Sunteți pe pagina 1din 5

In 1973, license was issued to Milagros Matuguina to operate logging businesses under her group Matuguina Logging Enterprises.

MIWPI was established in 1974 with 7 stockholders. Milagros Matuguina became the majority stockholder later on. Milagros later petitioned to have MLE be transferred to MIWPI. Pending approval of MLEs petition, Davao Enterprises Corporation filed a complaint against MLE before the District Forester (Davao) alleging that MLE has encroached upon the area allotted for DAVENCORs timber concession. The Investigating Committee found MLE guilty as charged and had recommended the Director to declare that MLE has done so. MLE appealed the case to the Ministry of Natural Resources. During pendency, Milagrosa withdrew her shares from MIWPI. Later, MNR Minister Ernesto Maceda found MLE guilty as charged. Pursuant to the finding, DAVENCOR and Philip Co requested Maceda to order MLE and/or MIWPI to comply with the ruling to pay the value in pesos of 2352.04 m3 worth of timbers. The Minister then issued a writ of execution against MIWPI. MIWPI filed a petition for prohibition before the Davao RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of MIWPI and has ordered to enjoin the Minister from pursuing the execution of the writ. DAVENCOR appealed and the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. MIWPI averred that it is not a party to the original case (as it was MLE that was sued a separate entity). That the issuance of the order of execution by the Minister has been made not only without or in excess of his authority but that the same was issued patently without any factual or legal basis, hence, a gross violation of MIWPIs constitutional rights under the due process clause. ISSUE: Whether or not MIWPIs right to due process has been violated. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of MIWPI. Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case not bound by judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner an execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. There is no basis for the issuance of the Order of Execution against the MIWPI. The same was issued without giving MIWPI an opportunity to defend itself and oppose the request of DAVENCOR for the issuance of a writ of execution against it. In fact, it does not appear that MIWPI was at all furnished with a copy of DAVENCORs letter requesting for the Execution of the Ministers decision against it. MIWPI was suddenly made liable upon the order of execution by the respondent Secretarys expedient conclusions that MLE and MIWPI are one and the same, apparently on the basis merely of DAVENCORs letter requesting for the Order, and without hearing or impleading MIWPI. Until the issuance of the Order of execution, MIWPI was not included or mentioned in the proceedings as having any participation in the encroachment in DAVENCORs timber concession. This action of the Minister disregards the most basic tenets of due process and elementary fairness. The liberal atmosphere which pervades the procedure in administrative proceedings does not empower the presiding officer to make conclusions of fact before hearing all the parties concerned. (1996 Oct 24) G.R. No. 163101

An agreement to submit to voluntary arbitration must be complied with notwithstanding the fact that the dispute involved, under the law, is also required to be submitted to compulsory arbitration. [Benguet Corporation v. Department of Environment and Natural Resources - Mines Adjudication Board and J.G. Realty and Mining (G.R. No. 163101, 13 February 2008)] Benguet Corporation (Benguet) and J.G. Realty and Mining (J.G. Realty) entered into a Royalty Agreement with Option to Purchase (RAWOP), wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the owner of four mining claims covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) Application No. APSA-V0009 jointly filed by J.G. Realty as claimowner and Benguet as operator. The RAWOP, among others, provide that any disputes x x x between Benguet and *J.G. Realty+ with reference to anything whatsoever pertaining to [the RAWOP] x x x shall not be cause of any action x x x in any court or administrative agency but shall x x x be referred to a Board of Arbitrators consisting of three (3) members, one to be selected by Benguet, another to be selected by [J.G. Realty] and the third to be selected by the aforementioned two arbitrators so appointed. It further provides that no action shall be instituted in court as to any matter in dispute as hereinabove stated, except to enforce the decision of the majority of the Arbitrators. J.G. Realty subsequently informed Benguet that it was terminating the RAWOP by reason of Benguets failure to comply with its obligations thereunder. J.G. Realty sought the cancellation of the RAWOP, filing a petition for this purpose with the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) having territorial jurisdiction over the mining area involved. In its Decision, the POA declared the RAWOP cancelled. The decision was affirmed on appeal to the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB). Among the issues raised before the Supreme Court is whether or not the POA lacks jurisdiction over the dispute in view of the arbitration clause. The Court resolved this issue in the affirmative ruling that under Philippine domestic arbitration law, an agreement to avail of voluntary arbitration before resort is made to the courts or quasi-judicial agencies of the government is a valid contractual stipulation that must be adhered to by the parties. Interpreting the provisions of the law and of the RAWOP, the Court ruled that, in the event a case that should properly be the subject of voluntary arbitration is erroneously filed with the courts or quasi-judicial agencies, the court or quasi-judicial agency shall determine, on motion, whether such contractual provision for arbitration is sufficient/effective and, if in the affirmative, the court or quasi-judicial agency shall then order the enforcement of said provision.

In resolving this issue, the Court rejected the contention of J.G. Realty that prior resort to arbitration is unavailing in the instant case because the POAs mandate is to arbitrate disputes involving mineral agreements. It stated that there is a clear distinction between compulsory and voluntary arbitration. The arbitration provided by the POA is compulsory, while the nature of the arbitration provision in the RAWOP is voluntary, not involving any government agency. Interestingly, it is not clear if or how the ruling will impact other types of commercial disputes which, under Philippine law, are required to undergo compulsory arbitration by a government agency, such as labor disputes. Notably, Republic Act No. 9285 provides that its provisions shall not apply to the resolution of labor disputes.

Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, all disputes involving mineral agreements shall be under the

exclusive and original jurisdiction of the respective Panels of Arbitrators of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
2

Republic Act No. 9285 (The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004) which provides that

domestic arbitration shall continue to be governed by Republic Act No. 876 (The Arbitration Law) Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals Posted on November 18, 2012 G.R.No. 120865-71 December 7, 1995 Facts: The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns. PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same. EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term Laguna de Bay Region. Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides: Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the

consternation of the LLDA. The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake. The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and (3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813. A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures otherwise demolition shall be effected. Issues: 1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned? 2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency? Held: 1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of EO No.927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges on municipal waters.The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. Implied repeals are not favored and, as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On the other hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating & monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake control and management. It partakes of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, least limitable and most demanding of all state powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the

LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. 2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a cease and desist order and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.

S-ar putea să vă placă și