Benjamin's Reflection Author(s): Arne Melberg Source: MLN, Vol. 107, No. 3, German Issue (Apr., 1992), pp.

478-498 Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2904943 . Accessed: 19/09/2013 07:54
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The Johns Hopkins University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to MLN.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 194.150.86.36 on Thu, 19 Sep 2013 07:54:22 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Reflection Benjamin's
Arne Melberg

the styleof thinking."'This gnomic state"Reflectionis primarily mentcomes earlyin WalterBenjamin's first major academic effort, in German Romanticism"from "The Concept of [Art]Criticism 1920, and myintentionhere is to develop some possible meanings of the verysame Benjamin, in the spirit of thisstatement, hopefully of as the "thinking who some pages furtheron talks of reflection thinking"(28,30). Connections will-firstly-be made with conlike the in the neighbourhoodof reflection, cepts or configurations and that mysteriousverb setzenhaunting famous romantic irony German thinkingsince Fichte and enteringmodern English literSince it is a in the guise of Paul de Man's posit(ing). ary criticism turn'took place under commonplace thatde Man's 'deconstructive Benjaminian influence I will-secondly-consider a de Manian (mis)reading of Benjamin and discuss some possible relationsbetween the Romantic Absolute and de Man's philosophy of language. Thirdly I am adding a note on these relationsin termsof as a "styleof think"violence." FinallyI willcome back to reflection from Benjamin not only to ing" with some scattered examples could be that reflection make the observation "style";but also that therefore and kind of is a reflection metaphorical transported
"... vor allem aber istReflexionder Stildes Denkens." Benjamin willbe quoted withpage referencesin the textwheneverpossible. Translationsare myown from am Main 1974, here page 18. Gesammelte I:1, Frankfurt Schriften Press MLN, 107, (1992): 478-498 ? 1992 by The Johns Hopkins University

This content downloaded from 194.150.86.36 on Thu, 19 Sep 2013 07:54:22 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

M L N

479

style:that the concept of reflectionis an applied "theory"of linguistictransport. as it is developed in Benjamin's first 1. The idea of "reflection," under the impressionof early German is major work, obviously romanticslike Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel and even Holderlin; I willclose up to some details in Benjamin's argumentby way of his to sumbut onlyafteran effort use of these startling poet-thinkers marize his argument: or as a way of thinking Benjamin startsby exalting"reflection" "this unmediated also called of as the (unmitrather, way thinking telbaren) thinking"wherebythe Romanticsforce theirway to "the Absolute" (das Absolute) (33). This connectionwith"the Absolute" but be necessary.Surprising:because "reflection" may surprising secondmediated (reflected)and therefore almost is, by definition, to be reflected. offers the that to an in relation light original ary But the connection with "the Absolute" is necessaryin order to operate that almost absolute idealism touched by Benjamin in this The next move will work (togetherwithsome radical materialism). withcriticism be to connect the "absolutely"aiming reflection (Krithree with These both tik)and, then, irony. steps-reflection,criticism,irony-are steps on Benjamin's own way into the "Absolute". The way seems to end in a concept of prose(to which I will return in myconclusion) togetherwiththe idea thatcriticism (and prose: criticalprose?) are tools forthe "idea"-another name forthe "Absolute"-and thereforeprimaryin relation to art: "In romantic is not only possible and necessary,but its Art, however,criticism theory implies unavoidably the paradox of a higher estimate of criticismthan of the works" (119). And Benjamin concludes his work"the "sober light"that dissertation by proclaimingthe "critical it into "the "blinds"and even dissolvesthe workof art whilelifting Absolute." "Reflection"has in this process apparently been transformed froma process of reflecting (and reflecting somethingelse) into a creativeact that creates what it reflects.If "reflection" always imthe or of already plies transport-transport image meaning-then has taken over from transportedor mediated sense of "reflection" A puzzling diathe immediate and concrete sense of "reflecting." lecticseems to evolve: whilethe concretesense of the term"reflecthen the already transtion" describes a kind of visual transport,

This content downloaded from 194.150.86.36 on Thu, 19 Sep 2013 07:54:22 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

480

ARNE MELBERG

ported sense-i.e., the metaphoricalsense of the term-seems to and is given,instead,the lose its metaphoricalqualityas transport task of an unmediated naming-the naming of the "Absolute." We have, then, already come close to a logical and linguistic predicament involvingthe acts of naming, reflectingand transporting.And thispredicamentseems onlypossible to express metaphorically-and it was well expressed by one of Benjamin's sources in his dissertation, Novalis, who has a fragment discussing on toyour ownshoulas the "reflective "reflection" power" ofjumping as Benjamin had it,it is "the styleof thinking," ders.2If reflection must apparentlyinclude such an awkwardtransport-but it must is a literalrendering(i.e. already a also remind us that"transport" in of word the "metaphor." transport itself) I now want to approach Benjamin's concept of reflectionby a detour, i.e., by some observations of the term as it is used by FriedrichSchlegel and Novalis. The obvious example from Schlegel, quoted and used by Benjamin, is the fragmenthailing "romanticpoetry"as a "progressive universalpoetry."3Schlegel goes on to say that "romanticpoetry" and willunite or re-unite"all separate poetical genres" (Gattungen) as it would somecombine "poetrywithphilosophyand rhetoric," timesmix and sometimesmelt together"poetryand prose," makproclamations ing "lifeand societypoetical." Afterthese optimistic Schlegel introduces a mirror in his argument: like the epic, he writes,"romanticpoetry"can become a "mirror"of its world and an "image" of itstime,still-and Schlegel now arrivesat his central image of reflection-also "romantic poetry" can no more than "float on the wings of poetical reflection"(auf den Fliigelnderpoits own reflection "as in ... schweben), etischen multiplying Reflexion endlosen ReihevonSpiegeln). an endless arrayof mirrors" (wiein einer It should be apparent already frommy paraphrasingquotation from the firsthalf of this famous fragmentthat there is a movement in Schlegel's argument: he startsby proclaiming"romantic tendencythatseems to be going on, at least poetry"a universalizing
2 I willbe withreferenceto the number of quoting Novalis in myown translation the fragment used and the name of itscollection.The quotationshould thenbe easy Nr. 993. to locate in any edition. Here the quotaton is fromDas allgemeine Brouillon, der ReflexThe German expression is: "das sich selbst auf die Schultern springen irenden Kraft." 3 I will quote and translate Schlegel after the same principles as Novalis; the fragmentin question is 116 fromAtheniums-Fragmente.

