The Naxalite Movement in India from Independence-Present: Theoretical and Pragmatic Challenges of Counterinsurgency within the Framework of a Constitutional

Democracy

Cody William Punter

Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Rudra Chaudhuri. As my supervisor, Dr. Chaudhuri imparted me with invaluable knowledge and helped guide me in the right direction. Our conversations, whether during formal meetings or in our more informal exchanges were always engaging. His enthusiasm both as a professor and supervisor were a source of inspiration throughout my research and writing of this paper. Without him this piece of scholarship would not have been possible.

I would also like to thank my professors, especially Antaol Lieven and Rudra Chaudhuri who both taught my course on the Conduct of Contemporary Warfare. It was thanks to their course that I was introduced to the issue of the Naxalite insurgency in India, and I would not have been able to write about such an engaging topic without their support.

I would also like to thank my family for their moral and financial support. They have continually provided me with the opportunity to expand my personal and academic horizons. It is to them, above all that I would like to dedicate my dissertation.

Introduction
It is an object of paramount importance that the cause which gave rise to [those disturbances] should be fully understood and such measures adopted as are deemed expedient to prevent a recurrence of similar disorders Judicial Authorities in Calcutta - 1831 1 When India became an independent country in 1947, it became the worlds largest democratic state. Since then it has gradually sought to establish a predominant presence in South East Asia while seeking a greater role amongst developed countries in the West. In recent years, it has become widely acknowledged as a world power in large part to the exponential growth of its economy as a result of the governments policies of economic liberalisation in the 1990s. While this has indeed raised its clout and reputation on the international stage, the exponential growth of the economy has been paralleled by that of an indigenous Maoist insurgency, which has challenged the political foundations upon which this growth rests, for the past 60. The greatest challenge the insurgency has put forward has been its rejection of the legitimacy of the Indian government based on the abdication of its legal and constitutional duties to the most disenfranchised and politically vulnerable social groups as set out in the constitution. In refuting the authority and legitimacy of the Indian government the Maoist groups has presented itself as rival political faction which has been able to achieve a great deal of popular support of the populations which it claims to represent. By 2006, the extent of the political control exerted by Maoist insurgency especially in the central region of India resulted in the Indian Prime Minister declaring that the insurgency was the countrys number one security threat.2

1 Guha, Ranjit (1980) p 3. 2 PMs speech at the Chief Ministers meet on Naxalism. April 13, 2006. 3

According to one estimate, up to 74,000 sq km or Indian territory is under the direct control of the Maoists (also known as the Naxalites).3 Moreover, as of 2007, the Cabinet Secretary stated that the Maoists officially had a presence in 182 districts in 16 states. However, while the extent of the Maoist presence is alarming and disturbing for the government, it is the exponential rise in Naxal-related violence over the past ten years that has led to growing discontent about the movement. Over the past five years over 10, 000 civilians and security personnel have lost their lives as a result of Naxal Violence with 2,732 deaths being reported in 2009 as against 1,769 in 2008.4 Despite the increasing levels of violence, the Indian government has so far failed to come to terms with the political issues which are raised by the growth and of the insurgency and has simply resorted to trying to stop violence with violence. While there has been a great deal written on the insurgency, the majority of what has been written in English has been journalistic/editorial in style and content. As a result, available literature on the topic of the insurgency has been either overly biased, or narrative in nature, with little attempt to place the insurgency within a social scientific frame of analysis. Moreover there has been little attempt to critically assess and compare the theoretical underpinnings of Maoism and Indian democracy within a historical context. Finally there has been little academic literature which has sought to critically apply a comprehensive theory of contemporary counter-insurgency to the current situation in India. Therefore this paper seeks to set the development of Maoist ideology against that of Indian democracy within a historical narrative whilst evaluating the states response to the Maoist insurgency within the framework of contemporary counterinsurgency theory. The goal of this approach is premised on the belief that the political element involved in both the development of the insurgency and the subsequent state response to it 3 Singh, Harindar (2010) p 4. 4 Hindustan Times, July 06, 2010. 4

has been largely neglected. As the central tenet of counter-insurgency theory is that the government must have a clear political aim to challenge that of the insurgent5, the need to understand the development of the political ideologies of both Maoism and democracy is fundamental to understanding how to formulate an effective counterinsurgency campaign. Indeed if the Indian government is to be successful in carrying out a counterinsurgency campaign it will have to acknowledge the primacy of political aims in determining its overall strategy. It should also be noted that the scope of this paper will be limited to the central regions of India. This is because of the 85 million Indians who are officially classified as scheduled tribes 70 million of them live in the heartland of India comprising the regions of Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Marahartra and Rajasthan.6 Thus while the government claims that 16 states are affected by Naxalism, this paper will be focusing specifically on those areas with tribal populations. Furthermore, of those states special attention will be given to Orissa, Andhra Pradesh West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkand, and especially Chhattisgarh, as these states form a region, otherwise known as the Red Corridor, which is the focal point of both insurgent and state violence. Finally, although the Naxalite movement currently has many front organisations, this paper will be focusing mainly on the current incarnation of the Communist Party of India (Maoist). In addressing the insurgency in this manner, the paper will be divided into three chapters. The first chapter hopes to examine two separate but closely connected issues. First it shows how Left-Wing ideologies in India, adopted from Maoism and MarxismLeninism, were used to politically mobilise peasant insurgencies, thus representing a fundamental shift in the nature of peasant insurgency in India. Having established that, it 5 Nagl, John (2005) p 29. 6 Guha, Ramchanrda (2007) p 3305. 5

then demonstrates how the political ideology of the movement was crystallised and subsequently transformed through external repression and internal splits resulting in the development of a more sophisticated political ideology. The second chapter is divided into two parts. The first part examines how after having changed its political direction, the Maoist movement was able to exploit the states failure to address problems related to the poverty, underdevelopment and fundamental legal rights of tribals. In doing so the Maoist movement was able to establish itself as a rival political ideology to that of the state leading to a broad support base amongst impoverished rural areas which the movement came to control. The second part of the chapter examines how at the turn of the Millennium the developmental and political aspects of Maoism were accompanied by an increase in violence. The state responded to this by resorting to violence without addressing the political and developmental grievances of local populations, thus leaving the insurgency un-defeated. The final chapter demonstrates how the states current response to the Naxalite insurgency has failed to draw on its own experiences and contemporary lessons of counter-insurgency. Moreover, the chapter suggests that in contrast to traditional counterinsurgencies, as a constitutional democracy, India faces specific challenges related to its institutional deficiencies and the high standards set by its legal framework. It then concludes that failure to overcome these challenges has resulted in a crisis in the political aim of the states counterinsurgency strategy, which ultimately fails to overwhelm the political ideology of Naxalism. In analysing and comparing the simultaneous development of the Maoist and democratic political traditions in India, this paper hopes to show that the democratic government of India has the resources to undermine the Naxalite insurgency. However this is dependant on it having a clear political aim, through which it can confront the

political challenges raised by the insurgency, and which is essential in order to bring a peaceful settlement to the insurgency.

Chapter 1
A revolutionary war is 20 percent military action and 80 percent political7 General Chang Ting-chen of Mao Zedongs central committee. During the colonial period, peasant insurgencies were a common form or resistance to the injustices of un-even land distribution, Indias caste system, and colonial repression. Between 1946-1951, in the Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh, India faced its first insurrection of the post-colonial era and its single largest insurrection on its soil since the 1857 war of independence.8 While it was the later and much smaller rebellion in Naxalabri that would give the Maoist movement in India its title, it is this movement that provided the foundations for modern Left-oriented revolution in the name of social justice and agrarian reform in India. What made it different from all the previous insurrections and insurgencies that the Indian government and the East India Company had dealt with, was that it was openly encouraged and organised by the Communist Party as a struggle against forced labour, illegal exactions, unauthorised evictions and more generally the feudal rule of the Nizam.9 It thus marked the beginning of a trend where peasant resistance to the social injustices they were subject to were not simply sporadic acts of defiance and violence organised by peasants in the name of peasants; they were now being mobilised by educated members of the Indian intelligentsia with a view to securing a political end. The first introduction of Communism as a form of revolutionary struggle in Telangana was a demonstration of the potency of the movements organisation and ideology. Firstly it showed that when combined with the organisational capacity of the Communist Party, high levels of peasant grievance could be effectively mobilised with 7 Galula, David (1964) p 89. 8 Singh, Prakesh (2006) p 4. 9 Singh, Prakesh (2006) p 5. 8

concrete results. This is evident in that during the five years in which the insurgents were fighting, they were able to establish control over approximately 3,000 villages.10 It also showed that such control cost dearly in terms of human life as around 4,000 people were killed in the struggle.11 Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, drawing on theories of Marxist-Leninism and Maoism, the Communist Party purported to offer an alternative to the state-led development paradigm, which was inadequate for addressing Indias wellentrenched feudalism.12 Thus, although the Telangana insurrection was quelled in 1951 without having achieved their intended radical agrarian reforms, it left an indelible mark on the history of peasant struggles and insurgency in India. However, while the revolutionary leftist ideology was a potent tool, it was by no means a single coherent line of thought something that became only too evident in the lead up and subsequent aftermath of the events in Naxalabri. The rebellion itself, which only lasted 72 days, was the result of a skirmish that erupted between a tribal youth who was attacked by a landlords goons when he went to plough his land. This resulted in the retaliation of the tribals in the area, who went about trying to forcefully capture back their lands. While the rebellion had been unplanned and resulted from indigenous grievances, a group of ultra-left ideologues regrouped to form the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) in May 1968 and proclaimed Allegiance to the armed struggle and non-participation in the elections13 In effect the AICCR was to form the armed revolutionary counterpart to the Communist Party of India (Maoist) the party in power in West Bengal under the United Front. However, while it all of those who formed the AICCCR agreed on the topic of non-participation in government, in the immediate aftermath its formation, the AICCCR 10 Ibid (2006) p 5. 11 Ibid (2006) p 5. 12 Chakrabarty, Biyut and Kujur, Rajat Kumar. (2010) p 41. 13 Iibd. (2010) p 42. 9

began to show internal rifts based on disagreements as how to best wage armed struggle. The main point of contention to arise was over the question of class annihilation, with AICCCR members basically split between two schools of thought. One was led by Charu Mazumdar who maintained the need for immediate annihilation of class enemies, the other by Kannhai Chatterjee who believed that the anihhalation of class enemies should only take place after building up massive organised forces.14 This was to result in a split of non-parliamentary leftist revolutionaries into two groups the Maoist Community Centre (MCC) led by Chatterjee and the Communist Part of India (Marxist-Leninist) led by Mazumdar. Of those issues which were creating the greatest rifts were the topics of annihalation, the use of firearms and the dependence on the petty bourgeois intellectual.15 Mazumdar was himself aware of the negative effects that this could have on the movement and answered by attacking dissidents as centrists while vigorously defending the party line of with an emphasis on the annihilation of class enemies.16 This constant defence of class annihilation as a tactic was part of Mazumdars obsession with revolutionary violence. Indeed, Mazumdar claimed that violence especially against class enemies jotedors, bourgeois compradors was the key to achieving revolutionary success. He decscribed his model for revolutionary success as follows: rely on the the poor and landless peasants; educate them in Mao Tsetung Thought; adhere firmly to the path or armed struggle; build guerrilla forces and march forward along the path of liquidating the class enemies [authors emphasis]; only thus can the high tide of struggle advance irresistibly.17

