IN THE ALTERNATIVE [G.R. No. 131755.

October 25, 1999] In the event that the subject equipment could not be seized, that defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay the plaintiff its actual market value of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00), Philippine Currency, exclusive of the damages under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) stated supra. Plaintiff further prays for the other equitable reliefs and remedies. [1] Upon application of Cyborg, a writ of replevin was issued following the filing of a P300,000.00 replevin bond. The directive was contained in the courts order of 27 August 1996, viz: WHEREFORE, pursuant to Sections 1 to 3, Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, a Writ of Replevin is hereby ordered issued requiring the Sheriff of this Court to forthwith take possession of the property specified on the face of this Order after serving a copy of this Order to defendants, together with a copy of the application, affidavit, and bond. Accordingly, the Sheriff of this Court is hereby required to comply with Sections 4 to 8 of Rule 60. IT IS SO ORDERED.[2] On 06 February 1997, petitioner was served with a copy of the summons and the writ of replevin. On 14 February 1997, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MTC since the complaint had asked for, among other things, the following: (a) x x x actual market value of the equipment (par. 8 of the complaint) (b) x x x actual damages for use of the equipment at the rate of P11,000.00 monthly from 09 April 1995 up to the time possession was taken by the plaintiff under the order of the Honorable Court (par. 9(a) of the complaint) -----------------------------(c) exemplary damages ------------------That judgment be rendered for the plaintiff ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the following amounts: (1) P11,000.00 per month as actual damages by way of reasonable compensation for the use, enjoyment and/or rental of the subject equipment from April 9, 1995 until it is repossessed by the plaintiff; P1,000.000.00 as exemplary damages and P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs. (d) attorneys fees ------------------------Total -----------------P150,000.00

MOVERS-BASECO INTEGRATED PORT SERVICES, INC ., petitioner, vs. CYBORG LEASING CORPORATION, respondent. DECISION VITUG, J.: The instant matter has been brought to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to seek a reversal of the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 16, in Civil Case No. 97-85267. Cyborg Leasing Corporation (Cyborg), herein private respondent, filed on 22 August 1996 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila a case, captioned Damages with Prayer for a Writ of Replevin (Civil Case No. 152839), against Conpac Warehousing, Inc. (Conpac), and herein petitioner Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services (movers). The complaint alleged that pursuant to a lease agreement, Cyborg had delivered one (1) NISSAN forklift to CONPAC. The lease agreement stipulated a monthly rental of P11,000.00 for the use of the equipment from its date of delivery. Conpac supposedly failed and refused to pay the stipulated rentals starting April 1995 notwithstanding demands therefor. Sometime in May 1995, petitioner took control of the operations of Conpac and seized all cargoes and equipment including the subject forklift. Petitioner ignored Cyborgs demand for the return to it of the equipment and the formal disclaimer of ownership made by CONPAC. In its Complaint, Cyborg prayed: UPON RECEIPT AND BEFORE ANSWER That an ORDER be issued directing the Sheriff or other officer of this Court to forthwith take custody and possession of the subject equipment and to dispose it in accordance with the Rules of Court. AFTER TRIAL

242,000.00 1,000,000.00 50,000.00 P1,442,000.00.

On 18 March 1997, the MTC issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, and ratiocinating, thus It is a fundamental axiom in adjective law that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and where there is none, no agreement of the parties can vest competencia (Leonor vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 69;

(2) (3)