This content downloaded from 194.150.86.36 on Thu, 19 Sep 2013 07:54:22 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

M L N

481

so to speak everywhere, combiningnot only kinds of potentially, with but literature also philosophyand both with uniting poetry moral and social life.Afterthisall-embracing gesture,however,the between mirror is evoked, invitingus to a mysteriousSchweben which should mean that "romanticpoetry"suddenly has mirrors, turned fromreflecting (and tendentially uniting)a world into rereflects itself: "romantic poetry" poetrylike a mirrorreflecting mirrors. flecting on poThis fragment could well be called a tropologicalfantasy as movement.The best name for and reflection etryas reflection And I call it a fantasy since the thatmovementwould be: Schweben. has, as Romanticfragments perhaps should have, a confragment ceptual as well as a poetical side. That is: it discusses "romantic but also illustrates or poetry"as a movement(tendency,Schweben) expresses the verysame movement.The centralpart of the fragmirrors as a similethatis spread over the mentuses the mirroring text in order to promote the idea that poetryis a kind of visual It seems, then,thatSchlegel's fragment movement,i.e., reflection. is a prime example of a metaphoricaltheoryon metaphor,using as centraltermsof transport. and Schweben reflection image in mind Benjamin may well have had this self-reflective when calling reflectionthe "thinkingof thinking."But Benjamin adds an elementthatis conspicuouslyabsentin Schlegel'sotherwise Kritik. And, as we remember,Benjamin's universalizing fragment: idea of criticism goes beyond and even dissolves the work of art thatmakes up while there can be no way out of the hall of mirrors Schlegel's "romanticpoetry"-consequentlyhe declares in another fragmentthat "poetrycan only be criticizedthroughpoetry."4 Benjamin's other primarysource, Novalis, may seem less poetological than Schlegel but more interestedin the other strand of of the self. And meaning of the term reflection:the constitution of reflection Novalis' discussion this comes as no surprise, since on his Fichte's commentaries consistsmainlyof Wissenschaftslehre, the empiricalselfout of withits famous procedure of establishing as an "absolute" self(absoluten Ich) and the "negative"self(Nicht-Ich) In Novalis' and the selves. of a dialectic positing(setzen) reflecting we read about the Fichte-Studien (in number 22 of 667 fragments) and are one. This where reflection act basic (Urhandlung) feeling whole but ratherlike a be a harmonious seems cannot Urhandlung
4

Nr. 117. Lyceums-Fragmente,

This content downloaded from 194.150.86.36 on Thu, 19 Sep 2013 07:54:22 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

482

ARNE MELBERG

center of conflict,since it shows a basic need to contradict(ein and this basic need is: "a feeling of Urbediirfnis entgegenzusetzen), of a reflection reflection, feeling." of the self"as Novalis calls it (Nr. 32) This is the "famousconflict as the centralterm.Thus (in and triesto pin down withreflection and Nr. 662) we learn thatthe selfis both subjectand objectto itself stateof mind is an "eternalfluctuation," thatthisreflective (unendthatmake up das Eine, licher Wechsel), repeatingthe contradictions which(here) is Novalis' termforthe fragilewhole produced as the self by way of reflection.Like Schlegel in the fragmentdiscussed as permanentmovement.Perabove, Novalis imagines reflection a more demonstrates harmonizing attitude while haps Schlegel Novalis stresses reflectionas permanent contradiction-it is the untransverysame Novalis who in anothercollectionof fragments ist auch dchte Individuum.5 dchte Dividuum das das writes: latably Both, however, share a fascinationfor Schweben. Schlegel arhis on the at Schweben as we remember, rived, "wings of poetic connectsthe termwithreflection and Novalis similarly reflection" in its "eternalfluctuation," constitutes and what reflection i.e., the Nr. 555 he identifiesthe being of the self self. In Fichte-Studien with das Schweben (underlined by Novalis) and the imagi(Ichheit) is to produce the "extremes"between self said of the nary power takes place. In the following whichdas Schweben (Nr. 556) fragment he asserts that "Being, being oneself,being free and floatingare sind Synonymen. Freyseynund Schweben synonyms":Seyn,Ich seyn, Brouillon(Nr. 622), And in a later fragmentfromDas allgemeine and is declared to be the activity producing das Schweben philosophy the self). thereforealso the freedomof the self(and, perhaps,from And poetry! could be ascribed the same function. Surelyreflection But here it is philosophythat is given a missionthat sounds, so to Novalis writesthat"philosophymakes evspeak, "deconstructive": the universe-like the Copernican sysloose-relativizes erything tem,it cancels all solidpoints-and makes somethingthatfloatsout of something quiescent (und machtaus dem Ruhendenein Schwebendes)." We are close, in this fragment,to the thought and style that Novalis has in common withSchlegel. This is also whatmakes them both vital to Benjamin's effortwhen expanding reflectionas a to the "thinkinto an idea of Kritik and, further, "styleof thinking"
5 Das BrouillonNr. 952. allgemeine

This content downloaded from 194.150.86.36 on Thu, 19 Sep 2013 07:54:22 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