14 Kujur, Rajat (2008) p 3. 15 Singh, Prakesh (2006) p 41. 16 Ibid. p 42. 17 Ghosh, Suniti Kumar (2009) p 249. 10

One of the results of this obsession was that it saw Mazumdar constantly looking to exploit opportunities for open conflict. In particular he sought to harness the adventurism and aggressiveness of disaffected male youths in urban areas. Indeed, although the ultimate goal of Mazumdars revolution was to liberate India from feudalism by inciting peasants to overthrow those who oppressed them, there was an almost tacit understanding that the peasants could only become a revolutionary force after it was acted upon by the revolutionary youth and students and by the working class.18 Mazumdars belief in the need to inspire those who were oppressed through guerrilla violence would in effect become the modus operandi of the CPI (M-L) in the years between the Naxalabri uprising in 1967 and Mazumdars death in 1972. Throughout this period, various CPI (M-L) cadres operated across India. As per Mazumdars doctrine, they largely carried out violence in urban areas. In West Bengal, where there had been links between the AICCR and student movements before the formation of the Party, youths and students were incited to start an iconoclastic campaign against Gandhi and Nehru.19 Throughout Calcutta and its surrounding villages these campaigns manifested themselves in the form of book burnings, attacks on educational institutions, and the targeting and killing of landlords and security personnel. Similar attacks were organised an carried out in other parts of the country under the initiative of the CPI (M-L) with schools, businessmen and policemen being attacked in Districts across Bihar, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh.20 As a result of the partys emphasis on bourgeois-led guerrilla conflict with specific attention being paid to urban areas, the peasantry and their grievances came to occupy an auxiliary role. As Kanu Sanyal, who was a key figure within the party pointed out, we 18 Dasgupta, Rajeshwari (2006) p 1924. 19 Ghosh, Suniti Kumar (2009) p 224. 20 Singh, Prakesh (2006) p 71. 11

had not faith in the heroic peasant masses we, the petty bourgeois leadership, imposed ourselves21 Thus although the CPI (M-L) under Mazumdar claimed to be fighting against the antiquated feudalism that restricted the rights and freedoms of tribals, they were themselves guilty of using the tribals for their own ideological ends. While this may have been justified at the time as a necessary measure for the achievement of a revolution, the reality is that it had an alienating affect within tribal areas. This alienation was further compounded by the state-response which the CPI (ML)-led violence invited especially in West Bengal. In response to the Maoist violence, the government of India in conjunction with state governments undertook Operation Steeplechase in the bordering districts of West Bengal, Orissa, and Bihar.
22

During this

period, a joint force of army and police personnel was organised and given increased mandates for the carrying out of arrests and application of violence with the implementation of acts such as the West Bengal Prevention of Violent Activities Acts (1970) and the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (1971).23 After being carried out for forty days, the operation was deemed a victory for state forces. Although it did not achieve any clear political goals, Operation Steeplechase was deemed a success based on the large amount of casualties inflicted upon CPI (M-L) cadres and their supporters and the number of people arrested across all three states. As a result, violence dropped as did the stealing or arms, but most importantly the administration was able to restore the peoples confidence in the state.24 Thus although severe measures were required against the CPI (M-L) the immediate threat which it posed to state-order was put down with relative ease. Amongst 21 Sanyal in Dasgupta, Rajeshwari (2006) p 1925 22 Singh, Prakesh (2006) p 99. 23 Ghosh, Suniti Kumar (2009) p 227 24 Singh, Prakesh (2006) p 100. Singh points out that in Birbhum for example of the 400 known activists known in the area only 150 were caught. 12

those peasants who were fighting for the improvement of their social and economic standing, many felt the Party betrayed them by placing its own political ideologies ahead of their own political goals. That the need to seize power was put ahead of their own agendas for agrarian reform was already an issue of contention; but that the move to seize political power could be put down so easily and lead to further setbacks for tribals increased the strain between the Party leadership and its tribal supporters. Thus in the end, Mazumdars strategy and its subsequent failure had a demoralising effect on the peasants and ended with considerably weakened support from various peasant association.25 The failure of Mazumdars tactical line also led to increased tensions amongst the ideological proponents of Marxist-Leninism and Maoism in India leading to debates over its political strategy and how best to implement it. At the core of the majority of disagreements of various factions during the 1970s was whether the teachings of Mao Tse Tsung were to be strictly adhered to, or whether there was room for variation and adaptation. Mazumdar, who had been heavily influenced by Mao, believed that Maos teachings were universally applicable and had to be strictly adhered to. However, in seeking to achieve the level of success which Mao had in China, Mazumdar was keen to achieve political ends faster than could be possible and his aim of achieving total revolution in India by 1975 was inconceivably far-fetched given the circumstances of the time. Moreover, he failed to predict that violence, especially in favour of urban targets and educational institutions would have an alienating affect rather than an inspiring one. Furthermore in seeking to adhere strictly to the Chinese model, Mazumdar was neglecting some of the differences which existed, and which Mao himself had pointed out, between the revolutionary situation in China as compared to other countries. 26 In this regard, Mazumdars line of thought failed to take into account two major differences 25 Ahuja, Pratul and Ganguly, Rajat (2007) p 266. 26 Ibid 248. 13

between India and China. Firstly, India is home to a wide range of nationalities, religions and languages whereas at the time of Maos revolution in China 94% of the population were Hans.27 Secondly, one of the successes of Maos revolution is that it provided a means of unifying China, which at the time of his revolution, had no central government. India on the other hand, not only had the tradition of a centralised bureaucratic state dating back to British rule, but ever since independence it had been subject to its own unifying process under the democratic ideology of Nehru. As such, Mazumdars revoltuonary goals for India based on strict adherence to Mao Tsetung Thought faced the dual challenges of extreme regional divisions while having to contend with a rival nationalist democratic ideology which was becoming increasingly entrenched in Indian political culture. The recognition of the shortcomings of Mazumdars strict adherence to Maoism and the nature of Indias regional differences would ultimately lead to endless splits and divisions throughout the 1970s, 80s and 90s. While many different lines of thought emerged with the death of Charu Mazumdar and the failure of his revolutionary model, one of the general conclusions reached amongst most parties was that pure military struggle should be limited, and greater emphasis given to peasant struggles. Further weight was added to this point when the Chinese communist issued a message in 1970 in which they disapproved of annihilation carried out by secret squads and disagreed with the view that guerrilla warfare was the only way to mobilise people against the enemy.28 Indeed, if anything was to be learned from the failures of Mazumdars movement, it was that Maos revolution did not provide the template for a successful revolution to be replicated under the circumstances of 1970s India. However, while the failure of the Naxalabri uprising had exposed the shortcomings of Mazumdars tactic of annihilation 27 Ibid. p 292. 28 Krishnaji, N. (1980) p 1615. 14

and the CPI (M-L)s overestimation of the capacity for a pan-Indian revolution, it did not undermine the socialist-egalitarian ideology or the communist capacity for large-scale organisation of disaffected populations. Rather, the decades following Naxalabri would prove that Marxism-Leninism-Maoism was a versatile ideology that could be adapted to a variety of settings and be employed to achieve the level of support which Mazumdar had sought for the success of his revolution. Thus the idea of class annihilation was dropped with an emphasis being placed on trying to come up with an Indianised version of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.29

ii

Having seen the Naxal movement swiftly crushed by 1972, through the arrest, death, and fleeing of large numbers of its cadres, the Naxalite movement became scattered and regionalised. However it would be wrong, as is often done in the literature on the history Naxalism, to suggest that the period of rivalry and splits represents a lull in the movement as a whole. As K.P Singh has pointed out, the various splits and dissensions during the 1970s 80s and 90s should be viewed as a process whereby each regional split led to a faction seeking to increase its individual base of support thus leading to a growth in organisational progress as opposed to regression.30 During this time there remained some small factions operating in West Bengal, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh, which upheld allegiance to Mazumdars line of class annihilation. However, for the most part, their tactics remained relatively unsophisticated and unpopular. As a result they were put down with relative ease by authorities conducting extensive police operations.31 29 Chakrabarty, Biyut and Kumar Kujur, Rajat. (2010) p 46. 30 Singh, P.K. (2008) p 14. 31 Singh, Prakesh (2006) pp 115-119. 15

Those who supported the goals of Marxist-Leninist-Maoism in India recognised that Mazumdars interpretation of Maoist ideology was crude and unsuited to the Indias socio-economic condition. Thus one group that had belonged to the CPI (ML) formed a new party called CPI (M-L) Liberation based in Bihar, and proceeded to undertake a project of course-correction. As part of correcting the mistakes of the past, the group suggested that greater emphasis should be put on mass peasant struggles while pure military armed struggle should be limited in an attempt to provide an Indianised version of Masixm-Leninism-Maoism.32 Moreover, implicit in the turn away from Mazumdars ideology was an understanding that a swift revolution was not possible given the circumstances of Indian social and political culture. Thus Mazumdars pipe dream of overthrowing the Indian government by 1975 through a united struggle was abandoned in favour of small scale regional organisation with an emphasis on winning over local populations. In keeping with this program of establishing themselves at a grassroots level the Maoists sought to establish control over areas that were isolated and ignored by states development and security initiatives. There were several reasons for this. Firstly in choosing to establish themselves where the majority of the population was living below the poverty line the revolutionaries faced a greater chance of mobilising populations in favour of a new peoples revolution.33 Secondly, the areas chosen tended to be characterised by their hilly and forested terrain, thus making them inaccessible to security personnel. The combination of these two factors meant that the Naxalites would be able to exert a combination of sympathy amongst and control over the tribal populations without government interference.