(1996);Department of Health vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 251 SCRA 700; 707 (1995); 1 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1988 5th rev. ed., p. 9). Albeit the subject equipment has a market value of P150,000.00 (paragraph 8, Complaint) and while it is true that interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs are excluded in ascertaining jurisdiction per Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7691 and are considered only to determine the filing fees, it is equally true that if the principal request in the complaint is for damages, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be determinative of competencia under Supreme Court Circular No. 09-94 dated June 14, 1994. The amount sought to be recovered is the amount of the demand (Oteng vs. Tan Kiem, Ta, 61 Phil. 87) and included in the computation of the jurisdictional amount are attorneys fees recoverable as damages (Article 2208, New Civil Code), consequential damages, exemplary damages if the amount thereof is specified in the complaint (Enerio vs. Alampay, 64 SCRA 142, and moral damages, if quantified in the complaint (Quiason, Philippines Courts and their Jurisdictions, 1986 ed., pp. 166168). Hence, on the basis of the clarification of the Supreme Court, the total claims of the plaintiff are beyond the purview of this Courts jurisdiction. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 152839 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction as prayed for. [3] The MTC, in its order of 10 June 1997, denied Cyborgs motion for reconsideration, elaborating that it x x x is not unaware of Justice Regalados discourse in his treatise that replevin is available only where the principal relief sought in the action is the recovery of personal property, the other reliefs, like damages, being merely incidental thereto (1 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1988 5th rev. ed., p. 437) which was utilized by plaintiffs counsel to secure re-evaluation of the challenged Order (page 2, Additional Arguments Relative to the Motion for Reconsideration). Yet, this Court cannot also ignore the language of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated June 14, 1994 that if the principal supplication is for damages, or is one of the causes of action, like in this case, the amount of such claim will spell the difference in jurisdiction between the Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court. WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and plaintiffs additional arguments relative to the motion for reconsideration are hereby DENIED. Accordingly, as prayed for by defendants counsel on May 27, 1997, Sheriff Abulencia is hereby directed to RETURN the Nissan Forklift described as Equipment No. C-201, 2 Tonner, Engine No. G1-214511 FG 25 TCM to defendant Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc.[4] Cyborg did not succeed in its motion for clarificatory judgment which the court took as just a second motion for reconsideration. Then, on 26 September 1997, Cyborg filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction and/or prayer for temporary restraining order, against the MTC Judge, Conpac Warehousing and Movers, before the RTC of Manila (Civil

Case No. 97-85267). This petition was opposed by Movers as being tardily filed. Still, later, an answer to this petition was filed by Movers. On 20 October 1997, the RTC issued an order granting Cyborgs application for preliminary injunction; the court said: The MTC dismissed the complaint filed by petitioner Cyborg for replevin of a leased Nissan forklift by defendant Compac and later taken into custody by defendant Movers-Baseco. Upon the MTCs denial of Cyborgs motion for reconsideration, Cyborg caused the filing of the instant petition. In its motion to dismiss before the MTC Manila, Movers-Baseco argued that the MTC had no jurisdiction over this case because while the alleged amount of the forklift is P150,000, together with the other amounts/damages claimed, the total is beyond the MTCs jurisdiction. Cyborg argued that since the principal action is for replevin, the other amounts being merely incidental, as the amount of P150,000 is within the MTC jurisdiction, the latter is competent to take cognizance of the case. Such arguments, however, are better reserved for the adjudication on the merits of this petition. The issue now is whether there is sufficient legal ground to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the MTCs order dated June 10, 1997 which directed the delivery of the replevied forklift back to Movers-Baseco. The MTC complaint alleged that the rentals of P11,000 per month are not being paid in the interim which lease contract is dated January 5, 1995 (Record, page 35). It appears that Cyborg is the lessor-owner of the forklift. In the meantime, the rentals are not being paid it. As owner of the same, Cyborg has a clear right to the possession of the same during the pendency of this proceedings, the MTC having already issued a writ of replevin to gain possession of the forklift which is now in the possession of Cyborg. This status quo existing at the time this petition was filed should be maintained pending the resolution of the case, otherwise, great damage will be caused to Cyborg, the owner. The 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure allow the ex parte issuance of a 20-day TRO, the Rules silent as to whether a bond should cover the 20-day TRO, as it is the writ of preliminary injunction that requires the filing of an injunction bond. Hence, this Court issued a TRO until October 22, 1997 (Rule 58, Section 5), otherwise, with the rentals in the interim being unpaid, Cyborg is destined to suffer GREAT damage (not necessarily irreparable), the Rule expressly mentioning great OR irreparable injury. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the respondents. The public and private respondents, the sheriff concerned, and any person acting for and in their behalf are restrained from implementing the order of the MTC Manila dated June 10, 1997 directing the delivery of the forklift back to the private respondent Movers-Baseco until the Court resolves the petition with finality.