M L N

483

thatfinally dissolvesthe workof art in the critically ing of thinking" My next developed idea. The name of thiscommon factoris irony. move, then, will be to approach the "romanticirony"in order to and criticism. establishits connectionswithreflection Irony was famouslydiscussed by Schlegel in several fragments and always in connectionwithhumour, wit and paradox. Apparironyto the traditionalrheently,Schlegel did not want to restrict it would be correctto say that he retorical trope and probably of as the qualitieslike humour etc: irony form stylistic garded irony would be the general rule governingall sortsof strategiesused to express and expand the "romanticpoetry"he praised in Athendums116 as quoted above. This should mean thatironyas well Fragment for as "romanticpoetry"are tendencies(ratherthan tropes/genres) would seem what solid, crossing borders, Schlegel: breaking up and hinting at, ifnot naming,the unnameable, expressingurbanity i.e., the Romantic"Absolute." This should also mean thatironyas The movement, withreflection. formis affiliated tendencyor form that Schlegel suggests as irony is, in fact,close to the reflection discussed by Novalis-and both termsseem to be derived fromthe dialectic of the self according to Fichte. As pointed out by Hans Eichner, Fichte gives the "prototypefor the succession of selfto which Schlegel aland self-limitation creation,self-annihilation This in with connection returns irony."6 explains one of ways as both and beyond intention discussingirony Schlegel's fragments "Hualso beyond the "arbitrarysemblance of self-annihilation." mour," Schlegel goes on-meaning, I think,that humour is the substanceof formalirony-"humour has to do withbeing and with This connection to non-being,and its real nature is reflection."7 of self and reflectionalso to and the dialectics therefore Fichte, where I another Schlegel declares phifragment explains, think, homeland of to "the real be irony."8 losophy There is an abundance of criticalliterature discussingromantic its but much less consequences: humour describing stylistic irony etc. This may seem paradoxical, since ironyshould be the formal tendency (and thereforehard to catch) while humour should be the palpable substance. Benjamin, in his firstdissertation, aligns as steps toirony,as we remember,with reflectionand criticism
6 Friedrich Hans Eichner: "Einleitung." In Kritische II, Munchen Schlegel-Ausgabe 1967, LXIX. 7 Athendums-Fragmente Nr. 305. 8 Nr. 42. Lyceums-Fragmente

This content downloaded from 194.150.86.36 on Thu, 19 Sep 2013 07:54:22 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

484

ARNE MELBERG

wards the Romantic Absolute (while a later Benjamin maintains reflectionas "styleof thinking"but is less explicitabout the connection to the "Absolute"). The relationof Romanticironyto this "Absolute" is, however,prominentin most interpretamysterious tions of the period, like in the latest I have come across, Manfred in diefriihromantische Asthetik.9 Frank associates Frank'sEinfihrung the Romantic "Absolute" with Being (both Novalis and Holderlin use the termSeyn)and, in a Heideggerian fashion,withtime.Time, and finalreason whythe "Absolute" is not a subthen,is the first movement.This movementis also stance but, rather,a fluctuating Romanthe reason whyBeing cannotbe named-except ironically. tic irony is, according to Frank, "the temporal movementof the Absolute repeated in the medium of art" (311). Ironic artSchlegels "romanticpoetry"-is thereforecredited withthe possibilityof transcendingall epistemologicalboundaries and (at least ironically)approaching the "Absolute." Frank even defines early Romanticismas the "Philosophyin which speculativethoughtrenounces the claim to reach the Absolute by reflection-and comthroughthe medium of art" (222f). pensates for this deficiency sides withphiWe can notice in thisdefinitionthat "reflection" and that both are contrastedto as losophy "speculative thought" the "medium of art" thatis given the privilegeof contactwiththe philosophicallyunattainable "Absolute." This should mean that in the already transportedmeaning of the Frank uses "reflection" as while denyingthe term the posreflection word, i.e., thinking, And of transport, a sibilities i.e., metaphoricalor poetical function. this is no doubt in full solidaritywith importantdimensions of Romantic thought,but not, I think,withall. More withSchelling than withSchlegel,so to speak. Frank'sRomanticart cannot be the 116 "romanticpoetry"we found in Schlegel's Athendums-Fragment of since art and on the reflection" reflection wings poetic "floating are here obviously one. And Frank's handling of "reflection"is from Benjamin's exaltationof "reflection," in different strikingly or as of as the "unmedithe first dissertation, "thinking thinking" ated thinking"making way into the "Absolute" (33). This is not broughtup to make an argumentwithFrank's excellent Einfihrungbut only to profile Benjamin's perhaps eccentric his metaphorical"reflection" as use of his termsand, prominently,
9 Frankfurtam Main 1989. I will quote Frank in my own translationand with page-referencesin the text.

This content downloaded from 194.150.86.36 on Thu, 19 Sep 2013 07:54:22 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

M L N

485

And the first "the styleof thinking." thingto say,then,is thatthere are no chains broken between his central and coordinated terms and thatthese are by no means opposed reflection-criticism-irony to art (even if criticism, dissolvesart by realizingit). Art is, finally, on the contrary, a "medium of reflection"(Reflexionsmedium, 65). Nor are Benjamin's terms opposed to philosophy understood as conceptual thinking."The concept," he writes,is "the adequate formof expression" for "reflection" (47); and art as a "medium of reflection"aims at nothing but "knowledge" (65)-although art to reach thisconceptual knowlmay need some help fromcriticism of is in idea. Nor the irony any way opposed to reflection; edge Romanticirony"derivesfromthe spiritof art and not fromthe will of the artist"(85) accordingto Benjamin,who is, therefore, close to in "naive" the Schlegel, who found intention (Absicht) unusably mattersof irony.10And Benjamin goes on to say that romantic ... can evidently only be representedin the irony,"like criticism, reflection" (85). make up a singlestrategy Thus, reflection-criticism-irony aiming at the annihilatingrealizationof the work of art, all according to the Benjamin of 1920. His idealism may well be called both absolute and transcendental,but it has some unexpected ingredients that point beyond idealism. One is that he uses a termlike reflecof thinking," as the "thinking but still,and in tion metaphorically thisveryexpression,keeps remindingus of the literalsense of the term. He, therefore, gives his centraltermsa so-to-speakmaterial touch but also connectsthem withmore classical and tropological senses,as when affiliating ironyand reflection. Accordingto HeinrichLausberg's renderingof the classicalrhetorical tradition, irony should be just as close to reflectionas Benjamin wanted it. Lausberg defines both tropes by their use of words "opposed" to straightcommunication.Irony is more drastic,since it can put a word "occasionallyagainst its meaning" througha change of concontextin order to throw text;while reflexio keeps to a well-known This will new lighton the word in a sympathetic reinterpretation. of the opand "thus give the true voluntas be tiefsinnig-emphatisch ponent a basis in language itself."11 Who would not like to have one's true voluntas-up till then
'o Athendums-Fragmente Nr. 305. " Heinrich Lausberg: Handbuchder literarischen Rhetorik. Muchen 1973 1:336 (? 664).