32 Kujur, Rajat (2008) p 3. 33 Garg, Ruchir (2008) p 27 16

Of those groups who were able to garner popular support in remote tribal areas over the next few decades, the Maoist Communist Centre and the Peoples War Group were to become the most influential. The two groups had developed in different regions along different lines. The PWG emerged in the period after the Emergency as a reactionary response to the authoritarian repression which communist and Naxalite leaders had faced and to the gradual acceptance of the parliamentary methods conceded by the CPI (M-L) Liberation. 34 Meanwhile the MCC had existed since 1969 under the name of Dakshin Desh and had evolved parallel to Mazumdars CPI (M-L) in opposition to its brazen policies.35 Indeed, despite the emphasis placed on the splits within the Naxalite movement during the 1970s and 1980s, with the PWG having renounced the policies of predecessor, both it and the MCC came to a more sophisticated understanding of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. In effect the central goal of their ideology remained that of their archaic predecessor: the liberation of the people from all exploitation and the dictatorship of the ruling classes through the violent overthrow of the Indian government.36 However the strategy through which they hoped to achieve this was far more sophisticated than the CPI (M-L)s had been. According to the PWG the success of an Indian Revolution was dependant on liberating the countryside first through area wide seizure of power, establishing guerrilla zones and base areas and then encircling the cities and finally capturing power throughout the country.
37

Similarly the MCC, which was based out of

Bihar, proclaimed the need for a protracted peoples war along the lines set out by the PWG and differed only in its emphasis on guerrilla warfare. The strategy of both the

34 Singh, Prakash (2006 pp. 121-131. 35 Chakrabarty, Biyut and Kujur, Rajat Kumar. (2010) p 53. 36 Kujur, Rajat (2008) p 7. 37 Chakrabarty, Biyut and Kujur, Rajat Kumar. (2010) p 52. 17

groups thus showed a better understanding of the contemporary political, social and military situation in which they were trying to establish themselves. Indeed the evolution of strategic thinking amongst the PWG and the MCC was apparent at the tactical level. While the leaders of the PWG did not completely give up the notion of attacking security forces, the main points of their programs consisted in concentrating on issues which directly affected tribals. Of those issues which PWG claimed to give primacy were: the redistribution of land; enforcing payment of minimum wages to the farm labour; imposing taxes and penalties; holding peoples courts; enforcing a social code.38 Thus rather than simply attacking the governments inability to ensure some of these social services, the members of the PWG attempted to win over local population by providing an ideological and more importantly a material alternative to the state as a benefactor and protector. In seeking to gather support for their cause from local populations the various Naxalite groups made a concerted effort to establish a strong presence in those areas which were most isolated from the governments security forces and most ignored by its development and social policies. As such, PWG was able to rapidly establish a strong base in the Telangana region where it had chosen to base itself in 1980 given the favourable terrain and the well-established history of popular rebellion in that area. Meanwhile the MCC chose to set itself up in Bihar where it competed with the more moderate Liberation as well as Party Unity. A few short years after having established itself in Telangana, PWG was able to spread its influence across the borders of Andhra Pradesh and into the Southern regions of Orissa and the Chhattisgarh region of Madhya Pradesh as early as 1982. Meanwhile MCCs overtly military line became increasingly influential amongst tribals in the central regions of Bihar. 38 Singh, Prakesh (2006) p 133. 18

Regardless of the feasibility of these strategic aims, whether it was Liberation, MCC or Party Unity in Bihar or PWG in Andhra Pradesh, at the grassroots level, considerable bases of support were developed over the following decades. The range of support varied from tribals in areas where the Naxalites established themselves, to those who took up arms to form part of its military program. Thus, rather than having found itself defeated by government repression in the wake of the Naxalabri uprising, the revolutionary left in India was able to evolve and expand its sphere of influence, thereby presenting an increasing threat to the authority and legitimacy of the Indian state by the end of the century.

19

Chapter 2
On the 26th January 1950 [the founding of Indian Republic with its new Constitution], we are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In politics we will have equality and in social and economic life we will have inequality.39 B.R. Ambedka Chair of the committee that drafted the Constitution. When they were drafting the Indian constitution, the founders of Indian democracy sought to redress the injustices suffered by tribals during the colonial period. At the time of Indian independence, Nehru proclaimed the dawn of an independent Indian democratic state would be tasked with the ending of poverty and ignorance and disease and inequality of opportunity40. Acknowledging some of the deep-seeded historical divisions which were inherent in Indias caste society, Nehru presented his Objectives Resolution to the Constituent Assembly of India on December 13, 1946. In it he proclaimed that adequate safeguards shall be provided for minorities, backward and tribal areas and depressed and other backward classes41 Subsequent legislation represented an attempt by the state government to address these issues. The two most important steps taken by the government in this respect were the abolition of the caste of untouchables as a legal classification as well as the abolition of the Zamindari system. The classification of individuals as untouchables was traditionally accepted as part of Indias caste system and had meant that those individuals classified as such were given lower legal status than those of higher castes. The implications of this categorisation meant that untouchables were frequently treated as less than human and were subject to a variety of injustices from not being allowed to draw water from

39 Sen, Amartya (2005) p 36. 40 Dreze, Jean and Sen, Amrtya (1997) p 5. 41 Guha, Ramachandra (2007) p 3305. 20

communal wells, to be subjected to lynching or burning over trivial matters, without recourse to due legal process.42 The Zamindari system was equally a feature of Indias caste system, which saw upper-caste members owning large amounts of land and often using this land to exploit landless peasants by charging extortionate rents and interest rates. Moreover their legal status as owners of the land permitted them to evict rentiers without proper cause, often in the interest of generating a greater profit. The intention of the abolition of the Zamindari system was to revoke the right of private intermediaries to control the land revenue system with the goal of clearer definitions of private property rights with respect to land ownership.43 However ground-breaking and well-intentioned these constitutional measures may have been, in the years following their implementation, those populations who were most marginalised by Indias uneven caste system, continued to face persecution and hard-ship. On the one hand this was due to the lack of legal and pragmatic re-enforcement that these initiatives received. Thus as Deze and Sen have pointed out, even with the abolition of the Zamindari system land ownership structure in India has remained relatively unchanged over the last forty years.44 On the other the Indian government failed to implement wider reaching reforms which might provide more robust welfare to under-privileged tribals in terms of political, gender, educational, healthcare, and legal rights. Part of the problem has been the way in which the India economy has grown. According to Jayati Ghosh, the models for economic growth in India since Nehru have been plagued by a pattern of growth which has been fundamentally unbalanced and in crucial respects unsustainable, [] as it failed to provide minimum basic needs to the 42 Ahuja, Pratul and Ganguly, Rajat (2010) p 255. 43 Dreze, Jean and Gazdar, Haris (1997) p 37. 44 Ibid. p 37-8. 21

bulk of the population and allowed for the persistence of absolute poverty among a fairly large section of the population45 Over the last forty years, whether under Nehru or during the period of rapid economic liberalisation in the 1990s under the guidance of the IMF, India has been unable to implement institutional changes at the local level, thus leaving landed proprietors and rich farmers to profit most in rural areas through maximising short-term gains without regard for the needs of tribal populations. Indeed, in 2004 a Report of the Expert Group on Prevention of Alienation of Tribal Land and Its Restoration concluded that the development paradigm pursued since independence has aggravated the prevailing discontent among marginalised sections of society.46 The inefficiency of Indian development in providing for the most marginalised sections includes lack of basic necessities in terms of access to food, clean water, healthcare and education. The list goes on to include the adminstrations failure to implement protective regulations in scheduled areas, resulting in land alienation, forced eviction from land, dependence on money-lenders and often compounded by blatant violence by state functionaries.47 In and of themselves, these shortcomings point to the failure of Indian democracy to deliver the promises of the constitution from which the government derives its legitimacy. However when held up against the spectre Naxalism these shortcomings provided for the encroachment of an opposing ideology which was able on prey the failures of the state. Indeed, as John Mackinlay has pointed out, one the main characteristics contributing to the support of an insurgency is that there must be an overwhelming sense of grievance for the insurgents to manipulate.48 With its ideological

45 Ghosh, Jayati (1998) p 169. 46 Banerjee, Sumanta (2008) p 11. 47 Ibid. p 11. 48 Mackinlay, John (2010) p 22. 22

turnaround in the late 1970s, the Maoists began to prove time and again that it was well aware of this fact. Throughout the 1970s, 80s and 1990s, the Maoists displayed a cautious and wellorganised approach to winning over local support in tribal areas. Already by the late 1970s the PWG, which was based in Telangana in the North of Andrha Pradesh set about creating committees to isolate certain areas in order to assess and exploit the grievances of the local tribal populations. Henceforth groups of Forrest Committees were created for the jungle areas and Regional Committees for the plains areas.49 Furthermore, small squads or dalams comprising between six to ten members would be organised and sent to talk to the people and they would consult the tribals about their grievances. In particular they would find out who was responsible for their problems. Once these individuals had been identified usually landlords or government officials, the Maosits would go about killing the most notorious amongst them.50 By either using direct acts of violence or simply intimidation, the armed cadres would in effect use violence as an empowering tool, but not an end in itself. Indeed, in contrast to the class annihilation which was seen as a strategic end in itself, the selected application of violence as a tactic at a local level was intended to be more symbolic. In this sense, the cautious application of force by Maoists can be explained as a form of Propaganda of the Deed at the local level.51 Kumar Himanshu gives the example of how a forest guard in Dantewada would punish a woman for carrying a bundle of firewood by raping her. He would then ask for a three-ruppee fine, which if unpaid would lead to the guard trying to extort Rs 300. The Naxalites were aware of the discontent this caused amongst the population and would seize upon it by capturing a forest guard, trying him 49 Singh, Prakesh (2006) p 132. 50 Mukherji, Nirmalangshu (2010) p 16. 51 Mackinlay, John (2010) p 151. 23

up, and having the tribals come to beat him.52 The list of methods used to gain popularity amongst the population further include: thrashing moneylenders and destroying promissory notes; attacks on or sometimes elimination of people found to be harassing women; eve teasers and those misbehaving with women being punished in praja (peoples) courts; warning the landlords to distribute land; organising demonstrations against the government on popular issues; and issuing statements to the media53 Indeed the Maoists quickly learned that confronting those people and issues which the local population viewed unfavourably was not only useful in gathering their support, but also in driving state representatives and landowners off the land, allowing the Maoists to take control.54 While some especially young males came to accept the Maoists because it provided them with an outlet for violent action, there was much more to the Maoists program which attracted tribals. For example in Dandakaranya in 1982, the Maoists saw local agitation by Tendu collectors against exploitation and for better wages as an opportunity for spreading their influence. During this period the PWG sent dalams into the region and helped the tribal farmers occupy hundreds of acres of land.55 As such they were able to empower the farmers and provide immediate results in terms of landownership where the state had previously failed to do so. While the government has the legal power to distribute land to the poor, it has repeatedly failed to do so. As such Naxalite groups were able to gain influence by performing the functions of the state in the forest areas of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, 52 Kumar, Himanshu (2009) p 11. 53 Reddy, K. Srivinas (2008) p 94. 54 Muhkerji, Nirmalangshu (2010) p 16 55 Garg, Ruchir (2008) p 37. 24