Serve a copy of this order, together with a copy of the affidavit, upon the public and private respondents. No additional injunction bond is being required because Cyborg already filed an injunction bond before the MTC Manila.[5] Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed before the RTC on 24 October 1997 this manifestation: For accuracy, respondent Movers-Baseco would like to sate that: (a) respondent Movers-Baseco never took custody of the forklift after the respondent Sheriff took possession of the same pursuant to the writ of replevin issued by the MTC; and (b) moreover, there is no bond posted by the petitioner for the issuance of the injunction. The bond referred to by this Court is the replevin bond posted in the Metropolitan Trial Court. [6] Ultimately, on 04 December 1997, the RTC promulgated its judgment in Civil Case No. 9785267; resolving the merits of the petition, it concluded: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, 1. Having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the orders of respondent judge dated March 18, (Annex A), June 10, 1997 (Annex B), and August 22, 1997 (Annex C) are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. 2. Respondent judge is ordered to refrain from implementing his order dated June 10, 1997 for the delivery of the forklift to respondent MOVERS-BASECO, making the writ of injunction permanent. 3. Remanding the case to the MTC Manila for trial on the merits. Let a certified copy of this judgment be served upon the public respondent MTC Manila judge. Serve likewise a copy of this judgment upon the respondent Sheriff, counsel for petitioner, counsel for CONPAC, and counsel for MOVERS-BASECO.[7] Petitioner timely resorted to this Court, via the instant petition for review, assailing the decision of the RTC and submitting to the Court the following legal issues: Whether or not(1) the MTC had jurisdiction over respondents complaint; (2) the MTCs order of dismissal had become final and executory; (3) Cyborgs special civil action of certiorari and prohibition before the RTC can be a substitute for a lost appeal; and (4) A temporary restraining order or preliminary writ of injunction can be issued without an injunction bond apart from the replevin bond.

The threshold issue concerns MTCs jurisdiction over the action filed by Cyborg in Civil Case No. 152839 for Damages with prayer for a writ of replevin. Hardly disputable is that jurisdiction of the court and the nature of the action must be determined by the averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought[8] vis--vis the corresponding provisions of the law involved.[9] Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, states: SEC. 33. Jurisdiciton of Metropolitan Trial Courts; Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees: Provided, further, That where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions; Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, in turn, provides: SUBJECT: Guidelines in the Implementation of Republic Act No. 7691, Entitled An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending For the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise Known As the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. xxx xxx xxx

2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. The complaint filed by Cyborg with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila prayed for the return of the Nissan Forklift to it, as owner and as lessor pursuant to a lease agreement executed by it in favor of Conpac, or, in the alternative for the payment of P150,000.00 (the actual market value of the forklift), plus damages, plus the amount of unpaid lease, starting 09 April 1995 at P11,000.00 per month, which as of the time of the filing of the complaint on 22 August 1996 had amounted to P180,000.00 which, together with the value of the forklift, reach the sum of P230,000.00

excluding the amount of damages and attorneys fees likewise claimed. It would be incorrect to argue that the actual damages in the form of unpaid rentals were just incident of the action for the return of the forklift, considering that private respondent specifically sought in the complaint not only the seizure of the forklift from petitioner - Movers, which took control of the operations of Conpac, but likewise the payment of unpaid and outstanding rentals. Verily, the Metropolitan Trial Courts orders of 18 March 1997 and 10 June 1997 dismissing the complaint and denying the motion of private respondent, respectively, were properly decreed. Another set back for Cyborgs cause was the fact that its petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction and prayer for temporary restraining order, filed before the RTC should not have been allowed not only for being late but also for not being a valid substitute for a lost appeal. A petition for certiorari under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should be filed within 60 days from receipt of the assailed decision, order or resolution. Cyborgs petition with the RTC was filed fourteen (14) days late[10] on 26 September 1997, or on the 74th day from its receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration on 14 July 1997. The RTC acted on the mistaken notion that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect only in October 1997; in fact, the new rules became operative since 01 July 1997. Having thus concluded, the Court need not take up the other issues raised. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 97-85267 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The orders dated 18 March 1997, 10 June 1997 and 22 August 1997 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 152839 for Damages With Prayer for a Writ of Replevin are reinstated. Civil Case No. 152839 for damages is ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. SO ORDERED G.R. No. 150656 April 29, 2003