This content downloaded from 194.150.86.36 on Thu, 19 Sep 2013 07:54:22 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

486

ARNE MELBERG

concealed to oneself-extracted out of one's own words by way of reflection?This seems to be Lausberg's idea of reflexio (and he in the same includes movement). irony therapeutic benevolently in his first but criticism is his dissertation Benjamin thinkssimilarly task comes close to to the that be term Lausberg's given major (and the workof art is the "opponent" to be enlightenedby reflexio is of course connected withreflection criticism). Benjamin's Kritik has and ironyas all termsare withthe Romantic Absolute. Kritik thereforenothing to do with subjectivewhim or even withjudgwritesBenjamin in 1920, to contemporary ment: contrary practice, but completion, "is notjudgment in its centralintention, criticism works on one of the the hand; their expansion, systematization dissolutionin the Absolute on the other" (78). Criticismis for Benjamin immanent,as is apparent in the last what is already therein the work 'systematizes' quotation: criticism does somethingto of art, thus making it 'complete.' Still,criticism esthe work that was not known withinthe work itself:criticism tablishesits relationto the Absolute. Criticism speaks the language of the Absolute on behalf of the work of art therebygivingwords Criticismis to its true voluntas (to use Lausberg's idea of reflexio). given thisremarkablecapacityby the dialecticalact of reflectionor, to use Schlegel's expression: by "floatingon the wingsof poetis like Romanticironybased on reflection ical reflection." Criticism and Benjamin connects both of them with the task of "making romantisieren, romantic," echoing Novalis' famous"The worldmust be made romantic,"Die Weltmugromantisiert werden,12 givingNovalis' words a poetological turnagainstthe subjectiveand singular. is close to ironybecause criticism In Benjamin's version criticism and in earnest, in order to trans"dissolves the form irrevocably formthe singularwork into the absolute workof art"-and thatis to romantisieren (84). We have reached, then,a pointwhere Benjamin's argumentpreconclusion, quoted in my introduction: pares us for his startling in the Romanticsense "impliesunavoidablythe parthat criticism thanof the works"(119). The adox of a higherestimateof criticism does whatthe work reason forthisshould now be obvious: criticism of art cannot do, it dissolvesitssingularity by connectingit withthe Absolute. Criticismapproaches the language of the Absolute, a language that is necessarilyobjective, ideal and thereforepure.
12

Nr. 105. Logologische Fragmente

This content downloaded from 194.150.86.36 on Thu, 19 Sep 2013 07:54:22 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

M L N

487

"Criticism" is Benjamin's first version of pure language pronounced in heavilyidealisticterms.His idea of pure language-as horizon or a hope of the future,a transcendental a lost possibility, a regulativenorm-will, however,notbe givenup. It willinsteadbe and thereby accommodated in less idealisticsettings approach what in this first dissertation:a "styleof thinkwas already a possibility ing." 2. Some of the notions mentioned above may seem protodeconstructivetoday: Novalis' idea of philosophy as making aus einSchwebendes dem Ruhenden (and much else could be quoted from Novalis to similar effect); Benjamin giving criticismthe task of "dissolving"the work of art and makingway for a higher estimathan of the work criticized.Today we can hear tion of criticism into accusatoryargumentsagainst deconturned like these things struction(rarelyagainst Romanticism)by its critics.I have no into give these tentionof going into that debate, but am only trying ideas a piece of their heritage-but such observationscould perhaps be used as mutual illuminationbetween Romanticismand Deconstruction.Benjamin's mediatingrole is obvious and, coming it is well established to Paul de Man's version of deconstruction, An investigation thatit took place under Benjaminian influence.13 and Deconstruction(inof correspondencesbetween Romanticism cluding Benjamin) could indeed lead very far, but I will restrict few myselfhere to Paul de Man and to one of his surprisingly direct commentarieson Benjamin: a lecture from 1977 dealing with Romantic philosophy under the Kierkegaardian heading "The Concept of Irony."14 De Man quotes and commentson a passage from Benjamin's firstdissertationtowards the end of his lecture,that has, up till then, discussed Schlegel's idea of ironyqualified by an exposition de Man is of Fichte's philosophyof das Ich. What mainlyinterests
13 1953See Lindsay Waters' "Introduction" to Paul de Man: CriticalWritings 1976, Minnesota UP 1989. 14It is withsome hesitationthat I use thisas yetunpublished lecture,that I have of read in a typescriptfrom a tape but that the author has had no possibility controlling.It is however the only time, to my knowledge, that de Man makes and thismakes the lecturehighlysuitexplicituse of Benjamin's earlydissertation able to my purposes. And since it is due to be published in the volume Aesthetic of using it here. Page referencesthat I give in mytext I willtake the liberty Ideology are however to the typescript.

This content downloaded from 194.150.86.36 on Thu, 19 Sep 2013 07:54:22 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