Maharashtra, Orissa, Bihar and Jharkhand.56 Although the seizure of land was not legal in the eyes of the state, to the tribals who had suffered for generations, the Naxalites became dispensers of justice. In those areas where Naxalites were able to gain increasing influence throughout the 1980s and 90s, that is exactly the model that they have used for their success by essentially providing a parallel government apparatus. Over time these parallel governments have been able to achieve a high level of sophistication and organisation. As armed groups gradually secured an area, they went about co-ordinating economic, political and social reforms based on the needs of the local population. Insofar as economic reforms are concerned, the Naxalites have made an effort to improve land rights, increase minimum wages and secure common property resources.57 In Andhra Pradesh, the Naxalites seized on the governments indifference to the wages of tendu leaf gatherers and secured both a minimum wage as well as a pay increase for the tribals.58 Meanwhile in Central Bihar, where the MCC has traditionally exerted a great deal of influence, Bela Bhatia who has done extensive field research in that region since the mid 90s has pointed to the fact that in Naxal-dominated areas there has been a significant rise in the average wage of tribal labourers as well as an equal wage for women.59 Over time, through their capacity to defend the territories that they occupy and their ability to mobilise local populations, the Naxalites have been able to establish their own system of governance and justice. Part of this has been achieved through the creation of gram rajya committees or Revolutionary Peoples Committees (RPC), which have been put in place in areas under Maoist control to provide the basic functions and services

56 Banerjee, Sumanta (2008) p 11. 57 Bhatia, Bela (2005) p 1542. 58 Banerjee, Sumanta (2008) p 11. 59 Iibid. p 1543. 25

of the state.60 By incorporating the local population in the political process these committees have been able to achieve a level of co-operation and an ad-hoc form of peoples rule. In Dandakaranya alone the Naxalites established RPCs in 500 villages,

and it is estimated that through these committees the Naxalites were able to wield influence over 2000 villages.61 Moreover, the Naxalites have made a concerted effort to address the lack of law and order in areas in which they came to establish a strong presence. On top of their ability to run parallel administrations they have been able to institute jan adalats (peoples courts) and systems of tax collection.62 The jan adalats have traditionally been very harsh in their verdicts with the death penalty being common. However, while their respect for traditional legal concepts such as due process and weighted sentencing have resulted in concern, they have continued to be held with increasing frequency. The trials are widely publicised before taking place and the fact that up to 5,000 villagers might attend the trial attest to their popularity.63 Indeed one of the reasons that they are so popular is that while the ineffectiveness of the local judicial system may keep a litigant involved in a petty land dispute tied up in court for several years, at a jan adalat the case can be settled in a matter of no time.64 Their system of taxation too has been criticised as it is based mostly on profits generated from extortion, levies, and theft by the armed cadres. However, that they have been able to profit from the corruption of contractors, government officials, businesses, mines, factories and forest contractors point just as

60 Garg, Ruchir (2008) p 35. 61 Ibid. p 35. 62 Jha, Sanjay K. (2008) p 62. 63 Singh, K.P. (2008) p 15. 64 Harivansh (2008) p 23. 26

much to the states inability to address fundamental inefficiencies its economic and political system as it does to the Naxalites opportunism.65 It must be acknowledged therefore, that in failing to deal with the underlying causes of tribal disaffection, the state has effectively allowed for a rival political and socio-economic form of governance to establish its authority in certain regions of the country. Indeed, where the Indian government has failed to provide substantive justice and development, the Naxalite movement has been able to distinguish itself by becoming directly involved in a struggle to capture the minds and beliefs of the population.66

ii

The ability of the Naxalites to take advantage of the situation in India through the spread of their ideology and their physical occupation of rural territory has been able to continue, more or less unchallenged up until present day. Of those achievements that are particularly impressive has been their ability to establish liberated zones over vast amounts of land, over which the Naxalites wield uncontested control through a combination of political mobilisation and coercion. As of June 2010, the Naxalites were able to claim the areas of Dantewada, Bastar, Bijapur and Narayanpur in Chhattisgarh; Malkinigiri and Rayagada in Orissa; West and East Singhbhum in Bihar; Gadchiroli in Maharashtra; West Midnapore in West Bengal for a total of 72,000 square kilometers as being unquestionably under their political and military control.67 Moreover, in the majority of these areas, the Naxalite presence has been established for decades, such that in certain areas many people have grown knowing the Naxalite leadership as the sole source of authority in those areas. The 65 Ibid. p 22. 66 Mackinlay, John (2010) p 18. 67 Singh, Harinder (2010) p 4. 27

situation is such that in some areas it is possible to come across second or even thirdgeneration cadres.68 Having established strong bases through their close contact with disaffected tribal populations, various Naxalite groups believed that there was a need to go beyond establishing the support of tribals, with the aim of achieving the intended aims of their revolutionary ideology. The significant turning point in this respect was the convening of the Coordination Committee of Maoist parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), where Maoist groups across South Asia including the Nepalese Maoists, reaffirmed their dedication to armed struggle. This led to the conclusion that the erstwhile splits in the Indian Maoist movement needed to be reconciled with the intention of forming a unified Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) a Red Corridor spreading from Nepal, through Bihar and the Dandakranya region to Andhra Pradesh.69 The conclusion of CCOMPOSA saw a series of mergers between Indian Maoist groups. First came the unification of Party Unity and the PWG, which then became the Communist Party of India (ML) (PW).70 This was followed by the 9th party congress of the Peoples War in March 2001, where the leaders of the organisation concluded that in order to achieve success it needed to increasingly militarise its operations.71 This was in turn followed by the announcement in 2003 that the two largest and most influential of the Naxalite groups for the previous three decades MCC and PWG were merging to form a unified command structure under the title of the Communist Party of India (Maoist).72 This final merger confirmed the essence of what was said at the 9th congress in 2001 when the new group proclaimed in a joint press release that: 68 Bhatia, Bela (2005) p 1541. 69 Jha, Sanjay (2008) p 66. 70 Singh, K.P. (2008) p 16. 71 Singh, Prakesh (2009) p 168. 72 Singh, K.P. (2008) p 16. 28

the immediate aim and program of the Maoist party is to carry on and complete the already ongoing and advancing New Democratic Revolution. This revolution will be carried out and completed through protracted peoples war with the armed seizure of power remaining as its central and principal task.73 Indeed, what makes the Naxalite movement different from the other insurgencies such as those in Nagaland, Jammu and Kashmir is that it rather than seeking to contest the authority of the Indian government to exercise its sovereignty over a given area based on racial, religious, or territorial claims, the Naxalite movement seeks to challenge the sovereignty of the democratic state by undermining the fundmental principles justice, governance, monopoly of violence which underpin its authority. It is thus that as of 2006 the Indian Prime Minister proclaimed that the Naxalite movement in India was Indias single largest security concern.74 Insofar as the state is concerned, the Naxalites increased sophistication and organisation have resulted in an increase in their guerrilla and military capacity. As early as the mid-1980s and reaching a peak in 1991, Naxalites began employing violence to secure their political and territorial gains.75 While levels of violence remained at a relatively stable level for the next decade, the 9th Congress of the PWG and the subsequent creation of the CPI (M), was accompanied with a rapid increase in violence. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, between 2004 and 2008, 877 security service personnel and 926 Naxalite cadres lost their lives as a result of violence between state and Maoist forces.76 However, what is perhaps most troubling is that in this fight for

73 Ramana, P.V. (2009) p 753. 74 PMs speech at the Chief Ministers meet on Naxalism. April 13, 2006. 75 Singh, K.P. (2008) p 14. 76 MHA Report on Naxalism 2008. Ministry of Home Affairs; mha.nic.in 29

authority and legitimacy between these tow factions, the number of civilians killed in that period was estimated at 2,461.77 The prospects of further violence have only continued to grow as the Naxal strong-holds expand their military capacity. In 2000, the Peoples War Group went about setting up the Peoples Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) in 2000 while smaller scale militias had been being formed since the early 1980s continued to flourish.78 Since the formation of the PLGA, it is estimated that 10,500 professional cadres have been trained, supplied with around 7,300 weapons, many of which are more sophisticated than the standard issue rifles of the Indian police.79 This is supplemented by its informal militia which consist tribals armed with traditional weapons and is considered to number around 40,000 spread across villages under Maoist control. Moreover, these armed cadres and militia are supported by large portions of disaffected populations. For example the peasant-worker (DAKMS front in Dandakarnya has 100,000 members while its womens front (KAMS) has nearly 90,000.80 However impressive the support base and military capacity of the Naxalite movement is, its goal of overthrowing the Indian government is neither realistic nor in the better interest of disaffected populations they claim to be fighting for. This is because the goal of the Naxalites is to advance their project of protracted peoples war by transforming the erstwhile guerrilla zones into liberated zones. Contrary to its title, once