MARGARITA ROMUALDEZ-LICAROS, petitioner, vs. ABELARDO B. LICAROS, respondent. CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a petition for review on certiorari1 to annul the Decision2 dated 9 August 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58487, as well as the Resolution dated 23 October 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition to annul the following decisions3 rendered by Branch 143 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati: (1) The Decision dated 27 December 19904 granting the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses Abelardo B. Licaros and Margarita Romualdez-Licaros; (2) The Decision dated 8 November 19915 declaring the marriage between the same spouses null and void. The Facts The antecedent facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows: x x x Abelardo Licaros (Abelardo, for short) and Margarita Romualdez-Licaros (Margarita, hereafter) were lawfully married on December 15, 1968. Out of this marital union were born

Maria Concepcion and Abelardo, Jr. Ironically, marital differences, squabbles and irreconcilable conflicts transpired between the spouses, such that sometime in 1979, they agreed to separate from bed and board. In 1982, Margarita left for the United States and there, to settle down with her two (2) children. In the United States, on April 26, 1989, Margarita applied for divorce before the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo (Annex "1", Rejoinder, pp. 164-165) where she manifested that she does not desire counseling at that time (Quotation, p. 166, Rollo). On August 6, 1990, Margarita was granted the decree of divorce (Annex 2, Answer, p. 108, Rollo) together with a distribution of properties between her and Abelardo (pp. 167168, Rollo). Not long after, on August 17, 1990, Abelardo and Margarita executed an "Agreement of Separation of Properties" (pp. 60-64, Rollo). This was followed-up by a petition filed on August 21, 1990 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses and for the approval of the agreement of separation of their properties. This was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 2551. On December 27, 1990, a decision was issued granting the petition and approving the separation of property agreement. For his part, on June 24, 1991, Abelardo commenced Civil Case No. 91-1757, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Margarita, based on psychological incapacity under the New Family Code. As Margarita was then residing at 96 Mulberry Lane, Atherton, California, U.S.A., Abelardo initially moved that summons be served through the International Express Courier Service. The court a quo denied the motion. Instead, it ordered that summons be served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, at the same time furnishing respondent a copy of the order, as well as the corresponding summons and a copy of the petition at the given address in the United States through the Department of Foreign Affairs, all at the expense of Abelardo. Respondent was given sixty (60) days after publication to file a responsive pleading. On July 15, 1991, Process Server, Maximo B. Dela Rosa, submitted his Officers Return quoted hereunder: "OFFICERS RETURN THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on July 3, 1991, I have served a copy of summons and complaint with annexes together with order dated June 28, 1991 issued by the Court in the aboveentitled case upon defendant Margarita Romualdez-Licaros c/o DFA. (sent by Mail) thru Pat G. Martines receiving Clerk of Department of Foreign Affairs a person authorized to receive this kind of process who acknowledged the receipt thereof at ADB Bldg., Roxas Blvd., Pasay City, Metro Manila." (p. 40, Rollo) As required by law, the case was referred to Trial Prosecutor Bruselas, Jr. to find out any possible collusion between the parties in the case. Thereafter, with the negative report of collusion, Abelardo was allowed to present his evidence ex-parte. On November 8, 1991, the Decision (Annex "A",