488

ARNE MELBERG

translatedas posit,and famouslyused by Fichte in the verb setzen, Ich (that posits itin the dialecticof absoluten his Wissenschaftslehre self), negative self and empirical self (that are posited). The verb was actuallyhaunting German Romantic philosophyup to Hegel and the probably most striking wording of its importancecan be fromhisFichte-Studien found in one of Novalis' fragments (Nr. 282, not quoted by de Man): "Positingis the original act," Setzenistdie Handlung. urspriingliche De Man's setzenis vital for the last stage of his philosophy of language and it seems motivatedboth by his readings of German In this Romanticismand his interestin linguistic "performatives." self that is that the Fichtean absolute lecture the main argument the construction due to performative "posits" itselfis an unstable and arbitrary characterof thispositingact. The self,understoodas a linguisticinvention,can at any time dissolve and that negative and dissolvingmovementis called "irony."FriedrichSchlegel'sidea of "irony" is read by de Man as the "radical negativity" (40) that the construction of the deconstructs fragile "allegory"of infallibly from the final the Man's De reader the self. argument recognizes of this from of 1979 and "The of parts ofReading chapter Allegories Rhetoricof Temporality"of 1969-with the difference, however, thatsetzen has turnedup as a regulativetermin the laterwork.And de Man insists,in the lecture, on setzenas the creative force of language itself,as the, so to speak, positiveside of language that, of however, carries its own negation as a permanent possibility with diversion or, Schlegel's word, "parabasis." Irony is, dissolving then, the immanentcapacityof language to negate any "posited" of narrative"(33; meaning as the "necessaryundoing of any theory cf. the "systematicundoing of understanding" administered by ofReading).And "irony"according to the final pages of Allegories Man as a witness is used de provingthis dialectic of by Benjamin in and positivity negativity language; Benjamin "sees the destructive power, the negative power, of the parabasis [i.e., the ironical digression] fully"(40f). As a proof, de Man translatesa passage from Benjamin's firstdissertationpresentinga remarkablemetaphor-or perhaps allegory-for the functionof irony. However, de Man's translationdistortsin some interestingrespects Benjamin's wording (or Benjamin's wording as I understand it-and withthe reservationthat de Man's oral commentary may be minlike this: his with translation).Benjamin's passage goes gled

This content downloaded from 194.150.86.36 on Thu, 19 Sep 2013 07:54:22 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

M L N

489

is like the storm, that of the formof representation The ironization in front of the transcendental order[Ordthe curtain raises[aufhebt] existence and in thistheimmediate of artand revealsthis, [Benung] of thework, as a mystery (86). stehen] which of form is likethe storm "theironization De Man translates: of art and reveals itfor curtain of the transcendental order lifts the up of the existence whatit is [!], in thisorderas wellas in theunmediate work" (41). In de Man's translationand commentary the point of Benjamin's to the seems slip away: pointbeing thatthe ironic"curtainpassage than the idea of art-represented by less reveals nothing raising" and the words that,therefore, Mysterium-and Ordnung Benjamin's is identical with the critical work revelation administered ironically done by "reflection."This point is made clear by the following insentences (not quoted by de Man) discussing the "mystery" volved in the "existence"of the workof art as it is revealed by the of irony.This "mystery" (thatmysteriously disap"curtain-raising" of creative from Man's translation)is not a "mystery de peared of substance"but a "mystery nota "mystery genius" and, therefore, of order," Ordnung, a term used by Benjamin to indicate that the work of art has an ideal and formalexistencebehind or above or This "mystery of expressiveand substantial. beyond the subjective, order" revealed by irony also demonstratesthe "absolute depenunzerdence" of the work of art on the "idea of art,"seinesewigen in derselben. storbaren Aufgehobenseins Benjamin goes on to declare irony to be beyond intentionor What he calls "formalirony"(because it is part of the subjectivity. formof art showing its ideal Ordnung)"must be valued as an obof the workitself.It representsthe parajective element (Moment) doxical attemptto build the image also by pullingdown (am Gebilde Abbruch zu bauen): in the work itselfto demonstrateits nochdurch relationwiththe idea" (87). De Man comes back to the lastsentence the paradoxical attempt it: "Formal irony... represents translating stillto construct the edificeby deconstructing it,and so to demonstrate the relationshipof the work to the idea withinthe work itself." De Man finallycriticisesBenjamin for not followinghis own radical insightsbut, instead, making irony-intoan element in a of ironywould where the negativity Hegelian dialectic of history, make way for a positive result. As far as I can see, de Man is

This content downloaded from 194.150.86.36 on Thu, 19 Sep 2013 07:54:22 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

490

ARNE MELBERG

misreading Benjamin here, perhaps misled by Benjamin's use of as quoted above (but not quoted by de Man). the Hegelian Moment in Benjamin's I can find no historicaldimension to that Moment and strictly text; it is, instead,used structurally irony idealistically: in the workitselfshould mean thatthe workcarriesits as a Moment own relation to the idea (also, here, called Ordnungas another of the RomanticAbsolute but hardlyto any Hegerepresentation lian Geist).And: that this relation could be realized by using the to paraphrase Schlegel. wingsof poetical reflection, It should be obvious now that de Man in spite of his finalcriticism is making Benjamin into an accomplice, so to speak, in a that is very much his own. He seems to be "radical negativity" to the covering up all traces leading to the "idea" and, therefore, of order" Romantic Absolute, silentlypassing over the "mystery that is Benjamin's central concern in this passage of his text. In to order to understandwhyde Man is doing this,we have, I think, take a closer look at the main argumentof his text.And I will,then, at all to do withFichtebut I willonly not discussifthishas anything consider some of de Man's assertionsthat make up a conclusion of de Man's own versionof irony thatis in any way a neat summary and deconstruction. Fichte'sdialecticof the selfis interpreted by de Man, perhaps not as a theoryof figurallanguage: "a theoryof trope, a surprisingly, "it is the tropological theoryon metaphor" based on substitution; and general form" (26; and "substisystemin its most systematic tution" should be an approximation of the "reflection"used by is called a "perforFichte and his criticalfollowers).This "system" "based on an originalact of positing."Twice in the mative"system same passage de Man here speaks of the "originalact of positing" (whichmay remindanyone of Novalis' "positingis the originalact" as quoted above). De Man also calls-and stillin the same passage"Positing"is furthermore "positing""the beginningof the system." asserted to be what happens first,creating the system-i.e., the systemof tropes making up language-that is thendeveloping. There is, in other words, no doubt whatsoeverthatde Man wants setzenis an original act that to make sure that the performative to that be a Nietzschean army of a appears "posits" language, and metaphors. tropes What, actually,is the "positing"that is given such a remarkable positionin thisphilosophyof language? De Man makes itclear that it is not simply a random performativespeech-act, nor is it an

This content downloaded from 194.150.86.36 on Thu, 19 Sep 2013 07:54:22 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