77 Ibid. 78 Sundar, Nandini (2006) p 3189. 79 Ibid. p 3189; Thakur, Sankarshan (2006):Referring to the Naxalites, a policeman from Bastar complained that They have ak-47s, we have 303 rifles and not enough ammunition. Morover the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and remote mines have made the Maoists increasingly lethal, especially due to the states insistence on sending out large patrols into Naxal areas as opposed to smaller groups as suggested in counterinsurgency theory. 80 Mukherji, Nirmalangshu (2010) p 17. 30

an area under Maoist control becomes declared liberated, the interests of the tribals become second order to the Maoist political program: Thereafter, the need to establish and secure their authority, protect their armed squads from the police and paramilitary, secure the obedience of the people living in the area to the sanghams set up by them etc., become matters of predominant concern.81 The result of the Maoists attempt to consolidate its political gains against the authority of the state has thus been an increase in violence and a retardation in the progress of tribal interests, as Maoists target schools, roads, and other government sponsored development projects. In theory the state has greater resources and a broader base of legitimacy than does the Naxalite movement, and thus should be able to reassert its sovereignty by undermining the Naxalites base of support. However in 2009 the Home Minister, P Chidambaram claimed that As a government we cannot sit back and say what there are underlying causes. We have to combat violence so that the civil administration can function82. Thus, rather than seeking to undermine the politics and developmental programs of the Naxalites, the counterinsurgency initiatives of the government have solely focussed on the insurgency as a problem of law and order. The central tenet of the L&O approach to counterinsurgency theory is that the primary consideration of counterinsurgency should focus on the targeting insurgents as they are seen as the principal cause of the breakdown of law and order. The resulting strategy relies heavily on the use of force at the tactical level and has as its primary goal the elimination either through intimidation, coercion or attrition of those who threaten to destabilise the functioning of the state. Conceived of as such, Indias counter 81 Balagopal, K (2006) p 2185. 82 Hindustan Times. October 16, 2009. 31

insurgency approach to the problem of Naxalism centres on two pivotal assumptions that the restoration of the authority of the state as defined in terms of law and order is the primary goal of counter-insurgency and that anyone who gets in the way of this goal is considered to be an enemy of the state. The resulting conflict between the state and the Naxalites each claiming to assert their authority has led to deterioration in the rights and general welfare of the tribals leading to their alienation. Of those initiatives which have been the most alienating have been those taking place in the state of Chhattisgarh. Having been consistently occupied since 1980 and increasingly becoming the focal point of Naxalite operations, in 2005 Mahendra Karma, the opposition leader of the Chhattisgarh assembly put forward the idea for the formation of the Salwa Judum. The group was organised the premise that the unrest created by the Naxalites encroachment of progress in the area could be harnessed an used to counter it. As a result bands of men and women, especially the young were recruited, funded, armed and assured of the assistance and the support of the state.83 Once armed, the civilians were grouped with police and paramilitary forces and sent to force villagers into camps located near major roads, with a view to sanitising the villages and being able control the population. When villagers refused to relocate the Salwa Judum responded by burning villages and raping women.84 Upwards of 50,000 people have been displaced as a result of the governments relocation program and been refused the right to return to their homes.85 Meanwhile within the camps, no suitable access to employment or land has been made while lack of food, water and shelter has seen people resort to raiding nearby villages.86

83 Thakur, Sankarshan (2006) 84 Guha, Ramchandra (2007) pp. 3310-3311. 85 Balgopal, K (2006) 2184 86 Sundar, Nadini (2006) p 3187. 32

Moreover, while the camps were allegedly opened to protect the people who inhabited the villages from the violence of the Naxalites, it instead led to a polarisation of the community in which tribals look upon their fellow countryman as an enemy.87 For the state government, this has been seen as a success as it has allowed the Chief Minister to proclaim with impunity that those who live in the camps are with us, and those who run away are Naxalites88 you are either with us or against us. However the government has failed to take into account the legal, political and security implications of arming civilians without giving them proper training or specific political goals in fighting insurgents and using them to force fellow villagers into makeshift camps. Furthermore, there was little consideration given to how the Maoists might respond to the movement. As a tribal living in the camps put it First it was the dalams, now there is the dalam, the Salwa Judum and the danger of being blamed by both for reporting to the other89. While the Salwa Judum has been led by the state government recent efforts by the central government to defeat the Maoist insurgency have shown that the perception of the insurgency as a zero-sum game emanates from the centre. In the Autumn of 2009, the central government launched Operation Green Hunt. Like the Salwa Judum, Operation Green Hunt was premised on the need to defeat insurgents as understood in traditional military terms. While the government has refused to employ the army90, it has relied heavily on its paramilitary force, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in conjunction with the state police of the districts of Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, Orissa, and Jharkand. 87 Kumar, Himanshu (2009) p 8. 88 Ibid p 8. 89 Thakur, Sankarshan (2006) 90 Raju, Radha Vinod (2010) The reason for not using the army is because it is trained to kill foreign enemies. The army has itself affirmed that it is not willing to engage with the insurgents. If it were to do so it require the implementation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which would provide for the suspension of certain fundamental rights. This would ultimately be worst than the current situation where although rights are being ignored, they are at least in theory upheld. 33

With an emphasis on eliminating insurgents, the CRPF has been accused of indiscriminately attacking unarmed tribals on the basis of their being Naxalite sympathisers. As with the Salwa Judum, the polarisation of tribals into enemies and friends of the state has led to an over-dependant and indiscriminate dependence on violence often against defenceless villagers. Not only has this had a demoralising effect on the tribals, it has equally led to the demoralising of the troops who are carrying out the operations. This is partly because, government forces suffered a series of devastating losses as a result of Maoist attacks carried out as counter-offensives against Operation Green Hunt. Of those loses, one happened to be the single largest defeat when 75 CRPF and one local police superintendant lost their lives in a Maoist ambush in Dantewada.91 While it is these recent attacks in particular that have gathered the greatest criticism from the Indian public, the Maoists are aware that inflicting calculated losses upon the state forces demoralises both the troops that are meant to be fighting them and the government that is meant to be co-ordinating that fighting. Indeed when an entire company of CRPF officers was wiped out in the Dantewada, rather taking the opportunity to boost morale by replacing it and sending the message the Maoist violence would be met with retaliation, the DG (government) elected to leave the post unfilled.92 This has led to resentment towards the state as expressed by a member of the CRPF in Chhattisgarh who commented that We are the expendables [] We count for nothing at least not in Dehli.93 The result of the governments counter-insurgency operations on the ground have therefore led to disaffection and disillusionment towards the state amongst both the 91 Datta, Saikat (2010) p 2. 92 Pandey, Brijesh (2010) 93 Ibid. 34

populations affected by the insurgency and the states own security forces. Although the Maoists goal of overthrowing the government has been claiming that the Maoist insurgency is the countrys single largest security threat it has failed to properly address the political challenge that it presents to the legitimacy of the government. While it may be argued that the Maoists have recently undermined their own political goals as a result of their increasing recourse to violence, the reality remains that they still have the support of and control over significant tribal areas as a result of their political and developmental work over the past three decades. Moreover, the governments overuse of force has done little to re-establish its own legitimacy. The current situation is thus such that, while the Maoists will find it difficult to expand outside their current areas of operation, the Indian state will not be able to easily restore order and legitimacy in the tribal areas that have passed out its grasp. If it wants to bring a conclusion to the insurgency, the government will have to address the political bankruptcy of its current counterinsurgency operations. Indeed, as John Mackinlay has pointed out to win back the population the state needs to have a political idea, a strategy that overwhelms the insurgent manifesto.94 Thus, if it is to restore the legitimacy and authority of democracy in India, the government will have to become more self critical, accountable, and most importantly more dedicated to winning over local populations rather than focussing on defeating its enemies.

94 Mackinlay, John (2010) p 6. 35

Chapter 3
I can fight Naxals but not Naxalism95 Rahul Sharma, Superintendant of police in Dantewada- 2008 While the Indian government has acknowledged that Naxalism poses a threat to the sovereignty of the state, it has consistently focused on targeting insurgents whilst failing to counter the political challenges raised by the movement. The resulting counterinsurgency operations which have followed from this understanding of the insurgency have depended on traditional military strategies without consideration for the effects that its application has on populations affected by insurgency. Moreover, the state has continually failed to provide physical and legal protection to those who are affected by the insurgency. Contrary to the Indian governments current approach, in drawing on theories from classical counter-insurgency theory, the American campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan gradually dropped the strategy of targeting insurgents in favour of a more sensitive and calculated approach where the objective is not to defeat an enemy as in conventional warfare, but rather to win the hearts and minds of the local population.96 The problem with targeting insurgents is that applying a disproportionate use of force on the part of the state adds to the strength of an insurgency by further alienating the affected population, whose support is required for a successful operation.97 In fact, the strategy of targeting insurgents by the American army in Afghanistan and Iraq became looked on so unfavourably that it became known as mowing the grass, because the killing of insurgents would only increase the resentment of local populations, leading more of them to join in the insurgents operation.98 95 Chakravarti, Sudeep (2008) p 376. 96 Kahl, Colin H. (2007) 97 Goswami, Nasrata (2010) p 98 Berman, Eli; Felter, Joseph; Shapiro, Jacob N. (2010) 36

Thus the strength of a counter-insurgency strategy must be assessed not by quantifiable data such as the number of insurgents killed, but by the extent of support from the local population.99 In order to win hearts and minds a comprehensive strategy which includes a mix of population security, governance reform, economic development, and leadership targeting is required.100 The assumption of this strategy is simple in that the more effective the government is at providing services to civilians, the more likely it is that they will prefer the government over the insurgents.101 In order to be able to implement the various strategies at the tactical level the central tenet of counterinsurgency theory claims that a government must have a clear political aim102. Indeed, to win back the population the state needs to not only have a political aim, but a strategy that overwhelms the insurgent manifesto.103 If one were to examine the policies of the central government over the last ten years it would appear that it had come to terms with some of the basic aspects of counterinsurgency theory. As early as March 2000 the then Home Minister L.K. Advani stated that the Naxalite problem is linked to economic development and therefore, the planning for security and development must go together104. In effect the rhetoric of the centre has changed little as the Chief Minister with the support of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh proclaimed that the government would be implementing a new twopronged strategy which provided for the dual implementation of security and development.105 Thus if one were to take the words of the governments at face value, it

99 Galula, David (1964) p 79. 100 Bittle, Stephen, (2010) 101 Berman, Eli; Felter, Joseph; Shapiro, Jacob N. (2010) 102 Nagl, John (2005) p 29. 103 Mackinlay, John (2010) p 6. 104 Reddy, Shashidhar M. (2008) p 51. 105 Sahni, Ajai. July (2010) 37

would appear that not only has the government understood the importance of counterinsurgency theory, but it has been practising it for the last ten years. The problem however, is that in claiming to deal with both the security and developmental needs of the populations affected by the insurgency, the government has relied on catchphrases and empty rhetoric without any reference to the nuts and bolts of what is available, a coherent strategy into which these capacities can be woven, and how it is to be implemented.106 The reality as to why the details involved in the implementation of counter-insurgency doctrine have yet to be applied are in effect related to its inability to deliver effective governance, which is a cornerstone of any successful counterinsurgency operation as it is necessary for ensuring the protection and the economic and social wellbeing of the affected populace.107 The situation in India is thus different from traditional counter-insurgency operations because expeditionary armies are for the most part responsible for the conduct of the counter-insurgency while local systems of governance are entrusted to the local population in order to provide legitimacy to the operation. In contrast, in fighting the Maoist insurgency the Indian government is simultaneously responsible for its counterinsurgency operation and the fulfillment of effective governance. The reason that this is so important for India is that it is directly responsible to its electorate and the ability to uphold the legal, security and social functions of the state are the source of its legitimacy. While the goal of contemporary counter-insurgency is to provide a climate in which the post-insurgent society can maintain political systems and institutions leading to long-term stability it would be assumed that the pre-existence of such systems and institutions in India would be advantageous in implementing a solution which is more sensitive to the needs of the population. 106 Sahni, Ajai. February (2010) 107 Singh, Harrinder (2010) p 4. 38