Petition) was handed down in Civil Case No. 91-1757 declaring the marriage between Abelardo and Margarita null and void. Almost nine (9) years later, on April 28, 2000, the petition at bench was commenced when Margarita received a letter dated November 18, 1991 from a certain Atty. Angelo Q. Valencia informing her that she no longer has the right to use the family name "Licaros" inasmuch as her marriage to Abelardo had already been judicially dissolved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati on November 8, 1991. Asseverating to have immediately made some verifications and finding the information given to be true, petitioner commenced the instant petition on the following grounds: (A) THERE WAS EXTRINSIC FRAUD IN THE PREPARATION AND FILING BY ABELARDO OF THE PETITION FOR DISSOLUTION OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS AND ITS ANNEX, THE AGREEMENT OF SEPARATION OF PROPERTIES. (B) THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.6 The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals debunked the claim of Margarita that there was extrinsic fraud in the preparation and filing by Abelardo of the Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and its annex, the Agreement of Separation of Properties. The Court of Appeals stated: x x x, the extrinsic fraud alluded to consists of Abelardo coercing Margarita into signing the petition to dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains together with the agreement of separation of properties, by threatening to cut-off all financial and material support of their children then still studying in the United States; that petitioner had no hand directly or indirectly in the preparation of the petition and agreement of separation of properties; that petitioner never met the counsel for the petitioner, nor the notary public who notarized the deed; and, petitioner never received any notice of the pendency of the petition nor a copy of the decision. Antithetically, a meticulous perusal of the controversial petition (Annex "B-1") and the agreement of separation of properties (pp. 60-64, Rollo) readily shows that the same were signed by the petitioner on the proper space after the prayer and on the portion for the verification of the petition. The same is true with the agreement of separation of properties. What is striking to note is that on August 6, 1990, Margarita appeared before Amado P. Cortez, Consul of the Republic of the Philippines at the San Francisco, California, United States Consulate Office, to affirm and acknowledge before said official that she executed the agreement of separation of properties of her own free will and deed, after being informed of the contents thereof. And yet, there is no showing that Abelardo was with her at the Philippine Consulate Office in confirming the separation of property agreement. Moreover, on page 2 of the same agreement, it is specifically stated that such property separation document shall be "subject to approval later on by the proper court of competent jurisdiction." The clear import

of this is that the agreement must have to be submitted before the proper court for approval, which explains and confirms petitioners signature on the petition filed in court. In main, We see no indication nor showing of coercion or fraud from these facts, which could very well be considered as extrinsic or collateral fraud to justify a petition under Rule 47. From all indications, the pretended coerced documents were rather freely and voluntarily executed by the parties therein knowing fully well the imports thereof. This conclusion finds more weight if We consider the fact that the separation of property was fully implemented and enforced, when apparently both parties correspondingly received the properties respectively assigned to each of them under the said document.7 The Court of Appeals also rejected Margaritas claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide thePetition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage for improper service of summons on her. The case involves the marital status of the parties, which is an action in rem or quasi in rem. The Court of Appeals ruled that in such an action the purpose of service of summons is not to vest the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but "only" to comply with due process. The Court of Appeals concluded that any irregularity in the service of summons involves due process which does not destroy the trial courts jurisdiction over the res which is the parties marital status. Neither does such irregularity invalidate the judgment rendered in the case. Thus, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment, stating that: At bar, the case involves the personal (marital) status of the plaintiff and the defendant. This status is theres over which the Philippine court has acquired jurisdiction. This is also the kind of action which the Supreme Court had ruled that service of summons may be served extraterritorially under Section 15 (formerly Section 17) of Rule 14 and where such service of summons is not for the purpose of vesting the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of the defendant but only for the purpose of complying with the requirements of fair play and due process. A fortiori, the court a quo had properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner-defendant when summons was served by publication and a copy of the summons, the complaint with annexes, together with the Order of June 28, 1991, was served to the defendant through the Department of Foreign Affairs by registered mail and duly received by said office to top it all. Such mode was upon instruction and lawful order of the court and could even be treated as any other manner the court may deem sufficient.8 Hence, the instant petition. The Issues The issues raised by Margarita are restated as follows: I. Whether Margarita was validly served with summons in the case for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Abelardo;

II. Whether there was extrinsic fraud in the preparation and filing by Abelardo of the Petition for Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains and its annex, the Agreement of Separation of Properties. The Courts Ruling The petition is bereft of merit. First Issue: Validity of the Service of Summons on Margarita Margarita insists that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her person in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage since she was never validly served with summons. Neither did she appear in court to submit voluntarily to its jurisdiction. On the other hand, Abelardo argues that jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not necessary. The trial and appellate courts made a clear factual finding that there was proper summons by publication effected through the Department of Foreign Affairs as directed by the trial court. Thus, the trial court acquired jurisdiction to render the decision declaring the marriage a nullity. Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. 9 As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15,10 Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. 11 Actions in personam12 and actions in rem or quasi in rem differ in that actions in personam are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments. On the other hand, actions in rem or quasi in rem are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world.13 At the time Abelardo filed the petition for nullity of the marriage in 1991, Margarita was residing in the United States. She left the Philippines in 1982 together with her two children. The trial court considered Margarita a non-resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. Since the petition affects the personal status of the plaintiff, the trial court authorized extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The term "personal status" includes family relations, particularly the relations between husband and wife.14 Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1) when the action affects the

personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines. In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendants last known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider sufficient. Applying the foregoing rule, the trial court required extraterritorial service of summons to be effected on Margarita in the following manner: x x x, service of Summons by way of publication in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, at the same time, furnishing respondent copy of this Order as well as the corresponding Summons and copy of the petition at her given address at No. 96 Mulberry Lane, Atherton, California, U.S.A., thru the Department of Foreign Affairs, all at the expense of petitioner.15 (Emphasis ours) The trial courts prescribed mode of extraterritorial service does not fall under the first or second mode specified in Section 15 of Rule 14, but under the third mode. This refers to "any other means that the judge may consider sufficient." The Process Servers Return of 15 July 1991 shows that the summons addressed to Margarita together with the complaint and its annexes were sent by mail to the Department of Foreign Affairs with acknowledgment of receipt. The Process Servers certificate of service of summons is prima facie evidence of the facts as set out in the certificate.16 Before proceeding to declare the marriage between Margarita and Abelardo null and void, the trial court stated in its Decision dated 8 November 1991 that "compliance with the jurisdictional requirements hav(e) (sic) been duly established." We hold that delivery to the Department of Foreign Affairs was sufficient compliance with the rule. After all, this is exactly what the trial court required and considered as sufficient to effect service of summons under the third mode of extraterritorial service pursuant to Section 15 of Rule 14. Second Issue: Validity of the Judgment Dissolving the Conjugal Partnership of Gains Margarita claims that Abelardo coerced her into signing the Petition for Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains ("Petition") and its annex, the Agreement of Separation of Properties ("Agreement"). Abelardo allegedly threatened to cut off all financial and material support to their children if Margarita did not sign the documents. The trial court did not find anything amiss in the Petition and Agreement that Abelardo filed, and thus the trial court approved the same. The Court of Appeals noted that a meticulous perusal of the Petition and Agreement readily shows that Margarita signed the same on the proper space after the prayer and on the portion for the verification of the petition. The Court of Appeals observed further that on 6

August 1990, Margarita appeared before Consul Amado Cortez in the Philippine Consulate Office in San Francisco, California, to affirm that she executed the Agreement of her own free will. There was no showing that Abelardo was at that time with her at the Philippine Consulate Office. Abelardo secured judicial approval of the Agreement as specifically required in the Agreement. The Court is bound by the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts that the parties freely and voluntarily executed the documents and that there is no showing of coercion or fraud. As a rule, in an appeal by certiorariunder Rule 45, the Court does not pass upon questions of fact as the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are binding on the Court. The Court is not a trier of facts. The Court will not examine the evidence introduced by the parties below to determine if the trial and appellate courts correctly assessed and evaluated the evidence on record. 17 The due and regular execution of an instrument acknowledged before an officer authorized to administer oaths cannot be overthrown by bare allegations of coercion but only by clear and convincing proof.18 A person acknowledging an instrument before an officer authorized to administer oaths acknowledges that he freely and voluntarily executed the instrument, giving rise to a prima facie presumption of such fact. In the instant case, Margarita acknowledged the Agreement before Consul Cortez. The certificate of acknowledgment signed by Consul Cortez states that Margarita personally appeared before him and "acknowledged before me that SHE executed the same of her own free will and deed."19 Thus, there is a prima facie presumption that Margarita freely and voluntarily executed the Agreement. Margarita has failed to rebut thisprima facie presumption with clear and convincing proof of coercion on the part of Abelardo. A document acknowledged before a notary public is prima facie evidence of the due and regular execution of the document.20 A notarized document has in its favor the presumption of regularity in its execution, and to contradict the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.21 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58487 dismissing the petition to annul judgment is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J. WARBY, petitioners, vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents. Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles Law Offices for petitioners. Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & Sanvicente Law Offices for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.: Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid. On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity) filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period. On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case. Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case together with twenty-two other cases assigned to different branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which were under investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter returned the said records to the trial court with the directive that they be re-raffled to the other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge Castro. Civil Case No. Q-41177 was reraffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then vacant. On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752RTC directing the judges in said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their complaints.

G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989

On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil Case No. Q-41177 was temporarily assigned, issuedan order to the Clerk of Court instructing him to issue a certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in case of deficiency, to include the same in said certificate. On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by petitioners. On August 30,1984, an amended complaint was filed by private respondent including the two additional defendants aforestated. Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q41177 was thereafter assigned, after his assumption into office on January 16, 1986, issued a Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying with the Resolution of this Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed by private respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less than Pl0,000,000. 00 as actual compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said second amended complaint however, private respondent alleges actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of about P44,601,623.70. On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second amended complaint and stating therein that the same constituted proper compliance with the Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereof should be furnished the Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the docket fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on private respondent's claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private respondent. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the said order of Judie Asuncion dated January 24, 1986. On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as d.qmages so the total claim amounts to about P64,601,623.70. On October 16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P80,396.00. 1 On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling, among others, as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 1, 09715 insofar as it seeks annulment of the order (a) denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint, as amended, and

(b) granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving due course to the portion thereof questioning the reassessment of the docketing fee, and requiring the Honorable respondent Court to reassess the docketing fee to be paid by private respondent on the basis of the amount of P25,401,707.00. 2 Hence, the instant petition. During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said judgment of respondent court, private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988. 3 The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177 on the ground of nonpayment of the correct and proper docket fee. Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private respondent had paid the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above related, and considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in the amended and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the same, petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should be annulled. In support of their theory, petitioners cite the latest ruling of the Court in Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA, 4 as follows: The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi Case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed. On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling in Manchester cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q41177 for at the time said civil case was filed in court there was no such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, 5 wherein this Court held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient. The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. 6 In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres, 7 this Court held that the payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In a forcible entry and detainer case before the justice of the peace court of Manaoag, Pangasinan, after notice of a judgment dismissing the case, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with said court but he deposited only P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of P16.00 as required, within the reglementary period of appeal of five (5) days after receiving notice of judgment. Plaintiff deposited the additional P8.00 to complete the amount of the docket fee only fourteen (14) days later. On the basis of these facts, this court held that the Court of First Instance did notacquire jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal as the appeal was not thereby perfected.

In Lee vs. Republic, 8 the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen by sending it through registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor General in 1953 but the required filing fee was paid only in 1956, barely 5V2 months prior to the filing of the petition for citizenship. This Court ruled that the declaration was not filed in accordance with the legal requirement that such declaration should be filed at least one year before the filing of the petition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro, this Court concluded that the filing of petitioner's declaration of intention on October 23, 1953 produced no legal effect until the required filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956. In Malimit vs. Degamo, 9 the same principles enunciated in Lazaro and Lee were applied. It was an original petition for quo warranto contesting the right to office of proclaimed candidates which was mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First Instance, within the one-week period after the proclamation as provided therefor by law. 10However, the required docket fees were paid only after the expiration of said period. Consequently, this Court held that the date of such payment must be deemed to be the real date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the date when it was mailed. Again, in Garica vs, Vasquez, 11 this Court reiterated the rule that the docket fee must be paid before a court will act on a petition or complaint. However, we also held that said rule is not applicable when petitioner seeks the probate of several wills of the same decedent as he is not required to file a separate action for each will but instead he may have other wills probated in the same special proceeding then pending before the same court. Then in Magaspi, 12 this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit and Lee that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court. Said case involved a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for the docket fee and P10.00 for the sheriffs fee, the complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R-11882. The prayer of the complaint sought that the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of the defendant be declared as null and void. It was also prayed that plaintiff be declared as owner thereof to whom the proper title should be issued, and that defendant be made to pay monthly rentals of P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948 up to the time the property is delivered to plaintiff, P500,000.00 as moral damages, attorney's fees in the amount of P250,000.00, the costs of the action and exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00. The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay the correct amount of the docket fee to which an opposition was filed by the plaintiff alleging that the action was for the recovery of a parcel of land so the docket fee must be based on its assessed value and that the amount of P60.00 was the correct docketing fee. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay P3,104.00 as filing fee. The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint to include the Republic as the defendant. In the prayer of the amended complaint the exemplary damages earlier sought was eliminated. The amended prayer merely sought moral damages as the court may determine, attorney's fees of P100,000.00 and the costs of the action. The defendant filed an opposition to the amended complaint. The opposition notwithstanding, the amended complaint was admitted by the trial court. The trial court reiterated its order for the payment of the additional docket fee which plaintiff assailed and then challenged before this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he paid the total docket fee in the amount of P60.00 and that if he has to pay the additional fee it must be based on the amended complaint.

The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff may be considered to have filed the case even if the docketing fee paid was not sufficient. In Magaspi, We reiterated the rule that the case was deemed filed only upon the payment of the correct amount for the docket fee regardless of the actual date of the filing of the complaint; that there was an honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee in that as the action appears to be one for the recovery of property the docket fee of P60.00 was correct; and that as the action is also one, for damages, We upheld the assessment of the additional docket fee based on the damages alleged in the amended complaint as against the assessment of the trial court which was based on the damages alleged in the original complaint. However, as aforecited, this Court overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester involves an action for torts and damages and specific performance with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, etc. The prayer in said case is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in question, the attachment of such property of defendants that may be sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may be rendered, and, after hearing, the issuance of an order requiring defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff. It was also prayed that the defendants be made to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally, actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as may be proved during the trial for attorney's fees. The plaintiff also asked the trial court to declare the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and sufficient for purposes of payment, and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Millon allegedly suffered by plaintiff. Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of only P410.00 for the docket fee based on the nature of the action for specific performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation. However, it was obvious from the allegations of the complaint as well as its designation that the action was one for damages and specific performance. Thus, this court held the plaintiff must be assessed the correct docket fee computed against the amount of damages of about P78 Million, although the same was not spelled out in the prayer of the complaint. Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court, filed an amended complaint on September 12, 1985 by the inclusion of another co-plaintiff and eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained. On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of the docket fee in the said case and other cases that were investigated. On November 12, 1985, the trial court directed the plaintiff to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they were asking for. This plaintiff did as instructed. In the body of the complaint the amount of damages alleged was reduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of damages was specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted. Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court," this Court held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by payment of only P410.00 for the docket fee. Neither can the amendment

of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes there was no such original complaint duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court were declared null and void. 13 The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases of under-assessment of docket fee which were investigated by this Court together with Manchester. The facts and circumstances of this case are similar toManchester. In the body of the original complaint, the total amount of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount of damages asked for was not stated. The action was for the refund of the premium and the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment with damages. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid. On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total amount of his claim in the amended and supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49. The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint. However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until] the case was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void. In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had that sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change of stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered.

Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must require the private respondent to pay the same. Thus, the Court rules as follows: 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in the original complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any, without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.