M L N

491

or Derindicationor idealization of any Saussurean arbitrariness act in mind. of signs; de Man has a more distinct ridean iterability "It is the catachresis, the ability He namesthe originalact catechresis: to name anything, false of language catachretically by usage, but to is to name and thus to posit anything language willing posit" (19). Catachresismeans here, as can be seen fromthe quotation, false usage.A more common sense of the termwould be, e.g., metaphorical expression without proper term, like 'leg of table'-but de Man's false usage indicates,perhaps, that there is no such thingin name or term. Or: a strainedor forced (but language as a proper expressive) combination,like speaking of an 'army of tropes.' De is in anycase the "originalact" providing Man's 'posited' catechresis of tropes.What the (false) basis for language, i.e., forthe "system" but itsown deconstrucfollowsis, of course, not only the "system" tion, or the ironic readings that remind us that every systemwhetherwe call it an allegoryor a self or a work or a history-is based on catachresis,i.e., a "false usage" that perhaps could be persuasive and expressivebut stillis forced onto us. This line of thoughtmay well seem like a condensed versionof what was on its way in "The Rhetoricof Temporality"and is implied throughout Allegoriesof Reading (although never put so summarynot so much of Fichte bluntly):it is simplythe systematic in this And twoelementscome out as striking as of de Man himself. I would to call a and like these giving privilege givinga summary: narrative. but is also the positingact is not only named catachresis, Firstly, given the privilege of being outside the linguisticsystemas an act. This means thatthe catachresiscould originaland originating not be a linguistic trope among all other tropes,but thatit has an immanentor perhaps substantialquality. Catachresis determines the use of language but could not be determinedby such use. The catachresisis giventhe privilegeof being out of reach fora perhaps of the figurmore conventional(but less dramatic)determination from that would the of derive tropes usage or inality language, in from not immanent case, and, any qualities. In any terpretation etc. must be the victimof de Man's version, also interpretation, catechresissince the catachresisis "posited" outside language as an "originalact." One consequence of de Man's givingthisprivilegeto catachresis seems to be thata pragmaticviewof language is ruled out. De Man defines,as we remember,catachresisas falseusageand thisimplies

This content downloaded from 194.150.86.36 on Thu, 19 Sep 2013 07:54:22 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

492

ARNE MELBERG

or simplyconventionalbut: that language is not (only) arbitrary false. And, according to normal logic, in order to be able to judge somethingas false,we need a notionof correct;and ifall language is systematized falseusage,theremuststillbe at least a transcendenof correct tal possibility usage to make it possible tojudge all actual have perverted usage as false. The "originalact" must,therefore, what was originallytrue. And this gives us perhaps a clue to understanding why de Man makes Benjamin into a truth-witness while silently passing over Benjamin's RomanticAbsolute and his of order." The reason could be that de Man (like Ben"mystery order but thatthisorder, for jamin) presupposes a transcendental can only de Man, is purely negative,is "nothing,"and, therefore, be negativelynamed afterits results,i.e., as false usage. Secondly, the giving of a founding privilegeto the catachresis element in de Man's summaryof makes way for another striking structure. He simplygives his philosophyof language: itsnarrative he tellsus, we have this"originalact us a narrativeof creation:first, follows of positing"thatis creationand fall in one movement,then the systemof tropes that makes up language and, withlanguage: man, world and history. This narrativemay come as a surpriseif we rememberde Man's normal scepticismor even hostility againstnarrativeand his insisting that irony necessarilydeconstructsor at least interruptsany narrativeallegory. It comes as no surprise,however,considering the privilegegivento the "originalact of positing":thisprovidesde or a perspectivefromwhichtimecan be Man witha starting-point and after. This sequence, in arranged a narrativesequence of before of course, becomes complicated when de Man, in his own narraof the verykind he is practicing, mustbe thatnarratives tion,insists of or as a an as a reminder repetition original negated by irony is also an elementand a point catachresis.Such an ironicrepetition within the very same narrative that it is supposed to negateto survey. making the amount of negations involveddifficult of language as should be de Man's one evident: Still, theory thing a systemof tropes posited by an originalact of catechresisis itself and furposited as a narrativetrope at its verysimplest(first/then) thermorebased on a mythof origin.His theoryis, as he said about Fichte's,"a theoryof trope,a theoryon metaphor,"or: a theoryof withsetzen as the formulathatgetsthe transport transport linguistic narrative His use of when wording his theoryshows us a going. reflection: a of Romantic theoryof language as a systemof piece

This content downloaded from 194.150.86.36 on Thu, 19 Sep 2013 07:54:22 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

M L N

493

tropes pronounced as a narrativetrope; a metaphoricaltheoryof metaphor. 3. This part is a note on possible relationsbetweende Man's "original act of positing" and Benjamin's fascinationof the Romantic Absolute; these relations will be traced in terms of violence.De Man's "original act" of catachresisseems to be a violentact in the an even more original (but unsense of pervertingand falsifying This neganameable) state and provokinga "radical negativity." far fromRomanticironyas it was is, at least in temperament, tivity discussed by Friedrich Schlegel, who used irony as the form for humour, playful wit, paradox, urbanityand reflectiveSchweben, and even connected it withEnthusiasmus. Walter Benjamin can, however, provide us with the link that seems to be missingwhen comingto Schlegel,and the name of that or rather:its link is the veryfetishof early German Romanticism, relatingHolderinterpretation-Holderlin. Benjamin is explicitly lin with violence and in terms that remind us of the Romantic Absolute in his seconddissertation,Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften, In a remarkable on Kunstkritik. afterthe first almostdirectly written betweenthe harmonizingart passage Benjamin develops a contrast of Goethe and Holderlin's late hymnsand Sophocles-translations. Some of Holderlin's own terms give Benjamin the basis for his is freand cesura.Niichternheit argument: "sobriety"(Niichternheit) quently used by Holderlin both in poems and theoreticalfragments,like in a late essay that happens to be called "Reflexion," The is positivelycontrasted to Begeisterung. where Niichternheit to where in Holderlin's commentary Sophocles, cesuracomes up is called "actuallyempty"(eigentlich the "tragicaltransport" leer)and not cesura that finds Holderlin effect correspondsto the rhythmical of works. He in structure in lines or verses but the qualifies (mysbut no doubt provokingto Benjamin) cesuraas "the pure teriously, word,"das reineWort. Benjamin quotes thisand goes on to connect Niichternheit with the cesura(which Holderlin does not). NiichternwritesBenjamin, heit, that of thatcesura,in whichfurthermore is onlyanother designation inroom to a with order to the interferes (Ausdruck) harmony, give sign all meansof within violence(ausdruckslosen Gewalt) (innerhalb) signless thanin theGreek everbeenmoreevident art.Suchviolence has hardly in on Holderlin's on the one hand, hymns the other.In the tragedy

