entitled to damages because the plaintiffs acted maliciously or in bad faith in suing them. They ask for P25,000 attorneys fees and litigation expenses and, in addition, moral damages. We hold that defemdamts' appeal is not meritorious. The record shows that the plaintiffs presented fifteen witnesses during the protracted trial of this case which lasted from 1954 to 1959. They fought tenaciously. They obviously incurred considerable

expenses in prosecuting their case. Although their causes of action turned out to be unfounded, yet the pertinacity and vigor with which they pressed their claim indicate their sincerity and good faith. There is the further consideration that the parties were descendants of common ancestors, the spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio, and that plaintiffs' action was based on their honest supposition that the funds used in the acquisition of the lands in litigation were earnings of the properties allegedly inherited from Manuel Salao. Considering those circumstances, it cannot be concluded with certitude that plaintiffs' action was manifestly frivolous or was primarily intended to harass the defendants. An award for damages to the defendants does not appear to be just and proper. The worries and anxiety of a defendant in a litigation that was not maliciously instituted are not the moral damages contemplated in the law (Solis & Yarisantos vs. Salvador, L-17022, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 887; Ramos vs. Ramos, supra). The instant case is not among the cases mentioned in articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code wherein moral damages may be recovered. Nor can it be regarded as analogous to any of the cases mentioned in those articles. The adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate; such right is so precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously. (Barreto vs. Arevalo, 99 Phil. 771. 779). The defendants invoke article 2208 (4) (11) of the Civil Code which provides that attorney's fees may be recovered "in case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff" (defendant is a plaintiff in his counterclaim) or "in any other case

where the court deems it just and equitable" that attorney's fees should he awarded. But once it is conceded that the plaintiffs acted in good faith in filing their action there would be no basis for adjudging them liable to the defendants for attorney's fees and litigation expenses (See Rizal Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, L-23729, May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 61). It is not sound public policy to set a premium on the right to litigate. An adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the winning party (Herrera vs. Luy Kim Guan, 110 Phil. 1020, 1028; Heirs of Justiva vs. Gustilo, 61 O. G. 6959). The trial court's judgment is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-17759

December 17, 1962

ISABEL V. SAGUINSIN, petitioner-appellant, vs. DIONISIO LINDAYAG, ET AL., oppositors-appellees. Gatchalian and Sison for petitioner-appellant. Delgado, Flores, Macapagal and Dizon for oppositors-appellees. DIZON, J.: On November 10, 1959 Maria V. Lindayag died intestate in Olongapo, Zambales. On May 27, 1960 her sister, Isabel V. Saguinsin filed with the Court of First Instance of said province a verified petition for the issuance in her favor of letters of administration over the estate of said deceased, alleging, among other things, that the latter left real and personal properties situated in the Provinces of Zambales and Bulacan worth approximately P100,000.00; that the names, ages and residences of her surviving heirs were: (1) Dionisio Lindayag, 60 years of age, surviving husband, residing at Olongapo, Zambales, (2) Isabel V. Saguinsin 54 years of age, sister of the deceased, residing at Hagonoy, Bulacan (3) Aurea V. Sacdalan, 46 years of age, sister of the deceased, and (4) Ines V. Calayag, 70 years of age, sister of the deceased, both residing at Paombong, Bulacan; and that, as far as petitioner knew, the decedent left no debts at the time of her death. On June 21, 1960 Dionisio V. Lindayag, the surviving spouse, in his behalf and in representation of the minors Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground lack of interest in the estate, she being neither heir nor a creditor thereof. The motion alleged that the late Maria V. Lindayag was survived by her husband the movant and their legally adopted minor children named Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag the decedent having left no legitimate natural or illegitimate child. A certified true

copy of the decision of the Justice of the Peace of Olongapo, Zambales, dated July 6, 1953 decreeing the adoption of said minors the decedent and her husband was attached to the motion. In opposing the motion to dismiss petitioner argued that only the facts alleged in the petition should be considered in determining its sufficiency.lawphil.net On July 28, 1960, after due hearing on the motion aforesaid, the Court issued the following order of dismissal: It appearing that the herein petitioner is only a sister of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag; that the deceased is survived by her husband and her three (3) adopted children named: Jesus, Concepcion and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag were adopted by the deceased on July 6, 1953; that the herein petitioner is obviously not an heir and has no interest in estate; and that the surviving heirs oppose the instant petition on the ground that they want to settle the estate extra-judicially among them to avoid unnecessary expenses in prosecuting this case, the Court finds the oppositors' opposition to be well taken. WHEREFORE, let this case be dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs. Petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the above order having been denied, she took the present appeal. The question to be resolved in this appeal is whether petitioner is "an interested person" in the estate of deceased Maria V. Lindayag. According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of administration must be filed an "interested person". An interested party has defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of

Julio Magbanwa, 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-3378, August 22, 1951; Espinosa vs. Barrios, 70 Phil. 311) Petitioner's interest in the estate of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag was disputed, through a motion to dismiss her petition, by the surviving spouse on the ground that said deceased was survived by him and by three legally adopted children thus excluding petitioner as an heir. In the course of the hearing held in connection with said motion, evidence was introduced in support thereof which, according to the lower court, established that said deceased was survived not only by her husband but by three legally adopted children named Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag. Upon these facts which petitioner does not dispute it is manifest that she is not an heir of her deceased sister and, therefore, has no material and direct interest in her estate. Petitioner's view that when a motion to dismiss a complaint or a petition is filed, only the facts alleged in the complaint or petition may be taken into account is not entirely correct. To the contrary, the rule is that at said hearing said motion may be proved or disproved in accordance with the rules of evidence, and it has been held that for that purpose, the hearing should be conducted as an ordinary hearing; and that the parties should be allowed to present evidence, except when the motion is based on the failure of the complaint or of the petition to state a cause of action (Asejo vs. Leonoso, 44 O. G. No. 10, 3832). In the present case, the motion to dismiss the petition was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings which, as already stated heretofore, was fully substantiated by the evidence presented during the hearing.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

G.R. No. L-24750 May 16, 1980 DOROTEO BANAWA, JULIANA MENDOZA, CASIANO AMPONIN and GLICERIA ABRENICA, petitioners, vs. PRIMITIVA MIRANO, GREGORIA MIRANO, JUANA MIRANO and MARCIANO MIRANO, respondents. Jose W. Diokno for petitioners. Recto Law Office for respondents.

(c) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Roman Biscocho, Paula Biscocho and Maria Carmen Mendoza in favor of Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, dated April 4, 1940, as evidenced by Exhibit 'E' and its registration in the registry of deeds of Batangas, to be null and void; (d) Declaring null and void the deed of donation, dated August 7, 1956, evidenced by Exhibit 'D' executed by the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza in favor of the spouses Casiano Amponin and Gliceria Abrenica as well as Tax Declarations No. 26818 in the names of the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, and No. 26845 in the names of the spouses Casiano Amponin and Gliceria Abrenica, and the registration of the said deed of donation in the registry of deeds of Batangas; and (e) Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs actual damages in the amount of P 4,500 and attorney's fees in the amount of P500.00, and the costs of this action. SO ORDERED. 2 The spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza both died during the pendency of this case in the Court of Appeals. They have been substituted by the petitioners Casiano Amponin and his wife Gliceria Abrenica, legally adopted daughter of one of the deceased petitioners and donee of the Carsuche property. 3 The petitioners filed on May 20, 1965, a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Said motion was denied on June 28, 1965. 4 As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts are: t.hqw

FERNANDEZ, J.:+.wph!1 This is a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 12, 1965 1 in CA G.R. No. 23597-R, entitled "Primitive Mirano, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus, Doroteo Banawa, et al., Defendants-Appellants", the dispositive part of which is: t.hqw In view of the foregoing, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs against defendantsappellants. The judgment of the lower court which was affirmed reads as follows: t.hqw WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (a) Declaring the plaintiffs to be the owners of the two parcels of land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint; (b) Ordering the defendants to deliver the possession of the said parcels of land to the plaintiffs;

It appears that sometime in 1911, Maria Mirano a niece of appellant Juliana Mendoza, and who was then about nine years old, was taken in by the appellants-spouses, Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, in the latter's house in Mahabang Lodlod, Taal, Batangas. Appellants spouses being childless, treated and reared her up like their own child. They hired a private tutor to teach her the rudiments of reading, writing and arithmetic. They supported her, gave her money, clothes and even jewelry. Maria reciprocated their care and affection by helping with the household chores. A few years later, the spouses opened up a store for general merchandise in barrio Lutucan, Sariaya, Quezon, from which they derived considerable income and which enabled them to acquire several parcels of land. On July 31, 1949, after a lingering illness, Maria Mirano died in Taal, Batangas while still living with the spouses. At the time of her death she left as her only nearest relatives the herein plaintiffs, namely Primitiva Mirano, who is a surviving sister, and Gregoria, Juana and Marciano, all surnamed Mirano, who are the children of a deceased brother, Martin Mirano. The parties do not dispute the Identity of the two parcels of land in controversy, which are described in paragraph 3 of the complaint as follows: t.hqw 1. A parcel of sugar land situated in the Barrio of Iba, Taal, Batangas, with an area of 44,200 square meters, more or less. Bounded on the North, by Ravine; on the East, by the property of

Leodovico Garcia; on the South by the property of Gregorio Amponin; and on the West, by the property of Gregorio Maria Aniversario (now Doroteo Banawa). Under Tax Declaration No. 25994 in the name of Maria Mirano and assessed at P2,210.00. 2. A parcel of sugar land situated in the barrio of Carsuche, Taal, Batangas, with an area of 54,093 square meters, more or less. Bounded on the North, by the property of Agapito Aro and Alley; on the East, by an Alley; on the South, by the properties of Filomeno Diomampo, Gregorio de la Rosa and Andres Moratilla; and on the West, by the property of Agapito Aro. Under Tax Declaration No. 19786 in the name of Maria Mirano and assessed at P2,760.00. For purposes of clearness and convenience, and since the respective assertions and evidences adduced by the parties regarding the two parcels of land are in sharp divergence, we shall refer to the first parcel as the Iba Property and to the second parcel as the Carsuche property and, moreover, we shall treat and discuss the two separately. Parcel 1, or the Iba Property. The parties agree that the Iba Property was originally owned by Placido Punzalan from whom it was acquired on May 5, 1921. Plaintiffs' evidence upon this point tends to show that the acquisition of the said parcel of land was pursuant to a deed of sale contained in a public instrument acknowledged

before Notary Public Ramon A. Cabrera on the date aforesaid, a photostatic copy of which was introduced in evidence as Exhibit 'A', the same having been secured from an original copy on file with the Division of Archives, Bureau of Libraries. The deed of sale in question states that the Iba property consisted formerly of two parcels of land and that they were sold for the amount of P2,000.00 in favor of Maria Mirano. Defendant Doroteo Banawa impliedly admitted the execution of this notarial document when he declared that in the execution of the document concerning the purchase of the Iba property from Punzalan the notary public charged him P20.00 and another P5.00 for stamps in the name of Maria Mirano since 1923 (Exhs. 'A-1' to 'A7'). By contrast, defendants' claim of ownership over the Iba property is predicated upon their assertion that the money used in buying said land pertained to the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza. Defendants contend that since 1919 Placido Punzalan borrowed money from defendant spouses on three different occasions for the sums of P1,200.00, P1,800.00 and P1,080.00, respectively, each of which was evidenced by Exhs. '1', '2', and '3', respectively. Upon the failure of Placido Punzalan to discharge said obligations in 1921, he agreed to sell the land aforementioned to the spouses for P 3,700.00, but as the total value of the three loans was P4,080.00, Punzalan had to reimburse to said spouses the difference of P380.00. The document of sale stated the price to be only P2,000.00 in view of the fact that Doroteo Banawa had only P25.00 with him when the deed was prepared by the notary public, and the latter was charging P10.00 for every one thousand pesos mentioned as the consideration of the contract,

Defendants likewise maintain that the sale was made to appear in favor of Maria Mirano because said spouses being already old, they want to leave something to Maria Mirano for her to lean upon when they would have been gone. They, however, made Maria understand that although the property was placed under her name, they would continue to be the owners thereof, to administer and enjoy the fruits of the same as long as they live, and that she would become the owner of the land only after their death. Maria supposedly expressed her conformity to and appreciation for the said arrangement. Maria Mirano was 19 years old when the deed of sale was executed. Parcel 2, or the Carsuche Property. There is no dispute between the parties that the Carsuche property was acquired by way of purchase from its original owners, to wit: Roman Biscocho, his sister Paula Biscocho, and sister-in-law Carmen Mendoza. The sale took place sometime in December, 1935. There is, however, a sharp conflict of evidence between the parties concerning the form of the document evidencing the same and in whose favor the sale was made at that time. The plaintiffs claim that the sale was evidenced by a public instrument executed before and ratified by Notary Public Vicente Ilagan of Taal, Batangas, and that the vendee mentioned in the said document was Maria Mirano. The defendants, on the other hand, assert that the sale was evidenced by a private writing prepared in the handwriting of Roman Biscocho and that it was in favor of the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza. Neither the public instrument allegedly ratified by Atty. Ilagan nor the private writing supposedly prepared by Roman Biscocho was presented before the lower court.

After laying the proper predicate for the presentation of secondary evidence, the plaintiffs presented Atty. Vicente Ilagan and Roman Biscocho to testify upon the execution of the aforesaid public instrument in December, 1935. These two declared that sometime in December, 1935, the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, Maria Mirano, Roman Biscocho, Paula Biscocho and Carmen Mendoza, accompanied by Atty. Regino Aro, went to the office of Atty. Ilagan in Taal, Batangas; that Atty. Aro, who was a classmate of Atty. Ilagan in the law school, asked the latter's permission to use his typewriter on which he prepared a document in English and which he asked Atty. Ilagan to ratify; that Atty. Ilagan translated into Tagalog the contents of the said document to the parties and. the witnesses, after which they all signed the same; that the document involved the sale of the Carsuche property in favor of Maria Mirano: that after paying him P20.00 for his services which Atty. Ilagan would not accept at first, Doroteo Banawa asked Atty. Ilagan in Tagalog whether the document that he ratified was 'strong enough' (Matibay) to safeguard the rights of Maria Mirano, to which Atty. Ilagan answered in the affirmative. Doroteo Banawa, on the other hand, stated that on being offered the Carsuche property by the owners thereof, they agreed on the purchase price of P3,700.00 of which a down payment of P1,200.00 was made and, later, an additional sum of P100.00 was given to Roman Biscocho, both payments being evidenced by a receipt dated December 15, 1936 (Exh. '9'). A few days later, Roman Biscocho prepared in his own handwriting a private document selling the Carsuche property in favor of the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza for the sum of P4,000.00, the vendors having asked for a

P300.00 increase in price. Doroteo Banawa, thereafter brought said private document to the municipal treasurer of Taal, Batangas, to whom he expressed the desire to have the land declared in the name of Maria Mirano so that the latter might attend to the payment of taxes over the land whenever he was away. This wish of Doroteo Banawa was done by his thumb-marking an affidavit, thus accounting for the fact that said land appears in the name of Maria Mirano in the tax declarations covering the same from 1934 to 1956. 5 The petitioners assign the following errors: t.hqw I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT THE PLACING OF IBA PROPERTY IN THE NAME OF THE LATE MARIA MIRANO WAS IN THE NATURE OF A DONATION INTER-VIVOS. II THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS' INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 632 OF THE OLD CIVIL CODE IS TOO LITERAL AND IGNORES THE RATIONALE OF THE LEGAL PROVISION. III THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT THE 'EXCEPTIVE' CLAUSE' OF ARTICLE 1448 OF THE CIVIL CODE IS APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT CASE.

IV THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT SECTION 5, RULE 100 OF THE OLD RULES OF COURT DOES NOT APPLY IN THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE MARIA MIRANO WAS NOT LEGALLY ADOPTED. V THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING WITH RESPECT TO THE CARSUCHE PROPERTY (LOT NO. 2) THAT THE DEED OF SALE EXECUTED IN 1940 IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS DOROTEO BANAWA AND HIS WIFE JULIANA MENDOZA AND WHICH WAS DULY REGISTERED DID NOT IMPAIR THE PRETENDED SALE TO MARIA MIRANO. 6 The first, second, third and fourth errors assigned refer to the Iba property, parcel 1, while the fifth error assigned refers to the Carsuche property, Lot 2. 7 As may be discerned from the assignment of errors, the basic issue is the ownership of the two parcels of land in question. The plaintiffs appellees, respondents herein, assert title to the lands as heirs of Maria Mirano. Defendants-appellants, petitioners herein, claim ownership over them by virtue of purchase from the original owners. Considering that in the case at bar the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are not contrary to those of the trial court, a minute scrutiny by this Court of said findings is not necessary. In Tolentino vs. de Jesus, et al., 8 this Court held: t.hqw

The findings of facts of the respondent Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and on this Court (Tamayo vs. Callejo, L- 25563, July 28, 1972, 46 SCRA 27; Nery, et al. vs. Lorenzo, et al., L-23096 & L-23376, April 27, 1972, 44 SCRA 43 1; Villacrucis vs. CA, L-29831, March 29, 1972, 44 SCRA 176; Dela Cruz, et al. vs. CA, L-24000, Nov. 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 68; Naga Dev. Corp. vs. CA, L-28175, Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 105, 115; Lacson & Basilio vs. Pineda, et al., L-28523, July 16, 1971, 40 SCRA 35; Qui;ano, et al. vs. CA, et al., L-23024, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 227; Reyes, et al. vs. CA, et al., L28466, March 27, 1971, 38 SCRA 138, 142; Gotamco Hermanas vs. Shotwell, et al., L-22519, March 27, 1971, 38 SCRA 112-117; Limjoco vs. CA, L-20656, Feb. 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 663-669; De Garcia, et al. vs. CA, L-20264, Jan. 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 130, 136-137; Simeon vs. Pe;a, L-29049, Dec. 29, 1970, 36 SCRA 611), unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellees [Roque vs. Buan, L-22459, Oct. 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 648]; (6) the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents [Garcia vs. CA, L-26490, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 622] ; and (9) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record [Salazar

vs. Gutierrez, L-21727, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 243]. The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions. However, all the issues raised by the petitioners shall be passed upon individually. The first error assigned reads: t.hqw The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in ruling that the placing of the Iba Properly in the name of the late Maria Mirano was in the nature of a donation inter-vivos. The respondents 9 correctly pointed out that neither the Court of Appeals nor the Court of First Instance of Batangas categorically stated that the placing of the properties in the name of Maria Mirano was in the nature of a donation inter-vivos. In rejecting the petitioners' contention that a donation mortis causa was executed, the Court of Appeals said that, under the facts and circumstances narrated by the petitioners, the placing of the Iba property in the name of Maria Mirano-if it was to be called a donation at all - was not in the nature of a donation mortis causa, but rather it would be in the nature of a donation inter-vivos, giving its reasons and citing the applicable law and decisions of this Court on the matter. The Court of First Instance made the same hypothetical conclusion. 10 The finding of the Court of First Instance of Batangas which was sustained by the Court of Appeals is that what was donated by the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza to Maria Mirano was the money used in the purchase of the lands in question. This conclusion of the Court of First Instance of Batangas was supported by the testimony of Macario B. Aro, a nephew of the deceased Doroteo Banawa, that the money used by Maria Mirano in the purchase of the Iba and Carsuche properties was given to her by, Doroteo Banawa. 11

If the money used by Maria Mirano in purchasing the properties was given to her by the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, or by either of them, then the money had belonged to her. Maria Mirano purchased and paid for the said properties with her money. As a matter or fact, the deed of sale, Exhibit "A", 12 recites as follows:t.hqw Que en consideracion a la suma de Dos Mil Pesos moneda filipina (P2,000.00) que me ha pagado Maria Mirano ... . It is also contended by the petitioners that the deeds of sale executed by the owners of the land in favor of Maria Mirano were simulated contracts intended to shortcut two different transactions: (1) a sale in favor of the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza; and (2) a donation of lands by the spouses in favor of Maria Mirano. 13 There are two kinds of simulated contracts, namely: the absolutely simulated contract and the relatively simulated one. In both instances, however, their nullity is based on the want of true consent of the parties. There is no intent to be bound or the true intent is hidden or concealed. Such contracts are even generally regarded as fraudulent with intent of injuring third persons. The purpose, therefore, of a simulated contract which may be annulled is to conceal the parties' true intent, or to deceive or defraud third persons. From the record, there is no showing of deception or fraud, nor of concealment of intent of the parties as to the sale of the Iba property by the vendors in favor of Maria Mirano. The transactions which transpired were purely: (1) donations of money or things representing or equivalent to money by the spouses in favor of Maria Mirano which could be made and accepted verbally; and (2) purchase of lands by Maria Mirano with the use of that money or credits (pre-existing indebtedness in favor of the spouses) as consideration thereof.

The petitioners' contention that "the contract of sale had been intended to be a contract of sale between the vendors and the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza" has no merit. The petitioners were present when the sales were made to Maria Mirano. They were the ones who caused the titles to the properties to be placed in the name of Maria Mirano because they wished "that after our death Maria Mirano could have something for her maintenance. 14 Moreover, the testimony of Vicente Ilagan, the notary public before whom the deed of sale was executed, to the effect that he was asked by Doroteo Banawa in Tagalog "Kung matibay ang documenting ito para kay Maria" 15 and to which query he answered, "Yes, Sir", 16 supports this conclusion. The conduct of the spouses at the time of the execution of the contracts are inconsistent with those which the petitioners, the late spouses and their successors-in interest, now assert. Their intention to make Maria Mirano the owner of the said parcels of land was clearly shown by their conduct at the time of the execution of the deeds of sale which influenced the vendors to believe that Maria Mirano was indeed the vendee in their agreement. The petitioners had full knowledge of the facts surrounding the execution of the document of sale. They are equitably estopped 17 to deny that the transfer of the lands in question in favor of Maria Mirano was the actual and true intent of the parties as embodied in the documents of sale of the Iba and Carsuche properties. The documents are what they purport to be contracts of sale from the vendors to the vendee, Maria Mirano. The petitioners submit that since there was transfer of title to the land in litigation to Maria Mirano when the purchase price was in fact actually paid by the petitioners-spouses, an implied trust was created. The present law on implied trust is Article 1448 of the New Civil Code which provides: t.hqw Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having beneficial interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However if

the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child. The transactions in question took place before the Civil Code of the Philippines became effective on August 30, 1950. Hence Article 1448 of said Code is not applicable. 18 Moreover, there is no showing that Maria Mirano bought the lands in question in trust for the petitioners. The petitioners also claim that they have become owners of the properties by acquisitive prescription under Article 1957 of the Old Civil Code which provides: t.hqw Ownership and other real rights in immovable property shall prescribe by possession in good faith and under a just title for ten years as between persons present and for twenty years as between absentees. The above-cited provision speaks of two essential requirements: (1) possession for ten (10) years as between persons present and twenty (20) years, for absentees; and (2) a just title. As regards the Iba property (Lot No. 1), petitioners have not presented any title, just or otherwise, to support their claim. And Article 1954 of the Old Civil Code provides, further, that a "just title must be proven; it never can be presumed." Not having a just title, as required by Article 1957 of the Old Civil Code, the petitioners cannot invoke prescription with respect to the Iba property. The petitioners also assert ownership by acquisitive prescription over the Iba property under Section 41 of the Code of Civil

Procedure. The pertinent portion of Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads t.hqw Ten years actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly continued for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or otherwise in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title, saving to the persons under disabilities the rights secured by the next section. In order to constitute such title by prescription or adverse possession, the possession by the claimant or by the person under or through whom he claims must have been actual open, public, continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants ... It is a fact that while Maria Mirano was alive she possessed the property in question as the owner thereof Hence, it is error for the petitioners to claim ownership over the Iba property by acquisitive prescription under Article 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure for their possession of the said property became adverse and exclusive only in July 1949 after Maria Mirano's death. From 1949 to the date of the filing in 1957 of the present action by the respondents only eight years had elapsed. The second error assigned is: t.hqw The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in ruling that petitioners' interpretation of Article 632 of the Old Civil Code is too literal and ignores the rationale of the legal provision. Article 632 of the Old Civil Code provides: "Donations of personal property may be made verbally or in writing. Verbal donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the gift. In the absence of

this requisite the donation shall produce no effect, unless made in writing and accepted in the same form." It is contended by the petitioners that oral donation of personal property requires simultaneous delivery of the gift. As regards the Iba property, the consideration given by Maria Mirano for the purchase of the said property from Placido Punzalan was the preexisting debts of the latter to the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza. The contention of the petitioners that there was no simultaneous delivery of the credits to Maria Mirano is not meritorious. Delivery may be actual or constructive. Actual delivery consists in the giving of actual possession to the vendee or his agent, as for example, in manually transferring the possession of a thing from the vendor to the vendee. Constructive delivery is a general term comprehending all those acts which, although not conferring physical possession of the thing, have been held by construction of law equivalent to acts of real delivery, as for example, the giving of the key to the house, as constructive delivery of the house from the vendor to the vendee. In the instant case, the oral donation of the gift consisting of preexisting obligations of the vendor, Placido Punzalan, was simultaneous or concurrent with the constructive delivery thereof to Maria Mirano when the spouses consented to the execution of the deed of sale of the Iba property in favor of Maria Mirano. The execution of the said deed of sale constituted payment by the vendor, Placido Punzalan, of his outstanding obligations due to the spouses, Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza. Consequently, there was constructive transfer of possession of the incorporeal rights of the spouses over the property in question to Maria Mirano.

It is no longer necessary to discuss the third error assigned because of the holding that Article 1448 of the New Civil Code has no retroactive application to the instant case. Anent the fourth error assigned, the petitioners urge that the donor spouses are entitled to the land in question by virtue of Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which reads: t.hqw ... In case of the death of the child, his parents and relatives by nature, and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs, except as to property received or inherited by the adopted child from either of his parents by adoption, which shall become the property of the latter or their legitimate relatives who shall participate in the order established by the Civil Code for intestate estates. The submission of the petitioners is that extrajudicial adoption is within the contemplation and spirit of this rule ofreversion adoptive. However, the rule involved specifically provides for the case of the judicially adopted child. It is an elementary rule of construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. The fifth error assigned is: t.hqw The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in ruling with respect to the Carsuche property (Lot No. 2) that the deed of sale executed in 1940 in favor of the petitioner Doroteo Banawa and his wife Juliana Mendoza did not impair the pretended sale to Maria Mirano. The Court of Appeals found that there was a sale of the Carsuche property in 1935 in favor of Maria Mirano and that such sale was embodied in a public instrument. However, in 1940 the same land was sold to the petitioners. The sale was duly registered. The

petitioners immediately entered into the possession of the land as owners. The claim of the petitioners that they have acquired by acquisitive prescription the Carsuche property (Lot No. 2) is meritorious. Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "Period of prescription as to real estate An action for recovery of title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest therein, can only be brought within ten years after the cause of action accrues." That the aforesaid Section 40 governs the instant case is clear from Article 1116 of the New Civil Code which provides that "prescriptions already running before the effectivity of the New Civil Code, shall be governed by the laws previously in force." The prescriptive period commenced to run since 1940, the date the sale in favor of the Banawas was registered with the Register of Deeds of Batangas. Hence the Code of Civil Procedure governs. The instant case, not having been filed within ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrued in 1940, prescribed under Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1950 because the same was filed only in 1957, seventeen (17) years later. The possession of the Banawas over the Carsuche property ripened into full ownership in 1950, ten (10) years after 1940, when the possession of the petitioner-spouses which was actual, open, public and continuous, under a claims of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claim commenced. (Sec. 41, Code of Civil Procedure). The sale in favor of the Banawas was registered in 1940 with the Register of Deeds of Batangas. The actual and adverse possession of the petitioner-spouses was continued by their present successors. The alleged bad faith of the petitioners in that they knew that the land was previously sold to Maria Mirano is of no consequence because Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that there is prescription "in whatever way such occupancy may have

commenced." As held in one case "... guilty knowledge is of no moment for under the law title by prescription may be acquired in whatever way possession may have been commenced or continued and so long as the possessor had possessed the land openly, publicly, continuously and under a claim of title for a period of over ten years." 19 The trial court found that the two parcels of land in question with a combined area of a little less than ten (10) hectares had an average annual net yield of P 500.00. A total amount of P 4,500.00 as actual damages was awarded in as much as Maria Mirano had been dead for nine (9) years when the decision of the trial court was rendered. An adjustment should be made in view of the finding of this Court that the Carsuche property, Lot 2, belongs to the petitioners. The Iba property, Lot 1, is about 45% of the combined area of the two lands in question. Forty-five percent (45 %) of the annual net income of P500.00 is equivalent to P225.00. Maria Mirano has been dead for about thirty-one (31) years now. During all this period, the petitioners have been in possession of the Iba property and receiving the products thereof. They should pay as actual damages the total amount of P6,975.00 representing the net income for the period of thirty-one (31) years on the basis of P225.00 a year. The respondents are also entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of P1,000.00. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed as to the Iba property (Lot No. 1) but reversed as to the Carsuche property (Lot No. 2) which was acquired by the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza who could validly donate the said property to Casiano Amponin and Gliceria Abrenica The petitioners are ordered to pay the private respondents the total amount of Six Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy-Five Pesos (P6,975.00) as actual damages and the amount of One Thousand

Pesos (P1,000.00) as attorney's fees, without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.1wph1.t Teehankee (Chairman), concurs in the result. Separate Opinions MAKASIAR, J., concurring and dissenting: I dissent, re the Iba parcel; because there was no valid donation of the land or of the purchase money. In addition to the views expressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners, to which I subscribe, I wish to stress the following: 1. The money with which to buy the property was not donated to Maria by the spouses Juliana Mendoza and Doroteo Banawa. Said spouses would not donate the large amount of P4,080.00 (although the deed states the amount as P2,000.00) to Maria Mirano who was merely tutored to learn the 3 R's reading, writing and arithmetic at the expense of said spouses. While it is true that they supported her, gave her money, clothes and even jewelry, they did not send her to school, much less give her a college education. It is unthinkable that the said spouses would give her P4,080.00 when they could not even give her a primary education which would cost very much less (from 1911 to 1915). The jewelry they could have given to her could not be better than trinkets, the cost of which was negligible but could be a fond possession of a poor, impressionable child in the rural area like Maria; 2. No cash actually passed to Maria from the spouses The amount of P4,080.00 allegedly donated by the spouses to Maria represented the various loans in the amounts of P1,200.00,

P1,800.00 and P1,080.00 previously extended to Placido Punzalan who, as vendor, sold the Iba parcel in payment of his debt. While the purchase price was P3,700.00, the purchase price was made to appear in the document as P2,000.00 to save on notarial fees; 3. Up to the time of her death on July 31, 1949 at the age of 48, Maria was still living with the spouses who reared her. This fact shows that Maria was still being supported by the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza; 4. If there was a valid donation of the money to pay for the Iba sugar land in Taal in 1921, which consists of 4.42 hectares, it would seem that Maria would have sufficient funds derived from the produce of such a big parcel with which to purchase for herself the Carsuche parcel for the amount of P3,700.00 or P4,000.00. But the fact of the matter is that it was still the spouses Juliana Mendoza and Doroteo Banawa who paid for the Carsuche property, only that the sale was allegedly made in favor of Maria, whom they did not legally adopt, to insure the survival of Maria long after they would have been dead as they were then already old. Again, this goes against the grain of human nature; because no such deep concern was exhibited by the spouses in favor of their legally adopted daughter Gliceria Abrenica; and 5. The spouses legally adopted petitioner Gliceria Abrenica, wife of co-petitioner Casiano Amponin, but never legally adopted Maria, niece of petitioner Juliana Mendoza. If the said spouses wanted to favor their niece Maria for helping in their business, they could have easily adopted her legally and thereby make her their legal heir, like petitioner Gliceria Abrenica. I concur re the Carsuche parcel. There was no valid sale in favor of Maria Mirano of said lot because:

1. While a photostat copy of the earlier deed of sale of 1921 was secured from the Division of Archives of the Bureau of Libraries and submitted in evidence as Exhibit A; no copy of the later alleged deed of sale in 1935 was presented in evidence concerning the Carsuche parcel. If there was such a 1935 deed of sale (14 years after the 1921 deed), a certified true copy thereof could be more easily secured from the Division of Archives of the Bureau of Libraries, as it was a later document (1935) than the 1921 deed of sale, which is available. The alleged sale in December, 1935 was allegedly notarized by Atty. Vicente Ilagan. It is strange that Atty. Aro who allegedly prepared the deed of sale, was not the one who notarized the same; 2. In 1935, Maria was already 23 years old. Being a very important document purportedly evidencing her title to the Carsuche sugar land also in Taal, of 5.4093 hectares, she should have retained the original or a copy of the alleged deed of sale, specially considering that the sum of P4,000.00 was allegedly paid for the same; 3. The cancelled tax declaration of the previous owner the vendor - or the new tax declaration in the name of the buyer, usually states the reason for such cancellation, like a deed of sale with its date and may include the name of the notary public and place of execution of the document. There is no intimation of such a statement or entry in the cancelled tax declaration of the vendor or in the new tax declaration in the name of Maria Mirano; and 4. There is no discussion of any exhaustive examination of the other four possible sources of the copies of the alleged 1935 deed of sale from the vendor, the notary public, the office of the clerk of court, and as above-stated, the alleged vendee herself.

G.R. No. L-51263 February 28, 1983 CRESENCIANO LEONARDO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA CAILLES, JAMES BRACEWELL and RURAL BANK OF PARAAQUE, INC.,respondents. Porfirio C. David for petitioner. Marquez & Marquez for private respondent.

plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo, share and share alike; (e) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell, within 30 days from the finality of this decision, to render an accounting of the fruits of the properties, and 30 days thereafter to pay to plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo his one-half share thereof with interest of 6% per annum; (f) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James to pay jointly and severally plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo the amount of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees; (g) Ordering defendants to pay the costs; and (h) Dismissing defendants' counterclaim. 1 From the record, it appears that Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was survived by two (2) daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue. On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money and accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased jointly with defendant, private respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties left by said Francisca Reyes, described in the complaint, partitioned between him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all the income derived from said properties from the time defendants took possession thereof until

DE CASTRO, J.: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 43476-R, promulgated on February 21, 1979, reversing the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in favor of petitioner: (a) Declaring plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo as the great grandson and heir of deceased FRANCISCA REYES, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased, jointly with defendant Maria Cailles; (b) Declaring the properties, subject of this complaint, to be the properties of the deceased FRANCISCA REYES and not of defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewen (c) Declaring null and void any sale of these properties by defendant Maria Cailles in so far as the share of Cresenciano Leonardo are affected; (d) Ordering the partition within 30 days from the finality of this decision, of the properties subject of this litigation, between defendant Maria Cailles and

said accounting shall have been made, delivering to him his share therein with legal interest. Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over the subject properties and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of representation. For his part, the other defendant, private respondent James Bracewell, claimed that said properties are now his by virtue of a valid and legal deed of sale which Maria Cailles had subsequently executed in his favor. These properties were allegedly mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc. sometime in September 1963. After hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which was earlier quoted, finding the evidence of the private respondent insufficient to prove ownership of the properties in suit. From said judgment, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as already stated, reversed the decision of the trial court, thereby dismissing petitioner's complaint, reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, this petition for review was filed of the following assignment of errors: I RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PROPERTIES IN QUESTION ARE THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. II RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED HIS FILIATION. III

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER, AS THE GREAT GRANDSON OF FRANCISCA REYES, HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT TO INHERIT BY REPRESENTATION. To begin with, the Court of Appeals found the subject properties to be the exclusive properties of the private respondents. There being two properties in this case both will be discussed separately, as each has its own distinct factual setting. The first was bought in 1908 by Maria Cailles under a deed of sale (Exh. '60'), which describes it as follows: . . . radicada en la calle Desposorio de este dicho Municipio dentro de los limites y linderos siquientes: Por la derecha a la entrada el solar de Teodorico Reyes por la izquierda el solar de Maria Calesa (Cailles) arriba citada por la espalda la via ferrea delRailroad Co., y la frente la dicha calle Desposorio After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles paid the realty taxes starting from 1918 up to 1948. Thereafter as she and her son Narciso Bracewell, left for Nueva Ecija, Francisca Reyes managed the property and paid the realty tax of the land. However, for unexplained reasons, she paid and declared the same in her own name. Because of this, plaintiff decided to run after this property, erroneously thinking that as the great grandson of Francisca Reyes, he had some proprietary right over the same. The second parcel on the other hand, was purchased by Maria Cailles in 1917 under a deed of

sale (Exh. '3') which describes the property as follows: . . . una parcela de terreno destinado al beneficio de la sal, que linda por Norte con la linea Ferrea y Salinar de Narciso Mayuga, por Este con los de Narciso Mayuga y Domingo Lozada, por Sur con los de Domingo Lozada y Fruto Silverio y por Oeste con el de Fruto Silverio y Linea Ferrea de una extension superficial de 1229.00 metros cuadrados. After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles likewise paid the realty tax in 1917 and continued paying the same up to 1948. Thereafter when she and her son, Narciso Bracewell, established their residence in Nueva Ecija, Francisco Reyes administered the property and like in the first case, declared in 1949 the property in her own name. Thinking that the property is the property of Francisca Reyes, plaintiff filed the instant complaint, claiming a portion thereof as the same allegedly represents the share of his father, As earlier stated, the court a quo decided the case in favor of the plaintiff principally because defendants' evidence do not sufficiently show that the 2 properties which they bought in 1908 and 1917, are the same as the properties sought by the plaintiff. Carefully going over the evidence, We believe that the trial judge misinterpreted the evidence as to the identification of the lands in question. To begin with, the deed of sale (Exh. '60') of 1908 clearly states that the land sold to Maria Cailles is en

la cane Desposorio in Las Pinas Rizal which was bounded by adjoining lands owned by persons living at the time, including the railroad track of the Manila Railroad Co. ('la via ferrea del Railroad Co.') With the exception of the area which was not disclosed in the deed, the description fits the land now being sought by the plaintiff, as this property is also located in Desposorio St. and is bounded by the M.R.R. Co. With these natural boundaries, there is indeed an assurance that the property described in the deed and in the tax declaration is one and the same property. The change of owners of the adjoining lands is immaterial since several decades have already passed between the deed and the declaration and 'during that period, many changes of abode would likely have occurred. Besides, it is a fact that defendants have only one property in Desposorio St. and they have paid the realty taxes of this property from May 29, 1914 up to May 28, 1948. Hence, there is no reason to doubt that this property is the same, if not Identical to the property in Desposorio St. which is now being sought after by the plaintiff. With respect to the other parcel which Maria Cailles bought from Tranquilino Mateo in 1917, it is true that there is no similar boundaries to be relied upon. It is however undeniable that after declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles began paying the realty taxes thereon on July 24, 1917 until 1948. (Reference to Exhibits omitted.) 2

Petitioner takes issue with the appellate court on the above findings of fact, forgetting that since the present petition is one for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be raised. It is a well-established rule laid down by this Court in numerous cases that findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are, generally, final and conclusive upon this Court. The exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the submission of both appellant and appellee. 3 None of the above exceptions, however, exists in the case at bar, hence, there is no reason to disturb the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals. Anent the second assignment of error, the Court of Appeals made the following findings: Going to the issue of filiation, plaintiff claims that he is the son of Sotero Leonardo, the son of one of the daughters (Pascuala) of Francisca Reyes. He further alleges that since Pascuala predeceased Francisca Reyes, and that his father, Sotero, who subsequently died in 1944, survived Francisca Reyes, plaintiff can consequently succeed to the estate of Francisca Reyes by right of representation. In support of his claim, plaintiff submitted in evidence his alleged birth certificate showing that his father is Sotero Leonardo, married to Socorro Timbol, his alleged mother. Since his supposed right will either rise or fall on the proper evaluation of this vital evidence, We have minutely scrutinized the same, looking for that vital link connecting him to the family tree of the deceased Francisca Reyes. However, this piece of evidence does not in any way lend credence to his tale.

This is because the name of the child described in the birth certificate is not that of the plaintiff but a certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol. Other than his bare allegation, plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he himself. Thus, even without taking time and space to go into further details, We may safely conclude that plaintiff failed to prove his filiation which is a fundamental requisite in this action where he is claiming to be an heir in the inheritance in question. 4 That is likewise a factual finding which may not be disturbed in this petition for review in the absence of a clear showing that said finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court making the finding of fact. Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.) WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed in this petition is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-22469 October 23, 1978 TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco, RAFAEL CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS, RAMON L. CORPUS, ENRIQUE J. CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD ASPRER and CIPRIANO NAVARRO, defendants-appellees.

opposed by the estate of Luis R. Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be declared Because the will does not contain an institution of heir. It was also opposed by Atty. Roman A. Cruz, who represented Juanita Corpus, Pedro Martinez and Juliana de Castro. Juanita Corpus was already dead when Atty. Cruz appeared as her counsel. Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partion was not in conformity with the will because the testator intended that the estate. should be "conserved" and not physically partitioned. Atty. Cruz prayed "que declare que el finado no dispuso en su testamento de sus bienes y negocios y que ha lugar a sucession intestadocon respecio a los raismos y que same un dia en esta causa para la recepcion de pruebas previa a la declaracion de quienes son los herederos legales o abintestato del difunto." The Probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project of partition. It held that in certain clauses of the will the testator intended to conserve his properties not in the sense of disposing of them after his death but for the purpose of Preventing that "tales bienes fuesen malgastados o desfilpar radios por los legatarios" and that if the testator intended a Perpetual prohibition against alienation, that conch tion would be regarded "como no puesta o no existents". it concluded that "no hay motives legales o morales para que la sucession de Don Teodoro R. Yangco sea declarada intestada (See Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888, which cites article 785 of the Spanish Civil Code as prohibiting perpetual entails, and Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546.) From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the estate of Luis R. Yangco aped to this Court (L-1476). Those appeals were dismissed in tills Court's resolutions of October 10 and 31, 1947 after the legatees and the appellants entered into compromise agreements. In the compromise dated October 7, 1947 the legatees agreed to pay P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs of Pio V. Corpus, the heirs of Isabel Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus. Herein appellant

AQUINO, J.: Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years. His will dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 54863. The decree of probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941 decision in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73 Phil. 527. The complete text of the will is quoted in that decision. Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died in October, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales. Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus. Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November 26, 1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will. That project of partition was

Tomas Corpus signed that compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. The estate of Luis R. Yangco entered into a similar compromise a ment A the resolution dismissing the appeal became, final and executory on October 14 and November 4, 1947, entries of judgment were made on those dates. Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus Signed a receipt dated October 24, 1947 wherein he acknowledge that he received from the Yangco estate the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000) "as settlement in full of my share of the compromise agreement as per understanding with Judge Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case" (Exh. D or 17). On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and physical partition of the Yangco estate. The probate court approved that agreement and noted that the 1945 project of partition was pro tanto modified. That did not set at rest the controvery over the Yangco's estate. On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in his Yangcos will sing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy. The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the action on the grounds of res judicata and laches. It held that the intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was passed upon in its order dated December 26, 1946 in Special Proceeding No. 54863 approving the project of partition for the testator's estate. Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution dated January 23, 1964 in CA-G. R. No. 18720-R certified the appeal to this Court because it involves real property

valued at more than fifty thousand pesos (Sec. 17151 Judiciary Law before it was amended by Republic Act No. 2613). Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in holding (1) that Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, (2) that his will had been duly legalized and (3) that plaintiff's action is barred by res judicata and laches. In the disposition of this appeal it is not necessary to resolve whether Yangco's will had been duly legalized and whether the action of Tomas Corpus is barred by res judicata and laches. The appeal may be resolved by de whether Juanita Corpus, the mother of apt Tomas Corpus was a legal heir of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mother's supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate? To answer that question, it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's filiation The trial court found that Yangco "a su muerte tambien le sbrevivieron Luis y Paz appellidados Yangco, hermanos naturales reconocidos por su padre natural Luis R. Yangco". The basis of the trial court's conclusion that Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate child was the statement in the will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco, dated June 14, 1907, that Teodoro and his three other children were his acknowledged natural children. His exact words are: Primera. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales reconocidos, Hamados Teodoro, Paz, Luisa y Luis, los cuales son mis unicos herederos forzosos (Exh. 1 in Testate Estate of Teodoro Yangco). That will was attested by Rafael del Pan Francisco Ortigas, Manuel Camus and Florencio Gonzales Diez Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco, Identified as Exhibit 1 herein, which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit 20, as found in the record on appeal in Special Proceeding No. 54863. He contends that it should not prevail over

the presumption of legitimacy found in section 69, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and over the statement of Samuel W. Stagg in his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco, that Luis Rafael Yangco made a second marital venture with Victoria Obin implying that he had a first marital venture with Ramona Arguelles, the mother of Teodoro. These contentions have no merit. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco, as reproduced in Exhibit I herein and as copied from Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the probate of Teodoro R. Yangco's wilt in incontestable. The said will is part of a public or official judicial record. On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to be legitimate. A marriage is presumed to have taken place between Ramona and Tomas. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. It is disputably presumption "That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage"; "that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate", and "that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life" (Sec. 5[z], [bb] and cc Rule 131, Rules of Court). Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint of Tomas Corpus. Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y el legitimado no tienen derecho a suceder abintestato a los hijos y parientes legitimos del padre o madre que to haya reconocido, ni ellos al hijo natural ni al legitimado". Article 943 "prohibits all

successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives" 16 Sanchez Roman, Civil Code, pp. 996-997 cited in Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279, 287. See 16 Scaevola Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 455-6). ... Appellant Corpus concedes that if 'Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, he (Tomas Corpus) would have no legal personality to intervene in the distribution of Yangco's estate (p. 8, appellant's brief). The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child". That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod further grounds of resentment (7 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., pp. 185- 6). Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy. Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her

illegitimate child (Cacho vs. Udan L- 19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693. See De Guzman vs. Sevilla, 47 Phil. 991). Where the testatrix, Rosario Table was the legitimate daughter of Jose Table the two acknowledged natural children of her uncle, Ramon Table her father's brother, were held not to be her legal heirs (Grey vs. Table 88 Phil. 128). By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent (Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322; Allarde vs. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909). The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a legitimate brother of her natural mother (Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29). WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995 BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA MANUEL, petitioners, vs. HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL, respondents.

to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter". On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land covered by TCT No. 41134. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away. On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land covered by OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134 (all still in the name of Juan Manuel). Following the registration of the document of adjudication with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three titles (OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134) in the name of Juan Manuel were canceled and new titles, TCT No. 184223, TCT No. 184224 and TCT No. 184225, were issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar. On 19 October 1992, Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed onehalf (1/2) portion of the land (now covered by TCT No. 184225) that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments. The case, there being no material dispute on the facts, was submitted to the court a quo for summary judgment. The trial court, in its now assailed 15th August 1994 decision, dismissed the complaint holding that petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit. Petitioners were also ordered to jointly and severally (solidarily) pay (a) respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar the sum of P5,000.00 for

VITUG, J.: The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left by an illegitimate child who died intestate without any surviving descendant or ascendant. Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born. Several years passed before Antonio Manuel, his wife Beatriz, and his mistress Ursula finally crossed the bar on, respectively, 06 August 1960, 05 February 1981 and 04 November 1976. Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 square meters, covered by Original Certificate of Title ("OCT") No. P-20594 was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of land, covered by OCT P-19902 and Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. 41134, were later bought by Juan and registered in his name. The couple were not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses

moral damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 for litigation expenses and (b) Estanislaoa Manuel the sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary damages and P500.00 for attorney's fees. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court. The petition before us raises the following contentions: That
1. THE LOWER COURT (HAS) FAILED TO CONSIDER THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 994 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, AS THE CONTROLLING LAW APPLICABLE BY VIRTUE OF THE ADMITTED FACTS, AND NOT ARTICLE 992 OF THE SAME CODE. 2. THE LOWER COURT, IN NOT ANNULLING ALL THE ACTS OF, AND VOIDING ALL DOCUMENTS EXECUTED BY, RESPONDENT MODESTA BALTAZAR, WHO ARROGATED UNTO HERSELF THE RIGHTS OF AN HEIR TO THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN MANUEL, (HAS) VIRTUALLY GRANTED SAID RESPONDENT THE STATUS OF AN HEIR MANIFESTLY CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND PUBLIC POLICY. 3. TO ENFORCE ONE'S RIGHT WHEN THEY ARE VIOLATED IS 1 NEVER A LEGAL WRONG.

Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads: Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (Emphasis supplied) Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions. This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in intestacy is explained by a noted civilist. 2 His thesis: What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, as legal or intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law speaks of"brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters. (Emphasis supplied) The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain", firstly, in the early case of Grey v. Fabie 3 and, then, in the

Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate (while the other half would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse) under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code, providing thusly: Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded by his or her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire estate. If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, she or he shall inherit onehalf of the estate, and the latter the other half. (Emphasis supplied)

relatively recent cases of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court 4 and De la Puerta v. Court of Appeals.5 In Diaz, we have said: Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the(a) legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate (b) child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than (c) recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases. Thus, it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the (d) former's inheritance; 6 that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; 7 that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the (e) estate of the legitimate grandparent; 8 that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father; 9 and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children (f) and relatives of his father. 10Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative 11 by, but must always be construed in (g) relation to, any other part as to produce a harmonious whole. 12 In passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference and concurrence in intestacy expressed in

Article 978 through Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz.:
Order of Preference Legitimate Children and Descendants (a) Order of Concurrence Legitimate Children and Descendants, Illegitimate Children and Descendants, and Surviving Spouse Legitimate Parents and Ascendants (b) Legitimate Parents and Ascendants Illegitimate Children and Descendants, and Surviving Spouse Illegitimate Children and Descendants (in the absence of ICDs and LPAs, the Illegitimate Parents) Surviving Spouse (d) Surviving Spouse and Illegitimate Parents Brothers and Sisters/ Nephews and Nieces Other Collateral Relatives (within the fifth civil degree) State (g) Alone (f) (e) Brothers and Sisters/ Nephews and Nieces and Surviving Spouse Alone (c) Illegitimate Children and Descendants and Surviving Spouse

In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A

ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. 13 We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of SelfAdjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not being the real "parties-in-interest" 14 in the case, had neither the standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint. The Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to sustain the award of amounts for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. An adverse result of a suit in law does not mean that its advocacy is necessarily so wrongful as to justify an assessment of damages against the actor. 15 WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 37) is AFFIRMED, except insofar as it has awarded moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in favor of private respondents, which portion is hereby DELETED. No special pronouncement on costs. SO ORDERED

G.R. No. L-43905 May 30, 1983

SERAFIA G. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, MARIA CLEMENTE and THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PAOMBONG, BULACAN, respondents. Amelita G. Tolentino for petitioner. Hermin E. Arceo for Maria Clemente. The Solicitor General for respondents.

In Special Proceedings No. 1587-M for Correction of Entry, petitioner sought to correct the name of the surviving spouse in the death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to "Serafia G. Tolentino", her name. The lower Court dismissed the petition "for lack of the proper requisites under the law" and indicated the need for a more detailed proceeding, Conformably thereto, petitioner filed the case below against private respondent and the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan, for her declaration as the lawful surviving spouse, and the correction of the death certificate of Amado. In an Order, dated October 21, 1976, respondent Court, upon private respondent's instance, dismissed the case, stating: The Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants in this case, thru counsel Atty. Hernan E. Arceo, for the reasons therein mentioned, is hereby GRANTED. Further: (1) the correction of the entry in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar is not the proper remedy because the issue involved is marital relationship; (2) the Court has not acquired proper jurisdiction because as prescribed under Art. 108, read together with Art. 412 of the Civil Code publication is needed in a case like this, and up to now, there has been no such publication; and (3) in a sense, the subject matter of this case has been aptly discussed in Special Proceeding No. 1587-M, which this Court has already dismissed, for lack of the proper requisites under the law. In view of the above dismissal, all other motions in this case are hereby considered MOOT and ACADEMIC. SO ORDERED. 1 Thus, petitioner's present recourse mainly challenging the grounds relied upon by respondent Court in ordering dismissal.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: The reversal of respondent Court's Order, dismissing petitioner's suit for her "declaration ... as the lawful surviving spouse of deceased Amado Tolentino and the correction of the death certificate of the same", is sought in this Petition for Review on Certiorari. The records disclose that Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with private respondent herein, Maria Clemente, at Paombong, Bulacan, on November 1, 1948 (Annex "C", Petition), while his marriage with petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino, celebrated on July 31, 1943, was still subsisting (Annex "A", Petition). Petitioner charged Amado with Bigamy in Criminal Case No. 2768 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch II, which Court, upon Amado's plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the corresponding penalty. After Amado had served the prison sentence imposed on him, he continued to live with private respondent until his death on July 25, 1974. His death certificate carried the entry "Name of Surviving Spouse Maria Clemente."

We rule for petitioner. First, for the remedy. Although petitioner's ultimate objective is the correction of entry contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, she initially seeks a judicial declaration that she is the lawful surviving spouse of the deceased, Amado, in order to lay the basis for the correction of the entry in the death certificate of said deceased. The suit below is a proper remedy. It is of an adversary character as contrasted to a mere summary proceeding. A claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. Private respondent, as the individual most affected; is a party defendant, and has appeared to contest the petition and defend her interests. The Local Civil Registrar is also a party defendant. The publication required by the Court below pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not absolutely necessary for no other parties are involved. After all, publication is required to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. 2 Besides, even assuming that this is a proceeding under Rule 108, it was the Court that was caned upon to order the publication, 3 but it did not. in the ultimate analysis, Courts are not concerned so much with the form of actions as with their substance. 4 Second, for the merits. Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted for Bigamy, that sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner and the deceased. There is no better proof of marriage than the admission by the accused of the existence of such marriage. 5 The second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. 6 No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. 7 It can be safely concluded, then, without need of further proof nor remand to the Court below, that private respondent is not the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado, but petitioner. Rectification of the erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar may, therefore, be validly made.

Having arrived at the foregoing conclusion, the other issues raised need no longer be discussed. In fine, since there is no question regarding the invalidity of Amado's second marriage with private respondent and that the entry made in the corresponding local register is thereby rendered false, it may be corrected. 8 While document such as death and birth certificates, are public and entries therein are presumed to be correct, such presumption is merely disputable and will have to yield to more positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy. 9 WHEREFORE, the Order, dated October 21, 1975, of respondent Court is hereby set aside and petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino, hereby declared the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado Tolentino. Let the corresponding correction be made in the latter's death certificate in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan. No costs. SOORDERED.

A.M. No. 190 October 18, 1977 RE: CLAIMS FOR BENEFITS OF THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO, FIDELA B. CHANLIONGCO, MARIO B. CHANLIONGCO II, MA. ANGELINA C. BUENAVENTURA and MARIO C. CHANLIONGCO, JR., claimants.+.wph!1 RESOLUTION

From the records now before US, it appears that the GSIS had already the release the life insurance proceeds; and the refund of rent to the claimants. What, therefore, to be settled are the retirement benefits and the money value of leave, both of which are to be paid by this court as the deceased's last employer. The record also shows that the late Atty. Chanliongco died ab intestato and that he filed or over to state in his application for membership with the GSIS the beneficiary or benefits of his retirement benefits, should he die before retirement. Hence, the retirement benefits shall accrue to his estate and will be distributed among his Legal heirs in with the benefits on intestate s , as in the caw of a fife if no benefit is named in the policy (Vda. de vs. GSIS, L-28093, Jan. 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 315, 325). Insofar therefore as the retirement benefits are WE adopt in toto, for being in accordance with law, the GSIS determination of the amount of the retirement the kill heirs and their e shares as indicated in its letter to US, dated March 15, 1977, to wit: +.wph!1 (a) Amount of retirement grautity:
1

MAKASIAR, J.:t.hqw This matter refers to the claims for retirement benefits filed by the heirs of the late ATTY. MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO an attorney in this Court, under the provisions of R.A. No. 1616, as amended by R.A. No. 4986, which was approved by this Court in its resolution of August 19, 1976, effective on July 12, 1976 it a g from the records that at the time of his death on July 12, 1976, Atty. Chanliongco was more than 63 years of age, with more than 38 years of service in the government. He did not have any pending criminal administrative or not case against him, neither did he have any money or property accountability. The highest salary he received was P18,700.00 per annum. The above named flied the appellants for benefits with the accruing and with the Government Service System. Aside from his widow, Dra. Fidel B. Chanliongco and an only Intimate Mario it appears that there are other deceased to namely, Mrs. Angelina C. , Jr., both born out of wedlock to Angelina R Crespo, and duly recognized by the deceased. Except Mario, Jr., who is only 17 years of age, all the claimants are of legal age. According to law, the benefits accruing to the deceased consist of: (1) retirement benefits; (2) money value of terminal leave; (3) life insurance and (4) refund of retirement premium.

. Total creditable service 2. Highest rate of salary 3. Gratuity in terms of months 4. Amount of gratuity (highest

37.57169 years

Pl,558.33333/mo.