However, rather than facilitate the implementation of counterinsurgency doctrine, India has been burdened by the existence of structural deficiencies in its political, legal and security institutions. One of the greatest problems in this regard is the culture of corruption which is such a part of Indian political and legal culture. In 2008, the Association for Democratic Reforms, an independent watchdog based out of New Delhi, claimed that nearly a fourth of the 540 Parliament members face criminal charges, including human trafficking, immigration rackets, embezzlement, rape and even murder.108 Meanwhile, according to the corruption Perception Index in 1995, India was ranked 35th out of 41 countries, while in 2003, it remained in the bottom third of all countries listed, ranking 83rd out of 133 countries.109 Thus rather than having a bureaucracy which is accountable to the law and the people in practice the bureaucracy, both at the centre and state levels has emerged as the locus of executive power, accountable neither to the political establishment nor to the people.110 As one former Home Minister put it: our whole administrative apparatus is in shambles and the organised and highly qualified civil services based on open competitive examinations, on the brink of extinction.111 Thus one of the ironies of the Indian situation, is that in contrast to the American military in Iraq and Afghanistan which has shown a great capacity for self-criticism, within the upper-ranks of the police-force, the military or the Ministry of Home Affairs there has remained unresponsive to the needs of the people. Meanwhile, deliberations in parliament and in the public has been divided along the rigid lines set out by the Ministry of Home Affairs with those who support development being considered pro-Maoist, while 108 Washington Times July 24th, 2008. 109 Singh, Prakash (2006) p 239. Furthermore, the World Economic Survey ranked India 45th out of 49 countries on the honesty of its public officials. 110 Chitalkar, Poorvi (2010) p 9. 111 Singh, Prakash (2006) p 250. 39

those who support law and order are pro-government, as if the two were mutually exclusive. As a result there has been relatively little constructive debate concerning its counter-insurgency doctrine and its over-reliance on force. However while it would be easy to blame the lack of debate within the states security apparatus for this shortcoming, it is the civil government which has failed to hold its security forces accountable to the criticisms of the public. One of the central problems in the respect is the gap in accountability between the central and state governments affected by Naxalism. While the central government has maintained that Naxalism is a threat to national security, it has continually reaffirmed that matters of law and order and development are matters of state importance.112 Indeed while both the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Planning Commission have continually offered to give money to states in need of support, they have failed to provide any political directive for the implementation of successful operations. The result of this has been an uneven response across the various afflicted states. Thus on one hand there has been the response of the government of Chhattisgarh which has taken a heavy-handed initiative without any political consideration for the negative outcomes of its operations and initiatives such as the Salwa Judum. In contrast, in Bihar, the governments approach to Naxalism has been lax due to a mutual understanding between the Naxalites and the ruling coalition resulting in a lack of action being taken by the state against the Naxalites.113 Somewhere in between these two extremes there is the state of Andhra Pradesh, which has been actively debating the need for a comprehensive 112 See Reddy, M. Shashdhar (2008) pp 48-58. This account traces the various responses of the central government of to the requests made by the government of Andhra Pradesh for assistance in tackling the Naxalite insurgency between 1998 and 2004. As per a statement made on the 10th December 2002, public order and police being state subjects, it is for concerned state governments to devise methods and take concrete steps to curb Left-wing extremist violence. 113 Vinod Raju, Radha (2010) 40

approach to counter-insurgency since the late 1980s. As a result it has gradually adopted a political approach and applied a series of measures at the grass roots level. In doing so it has acknowledged the importance of gradually building up the support of the population, using small but well-trained forces which were paid a substantial 50% remuneration114 Moreover, police stations were re-occupied, fortified with barbed wire and heavy machine guns and given excellent lines of communication. Finally, in acknowledging the need to arrive at a political settlement, the government in Andhra Pradesh held peace talks with the insurgents. Although the talks broke down the fact the government and the Maoists in the region were willing to temporarily cease hostilities to search for a need for a political settlement to the insurgency represented a progress in the governments approach to the insurgency While the experience of Andhra Pradesh has been looked upon as a success at the state-level, the reality is that the majority of Naxalites simply fled to the states of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and Bihar, where police are less well equipped to counter guerrilla warfare. The problem with this imbalance is that in leaving state governments to tackle problems of public order no coherent police effort of the kind required to fight counter-insurgency can be established. So far the governments idea of a co-ordinated approach has centred on how to use the paramilitary CRPF, while guaranteeing money to states. The problem with this is that the while the CRPF is integral to the counterinsurgency operations it can only be employed successfully if it has the intelligence network and security infrastructure which can only come from established well-trained local police forces. Moreover when money is handed out without conditions and a means of ensuring that it is used effectively, it often gets wasted and embezzled. Thus the centre

114 Vinod Raju, Radha (2010) 41

must go beyond relying on paramilitary forces and simply giving money to states and instead put pressure on state governments to establish effective police forces. The implementation of a state-wide program to improve its security forces should be premised on the success of the Andhra model. One of the greatest problems in this respect, is that there is a severe lack of police officers across the states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkand, Mahrastatra, West Bengal and Orissa.115 One of the most important lessons to be drawn from Andhra Pradesh and other successful counter-insurgency campaigns is that there cannot be any substitute for guarding the populace by ensuring [a] physical presence116 Therefore if the government wants to implement a comprehensive security strategy across Naxal-affected states it will have to ensure that the severe crisis in police vacancies is filled.117 Not only that but there should be an emphasis on recruiting local populations to fill those vacancies. Indeed, as recently experienced by the American army in Iraq and Afghanistan, one of the greatest difficulties encountered in initiating a population centric counter-insurgency is the inability of expeditionary forces to communicate with local populations and associate with local customs. This is just as much the case in India where dialects vary across tribal areas. However, so far the government has relied heavily on paramilitary forces such as the CRPF, which although they have training in counter-insurgency, cannot provide the permanent presence and local knowledge upon which the building of effective intelligence is based. In order to ensure that the police focuses on protecting the population, the government needs to ensure that the police forces are given adequate resources such as weapons, communications, a defensible police stations and sufficient remuneration in 115 Sahni, Ajai (2010) p 3. 116 Singh, Harinder (2010) p 4. 117 Sahni, Ajai February (2010) p 3. According to Sahni, the deficiencies in police forces given as a percentage as respectively Bihar 33%; Orissa 19%; Jharkhand 21%; Chhattisgarh 25%; Andhra Pradesh 11%; West Bengal 25%. 42

order to ensure that police know that they have the support of the state. Moreover, rigid training relating to the sensitivity required when dealing with local populations need to be administered to any police officer who is going to be policing a Naxal affected area. While this is fundamental to the success of counter-insurgency, it is probably the most difficult facet of the security strategy as it is dependant on the need for a political understanding of law and order. Even without taking into account the added sensitivity required in a counter-insurgency, the level of corruption within the police force presents a major challenge to successful counter-insurgency operations. Indeed according to a report produced by Human Rights Watch in 2009, state police forces in India operate outside the law, lack sufficient ethical and professional standards, are overstretched and outmatched by criminal elements, and unable to cope with increasing public demands and expectations118. If it is to win over local populations from the insurgents, the Indian government will have to make a concerted effort to purge criminal elements from its police force through drastic reforms and the application of the law to those forces which are guilty of committing abuses such as torture, murder and rape. Beyond the challenges inherent in the reform of its state police force, the central government also faces the challenge of implementing development initiatives that are beneficial to the populations who have been won over by the rudimentary improvements made by the Naxalites. The governments Planning Commission recently put together a panel of activists, journalists, professors, ex-police officers, and former politicians. It concluded that if it is to effectively deal with the insurgency it will have to reverse the current development paradigm pursued since independence which has aggravated the prevailing discontent among marginalised society.119

118 India: Overhaul Abusive, Failing System; www.hrw.org. 119 Banerjee, Sumanta (2010) p 11. 43

However so far, the government has been unable to reconcile the political goals of economic development as viewed by the central and state governments with the political goals required in a counter-insurgency campaign. Thus, under the supervision of the central government there have been several programs such as the National Employment Rural Guarantee Act (NERGA) and the Backwards Districts Initiative, which have been put in place under the supervision of the central government.120 However the implementation of acts such as the NERGA has been poor as a result of the corrupt bureaucracy of the state.121 Indeed of those areas that have been worst affected by Naxalism, none have shown any serious dedication to providing sustainable development to tribal populations. The reasons for this can be summed up by the fact that it remains in the immediate economic interest of the state to push through development projects which are centered on profit creation rather than jobs creation and conservation of specially designated tribals areas.122 In part this can be blamed by pressure placed upon them as a result of the central governments creation of Special Economic Zones under the SEZ Act of 2005, which has essentially led to the creation of geographical regions with different economic laws to the rest of the country in order to facilitate increased investment and economic activity.123 Of those areas which have been designated for the implementation of SEZs, the Naxalaffected states of Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand, Marahastra and Karnatka, have a variety of steel, iron and mining projects planned totaling US$ 85 billion of promised

120 Ministry of Home Affairs Annual Report on Naxalism 2009; http://mha.nic.in 121 See Banerjee, Kaustav and Saha Partha (2010) p 47. In many cases the NERGA has failed to even guarantee minimum wages due to poor implementation, while lower level corruption in government banks has meant that often workers do not get paid at all. 122 See Banerjee, Kaustav and Saha Partha (2010) 123 Chakrabarty, Bidyut and Kumar Kujur, Rajat (2010) p 165. 44

investment.124 The problem of these projects is not so much their goal of economic development, but rather the fact they do not involve the people but simply treat them as objects of the development process and often end up as conduits of largesse for elite groups middlemen, contractors, officials, politicians and favoured special interest groups [with] very little reaches the intended beneficiaries.125 According to section 46 of the Indian constitution the state is entrusted both with promoting the economic interests of Scheduled Castes and Tribes and with their protection from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.126 This is accompanied by Schedules V and VI of the constitution which provide for local councils to share in the royalties from minerals found on tribal land; in practice however the tribals do not get to see any of the profits with proceeds usually going to contractors and state-level politicians.127 The extent of the lower-level corruption is so bad that even when corporations are willing or where state resources are available and earmarked for the purpose of rehabilitation and fair compensation, the fail to reach the intended populations.128 Moreover the impact of the projects guaranteed under the SEZs and development projects which preceded them has led to massive displacement and loss of land and livelihoods. One estimate claims that from the time of independence until 2000, a total of 1.7 million people of which .8 million were tribal were displaced by central and state

124 Kujur, Rajat Kumar (2007). 125 Bardhan, Pranab (1998) p 189. 126 Indian Constitution - Article 46. 127 Guha, Ramchandra (2007) p 3310. 128 Sahni, Ajai July (2010); Sharma, E. A. S. (2010) gives the example of a chunk of l and forcibly acquired from the people and givenr cheaply to a private power company in Visakhampatnam district in 1994 is still with that company without any sign of a power project coming up. The government is even a silent witness to the company leasing out that land to the original cultivators at escalating rentals. 45

government schemes.129 While the government is bound by Schedules V and VI to provide for the rehabilitation of tribals displaced by development projects, it has so far only rehabilitated 25%.130 Indeed rather than uphold the law in favour of the tribals, state officials have been better known for manipulating land records in their own favour, in order to claim tribal lands.131 Rather than employing laws to uphold the principle of justice as guaranteed in the constitution and in favour of the population, the government has so far sought to use the counter-insurgency as an excuse for flaunting the law. Take for example the issues of the Salwa Judum. Since its inception, it has increasingly come under criticism from a wide range of politicians, human rights activists and special reports and enquiries for its human rights abuses and for being the product of an alliance between international and national mining interests and the local elites, capitalising on local inter-tribe rivalries, mediated by national and state policymakers.132 On the 10th of June 2008, the Supreme Court acknowledged the widespread allegations of abuses on the part of the Salwa Judum by ordering the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) to investigate into the situation in Dantewada. While this should have been an opportunity to enforce the governments commitment to legal accountability, rather than appointing an independent committee to conduct an enquiry, the NHRC directed its police wing to constitute a factfinding committee.133 The resulting conclusions were neither objective nor neutral, as violations by the Salwa Judum effectively went uncondemned and were rather held up as an effective extension of law enforcement. Not only were the investigators themselves

129 Ahuja, Pratul and Ganguly, Rajat (2007) p 262. 130 Subramanian, K.S. (2010) P 25. 131 Chakrabarty, Bidyut and Kumar Kujur, Rajat (2010) p 118. 132 Maringanti, Anant (2010) p 43. 133 Balgopal, K (2008) p 10. 46

biased. When the Salwa Judum found out that villagers had been speaking with the NHRC committee, they punished them by beating them.134 The inability the government to suppress such a counter-productive and unlawful movement for which it was responsible on the one hand, and the inability to ensure that its representatives whether they be elected officials or security personnel comply with the law on the other, are indicative that the government has failed to understand the importance of the supremacy of politics in fighting counter-insurgencies. Indeed rather than seeking to uphold the law as a means of gaining the support of the people, its strategy has been to subsume legal and political rights to its counter-insurgency operations. As a result, dozens of human rights activists who were fighting for the wellbeing of tribal populations, have been unlawfully detained or murdered without recourse to justice135. At the same time, tribal populations continue to be beaten, raped and unlawfully detained by police forces. Furthermore while the importance of reforming its police force is central to both a successful counter-insurgency operation and the provision of substantive justice, both the central and the majority of state governments have failed to comply with a 2006 Supreme Court Judgement which mandated the reform of police laws.136 The central governments attitude towards the need to focus on issues of legal rights and civil liberties was best summed up when the Home Minister P. Chidambaram proclaimed in the states defence that civil society organisations were getting in the way of the States efforts to contain rebels 137 In criminalising human rights groups and the institutions of civil society which sympathise with the economic and social issues which Naxalism claims to fight for, the 134 Kumar, Himanshu (2009) p 9. 135 See Guha, Ramchandra (2007) p 3310; Chakravarti, Sudeep (2009) pp 366- 374; Radhika, M. (2007). 136 India: Overhaul Abusive, Failing Police System. Human Rights Watch; www.hrw.org. 137 Sahni, Ajai. July (2010) 47

government has generally failed to note the rising consciousness of the deprived sections of society, who are today more determined than ever before to struggle for land, forest resources, minimum wages, social dignity and self-governance. Instead of recognising this new consciousness as a positive democratic phenomenon138 While this may be dismissed by the government as superficial to its counter-insurgency strategy, if it is to come up with a coherent political platform that sets the standard for Indias counterinsurgency operations, the Indian government will have to come to terms with the fact that dissent is a necessary part of a functioning constitutional democracy. Not only must it allow for dissent, but it must encourage and provide channels through which tribals and especially tribal women can become politically empowered.139 Thus, although there is a need to acknowledge the importance of implementing the nuts and bolts of counter-insurgency, as the American campaign in Afghanistan has recently acknowledged, these provisions can only have a lasting impact if they are accompanied by a political surge a committed effort to persuade insurgents to put down their arms and give up the fight.140 In India the importance of a political surge is even more imperative as the institutional deficiencies inherent in Indias political and security apparatus means that the desired outcomes of security and development initiatives will take a long time to implement and will therefore not be able to provide a conclusive end to violence in the short term.141 The most effective way to achieve a political end to the insurgency is to hold talks with insurgents. As an article recently published by Anant Maringanti has pointed out in order for there to be talks, the government must acknowledge that the Maoist movement

138 Sahni, Ajai (2001) 139 Raja, D. (2008) p 9. 140 Fontini, Christia and Semple, Michael(2009) pp 34-5. 141 Sahni, Ajai. Feburary(2010) 48

is a political movement and there can only be a political resolution.142 In order to this it the government will have to acknowledge that the current insurgency is not the same as the one that it crushed in the late 1960s. Not only has the current insurgency been able to mobilise and control a large portion of the population; in the past 5 years it has increasingly employed the rhetoric of democracy and demonstrated a willingness to arrive at a political solution to the insurgency.143 In part this is because the majority of the leaders, who are generally well-educated, realise that despite the progress which they have made in the last thirty years, the movement has reached a plateau and thus the goal of overthrowing the government through armed insurrection is neither possible, nor in the interests of the masses of people they claim to represent. As one senior Maoist commander acknowledged: Communist rule is a very distant ambition. Just now we are fighting for democracy. We are fighting for the Constitution.144 Indeed one of the benefits of confronting the Maoist insurgents on a political plane is that there are elements of their political ideology which not only coincide with those of the government, but which are in fact enshrined in its constitution. However so far, any talk of being able to negotiate between the government and the insurgents has been constrained due to the Home Ministers insistence on the precondition that Maoists abjure violence and say they are prepared for talks no ifs buts and no conditions.145 As Deepak Malholtra has pointed out such strict preconditions as the unilateral cessation of violence on behalf of the government have the virtue of ideological purity but the vice of impracticality146. Thus one of the drawbacks of the Indian situation is that whereas the American army has been under pressure from local 142 Maringanti, Anant (2010) p 45. 143 The Hindu: Azad Interview. 144 Chaudhury, Shoma (2010) 145 The Hindu: Azad Interview. 146 Malholtra, Deepak (2009) p 89. 49

tribal groups to be more accommodating in its plans for state-building and in finding an acceptable political solution to the Afghan insurgency, the Indian government has continued to retreat into ideological rigidity and an inability to compromise. If the government is to achieve an acceptable political conclusion to the insurgency it will have to therefore have to be more flexible in dealing with insurgents. Finally, while it will have to acknowledge that talks are an important step in achieving a political solution to the insurgency it must be understood that they must be seen as an intermediate stage not the goal itself.147 Therefore the government must not only enter into negotiations with the insurgents, but must also engage with tribal populations. One of the proposed suggestions for such an endeavor would see the government approach the various independent mass organisations which are working on their behalf as intermediaries and advisors, as it currently lacks the capacity to do so on its own.148 However, as matters currently stand, the prospects of achieving reconciliation and a political conclusion to the insurgency continues to be hindered by the governments inability to overcome the polarised political climate which it is both a part of and responsible for creating. Until the Indian government can separate politics from violence and dedicate itself to a long-term project of institutional and developmental reform in the name of substantive justice, it will find itself constrained to depending on violence to counter an insurgency as it has done for the past 60 years, without any prospect of a peaceful conclusion.

147 Maringanti, Anant (2010) p 45. 148 Hensman, Rohini (2010) 50

Conclusion

A study of the Naxalite insurgency in India shows that it evolved as a political political ideology over time. This process saw the movement begin by questioning challenging the still extant feudal land-owning systems which alienated the basic rights of triblas as enshrined in the Indian constitution. The increasing militarisation, and politicization of the movement throughout the 20th century saw it able to rest traditional political authority from the state by establishing an alternate form of political legitimacy which developed a significant support base in isolated rural areas. However, the movements support base has remained fairly small in comparison to the intended goals of its original ideologues. The Indian state has also undergone a political transformation since gaining independence. With the writing of its constitution, it gained a document that provided for a model of equality and justice in a country, which more so than other contemporary democracies, was deeply divided along lines of class and caste. There have been many areas where the constitution has been applied to provide social justice and equality. Moreover, the continued support for democratic forms of governance through widespread participation in local, state and national elections attest to the very broad base of legitimacy that the government enjoys. However, there is equally a general feeling of despair among the people over the way the executive, the legislature and the judiciary have been functioning.149 The combination of the states failure and the Naxalites opportunism has created a situation in which the state and the insurgency are stuck in a violent stalemate. If it is going to counter the insurgency and provide substantive justice to tribal populations, the 149 Singh, Prakesh (2006) p 250. 51

government needs to simultaneously reaffirm its ability to provide security, development, governance and justice. In a counter insurgency the various different strategic components form a whole in which the pieces mutually support one another. If you pull one out and don't do any of the rest, especially if you pull one out in a way that undermines the rest it could hinder the governments counter-insurgency campaign 150. In order to ensure that the pieces required for a counter-insurgency are held in place, the Indian government will have to show that it has the political will to implement the necessary policy and institutional reforms. However, on top of needing to apply the necessary reforms to its counterinsurgency doctrine, the Indian government faces the further challenge of confronting the special interests of domestic and international companies, as well as the public officials and private individuals who profit from their business. More than ever the government of India finds itself under pressure from international markets and investors to be economically competitive. So far these pressures have had a negative effect on the governments social and economic policies towards tribals. If it wants to end the insurgency and maintain its position as a strong international economy it will have to give serious consideration as to how it can reconcile the demand for continued economic growth and the need to provide sustainable development for tribals. The acceptance and promotion of tribal rights wherever they may be legally applicable will fundamental in achieving this. However, there will also have to be a deeper reconsideration of the institutional framework of the Indian political system and its socio-economic impact upon the population. While the political outcome of the insurgency in India is almost certainly going to see the constitutional democratic system stay in place, its nature and character remain open for debate. If it wants to end the current insurgency and deny opportunities to 150 Biddle, Stephen (2010) 52

future insurgents, it will have to acknowledge that the maintenance of the status quo is unacceptable..

At the time of writing this paper, the Indian press suggested that talks between the government and Azad, the spokesperson for the CPI (M) and fourth in rank in the party, were being prepared, with a view to entering into political negotiations. The build-up to the talks was met with anticipation that at the very least a ceasefire might be agreed upon, leading to a temporary cessation of violence on both sides. However on July 2nd Azad, the very person who was supposed to be pushing for a mutual ceasefire was found dead. If this was not already a setback for the possibility of a political resolution to the violence, the circumstances surrounding his death seem that his death was an assassination staged as an encounter between state and Maoists.. Whether this is true or not, the government has refused to hold an official inquiry into the death. Meanwhile, in the last week of August 2010, Kisenji, one of the higher ranking members of the CPI (M), reaffirmed his partys dedication to a peaceful settlement contingent on a mutual ceasefire and an inquiry into the death of Azad.151 It remains to be seen whether the government will overcome its tradition of maintaining the status quo.

151 Chaudhury, Shoma (2010) 53

 Bibliography Ahuja, Pratul and Ganguly, Rajat. The Fire Within: Naxalite Insurgency Violence in India. Small Wars & Insurgencies. Vol 18, no. 2 (2007); pp 249-274.

Balgopal, K. Peoples War and the Government. Economic and Political Weekly. February 8, 2003.

Balgopal, K. Physiognomy of Violence. Economic and Political Weekly. June 3, 2006.

Balgopal, K. The NHRC on Salwa Judum: A Most Friendly Inquiry. Economic and Political Weekly. December 20, 2008; pp 10-14.

Banerjee, Kaustav and Saha, Partha. The NREGA, the Maoists and the Developmental Woes of the Indian State. Economic and Political Weekly. July 10, 2010; pp 42-47.

Banerjee, Sumanta. On the Naxalite Movement: A Report with a Difference Economic and Political Weekly. May 24, 2008.

Berman, Eli; Felter, Joseph H.; Shapiro, Jacob N. Constructive COIN: How Development Can Fight Radicals. Foreign Affairs. June 1, 2010. www.foreignaffairs.com

Bhatia, Bela. The Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar. Economic and Political Weekly. April 9, 2005; pp 1536-1549.

Bhattacharya, Dipankar. Trail Blazed by Naxalabri Uprising. Economic and Political Weekly. December 16, 2006; pp 5191-5194.

Biddle, Stephen. Q&A with Stephen Biddle on Afghanistan. Foreign Affairs, August 11, 2010: www.foreignaffaris.com.

Biddle, Stephen; Christia, Fontini and Their, J. Alexander. Defining Success in

54

Afghanistan. Foreign Affairs, July/August 2010.

Chakrabarty, Biyut and Kumar Kujur, Rajat. Maoism in India: Reincarnation of ultra-left wing extremism in the twenty-first century. Routledge (2010).

Charkravarti, Sudeep. Red Sun: Travels in Naxalite Country. Penguin Books (2008).

Chaudhury, Shoma. Are We Living in a State that Mouths Peace but Shoots Its Messengers. Tehelka. Vol 7, issue 34, August 28, 2010.

Chitalkar, Poorvi. Charting a New Institutional Development In India:Diagnosing Executive Failure, Critiquing Judicial Activism and Proposing Innovative Institutional Solutions. University of Toronto (2008). Christia, Fotini and Semple, Michael. Flipping the Taliban: How to Win in Afghanistan. Foreign Affairs, July/August 2009; pp 34-45.

Dasgupta, Rajeshwari. Towards the New Man: Revolutionary Youth and Rural Agency in the Naxalite Movement. Economic and Political Weekly. May 31, 2006.

Datta, Saikat. Death of an Illusion. Outlook India, April 19, 2010. Dreze, Jean and Gazdar, Haris. Uttar Pradesh: The Burden of Inertia in: Dreze, Jean and Sen Amartya: eds. Indian Development. OUP (1997).

Dreze, Jean and Sen Amartya: eds. Indian Development. OUP (1997). Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Frederick A. Praeger Inc. (1964).

Garg, Ruchir. The Case of Dandakarnya, ed. Ramana, P.V.: The Naxal Challenge: Causes, Linkages and Policy Options, Observer Research Foundation (2008).

Ghosh, Jaylal. Development Strategy in India: A Political Economy Perspective

55

eds. Bose, Sugata and Jalal Ayesha: Nationalism, Democracy & Development: World Politics in India. OIP (1998).

Goswami, Namrata. Indias counter-insurgency experience: the trust and nurture strategy. Small Wars and Insurgencies. Vol. 20 no. 1, March 2009; pp 66-86.

Guha, Rajit. Elementary Aspects of Colonial Insurgency. OUP (1983). Guha, Ramchanrda. Adivasis, Naxalites and Indian Democracy. Economic and Political Weekly. August 11, 2007; pp 3305-3312.

Gupta, Smita. Searching for a Third Way in Dantewada. Economic and Political Weekly. April 17, 2010; pp 12-17.

Hensman, Rohini. Heading for a Bloodbath. Outlook India. April 22, 2010. Jha, Sanjay. Political Bases and Dimensions of the Naxalite Movement. ed. Ramana P.V. The Naxal Challenge. Observer Research Foundation (2008).

Kahl, Colin. COIN of the Realm: Is There a Future for Counterinsurgency. Foreign Affairs. November/December 2007. www.foreignaffairs.com

Krishnji, N. Lessons of Naxalabri. Economic and Political Weekly Vol 15, no. 36, 1980.

Kujur, Rajat Kumar. Underdevelopment and Naxal Movement. Economic and Political Weekly. February 18, 2006; pp 557-559.

Kujur, Rajat Kumar. From CRZ to SEZ: Naxal Reings of Terror. Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies: Article 2271, April 21, 2007.

Kujur, Rajat. Naxal Movement in India: A profile. Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies. New Dehli, September 2008.

Kujur, Rajat Kumar. Violent Revolution: The Naxal War Zone in Orissa. Insititute for Peace and Conflict Studies: Article 2614. July 8, 2008.

56

Kumar, Himanshu. Who is the Problem, the CPI (Maoist) or the Indian State. Economic and Political Weekly. November 21, 2009. Mackinlay, John. The Insurgent Archipelago. C Hurst & Co (2010). Malholtra, Deepak. Without Condition. Foreign Affairs, September/October Maringanti, Anant Talks between the Maoists and the State: Learning from the Experience. Economic and Political Weekly. August 21, 2010. Mittal, Tusha. Party offices, schools and panchayats are stacked with arms. Tehelka. Vol 7, no. 32, August 14, 2010. Mukerhji, Nirmalangshu. Arms over the People: What Have the Maoists Achieved in Dandakaranya?. Economic and Political Weekly. June 19 2010. Nagl, John. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. University of Chicago Press (2002). Naithan Shobita. Doomed by Caste Damned by Gender. Tehleka. July 24 2010. Pandey, Brijesh. Hard Battles, Harder Lives. Tehelka, Vol 7, Issue 29, 2010. Radhika, M. In the Line of Fire. Tehleka. August 25, 2007. www.tehelka.com. Ramana, P.V. A Critical Evaluation of the Union Governments Repsonse to the Maoist Challenge. Strategic Analysis: Vol. 33, no. 5. September 2009; pp 745-759. Dated July 24, 2009. Andhra

Ray, Aswini W. Human Rights Movement in India: A Historical Perspective. Economic and Political Weekly. August 9, 2003; pp 3409-3415.

Reddy, M. Shashidhar. A Political Approach to the Naxalite Problem: Viability and Prerequisites for Success. ed. Ramana, P.V The Naxal Challenge. Observer Research Foundation (2008).

57

Sahni, Ajai. Naxalism The Retreat of Civil Governance. South Asia Intelligence Review, May, 2000; http://www.satp.org/

Sahni, Ajai. Anti-Maoist Strategy: Utter Disarray. South Asia Intelligence Review, July 19, 2010 :http://www.satp.org/

Sahni, Ajai. Indias Maoists and the Dreamscape of Solutions. South Asia Intelligence Review, February, 2010: http://www.satp.org/

Sarma, E.A.S. The Saga of Sompeta: Public Deception, Private Gains. Economic and Political Weekly. August 14, 2010.

Sen, Amrtya. The Argumentative Indian. Penguin Books (2005) Singh, Harinder. Countering the Naxals. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. June 11, 2010.

Singh, Prakesh. The Naxalite Movement in India. Rupa & Co (2006). Singh, P.K. The Trajectory of the Movement. ed. Ramana, P.V The Naxal Challenge. Observer Research Foundation (2008).

Subramanian, K.S. State Response to Maoist Violence: A Critical Assesment. Economic and Political Weekly. August 7, 2010.

Sundar, Nadini. Bastar, Maoism and Salwa Judum. Economic and Political Weekly. July 22, 2006; pp 3187-3192.

Thakur, Sankarshan. My Battle your Blood. Tehelka. May 31, 2006. Vinod, Raju Radha. Countering the Naxal Threat II: The Case for Specialised Units. Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies: Article 3150. 14 June 2010.

Reports/Interviews India: Overhaul Abusive, Failing Police System. Human Rights Watch; www.hrw.org.

58

The Hindu: Interview with Azad: http://www.thehindu.com/multimedia/ /00103/Edited_text_of_12_2_103996a.pdf

archive

MHA Report on Naxalism 2008. Ministry of Home Affairs; mha.nic.in. PMs Speech at the Chief Ministers Meet on Naxalism. April 13, 2006. http://pmindia.nic.in/speech/content.asp?id=311

59