This content downloaded from 194.150.86.36 on Thu, 19 Sep 2013 07:54:22 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

494

ARNEMELBERG

derDichtung ins Wort desDichters thingbeyond the poet (das etwasjenseits fdllt).15

in thehymns as inas theherobeingstruck noticeable silent, tragedy that in therhythm. terference Yes, one could notdescribe (Einspruch) that thepoetry thanbysaying moreprecisely gives waytosomerhythm

Let me here onlypoint out thatthe "violence"Benjamin is describthe poet and therefore ing seems to derive frombeyond,jenseits, outside poetical language; still "it" works (violently)within lanall means "within, innerhalb, guage as an anti-poeticalinterference of art." "It" is apparentlyalso beyond the poetical subjectsince "it" interruptsthe poet's harmoniouslyintended rhythmwith someor intentional thatis ausdruckslos, lackingsignification thing,etwas, expression. with poetical harWhat is this impersonal etwasthat interferes voice? with the and Well, itcould not poet's minglesviolently mony dissertation considered be faraway fromwhat Benjamin in hisfirst of as jenseitsof the poet (but not beyond criticism):the "mystery order" discovered withinthe poem and leading-on the wings of reflection-from the subject into the Absolute. Still,somethingis because somethinghas turnedwhatwas easilynamed and different handled in thefirstdissertationinto somethinganonymouslyviolent in the second.I can only speculate on the reasons for this betweenthe change and would prefer,here, to keep to similarities and nameless of order" and the second mysterious first"mystery etwas. Importantto notice,then,is thatboth categoriesare substanAnd as substancestheycannot be derived tial: theyare something. or be regarded as expressionsbut are impersonally fromintentions order. This would connected witha higher (or at least: different) fromany mean thatboth orders mustbe called inhuman; different I now And to intention. what or indifferent any poetical subjectivity indifference would be the reason in of inhuman terms why suggest disserorder" of the Absolute fromBenjamin's first the "mystical tationcould be associated withviolence in the second. The difference is, of course, thatwhatwas first happilynamed and evoked (as the Absolute) has turned into an anonymousetwassituatedjenseits of human language but still working violentlywithinlanguage, "withinall means of art." And when we come to Paul de Man's has turned into nothing. renderingof Benjamin, something
15 in Gesammelte Goethes I;1, Frankfurtam Main Schriften Wahlverwandtschaften, 1974, 181f.

This content downloaded from 194.150.86.36 on Thu, 19 Sep 2013 07:54:22 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

M L N

495

At least we have, perhaps, a kind of explanation for de Man's of Benjamin in "The Concept of Irony." De Man mis-translation as said above, presuppose a transcendental order, a substanmay, tial "outside,"but this"outside" is a purelynegative"nothing"and thereforeunnameable: while approaching Benjamin's effortsof of order" and order of art"as "mystery naming"the transcendental of to de Man has erase names. the Still,he "mystery substance," thathis unnameable "nothing"workswithin insists language under the pseudonym "catachresis." 4. I startedthisessay by quoting Benjamin fromhis first dissertation declaring reflectionas a "styleof thinking."Now, "style"is both as a quality and as a concept when it notoriouslydifficult comes to definitions.Still,there is an obvious tendencyin all styor results, and thistendency listicefforts, whatevertheirintentions takes us fromsubstanceto form.Styleis discourse,according to a recent discussion of the term,but the stylistic "profile"of the discourse is not immanentbut always dependent on its reader.'6 In and second disserthe comparison above between Benjamin's first tations,we mightnotice a similartendency:fromthe heavilysubof the stantial philosophy of the firstinto the practical criticism second. The Romantic Absolute did not disappear along the way And but was, as we mightnotice,turned into an anonymousetwas. myimpressionis thatthe RomanticAbsolutestaysanonymouswith Benjamin; or: could no longer be named but only be approached in striking metaphors.That is: not anonymousbut pseudonymous. A late mentioningof Holderlin gives an interesting example, on the verysame letterthatBenjamin used since itis a commentary in his second dissertation as quoted above, a letterwhere Holderlin When Benjamin publishesand commentson discussesNiichternheit. he characterizesHolderlin as movthisletterin Deutsche Menschen, ing on "rough heights,where the naked rock of language emerges Fels derSprache etc. (Aufschroffen Hihen, wo dernackte everywhere" an Tag tritt).17 schoniiberall Elements of thismetaphorrecall the "signlessviolence" thatwas said to "interfere"with poetical language in Holderlin's hymns, as quoted Wahlverwandtschaften according to Benjamin in Goethes
16

17

in Fiction etdiction, Paris 1991, 140-151. Gerard Genette: "Styleet signification," am Main 1972, 171. Gesammelte IV:1, Frankfurt Schriften

This content downloaded from 194.150.86.36 on Thu, 19 Sep 2013 07:54:22 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