50.14338 months

salary) x (No. of grautity months) (b) Legal heirs:

1

P78,140,10

memorandum dated March 23, 1977, indicated the breakdown of these items as follows: Unpaid salary for July 8-12, 1976 @

. Fidela B. Chanliongco.

widow legitimate son illegitimate child illegitimate child

P1,416.66/mo. 10% salary adj. for July 1-12, 1976 Money value of terminal leave for the period from July 13, 1976 to September 14,1977 @ P1,558.33

P228.49 54.84

2. Mario B. Chanliongco II. 3. Ma. Angelina C. Buenaventura 4. Mario Chanliongco Jr.

(c) Distribution 21,962.54 P22,9245.87 (1) 8/16 share to Mario II (2) 4/16 share to the widow, Fidela B. Chanliongco (3) 2/16 share, or P9,767.5125 each to the two illegitimate children Ma. Angelina C. Buenaventura and Mario Chanliongco, Jr. TOTAL P39,070.050 Sub-Total 19,535.025 Less: Withholding Tax 19 535 25 Supreme Court Savings & Loan Association P78.140.100 NET PROCEEDS 7,340.42 8.740.42 P13,505.45 P1,400.00

Coming now to the money value of the terminal leave, unpaid salary and 10% adjustment pursuant to Budget Circular No. 240, dated July 22, 1974, this Court's Finance Officer, in a

It further appears that at the time of his death the late Atty. Chanliongco had an outstanding account with the Supreme Court Savings & Loans Association in the sum of P7,340.42. Deduction

this amount plus another sum of P1,400.00, representing withhold tax due from him, or a total of P8,740.42, from above sub-total sum of P22,245.87. WE have at the net sum P13,505.45, available for distribute to the claimants as follows:
1

. FIDELA B. CHANLIONGCO

A. HER 4/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY B. HER SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TEAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT:

. Fidela B. Chanliongco a. As her conjugal share b. As a legal heir 2. Mario Chanliongco II 3. Ma. Angelina C. Buenaventura 4. Mario Jr. TOTAL It will be seen from the f distribution that the money value of the unused vacation and sick leave, unpaid will and 10% adjustment due to the has been treated as conjugal property. Accordingly, one-half (l/2) goes to the widow as her share in the conjugal hip and the other half P6,752.725 is to be distributed to the deceased's kill him, using the same one WE used in distributing the retirement benefits. This is so because "Vacation with pay is not a gratuity but is compensation for services rendered." (Ramey vs. State, 296 NW 323, 296 Mich. 449). WHEREFORE, THE CLAIMS ARE HEREBY APPROVED. THE FINANCE AND/OR DISBURSING OFFICER OF THIS COURT IS ORDERED To pay IMMEDIATELY TO EACH AND EVERY CLAIMANT HE VARIOUS SUMS HEREUNDER INDICATED OPPOSITE THEIR NAMES, AS FOLLOWS: P 6,752.72

(1) AS HER CONJUGAL SHARE P 1,688.18 P 3,376.36 844.10 (2) AS A LEGAL HEIR TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HER 2. MARIO CHANLIONGCO II A. HIS 8/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY B. HIS SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TERMINAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HIM 3. MA. ANGELINA C. BUENAVENTURA: A. HER 2/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY B. HER SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TERMINAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HER

844.09 P13,505.45

4. MARIO CHANLIONGCO JR. TO BE PAID THROUGH HIS MOTHER AND NATURAL GUARDIAN, ANGELINA CRESPO): A. HIS 2/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY B. HIS SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TERMINAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HIM SO ORDERED. Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Mu;oz Palma, Concepcion, Jr., Martin, Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.1wph1.t Fernando, J., is on leave. Separate Opinions

In this case the decedent's legal heirs are his legitimate child, his widow and two intimate children. His estate is partitioned among those heirs by giving them their respective time. The legitimate child gets one-half of the estate as his legitime P9,767.51 which is regarded as his share as a legal heir Art 888, Civil Code). The widow's legitime is one-fourth of the estate. That represents 844.10 also her share as a legal heir (Art. 892, 1st sentence, Civil Code). The remaining one-fourth of the estate, which is the free portion, goes to the illegitimate children in equal shares, as their legitime, P10,611.61 Pursuant to the provision that 'the legitimate of the illegitimate children shall be taken from the portion of the estate at the free disposal of the testator, provoked that in no case shall the total legitime of such illegitimate children exceed that free portion, and that the legitime of the surviving spouse must first be fully satisfied par., art. 895, Civil Code). The rule in Santillon vs. Miranda, L-19281, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 563, that when the surviving spouse concurs with only one legitimate child, the spouse is entitled to one-half of the estate and the gets the other half, t to article 996 of the Civil Code, does not apply to the case because here intimate children concur with the surviving spouse and the intimate child. In this case, to divide the estate between the surviving spouse and the ligitemate child that deprive the illegitimate children of their legitime. So, the decendent's estate is distributed in the proportion of 1/2 for the legitimate child, 1/4 for the widow and 1/8 each for the two illegitimate children. Also not of possible application to this case is the rule that the legal of an acknowledge natural child is 1/2 of the legitime of the legitimate child of that the of the spurious child is 2/5 of that of the

AQUINO, J., concurring: I concur. The provisions on legitime are found under the rubric of testamentary succession. That does not mean that the legitime is taken into account only in testamentary succession. The legitime must also be taken into consideration in legal succession. There may be instances, like the instant case, where in legal succession the estate is distributed according to the rules on legitime without applying the rules on intestate ion. The reason is that sometimes the estate is not even sufficient to satisfy the legitimes. The legitimes of the primary compulsory heirs, like a child or descendant, should first be satisfied.

of the intimate child or 4/5 of that of that of the acknowledged natural child. The rule be applied because the estate is not sufficient to cover legitimes of all compulsory heirs. That is one of the flaws of the law of succession. A situation as in the instant case may arise where the illegitimate children get less than their legitime. With respect to the decendant's unpaid salary and the money value of his leave, the same are conjugal properties because of the rule that property "obtained by the or work, or as salary of the spouses, or either of them", is conjugal in character (Art. 153[2], Civil Code).

G.R. No. L-37903 March 30, 1977 GERTRUDES L. DEL ROSARIO, petitioner, vs. DOROTEA O. CONANAN and MARILOU DEL ROSARIO, respondents. Dante P. Mercado for petitioner Laig, Ruiz & Associates for respondents.

PETITIONER admits that oppositor DOROTEA OTERA DEL ROSARIO is the. legitimate surviving wife of the deceased FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO. PETITIONER admits that MARILOU DEL ROSARIO, is the legally adopted child of the late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO and DOROTEA DEL ROSARIO CONANAN THAT THE PARTIES admit that the late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO died last September 12, 1969 at Antipolo, Rizal in a plane crash and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court. That the only surviving nearest relatives of deceased FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO are the petitioner and oppositors DOROTEO O. CONANAN and MARILOU DEL ROSARIO. Parties admit to pay their respective counsel in the amount to be determined by the court. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that on the basis of the facts stipulated, the Court declare the heirs of the deceased (pp. 9-10, rec.). On June 21, 1973, the lower court issued the challenged order, pertinent portions of which read: A perusal of the petition shows that the instant case was filed under the provisions of Section 2, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads as follows: Whenever the gross value of the estate; of a deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not

MAKASIAR, J.: Review of the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated June 21, 1973, dismissing petitioner's petition for settlement and partition of estate. On November 13, 1972, petitioner filed with the court below the above-said petition, subject of which is the estate left by her late son, Felix L. del Rosario, who died in a plane crash on September 12, 1969 at Antipolo, Rizal (Partial Joint Stipulation of Facts, p. 2, petition, p. 6, rec.). On March 17, 1973, respondents filed their opposition. On April 26, 1973, the court a quo, pursuant to a verbal agreement forged between the parties, issued an order requiring them to come up with a joint stipulation of facts (p. 9, rec.). On May 19, 1973, the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts: OPPOSITOR admits that petitioner is the legitimate mother of the late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO.

exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact is made to appear to the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested person and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and after such other notice to interested persons as the court may direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there is, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate, and to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such persons, in their own right, if they are of lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and judgment made or rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real

estate, shall be recorded in the proper registrar's office. While it may be true that a petition for summary settlement is allowed under the aforequoted provision of the rules, the same rule specifically limits the action to estates the gross value of which does not exceed P10,000.00, The instant petition, however, clearly alleges that the value of the real properties alone left by the deceased Felix del Rosario amounts to P33,000.00 which is obviously over and above-the value of the estate allowed under the rules. The action taken by the petitioner (cannot be) construed as one filed under an intestate proceeding as the requirements provided by law for the same has not been complied with. Based on the foregoing observation alone, the petition must perforce be dismissed. But granting arguendo that this Court may consider the petition as an exercise (of) the powers of a probate Court in determining and declaring the heirs of the deceased as prayed for in the, aforequoted partial joint stipulation of facts, the law on intestate succession is clear that an adopted child concurring with the surviving spouse of the adopter excludes the legitimate ascendants from succession, ... The contention of the petitioner that Article 343 is applicable in the instant case finds no basis for 'the said article is applicable in cases where there are no other concurring intestate heirs of the adopted child. ... Based on the foregoing, therefore, the petitioner not being included as intestate heir of the deceased cannot be considered as a co-owner of or have any right over the properties sought to be partitioned and

under the provisions of Section 1, Rule e 69 in re action to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, such action must be commenced or instituted by the party in interest. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings, the Court hereby DISMISSES THE PETITION WITHOUT PRONOUNCEMENT AS TO COSTS (pp, 10-12, rec.). On July 10, 1973, petitioner filed a notice of appeal, record on appeal and appeal bond (see respondents comments, p. 18, rec.). I

said holding would preclude petitioner from re-filing the proper action a consequence which, on the ground of equity and fair play, We cannot allow to befall on petitioner We deemed it essential, for the guidance of the parties especially herein, petitioner, to point out the demerits of the appealed verdict. 1. Which of the following articles of the New Civil Code will apply, Article 343 on the one hand, or Articles 341, 978 and 979 on the other; and 2. Whether the material data rule enuciated by Rule 41, Section 6 the New Rules of Court should be followed, ex cathedra, in the present case: A

WE rule that on purely jurisdictional consideration, the instant petition should be dismissed. Indeed, in a litany of precedents dating as far back as the 1938 case of Utulo vs. Pasiono Vda. de Garcia (66 Phil. 802) and reaffirmed in Asuncion and Castro vs, De la Cruz (No. L-7855, November 23, 1955, 97 Phil. 910) andGutierrez vs. Cruz (G.R. No. L-21027, July 20, 1968, 24 SCRA 69), WE uniformly held that for the court to acquire jurisdiction in a petition for summary settlement of estate under the rules, the requirement that the amount of the estate involved should not exceed P10,000,00 (P6,000.00 under the old rules) is jurisdictional. In the instant case, both parties jointly affirmed that the value of the realty left by the deceased Felix del Rosario is in the aggregate amount of P33,000.00 which, as the court a quo correctly found, is obviously "over and above the value allowed under the rules." II However, by virtue of the transcendental implications of the holding of the court a quo in the sense that once wholly sustained,

The lower court found the following the new provisions of the New Civil Code gername to the instant case: Art. 341. The adoption shall: (1) Give to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopted; (2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature; (3) Make the adopted person a legal heir of the adopted; (4) Entitle the adopted person to use the adopter's surname." Art. 978. Succession pertains, in the first place, to the decending direct line. Art. 979. Legitimate children and their decendants suceed the parents and the other ascendants,

without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages. WE opine that the governing provision is the hereinafter quoted article 343 of the New Civil Code, in relation to Articles 893 and 1000 of said law, which directs that: Art. 343. If the adopter is survived by legitimate parents or ascendants and by an adopted person. the latter shall not have more successional rights than an acknowledged natural child. Article 343 of the New Civil Code is qualification to Article 341 which gives an adopted child the same rights and duties as though he were a legitimate child. The reason for this is that: (I)t is unjuest to exclude the adopter's parents from the inheritance in facor of an adopted person (Report of the Code Commission, p. 92). It is most unfair to accord more successional rights to the adopted, who is only related artificially by fiction of law to the deceased, than those who are naturally related to him by blood in the direct ascending line. The applicability of Article 343 does not exclude the surviving parent of the deceased adopter, not only because a contrary view would defeat the intent of the framers of the law, but also because in intestate succession, where legitimate parents or ascendants concur with the surviving spouse of the deceased, the latter does not necessarily exclude the former from the inheritance. This is affirmed by Article 893 of the New Civil Code which states: If the testator leaves no legitimate descendants, but leaves legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse shall have a right to onefourth (only) of the hereditary estate.

This fourth shall be taken from the free portion. Article 343 does not require that the concurring heirs should be the aodpted child and the legitimate parents or ascendants only. The language of the law is clear, and a contrary view cannot be presumed. It is, thus, OUR view that Article 343 should be made to apply, consonant with the cardinal rule in statutory construction that all the provisions of the New Civil Code must be reconciled and given effect. Under Article 343, an adopted child surviving with legitimate parents of the deceased adopter, has the same successional rights as an acknowledged natural child, which is comprehended in the term "illegitimate children". Consequently , the respective shares of the surviving spouse, ascendant and adopted child should be determined by Article 1000 of the New Civil Code, which reads: Art. 1000. If legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse and illegitimate children are left, the ascendants shall be entitled to onehalf of the inheritance, and the other half shall be divided between the surviving spouse and the illegitimate children so that such widow or widower shall have one-fourth of the estate, the illegitimate children the other fourth. B Anent the other issue, respondents, in their comment of June 29, 1973, emphasize that the petitioner's record on appeal violates the material data rule in that It does not state when the notice of appeal and appeal bond were filed with the lower court in disregard of the requirment of Section 6, Rule 41 of

the Rules of Court that the record on appeal must contain such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time. Recent jurisprudence has construed liberally the material data rule, whenever circumstances and substantial justice warrant. The cases of Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeal, No. L-336629, September 28, 1973 (53 SCRA 228) andVillanueva vs. Court of Appeal (No. L-29719, Novemner 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 216, 220) are particularly in point. In Villanueva, WE held: The deviation from the rigid rule aopted in the case of Government of the Philippines vs. Antonio, etal., G.R. No. L-23736, October 19, 1965, is due to our realization that after all what is of vital importance in the requirement fo Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of court is that the Record on Appeal shall show that the appeal was really perfected within the reglementary period. If it could ascertained from the record of the case that the appeal was perfected within the reglementary period, although such fact did not evidently appear on the face of the record on appeal, the defect or deficiency is not fatal. If the appellate court is convinced that the appeal was perfected on time, it should not throw out but assume jurisdiction over it. After all, that procedural requirement is only intended to enable the appellate court to determine if the appeal is still within its jurisdiction and nothing more (Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 220, emphasis supplied). From the docket and process slip of this case, it is shown that the date of notice of the Court of First Instance decision is July 3, 1973 and that the expiry date to file petition for certiorari with the

Supreme Court is December 14, 1973. Petitioner filed her notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal on July 10, 1973 or still very much within the reglementary period to perfect an appeal. And although this is not mentioned in the record on appeal. And although this is not mentioned in the record on appeal, it is, nevertheless, a fact of record, the veracity of which this COURT does not doubt. Perforce, there being substantial compliance with the requirement of the Rules of Court, WE resolve this issue in favor of petitioner. The liberal interpretation of the material data rule aimed at serving the ends of substantial justice has found amplification in the recent cases of Pimental, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-39423 and L-39684, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 475; Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, Tomas Carag, et al., L-40495, October 21, 1975, 67 SCRA 322, 328-332; and Manuel R. Luna vs. Court of Appeals, Capati, et al., L-37123, October 30 1975, 67 SCRA 503, 506. WHEREFORE, THE INSTANT PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO PETITIONER'S FILING THE APPROPRIATE ACTION IS A COMPETENT COURT. NO COSTS. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-7768

November 14, 1912

sentence the latter to return to them and, further, that he indemnify them in the amount of P800, and pay the costs. Andres Candia, a nephew of Roberta Montesa as the son of her sister, testified that he had been brought up, from the time he was very young, in the house of the spouses Cedeo and Montesa; that he worked on the house which those spouses left at their death when it was under construction, and, from his boyhood, assisted in the cultivation of the land; that said Apolonio Cedeo, otherwise known as Isidario Cedeo, was a cabeza de barangay of the pueblo of Sibonga, who, in order to pay certain shortages of the cabeceria under his charge, on the 24th of June, 1881, sold the said land to Juan Basa Villarosa, who held it in quiet and peaceable possession for twenty-four years and at his death such possession was continued by his sons, Sinforoso and Vicente Villarosa, from whom witness, Andres Candia, acquired the property by purchase; that at no time did he hold the same as a lessee nor pay for it any emphyteutic rent whatever; and that he never had in his possession the animals mentioned in the complaint. The court absolved the defendant from the complainant, on the grounds that, with regard to the animals and real property sued for, there was no proof whatever that they were in possession of the spouses at the time of their death, and, with respect to the land: (1) That the defendant was the possessor in good faith continuously and was presumed to hold under just title so long as the contrary should not be proved; and (2) that neither the plaintiffs nor their alleged predecessors in interest made demand for it during the period of twenty-six years, since the ownership thereof was conveyed by Isidario or Apolinario Cedeo to Juan Basa Villarosa, on the 24th of June, 1881, it being that during this very long period of time they did not obtain possession of the property. The judgment having been appealed through a bill exceptions and the appeal having been heard, we determine: With respect to the property, that the opinion of the trial court is unchangeable, as, in

MANUEL SARITA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ANDRES CANDIA, defendant-appellee. Felix Sevilla y Macam, for appellants. Vicente Urgello, for appellee.

ARELLANO, C.J.: The spouses Apolinario Cedeo and Roberto Montesa acquired during their marriage a piece of land, apparently of an area of 2 cavanes of corn upon which they had planted fruit trees. Apolinario Cedeo died in 1895 and Roberta Montesa in 1909. It is alleged that during the lifetime of these spouses, from 1886 to April, 1909, on which latter date Roberta Montesa died, Andres Candia was holding and cultivating the said land, but that as stated in the complainant, he did so merely under a lease and paid the said spouses one hundred pesos semiannually; that, from May, 1909, he refused to pay the emphyteutic rent for the cultivation of the land, appropriated the land and claimed ownership thereof; and that he also took possession of four mares, twelve carabaos, and several pieces of furniture which were in the house erected on the said land a house worth 50 pesos which he also seized and claimed as his property. Apolinario Cedeo had three brothers and one sister, Macario, Domingo, Leon, and Cristeta, of whom only the last mentioned is living. Macario left of five children, among them Tomas Cedeo; Domingo, the same number, among them a daughter named Sofia, who died leaving a son, Manuel Sarita; and Leon, four, among them, Gregorio Cedeo. All of these except Gregorio Cedeo and his brothers sue for the ownership of the land and the other personal property of Andres Candia which, together with the fruits thereof, they requested the Court of First Instance of Cebu to

this regard, it has not been impugned as erroneous on appeal, and is certainly in accord with the merits of the case; and, as concerns the land, (1) that this action is one for the recovery of possession from the present possessor, and, in order to bring it, the plaintiffs make use of hereditary right, by styling themselves the heirs of Apolinario Cedeo; (2) that the plaintiffs are, on the one side, Cristeta Cedeo, on another, some nephews and nieces of the latter, his brother Macario's children; and on the other, some children of Domingo Cedeo, among them Manuel Sarita, the principal plaintiff, in representation of his deceased mother, Sofia, also a daughter of Domingo Cedeo; (3) that they assert their hereditary right in an intestate succession, and that the land in question was the community property of the deceased spouses, Cedeo and Montesa, as established hypothetically, especially by the plaintiffs' witnesses, Estanislao Solano and Irineo Tormis; (4) that, such being the case, they could demand, as the legitimate heirs of Apolonio Cedeo, only one-half of the land, but not the other half which belonged to Roberta Montesa, of whom they are not heirs ab intestato, from the fact that they are collateral relatives of this woman's husband: so that claim to all the land is manifestly unfounded; (5) that, moreover, it is manifestly unfounded in so much as Sofia's son, Manuel Sarita, in representation of his mother, could not act as a plaintiff, nor could she, Sofia do so by representing her father, Domingo; on the hypothesis that the right of representation in the collateral line can only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters (Civil Code, art. 925, par. 2), and the said Manuel Sarita is not a child of a brother, as are the children of Macario and Domingo Cedeo; and, finally, that it was manifestly imprudent also to include as plaintiffs Gregorio, Lorenzo, Abundio and Jose, the children of Leon Cedeo, a brother of the deceased Apolinario Cedeo, when, as the first of them testified, they did not attempt to take part in this litigation:lawph!l.net JUDGE. Is Mr. Sevilla your attorney? WITNESS. No, sir.

Q. Have you employed him?A. No. Q. Have you spoken to him about this case?A. No, sir. Q. So then, you were never in Mr. Sevilla's office?A. I do not know where it is. Q. Have you authorized this action against Andres Candia?A. No, sir. Q. Have your brothers, Lorenzo, Juan, and the others, done so?A. They have not. Q. So that in this suit neither you nor your brothers now have any claim against Andres Candia?A. No. Elsewhere this same witness said: My uncles and cousins spoke to me about the institution of this suit; I told them that it could not be, because the land was purchased by Juan Villarosa at the time that our deceased uncle found himself obliged to cover certain shortages against him in the cabeceria; it was then that he sold the land. In view of the foregoing considerations, we decide, with respect to the exercise of the hereditary right derived from the intestate succession of Apolinario Cedeo: First. That Manuel Sarita, the principal plaintiff, in whose house, according to Exhibit D, there was drawn up at his request the engagement of all the plaintiffs to confide the suit to the attorney who has conducted it, has absolutely no such right, because he cannot represent his grandfather Domingo, since, as aforesaid, in the collateral line the right of representation can only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, but not in favor of the grandson of a brother, such as is the said Manuel Sarita, the son

of Sofia Cedeo who, in turn, was the daughter of Domingo Cedeo. Second. That, on the hypothesis that such hereditary right derived from the intestate succession of Apolinario Cedeo, does exist, it could only be exercised by Cristeta Cedeo, the children of Macario Cedeo, and those of Domingo Cedeo, but not by Manuel Sarita, because in inheritances the nearer relative excludes the more remote, excepting the right of representation in proper cases (Civil Code, art 921); from which it is inferred that, in pushing forward Cristeta Cedeo, the children of Macario Cedeo and those of Domingo Cedeo, to exercise such a hereditary right, it should have been noticed that the personality of these parties as the nearest relatives excluded that of Manuel Sarita, the son of Sofia Cedeo, of a more remote degree. Third. That, on the same hypothesis, in the eyes of the law no meaning whatever could be given to the document, Exhibit H of the plaintiffs, wherein it is made to appear that the widow of Apolinario Cedeo, Roberta Montesa implored of the heirs of her deceased husband that she be allowed to continue in her possession of the land and the house of the family; inasmuch as, as coowner of such property, she was entitled to one-half of it and, besides, had a right of usufruct to one-half of the other half of the same, pursuant to the provisions of articles 837 and 953 of the Civil Code, and until she was satisfied for her part of usufruct, this half of the other half remained liable for the payment of such part of usufruct. (Civil Code, art. 838.) Fourth. The hypothesis disappears from the moment that it is proved that at the death of such alleged predecessor in interest in the inheritance, the land in question was not owned by him, it having been transferred in 1881, according to a conclusion established by the trial judge. Therefore, the action for the recovery of possession, derived from such alleged inheritance, cannot exist.

This transfer of the and affected by Isidario or Apolinario Cedeo was originally the title alleged by the defendant a title which must not be presumed in the present case, but proved. It is true that the possessor, in the capacity of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he holds under the lawful title and cannot be compelled to exhibit it (Civil Code, art. 446); but it is also true that when the defendant agrees with the plaintiffs that the thing demanded belonged to a determinate person during his lifetime from whom these latter claim to derive their right, the existence is thereby admitted of a right of ownership opposed to that of the present possessor, and hence logically the necessity for the latter to prove his title and exhibit it, in order to destroy the contrary presumption in favor of that prior ownership. The defendant, according to the finding of the trial judge, has proved that he has such a title, by the exhibition of three documents: one, of the sale by Isidario or Apolinario Cedeo to Juan Basa Villarosa (Exhibit 2); another, of the sale with pacto de retro by the latter's son, Sinforoso Villarosa, to the defendant (Exhibit 3); and the other, of a final sale by the other son, Vicente Villarosa, to the same party, Andres Candia (Exhibit 4). Against this finding of the lower court, the appellants allege: 1. That Isidario Cedeo, the vendor, has nothing to do with Apolinario Cedeo, his predecessor in interest; and, 2. That the land in Talamban known as that of Juan Basa Villarosa is about 15 or 20 brazas distant from the land in Talamban which is concerned in this litigation. But the finding impugned is in no wise erroneous. Tomas Cedeo, one of the plaintiffs, testified that his uncle Apolinario had the baptismal or Christian name of Isidario, was better known by the nickname of Adiot, and was the only cabeza de barangay in Sibonga with the surname of Cedeo. Domingo Cedeo, who was erroneously made to appear as a plaintiff, said that the original owner of the land in question was "his deceased uncle, Isidario Cedeo," and that Isidario was the true name. The averment of the appellants that "the finding of the court is precisely contrary to

the agreement made by both parties" (brief, 8)is in all respects incorrect. "In the said agreement, they say, no other name than that of Apolinario was recorded and admitted to be the name of the plaintiff's predecessor in interest. By that same agreement the defendant could not be heard to prove another so different name as that of Isidario for the purpose of confusing it with that of Apolinario . . . (brief, 8). The agreement only says: "By agreement between the attorneys for both parties, the complaint in this case is understood to be amended in the sense that the name of Apolonio Cedeo, which occurs in the first line of the first paragraph of the complaint, is substituted for the name of Apolinario Cedeo; it is being agreed that the amended answer which the court has just admitted refers to the complaint so amended." The only point that appears to be agreed upon is that where the plaintiffs say in their complaint Apolonio, the same shall be read Apolinario; but it was not agreed that the party Apolinario might not be known by any other name than that Apolinario, nor that the defendant should not try to prove another name as that of Isidario. It is also in all respects inexact that the land in Talamban, the subject matter of the complaint, which formerly belonged to Apolinario Cedeo, is different from the land in Talamban which the defendant claim was sold by Isidario Cedeo to Juan Basa Villarosa. The complaint says: "Boundaries: On the north, by Calixto Nejarda; on the south, by the river called Grande and Alejandro Mirafuentes; on the east, by the same river, Grande; on the west, by a large rock." Defendant's Exhibit 2 says: "Bounded on the north by Calixto Nejarda; on the east by Calixto Nejarda; on the south by Alejandro Mirafuentes; and on the west by Miguel and a large rock." The plaintiffs' witnesses, Solano and Cuestas, and the plaintiffs themselves, Sarita and Tomas Cedeo, designate the same boundaries as does the defendant, giving also as the eastern boundary, besides the river, Calixto Nejarda . . . The interposition of "Miguel" as being on the west, written in other documents as on the south, is perfectly explained by the defendant: It refers to Miguel Calixtio who broke up the ground

between the large rock and the land in dispute; and so it is that in subsequent documents it also appears as the western boundary. For the proceeding reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellants.

G.R. No. L-19382

August 31, 1965

IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS. FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant, vs. GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE VILLEGAS, JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositorsappellees. Mateo C. Bacalso and C. Kintanar for petitioner-appellant. Gaudioso Sosmea and C. Tomakin for oppositors-appellees. REYES, J.B.L., J.: This is a pauper's appeal, directly brought to this Court on points of law, from a resolution, dated September 20, 1961, excluding petitioner-appellant herein, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, as heir in the summary settlement of the estate of Melodia Ferraris, Special Proceeding No. 2177-R of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Third Branch, as well as from the order, dated October 16, 1961, denying a motion to reconsider said resolution. The facts of this case are not disputed by the parties. Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944. Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs.

Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of onethird (1/3) share in the estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court. The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who predeceased her (the decedent). These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris. The following diagram will help illustrate the degree of relationship of the contending parties to said Melodia Ferraris: Note: Picture The sole issue to be resolved in this case is: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him or her? Otherwise, will the aunt concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance or will the former be excluded by the latter? The trial court ruled that the oppositors-appellees, as children of the only predeceased brother of the decedent, exclude the aunt (petitioner-appellant) of the same decedent reasoning out that the former are nearer in degree (two degrees) than the latter since nieces and nephews succeed by right of representation, while petitioner-appellant is three degrees distant from the decedent, and that other collateral relatives are excluded by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in accordance with article 1009 of the New Civil Code.

Against the above ruling, petitioner-appellant contends in the present appeal that she is of the same or equal degree of relationship as the oppositors appellees, three degrees removed from the decedent; and that under article 975 of the New Civil Code no right of representation could take place when the nieces and nephew of the decedent do not concur with an uncle or aunt, as in the case at bar, but rather the former succeed in their own right. We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by Article 975: ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions. Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provided as follows: ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.

ART. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces, who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stripes. ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sister nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate. The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood. Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. This was also and more clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows: ART. 952. In the absence of brother, or sisters and of nephews or nieces, children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce, shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. ART. 954. Should there be neither brothers or sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate of deceased. The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of the whole blood. It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded

only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis-a-vis the other collaterals. Appellants quote paragraph 2 of Tolentino's commentaries to Article 1009 of the present Civil Code as declaring that Article 1009 does not establish a rule of preference. Which is true as to "other collaterals," since preference among them is according to their proximity to the decedent, as established by Article 962, paragraph 1. ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. But Tolentino does not state that nephews and nieces concur with other collaterals of equal degree. On the contrary, in the first paragraph of his commentaries to Article 1009 (Vol II, p. 439) (which counsel for appellants had unethically omitted to quote), Tolentino expressly states: Other collaterals. The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives within the fifth degree. Beyond this, we can safely say there is hardly any affection to merit the succession of collaterals. Under the law, therefore, relatives beyond the fifth degree are no longer considered as relatives, for successional purposes. Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should be understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts, there being no right of representation. They succeed

without distinction of lines or preference among them on account of the whole blood relationship. (Emphasis supplied) We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. The decision appealed from, in so far as it conforms to this rule, is hereby affirmed. No costs.

G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977 GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO CARTENA, defendant-appellant. Antonio E. Lacsam & Cesar A. Azucena, Jr. for appellant. Ricardo A. Fabros, Jr. for appellees.

Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 (Exhibit C) leaving the plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August 19, 1944 (Exhibit B) survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino. Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945 (Exhibit A). Surviving her are her heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong. Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on April 14, 1952 leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter of the second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months before the present suit was filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her husband, the defendant herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese) and her father Geronimo Almanza.

GUERRERO, J.: This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals 1 in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 17, paragraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, since the only issue raised is the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter which is purely a legal question. The following findings of fact by the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City in Civil Case No. SP-265, and adopted by the Court of Appeals, show that: Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859 (Exh. "D") Of this marriage there were born three children namely: Perpetua Bagsic (Exhibit G), Igmedia Bagsic (Exhibit F), and Ignacio Bagsic (Exhibit H). Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic. On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso (Exhibit "E"). Of this second marriage were born two children, Felipa Bagsic (Exhibit J) and Maura Bagsic (Exhibit I). Simeon Bagsic died sometime in 1901. Silvestra Glorioso also died.

The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns the one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the following described five (5) parcels of land which she inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso, to wit: A. A parcel of land in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with 38 fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of 1,077, sq. m. Bounded on the N. by German Garingan; on the E. by Juan Aliagas; on the S. by Bernardino Alina; and on the W. by Feliciana Glorioso Covered by Tax No. 12713 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 31232, assessed at P170.00 in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza; B. A parcel of land, also situated in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of 9,455 sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Paulino Gajuco; on the E. by Felisa Gavino and German Garigan; on the S. by Esteban Calayag; and on the W. by Laureano Ambion, Covered by Tax No. 12714 for the year 1948 in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza; C. A parcel of land situated in same Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with 376 fruit bearing coconut trees and having an area of 11,739 sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Jacinto Alvero, Anacleto Glorioso and Bernardino Alma; on the E. by Bernardino Alma; on the S. by Rosendo Banaad, Jacinto Alvero and Casayan River; and on the W. by Anacleto Glorioso Covered by Tax No. 12715 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 31234, assessed at P2,720.00 in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza; D. A residential lot, situated at P. Alcantara Street, Int., City of San Pablo, with an area of 153, sq. m.

Bounded on the N. by heirs of Pedro Calampiano; on the E. by Petronilo Cartago; on the S. by Ignacio Yerro; and on the W. by Melecio Cabrera. Covered by Tax No. 17653 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 21452, assessed at P610.00 in the name of Cristeta Almanza; and E. A parcel of coconut land, situated at Bo. Buenavista, Candelaria, Quezon, planted with 300 coconut trees fruit bearing. Area - 24,990 sq. m. Bounded on the N. (Ilaya) by heirs of Pedro de Gala on the E. by Julian Garcia; on the S. (Ibaba) by Julian Garcia, and on the W. by Taguan River. Covered by Tax No. 21452, assessed at P910.00. Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic. After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above-described properties passed on to Cristela Almanza who took charge of the administration of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and requested for the partition of their aunt's properties. However, they were prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not to divide the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial of Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having agreed to defer the partition of the same, the plaintiffs brought out the subject again sometime in 1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as the debts, accordingly, had already been paid. Unfortunately, she died without the division of the properties having been effected, thereby leaving the possession and administration of the same to the defendants.

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs who are hereby declared to be entitled to ten twenty-fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of land in dispute. The defendant Engracio Manese and the heirs of the deceased Geronimo Almanza, who are represented in the instant case by the administrator Florentino Cartena, are hereby required to pay the plaintiffs from July 23, 1959 the sum of P625.00 per annum until the ten-twenty fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of land are delivered to the plaintiffs, with legal interest from the time this decision shall have become final. With costs against the defendants. SO ORDERED. City of San Pablo, September 21, 1962. From the aforesaid decision of the trial court, Florentino Cartena, the substitute defendant for Geronimo Almanza, appealed to the Court of Appeals. The other defendant, Engracio Manese, did not appeal and execution was issued with respect to the parcels of land in his possession, that is, those described under Letters D and E in the complaint. Hence, the subject matter of the case on appeal was limited to the one-half undivided portion of only three of the five parcels of land described under letters A, B and C in the complaint which defendant Cartena admitted to be only in his possession. 2 On appeal, defendant-appellant Cartena contends that the provisions of Arts. 995, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code, applied by the trial court in allowing plaintiffs-appellees to succeed to the properties left by Maura Bagsic were not the applicable provisions. He asserts that in the course of the trial of the case in

the lower court, plaintiffs requested defendants to admit that Felipa Bagsic, the sole sister of full blood of Maura Bagsic, died on May 9. 1955. Since Maura Bagsic died on April 14, 1952, Felipa succeeded to Maura's estate. In support thereof, he cites Art. 1004 of the New Civil Code which provides that "should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares," and he concludes with the rule that the relatives nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones. (Art. 962, New Civil Code) On the other hand, plaintiffs-appellees claim that the date of death of Felipa Bagsic was not raised as an issue in the trial court. It was even the subject of stipulation of the parties as clearly shown in the transcript of the stenographic notes that Felipa Bagsic died on May 9. 1945. 3 The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the case have been duly established in the trial court and that the only issue left for determination is a purely legal question involving the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, hence the appellate court certified this case to Us. We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code are applicable to the admitted facts of the case at bar. These Articles provide: Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of tile deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions." Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter.

Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita or per stirpes, in accordance with the rules laid down for brothers and sisters of the full blood. In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code. By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right. InAbellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382, August 31, I965, 14 SCRA 986, this Court held that "nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased." Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in their right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Article 1006 of the New Civil Code (supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of half blood. Such distinction between whole and half blood relationships with the deceased has been recognized in Dionisia Padura, et al. vs. Melanie Baldovino, et al., No. L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065 (unreported) and in Alviar vs. Alviar, No. L-22402, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 610).

The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half blood citing Art. 1004, NCC is unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on an erroneous factual assumption, that is, that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as indicated here before, is not true as she died on May 9, 1945, thus she predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic. We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and jurisprudence. ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. No costs.