496

ARNE MELBERG

earlier. Now we are invited to imagine the poet as walking on with the harrough rocks, somethingthat obviously"interferes" of Holderlin himself called the his transport. "interfering" mony cesuraa "pure word" and Benjamin's "naked rock" reminds us of this: language being "naked" could only mean an uncovered, unadorned, pre-figurative language. And: a language that is ausi.e., beyond any subjectiveintentionand thereforeas indruckslos, and as absolute and substantial as human as the "naked rock"itself the Romantic Absolute of the firstdissertation.(Had we taken dissertationon the Baroque tragedyinto considBenjamin's third eration we would have guessed that intentionhas nothing to do witha truththatis purelyexpressed only in the inhumanlymeaningless language of "Adamic naming."18) My point is, of course, that Benjamin in this last example apthe pure language, in a striking metaproaches his old favourite, in to uses a order evoke a he phor,i.e., stylistic figure pre-figurative state of language. And that should not, I think,be regarded as but as a displacementof substancebyform, contradictory, meaning thatthe RomanticAbsolute has been pseudonymously transported into "style." into language and transformed dissertation This developmentwas predictedalready in the first and where he diswhere Benjamin evokes the "styleof thinking" cussed poetryas prose-and as a conclusionto thisessay I willconof understandingthis.Prose,I said, was a sider some possibilities for i.e., the steps summary Benjamin's reflection-criticism-irony, of into the Absolute. from the work art idea and the Toleading this wards the end of the dissertation some Benjamin gives thought provocative wordings: "The idea of poetry is the prose" (101); "The conception of the idea of poetryas the prose determinesthe whole of the Romanticphilosophyof art" (103). And as a support Nr 382): "The for this he quotes Novalis (Das allgemeine Brouillon, is the is the arts." (Novalis prose among perhaps a feeble poetry for he could also be to effect, support Benjamin; quoted contrary as when saying, in the Logologische 51: "The Fragmente highest, authenticprose is the lyricalpoem." Perhaps it would be correctto formulasfor a stateof textthat goes say that Novalis keeps trying the between beyond boundary poetryand prose. And perhaps this
18 desdeutschen Gesammelte am Main 1:1, Frankfurt Ursprung Trauerspiels, Schriften 1974, 215-217; Benjamin declares e.g., that "truthis the death of intention"(Die Wahrheit istder Tod derIntention).

This content downloaded from 194.150.86.36 on Thu, 19 Sep 2013 07:54:22 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

M L N

497

is what gives Benjamin's own mature styleits easily undecidability distinguishableprofile.) Benjamin uses Holderlin (and thisis the onlytime Interestingly, in the firstdissertation)to develop his idea of prose. As in the Menschen itis Holderlin's idea and as in Deutsche second dissertation that has impressed Benjamin as a "completelynew of Niichternheit and stillunpredictably workingbasic thoughtof the Romanticphilosophy of art" (103). And the relationof Holderlin's Nichternheit and of both to prose is to Benjamin's own basic term reflection quicklyestablished: of art]is relatedto the of the sobriety It is apparenthow this[thesis of thatphilosophy, thereflection. The promethodological procedure imof artis mostdistinctly as a principle saic,in whichthe reflection of incommon is furthermore usagea metaphorical designation printed, thesober(desNiichternen) (103). withprose here relatedto or even identified Not onlyis Niichternheit but said is (which certainly by Holderlin), proseis beyond anything which is also called the very named a realization of reflection, all threeconvergingterms method of philosophy.In what follows, are contrastedto Platonic mania (which would be Holderlin's BeStill,prose could not simplybe prose: when Benjamin geisterung). withinthe talks of reflectionas "distinctly imprinted"(ausgeprdgt) is term. "Prose" it that the is evident "prose" "higher" "prosaic," rock to of less than "the naked language," use the implies nothing on Holderlin's later from much note Benjamin's metaphor is not Prose Niichternheit simplyprose but a pseud(quoted above). to thisI would liketo call for And as a witness pure language. onym Theodor Adorno, who was also provoked by Holderlin into some of his late essay of his mostremarkableobservations.I am thinking "Parataxis," which is, among other things,a rendering of Benmyselfhere to quote jamin's ideas on Holderlin. I have to restrict one observation that has explicitlyto do with "pure language." the singularand perhaps anti-poetical When characterizing syntax of Holderlin's late hymns,Adorno writesthat "pure language . .. should be prose like the holy texts."19 establishedas the means What Benjamin in his first dissertation of reaching the Absolute-reflection,criticism, irony-can now be
19Th. W. Adorno: "Parataxis. Zur spaten LyrikHolderlins." Schriften 11 (Noten am Main 1974, 470. zur Literatur), Frankfurt

This content downloaded from 194.150.86.36 on Thu, 19 Sep 2013 07:54:22 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

498

ARNE MELBERG

summarized as proseand thisproseis, according to Adorno, "holy" to the degree that it approaches "pure language," which,consequently,is the language of the Absolute. Wherever we turn, we seem to meet this mysterious Absolute,by now also given a sacral dimension. We should, however,not forgetits worldlyside. Benjamin does not (nor does Adorno, but I cannot go into that here): in the quotation above, Benjamin remindsus of the "common usrelates the prosaic to the prose, the proage" that metaphorically saic being "a metaphorical designation of the sober (des Niichternen)." The meaning of the passage seems thereforenot only to be and "prose" as versionsof Niichternheit, an exaltationof reflection or less holyAbsolute. The meaning of more in its turn a version a into the world,the name of Absolute from the is also to show a way this way being "common usage," Sprachgebrauch: language in use. in use turnsmetaAnd, according to the same passage: language indirect. Direct and language would be phorical, i.e., figurative is not language in use and could pure language but directlanguage not be used. Benjamin's approximationof the prose of pure lanwhich,in use, becomes his "styleof thinkguage is called reflection, ing." could My suggestionis, then,thatBenjamin's "styleof thinking" be understood as a prosaic stylewitha metaphoricalrelationto an ideal of pure "prose." This ideal is named the Absolute in the first dissertation and, even ifthe namingsoon disappears,the ideal does not. The pure language is always there as a background or a horizon,givinghis language its,so to speak, pseudonymouscharacter of predictability and genre. Anyone and savingitfromthe triviality struck from will be a later reading Benjamin period by his constant of poetryand prose, ficin and above an undecidability Schweben tion and philosophy, idealism and materialism,substance and of metaphors-"the naked form.Not least: his elaborate inventions since theysuggest rockof language"-become all the more striking an unmetaphoricallanguage of pure naming. The idealisticsubhas turned into stance called the Absolute in the firstdissertation formand a formthat keeps remindingus of lost substance. Benand jamin never hesitatesto use his "wingsof poetical reflection" into use. his ideal prosaic put prose
i Oslo Universitetet

This content downloaded from 194.150.86.36 on Thu, 19 Sep 2013 07:54:22 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions