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NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. CITY OF CABANATUAN, respondent. DECISION PUNO, J.

: This is a petition for review of the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated March 12, 2001 and July 10, 2001, respectively, finding petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) liable to pay franchise tax to respondent City of Cabanatuan. Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under Commonwealth Act No. 120, as amended. It is tasked to undertake the development of hydroelectric generations of power and the production of electricity from nuclear, geothermal and other sources, as well as, the transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis. Concomitant to its mandated duty, petitioner has, among others, the power to construct, operate and maintain power plants, auxiliary plants, power stations and substations for the purpose of developing hydraulic power and supplying such power to the inhabitants. For many years now, petitioner sells electric power to the residents of Cabanatuan City, posting a gross income of P107,814,187.96 in 1992. Pursuant to section 37 of Ordinance No. 165-92, the respondent assessed the petitioner a franchise tax amounting to P808,606.41, representing 75% of 1% of the latters gross receipts for the preceding year. Petitioner, whose capital stock was subscribed and paid wholly by the Philippine Government, refused to pay the tax assessment. It argued that the respondent has no authority to impose tax on government entities. Petitioner also contended that as a non-profit organization, it is exempted from the payment of all forms of taxes, charges, duties or fees in accordance with sec. 13 of Rep. Act No. 6395, as amended, viz: Sec.13. Non-profit Character of the Corporation; Exemption from all Taxes, Duties, Fees, Imposts and Other Charges by Government and Governmental Instrumentalities.- The Corporation shall be non-profit and shall devote all its return from its capital investment, as well as excess revenues from its operation, for expansion. To enable the Corporation to pay its indebtedness and obligations and in furtherance and effective implementation of the policy enunciated in Section one of this Act, the Corporation is hereby exempt: (a) From the payment of all taxes, duties, fees, imposts, charges, costs and service fees in any court or administrative proceedings in which it may be a party, restrictions and duties to the Republic of the Philippines, its provinces, cities, municipalities and other government agencies and instrumentalities; (b) From all income taxes, franchise taxes and realty taxes to be paid to the National Government, its provinces, cities, municipalities and other government agencies and instrumentalities; (c) From all import duties, compensating taxes and advanced sales tax, and wharfage fees on import of foreign goods required for its operations and projects; and (d) From all taxes, duties, fees, imposts, and all other charges imposed by the Republic of the Philippines, its provinces, cities, municipalities and other government agencies and instrumentalities, on all petroleum products used by the Corporation in the generation, transmission, utilization, and sale of electric power. The respondent filed a collection suit in the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, demanding that petitioner pay the assessed tax due, plus a surcharge equivalent to 25% of the amount of tax, and 2% monthly interest. Respondent alleged that petitioners exemption from local taxes has been repealed by section 193 of Rep. Act No. 7160, which reads as follows:

Sec. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges.- Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. On January 25, 1996, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the case. It ruled that the tax exemption privileges granted to petitioner subsist despite the passage of Rep. Act No. 7160 for the following reasons: (1) Rep. Act No. 6395 is a particular law and it may not be repealed by Rep. Act No. 7160 which is a general law; (2) section 193 of Rep. Act No. 7160 is in the nature of an implied repeal which is not favored; and (3) local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the national government. Pertinent portion of the Order reads: The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein repealing provisions which expressly and specifically cite(s) the particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its number or title is repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied repeal. Sec. 193 of R.A. No. 7160 is an implied repealing clause because it fails to identify the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislative is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. It is also a well-settled rule that, generally, general law does not repeal a special law unless it clearly appears that the legislative has intended by the latter general act to modify or repeal the earlier special law. Thus, despite the passage of R.A. No. 7160 from which the questioned Ordinance No. 165-92 was based, the tax exemption privileges of defendant NPC remain. Another point going against plaintiff in this case is the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Basco vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 197 SCRA 52, where it was held that: Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. xxx Being an instrumentality of the government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by mere local government. Like PAGCOR, NPC, being a government owned and controlled corporation with an original charter and its shares of stocks owned by the National Government, is beyond the taxing power of the Local Government. Corollary to this, it should be noted here that in the NPC Charters declaration of Policy, Congress declared that: xxx (2) the total electrification of the Philippines through the development of power from all services to meet the needs of industrial development and dispersal and needs of rural electrification are primary objectives of the nations which shall be pursued coordinately and supported by all instrumentalities and agencies of the governmen t, including its financial institutions. (underscoring supplied). To allow plaintiff to subject defendant to its tax-ordinance would be to impede the avowed goal of this government instrumentality. Unlike the State, a city or municipality has no inherent power of taxation. Its taxing power is limited to that which is provided for in its charter or other statute. Any grant of taxing power is to be construed strictly, with doubts resolved against its existence. From the existing law and the rulings of the Supreme Court itself, it is very clear that the plaintiff could not impose the subject tax on the defendant.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts Order on the ground that section 193, in relation to sections 137 and 151 of the LGC, expressly withdrew the exemptions granted to the petitioner. It ordered the petitioner to pay the respondent city government the following: (a) the sum of P808,606.41 representing the franchise tax due based on gross receipts for the year 1992, (b) the tax due every year thereafter based in the gross receipts earned by NPC, (c) in all cases, to pay a surcharge of 25% of the tax due and unpaid, and (d) the sum of P 10,000.00 as litigation expense. On April 4, 2001, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the Court of Appeals Decision. This was denied by the appellate court, viz: The Court finds no merit in NPCs motion for reconsideration. Its arguments reiterated therein that the taxing power of the province under Art. 137 (sic) of the Local Government Code refers merely to private persons or corporations in which category it (NPC) does not belong, and that the LGC (RA 7160) which is a general law may not impliedly repeal the NPC Charter which is a special lawfinds the answer in Section 193 of the LGC to the effect that tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations except local water districts xxx are hereby withdrawn. The repeal is direct and unequivocal, not implied. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED. In this petition for review, petitioner raises the following issues: A. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NPC, A PUBLIC NON PROFIT CORPORATION, IS LIABLE TO PAY A FRANCHISE TAX AS IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT SECTION 137 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE IN RELATION TO SECTION 131 APPLIES ONLY TO PRIVATE PERSONS OR CORPORATIONS ENJOYING A FRANCHISE. B. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NPCS EXEMPTION FROM ALL FORMS OF TAXES HAS BEEN REPEALED BY THE PROVISION OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AS THE ENACTMENT OF A LATER LEGISLATION, WHICH IS A GENERAL LAW, CANNOT BE CONSTRUED TO HAVE REPEALED A SPECIAL LAW. C. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT AN EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER THROUGH TAX EXEMPTION SHOULD PREVAIL OVER THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE. It is beyond dispute that the respondent city government has the authority to issue Ordinance No. 165-92 and impose an annual tax on businesses enjoying a franchise, pursuant to section 151 in relation to section 137 of the LGC, viz: Sec. 137. Franchise Tax.- Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law, the province may impose a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise, at a rate not exceeding fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year based on the incoming receipt, or realized, within its territorial jurisdiction. In the case of a newly started business, the tax shall not exceed one-twentieth (1/20) of one percent (1%) of the capital investment. In the succeeding calendar year, regardless of when the business started to operate, the tax shall be based on the gross receipts for the preceding calendar year, or any fraction thereof, as provided herein. (emphasis supplied)

xxx Sec. 151. Scope of Taxing Powers.- Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the city, may levy the taxes, fees, and charges which the province or municipality may impose: Provided, however, That the taxes, fees and charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and independent component cities shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance with the provisions of this Code. The rates of taxes that the city may levy may exceed the maximum rates allowed for the province or municipality by not more than fifty percent (50%) except the rates of professional and amusement taxes. Petitioner, however, submits that it is not liable to pay an annual franchise tax to the respondent city government. It contends that sections 137 and 151 of the LGC in relation to section 131, limit the taxing power of the respondent city government to private entities that are engaged in trade or occupation for profit. Section 131 (m) of the LGC defines a franchise as a right or privilege, affected with public interest which is conferred upon private persons or corporations, under such terms and conditions as the government and its political subdivisions may impose in the interest of the public welfare, security and safety. From the phraseology of this provision, the petitioner claims that the word private modifies the terms persons and corporations. Hence, when the LGC uses the term franchise, petitioner submits that it should refer specifically to franchises granted to private natural persons and to private corporations. Ergo, its charter should not be considered a franchise for the purpose of imposing the franchise tax in question. On the other hand, section 131 (d) of the LGC defines business as trade or commercial activity regularly engaged in as means of livelihood or with a view to profit. Petitioner claims that it is not engaged in an activity for profit, in as much as its charter specifically provides that it is a non -profit organization. In any case, petitioner argues that the accumulation of profit is merely incidental to its operation; all these profits are required by law to be channeled for expansion and improvement of its facilities and services. Petitioner also alleges that it is an instrumentality of the National Government, and as such, may not be taxed by the respondent city government. It cites the doctrine in Basco vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation where this Court held that local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government, viz: Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere local government. The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government. (MC Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579) This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over local governments. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate

a federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even seriously burden it from accomplishment of them. (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, italics supplied) Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as a tool regulation ( U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42). The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the power to destroy (Mc Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it. Petitioner contends that section 193 of Rep. Act No. 7160, withdrawing the tax privileges of governmentowned or controlled corporations, is in the nature of an implied repeal. A special law, its charter cannot be amended or modified impliedly by the local government code which is a general law. Consequently, petitioner claims that its exemption from all taxes, fees or charges under its charter subsists despite the passage of the LGC, viz: It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. Moreover, it has to be conceded that the charter of the NPC constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, is a general law. It is a basic rule in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. Finally, petitioner submits that the charter of the NPC, being a valid exercise of police power, should prevail over the LGC. It alleges that the power of the local government to impose franchise tax is subordinate to petitioners exemption from taxation; police power being the most pervasive, the least limitable and most demanding of all powers, including the power of taxation. The petition is without merit. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government, for without taxes, the government can neither exist nor endure. A principal attribute of sovereignty, the exercise of taxing power derives its source from the very existence of the state whose social contract with its citizens obliges it to promote public interest and common good. The theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and well-being of the people. In recent years, the increasing social challenges of the times expanded the scope of state activity, and taxation has become a tool to realize social justice and the equitable distribution of wealth, economic progress and the protection of local industries as well as public welfare and similar objectives. Taxation assumes even greater significance with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Thenceforth, the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges pursuant to Article X, section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, viz: Section 5.- Each Local Government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue, to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the Local Governments. This paradigm shift results from the realization that genuine development can be achieved only by strengthening local autonomy and promoting decentralization of governance. For a long time, the

countrys highly centralized government structure has bred a culture of dependence among local government leaders upon the national leadership. It has also dampened the spirit of initiative, innovation and imaginative resilience in matters of local development on the part of local government leaders. The only way to shatter this culture of dependence is to give the LGUs a wider role in the delivery of basic services, and confer them sufficient powers to generate their own sources for the purpose. To achieve this goal, section 3 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution mandates Congress to enact a local government code that will, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy , set the guidelines and limitations to this grant of taxing powers, viz: Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. To recall, prior to the enactment of the Rep. Act No. 7160, also known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), various measures have been enacted to promote local autonomy. These include the Barrio Charter of 1959, the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, the Decentralization Act of 1967 and the Local Government Code of 1983. Despite these initiatives, however, the shackles of dependence on the national government remained. Local government units were faced with the same problems that hamper their capabilities to participate effectively in the national development efforts, among which are: (a) inadequate tax base, (b) lack of fiscal control over external sources of income, (c) limited authority to prioritize and approve development projects, (d) heavy dependence on external sources of income, and (e) limited supervisory control over personnel of national line agencies. Considered as the most revolutionary piece of legislation on local autonomy, the LGC effectively deals with the fiscal constraints faced by LGUs. It widens the tax base of LGUs to include taxes which were prohibited by previous laws such as the imposition of taxes on forest products, forest concessionaires, mineral products, mining operations, and the like. The LGC likewise provides enough flexibility to impose tax rates in accordance with their needs and capabilities. It does not prescribe graduated fixed rates but merely specifies the minimum and maximum tax rates and leaves the determination of the actual rates to the respective sanggunian. One of the most significant provisions of the LGC is the removal of the blanket exclusion of instrumentalities and agencies of the national government from the coverage of local taxation. Although as a general rule, LGUs cannot impose taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, this rule now admits an exception, i.e., when specific provisions of the LGC authorize the LGUs to impose taxes, fees or charges on the aforementioned entities, viz: Section 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of the Local Government Units. - Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following: xxx (o) Taxes, fees, or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local government units. (emphasis supplied) In view of the afore-quoted provision of the LGC, the doctrine in Basco vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation relied upon by the petitioner to support its claim no longer applies. To emphasize, the Basco case was decided prior to the effectivity of the LGC, when no law empowering the local government units to tax instrumentalities of the National Government was in effect. However, as this Court ruled in the case of Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) vs. Marcos,

nothing prevents Congress from decreeing that even instrumentalities or agencies of the government performing governmental functions may be subject to tax. In enacting the LGC, Congress exercised its prerogative to tax instrumentalities and agencies of government as it sees fit. Thus, after reviewing the specific provisions of the LGC, this Court held that MCIAA, although an instrumentality of the national government, was subject to real property tax, viz: Thus, reading together sections 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, we conclude that as a general rule, as laid down in section 133, the taxing power of local governments cannot extend to the levy of inter alia, taxes, fees and charges of any kind on the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local government units; however, pursuant to section 232, provinces, cities and municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila Area may impose the real property tax except on, inter alia, real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person as provided in the item (a) of the first paragraph of section 12. In the case at bar, section 151 in relation to section 137 of the LGC clearly authorizes the respondent city government to impose on the petitioner the franchise tax in question. In its general signification, a franchise is a privilege conferred by government authority, which does not belong to citizens of the country generally as a matter of common right. In its specific sense, a franchise may refer to a general or primary franchise, or to a special or secondary franchise. The former relates to the right to exist as a corporation, by virtue of duly approved articles of incorporation, or a charter pursuant to a special law creating the corporation. The right under a primary or general franchise is vested in the individuals who compose the corporation and not in the corporation itself. On the other hand, the latter refers to the right or privileges conferred upon an existing corporation such as the right to use the streets of a municipality to lay pipes of tracks, erect poles or string wires. The rights under a secondary or special franchise are vested in the corporation and may ordinarily be conveyed or mortgaged under a general power granted to a corporation to dispose of its property, except such special or secondary franchises as are charged with a public use. In section 131 (m) of the LGC, Congress unmistakably defined a franchise in the sense of a secondary or special franchise. This is to avoid any confusion when the word franchise is used in the context of taxation. As commonly used, a franchise tax is a tax on the privilege of transacting business in the state and exercising corporate franchises granted by the state. It is not levied on the corporation simply for existing as a corporation, upon its property or its income, but on its exercise of the rights or privileges granted to it by the government. Hence, a corporation need not pay franchise tax from the time it ceased to do business and exercise its franchise. It is within this context that the phrase tax on businesses enjoying a franchise in section 137 of the LGC should be interpreted and understood. Verily, to determine whether the petitioner is covered by the franchise tax in question, the following requisites should concur: (1) that petitioner has a franchise in the sense of a secondary or special franchise; and (2) that it is exercising its rights or privileges under this franchise within the territory of the respondent city government. Petitioner fulfills the first requisite. Commonwealth Act No. 120, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7395, constitutes petitioners primary and secondary franchises. It serves as the petitioners charter, defining its composition, capitalization, the appointment and the specific duties of its corporate officers, and its corporate life span. As its secondary franchise, Commonwealth Act No. 120, as amended, vests the petitioner the following powers which are not available to ordinary corporations, viz: xxx (e) To conduct investigations and surveys for the development of water power in any part of the Philippines;

(f) To take water from any public stream, river, creek, lake, spring or waterfall in the Philippines, for the purposes specified in this Act; to intercept and divert the flow of waters from lands of riparian owners and from persons owning or interested in waters which are or may be necessary for said purposes, upon payment of just compensation therefor; to alter, straighten, obstruct or increase the flow of water in streams or water channels intersecting or connecting therewith or contiguous to its works or any part thereof: Provided, That just compensation shall be paid to any person or persons whose property is, directly or indirectly, adversely affected or damaged thereby; (g) To construct, operate and maintain power plants, auxiliary plants, dams, reservoirs, pipes, mains, transmission lines, power stations and substations, and other works for the purpose of developing hydraulic power from any river, creek, lake, spring and waterfall in the Philippines and supplying such power to the inhabitants thereof; to acquire, construct, install, maintain, operate, and improve gas, oil, or steam engines, and/or other prime movers, generators and machinery in plants and/or auxiliary plants for the production of electric power; to establish, develop, operate, maintain and administer power and lighting systems for the transmission and utilization of its power generation; to sell electric power in bulk to (1) industrial enterprises, (2) city, municipal or provincial systems and other government institutions, (3) electric cooperatives, (4) franchise holders, and (5) real estate subdivisions xxx; (h) To acquire, promote, hold, transfer, sell, lease, rent, mortgage, encumber and otherwise dispose of property incident to, or necessary, convenient or proper to carry out the purposes for which the Corporation was created: Provided, That in case a right of way is necessary for its transmission lines, easement of right of way shall only be sought: Provided, however, That in case the property itself shall be acquired by purchase, the cost thereof shall be the fair market value at the time of the taking of such property; (i) To construct works across, or otherwise, any stream, watercourse, canal, ditch, flume, street, avenue, highway or railway of private and public ownership, as the location of said works may require xxx; (j) To exercise the right of eminent domain for the purpose of this Act in the manner provided by law for instituting condemnation proceedings by the national, provincial and municipal governments; xxx (m) To cooperate with, and to coordinate its operations with those of the National Electrification Administration and public service entities; (n) To exercise complete jurisdiction and control over watersheds surrounding the reservoirs of plants and/or projects constructed or proposed to be constructed by the Corporation. Upon determination by the Corporation of the areas required for watersheds for a specific project, the Bureau of Forestry, the Reforestation Administration and the Bureau of Lands shall, upon written advice by the Corporation, forthwith surrender jurisdiction to the Corporation of all areas embraced within the watersheds, subject to existing private rights, the needs of waterworks systems, and the requirements of domestic water supply; (o) In the prosecution and maintenance of its projects, the Corporation shall adopt measures to prevent environmental pollution and promote the conservation, development and maximum utilization of natural resources xxx With these powers, petitioner eventually had the monopoly in the generation and distribution of electricity. This monopoly was strengthened with the issuance of Pres. Decree No. 40, nationalizing the electric power industry. Although Exec. Order No. 215 thereafter allowed private sector participation in the generation of electricity, the transmission of electricity remains the monopoly of the petitioner.

Petitioner also fulfills the second requisite. It is operating within the respondent city governments territorial jurisdiction pursuant to the powers granted to it by Commonwealth Act No. 120, as amended. From its operations in the City of Cabanatuan, petitioner realized a gross income of P107,814,187.96 in 1992. Fulfilling both requisites, petitioner is, and ought to be, subject of the franchise tax in question. Petitioner, however, insists that it is excluded from the coverage of the franchise tax simply because its stocks are wholly owned by the National Government, and its charter characterized it as a non -profit organization. These contentions must necessarily fail. To stress, a franchise tax is imposed based not on the ownership but on the exercise by the corporation of a privilege to do business. The taxable entity is the corporation which exercises the franchise, and not the individual stockholders. By virtue of its charter, petitioner was created as a separate and distinct entity from the National Government. It can sue and be sued under its own name, and can exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Code. To be sure, the ownership by the National Government of its entire capital stock does not necessarily imply that petitioner is not engaged in business. Section 2 of Pres. Decree No. 2029 classifies government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) into those performing governmental functions and those performing proprietary functions, viz: A government-owned or controlled corporation is a stock or a non-stock corporation, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, which is directly chartered by special law or if organized under the general corporation law is owned or controlled by the government directly, or indirectly through a parent corporation or subsidiary corporation, to the extent of at least a majority of its outstanding voting capital stock xxx. (emphases supplied) Governmental functions are those pertaining to the administration of government, and as such, are treated as absolute obligation on the part of the state to perform while proprietary functions are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interest of society, and are merely optional on the government. Included in the class of GOCCs performing proprietary functions are business-like entities such as the National Steel Corporation (NSC), the National Development Corporation (NDC), the Social Security System (SSS), the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and the National Water Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), among others. Petitioner was created to undertake the development of hydroelectric generation of power and the production of electricity from nuclear, geothermal and other sources, as well as the transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis. Pursuant to this mandate, petitioner generates power and sells electricity in bulk. Certainly, these activities do not partake of the sovereign functions of the government. They are purely private and commercial undertakings, albeit imbued with public interest. The public interest involved in its activities, however, does not distract from the true nature of the petitioner as a commercial enterprise, in the same league with similar public utilities like telephone and telegraph companies, railroad companies, water supply and irrigation companies, gas, coal or light companies, power plants, ice plant among others; all of which are declared by this Court as ministrant or proprietary functions of government aimed at advancing the general interest of society. A closer reading of its charter reveals that even the legislature treats the character of the petitioners enterprise as a business, although it limits petitioners profits to twelve percent (12%), viz: (n) When essential to the proper administration of its corporate affairs or necessary for the proper transaction of its business or to carry out the purposes for which it was organized, to contract indebtedness and issue bonds subject to approval of the President upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance;

(o) To exercise such powers and do such things as may be reasonably necessary to carry out the business and purposes for which it was organized, or which, from time to time, may be declared by the Board to be necessary, useful, incidental or auxiliary to accomplish the said purpose xxx.(emphases supplied) It is worthy to note that all other private franchise holders receiving at least sixty percent (60%) of its electricity requirement from the petitioner are likewise imposed the cap of twelve percent (12%) on profits. The main difference is that the petitioner is mandated to devote all its returns from its capital investment, as well as excess revenues from its operation, for expansion while other franchise holders have the option to distribute their profits to its stockholders by declaring dividends. We do not see why this fact can be a source of difference in tax treatment. In both instances, the taxable entity is the corporation, which exercises the franchise, and not the individual stockholders. We also do not find merit in the petitioners contention that its tax exemptions under its charter subsist despite the passage of the LGC. As a rule, tax exemptions are construed strongly against the claimant. Exemptions must be shown to exist clearly and categorically, and supported by clear legal provisions. In the case at bar, the petitioners sole refuge is section 13 of Rep. Act No. 6395 exempting from, among others, all income taxes, franchise taxes and realty taxes to be paid to the National Government, its provinces, cities, municipalities and other government agencies and instrumentalities. However, section 193 of the LGC withdrew, subject to limited exceptions, the sweeping tax privileges previously enjoyed by private and public corporations. Contrary to the contention of petitioner, section 193 of the LGC is an express, albeit general, repeal of all statutes granting tax exemptions from local taxes. It reads: Sec. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges.- Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. ( emphases supplied) It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Not being a local water district, a cooperative registered under R.A. No. 6938, or a non-stock and nonprofit hospital or educational institution, petitioner clearly does not belong to the exception. It is therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to point to some provisions of the LGC that expressly grant it exemption from local taxes. But this would be an exercise in futility. Section 137 of the LGC clearly states that the LGUs can impose franchise tax notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law. This particular provision of the LGC does not admit any exception. In City Government of San Pablo, Laguna v. Reyes, MERALCOs exemption from the payment of franchise taxes was brought as an issue before this Court. The same issue was involved in the subsequent case of Manila Electric Company v. Province of Laguna. Ruling in favor of the local government in both instances, we ruled that the franchise tax in question is imposable despite any exemption enjoyed by MERALCO under special laws, viz: It is our view that petitioners correctly rely on provisions of Sections 137 and 193 of the LGC to support their position that MERALCOs tax exemption has been withdrawn. The explicit language of section 137 which authorizes the province to impose franchise tax notwithstandin g any exemption granted by any law or other special law is all-encompassing and clear. The franchise tax is imposable despite any exemption enjoyed under special laws. Section 193 buttresses the withdrawal of extant tax exemption privileges. By stating that unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by all

persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations except (1) local water districts, (2) cooperatives duly registered under R.A. 6938, (3) non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are withdrawn upon the effectivity of this code, the obvious import is to limit the exemptions to the three enumerated entities. It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. In the absence of any provision of the Code to the contrary, and we find no other provision in point, any existing tax exemption or incentive enjoyed by MERALCO under existing law was clearly intended to be withdrawn. Reading together sections 137 and 193 of the LGC, we conclude that under the LGC the local government unit may now impose a local tax at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar based on the incoming receipts realized within its territorial jurisdiction. The legislative purpose to withdraw tax privileges enjoyed under existing law or charter is clearly manifested by the language used on (sic) Sections 137 and 193 categorically withdrawing such exemption subject only to the exceptions enumerated. Since it would be not only tedious and impractical to attempt to enumerate all the existing statutes providing for special tax exemptions or privileges, the LGC provided for an express, albeit general, withdrawal of such exemptions or privileges. No more unequivocal language could have been used . (emphases supplied). It is worth mentioning that section 192 of the LGC empowers the LGUs, through ordinances duly approved, to grant tax exemptions, initiatives or reliefs. But in enacting section 37 of Ordinance No. 16592 which imposes an annual franchise tax notwithstanding any exemp tion granted by law or other special law, the respondent city government clearly did not intend to exempt the petitioner from the coverage thereof. Doubtless, the power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and support myriad activities of the local government units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. As this Court observed in the Mactan case, the original reasons for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to government-owned or controlled corporations and all other units of government were that such privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion and distortions in the tax treatment of similarly situated enterprises. With the added burden of devolution, it is even more imperative for government entities to share in the requirements of development, fiscal or otherwise, by paying taxes or other charges due from them. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated March 12, 2001 and July 10, 2001, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 168557 February 16, 2007 INC., Petitioner,

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. LOCAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF BATANGAS, LAURO C. ANDAYA, in his capacity as the Assessor of the Province of Batangas, and the PROVINCE OF BATANGAS represented by its Provincial Assessor, Respondents. DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.: Before us are two consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 168557 and G.R. No. 170628, which were filed by petitioners FELS Energy, Inc. (FELS) and National Power Corporation (NPC), respectively. The first is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the August 25, 2004 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 67490 and its Resolution2 dated June 20, 2005; the second, also a petition for review on certiorari, challenges the February 9, 2005 Decision 3 and November 23, 2005 Resolution4 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 67491. Both petitions were dismissed on the ground of prescription. The pertinent facts are as follows: On January 18, 1993, NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy, Inc. over 3x30 MW diesel engine power barges moored at Balayan Bay in Calaca, Batangas. The contract, denominated as an Energy Conversion Agreement5 (Agreement), was for a period of five years. Article 10 reads: 10.1 RESPONSIBILITY. NAPOCOR shall be responsible for the payment of (a) all taxes, import duties, fees, charges and other levies imposed by the National Government of the Republic of the Philippines or any agency or instrumentality thereof to which POLAR may be or become subject to or in relation to the performance of their obligations under this agreement (other than (i) taxes imposed or calculated on the basis of the net income of POLAR and Personal Income Taxes of its employees and (ii) construction permit fees, environmental permit fees and other similar fees and charges) and (b) all real estate taxes and assessments, rates and other charges in respect of the Power Barges.6 Subsequently, Polar Energy, Inc. assigned its rights under the Agreement to FELS. The NPC initially opposed the assignment of rights, citing paragraph 17.2 of Article 17 of the Agreement. On August 7, 1995, FELS received an assessment of real property taxes on the power barges from Provincial Assessor Lauro C. Andaya of Batangas City. The assessed tax, which likewise covered those due for 1994, amounted to P56,184,088.40 per annum. FELS referred the matter to NPC, reminding it of its obligation under the Agreement to pay all real estate taxes. It then gave NPC the full power and authority to represent it in any conference regarding the real property assessment of the Provincial Assessor. In a letter7 dated September 7, 1995, NPC sought reconsideration of the Provincial Assessors decision to assess real property taxes on the power barges. However, the motion was denied on September 22, 1995, and the Provincial Assessor advised NPC to pay the assessment. 8 This prompted NPC to file a petition with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA) for the setting aside of the assessment and the declaration of the barges as non-taxable items; it also prayed that should LBAA find the barges to be taxable, the Provincial Assessor be directed to make the necessary corrections. 9 In its Answer to the petition, the Provincial Assessor averred that the barges were real property for purposes of taxation under Section 199(c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160.

FELS ENERGY, vs. THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS and

THE OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF BATANGAS, Respondents. x----------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 170628 February 16, 2007

Before the case was decided by the LBAA, NPC filed a Manifestation, informing the LBAA that the Department of Finance (DOF) had rendered an opinion10 dated May 20, 1996, where it is clearly stated that power barges are not real property subject to real property assessment. On August 26, 1996, the LBAA rendered a Resolution 11 denying the petition. The fallo reads: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. FELS is hereby ordered to pay the real estate tax in the amount of P56,184,088.40, for the year 1994. SO ORDERED.12 The LBAA ruled that the power plant facilities, while they may be classified as movable or personal property, are nevertheless considered real property for taxation purposes because they are installed at a specific location with a character of permanency. The LBAA also pointed out that the owner of the bargesFELS, a private corporationis the one being taxed, not NPC. A mere agreement making NPC responsible for the payment of all real estate taxes and assessments will not justify the exemption of FELS; such a privilege can only be granted to NPC and cannot be extended to FELS. Finally, the LBAA also ruled that the petition was filed out of time. Aggrieved, FELS appealed the LBAAs ruling to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA). On August 28, 1996, the Provincial Treasurer of Batangas City issued a Notice of Levy and Warrant by Distraint13 over the power barges, seeking to collect real property taxes amounting to P232,602,125.91 as of July 31, 1996. The notice and warrant was officially served to FELS on November 8, 1996. It then filed a Motion to Lift Levy dated November 14, 1996, praying that the Provincial Assessor be further restrained by the CBAA from enforcing the disputed assessment during the pendency of the appeal. On November 15, 1996, the CBAA issued an Order14 lifting the levy and distraint on the properties of FELS in order not to preempt and render ineffectual, nugatory and illusory any resolution or judgment which the Board would issue. Meantime, the NPC filed a Motion for Intervention 15 dated August 7, 1998 in the proceedings before the CBAA. This was approved by the CBAA in an Order16 dated September 22, 1998. During the pendency of the case, both FELS and NPC filed several motions to admit bond to guarantee the payment of real property taxes assessed by the Provincial Assessor (in the event that the judgment be unfavorable to them). The bonds were duly approved by the CBAA. On April 6, 2000, the CBAA rendered a Decision17 finding the power barges exempt from real property tax. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of the Province of Batangas is hereby reversed. Respondent-appellee Provincial Assessor of the Province of Batangas is hereby ordered to drop subject property under ARP/Tax Declaration No. 018-00958 from the List of Taxable Properties in the Assessment Roll. The Provincial Treasurer of Batangas is hereby directed to act accordingly. SO ORDERED.
18

did not preclude the NPC from pursuing its claim for tax exemption in accordance with Section 206 of R.A. No. 7160. The Provincial Assessor filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by FELS and NPC. In a complete volte face, the CBAA issued a Resolution 20 on July 31, 2001 reversing its earlier decision. The fallo of the resolution reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the resolution of this Board that: (a) The decision of the Board dated 6 April 2000 is hereby reversed. (b) The petition of FELS, as well as the intervention of NPC, is dismissed. (c) The resolution of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Batangas is hereby affirmed, (d) The real property tax assessment on FELS by the Provincial Assessor of Batangas is likewise hereby affirmed. SO ORDERED.21 FELS and NPC filed separate motions for reconsideration, which were timely opposed by the Provincial Assessor. The CBAA denied the said motions in a Resolution 22 dated October 19, 2001. Dissatisfied, FELS filed a petition for review before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67490. Meanwhile, NPC filed a separate petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67491. On January 17, 2002, NPC filed a Manifestation/Motion for Consolidation in CA-G.R. SP No. 67490 praying for the consolidation of its petition with CA-G.R. SP No. 67491. In a Resolution23 dated February 12, 2002, the appellate court directed NPC to re-file its motion for consolidation with CA-G.R. SP No. 67491, since it is the ponente of the latter petition who should resolve the request for reconsideration. NPC failed to comply with the aforesaid resolution. On August 25, 2004, the Twelfth Division of the appellate court rendered judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 67490 denying the petition on the ground of prescription. The decretal portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed Resolutions dated July 31, 2001 and October 19, 2001 of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.24 On September 20, 2004, FELS timely filed a motion for reconsideration seeking the reversal of the appellate courts decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 67490. Thereafter, NPC filed a petition for review dated October 19, 2004 before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 165113, assailing the appellate courts decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 67490. The petition was, however, denied in this Courts Resolution25 of November 8, 2004, for NPCs failure to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in the challenged decision. NPC filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court denied with finality in a Resolution 26 dated January 19, 2005.

Ruling in favor of FELS and NPC, the CBAA reasoned that the power barges belong to NPC; since they are actually, directly and exclusively used by it, the power barges are covered by the exemptions under Section 234(c) of R.A. No. 7160.19 As to the other jurisdictional issue, the CBAA ruled that prescription

Meantime, the appellate court dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 67491. It held that the right to question the assessment of the Provincial Assessor had already prescribed upon the failure of FELS to appeal the disputed assessment to the LBAA within the period prescribed by law. Since FELS had lost the right to question the assessment, the right of the Provincial Government to collect the tax was already absolute. NPC filed a motion for reconsideration dated March 8, 2005, seeking reconsideration of the February 5, 2005 ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 67491. The motion was denied in a Resolution 27 dated November 23, 2005. The motion for reconsideration filed by FELS in CA-G.R. SP No. 67490 had been earlier denied for lack of merit in a Resolution28 dated June 20, 2005. On August 3, 2005, FELS filed the petition docketed as G.R. No. 168557 before this Court, raising the following issues: A. Whether power barges, which are floating and movable, are personal properties and therefore, not subject to real property tax. B. Assuming that the subject power barges are real properties, whether they are exempt from real estate tax under Section 234 of the Local Government Code ("LGC"). C. Assuming arguendo that the subject power barges are subject to real estate tax, whether or not it should be NPC which should be made to pay the same under the law. D. Assuming arguendo that the subject power barges are real properties, whether or not the same is subject to depreciation just like any other personal properties. E. Whether the right of the petitioner to question the patently null and void real property tax assessment on the petitioners personal properties is imprescriptible.29 On January 13, 2006, NPC filed its own petition for review before this Court (G.R. No. 170628), indicating the following errors committed by the CA: I THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE APPEAL TO THE LBAA WAS FILED OUT OF TIME.

II THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE POWER BARGES ARE NOT SUBJECT TO REAL PROPERTY TAXES. III THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ASSESSMENT ON THE POWER BARGES WAS NOT MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.30 Considering that the factual antecedents of both cases are similar, the Court ordered the consolidation of the two cases in a Resolution31 dated March 8, 2006.1awphi1.net In an earlier Resolution dated February 1, 2006, the Court had required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda within 30 days from notice. Almost a year passed but the parties had not submitted their respective memoranda. Considering that taxesthe lifeblood of our economyare involved in the present controversy, the Court was prompted to dispense with the said pleadings, with the end view of advancing the interests of justice and avoiding further delay. In both petitions, FELS and NPC maintain that the appeal before the LBAA was not time-barred. FELS argues that when NPC moved to have the assessment reconsidered on September 7, 1995, the running of the period to file an appeal with the LBAA was tolled. For its part, NPC posits that the 60-day period for appealing to the LBAA should be reckoned from its receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration. Petitioners contentions are bereft of merit. Section 226 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, provides: SECTION 226. Local Board of Assessment Appeals. Any owner or person having legal interest in the property who is not satisfied with the action of the provincial, city or municipal assessor in the assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the written notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the province or city by filing a petition under oath in the form prescribed for the purpose, together with copies of the tax declarations and such affidavits or documents submitted in support of the appeal. We note that the notice of assessment which the Provincial Assessor sent to FELS on August 7, 1995, contained the following statement: If you are not satisfied with this assessment, you may, within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt hereof, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the province by filing a petition under oath on the form prescribed for the purpose, together with copies of ARP/Tax Declaration and such affidavits or documents submitted in support of the appeal.32 Instead of appealing to the Board of Assessment Appeals (as stated in the notice), NPC opted to file a motion for reconsideration of the Provincial Assessors decision, a remedy not sanctioned by law. The remedy of appeal to the LBAA is available from an adverse ruling or action of the provincial, city or municipal assessor in the assessment of the property. It follows then that the determination made by the respondent Provincial Assessor with regard to the taxability of the subject real properties falls within its power to assess properties for taxation purposes subject to appeal before the LBAA. 33

We fully agree with the rationalization of the CA in both CA-G.R. SP No. 67490 and CA-G.R. SP No. 67491. The two divisions of the appellate court cited the case of Callanta v. Office of the Ombudsman, 34 where we ruled that under Section 226 of R.A. No 7160,35 the last action of the local assessor on a particular assessment shall be the notice of assessment; it is this last action which gives the owner of the property the right to appeal to the LBAA. The procedure likewise does not permit the property owner the remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration before the local assessor. The pertinent holding of the Court in Callanta is as follows: x x x [T]he same Code is equally clear that the aggrieved owners should have brought their appeals before the LBAA. Unfortunately, despite the advice to this effect contained in their respective notices of assessment, the owners chose to bring their requests for a review/readjustment before the city assessor, a remedy not sanctioned by the law. To allow this procedure would indeed invite corruption in the system of appraisal and assessment. It conveniently courts a graft-prone situation where values of real property may be initially set unreasonably high, and then subsequently reduced upon the request of a property owner. In the latter instance, allusions of a possible covert, illicit trade-off cannot be avoided, and in fact can conveniently take place. Such occasion for mischief must be prevented and excised from our system. 36 For its part, the appellate court declared in CA-G.R. SP No. 67491: x x x. The Court announces: Henceforth, whenever the local assessor sends a notice to the owner or lawful possessor of real property of its revised assessed value, the former shall no longer have any jurisdiction to entertain any request for a review or readjustment. The appropriate forum where the aggrieved party may bring his appeal is the LBAA as provided by law. It follows ineluctably that the 60-day period for making the appeal to the LBAA runs without interruption. This is what We held in SP 67490 and reaffirm today in SP 67491.37 To reiterate, if the taxpayer fails to appeal in due course, the right of the local government to collect the taxes due with respect to the taxpayers property becomes absolute upon the expiration of the period to appeal.38 It also bears stressing that the taxpayers failure to question the assessment in the LBAA renders the assessment of the local assessor final, executory and demandable, thus, precluding the taxpayer from questioning the correctness of the assessment, or from invoking any defense that would reopen the question of its liability on the merits.39 In fine, the LBAA acted correctly when it dismissed the petitioners appeal for having been filed out of time; the CBAA and the appellate court were likewise correct in affirming the dismissal. Elementary is the rule that the perfection of an appeal within the period therefor is both mandatory and jurisdictional, and failure in this regard renders the decision final and executory. 40 In the Comment filed by the Provincial Assessor, it is asserted that the instant petition is barred by res judicata; that the final and executory judgment in G.R. No. 165113 (where there was a final determination on the issue of prescription), effectively precludes the claims herein; and that the filing of the instant petition after an adverse judgment in G.R. No. 165113 constitutes forum shopping. FELS maintains that the argument of the Provincial Assessor is completely misplaced since it was not a party to the erroneous petition which the NPC filed in G.R. No. 165113. It avers that it did not participate in the aforesaid proceeding, and the Supreme Court never acquired jurisdiction over it. As to the issue of forum shopping, petitioner claims that no forum shopping could have been committed since the elements of litis pendentia or res judicata are not present. We do not agree. Res judicata pervades every organized system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the

State that there should be an end to litigation republicae ut sit litium; and (2) the hardship on the individual of being vexed twice for the same cause nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa. A conflicting doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and dereliction of individuals and prefer the regalement of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.41 As we ruled in Heirs of Trinidad De Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Court of Appeals:42 x x x An existing final judgment or decree rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction acting upon a matter within its authority is conclusive on the rights of the parties and their privies. This ruling holds in all other actions or suits, in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction, touching on the points or matters in issue in the first suit. xxx Courts will simply refuse to reopen what has been decided. They will not allow the same parties or their privies to litigate anew a question once it has been considered and decided with finality. Litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere. The effective and efficient administration of justice requires that once a judgment has become final, the prevailing party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict by subsequent suits on the same issues filed by the same parties. This is in accordance with the doctrine of res judicata which has the following elements: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment must be on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. The application of the doctrine of res judicata does not require absolute identity of parties but merely substantial identity of parties. There is substantial identity of parties when there is community of interest or privity of interest between a party in the first and a party in the second case even if the first case did not implead the latter. 43 To recall, FELS gave NPC the full power and authority to represent it in any proceeding regarding real property assessment. Therefore, when petitioner NPC filed its petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 165113, it did so not only on its behalf but also on behalf of FELS. Moreover, the assailed decision in the earlier petition for review filed in this Court was the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 67490, in which FELS was the petitioner. Thus, the decision in G.R. No. 165116 is binding on petitioner FELS under the principle of privity of interest. In fine, FELS and NPC are substantially "identical parties" as to warrant the application of res judicata. FELSs a rgument that it is not bound by the erroneous petition filed by NPC is thus unavailing. On the issue of forum shopping, we rule for the Provincial Assessor. Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse judgment in one forum, a party seeks another and possibly favorable judgment in another forum other than by appeal or special civil action or certiorari. There is also forum shopping when a party institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.44 Petitioner FELS alleges that there is no forum shopping since the elements of res judicata are not present in the cases at bar; however, as already discussed, res judicata may be properly applied herein. Petitioners engaged in forum shopping when they filed G.R. Nos. 168557 and 170628 after the petition for review in G.R. No. 165116. Indeed, petitioners went from one court to another trying to get a favorable decision from one of the tribunals which allowed them to pursue their cases. It must be stressed that an important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.45 The rationale against forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different fora. Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.46

Thus, there is forum shopping when there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.47 Having found that the elements of res judicata and forum shopping are present in the consolidated cases, a discussion of the other issues is no longer necessary. Nevertheless, for the peace and contentment of petitioners, we shall shed light on the merits of the case. As found by the appellate court, the CBAA and LBAA power barges are real property and are thus subject to real property tax. This is also the inevitable conclusion, considering that G.R. No. 165113 was dismissed for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error. Tax assessments by tax examiners are presumed correct and made in good faith, with the taxpayer having the burden of proving otherwise. 48 Besides, factual findings of administrative bodies, which have acquired expertise in their field, are generally binding and conclusive upon the Court; we will not assume to interfere with the sensible exercise of the judgment of men especially trained in appraising property. Where the judicial mind is left in doubt, it is a sound policy to leave the assessment undisturbed.49 We find no reason to depart from this rule in this case. In Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., et al. v. The City of New York, et al., 50 a power company brought an action to review property tax assessment. On the citys motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court of New York held that the barges on which were mounted gas turbine power plants designated to generate electrical power, the fuel oil barges which supplied fuel oil to the power plant barges, and the accessory equipment mounted on the barges were subject to real property taxation. Moreover, Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that "[d]ocks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast" are considered immovable property. Thus, power barges are categorized as immovable property by destination, being in the nature of machinery and other implements intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or work.51 Petitioners maintain nevertheless that the power barges are exempt from real estate tax under Section 234 (c) of R.A. No. 7160 because they are actually, directly and exclusively used by petitioner NPC, a government- owned and controlled corporation engaged in the supply, generation, and transmission of electric power. We affirm the findings of the LBAA and CBAA that the owner of the taxable properties is petitioner FELS, which in fine, is the entity being taxed by the local government. As stipulated under Section 2.11, Article 2 of the Agreement: OWNERSHIP OF POWER BARGES. POLAR shall own the Power Barges and all the fixtures, fittings, machinery and equipment on the Site used in connection with the Power Barges which have been supplied by it at its own cost. POLAR shall operate, manage and maintain the Power Barges for the purpose of converting Fuel of NAPOCOR into electricity.52 It follows then that FELS cannot escape liability from the payment of realty taxes by invoking its exemption in Section 234 (c) of R.A. No. 7160, which reads: SECTION 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are exempted from payment of the real property tax:

xxx (c) All machineries and equipment that are actually, directly and exclusively used by local water districts and government-owned or controlled corporations engaged in the supply and distribution of water and/or generation and transmission of electric power; x x x Indeed, the law states that the machinery must be actually, directly and exclusively used by the government owned or controlled corporation; nevertheless, petitioner FELS still cannot find solace in this provision because Section 5.5, Article 5 of the Agreement provides: OPERATION. POLAR undertakes that until the end of the Lease Period, subject to the supply of the necessary Fuel pursuant to Article 6 and to the other provisions hereof, it will operate the Power Barges to convert such Fuel into electricity in accordance with Part A of Article 7. 53 It is a basic rule that obligations arising from a contract have the force of law between the parties. Not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, the parties to the contract are bound by its terms and conditions.54 Time and again, the Supreme Court has stated that taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. 55 The law does not look with favor on tax exemptions and the entity that would seek to be thus privileged must justify it by words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be misinterpreted.56 Thus, applying the rule of strict construction of laws granting tax exemptions, and the rule that doubts should be resolved in favor of provincial corporations, we hold that FELS is considered a taxable entity. The mere undertaking of petitioner NPC under Section 10.1 of the Agreement, that it shall be responsible for the payment of all real estate taxes and assessments, does not justify the exemption. The privilege granted to petitioner NPC cannot be extended to FELS. The covenant is between FELS and NPC and does not bind a third person not privy thereto, in this case, the Province of Batangas. It must be pointed out that the protracted and circuitous litigation has seriously resulted in the local governments deprivation of revenues. The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its magnitude, acknowledging in its very nature no perimeter so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency who are to pay for it.57 The right of local government units to collect taxes due must always be upheld to avoid severe tax erosion. This consideration is consistent with the State policy to guarantee the autonomy of local governments58 and the objective of the Local Government Code that they enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to empower them to achieve their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them effective partners in the attainment of national goals.59 In conclusion, we reiterate that the power to tax is the most potent instrument to raise the needed revenues to finance and support myriad activities of the local government units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people.60 WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED and the assailed Decisions and Resolutions AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the April 28, 2006 Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc in CTA EB No. 64, which upheld respondents assessment against petitioner for deficiency excise taxes for the taxable years 1992 and 1994 to 1997. Said En Banc decision reversed and set aside the August 2, 2004 Decision and January 20, 2005 Resolution of the CTA Division in CTA Case No. 6003 entitled Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, which ordered the withdrawal of the April 22, 1998 collection letter of respondent and enjoined him from collecting said deficiency excise taxes.

On July 23, 1999, the CTA rendered a Decision in CTA Case No. 5728 ruling, inter alia, that the use by PSPC of the TCCs was legal and valid, and that respondents attempt to collect alleged delinquent taxes and penalties from PSPC without an assessment constitutes denial of due process. The dispositive portion of the July 23, 1999 CTA Decision reads:

[T]he instant petition for review is GRANTED. The collection letter issued by the Respondent dated April 22, 1998 is considered withdrawn and he is ENJOINED from any attempts to collect from petitioner the specific tax, surcharge and interest subject of this petition.

The Facts Respondent elevated the July 23, 1999 CTA Decision in CTA Case No. 5728 to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55329. This case was subsequently consolidated with the similarly situated case of Petron Corporation under CA-G.R. SP No. 55330. To date, these consolidated cases are still pending resolution before the CA. Meanwhile, in late 1999, and despite the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 55329, the Center sent From 1988 to 1997, PSPC paid part of its excise tax liabilities with Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) which it acquired through the Department of Finance (DOF) One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center (Center) from other Board of Investment (BOI)-registered companies. The Center is a composite body run by four government agencies, namely: the DOF, Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Bureau of Customs (BOC), and BOI. several letters to PSPC dated August 31, 1999, September 1, 1999, and October 18, 1999. The first required PSPC to submit copies of pertinent sales invoices and delivery receipts covering sale transactions of PSPC products to the TCC assignors/transferors purportedly in connection with an ongoing post audit. The second letter similarly required submission of the same documents covering PSPC Industrial Fuel Oil (IFO) deliveries to Spintex International, Inc. The third letter is in reply to the September 29, 1999 letter sent by PSPC requesting a list of the serial numbers of the TCCs assigned or transferred to it by various Through the Center, PSPC acquired for value various Center-issued TCCs which were correspondingly transferred to it by other BOI-registered companies through Center-approved Deeds of Assignments. Subsequently, when PSPC signified its intent to use the TCCs to pay part of its excise tax liabilities, said payments were duly approved by the Center through the issuance of Tax Debit Memoranda (TDM), and the BIR likewise accepted as payments the TCCs by issuing its own TDM covering said TCCs, and the corresponding Authorities to Accept Payment for Excise Taxes (ATAPETs). In its letter dated October 29, 1999 and received by the Center on November 3, 1999, PSPC emphasized that the required submission of these documents had no legal basis, for the applicable rules and regulations on the matter only require that both the assignor and assignee of TCCs be BOI-registered entities. On November 3, 1999, the Center informed PSPC of the cancellation of the first batch of TCCs transferred to PSPC and the TDM covering PSPCs use of these TCCs as well as the corresponding TCC However, on April 22, 1998, the BIR sent a collection letter to PSPC for alleged deficiency excise tax liabilities of PhP 1,705,028,008.06 for the taxable years 1992 and 1994 to 1997, inclusive of delinquency surcharges and interest. As basis for the collection letter, the BIR alleged that PSPC is not a qualified transferee of the TCCs it acquired from other BOI-registered companies. These alleged excise tax deficiencies covered by the collection letter were already paid by PSPC with TCCs acquired through, and issued and duly authorized by the Center, and duly covered by TDMs of both the Center and BIR, with the latter also issuing the corresponding ATAPETs. PSPC protested the assessment letter, but the protest was denied by the BIR, constraining it to PSPC protested the April 22, 1998 collection letter, but the protest was denied by the BIR through the Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 8. PSPC filed its motion for reconsideration. However, due to respondents inaction on the motion, on February 2, 1999, PSPC filed a petition for review before the CTA, docketed as CTA Case No. 5728. file another petition for review before the CTA, docketed as CTA Case No. 6003. On November 22, 1999, PSPC received the November 15, 1999 assessment letter from respondent for excise tax deficiencies, surcharges, and interest based on the first batch of cancelled TCCs and TDM covering PSPCs use of the TCCs. All these cancelled TDM and TCCs were also part of the subject matter in CTA Case No. 5728, now pending before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 55329. assignments. PSPCs motion for reconsideration was not acted upon. BOI-registered companies, either assignors or transferors.

Petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC) is the Philippine subsidiary of the international petroleum giant Shell, and is engaged in the importation, refining and sale of petroleum products in the country.

Parenthetically, on March 30, 2004, Republic Act No. (RA) 9282 was promulgated amending RA 1125, expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA and enlarging its membership. It became effective on April 23, 2004 after its due publication. Thus, CTA Case No. 6003 was heard and decided by a CTA Division.

Anent the affidavits of former Officers or General Managers of transferors attesting that no IFO deliveries were made by PSPC, the CTA Division ruled that such cannot be given probative value as the affiants were not presented during trial of the case. However, the CTA Division said that the November 15, 1999 assessment was not precluded by the prior CTA Case No. 5728 as the latter concerned the validity of the transfer of the TCCs, while CTA Case No. 6003 involved alleged fraudulent

The Ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals Division (CTA Case No. 6003) On August 2, 2004, the CTA Division rendered a Decision granting the PSPCs petition for review. The dispositive portion reads:

procurement and transfer of the TCCs.

Respondent forthwith filed his motion for reconsideration of the above decision which was rejected on January 20, 2005. And, pursuant to Section 11 of RA 9282, respondent appealed the above decision through a petition for review before the CTA En Banc.

[T]he instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assessment issued by the respondent dated November 15, 1999 against petitioner is hereby CANCELLED and SET ASIDE. In granting PSPCs petition for review, the CTA Division held that respondent failed to prove with convincing evidence that the TCCs transferred to PSPC were fraudulently issued as respondents finding of alleged fraud was merely speculative. The CTA Division found that neither the respondent nor the Center could state what sales figures were used as basis for the TCCs to issue, as they merely based their conclusions on the audited financial statements of the transferors which did not clearly show the actual export sales of transactions from which the TCCs were issued.

The Ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc (CTA EB No. 64) The CTA En Banc, however, rendered the assailed April 28, 2006 Decision setting aside the August 2, 2004 Decision and the January 20, 2005 Resolution of the CTA Division. The fallo reads:

In the same vein, the CTA Division held that the machinery and equipment cannot be the basis in concluding that transferor could not have produced the volume of products indicated in its BOI registration. It further ruled that the Center erroneously based its findings of fraud on two possibilities: either the transferor did not declare its export sales or underdeclare them. Thus, no specific fraudulent acts were identified or proven. The CTA Division concluded that the TCCs transferred to PSPC were not fraudulently issued.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution dated August 2, 2004 and January 20, 2005, respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered dismissing respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporations Petition for Review filed in C.T.A. Case No. 6003 for lack of merit. Accordingly, respondent is ORDERED TO PAY the petitioner the amount of P570,577,401.61 as deficiency excise tax for the taxable years 1992 and 1994 to 1997, inclusive of 25% surcharge and 20% interest, computed as follows: Basic Tax Add: Surcharge (25%) Interest (20%) Total Tax Due P285,766,987.00 71,441,746.75 213,368,667.86 P570,577,401.61

On the issue of whether a TCC transferee should be a supplier of either capital equipment, materials, or supplies, the CTA Division ruled in the negative as the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the DOF and BOI executed on August 29, 1989 specifying such requirement was not incorporated in the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Executive Order No. (EO) 226. The CTA Division found that only the October 5, 1982 MOA between the then Ministry of Finance (MOF) and BOI was incorporated in the IRR of EO 226. It held that while the August 29, 1989 MOA indeed amended the October 5, 1982 MOA still it was not incorporated in the IRR. Moreover, according to the CTA Division, even if the August 29, 1989 MOA was elevated or incorporated in the IRR of EO 226, still, it is ineffective and could not bind nor prejudice third parties as it was never published.

In addition, respondent is hereby ORDERED TO PAY 20% delinquency interest thereon per annum computed from December 4, 1999 until full payment thereof, pursuant to Sections 248 and 249 of the NIRC of 1997. SO ORDERED. The CTA En Banc resolved respondents appeal by holding that PSPC was liable to pay the alleged excise tax deficiencies arising from the cancellation of the TDM issued against its TCCs which were used to pay some of its excise tax liabilities for the years 1992 and 1994 to 1997. It ratiocinated in this wise, to wit:

First, the finding of the DOF that the TCCs had no monetary value was undisputed. Consequently, there was a non-payment of excise taxes corresponding to the value of the TCCs used for payment. Since it was PSPC which acquired the subject TCCs from a third party and utilized the same to discharge its own obligations, then it must bear the loss.

DEFICIENCY EXCISE TAXES, FOR THE TAXABLE YEARS, 1992 AND 1994 TO 1997. II WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED 28 APRIL 2006 UPHOLDING THE CANCELLATION OF THE TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATES UTILIZED BY PETITIONER PSPC IN PAYING ITS EXCISE TAX LIABILITIES. III WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING SURCHARGES AND INTERESTS ON THE ALLEGED DEFICIENCY EXCISE TAX OF PETITIONER PSPC. IV WHETHER OR NOT THE ASSESSMENT DATED 15 NOVEMBER 1999 IS VOID CONSIDERING THAT IT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY AS WELL AS REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS IN THE ISSUANCE OF ASSESSMENTS. The Courts Ruling

Second, the TCCs carry a suspensive condition, that is, their issuance was subject to post audit in order to determine if the holder is indeed qualified to use it. Thus, until final determination of the holders right to the issuance of the TCCs, there is no obligation on the part of the DOF or BIR to recognize the rights of the holder or assignee. And, considering that the subject TCCs were canceled after the DOFs finding of fraud in its issuance, the assignees must bear the consequence of such cancellation.

Third, PSPC was not an innocent purchaser for value of the TCCs as they contained liability clauses expressly stipulating that the transferees are solidarily liable with the transferors for any fraudulent act or violation of pertinent laws, rules, or regulations relating to the transfer of the TCC.

Fourth, the BIR was not barred by estoppel as it is a settled rule that in the performance of its governmental functions, the State cannot be estopped by the neglect of its agents and officers. Although the TCCs were confirmed to be valid in view of the TDM, the subsequent finding on post audit by the Center declaring the TCCs to be fraudulently issued is entitled to the presumption of regularity. Thus, the cancellation of the TCCs was legal and valid.

The petition is meritorious.

First Issue: Assessment of excise tax deficiencies Fifth, the BIRs assessment did not prescribe considering that no payment took effect as the subject TCCs were canceled upon post audit. Consequently, the filing of the tax return sans payment due to the cancellation of the TCCs resulted in the falsity and/or omission in the filing of the tax return which put them in the ambit of the applicability of the 10-year prescriptive period from the discovery of falsity, fraud, or omission. PSPC contends that respondent had no basis in issuing the November 15, 1999 assessment as PSPC had no pending unpaid excise tax liabilities. PSPC argues that under the IRR of EO 226, it is allowed to use TCCs transferred from other BOI-registered entities. On one hand, relative to the validity of the transferred TCCs, PSPC asserts that the TCCs are not subject to a suspensive condition; that the post-audit of a transferred TCC refers only to computational discrepancy; that the solidary liability of the Finally, however, the CTA En Banc applied Aznar v. Court of Tax Appeals, where this Court held that without proof that the taxpayer participated in the fraud, the 50% fraud surcharge is not imposed, but the 25% late payment and the 20% interest per annum are applicable. transferor and transferee refers to computational discrepancy resulting from the transfer and not from the issuance of the TCC; that a post-audit cannot affect the validity and effectivity of a TCC after it has been utilized by the transferee; and that the BIR duly acknowledged the use of the subject TCCs, accepting them as payment for the excise tax liabilities of PSPC. On the other hand, PSPC maintains that if there Thus, PSPC filed this petition with the following issues: was indeed fraud in the issuance of the subject TCCs, of which it had no knowledge nor participation, the Centers remedy is to go after the transferor for the value of the TCCs the Center may have erroneously I issued.

PSPC likewise assails the BIR assessment on prescription for having been issued beyond the WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING PETITIONER PSPC TO PAY THE AMOUNT OF TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN PESOS (P285,766,987.00), AS ALLEGED three-year prescriptive period under Sec. 203 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC); and neither can the BIR use the 10-year prescriptive period under Sec. 222(a) of the NIRC, as PSPC has neither failed to file a return nor filed a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade taxes.

subject to post-audit is in the nature of a suspensive condition under Article 1181 of the Civil Code, which is quoted hereunder for ready reference, to wit: Respondent, on the other hand, counters that petitioner is liable for the tax liabilities adjudged by the CTA En Banc since PSPC, as transferee of the subject TCCs, is bound by the liability clause found at the dorsal side of the TCCs which subjects the genuineness, validity, and value of the TCCs to the outcome of the post-audit to be conducted by the Center. He relies on the CTA En Bancs finding of the presence of a suspensive condition in the issuance of the TCCs. Thus, according to him, with the finding by the Center that the TCCs were fraudulently procured the subsequent cancellation of the TCCs resulted in the non-payment by PSPC of its excise tax liabilities equivalent to the value of the canceled TCCs. The above-quoted article speaks of obligations. These conditions affect obligations in diametrically opposed ways. If the suspensive condition happens, the obligation arises; in other words, if the condition does not happen, the obligation does not come into existence. On the other hand, the resolutory condition extinguishes rights and obligations already existing; in other words, the obligations and rights already exist, but under the threat of extinction upon the happening of the resolutory condition. (8 Manresa 130-131, cited on page 140, Civil Code of the Philippines, Tolentino, 1962 ed., Vol. IV). In adopting the foregoing provision of law, this Court rules that the issuance of the tax credit certificate is subject to the condition that a post-audit will subsequently be conducted in order to determine if the holder is indeed qualified for its issuance. As stated earlier, the holder takes the same subject to the outcome of the post-audit. Thus, unless and until there is a final determination of the holders right to the issuance of the certificate, there exists no obligation on the part of the DOF or the BIR to recognize the rights of then holder or transferee. x x x xxxx The validity and propriety of the TCC to effectively constitute payment of taxes to the government are still subject to the outcome of the post-audit. In other words, when the issuing authority (DOF) finds, as in the case at bar, circumstances which may warrant the cancellation of the certificate, the holder is inevitably bound by the outcome by the virtue of the express provisions of the TCCs. The CTA En Banc is incorrect. In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition.

Respondent likewise posits that the Center erred in approving the transfer and issuance of the TDM, and of the TDM and ATAPETs issued by the BIR in accepting the utilization by PSPC of the subject TCCs, as payments for excise taxes cannot prejudice the BIR from assessing the tax deficiencies of PSPC resulting from the non-payment of the deficiencies after due cancellation by the Center of the subject TCCs and corresponding TDM.

Respondent concludes that due to the fraudulent procurement of the subject TCCs, his right to assess has not yet prescribed. He relies on the finding of the Center that the fraud was discovered only after the post-audit was conducted; hence, Sec. 222(a) of the NIRC applies, reckoned from October 24, 1999 or the date of the post-audit report. In fine, he points that what is at issue is the resulting nonpayment of PSPCs excise tax liabilities from the cancellation of subject TCCs and not the amount of deficiency taxes due from PSPC, as what was properly assessed on November 15, 1999 was the amount of tax declared and found in PSPCs excise tax returns covered by the subject TCCs.

We find for PSPC. The CTA En Banc upheld respondents theory by holding that the Center has the authority to do a post-audit on the TCCs it issued; the TCCs are subject to the results of the post-audit since their issuance is subject to a suspensive condition; the transferees of the TCCs are solidarily liable with the transferors on the result of the post-audit; and the cancellation of the subject TCCs resulted in PSPC having to bear the loss anchored on its solidary liability with the transferor of the subject TCCs. We can neither sustain respondents theory nor that of the CTA En Banc.

Art.1181 tells us that the condition is suspensive when the acquisition of rights or demandability of the obligation must await the occurrence of the condition. However, Art. 1181 does not apply to the present case since the parties did NOT agree to a suspensive condition. Rather, specific laws, rules, and regulations govern the subject TCCs, not the general provisions of the Civil Code. Among the applicable laws that cover the TCCs are EO 226 or the Omnibus Investments Code, Letter of Instructions No. 1355, EO 765, RP-US Military Agreement, Sec. 106(c) of the Tariff and Customs Code, Sec. 106 of the NIRC, BIR Revenue Regulations (RRs), and others. Nowhere in the aforementioned laws does the post-audit become necessary for the validity or effectivity of the TCCs. Nowhere in the aforementioned laws is it provided that a TCC is issued subject to a suspensive condition. The CTA En Bancs holding of the presence of a suspensive condition is untenable as the subject TCCs duly issued by the Center are immediately effective and valid. The suspensive condition as ratiocinated by the CTA En Banc is one where the transfer contract was duly effected on the day it was executed between the transferee and the transferor but the TCC cannot be enforced until after the post-

First, in overturning the August 2, 2004 Decision of the CTA Division, the CTA En Banc applied Article 1181 of the Civil Code in this manner:

To completely understand the matter presented before Us, it is worth emphasizing that the statement on the subject certificate stating that it is issued

audit has been conducted. In short, under the ruling of the CTA En Banc, even if the TCC has been

issued, the real and true application of the tax credit happens only after the post-audit confirms the TCCs validity and not before the confirmation; thus, the TCC can still be canceled even if it has already been ostensibly applied to specific internal revenue tax liabilities.

1.

This Tax Credit Certificate (TCC) shall entitle the grantee to apply the tax credit against taxes and duties until the amount is fully utilized, in accordance with the pertinent tax and customs laws, rules and regulations. xxxx

We are not convinced. We cannot subscribe to the CTA En Bancs holding that the suspensive condition suspends the effectivity of the TCCs as payment until after the post-audit. This strains the very nature of a TCC.

4.

To acknowledge application of payment, the One-Stop-Shop Tax Credit Center shall issue the corresponding Tax Debit Memo (TDM) to the grantee. The authorized Revenue Officer/Customs Collector to which payment/utilization was made shall accomplish the Application of Tax Credit portion at the back of the certificate and affix his signature on the column provided. (Emphasis supplied.)

A tax credit is not specifically defined in our Tax Code, but Art. 21 of EO 226 defines a tax credit as any of the credits against taxes and/or duties equal to those actually paid or would have been paid to evidence which a tax credit certificate shall be issued by the Secretary of Finance or his representative, or the Board (of Investments), if so delegated by the Secretary of Finance. Tax credits were granted under EO 226 as incentives to encourage investments in certain businesses. A tax credit generally refers to an amount that may be subtracted directly from ones total tax liability. It is therefore an allowance against the tax itself or a deduction from what is owed by a taxpayer to the government. In RR 5-2000, a tax credit is defined as the amount due to a taxpayer resulting from an overpayment of a tax liability or erroneous payment of a tax due. The foregoing guidelines cannot be clearer on the validity and effectivity of the TCC to pay or settle tax liabilities of the grantee or transferee, as they do not make the effectivity and validity of the TCC dependent on the outcome of a post-audit. In fact, if we are to sustain the appellate tax court, it would be absurd to make the effectivity of the payment of a TCC dependent on a post-audit since there is no contemplation of the situation wherein there is no post-audit. Does the payment made become effective if no post-audit is conducted? Or does the so-called suspensive condition still apply as no law, rule, or regulation specifies a period when a post-audit should or could be conducted with a prescriptive period? Clearly, a tax payment through a TCC cannot be both effective when made and dependent on a future event for its effectivity. Our system of laws and procedures abhors ambiguity. A TCC is Moreover, if the TCCs are considered to be subject to post-audit as a suspensive condition, the a certification, duly issued to the taxpayer named therein, by the Commissioner or his duly authorized representative, reduced in a BIR Accountable Form in accordance with the prescribed formalities, acknowledging that the granteetaxpayer named therein is legally entitled a tax credit, the money value of which may be used in payment or in satisfaction of any of his internal revenue tax liability (except those excluded), or may be converted as a cash refund, or may otherwise be disposed of in the manner and in accordance with the limitations, if any, as may be prescribed by the provisions of these Regulations. From the above definitions, it is clear that a TCC is an undertaking by the government through the BIR or DOF, acknowledging that a taxpayer is entitled to a certain amount of tax credit from either an overpayment of income taxes, a direct benefit granted by law or other sources and instances granted by law such as on specific unused input taxes and excise taxes on certain goods. As such, tax credit is transferable in accordance with pertinent laws, rules, and regulations. very purpose of the TCC would be defeated as there would be no guarantee that the TCC would be honored by the government as payment for taxes. No investor would take the risk of utilizing TCCs if these were subject to a post-audit that may invalidate them, without prescribed grounds or limits as to the exercise of said post-audit.

The inescapable conclusion is that the TCCs are not subject to post-audit as a suspensive condition, and are thus valid and effective from their issuance. As such, in the present case, if the TCCs have already been applied as partial payment for the tax liability of PSPC, a post-audit of the TCCs cannot simply annul them and the tax payment made through said TCCs. Payment has already been made and is as valid and effective as the issued TCCs. The subsequent post-audit cannot void the TCCs and allow the respondent to declare that utilizing canceled TCCs results in nonpayment on the part of PSPC. As will be discussed, respondent and the Center expressly recognize the TCCs as valid payment of PSPCs tax liability.

Therefore, the TCCs are immediately valid and effective after their issuance. As aptly pointed out in the dissent of Justice Lovell Bautista in CTA EB No. 64, this is clear from the Guidelines and Instructions found at the back of each TCC, which provide: are: Second, the only conditions the TCCs are subjected to are those found on its face. And these

1.

Post-audit and subsequent adjustment in the event of computational discrepancy; A reduction for any outstanding account/obligation of herein claimant with the BIR and/or BOC; and Revalidation with the Center in case the TCC is not utilized or applied within one (1) year from date of issuance/date of last utilization.

equipment provider or a supplier of raw material and/or component supplier to the transferors. What the law requires is that the transferee be a BOI-registered company similar to the BOI-registered transferors.

2.

3.

The IRR of EO 226, which incorporated the October 5, 1982 MOA between the MOF and BOI, pertinently provides for the guidelines concerning the transferability of TCCs:

The above conditions clearly show that the post-audit contemplated in the TCCs does not pertain to their genuineness or validity, but on computational discrepancies that may have resulted from the transfer and utilization of the TCC. This is shown by a close reading of the first and second conditions above; the third condition is self explanatory. Since a tax credit partakes of what is owed by the State to a taxpayer, if the taxpayer has an outstanding liability with the BIR or the BOC, the money value of the tax credit covered by the TCC is primarily applied to such internal revenue liabilities of the holder as provided under condition number two. Elsewise put, the TCC issued to a claimant is applied first and foremost to any outstanding liability the claimant may have with the government. Thus, it may happen that upon post-audit, a TCC of a taxpayer may be reduced for whatever liability the taxpayer may have with the BIR which remains unpaid due to inadvertence or computational errors, and such reduction necessarily affects the balance of the monetary value of the tax credit of the TCC.

[T]he MOF and the BOI, through their respective representatives, have agreed on the following guidelines to govern the transferability of tax credit certificates: 1) All tax credit certificates issued to BOI-registered enterprises under P.D. 1789 may be transferred under conditions provided herein; 2) The transferee should be a BOI-registered firm;

3) The transferee may apply such tax credit certificates for payment of taxes, duties, charges or fees directly due to the national government for as long as it enjoys incentives under P.D. 1789. (Emphasis supplied.) The above requirement has not been amended or repealed during the unfolding of the instant controversy. Thus, it is clear from the above proviso that it is only required that a TCC transferee be BOI-

For example, Company A has been granted a TCC in the amount of PhP 500,000 through its export transactions, but it has an outstanding excise tax liability of PhP 250,000 which due to inadvertence was erroneously assessed and paid at PhP 225,000. On post-audit, with the finding of a deficiency of PhP 25,000, the utilization of the TCC is accordingly corrected and the tax credit remaining in the TCC correspondingly reduced by PhP 25,000. This is a concrete example of a computational discrepancy which comes to light after a post-audit is conducted on the utilization of the TCC. The same holds true for a transferees use of the TCC in paying its outstanding internal reven ue tax liabilities.

registered. In requiring PSPC to submit sales documents for its purported post-audit of the TCCs, the Center gravely abused its discretion as these are not required of the transferee PSPC by law and by the rules.

While the October 5, 1982 MOA appears to have been amended by the August 29, 1989 MOA between the DOF and BOI, such may not operate to prejudice transferees like PSPC. For one, the August 29, 1989 MOA remains only an internal agreement as it has neither been elevated to the level of nor incorporated as an amendment in the IRR of EO 226. As aptly put by the CTA Division:

Other examples of computational errors would include the utilization of a single TCC to settle several internal revenue tax liabilities of the taxpayer or transferee, where errors committed in the reduction of the credit tax running balance are discovered in the post-audit resulting in the adjustment of the TCC utilization and remaining tax credit balance. If the 1989 MOA has validly amended the 1982 MOA, it would have been incorporated either expressly or by reference in Rule VII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRRs) of E.O. 226. To date, said Rule VII has not been repealed, amended or otherwise modified. It is noteworthy that the 1999 edition of the official publication by the BOI of E.O. 226 and its IRRs (Exhibit R) which is the latest version, as amended, has not mentioned expressly or by reference [sic] 1989 MOA. The MOA mentioned therein is still the 1982 MOA. The 1982 MOA, although executed as a mere agreement between the DOF and the BOI was elevated to the status of a rule and regulation applicable to the general public by reason of its having been expressly incorporated in Rule VII of the IRRs. On the other hand, the 1989 MOA which purportedly amended the 1982 MOA, remained a mere agreement between the DOF and the BOI because, unlike the 1982 MOA, it was never incorporated either expressly or by reference to any amendment or revision of the said IRRs. Thus, it cannot be the basis of any

Third, the post-audit the Center conducted on the transferred TCCs, delving into their issuance and validity on alleged violations by PSPC of the August 29, 1989 MOA between the DOF and BOI, is completely misplaced. As may be recalled, the Center required PSPC to submit copies of pertinent sales invoices and delivery receipts covering sale transactions of PSPC products to the TCC assignors/transferors purportedly in connection with an ongoing post audit. As correctly protested by PSPC but which was completely ignored by the Center, PSPC is not required by law to be a capital

invalidation of the transfers of TCCs to petitioner nor of any other sanction against petitioner. The above clause to our mind clearly provides only for the solidary liability relative to the For another, even if the August 29, 1989 MOA has indeed amended the IRR, which it has not, still, it is ineffective and cannot prejudice third parties for lack of publication as mandatorily required under Chapter 2 of Book VII, EO 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, which pertinently provides: transfer of the TCCs from the original grantee to a transferee. There is nothing in the above clause that provides for the liability of the transferee in the event that the validity of the TCC issued to the original grantee by the Center is impugned or where the TCC is declared to have been fraudulently procured by the said original grantee. Thus, the solidary liability, if any, applies only to the sale of the TCC to the transferee by the original grantee. Any fraud or breach of law or rule relating to the issuance of the TCC Section 3. Filing.(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or person. (2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. (3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection. Section 4. Effectivity.In addition to other rule-making requirement provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. Section 5. x x x x (2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text. It is clear that the Center or DOF cannot compel PSPC to submit sales documents for the purported post-audit, as PSPC has duly complied with the requirements of the law and rules to be a qualified transferee of the subject TCCs. Fourth, we likewise fail to see the liability clause at the dorsal portion of the TCCs to be a suspensive condition relative to the result of the post-audit. Said liability clause indicates: In the instant case, a close review of the factual milieu and the records reveals that PSPC is a transferee in good faith and for value. No evidence was adduced that PSPC participated in any way in the issuance of the subject TCCs to the corporations who in turn conveyed the same to PSPC. It has likewise been shown that PSPC was not involved in the processing for the approval of the transfers of the subject TCCs from the various BOI-registered transferors. by the Center to the transferor or the original grantee is the latters responsibility and liability. The transferee in good faith and for value may not be unjustly prejudiced by the fraud committed by the claimant or transferor in the procurement or issuance of the TCC from the Center. It is not only unjust but well-nigh violative of the constitutional right not to be deprived of ones property without due process of law. Thus, a re-assessment of tax liabilities previously paid through TCCs by a transferee in good faith and for value is utterly confiscatory, more so when surcharges and interests are likewise assessed. A transferee in good faith and for value of a TCC who has relied on the Centers representation of the genuineness and validity of the TCC transferred to it may not be legally required to pay again the tax covered by the TCC which has been belatedly declared null and void, that is, after the TCCs have been fully utilized through settlement of internal revenue tax liabilities. Conversely, when the transferee is party to the fraud as when it did not obtain the TCC for value or was a party to or has knowledge of its fraudulent issuance, said transferee is liable for the taxes and for the fraud committed as provided for by law.

Respondent, through the Center, made much of the alleged non-payment through non-delivery by PSPC of the IFOs it purportedly sold to the transferors covered by supply agreements which were allegedly the basis of the Center for the approval of the transfers. Respondent points to the requirement under the August 29, 1989 MOA between the DOF and BOI, specifying the requirement that [t]he transferee should be a BOI-registered firm which is a domestic capital equipment supplier, or a raw material and/or component supplier of the transferor.

LIABILITY CLAUSE

Both the TRANSFEROR and the TRANSFEREE shall be jointly and severally liable for any fraudulent act or violation of the pertinent laws, rules and regulations relating to the transfer of this TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE. (Emphasis supplied.)

As discussed above, the above amendment to the October 5, 1982 MOA between BOI and MOF cannot prejudice any transferee, like PSPC, as it was neither incorporated nor elevated to the IRR of EO 226, and for lack of due publication. The pro-forma supply agreements allegedly executed by PSPC and the transferors covering the sale of IFOs to the transferors have been specifically denied by PSPC. Moreover, the above-quoted requirement is not required under the IRR of EO 226. Therefore, it is incumbent for respondent to present said supply agreements to prove participation by PSPC in the approval of the transfers of the subject TCCs. Respondent failed to do this.

Fifth, PSPC cannot be blamed for relying on the Centers approval for the transfers of the subject TCCs and the Centers acceptance of the TCCs for the payment of its excise tax liabilities. Likewise, PSPC cannot be faulted in relying on the BIRs acceptance of the subject TCCs as payment for its excise tax liabilities. This reliance is supported by the fact that the subject TCCs have passed through stringent reviews starting from the claims of the transferors, their issuance by the C enter, the Centers approval for their transfer to PSPC, the Centers acceptance of the TCCs to pay PSPCs excise tax liabilities through the issuance of the Centers TDM, and finally the acceptance by the BIR of the subject TCCs as payment through the issuance of its own TDM and ATAPETs.

PSPC claims to be a transferee in good faith of the subject TCCs. It believed that its tax obligations for 1992 and 1994 to 1997 had in fact been paid when it applied the subject TCCs, considering that all the necessary authorizations and approvals attendant to the transfer and utilization of the TCCs were present. It is undisputed that the transfers of the TCCs from the original holders to PSPC were duly approved by the Center, which is composed of a number of government agencies, including the BIR. Such approval was annotated on the reverse side of the TCCs, and the Center even issued TDM which is proof of its approval for PSPC to apply the TCCs as payment for the tax liabilities. The BIR issued its own TDM, also signifying approval of the TCCs as payment for PSPCs tax liabilities. The BIR also issued ATAPETs covering the aforementioned BIR-issued TDM, further proving its acceptance of the TCCs as valid tax payments, which formed part of PSPCs total tax payments along with checks duly acknowledged and received by BIRs authorized agent banks. The tax credit of a taxpayer evidenced by a TCC is used up or, in accounting parlance, debited when applied to the taxpayers internal revenue tax liability, and the TCC canceled after the tax credit it Several approvals were secured by PSPC before it utilized the transferred TCCs, and it relied on the verification of the various government agencies concerned of the genuineness and authenticity of the TCCs as well as the validity of their issuances. Furthermore, the parties stipulated in open court that the BIR-issued ATAPETs for the taxes covered by the subject TCCs confirm the correctness of the amount of excise taxes paid by PSPC during the tax years in question. For example, a transferee or the tax claimant has a TCC of PhP 1 million, which was used to Thus, it is clear that PSPC is a transferee in good faith and for value of the subject TCCs and may not be prejudiced with a re-assessment of excise tax liabilities it has already settled when due with the use of the subject TCCs. Logically, therefore, the excise tax returns filed by PSPC duly covered by the TDM and ATAPETs issued by the BIR confirming the full payment and satisfaction of the excise tax liabilities of PSPC, have not been fraudulently filed. Consequently, as PSPC is a transferee in good faith and for value, Sec. 222(a) of the NIRC does not apply in the instant case as PSPC has neither been shown nor proven to have committed any fraudulent act in the transfer and utilization of the subject TCCs. With more reason, therefore, that the three-year prescriptive period for assessment under Art. 203 of the NIRC has already set in and bars respondent from assessing anew PSPC for the excise taxes already paid in 1992 and 1994 to 1997. Besides, even if the period for assessment has not prescribed, still, there is no valid ground for the assessment as the excise tax liabilities of PSPC have been duly settled and paid. pay income tax liability of PhP 500,000, documentary stamp tax liability of PhP 100,000, and value-added tax liability of PhP 350,000, for an aggregate internal revenue tax liability of PhP 950,000. After the payments through the PhP 1 million TCC have been approved and accepted by the BIR through the issuance of corresponding TDM, the TCC money value is reduced to only PhP 50,000, that is, a credit balance of PhP 50,000. In this sense, the tax credit of the TCC has been canceled or used up in the amount of PhP 950,000. Now, let us say the transferee or taxpayer has excise tax liability of PhP 250,000, s/he only has the remaining PhP 50,000 tax credit in the TCC to pay part of said excise tax. When the transferee or taxpayer applies such payment, the TCC is canceled as the money value of the tax credit it represented has been fully debited or used up. In short, there is no more tax credit available for the taxpayer to settle his/her other tax liabilities. represented is fully debited or used up. A credit is a payable or a liability. A tax credit, therefore, is a liability of the government evidenced by a TCC. Thus, the tax credit of a taxpayer evidenced by a TCC is debited by the BIR through a TDM, not only evidencing the payment of the tax by the taxpayer, but likewise deducting or debiting the existing tax credit with the amount of the tax paid. Sixth, we are of the view that the subject TCCs cannot be canceled by the Center as these had already been canceled after their application to PSPCs excise tax liabilities. PSPC contends they are already functus officio, not quite in the sense of being no longer effective, but in the sense that they have been used up. When the subject TCCs were accepted by the BIR through the latters issuance of TDM and the ATAPETs, the subject TCCs were duly canceled. Therefore, PSPC cannot be prejudiced by the Centers turnaround in assailing the validity of the subject TCCs which it issued in due course.

In the instant case, with due application, approval, and acceptance of the payment by PSPC of the subject TCCs for its then outstanding excise tax liabilities in 1992 and 1994 to 1997, the subject TCCs have been canceled as the money value of the tax credits these represented have been used up. Therefore, the DOF through the Center may not now cancel the subject TCCs as these have already been canceled and used up after their acceptance as payment for PSPCs excise tax liabilities. What has been used up, debited, and canceled cannot anymore be declared to be void, ineffective, and canceled anew.

which the Center relied upon as basis for the cancellation is defective, ineffective, and cannot prejudice third parties for lack of publication.

As we have explained above, the subject TCCs after being fully utilized in the settlement of PSPCs excise tax liabilities have been canceled, and thus cannot be canceled anymore. For being immediately effective and valid when issued, the subject TCCs have been duly utilized by transferee PSPC which is a transferee in good faith and for value.

Besides, it is indubitable that with the issuance of the corresponding TDM, not only is the TCC canceled when fully utilized, but the payment is also final subject only to a post-audit on computational errors. Under RR 5-2000, a TDM is On the issue of the fraudulent procurement of the TCCs, it has been asseverated that fraud was committed by the TCC claimants who were the transferors of the subject TCCs. We see no need to rule on this issue in view of our finding that the real issue in this petition does not dwell on the validity of the TCCs procured by the transferor from the Center but on whether fraud or breach of law attended the a certification, duly issued by the Commissioner or his duly authorized representative, reduced in a BIR Accountable Form in accordance with the prescribed formalities, acknowledging that the taxpayer named therein has duly paid his internal revenue tax liability in the form of and through the use of a Tax Credit Certificate, duly issued and existing in accordance with the provisions of these Regulations. The Tax Debit Memo shall serve as the official receipt from the BIR evidencing a taxpayers payment or satisfaction of his tax obligation . The amount shown therein shall be charged against and deducted from the credit balance of the aforesaid Tax Credit Certificate. Thus, with the due issuance of TDM by the Center and TDM by the BIR, the payments made by PSPC with the use of the subject TCCs have been effected and consummated as the TDMs serve as the official receipts evidencing PSPCs payment or satisfaction of its tax obligation. Moreover, the BIR not only issued the corresponding TDM, but it also issued ATAPETs which doubly show the payment of the subject excise taxes of PSPC. transfer of said TCCs by the transferor to the transferee.

The finding of the CTA En Banc that there was fraud in the procurement of the subject TCCs is, therefore, irrelevant and immaterial to the instant petition. Moreover, there are pending criminal cases arising from the alleged fraud. We leave the matter to the anti-graft court especially considering the failure of the affiants to the affidavits to appear, making these hearsay evidence.

We note in passing that PSPC and its officers were not involved in any fraudulent act that may have been undertaken by the transferors of subject TCCs, supported by the finding of the Ombudsman Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo that Pacifico R. Cruz, PSPC General Manager of the Treasury and Taxation Department, who was earlier indicted as accused in OMB-0-99-2012 to 2034 for violation of Sec. 3(e) and (j) of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti -Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for allegedly conspiring with other accused in defrauding and causing undue injury to the government, did

Based on the above discussion, we hold that respondent erroneously and without factual and legal basis levied the assessment. Consequently, the CTA En Banc erred in sustaining respondents assessment.

not in any way participate in alleged fraudulent activities relative to the transfer and use of the subject TCCs.

In a Memorandum addressed to then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, the Special Prosecutor Second Issue: Cancellation of TCCs Leonardo P. Tamayo recommended dropping Pacifico Cruz as accused in Criminal Case Nos. 2594025962 entitled People of the Philippines v. Antonio P. Belicena, et al., pending before the Sandiganbayan PSPC argues that the CTA En Banc erred in upholding the cancellation by the Center of the subject TCCs it used in paying some of its excise tax liabilities as the subject TCCs were genuine and authentic, having been subjected to thorough and stringent procedures, and approvals by the Center. Moreover, PSPC posits that both the CTAs Division and En Banc duly found that PSPC had neither knowledge, involvement, nor participation in the alleged fraudulent issuance of the subject TCCs, and, thus, as a transferee in good faith and for value, it cannot be held solidarily liable for any fraud attendant to the issuance of the subject TCCs. PSPC further asserts that the Center has no authority to cancel the subject TCCs as such authority is lodged exclusively with the BOI. Lastly, PSPC said that the Centers Excom Resolution No. 03 -05-99 Prosecutor Tamayo found that Cruzs involvement in the transfers of the subject TCCs came after the applications for the transfers had been duly processed and approved; and that Cruz could not have been part of the conspiracy as he cannot be presumed to have knowledge of the irregularity, because the 1989 MOA, which prescribed the additional requirement that the transferee of a TCC should be a supplier of the transferor, was not yet published and made known to private parties at the time the subject TCCs were transferred to PSPC. The Memorandum of Special Prosecutor Tamayo was duly approved by then Fifth Division for lack of probable cause. Special

Ombudsman Desierto. Consequently, on May 31, 2000, the Sandiganbayan Fifth Division, hearing Criminal Case Nos. 25940-25962, dropped Cruz as accused.

Sec. 3, letter l. of AO 266, in relation to letters a. and g., does give ample authority to the Center to cancel the TCCs it issued. Evidently, the Center cannot carry out its mandate if it cannot cancel the TCCs it may have erroneously issued or those that were fraudulently issued. It is axiomatic that when

But even assuming that fraud attended the procurement of the subject TCCs, it cannot prejudice PSPCs rights as earlier explained since PSPC has not been shown or proven to have participated in the perpetration of the fraudulent acts, nor is it shown that PSPC committed fraud in the transfer and utilization of the subject TCCs.

the law and its implementing rules are silent on the matter of cancellation while granting explicit authority to issue, an inherent and incidental power resides on the issuing authority to cancel that which was issued. A caveat however is required in that while the Center has authority to do so, it must bear in mind the nature of the TCCs immediate effectiveness and validity for which cancellation may only be exercised before a transferred TCC has been fully utilized or canceled by the BIR after due application of the

On the issue of the authority to cancel duly issued TCCs, we agree with respondent that the Center has concurrent authority with the BIR and BOC to cancel the TCCs it issued. The Center was created under Administrative Order No. (AO) 266 in relation to EO 226. A scrutiny of said executive issuances clearly shows that the Center was granted the authority to issue TCCs pursuant to its mandate under AO 266. Sec. 5 of AO 266 provides:

available tax credit to the internal revenue tax liabilities of an innocent transferee for value, unless of course the claimant or transferee was involved in the perpetration of the frau d in the TCCs issuance, transfer, or utilization. The utilization of the TCC will not shield a guilty party from the consequences of the fraud committed.

While we agree with respondent that the State in the performance of governmental function is not estopped by the neglect or omission of its agents, and nowhere is this truer than in the field of taxation, SECTION 5. Issuance of Tax Credit Certificates and/or Duty Drawback.The Secretary of Finance shall designate his representatives who shall, upon the recommendation of the CENTER, issue tax credit certificates within thirty (30) working days from acceptance of applications for the enjoyment thereof. (Emphasis supplied.) On the other hand, it is undisputed that the BIR under the NIRC and related statutes has the authority to both issue and cancel TCCs it has issued and even those issued by the Center, either upon full utilization in the settlement of internal revenue tax liabilities or upon conversion into a tax refund of unutilized TCCs in specific cases under the conditions provided. AO 266 however is silent on whether or not the Center has authority to cancel a TCC it itself issued. Sec. 3 of AO 266 reveals: yet this principle cannot be applied to work injustice against an innocent party. In the case at bar, PSPCs rights as an innocent transferee for value must be protected. Therefore, the remedy for respondent is to go after the claimant companies who allegedly perpetrated the fraud. This is now the subject of a criminal prosecution before the Sandiganbayan docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 25940-25962 for violation of RA 3019. On the issue of the publication of the Centers Excom Resolution No. 03 -05-99 providing for the Guidelines and Procedures for the Cancellation, Recall and Recovery of Fraudulently Issued Tax Credit Certificates, we find that the resolution is invalid and unenforceable. It authorizes the cancellation of TCCs and TDM which are found to have been granted without legal basis or based on fraudulent SECTION 3. Powers, Duties and Functions.The Center shall have the following powers, duties and functions: a. To promulgate the necessary rules and regulations and/or guidelines for the effective implementation of this administrative order; xxxx g. To enforce compliance with tax credit/duty drawback policy and procedural guidelines; xxxx l. To perform such other functions/duties as may be necessary or incidental in the furtherance of the purpose for which it has been established. (Emphasis supplied.) We explained in People v. Que Po Lay that a rule which carries a penal sanction will bind the public if the public is officially and specifically informed of the contents and penalties prescribed for the breach of the rule. Since Excom Resolution No. 03-05-99 was neither registered with the U.P. documents. The cancellation of the TCCs and TDM is covered by a penal provision of the assailed resolution. Such being the case, it should have been published and filed with the National Administrative Register of the U.P. Law Center in accordance with Secs. 3, 4, and 5, Chapter 2 of Book VII, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987.

Law Center nor published, it is ineffective and unenforceable. Even if the resolution need not be published, the punishment for any alleged fraudulent act in the procurement of the TCCs must not be visited on PSPC, an innocent transferee for value, which has not been shown to have participated in the fraud. Respondent must go after the perpetrators of the fraud.

Third Issue: Imposition of surcharges and interests PSPC claims that having no deficiency excise tax liabilities, it may not be liable for the late payment surcharges and annual interests.

PSPC was merely informed that it is liable for the amount of excise taxes it declared in its excise tax returns for 1992 and 1994 to 1997 covered by the subject TCCs via the formal letter of demand and assessment notice. For being formally defective, the November 15, 1999 formal letter of demand and assessment notice is void. Paragraph 3.1.4 of Sec. 3, RR 12-99 pertinently provides: 3.1.4 Formal Letter of Demand and Assessment Notice.The formal letter of demand and assessment notice shall be issued by the Commissioner or his duly authorized representative. The letter of demand calling for payment of the taxpayers deficiency tax or taxes shall state the facts, the law, rules and regulations, or jurisprudence on which the assessment is based , otherwise, the formal letter of

This issue has been mooted by our disquisition above resolving the first issue in that PSPC has duly settled its excise tax liabilities for 1992 and 1994 to 1997. Consequently, there is no basis for the imposition of a late payment surcharges and for interests, and no need for further discussion on the matter.

Fourth Issue: Non-compliance with statutory and procedural due process

demand and assessment notice shall be void. The same shall be sent to the taxpayer only by registered mail or by personal delivery. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

Finally, PSPC avers that its statutory and procedural right to due process was violated by respondent in the issuance of the assessment. PSPC claims respondent violated RR 12-99 since no pre-assessment notice was issued to PSPC before the November 15, 1999 assessment. Moreover, PSPC argues that the November 15, 1999 assessment effectively deprived it of its statutory right to protest the pre-assessment within 30 days from receipt of the disputed assessment letter. While this has likewise been mooted by our discussion above, it would not be amiss to state that PSPCs rights to substantive and procedural due process have indeed been violated. The facts show that PSPC was not accorded due process before the assessment was levied on it. The Center required PSPC to submit certain sales documents relative to supposed delivery of IFOs by PSPC to the TCC transferors. PSPC contends that it could not submit these documents as the transfer of the subject TCCs did not require that it be a supplier of materials and/or component supplies to the transferors in a letter dated October 29, 1999 which was received by the Center on November 3, 1999. On the same day, the Center informed PSPC of the cancellation of the subject TCCs and the TDM covering the application of the TCCs to PSPCs excise tax liabilities. The objections of PSPC were brushed aside by the Center and the assessment was issued by respondent on November 15, 1999, without following the statutory and procedural requirements clearly provided under the NIRC and applicable regulations. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The April 28, 2006 CTA En Banc Decision in CTA EB No. 64 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the August 2, 2004 CTA Decision in CTA Case No. 6003 disallowing the assessment is hereby REINSTATED. The assessment of respondent for deficiency excise taxes against petitioner for 1992 and 1994 to 1997 inclusive contained in the April 22, 1998 letter of respondent is canceled and declared without force and effect for lack of legal basis. No What is applicable is RR 12-99, which superseded RR 12-85, pursuant to Sec. 244 in relation to Sec. 245 of the NIRC implementing Secs. 6, 7, 204, 228, 247, 248, and 249 on the assessment of national internal revenue taxes, fees, and charges. The procedures delineated in the said statutory provisos and RR 12-99 were not followed by respondent, depriving PSPC of due process in contesting the formal assessment levied against it. Respondent ignored RR 12-99 and did not issue PSPC a notice for informal conference and a preliminary assessment notice, as required. PSPCs November 4, 1999 motion for reconsideration of the purported Center findings and cancellation of the subject TCCs and the TDM was not even acted upon. SO ORDERED. pronouncement as to costs. In short, respondent merely relied on the findings of the Center which did not give PSPC ample opportunity to air its side. While PSPC indeed protested the formal assessment, such does not denigrate the fact that it was deprived of statutory and procedural due process to contest the assessment before it was issued. Respondent must be more circumspect in the exercise of his functions, as this Court aptly held in Roxas v. Court of Tax Appeals:

The power of taxation is sometimes called also the power to destroy. Therefore it should be exercised with caution to minimize injury to the proprietary rights of a taxpayer. It must be exercised fairly, equally and uniformly, lest the tax collector kill the hen that lays the golden egg. And, in the order to maintain the general publics trust and confidence in the Government this power must be used justly and not treacherously.

COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. represented by its President, JESUS L. ARRANZA, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF MEAT PROCESSORS, INC. (PAMPI), represented by its Secretary, ROMEO G. HIDALGO, FEDERATION OF FREE FARMERS (FFF), represented by its President,

JEREMIAS U. MONTEMAYOR, and BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (BMP), represented by its Chairperson, FELIMON C. LAGMAN, petitioners, vs. HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, CLARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, 88 MART DUTY FREE, FREEPORT TRADERS, PX CLUB, AMERICAN HARDWARE, ROYAL DUTY FREE SHOPS, INC., DFS SPORTS, ASIA PACIFIC, MCI DUTY FREE DISTRIBUTOR CORP. (formerly MCI RESOURCES, CORP.), PARK & SHOP, DUTY FREE COMMODITIES, L. FURNISHING, SHAMBURGH, SUBIC DFS, ARGAN TRADING CORP., ASIPINE CORP., BEST BUY, INC., PX CLUB, CLARK TRADING, DEMAGUS TRADING CORP., D.F.S. SPORTS UNLIMITED, INC., DUTY FREE FIRST SUPERSTORE, INC., FREEPORT, JC MALL DUTY FREE INC. (formerly 88 Mart [Clark] Duty Free Corp.), LILLY HILL CORP., MARSHALL, PUREGOLD DUTY FREE, INC., ROYAL DFS and ZAXXON PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents. DECISION AZCUNA, J.: This is a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction seeking to enjoin and prohibit the Executive Branch, through the public respondents Ruben Torres in his capacity as Executive Secretary, the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), the Clark Development Corporation (CDC) and the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), from allowing, and the private respondents from continuing with, the operation of tax and duty-free shops located at the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), and to declare the following issuances as unconstitutional, illegal, and void: 1. Section 5 of Executive Order No. 80,[1] dated April 3, 1993, regarding the CSEZ. 2. Executive Order No. 97-A, dated June 19, 1993, pertaining to the SSEZ. 3. Section 4 of BCDA Board Resolution No. 93-05-034,[2] dated May 18, 1993, pertaining to the CSEZ. Petitioners contend that the aforecited issuances are unconstitutional and void as they constitute executive lawmaking, and that they are contrary to Republic Act No. 7227[3] and in violation of the Constitution, particularly Section 1, Article III (equal protection clause), Section 19, Article XII (prohibition of unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade), and Section 12, Article XII (preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods). The facts are as follows: On March 13, 1992, Republic Act No. 7227 was enacted, providing for, among other things, the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions into alternative productive uses in the form of special economic zones in order to promote the economic and social development of Central Luzon in particular and the country in general. Among the salient provisions are as follows: SECTION 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. ... The abovementioned zone shall be subject to the following policies:

(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the Constitution and the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code, the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to generate employment opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign investments; (b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines;[4] (c) The provision of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed within the Subic Special Economic Zone. In lieu of paying taxes, three percent (3%) of the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special Ecoomic Zone shall be remitted to the National Government, one percent (1%) each to the local government units affected by the declaration of the zone in proportion to their population area, and other factors. In addition, there is hereby established a development fund of one percent (1%) of the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special Economic Zone to be utilized for the development of municipalities outside the City of Olangapo and the Municipality of Subic, and other municipalities contiguous to the base areas. ... SECTION 15. Clark and Other Special Economic Zones. Subject to the concurrence by resolution of the local government units directly affected, the President is hereby authorized to create by executive proclamation a Special Economic Zone covering the lands occupied by the Clark military reservations and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America, as amended, located within the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City, Municipalities of Mabalacat and Porac, Province of Pampanga and the Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, in accordance with the policies as herein provided insofar as applicable to the Clark military reservations. The governing body of the Clark Special Economic Zone shall likewise be established by executive proclamation with such powers and functions exercised by the Export Processing Zone Authority pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 66 as amended. The policies to govern and regulate the Clark Special Economic Zone shall be determined upon consultation with the inhabitants of the local government units directly affected which shall be conducted within six (6) months upon approval of this Act. Similarly, subject to the concurrence by resolution of the local government units directly affected, the President shall create other Special Economic Zones, in the base areas of Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union (excluding areas designated for communications, advance warning and radar requirements of the Philippine Air Force to be determined by the Conversion Authority) and Camp John Hay in the City of Baguio. Upon recommendation of the Conversion Authority, the President is likewise authorized to create Special Economic Zones covering the Municipalities of Morong, Hermosa, Dinalupihan, Castillejos and San Marcelino. On April 3, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 80, which declared, among others, that Clark shall have all the applicable incentives granted to the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone under Republic Act No. 7227. The pertinent provision assailed therein is as follows:

SECTION 5. Investments Climate in the CSEZ. Pursuant to Section 5(m) and Section 15 of RA 7227, the BCDA shall promulgate all necessary policies, rules and regulations governing the CSEZ, including investment incentives, in consultation with the local government units and pertinent government departments for implementation by the CDC. Among others, the CSEZ shall have all the applicable incentives in the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone under RA 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in the Export Processing Zones, the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 and new investments laws which may hereinafter be enacted. The CSEZ Main Zone covering the Clark Air Base proper shall have all the aforecited investment incentives, while the CSEZ Sub-Zone covering the rest of the CSEZ shall have limited incentives. The full incentives in the Clark SEZ Main Zone and the limited incentives in the Clark SEZ Sub-Zone shall be determined by the BCDA. Pursuant to the directive under Executive Order No. 80, the BCDA passed Board Resolution No. 93-05034 on May 18, 1993, allowing the tax and duty-free sale at retail of consumer goods imported via Clark for consumption outside the CSEZ. The assailed provisions of said resolution read, as follows: Section 4. SPECIFIC INCENTIVES IN THE CSEZ MAIN ZONE. The CSEZ-registered enterprises/businesses shall be entitled to all the incentives available under R.A. No. 7227, E.O. No. 226 and R.A. No. 7042 which shall include, but not limited to, the following: I. As in Subic Economic and Free Port Zone: A. ... 4. Tax and duty-free purchase and consumption of goods/articles (duty free shopping) within the CSEZ Main Zone. For individuals, duty-free consumer goods may be brought out of the CSEZ Main Zone into the Philippine Customs territory but not to exceed US$200.00 per month per CDC-registered person, similar to the limits imposed in the Subic SEZ. This privilege shall be enjoyed only once a month. Any excess shall be levied taxes and duties by the Bureau of Customs. Customs:

Nine days after, on June 19, 1993, Executive Order No. 97-A was issued, Further Clarifying the Tax and Duty-Free Privilege Within the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone. The relevant provisions read, as follows: SECTION 1. The following guidelines shall govern the tax and duty-free privilege within the Secured Area of the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone: 1.1 The Secured Area consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base shall be the only completely tax and duty-free area in the SSEFPZ. Business enterprises and individuals (Filipinos and foreigners) residing within the Secured Area are free to import raw materials, capital goods, equipment, and consumer items tax and duty-free. Consumption items, however, must be consumed within the Secured Area. Removal of raw materials, capital goods, equipment and consumer items out of the Secured Area for sale to non-SSEFPZ registered enterprises shall be subject to the usual taxes and duties, except as may be provided herein. 1.2. Residents of the SSEFPZ living outside the Secured Area can enter the Secured Area and consume any quantity of consumption items in hotels and restaurants within the Secured Area. However, these residents can purchase and bring out of the Secured Area to other parts of the Philippine territory consumer items worth not exceeding US$100 per month per person. Only residents age 15 and over are entitled to this privilege. 1.3. Filipinos not residing within the SSEFPZ can enter the Secured Area and consume any quantity of consumption items in hotels and restaurants within the Secured Area. However, they can purchase and bring out [of] the Secured Area to other parts of the Philippine territory consumer items worth not exceeding US$200 per year per person. Only Filipinos age 15 and over are entitled to this privilege. Petitioners assail the $100 monthly and $200 yearly tax-free shopping privileges granted by the aforecited provisions respectively to SSEZ residents living outside the Secured Area of the SSEZ and to Filipinos aged 15 and over residing outside the SSEZ. On February 23, 1998, petitioners thus filed the instant petition, seeking the declaration of nullity of the assailed issuances on the following grounds: I. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 97-A, SECTION 5 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 80, AND SECTION 4 OF BCDA BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 93-05-034 ARE NULL AND VOID [FOR] BEING AN EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE LAWMAKING. II. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 97-A, SECTION 5 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 80, AND SECTION 4 OF BCDA BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 93-05-034 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND THE PROHIBITION AGAINST UNFAIR COMPETITION AND PRACTICES IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE. III.

5.

On June 10, 1993, the President issued Executive Order No. 97, Clarifying the Tax and Duty Free Incentive Within the Subic Special Economic Zone Pursuant to R.A. No. 7227. Said issuance in part states, thus: SECTION 1. On Import Taxes and Duties Tax and duty-free importations shall apply only to raw materials, capital goods and equipment brought in by business enterprises into the SSEZ. Except for these items, importations of other goods into the SSEZ, whether by business enterprises or resident individuals, are subject to taxes and duties under relevant Philippine laws. The exportation or removal of tax and duty-free goods from the territory of the SSEZ to other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to duties and taxes under relevant Philippine laws.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 97-A, SECTION 5 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 80, AND SECTION 4 OF BCDA BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 93-05-034 ARE NULL AND VOID [FOR] BEING VIOLATIVE OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7227.

IV. THE CONTINUED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHALLENGED ISSUANCES IF NOT RESTRAINED WILL CONTINUE TO CAUSE PETITIONERS TO SUFFER GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE INJURY.[5] In their Comments, respondents point out procedural issues, alleging lack of petitioners legal standing, the unreasonable delay in the filing of the petition, laches, and the propriety of the remedy of prohibition. Anent the claim on lack of legal standing, respondents argue that petitioners, being mere suppliers of the local retailers operating outside the special economic zones, do not stand to suffer direct injury in the enforcement of the issuances being assailed herein. Assuming this is true, this Court has nevertheless held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review.[6] In the same vein, with respect to the other alleged procedural flaws, even assuming the existence of such defects, this Court, in the exercise of its discretion, brushes aside these technicalities and takes cognizance of the petition considering the importance to the public of the present case and in keeping with the duty to determine whether the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution.[7] Now, on the constitutional arguments raised: As this Court enters upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the Government, it bears emphasis that deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to be valid.[8] This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each others acts.[9] Hence, to doubt is to sustain. The theory is that before the act was done or the law was enacted, earnest studies were made by Congress, or the President, or both, to insure that the Constitution would not be breached.[10] This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one.[11] In other words, before a statute or a portion thereof may be declared unconstitutional, it must be shown that the statute or issuance violates the Constitution clearly, palpably and plainly, and in such a manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court.[12] The Issue on Executive Legislation Petitioners claim that the assailed issuances (Executive Order No. 97-A; Section 5 of Executive Order No. 80; and Section 4 of BCDA Board Resolution No. 93-05-034) constitute executive legislation, in violation of the rule on separation of powers. Petitioners argue that the Executive Department, by allowing through the questioned issuances the setting up of tax and duty-free shops and the removal of consumer goods and items from the zones without payment of corresponding duties and taxes, arbitrarily provided additional exemptions to the limitations imposed by Republic Act No. 7227, which limitations petitioners identify as follows: (1) [Republic Act No. 7227] allowed only tax and duty-free importation of raw materials, capital and equipment. (2) It provides that any exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines.

Anent the first alleged limitation, petitioners contend that the wording of Republic Act No. 7227 clearly limits the grant of tax incentives to the importation of raw materials, capital and equipment only. Hence, they claim that the assailed issuances constitute executive legislation for invalidly granting tax incentives in the importation of consumer goods such as those being sold in the duty-free shops, in violation of the letter and intent of Republic Act No. 7227. A careful reading of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 7227, which pertains to the SSEZ, would show that it does not restrict the duty-free importation only to raw materials, capital and equipment. Section 12 of the cited law is partly reproduced, as follows: SECTION 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. ... The abovementioned zone shall be subject to the following policies: ... (b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines.[13] While it is true that Section 12 (b) of Republic Act No. 7227 mentions only raw materials, capital and equipment, this does not necessarily mean that the tax and duty-free buying privilege is limited to these types of articles to the exclusion of consumer goods. It must be remembered that in construing statutes, the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the Legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the policy and objects of the Legislature.[14] In the present case, there appears to be no logic in following the narrow interpretation petitioners urge. To limit the tax-free importation privilege of enterprises located inside the special economic zone only to raw materials, capital and equipment clearly runs counter to the intention of the Legislature to create a free port where the free flow of goods or capital within, into, and out of the zones is insured. The phrase tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment was merely cited as an example of incentives that may be given to entities operating within the zone. Public respondent SBMA correctly argued that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, on which petitioners impliedly rely to support their restrictive interpretation, does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example.[15] It is obvious from the wording of Republic Act No. 7227, particularly the use of the phrase such as, that the enumeration only meant to illustrate incentives that the SSEZ is authorized to grant, in line with its being a free port zone. Furthermore, said legal maxim should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest, and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the Legislature.[16] The records of the Senate containing the discussion of the concept of special economic zone in Section 12 (a) of Republic Act No. 7227 show the legislative intent that consumer goods entering the SSEZ which

satisfy the needs of the zone and are consumed there are not subject to duties and taxes in accordance with Philippine laws, thus: Senator Guingona. . . . The concept of Special Economic Zone is one that really includes the concept of a free port, but it is broader. While a free port is necessarily included in the Special Economic Zone, the reverse is not true that a free port would include a special economic zone. Special Economic Zone, Mr. President, would include not only the incoming and outgoing of vessels, duty-free and tax-free, but it would involve also tourism, servicing, financing and all the appurtenances of an investment center. So, that is the concept, Mr. President. It is broader. It includes the free port concept and would cater to the greater needs of Olangapo City, Subic Bay and the surrounding municipalities. Senator Enrile. May I know then if a factory located within the jurisdiction of Morong, Bataan that was originally a part of the Subic Naval reservation, be entitled to a free port treatment or just a special economic zone treatment? Senator Guingona. As far as the goods required for manufacture is concerned, Mr. President, it would have privileges of duty-free and tax-free. But in addition, the Special Economic Zone could embrace the needs of tourism, could embrace the needs of servicing, could embrace the needs of financing and other investment aspects. Senator Enrile. When a hotel is constructed, Mr. President, in this geographical unit which we call a special economic zone, will the goods entering to be consumed by the customers or guests of the hotel be subject to duties? Senator Guingona. That is the concept that we are crafting, Mr. President. Senator Enrile. No. I am asking whether those goods will be duty-free, because it is constructed within a free port. Senator Guingona. For as long as it services the needs of the Special Economic Zone, yes. Senator Enrile. For as long as the goods remain within the zone, whether we call it an economic zone or a free port, for as long as we say in this law that all goods entering this particular territory will be dutyfree and tax-free, for as long as they remain there, consumed there or reexported or destroyed in that place, then they are not subject to the duties and taxes in accordance with the laws of the Philippines ? Senator Guingona. Yes.[17] Petitioners rely on Committee Report No. 1206 submitted by the Ad Hoc Oversight Committee on Bases Conversion on June 26, 1995. Petitioners put emphasis on the reports finding that the setting up of dutyfree stores never figured in the minds of the authors of Republic Act No. 7227 in attracting foreign investors to the former military baselands. They maintain that said law aimed to attract manufacturing and service enterprises that will employ the dislocated former military base workers, but not investors who would buy consumer goods from duty-free stores. The Court is not persuaded. Indeed, it is well-established that opinions expressed in the debates and proceedings of the Legislature, steps taken in the enactment of a law, or the history of the passage of the law through the Legislature, may be resorted to as aids in the interpretation of a statute with a doubtful meaning.[18] Petitioners posture, however, overlooks the fact that the 1995 Committee Report they are referring to came into being well after the enactment of Republic Act No. 7227 in 1993. Hence, as

pointed out by respondent Executive Secretary Torres, the aforementioned report cannot be said to form part of Republic Act No. 7227s legislative history. Section 12 of Republic Act No. 7227, provides in part, thus: SEC. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. -- . . . The abovementioned zone shall be subject to the following policies: (a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the Constitution and the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code, the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to generate employment opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign investments. [19] The aforecited policy was mentioned as a basis for the issuance of Executive Order No. 97-A, thus: WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7227 provides that within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the Constitution and the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code, the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone (SSEFPZ) shall be developed into a self-sustaining industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to generate employment opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign investments; and WHEREAS, a special tax and duty-free privilege within a Secured Area in the SSEFPZ subject, to existing laws has been determined necessary to attract local and foreign visitors to the zone. Executive Order No. 97-A provides guidelines to govern the tax and duty-free privileges within the Secured Area of the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone. Paragraph 1.6 thereof states that (t)he sale of tax and duty-free consumer items in the Secured Area shall only be allowed in duly authorized duty-free shops. The Court finds that the setting up of such commercial establishments which are the only ones duly authorized to sell consumer items tax and duty-free is still well within the policy enunciated in Section 12 of Republic Act No. 7227 that . . .the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be developed into a selfsustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to generate employment opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign investments . (Emphasis supplied.) However, the Court reiterates that the second sentences of paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of Executive Order No. 97-A, allowing tax and duty-free removal of goods to certain individuals, even in a limited amount, from the Secured Area of the SSEZ, are null and void for being contrary to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 7227. Said Section clearly provides that exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines. On the other hand, insofar as the CSEZ is concerned, the case for an invalid exercise of executive legislation is tenable. In John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition, et al. v. Victor Lim, et al.,[20] this Court resolved an issue, very much like the one herein, concerning the legality of the tax exemption benefits given to the John Hay Economic Zone under Presidential Proclamation No. 420, Series of 1994, CREATING AND DESIGNATING A PORTION OF THE AREA COVERED BY THE FORMER CAMP JOHN AS THE JOHN HAY SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7227.

In that case, among the arguments raised was that the granting of tax exemptions to John Hay was an invalid and illegal exercise by the President of the powers granted only to the Legislature. Petitioners therein argued that Republic Act No. 7227 expressly granted tax exemption only to Subic and not to the other economic zones yet to be established. Thus, the grant of tax exemption to John Hay by Presidential Proclamation contravenes the constitutional mandate that [n]o law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress.[21] This Court sustained the argument and ruled that the incentives under Republic Act No. 7227 are exclusive only to the SSEZ. The President, therefore, had no authority to extend their application to John Hay. To quote from the Decision: More importantly, the nature of most of the assailed privileges is one of tax exemption. It is the legislature, unless limited by a provision of a state constitution, that has full power to exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax. Other than Congress, the Constitution may itself provide for specific tax exemptions, or local governments may pass ordinances on exemption only from local taxes. The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the Constitutions imposition that a law granting any tax exemption must have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress. In the same vein, the other kinds of privileges extended to the John Hay SEZ are by tradition and usage for Congress to legislate upon. Contrary to public respondents suggestions, the claimed statutory exemption of the John Hay SEZ from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based; it must be expressly granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to be mistaken. Tax exemption cannot be implied as it must be categorically and unmistakably expressed. If it were the intent of the legislature to grant to John Hay SEZ the same tax exemption and incentives given to the Subic SEZ, it would have so expressly provided in R.A. No. 7227.[22] In the present case, while Section 12 of Republic Act No. 7227 expressly provides for the grant of incentives to the SSEZ, it fails to make any similar grant in favor of other economic zones, including the CSEZ. Tax and duty-free incentives being in the nature of tax exemptions, the basis thereof should be categorically and unmistakably expressed from the language of the statute. Consequently, in the absence of any express grant of tax and duty-free privileges to the CSEZ in Republic Act No. 7227, there would be no legal basis to uphold the questioned portions of two issuances: Section 5 of Executive Order No. 80 and Section 4 of BCDA Board Resolution No. 93-05-034, which both pertain to the CSEZ. Petitioners also contend that the questioned issuances constitute executive legislation for allowing the removal of consumer goods and items from the zones without payment of corresponding duties and taxes in violation of Republic Act No. 7227 as Section 12 thereof provides for the taxation of goods that are exported or removed from the SSEZ to other parts of the Philippine territory. On September 26, 1997, Executive Order No. 444 was issued, curtailing the duty-free shopping privileges in the SSEZ and the CSEZ to prevent abuse of duty-free privilege and to protect local industries from unfair competition. The pertinent provisions of said issuance state, as follows: SECTION 3. Special Shopping Privileges Granted During the Year-round Centennial Anniversary Celebration in 1998. Upon effectivity of this Order and up to the Centennial Year 1998, in addition to the permanent residents, locators and employees of the fenced-in areas of the Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone and the Clark Special Economic Zone who are allowed unlimited duty free purchases, provided these are consumed within said fenced-in areas of the Zones, the residents of the municipalities adjacent to Subic and Clark as respectively provided in R.A. 7227 (1992) and E.O. 97-A s. 1993 shall continue to be allowed One Hundred US Dollars (US$100) monthly shopping privilege until 31 December

1998. Domestic tourists visiting Subic and Clark shall be allowed a shopping privilege of US$25 for consumable goods which shall be consumed only in the fenced-in area during their visit therein. SECTION 4. Grant of Duty Free Shopping Privileges Limited Only To Individuals Allowed by Law. Starting 1 January 1999, only the following persons shall continue to be eligible to shop in duty free shops/outlets with their corresponding purchase limits: a. Tourists and Filipinos traveling to or returning from foreign destinations under E.O. 97-A s. 1993 One Thousand US Dollars (US$1,000) but not to exceed Ten Thousand US Dollars (US$10,000) in any given year; Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) and Balikbayans defined under R.A. 6768 dated 3 November 1989 Two Thousand US Dollars (US$2,000); Residents, eighteen (18) years old and above, of the fenced-in areas of the freeports under R.A. 7227 (1992) and E.O. 97-A s. 1993 Unlimited purchase as long as these are for consumption within these freeports. The term "Residents" mentioned in item c above shall refer to individuals who, by virtue of domicile or employment, reside on permanent basis within the freeport area. The term excludes (1) non-residents who have entered into short- or long-term property lease inside the freeport, (2) outsiders engaged in doing business within the freeport, and (3) members of private clubs (e.g., yacht and golf clubs) based or located within the freeport. In this regard, duty free privileges granted to any of the above individuals (e.g., unlimited shopping privilege, tax-free importation of cars, etc.) are hereby revoked.[23] A perusal of the above provisions indicates that effective January 1, 1999, the grant of duty-free shopping privileges to domestic tourists and to residents living adjacent to SSEZ and the CSEZ had been revoked. Residents of the fenced-in area of the free port are still allowed unlimited purchase of consumer goods, as long as these are for consumption within these freeports. Hence, the only individuals allowed by law to shop in the duty-free outlets and remove consumer goods out of the free ports tax-free are tourists and Filipinos traveling to or returning from foreign destinations, and Overseas Filipino Workers and Balikbayans as defined under Republic Act No. 6768.[24] Subsequently, on October 20, 2000, Executive Order No. 303 was issued, amending Executive Order No. 444. Pursuant to the limited duration of the privileges granted under the preceding issuance, Section 2 of Executive Order No. 303 declared that [a]ll special shopping privileges as granted under Section 3 of Executive Order 444, s. 1997, are hereby deemed terminated. The grant of duty free shopping privileges shall be restricted to qualified individuals as provided by law. It bears noting at this point that the shopping privileges currently being enjoyed by Overseas Filipino Workers, Balikbayans, and tourists traveling to and from foreign destinations, draw authority not from the issuances being assailed herein, but from Executive Order No. 46[25] and Republic Act No. 6768, both enacted prior to the promulgation of Republic Act No. 7227. From the foregoing, it appears that petitioners objection to the allowance of tax-free removal of goods from the special economic zones as previously authorized by the questioned issuances has become moot and academic. In any event, Republic Act No. 7227, specifically Section 12 (b) thereof, clearly provides that exporta tion or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines.

b.

c.

Thus, the removal of goods from the SSEZ to other parts of the Philippine territory without payment of said customs duties and taxes is not authorized by the Act. Consequently, the following italicized provisions found in the second sentences of paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 97A are null and void: 1.2 Residents of the SSEFPZ living outside the Secured Area can enter and consume any quantity of consumption items in hotels and restaurants within the Secured Area. However, these residents can purchase and bring out of the Secured Area to other parts of the Philippine territory consumer items worth not exceeding US $100 per month per person . Only residents age 15 and over are entitled to this privilege. 1.3 Filipinos not residing within the SSEFPZ can enter the Secured Area and consume any quantity of consumption items in hotels and restaurants within the Secured Area. However, they can purchase and bring out of the Secured Area to other parts of the Philippine territory consumer items worth not exceeding US $200 per year per person . Only Filipinos age 15 and over are entitled to this privilege.[26] A similar provision found in paragraph 5, Section 4(A) of BCDA Board Resolution No. 93-05-034 is also null and void. Said Resolution applied the incentives given to the SSEZ under Republic Act No. 7227 to the CSEZ, which, as aforestated, is without legal basis. Having concluded earlier that the CSEZ is excluded from the tax and duty-free incentives provided under Republic Act No. 7227, this Court will resolve the remaining arguments only with regard to the operations of the SSEZ. Thus, the assailed issuance that will be discussed is solely Executive Order No. 97-A, since it is the only one among the three questioned issuances which pertains to the SSEZ. Equal Protection of the Laws Petitioners argue that the assailed issuance (Executive Order No. 97-A) is violative of their right to equal protection of the laws, as enshrined in Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. To support this argument, they assert that private respondents operating inside the SSEZ are not different from the retail establishments located outside, the products sold being essentially the same. The only distinction, they claim, lies in the products variety and source, and the fact that private respondents import their items tax free, to the prejudice of the retailers and manufacturers located outside the zone. Petitioners contention cannot be sustained. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification.[27] Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinction, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.[28] Applying the foregoing test to the present case, this Court finds no violation of the right to equal protection of the laws. First, contrary to petitioners claim, substantial distinctions lie between the establishments inside and outside the zone, justifying the difference in their treatment. In Tiu v. Court of Appeals,[29] the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A was challenged for being violative of the equal protection clause. In that case, petitioners claimed that Executive Order No. 97-A was discriminatory in confining the application of Republic Act No. 7227 within a secured area of the SSEZ, to the exclusion of those outside but are, nevertheless, still within the economic zone. Upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A, this Court therein found substantial differences between the retailers inside and outside the secured area, thereby justifying a valid and reasonable classification:

Certainly, there are substantial differences between the big investors who are being lured to establish and operate their industries in the so-called secured area and the present business operators outside the area. On the one hand, we are talking of billion-peso investments and thousands of new jobs. On the other hand, definitely none of such magnitude. In the first, the economic impact will be national; in the second, only local. Even more important, at this time the business activities outside the secured area are not likely to have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law, which is to turn the former military base to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy. There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits and incentives accorded in R.A. 7227. Additionally, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, it will be easier to manage and monitor the activities within the secured area, which is already fenced off, to prevent fraudulent importation of merchandise or smuggling. It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual and material differences between territories, there is no violation of the constitutional clause. And of course, anyone, including the petitioners, possessing the requisite investment capital can always avail of the same benefits by channeling his or her resources or business operations into the fenced-off free port zone.[30] The Court in Tiu found real and substantial distinctions between residents within the secured area and those living within the economic zone but outside the fenced-off area. Similarly, real and substantial differences exist between the establishments herein involved. A significant distinction between the two groups is that enterprises outside the zones maintain their businesses within Philippine customs territory, while private respondents and the other duly-registered zone enterprises operate within the so-called separate customs territory. To grant the same tax incentives given to enterprises within the zones to businesses operating outside the zones, as petitioners insist, would clearly defeat t he statutes intent to carve a territory out of the military reservations in Subic Bay where free flow of goods and capital is maintained. The classification is germane to the purpose of Republic Act No. 7227. As held in Tiu, the real concern of Republic Act No. 7227 is to convert the lands formerly occupied by the US military bases into economic or industrial areas. In furtherance of such objective, Congress deemed it necessary to extend economic incentives to the establishments within the zone to attract and encourage foreign and local investors. This is the very rationale behind Republic Act No. 7227 and other similar special economic zone laws which grant a complete package of tax incentives and other benefits. The classification, moreover, is not limited to the existing conditions when the law was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, inasmuch as the law envisioned the former military reservation to ultimately develop into a self-sustaining investment center. And, lastly, the classification applies equally to all retailers found within the secured area. As ruled in Tiu, the individuals and businesses within the secured area, being in like circumstances or contributing directly to the achievement of the end purpose of the law, are not categorized further. They are all similarly treated, both in privileges granted and in obligations required. With all the four requisites for a reasonable classification present, there is no ground to invalidate Executive Order No. 97-A for being violative of the equal protection clause. Prohibition against Unfair Competition and Practices in Restraint of Trade Petitioners next argue that the grant of special tax exemptions and privileges gave the private respondents undue advantage over local enterprises which do not operate inside the SSEZ, thereby creating unfair competition in violation of the constitutional prohibition against unfair competition and practices in restraint of trade.

The argument is without merit. Just how the assailed issuance is violative of the prohibition against unfair competition and practices in restraint of trade is not clearly explained in the petition. Republic Act No. 7227, and consequently Executive Order No. 97-A, cannot be said to be distinctively arbitrary against the welfare of businesses outside the zones. The mere fact that incentives and privileges are granted to certain enterprises to the exclusion of others does not render the issuance unconstitutional for espousing unfair competition. Said constitutional prohibition cannot hinder the Legislature from using tax incentives as a tool to pursue its policies. Suffice it to say that Congress had justifiable reasons in granting incentives to the private respondents, in accordance with Republic Act No. 7227s policy of developing th e SSEZ into a self-sustaining entity that will generate employment and attract foreign and local investment. If petitioners had wanted to avoid any alleged unfavorable consequences on their profits, they should upgrade their standards of quality so as to effectively compete in the market. In the alternative, if petitioners really wanted the preferential treatment accorded to the private respondents, they could have opted to register with SSEZ in order to operate within the special economic zone. Preferential Use of Filipino Labor, Domestic Materials and Locally Produced Goods Lastly, petitioners claim that the questioned issuance (Executive Order No. 97-A) openly violated the State policy of promoting the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods and adopting measures to help make them competitive. Again, the argument lacks merit. This Court notes that petitioners failed to substantiate their sweeping conclusion that the issuance has violated the State policy of giving preference to Filipino goods and labor. The mere fact that said issuance authorizes the importation and trade of foreign goods does not suffice to declare it unconstitutional on this ground. Petitioners cite Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS[31] which, however, does not apply. That case dealt with the policy enunciated under the second paragraph of Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution,[32] applicable to the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, which is different from the policy invoked in this petition, specifically that of giving preference to Filipino materials and labor found under Section 12 of the same Article of the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied). In Taada v. Angara,[33] this Court elaborated on the meaning of Section 12, Article XII of the Constitution in this wise: [W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.[34] This Court notes that the Executive Department, with its subsequent issuance of Executive Order Nos. 444 and 303, has provided certain measures to prevent unfair competition. In particular, Executive Order Nos. 444 and 303 have restricted the special shopping privileges to certain individuals.[35] Executive Order No. 303 has limited the range of items that may be sold in the duty-free outlets,[36] and imposed sanctions to curb abuses of duty-free privileges.[37] With these measures, this Court finds no reason to strike down Executive Order No. 97-A for allegedly being prejudicial to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Section 5 of Executive Order No. 80 and Section 4 of BCDA Board Resolution No. 93-05-034 are hereby declared NULL and VOID and are accordingly declared of no legal force and effect. Respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the aforesaid void provisions. All portions of Executive Order No. 97-A are valid and effective, except the second sentences in paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of said Executive Order, which are hereby declared INVALID. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER, VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

Simple and uncomplicated is the central issue involved, yet whopping is the amount at stake in this case. After much wrangling in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) and the Court of Appeals, Fortune Tobacco Corporation (Fortune Tobacco) was granted a tax refund or tax credit representing specific taxes erroneously collected from its tobacco products. The tax refund is being re-claimed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) in this petition. The following undisputed facts, summarized by the Court of Appeals, are quoted in the assailed Decision[1] dated 28 September 2004: CAG.R. SP No. 80675 x x x x

Petitioner[2] is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with principal address at Fortune Avenue, Parang, Marikina City. Petitioner is the manufacturer/producer of, among others, the following cigarette brands, with tax rate classification based on net retail price prescribed by Annex "D" to R.A. No. 4280, to wit: Brand Tax Rate Champion M 100 P1.00 Salem M 100 P1.00 Salem M King P1.00 Camel F King P1.00 Camel Lights Box 20's P1.00 Camel Filters Box 20's P1.00 Winston F Kings P5.00 Winston Lights P5.00 Immediately prior to January 1, 1997, the above-mentioned cigarette brands were subject to ad valorem tax pursuant to then Section 142 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended. However, on January 1, 1997, R.A. No. 8240 took effect whereby a shift from the ad valorem tax (AVT) system to the specific tax system was made and subjecting the aforesaid cigarette brands to specific tax under [S]ection 142 thereof, now renumbered as Sec. 145 of the Tax Code of 1997, pertinent provisions of which are quoted thus: Section 145. Cigars and Cigarettes(A) Cigars. - There shall be levied, assessed and collected on cigars a tax of One peso (P1.00) per cigar. "(B) Cigarettes packed by hand. - There shall be levied, assessesed and collected on cigarettes packed by hand a tax of Forty centavos (P0.40) per pack. (C) Cigarettes packed by machine. - There shall be levied, assessed and collected on cigarettes packed by machine a tax at the rates prescribed below: (1) If the net retail price (excluding the excise tax and the value-added tax) is above Ten pesos (P10.00) per pack, the tax shall be Twelve (P12.00) per pack; (2) If the net retail price (excluding the excise tax and the value added tax) exceeds Six pesos and Fifty

centavos (P6.50) but does not exceed Ten pesos (P10.00) per pack, the tax shall be Eight Pesos (P8.00) per pack. (3) If the net retail price (excluding the excise tax and the value-added tax) is Five pesos (P5.00) but does not exceed Six Pesos and fifty centavos (P6.50) per pack, the tax shall be Five pesos (P5.00) per pack; (4) If the net retail price (excluding the excise tax and the value-added tax) is below Five pesos (P5.00) per pack, the tax shall be One peso (P1.00) per pack; "Variants of existing brands of cigarettes which are introduced in the domestic market after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8240 shall be taxed under the highest classification of any variant of that brand. The excise tax from any brand of cigarettes within the next three (3) years from the effectivity of R.A. No. 8240 shall not be lower than the tax, which is due from each brand on October 1, 1996. Provided, however, that in cases were (sic) the excise tax rate imposed in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) hereinabove will result in an increase in excise tax of more than seventy percent (70%), for a brand of cigarette, the increase shall take effect in two tranches: fifty percent (50%) of the increase shall be effective in 1997 and one hundred percent (100%) of the increase shall be effective in 1998. Duly registered or existing brands of cigarettes or new brands thereof packed by machine shall only be packed in twenties. The rates of excise tax on cigars and cigarettes under paragraphs (1), (2) (3) and (4) hereof, shall be increased by twelve percent (12%) on January 1, 2000 . (Emphasis supplied) New brands shall be classified according to their current net retail price.

Excise) is P6.51 up to P10.00 per pack (3) Net Retail Price (excluding VAT and P5.00/pack excise) is P5.00 to P6.50 per pack (4) Net Retail Price (excluding VAT and excise) is below P5.00 per pack) P1.00/pack P5.60/pack

P1.12/pack

Revenue Regulations No. 17-99 likewise provides in the last paragraph of Section 1 thereof, "(t)hat the new specific tax rate for any existing brand of cigars, cigarettes packed by machine, distilled spirits, wines and fermented liquor shall not be lower than the excise tax that is actually being paid prior to January 1, 2000." For the period covering January 1-31, 2000, petitioner allegedly paid specific taxes on all brands manufactured and removed in the total amounts of P585,705,250.00. On February 7, 2000, petitioner filed with respondent's Appellate Division a claim for refund or tax credit of its purportedly overpaid excise tax for the month of January 2000 in the amount of P35,651,410.00 On June 21, 2001, petitioner filed with respondent's Legal Service a letter dated June 20, 2001 reiterating all the claims for refund/tax credit of its overpaid excise taxes filed on various dates, including the present claim for the month of January 2000 in the amount of P35,651,410.00. As there was no action on the part of the respondent, petitioner filed the instant petition for review with this Court on December 11, 2001, in order to comply with the two-year period for filing a claim for refund. In his answer filed on January 16, 2002, respondent raised the following Special and Affirmative Defenses; 4. Petitioner's alleged claim for refund investigation/examination by the Bureau; is subject to administrative routinary

For the above purpose, `net retail price' shall mean the price at which the cigarette is sold on retail in twenty (20) major supermarkets in Metro Manila (for brands of cigarettes marketed nationally), excluding the amount intended to cover the applicable excise tax and value-added tax. For brands which are marketed only outside Metro [M]anila, the `net retail price' shall mean the price at which the cigarette is sold in five (5) major supermarkets in the region excluding the amount intended to cover the applicable excise tax and the value-added tax. The classification of each brand of cigarettes based on its average retail price as of October 1, 1996, as set forth in Annex "D," shall remain in force until revised by Congress. Variant of a brand shall refer to a brand on which a modifier is prefixed and/or suffixed to the root name of the brand and/or a different brand which carries the same logo or design of the existing brand.

5.

The amount of P35,651,410 being claimed by petitioner as alleged overpaid excise tax for the month of January 2000 was not properly documented. In an action for tax refund, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to establish its right to refund, and failure to sustain the burden is fatal to its claim for refund/credit. Petitioner must show that it has complied with the provisions of Section 204(C) in relation [to] Section 229 of the Tax Code on the prescriptive period for claiming tax refund/credit; Claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant for the same partake of tax exemption from taxation; and The last paragraph of Section 1 of Revenue Regulation[s] [No.]17-99 is a valid implementing regulation which has the force and effect of law." G.R. SP No. 83165

6. To implement the provisions for a twelve percent (12%) increase of excise tax on, among others, cigars and cigarettes packed by machines by January 1, 2000, the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, issued Revenue Regulations No. 17-99, dated December 16, 1999, which provides the increase on the applicable tax rates on cigar and cigarettes as follows: SECTION DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLES PRESENT NEW SPECIFIC SPECIFIC TAX TAX RATE RATES PRIOR Effective Jan.. 1, TO JAN. 1, 2000 2000 P1.00/cigar P1.12/cigar CA P13.44/pack

7.

8.

9.

145

(A) Cigars (B)Cigarettes packed by Machine

(1) Net Retail Price (excluding VAT and P12.00/pack Excise) exceeds P10.00 per pack (2) Net Retail Price (excluding VAT and P8.00/pack

P8.96/pack

The petition contains essentially similar facts, except that the said case questions the CTA's December 4, 2003 decision in CTA Case No. 6612 granting respondent's[3] claim for refund of the amount of P355,385,920.00 representing erroneously or illegally collected specific taxes covering the period January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002, as well as its March 17, 2004 Resolution denying a reconsideration

thereof. x x x x

1.

That by January 1, 2000, the excise tax on cigarettes should be the higher tax imposed under the specific tax system and the tax imposed under the ad valorem tax system plus the 12% increase imposed by par. 5, Sec. 145 of the Tax Code; The increase of 12% starting on January 1, 2000 does not apply to the brands of cigarettes listed under Annex "D" referred to in par. 8, Sec. 145 of the Tax Code; The 12% increment shall be computed based on the net retail price as indicated in par. C, subpar. (1)-(4), Sec. 145 of the Tax Code even if the resulting figure will be lower than the amount already being paid at the end of the transition period. This is the interpretation followed by both the CTA and the Court of Appeals.[7]

In both CTA Case Nos. 6365 & 6383 and CTA No. 6612, the Court of Tax Appeals reduced the issues to be resolved into two as stipulated by the parties, to wit: (1) Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 1 of Revenue Regulation[s] [No.] 17-99 is in accordance with the pertinent provisions of Republic Act [No.] 8240, now incorporated in Section 145 of the Tax Code of 1997; and (2) Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a refund of P35,651,410.00 as alleged overpaid excise tax for the month of January 2000. x x x x

2.

3.

Hence, the respondent CTA in its assailed October 21, 2002 [twin] Decisions[s] disposed in CTA Case Nos. 6365 & 6383: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds the instant petition meritorious and in accordance with law. Accordingly, respondent is hereby ORDERED to REFUND to petitioner the amount of P35,651.410.00 representing erroneously paid excise taxes for the period January 1 to January 31, 2000. SO ORDERED. Herein petitioner sought reconsideration of the above-quoted decision. In [twin] resolution[s] [both] dated July 15, 2003, the Tax Court, in an apparent change of heart, granted the petitioner's consolidated motions for reconsideration, thereby denying the respondent's claim for refund. However, on consolidated motions for reconsideration filed by the respondent in CTA Case Nos. 6363 and 6383, the July 15, 2002 resolution was set aside, and the Tax Court ruled, this time with a semblance of finality, that the respondent is entitled to the refund claimed. Hence, in a resolution dated November 4, 2003, the tax court reinstated its December 21, 2002 Decision and disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, our Decisions in CTA Case Nos. 6365 and 6383 are hereby REINSTATED. Accordingly, respondent is hereby ORDERED to REFUND petitioner the total amount of P680,387,025.00 representing erroneously paid excise taxes for the period January 1, 2000 to January 31, 2000 and February 1, 2000 to December 31, 2001. SO ORDERED. Meanwhile, on December 4, 2003, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered decision in CTA Case No. 6612 granting the prayer for the refund of the amount of P355,385,920.00 representing overpaid excise tax for the period covering January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002. The tax court disposed of the case as follows: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. Accordingly, respondent is hereby ORDERED to REFUND to petitioner the amount of P355,385,920.00 representing overpaid excise tax for the period covering January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002. SO ORDERED. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated March 17, 2004.[4] (Emphasis supplied) (Citations omitted) The Commissioner appealed the aforesaid decisions of the CTA. The petition questioning the grant of refund in the amount of P680,387,025.00 was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 80675, whereas that assailing the grant of refund in the amount of P355,385,920.00 was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 83165. The petitions were consolidated and eventually denied by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court also denied reconsideration in its Resolution[5] dated 1 March 2005. In its Memorandum 22 dated November 2006, filed on behalf of the Commissioner, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks to convince the Court that the literal interpretation given by the CTA and the Court of Appeals of Section 145 of the Tax Code of 1997 (Tax Code) would lead to a lower tax imposable on 1 January 2000 than that imposable during the transition period. Instead of an increase of 12% in the tax rate effective on 1 January 2000 as allegedly mandated by the Tax Code, the appellate court's ruling would result in a significant decrease in the tax rate by as much as 66%. The OSG argues that Section 145 of the Tax Code admits of several interpretations, such as:
[6]

This being so, the interpretation which will give life to the legislative intent to raise revenue should govern, the OSG stresses. Finally, the OSG asserts that a tax refund is in the nature of a tax exemption and must, therefore, be construed strictly against the taxpayer, such as Fortune Tobacco. In its Memorandum[8] dated 10 November 2006, Fortune Tobacco argues that the CTA and the Court of Appeals merely followed the letter of the law when they ruled that the basis for the 12% increase in the tax rate should be the net retail price of the cigarettes in the market as outlined in paragraph C, sub paragraphs (1)-(4), Section 145 of the Tax Code. The Commissioner allegedly has gone beyond his delegated rule-making power when he promulgated, enforced and implemented Revenue Regulation No. 17-99, which effectively created a separate classification for cigarettes based on the excise tax "actually being paid prior to January 1, 2000."[9] It should be mentioned at the outset that there is no dispute between the fact of payment of the taxes sought to be refunded and the receipt thereof by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). There is also no question about the mathematical accuracy of Fortune Tobacco's claim since the documentary evidence in support of the refund has not been controverted by the revenue agency. Likewise, the claims have been made and the actions have been filed within the two (2)-year prescriptive period provided under Section 229 of the Tax Code. The power to tax is inherent in the State, such power being inherently legislative, based on the principle that taxes are a grant of the people who are taxed, and the grant must be made by the immediate representatives of the people; and where the people have laid the power, there it must remain and be exercised.[10] This entire controversy revolves around the interplay between Section 145 of the Tax Code and Revenue Regulation 17-99. The main issue is an inquiry into whether the revenue regulation has exceeded the allowable limits of legislative delegation. For ease of reference, Section 145 of the Tax Code is again reproduced in full as follows: Section 145. Cigars and Cigarettes(A) Cigars.--There shall be levied, assessed and collected on cigars a tax of One peso (P1.00) per cigar. (B). Cigarettes packed by hand.--There shall be levied, assessed and collected on cigarettes packed by hand a tax of Forty centavos (P0.40) per pack. (C) Cigarettes packed by machine.--There shall be levied, assessed and collected on cigarettes packed by machine a tax at the rates prescribed below: (1) If the net retail price (excluding the excise tax and the value-added tax) is above Ten pesos (P10.00) per pack, the tax shall be Twelve pesos (P12.00) per pack; (2) If the net retail price (excluding the excise tax and the value added tax) exceeds Six pesos and Fifty

centavos (P6.50) but does not exceed Ten pesos (P10.00) per pack, the tax shall be Eight Pesos (P8.00) per pack. (3) If the net retail price (excluding the excise tax and the value-added tax) is Five pesos (P5.00) but does not exceed Six Pesos and fifty centavos (P6.50) per pack, the tax shall be Five pesos (P5.00) per pack; (4) If the net retail price (excluding the excise tax and the value-added tax) is below Five pesos (P5.00) per pack, the tax shall be One peso (P1.00) per pack; Variants of existing brands of cigarettes which are introduced in the domestic market after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8240 shall be taxed under the highest classification of any variant of that brand. The excise tax from any brand of cigarettes within the next three (3) years from the effectivity of R.A. No. 8240 shall not be lower than the tax, which is due from each brand on October 1, 1996. Provided, however, That in cases where the excise tax rates imposed in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) hereinabove will result in an increase in excise tax of more than seventy percent (70%), for a brand of cigarette, the increase shall take effect in two tranches: fifty percent (50%) of the increase shall be effective in 1997 and one hundred percent (100%) of the increase shall be effective in 1998. Duly registered or existing brands of cigarettes or new brands thereof packed by machine shall only be packed in twenties. The rates of excise tax on cigars and cigarettes under paragraphs (1), (2) (3) and (4) hereof, shall be increased by twelve percent (12%) on January 1, 2000 . New brands shall be classified according to their current net retail price.

excise) is P5.00 to P6.50 per pack P1.00/pack P1.12/pack (4) Net Retail Price (excluding VAT and excise) is below P5.00 per pack) This table reflects Section 145 of the Tax Code insofar as it mandates a 12% increase effective on 1 January 2000 based on the taxes indicated under paragraph C, sub-paragraph (1)-(4). However, Revenue Regulation No. 17-99 went further and added that "[T]he new specific tax rate for any existing brand of cigars, cigarettes packed by machine, distilled spirits, wines and fermented liquor shall not be lower than the excise tax that is actually being paid prior to January 1, 2000 ."[13] Parenthetically, Section 145 states that during the transition period, i.e., within the next three (3) years from the effectivity of the Tax Code, the excise tax from any brand of cigarettes shall not be lower than the tax due from each brand on 1 October 1996. This qualification, however, is conspicuously absent as regards the 12% increase which is to be applied on cigars and cigarettes packed by machine, among others, effective on 1 January 2000. Clearly and unmistakably, Section 145 mandates a new rate of excise tax for cigarettes packed by machine due to the 12% increase effective on 1 January 2000 without regard to whether the revenue collection starting from this period may turn out to be lower than that collected prior to this date. By adding the qualification that the tax due after the 12% increase becomes effective shall not be lower than the tax actually paid prior to 1 January 2000, Revenue Regulation No. 17-99 effectively imposes a tax which is the higher amount between the ad valorem tax being paid at the end of the three (3)-year transition period and the specific tax under paragraph C, sub-paragraph (1)-(4), as increased by 12%--a situation not supported by the plain wording of Section 145 of the Tax Code. This is not the first time that national revenue officials had ventured in the area of unauthorized administrative legislation. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Reyes,[14] respondent was not informed in writing of the law and the facts on which the assessment of estate taxes was made pursuant to Section 228 of the 1997 Tax Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8424. She was merely notified of the findings by the Commissioner, who had simply relied upon the old provisions of the law and Revenue Regulation No. 1285 which was based on the old provision of the law. The Court held that in case of discrepancy between the law as amended and the implementing regulation based on the old law, the former necessarily prevails. The law must still be followed, even though the existing tax regulation at that time provided for a different procedure.[15] In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation ,[16] the tax authorities gave the term "tax credit" in Sections 2(i) and 4 of Revenue Regulation 2-94 a meaning utterly disparate from what R.A. No. 7432 provides. Their interpretation muddled up the intent of Congress to grant a mere discount privilege and not a sales discount. The Court, striking down the revenue regulation, held that an administrative agency issuing regulations may not enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law it administers, and it cannot engraft additional requirements not contemplated by the legislature. The Court emphasized that tax administrators are not allowed to expand or contract the legislative mandate and that the "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction should be applied such that where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law. [17] In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop, Inc.,[18] Commissioner Jose Ong issued Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 15-91, as well as the clarificatory Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) 43-91, imposing a 5% lending investor's tax under the 1977 Tax Code, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 273, on pawnshops. The Commissioner anchored the imposition

For the above purpose, `net retail price' shall mean the price at which the cigarette is sold on retail in twenty (20) major supermarkets in Metro Manila (for brands of cigarettes marketed nationally), excluding the amount intended to cover the applicable excise tax and value-added tax. For brands which are marketed only outside Metro Manila, the `net retail price' shall mean the price at which the cigarette is sold in five (5) major intended to cover the applicable excise tax and the value-added tax. The classification of each brand of cigarettes based on its average retail price as of October 1, 1996, as set forth in Annex "D," shall remain in force until revised by Congress. Variant of a brand' shall refer to a brand on which a modifier is prefixed and/or suffixed to the root name of the brand and/or a different brand which carries the same logo or design of the existing brand. [11] (Emphasis supplied) Revenue Regulation 17-99, which was issued pursuant to the unquestioned authority of the Secretary of Finance to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the Tax Code, [12] interprets the above-quoted provision and reflects the 12% increase in excise taxes in the following manner: SECTION DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLES PRESENT NEW SPECIFIC SPECIFIC TAX TAX RATE RATES PRIOR Effective Jan.. 1, TO JAN. 1, 2000 2000 145 (A) Cigars P1.00/cigar P1.12/cigar (B)Cigarettes packed by Machine (1) Net Retail Price (excluding VAT and P12.00/pack Excise) exceeds P10.00 per pack (2) Net Retail Price (excluding VAT and Excise) is P6.51 up to P10.00 per pack (3) Net Retail Price (excluding VAT and P8.00/pack P13.44/pack

P8.96/pack

P5.00/pack

P5.60/pack

on the definition of lending investors provided in the 1977 Tax Code which, according to him, was broad enough to include pawnshop operators. However, the Court noted that pawnshops and lending investors were subjected to different tax treatments under the Tax Code prior to its amendment by the executive order; that Congress never intended to treat pawnshops in the same way as lending investors; and that the particularly involved section of the Tax Code explicitly subjected lending investors and dealers in securities only to percentage tax. And so the Court affirmed the invalidity of the challenged circulars, stressing that "administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out."[19] In Philippine Bank of Communications v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, [20] the then acting Commissioner issued RMC 7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years for claims of excess quarterly income tax payments, thereby creating a clear inconsistency with the provision of Section 230 of the 1977 Tax Code. The Court nullified the circular, ruling that the BIR did not simply interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by Congress. The Court held: It bears repeating that Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered administrative rulings (in the sense of more specific and less general interpretations of tax laws) which are issued from time to time by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is widely accepted that the interpretation placed upon a statute by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation is not conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found to be erroneous. Thus, courts will not countenance administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement.[21] In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. CA, et al.,[22] the central issue was the validity of RMO 4-87 which had construed the amnesty coverage under E.O. No. 41 (1986) to include only assessments issued by the BIR after the promulgation of the executive order on 22 August 1986 and not assessments made to that date. Resolving the issue in the negative, the Court held: x x x all such issuances must not override, but must remain consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law.[23] x x x

simplify tax administration by classifying cigarettes, among others, into high, medium and low-priced based on their net retail price and accordingly graduating tax rates. At any rate, this advertence to the legislative record is merely gratuitous because, as we have held, the meaning of the law is clear on its face and free from the ambiguities that the Commissioner imputes. We simply cannot disregard the letter of the law on the pretext of pursuing its spirit. [26] Finally, the Commissioner's contention that a tax refund partakes the nature of a tax exemption does not apply to the tax refund to which Fortune Tobacco is entitled. There is parity between tax refund and tax exemption only when the former is based either on a tax exemption statute or a tax refund statute. Obviously, that is not the situation here. Quite the contrary, Fortune Tobaccos claim for refund is premised on its erroneous payment of the tax, or better still the government's exaction in the absence of a law. Tax exemption is a result of legislative grace. And he who claims an exemption from the burden of taxation must justify his claim by showing that the legislature intended to exempt him by words too plain to be mistaken.[27] The rule is that tax exemptions must be strictly construed such that the exemption will not be held to be conferred unless the terms under which it is granted clearly and distinctly show that such was the intention.[28] A claim for tax refund may be based on statutes granting tax exemption or tax refund. In such case, the rule of strict interpretation against the taxpayer is applicable as the claim for refund partakes of the nature of an exemption, a legislative grace, which cannot be allowed unless granted in the most explicit and categorical language. The taxpayer must show that the legislature intended to exempt him from the tax by words too plain to be mistaken.[29] Tax refunds (or tax credits), on the other hand, are not founded principally on legislative grace but on the legal principle which underlies all quasi-contracts abhorring a person's unjust enrichment at the expense of another.[30] The dynamic of erroneous payment of tax fits to a tee the prototypic quasi-contract, solutio indebiti, which covers not only mistake in fact but also mistake in law. [31] The Government is not exempt from the application of solutio indebiti.[32] Indeed, the taxpayer expects fair dealing from the Government, and the latter has the duty to refund without any unreasonable delay what it has erroneously collected.[33] If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, it must hold itself against the same standard in refunding excess (or erroneous) payments of such taxes. It should not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of taxpayers. [34] And so, given its essence, a claim for tax refund necessitates only preponderance of evidence for its approbation like in any other ordinary civil case. Under the Tax Code itself, apparently in recognition of the pervasive quasi-contract principle, a claim for tax refund may be based on the following: (a) erroneously or illegally assessed or collected internal revenue taxes; (b) penalties imposed without authority; and (c) any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected.[35] What is controlling in this case is the well-settled doctrine of strict interpretation in the imposition of taxes, not the similar doctrine as applied to tax exemptions. The rule in the interpretation of tax laws is that a statute will not be construed as imposing a tax unless it does so clearly, expressly, and unambiguously. A tax cannot be imposed without clear and express words for that purpose. Accordingly, the general rule of requiring adherence to the letter in construing statutes applies with peculiar strictness to tax laws and the provisions of a taxing act are not to be extended by implication. In answering the question of who is subject to tax statutes, it is basic that in case of doubt, such statutes are to be construed most strongly against the government and in favor of the subjects or citizens because burdens are not to be imposed nor presumed to be imposed beyond what statutes expressly and clearly import. [36] As burdens, taxes should not be unduly exacted nor assumed beyond the plain meaning of the tax laws. [37] WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 80675, dated 28 September 2004, and its Resolution, dated 1 March 2005, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

If, as the Commissioner argues, Executive Order No. 41 had not been intended to include 1981-1985 tax liabilities already assessed (administratively) prior to 22 August 1986, the law could have simply so provided in its exclusionary clauses. It did not. The conclusion is unavoidable, and it is that the executive order has been designed to be in the nature of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically excepted by it.[24] In the case at bar, the OSG's argument that by 1 January 2000, the excise tax on cigarettes should be the higher tax imposed under the specific tax system and the tax imposed under the ad valorem tax system plus the 12% increase imposed by paragraph 5, Section 145 of the Tax Code, is an unsuccessful attempt to justify what is clearly an impermissible incursion into the limits of administrative legislation. Such an interpretation is not supported by the clear language of the law and is obviously only meant to validate the OSG's thesis that Section 145 of the Tax Code is ambiguous and admits of several interpretations. The contention that the increase of 12% starting on 1 January 2000 does not apply to the brands of cigarettes listed under Annex "D" is likewise unmeritorious, absurd even. Paragraph 8, Section 145 of the Tax Code simply states that, "[T]he classification of each brand of cigarettes based on its average net retail price as of October 1, 1996, as set forth in Annex `D', shall remain in force until revised by Congress." This declaration certainly does not lend itself to the interpretation given to it by the OSG. As plainly worded, the average net retail prices of the listed brands under Annex "D," which classify cigarettes according to their net retail price into low, medium or high, obviously remain the bases for the application of the increase in excise tax rates effective on 1 January 2000. The foregoing leads us to conclude that Revenue Regulation No. 17-99 is indeed indefensibly flawed. The Commissioner cannot seek refuge in his claim that the purpose behind the passage of the Tax Code is to generate additional revenues for the government. Revenue generation has undoubtedly been a major consideration in the passage of the Tax Code. However, as borne by the legislative record, [25] the shift from the ad valorem system to the specific tax system is likewise meant to promote fair competition among the players in the industries concerned, to ensure an equitable distribution of the tax burden and to

On May 28, 2004, the DSWD approved and adopted the Implementing Rules and Regulations SO ORDERED. of R.A. No. 9257, Rule VI, Article 8 of which states:

CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP v DSWD This is a petition for Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003. Article 8. Tax Deduction of Establishments. The establishment may claim the discounts granted under Rule V, Section 4 Discounts for Establishments; Section 9, Medical and Dental Services in Private Facilities[,] and Sections 10 and 11 Air, Sea and Land Transportation as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered. Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted; Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended; Provided, finally, that the implementation of the tax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations to be issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and approved by the Department of Finance (DOF). On July 10, 2004, in reference to the query of the Drug Stores Association of the Philippines (DSAP) concerning the meaning of a tax deduction under the Expanded Senior Citizens Act, the DOF, through Director IV Ma. Lourdes B. Recente, clarified as follows: The antecedents are as follows: 1) The difference between the Tax Credit (under the Old Senior Citizens Act) and Tax Deduction (under the Expanded Senior Citizens Act). 1.1. The provision of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7432 (the old Senior Citizens Act) grants twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging establishment, restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of medicines anywhere in the country, the costs of which may be claimed by the private establishments concerned as tax credit. Effectively, a tax credit is a peso-for-peso deduction from a taxpayers tax liability due to the government of the amount of discounts such establishment has granted to a senior citizen. The establishment recovers the full amount of discount given to a senior citizen and hence, the government shoulders 100% of the discounts granted. It must be noted, however, that conceptually, a tax credit scheme under the Philippine tax system, necessitates that prior payments of taxes have been made and the taxpayer is attempting to recover this tax payment from his/her income tax due. The tax credit scheme under R.A. No. 7432 is, therefore, inapplicable since no tax payments have previously occurred. 1.2. The provision under R.A. No. 9257, on the other hand, provides that the establishment concerned may claim the discounts under Section 4(a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction from gross income, based on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered. Under this scheme, the establishment concerned is allowed to deduct from gross income, in computing for its tax liability, the amount

Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines.

Public respondents, on the other hand, include the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the Department of Health (DOH), the Department of Finance (DOF), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) which have been specifically tasked to monitor the drugstores compliance with the law; promulgate the implementing rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the law; and prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring drugstore establishments.

On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and it became effective on March 21, 2004. Section 4(a) of the Act states: SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: (a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens; ... The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.

of discounts granted to senior citizens. Effectively, the government loses in terms of foregone revenues an amount equivalent to the marginal tax rate the said establishment is liable to pay the government. This will be an amount equivalent to 32% of the twenty percent (20%) discounts so granted. The establishment shoulders the remaining portion of the granted discounts. It may be necessary to note that while the burden on [the] government is slightly diminished in terms of its percentage share on the discounts granted to senior citizens, the number of potential establishments that may claim tax deductions, have however, been broadened. Aside from the establishments that may claim tax credits under the old law, more establishments were added under the new law such as: establishments providing medical and dental services, diagnostic and laboratory services, including professional fees of attending doctors in all private hospitals and medical facilities, operators of domestic air and sea transport services, public railways and skyways and bus transport services. A simple illustration might help amplify the points discussed above, as follows: Tax Deduction Credit Tax

On November 12, 2004, the DOH issued Administrative Order No 177 amending A.O. No. 171. Under A.O. No. 177, the twenty percent discount shall not be limited to the purchase of unbranded generic medicines only, but shall extend to both prescription and non-prescription medicines whether branded or generic. Thus, it stated that [t]he grant of twenty percent (20%) discount shall be provided in the purchase of medicines from all establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act based on the following grounds:

1)

The law is confiscatory because it infringes Art. III, Sec. 9 of the Constitution which provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; It violates the equal protection clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) enshrined in our Constitution which states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied of the equal protection of the laws; and

2)

Gross Sales Less : Cost of goods sold Net Sales Less: Operating Expenses:

xxxxxx xxxxx xxxxx x

xxxxxx xxxxx xxxxxx 3) The 20% discount on medicines violates the constitutional guarantee in Article XIII, Section 11 that makes essential goods, health and other social services available to all people at affordable cost.

Tax Deduction on Discounts x x x x Other deductions: Net Taxable Income Tax Due Less: Tax Credit Net Tax Due xxxx xxxxx xxx ---

-xxxx xxxxx xxx ______x x xx

Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital because 1) drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount. Examining petitioners arguments, it is apparent that what petitioners are ultimately questioning is the validity of the tax deduction scheme as a reimbursement mechanism for the twenty percent (20%) discount that they extend to senior citizens.

As shown above, under a tax deduction scheme, the tax deduction on discounts was subtracted from Net Sales together with other deductions which are considered as operating expenses before the Tax Due was computed based on the Net Taxable Income. On the other hand, under a tax credit scheme, the amount of discounts which is the tax credit item, was deducted directly from the tax due amount. Meanwhile, on October 1, 2004, Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 171 or the Policies and Guidelines to Implement the Relevant Provisions of Republic Act 9257, otherwise known as the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003 was issued by the DOH, providing the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount in the purchase of unbranded generic medicines from all establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens.

Based on the afore-stated DOF Opinion, the tax deduction scheme does not fully reimburse petitioners for the discount privilege accorded to senior citizens. This is because the discount is treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense that is subtracted from the gross income and results in a lower taxable income. Stated otherwise, it is an amount that is allowed by law to reduce the income prior to the application of the tax rate to compute the amount of tax which is due. Being a tax deduction, the discount does not reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso basis but merely offers a fractional reduction in taxes owed.

underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women and children. Consonant with these constitutional principles the following are the declared policies of this Act: Theoretically, the treatment of the discount as a deduction reduces the net income of the private establishments concerned. The discounts given would have entered the coffers and formed part of the gross sales of the private establishments, were it not for R.A. No. 9257. ... (f) To recognize the important role of the private sector in the improvement of the welfare of senior citizens and to actively seek their partnership.

The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. To implement the above policy, the law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters, Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction. A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would not meet the definition of just compensation. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely Having said that, this raises the question of whether the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government program. veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. It is [t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as the State considers them an integral part of our society. For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as set forth in the law itself. Thus, the Act provides: Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is SEC. 2. Republic Act No. 7432 is hereby amended to read as follows: SECTION 1. Declaration of Policies and Objectives. Pursuant to Article XV, Section 4 of the Constitution, it is the duty of the family to take care of its elderly members while the State may design programs of social security for them. In addition to this, Section 10 in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies provides: The State shall provide social justice in all phases of national development. Further, Article XIII, Section 11, provides: The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor. must yield to general welfare. the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.

The Court believes so.

Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business, because petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and

come up with a financial report, so that they have not been able to show properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their disadvantage. Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution provides the precept for the protection of property, various laws and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of contracts and public utilities, continuously serve as a reminder that In treating the discount as a tax deduction, petitioners insist that they will incur losses because, referring to the DOF Opinion, for every P1.00 senior citizen discount that petitioners would give, P0.68 will be shouldered by them as only P0.32 will be refunded by the government by way of a tax deduction. Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens program rests largely on the support imparted by petitioners and the other private establishments concerned. This being the case, the means employed in To illustrate this point, petitioner Carlos Super Drug cited the anti-hypertensive maintenance drug Norvasc as an example. According to the latter, it acquires Norvasc from the distributors at P37.57 per tablet, and retails it at P39.60 (or at a margin of 5%). If it grants a 20% discount to senior citizens or an amount equivalent to P7.92, then it would have to sell Norvasc at P31.68 which translates to a loss from capital of P5.89 per tablet. Even if the government will allow a tax deduction, only P2.53 per tablet will be refunded and not the full amount of the discount which is P7.92. In short, only 32% of the 20% discount will be reimbursed to the drugstores. Petitioners computation is flawed. For purposes of reimbursement, the law states that the cost of the discount shall be deducted from gross income, the amount of income derived from all sources before deducting allowable expenses, which will result in net income. Here, petitioners tried to show a loss on a per transaction basis, which should not be the case. An income statement, showing an accounting of petitioners sales, expenses, and net profit (or loss) for a given period could have accurately reflected the effect of the discount on their income. Absent any financial statement, petitioners cannot substantiate their claim that they will be operating at a loss should they give the discount. In addition, the computation was erroneously based on the assumption that their customers consisted wholly of senior citizens. Lastly, the 32% tax rate is to be imposed on income, not on the amount of the discount. This case, of course, is ultimately not just about cement. For respondents, it is about love of country and the future of the domestic industry in the face of foreign competition. For this Court, it is about elementary statutory construction, constitutional limitations on the executive power to impose tariffs and similar measures, and obedience to the law. Just as much was asserted in the Decision, and the same holds true with this present Resolution. An extensive narration of facts can be found in the Decision.[2] As can well be recalled, the case centers on the interpretation of provisions of Republic Act No. 8800, the Safeguard Mea sures Act (SMA), which was one of the laws enacted by Congress soon after the Philippines ratified the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.[3] The SMA provides the structure and mechanics for the imposition of emergency measures, including tariffs, to protect domestic industries and producers from increased imports which inflict or could inflict serious injury on them.[4] A brief summary as to how the present petition came to be filed by Southern Cross. Philcemcor, an association of at least eighteen (18) domestic cement manufacturers filed with the DTI a petition seeking the imposition of safeguard measures on gray Portland cement,[5] in accordance with the SMA. After the DTI issued a provisional safeguard measure,[6] the application was referred to the Tariff Commission for a formal investigation pursuant to Section 9 of the SMA and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, in order to determine whether or not to impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland Cement is hardly an exciting subject for litigation. Still, the parties in this case have done their best to put up a spirited advocacy of their respective positions, throwing in everything including the proverbial kitchen sink. At present, the burden of passion, if not proof, has shifted to public respondents Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and private respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation (Philcemcor),[1] who now seek reconsideration of our Decision dated 8 July 2004 (Decision), which granted the petition of petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross). SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. CEMENT MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. invoking the active participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is reasonably and directly related. Without sufficient proof that Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the continued implementation of the same would be unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the Court will refrain from quashing a legislative act. the right to property can be relinquished upon the command of the State for the promotion of public good.

Furthermore, it is unfair for petitioners to criticize the law because they cannot raise the prices of their medicines given the cutthroat nature of the players in the industry. It is a business decision on the part of petitioners to peg the mark-up at 5%. Selling the medicines below acquisition cost, as alleged by petitioners, is merely a result of this decision. Inasmuch as pricing is a property right, petitioners cannot reproach the law for being oppressive, simply because they cannot afford to raise their prices for fear of losing their customers to competition.

The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical industry and the competitive pricing component of the business. While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.

cement. The Tariff Commission held public hearings and conducted its own investigation, then on 13 March 2002, issued its Formal Investigation Report (Report). The Report determined as follows: The elements of serious injury and imminent threat of serious injury not having been established, it is hereby recommended that no definitive general safeguard measure be imposed on the importation of gray Portland cement.[7] The DTI sought the opinion of the Secretary of Justice whether it could still impose a definitive safeguard measure notwithstanding the negative finding of the Tariff Commission. After the Secretary of Justice opined that the DTI could not do so under the SMA,[8] the DTI Secretary then promulgated a Decision[9] wherein he expressed the DTIs disagreement with the conclusions of the Tariff Commission, but at the same time, ultimately denying Philcemcors application for safeguard measures on the ground that the he was bound to do so in light of the Tariff Commissions negative findings.[10] Philcemcor challenged this Decision of the DTI Secretary by filing with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus[11] seeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as well as the Tariff Commissions Report. It prayed that the Court of Appeals direct the DTI Secretary to disregard the Report and to render judgment independently of the Report. Philcemcor argued that the DTI Secretary, vested as he is under the law with the power of review, is not bound to adopt the recommendations of the Tariff Commission; and, that the Report is void, as it is predicated on a flawed framework, inconsistent inferences and erroneous methodology.[12] The Court of Appeals Twelfth Division, in a Decision[13] penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Elvi John Asuncion,[14] partially granted Philcemcors petition. The appellate court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari since it alleged grave abuse of discretion. While it refused to annul the findings of the Tariff Commission,[15] it also held that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the factual findings of the Tariff Commission since such findings are merely recommendatory and they fall within the ambit of the Secretarys discretionary review. It determined that the legislative intent is to grant the DTI Secretary the power to make a final decision on the Tariff Commissions recommendation.[16] On 23 June 2003, Southern Cross filed the present petition, arguing that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over Philcemcors petition, as the proper remedy is a petition for review with the CTA conformably with the SMA, and; that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission on the existence or non-existence of conditions warranting the imposition of general safeguard measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary. Despite the fact that the Court of Appeals Decision had not yet become final, its binding force was cited by the DTI Secretary when he issued a new Decision on 25 June 2003, wherein he ruled that that in light of the appellate courts Decision, there was no longer any legal impediment to his deciding Philcemcors application for definitive safeguard measures.[17] He made a determination that, contrary to the findings of the Tariff Commission, the local cement industry had suffered serious injury as a result of the import surges.[18] Accordingly, he imposed a definitive safeguard measure on the importation of gray Portland cement, in the form of a definitive safeguard duty in the amount of P20.60/40 kg. bag for three years on imported gray Portland Cement.[19] On 7 July 2003, Southern Cross filed with the Court a Very Urgent Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or A Writ of Preliminary Injunction (TRO Application), seeking to enjoin the DTI Secretary from enforcing his Decision of 25 June 2003 in view of the pending petition before this Court. Philcemcor filed an opposition, claiming, among others, that it is not this Court but the CTA that has jurisdiction over the application under the law. On 1 August 2003, Southern Cross filed with the CTA a Petition for Review, assailing the DTI Secretarys 25 June 2003 Decision which imposed the definite safeguard measure. Yet Southern Cross did not

promptly inform this Court about this filing. The first time the Court would learn about this Petition with the CTA was when Southern Cross mentioned such fact in a pleading dated 11 August 2003 and filed the next day with this Court.[20] Philcemcor argued before this Court that Southern Cross had deliberately and willfully resorted to forumshopping; that the CTA, being a special court of limited jurisdiction, could only review the ruling of the DTI Secretary when a safeguard measure is imposed; and that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission are not binding on the DTI Secretary.[21] After giving due course to Southern Crosss Petition, the Court called the case for oral argument on 18 February 2004.[22] At the oral argument, attended by the counsel for Philcemcor and Southern Cross and the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court simplified the issues in this wise: (i) whether the Decision of the DTI Secretary is appealable to the CTA or the Court of Appeals; (ii) assuming that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, whether its Decision is in accordance with law; and, whether a Temporary Restraining Order is warranted.[23] After the parties had filed their respective memoranda, the Courts Second Division, to which the case had been assigned, promulgated its Decision granting Southern Crosss Petition.[24]The Decision was unanimous, without any separate or concurring opinion. The Court ruled that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over Philcemcors Petition, the proper remedy under Section 29 of the SMA being a petition for review with the CTA; and that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the negative determination of the Tariff Commission and could therefore impose the general safeguard measures, since Section 5 of the SMA precisely required that the Tariff Commission make a positive final determination before the DTI Secretary could impose these measures. Anent the argument that Southern Cross had committed forumshopping, the Court concluded that there was no evident malicious intent to subvert procedural rules so as to match the standard under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court of willful and deliberate forum shopping. Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 5 June 2003 was declared null and void. The Court likewise found it necessary to nullify the Decision of the DTI Secretary dated 25 June 2003, rendered after the filing of this present Petition. This Decision by the DTI Secretary had cited the obligatory force of the null and void Court of Appeals Decision, notwithstanding the fact that the decision of the appellate court was not yet final and executory. Considering that the decision of the Court of Appeals was a nullity to begin with, the inescapable conclusion was that the new decision of the DTI Secretary, prescinding as it did from the imprimatur of the decision of the Court of Appeals, was a nullity as well. After the Decision was reported in the media, there was a flurry of newspaper articles citing alleged negative reactions to the ruling by the counsel for Philcemcor, the DTI Secretary, and others.[25] Both respondents promptly filed their respective motions for reconsideration. On 21 September 2004, the Court En Banc resolved, upon motion of respondents, to accept the petition and resolve the Motions for Reconsideration.[26] The case was then reheard[27] on oral argument on 1 March 2005. During the hearing, the Court elicited from the parties their arguments on the two central issues as discussed in the assailed Decision, pertaining to the jurisdictional aspect and to the substantive aspect of whether the DTI Secretary may impose a general safeguard measure despite a negative determination by the Tariff Commission. The Court chose not to hear argumentation on the peripheral issue of forum-shopping,[28] although this question shall be tackled herein shortly. Another point of concern emerged during oral arguments on the exercise of quasi-judicial powers by the Tariff Commission, and the parties were required by the Court to discuss in their respective memoranda whether the Tariff Commission could validly exercise quasi-judicial powers in the exercise of its mandate under the SMA.

The Court has likewise been notified that subsequent to the rendition of the Courts Decision, Philcemcor filed a Petition for Extension of the Safeguard Measure with the DTI, which has been referred to the Tariff Commission.[29] In an Urgent Motion dated 21 December 2004, Southern Cross prayed that Philcemcor, the DTI, the Bureau of Customs, and the Tariff Commission be directed to cease and desist from taking any and all actions pursuant to or under the null and void CA Decision and DTI Decision, including proceedings to extend the safeguard measure.[30] In a Manifestation and Motion dated 23 June 2004, the Tariff Commission informed the Court that since no prohibitory injunction or order of such nature had been issued by any court against the Tariff Commission, the Commission proceeded to complete its investigation on the petition for extension, pursuant to Section 9 of the SMA, but opted to defer transmittal of its report to the DTI Secretary pending guidance from this Court on the propriety of such a step considering this pending Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution dated 5 July 2005, the Court directed the parties to maintain the status quo effective of even date, and until further orders from this Court. The denial of the pending motions for reconsideration will obviously render the pending petition for extension academic. I. Jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals Under Section 29 of the SMA The first core issue resolved in the assailed Decision was whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the special civil action for certiorari filed by Philcemcor assailing the 5 April 2002 Decision of the DTI Secretary. The general jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over special civil actions for certiorari is beyond doubt. The Constitution itself assures that judicial review avails to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. At the same time, the special civil action of certiorari is available only when there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[31] Philcemcors recourse of special civil action before the Court of Appeals to challenge the Decision of the DTI Secretary not to impose the general safeguard measures is not based on the SMA, but on the general rule on certiorari. Thus, the Court proceeded to inquire whether indeed there was no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that would warrant the allowance of Philcemcors special civil action. The answer hinged on the proper interpretation of Section 29 of the SMA, which reads: Section 29. Judicial Review. Any interested party who is adversely affected by the ruling of the Secretary in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure may file with the CTA, a petition for review of such ruling within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. Provided, however, that the filing of such petition for review shall not in any way stop, suspend or otherwise toll the imposition or collection of the appropriate tariff duties or the adoption of other appropriate safeguard measures, as the case may be. The petition for review shall comply with the same requirements and shall follow the same rules of procedure and shall be subject to the same disposition as in appeals in connection with adverse rulings on tax matters to the Court of Appeals.[32] (Emphasis supplied) The matter is crucial for if the CTA properly had jurisdiction over the petition challenging the DTI Secretarys ruling not to impose a safeguard measure, then the special civil action of certiorari resorted to instead by Philcemcor would not avail, owing to the existence of a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[33] The Court of Appeals, in asserting that it had jurisdiction, merely cited the general rule on certiorari jurisdiction without bothering to refer to, or possibly even study, the import of Section 29. In contrast, this Court duly considered the meaning and ramifications of Section 29, concluding that it provided for a plain, speedy and adequate remedy that Philcemcor could have resorted to instead of filing the special civil action before the Court of Appeals. Philcemcor still holds on to its hypothesis that the petition for review allowed under Section 29 lies only if the DTI Secretarys ruling imposes a safeguard measure. If, on the other hand, the DTI Secretarys ruling is not to impose a safeguard measure, judicial review under Section 29 could not be resorted to since the

provision refers to rulings in connection wi th the imposition of the safeguard measure, as opposed to the non-imposition. Since the Decision dated 5 April 2002 resolved against imposing a safeguard measure, Philcemcor claims that the proper remedial recourse is a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Interestingly, Republic Act No. 9282, promulgated on 30 March 2004, expressly vests unto the CTA jurisdiction over [d]ecisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in case of nonagricultural product, commodity or article . . . involving . . . safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said duties .[34] It is clear that any future attempts to advance the literalist position of the respondents would consequently fail. However, since Republic Act No. 9282 has no retroactive effect, this Court had to decide whether Section 29 vests jurisdiction on the CTA over rulings of the DTI Secretary not to impose a safeguard measure. And the Court, in its assailed Decision, ruled that the CTA is endowed with such jurisdiction. Both respondents reiterate their fundamentalist reading that Section 29 authorizes the petition for review before the CTA only when the DTI Secretary decides to impose a safeguard measure, but not when he decides not to. In doing so, they fail to address what the Court earlier pointed out would be the absurd consequences if their interpretation is followed to its logical end. But in affirming, as the Court now does, its previous holding that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for review questioning the non-imposition of safeguard measures by the DTI Secretary, the Court relies on the plain reading that Section 29 explicitly vests jurisdiction over such petitions on the CTA. Under Section 29, there are three requisites to enable the CTA to acquire jurisdiction over the petition for review contemplated therein: (i) there must be a ruling by the DTI Secretary; (ii) the petition must be filed by an interested party adversely affected by the ruling; and (iii) such ruling must be in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure. Obviously, there are differences between a ruling for the imposition of a safeguard measure, and one issued in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure. The first adverts to a singular type of ruling, namely one that imposes a safeguard measure. The second does not contemplate only one kind of ruling, bu t a myriad of rulings issued in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure. Respondents argue that the Court has given an expansive interpretation to Section 29, contrary to the established rule requiring strict construction against the existence of jurisdiction in specialized courts.[35] But it is the express provision of Section 29, and not this Court, that mandates CTA jurisdiction to be broad enough to encompass more than just a ruling imposing the safeguard measure . The key phrase remains in connection with. It has connotations that are obvious even to the layman. A ruling issued in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure would be one that bears some relation to the imposition of a safeguard measure. Obviously, a ruling imposing a safeguard measure is covered by the phrase in connection with, but such ruling is by no means exclusive. Rulings which modify, suspend or terminate a safeguard measure are necessarily in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure. So does a ruling allowing for a provisional safeguard measure. So too, a ruling by the DTI Secretary refusing to refer the application for a safeguard measure to the Tariff Commission. It is clear that there is an entire subset of rulings that the DTI Secretary may issue in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure, including those that are provisional, interlocutory, or dispositive in character.[36] By the same token, a ruling not to impose a safeguard measure is also issued in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure. In arriving at the proper interpretation of in connection with, the Court referred to the U.S. Supreme Court cases of Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.[37] and New York State Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Ins.[38] Both cases considered the interpretation of the phrase relates to as used in a federal statute, the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974. Respondents criticize the citations on the premise that the cases are not binding in our jurisdiction and do not involve safeguard measures. The criticisms are offtangent considering that our ruling did not call for the application of the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 in the Philippine milieu. The American cases are not relied upon as precedents, but as guides

of interpretation. Certainly, if there are applicable local precedents pertaining to the interpretation of the phrase in connection with, then these certainly would have some binding force. But none avail, and neither do the respondents demonstrate a countervailing holding in Philippine jurisprudence. Yet we should consider the claim that an expansive interpretation was favored in Shaw because the law in question was an employees benefit law that had to be given an interpretation favorable to its intended beneficiaries.[39] In the next breath, Philcemcor notes that the U.S. Supreme Court itself was alarmed by the expansive interpretation in Shaw and thus in Blue Cross, the Shaw ruling was reversed and a more restrictive interpretation was applied based on congressional intent.[40] Respondents would like to make it appear that the Court acted rashly in applying a discarded precedent in Shaw, a non-binding foreign precedent nonetheless. But the Court did make the following observation in its Decision pertaining to Blue Cross: Now, let us determine the maximum scope and reach of the phrase in connection with as used in Section 29 of the SMA. A literalist reading or linguistic survey may not satisfy. Even the U.S. Supreme Court in New York State Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Ins.[41] conceded that the phrases relate to or in connection with may be extended to the farthest stretch of indeterminacy for, universally, relations or connections are infinite and stop nowhere.[42] Thus, in the case the U.S. High Court, examining the same phrase of the same provision of law involved in Shaw, resorted to looking at the statute and its objectives as the alternative to an uncritical literalism. A similar inquiry into the other provisions of the SMA is in order to determine the scope of review accorded therein to the CTA .[43] In the next four paragraphs of the Decision, encompassing four pages, the Court proceeded to inquire into the SMA and its objectives as a means to determine the scope of rulings to be deemed as in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure. Certainly, this Court did not resort to the broadest interpretation possible of the phrase in connection with, but instead sought to bring it into the context o f the scope and objectives of the SMA. The ultimate conclusion of the Court was that the phrase includes all rulings of the DTI Secretary which arise from the time an application or motu proprio initiation for the imposition of a safeguard measure is taken.[44] This conclusion was derived from the observation that the imposition of a general safeguard measure is a process, initiated motu proprio or through application, which undergoes several stages upon which the DTI Secretary is obliged or may be called upon to issue a ruling. It should be emphasized again that by utilizing the phrase in connection with, it is the SMA that expressly vests jurisdiction on the CTA over petitions questioning the non-imposition by the DTI Secretary of safeguard measures. The Court is simply asserting, as it should, the clear intent of the legislature in enacting the SMA. Without in connection with or a synonymous phrase, the Court would be compelled to favor the respondents position that only rulings imposing safeguard measures may be elevated on appeal to the CTA. But considering that the statute does make use of the phrase, there is little sense in delving into alternate scenarios. Respondents fail to convincingly address the absurd consequences pointed out by the Decision had their proposed interpretation been adopted. Indeed, suffocated beneath the respondents legalistic tinsel is the elemental questionwhat sense is there in vesting jurisdiction on the CTA over a decision to impose a safeguard measure, but not on one choosing not to impose. Of course, it is not for the Court to inquire into the wisdom of legislative acts, hence the rule that jurisdiction must be expressly vested and not presumed. Yet ultimately, respondents muddle the issue by making it appear that the Decision has uniquely expanded the jurisdictional rules. For the respondents, the proper statutory interpretation of the crucial phrase in connection with is to pretend that the phrase did not exist at all in the statute. The Court, in taking the effort to examine the meaning and extent of the phrase, is merely giving breath to the legislative will. The Court likewise stated that the respondents position calls for split jurisdiction, which is judicially abhorred. In rebuttal, the public respondents cite Sections 2313 and 2402 of the Tariff and Customs Code

(TCC), which allegedly provide for a splitting of jurisdiction of the CTA. According to public respondents, under Section 2313 of the TCC, a decision of the Commissioner of Customs affirming a decision of the Collector of Customs adverse to the government is elevated for review to the Secretary of Finance. However, under Section 2402 of the TCC, a ruling of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs against a taxpayer must be appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals, and not to the Secretary of Finance. Strictly speaking, the review by the Secretary of Finance of the decision of the Commissioner of Customs is not judicial review, since the Secretary of Finance holds an executive and not a judicial office. The contrast is apparent with the situation in this case, wherein the interpretation favored by the respondents calls for the exercise of judicial review by two different courts over essentially the same questionwhether the DTI Secretary should impose general safeguard measures. Moreover, as petitioner points out, the executive department cannot appeal against itself. The Collector of Customs, the Commissioner of Customs and the Secretary of Finance are all part of the executive branch. If the Collector of Customs rules against the government, the executive cannot very well bring suit in courts against itself. On the other hand, if a private person is aggrieved by the decision of the Collector of Customs, he can have proper recourse before the courts, which now would be called upon to exercise judicial review over the action of the executive branch. More fundamentally, the situation involving split review of the decision of the Collector of Customs under the TCC is not apropos to the case at bar. The TCC in that instance is quite explicit on the divergent reviewing body or official depending on which party prevailed at the Collector of Customs level. On the other hand, there is no such explicit expression of bifurcated appeals in Section 29 of the SMA. Public respondents likewise cite Fabian v. Ombudsman[45] as another instance wherein the Court purportedly allowed split jurisdiction. It is argued that the Court, in ruling that it was the Court of Appeals which possessed appellate authority to review decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases while the Court retaining appellate jurisdiction of decisions of the Ombudsman in non-administrative cases, effectively sanctioned split jurisdiction between the Court and the Court of Appeals.[46] Nonetheless, this argument is successfully undercut by Southern Cross, which points out the essential differences in the power exercised by the Ombudsman in administrative cases and non-administrative cases relating to criminal complaints. In the former, the Ombudsman may impose an administrative penalty, while in acting upon a criminal complaint what the Ombudsman undertakes is a preliminary investigation. Clearly, the capacity in which the Ombudsman takes on in deciding an administrative complaint is wholly different from that in conducting a preliminary investigation. In contrast, in ruling upon a safeguard measure, the DTI Secretary acts in one and the same role. The variance between an order granting or denying an application for a safeguard measure is polar though emanating from the same equator, and does not arise from the distinct character of the putative actions involved. Philcemcor imputes intelligent design behind the alleged intent of Congress to limit CTA review only to impositions of the general safeguard measures. It claims that there is a necessary tax implication in case of an imposition of a tariff where the CTAs expertise is necessary, but there is no such tax implication, hence no need for the assumption of jurisdiction by a specialized agency, when the ruling rejects the imposition of a safeguard measure. But of course, whether the ruling under review calls for the imposition or non-imposition of the safeguard measure, the common question for resolution still is whether or not the tariff should be imposed an issue definitely fraught with a tax dimension. The determination of the question will call upon the same kind of expertise that a specialized body as the CTA presumably possesses. In response to the Courts observation that the setup proposed by respondents was novel, unusual, cumbersome and unwise, public respondents invoke the maxim that courts should not be concerned with the wisdom and efficacy of legislation.[47] But this prescinds from the bogus claim that the CTA may not exercise judicial review over a decision not to impose a safeguard measure, a prohibition that finds no statutory support. It is likewise settled in statutory construction that an interpretation that would cause

inconvenience and absurdity is not favored. Respondents do not address the particular illogic that the Court pointed out would ensue if their position on judicial review were adopted. According to the respondents, while a ruling by the DTI Secretary imposing a safeguard measure may be elevated on review to the CTA and assailed on the ground of errors in fact and in law, a ruling denying the imposition of safeguard measures may be assailed only on the ground that the DTI Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion. As stressed in the Decision, [c]ertiorari is a remedy narrow in its scope and inflexible in its character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop.[48] It is incorrect to say that the Decision bars any effective remedy should the Tariff Commission act or conclude erroneously in making its determination whether the factual conditions exist which necessitate the imposition of the general safeguard measure. If the Tariff Commission makes a negative final determination, the DTI Secretary, bound as he is by this negative determination, has to render a decision denying the application for safeguard measures citing the Tariff Commissions findings as basis. Necessarily then, such negative determination of the Tariff Commission being an integral part of the DTI Secretarys ruling would be open for review before the CTA, which agai n is especially qualified by reason of its expertise to examine the findings of the Tariff Commission. Moreover, considering that the Tariff Commission is an instrumentality of the government, its actions (as opposed to those undertaken by the DTI Secretary under the SMA) are not beyond the pale of certiorari jurisdiction. Unfortunately for Philcemcor, it hinged its cause on the claim that the DTI Secretarys actions may be annulled on certiorari, notwithstanding the explicit grant of judicial review over that cabinet members actions under the SMA to the CTA. Finally on this point, Philcemcor argues that assuming this Courts interpretation of Section 29 is correct, such ruling should not be given retroactive effect, otherwise, a gross violation of the right to due process would be had. This erroneously presumes that it was this Court, and not Congress, which vested jurisdiction on the CTA over rulings of non-imposition rendered by the DTI Secretary. We have repeatedly stressed that Section 29 expressly confers CTA jurisdiction over rulings in connection with the imposition of the safeguard measure, and the reassertion of this point in the Decision was a matter of emphasis, not of contrivance. The due process protection does not shield those who remain purposely blind to the express rules that ensure the sporting play of procedural law. Besides, respondents claim would also apply every time this Court is compelled to settle a novel question of law, or to reverse precedent. In such cases, there would always be litigants whose causes of action might be vitiated by the application of newly formulated judicial doctrines. Adopting their claim would unwisely force this Court to treat its dispositions in unprecedented, sometimes landmark decisions not as resolutions to the live cases or controversies, but as legal doctrine applicable only to future litigations. II. Positive Final Determination By the Tariff Commission an Indispensable Requisite to the Imposition of General Safeguard Measures The second core ruling in the Decision was that contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals, the DTI Secretary was barred from imposing a general safeguard measure absent a positive final determination rendered by the Tariff Commission. The fundamental premise rooted in this ruling is based on the acknowledgment that the required positive final determination of the Tariff Commission exists as a properly enacted constitutional limitation imposed on the delegation of the legislative power to impose tariffs and imposts to the President under Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Congressional Limitations Pursuant To Constitutional Authority on the Delegated Power to Impose Safeguard Measures

The safeguard measures imposable under the SMA generally involve duties on imported products, tariff rate quotas, or quantitative restrictions on the importation of a product into the country. Concerning as they do the foreign importation of products into the Philippines, these safeguard measures fall within the ambit of Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which states: The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.[49] The Court acknowledges the basic postulates ingrained in the provision, and, hence, governing in this case. They are: (1) It is Congress which authorizes the President to impose tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts . Thus, the authority cannot come from the Finance Department, the National Economic Development Authority, or the World Trade Organization, no matter how insistent or persistent these bodies may be. (2) The authorization granted to the President must be embodied in a law . Hence, the justification cannot be supplied simply by inherent executive powers. It cannot arise from administrative or executive orders promulgated by the executive branch or from the wisdom or whim of the President. (3) The authorization to the President can be exercised only within the specified limits set in the law and is further subject to limitations and restrictions which Congress may impose. Consequently, if Congress specifies that the tariff rates should not exceed a given amount, the President cannot impose a tariff rate that exceeds such amount. If Congress stipulates that no duties may be imposed on the importation of corn, the President cannot impose duties on corn, no matter how actively the local corn producers lobby the President. Even the most picayune of limits or restrictions imposed by Congress must be observed by the President. There is one fundamental principle that animates these constitutional postulates. These impositions under Section 28(2), Article VI fall within the realm of the power of taxation, a power which is within the sole province of the legislature under the Constitution. Without Section 28(2), Article VI, the executive branch has no authority to impose tariffs and other similar tax levies involving the importation of foreign goods. Assuming that Section 28(2) Article VI did not exist, the enactment of the SMA by Congress would be voided on the ground that it would constitute an undue delegation of the legislative power to tax. The constitutional provision shields such delegation from constitutional infirmity, and should be recognized as an exceptional grant of legislative power to the President, rather than the affirmation of an inherent executive power. This being the case, the qualifiers mandated by the Constitution on this presidential authority attain primordial consideration. First, there must be a law, such as the SMA. Second, there must be specified limits, a detail which would be filled in by the law. And further, Congress is further empowered to impose limitations and restrictions on this presidential authority. On this last power, the provision does not provide for specified conditions, such as that the limitations and restrictions must conform to prior statutes, internationally accepted practices, accepted jurisprudence, or the considered opinion of members of the executive branch. The Court recognizes that the authority delegated to the President under Section 28(2), Article VI may be exercised, in accordance with legislative sanction, by the alter egos of the President, such as department secretaries. Indeed, for purposes of the Presidents exercise of power to impose tariffs under Article VI, Section 28(2), it is generally the Secretary of Finance who acts as alter ego of the President. The SMA provides an exceptional instance wherein it is the DTI or Agriculture Secretary who is tasked by Congress,

in their capacities as alter egos of the President, to impose such measures. Certainly, the DTI Secretary has no inherent power, even as alter ego of the President, to levy tariffs and imports. Concurrently, the tasking of the Tariff Commission under the SMA should be likewise construed within the same context as part and parcel of the legislative delegation of its inherent power to impose tariffs and imposts to the executive branch, subject to limitations and restrictions. In that regard, both the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary may be regarded as agents of Congress within their limited respective spheres, as ordained in the SMA, in the implementation of the said law which significantly draws its strength from the plenary legislative power of taxation. Indeed, even the President may be considered as an agent of Congress for the purpose of imposing safeguard measures. It is Congress, not the President, which possesses inherent powers to impose tariffs and imposts. Without legislative authorization through statute, the President has no power, authority or right to impose such safeguard measures because taxation is inherently legislative, not executive . When Congress tasks the President or his/her alter egos to impose safeguard measures under the delineated conditions, the President or the alter egos may be properly deemed as agents of Congress to perform an act that inherently belongs as a matter of right to the legislature. It is basic agency law that the agent may not act beyond the specifically delegated powers or disregard the restrictions imposed by the principal. In short, Congress may establish the procedural framework under which such safeguard measures may be imposed, and assign the various offices in the government bureaucracy respective tasks pursuant to the imposition of such measures, the task assignment including the factual determination of whether the necessary conditions exists to warrant such impositions. Under the SMA, Congress assigned the DTI Secretary and the Tariff Commission their respective functions[50] in the legislatures scheme of things. There is only one viable ground for challenging the legality of the limitations and restrictions imposed by Congress under Section 28(2) Article VI, and that is such limitations and restrictions are themselves violative of the Constitution. Thus, no matter how distasteful or noxious these limitations and restrictions may seem, the Court has no choice but to uphold their validity unless their constitutional infirmity can be demonstrated. What are these limitations and restrictions that are material to the present case? The entire SMA provides for a limited framework under which the President, through the DTI and Agriculture Secretaries, may impose safeguard measures in the form of tariffs and similar imposts. The limitation most relevant to this case is contained in Section 5 of the SMA, captioned Conditions for the Application of General Safeguard Measures, and stating: The Secretary shall apply a general safeguard measure upon a positive final determination of the [Tariff] Commission that a product is being imported into the country in increased quantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic production, as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry; however, in the case of non-agricultural products, the Secretary shall first establish that the application of such safeguard measures will be in the public interest.[51] Positive Final Determination By Tariff Commission Plainly Required by Section 5 of SMA There is no question that Section 5 of the SMA operates as a limitation validly imposed by Congress on the presidential[52] authority under the SMA to impose tariffs and imposts. That the positive final determination operates as an indispensable requisite to the imposition of the safeguard measure, and that it is the Tariff Commission which makes such determination, are legal propositions plainly expressed in Section 5 for the easy comprehension for everyone but respondents.

Philcemcor attributes this Courts conclusion on the indispensability of the positive final determination to flawed syllogism in that we read the propositi on if A then B as if it stated if A, and only A, then B.[53] Translated in practical terms, our conclusion, according to Philcemcor, would have only been justified had Section 5 read shall apply a general safeguard measure upon, and only upon, a positive final determination of the Tariff Commission. Statutes are not designed for the easy comprehension of the five-year old child. Certainly, general propositions laid down in statutes need not be expressly qualified by clauses denoting exclusivity in order that they gain efficacy. Indeed, applying this argument, the President would, under the Constitution, be authorized to declare martial law despite the absence of the invasion, rebellion or public safety requirement just because the first paragraph of Section 18, Article VII fails to state the magic word only.[54] But let us for the nonce pursue Philcemcors logic further. It claims that since Section 5 does not allegedly limit the circumstances upon which the DTI Secretary may impose general safeguard measures, it is a worthy pursuit to determine whether the entire context of the SMA, as discerned by all the other familiar indicators of legislative intent supplied by norms of statutory interpretation, would justify safeguard measures absent a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission. The first line of attack employed is on Section 5 itself, it allegedly not being as clear as it sounds. It is advanced that Section 5 does not relate to the legal ability of either the Tariff Commission or the DTI Secretary to bind or foreclose review and reversal by one or the other. Such relationship should instead be governed by domestic administrative law and remedial law. Philcemcor thus would like to cast the proposition in this manner: Does it run contrary to our legal order to assert, as the Court did in its Decision, that a body of relative junior competence as the Tariff Commission can bind an administrative superior and cabinet officer, the DTI Secretary? It is easy to see why Philcemcor would like to divorce this DTI Secretary-Tariff Commission interaction from the confines of the SMA. Shorn of context, the notion would seem radical and unjustifiable that the lowly Tariff Commission can bind the hands and feet of the DTI Secretary. It can be surmised at once that respondents preferred interpretation is based not on the express language of the SMA, but from implications derived in a roundabout manner. Certainly, no provision in the SMA expressly authorizes the DTI Secretary to impose a general safeguard measure despite the absence of a positive final recommendation of the Tariff Commission. On the other hand, Section 5 expressly states that the DTI Secretary shall apply a general safeguard measure upon a positive final determination of the [Tariff] Commission. The causal connection in Section 5 between the impositio n by the DTI Secretary of the general safeguard measure and the positive final determination of the Tariff Commission is patent, and even respondents do not dispute such connection. As stated earlier, the Court in its Decision found Section 5 to be clear, plain and free from ambiguity so as to render unnecessary resort to the congressional records to ascertain legislative intent. Yet respondents, on the dubitable premise that Section 5 is not as express as it seems, again latch on to the record of legislative deliberations in asserting that there was no legislative intent to bar the DTI Secretary from imposing the general safeguard measure anyway despite the absence of a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission. Let us take the bait for a moment, and examine respondents commonly cited portion of the legislative record. One would presume, given the intense advocacy for the efficacy of these citations, that they contain a smoking gun express declarations from the legislators that the DTI Secr etary may impose a general safeguard measure even if the Tariff Commission refuses to render a positive final determination. Such smoking gun, if it exists, would characterize our Decision as disingenuous for ignoring such contrary expression of intent from the legislators who enacted the SMA. But as with many things, the anticipation is more dramatic than the truth.

The excerpts cited by respondents are derived from the interpellation of the late Congressman Marcial Punzalan Jr., by then (and still is) Congressman Simeon Datumanong.[55] Nowhere in these records is the view expressed that the DTI Secretary may impose the general safeguard measures if the Tariff Commission issues a negative final determination or otherwise is unable to make a positive final determination. Instead, respondents hitch on the observations of Congressman Punzalan Jr., that the results of the [Tariff] Commissions findings . . . is subsequently submitted to [the DTI Secretary] for the [DTI Secretary] to impose or not to impose; and that the [DTI Secretary] here iswho would make the final decision on the recommendation that is made by a more technical body [such as the Tariff Commission].[56] There is nothing in the remarks of Congressman Punzalan which contradict our Decision. His observations fall in accord with the respective roles of the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary under the SMA. Under the SMA, it is the Tariff Commission that conducts an investigation as to whether the conditions exist to warrant the imposition of the safeguard measures. These conditions are enumerated in Section 5, namely; that a product is being imported into the country in increased quantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic production, as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry. After the investigation of the Tariff Commission, it submits a report to the DTI Secretary which states, among others, whether the above-stated conditions for the imposition of the general safeguard measures exist. Upon a positive final determination that these conditions are present, the Tariff Commission then is mandated to recommend what appropriate safeguard measures should be undertaken by the DTI Secretary. Section 13 of the SMA gives five (5) specific options on the type of safeguard measures the Tariff Commission recommends to the DTI Secretary. At the same time, nothing in the SMA obliges the DTI Secretary to adopt the recommendations made by the Tariff Commission. In fact, the SMA requires that the DTI Secretary establish that the application of such safeguard measures is in the public interest, notwithstanding the Tariff Commissions recommendation on the appropriate safeguard measure upon its positive final determination. Thus, even if the Tariff Commission makes a positive final determination, the DTI Secretary may opt not to impose a general safeguard measure, or choose a different type of safeguard measure other than that recommended by the Tariff Commission. Congressman Punzalan was cited as saying that the DTI Secretary makes the decision to impose or no t to impose, which is correct since the DTI Secretary may choose not to impose a safeguard measure in spite of a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission. Congressman Punzalan also correctly stated that it is the DTI Secretary who makes the final decision on the recommendation that is made [by the Tariff Commission], since the DTI Secretary may choose to impose a general safeguard measure different from that recommended by the Tariff Commission or not to impose a safeguard measure at all. Nowhere in these cited deliberations was Congressman Punzalan, or any other member of Congress for that matter, quoted as saying that the DTI Secretary may ignore a negative determination by the Tariff Commission as to the existence of the conditions warranting the imposition of general safeguard measures, and thereafter proceed to impose these measures nonetheless. It is too late in the day to ascertain from the late Congressman Punzalan himself whether he had made these remarks in order to assure the other legislators that the DTI Secretary may impose the general safeguard measures notwithstanding a negative determination by the Tariff Commission. But certainly, the language of Section 5 is more resolutory to that question than the recorded remarks of Congressman Punzalan. Respondents employed considerable effort to becloud Section 5 with undeserved ambiguity in order that a proper resort to the legislative deliberations may be had. Yet assuming that Section 5 deserves to be clarified through an inquiry into the legislative record, the excerpts cited by the respondents are far more ambiguous than the language of the assailed provision regarding the key question of whether the DTI Secretary may impose safeguard measures in the face of a negative determination by the Tariff Commission. Moreover, even Southern Cross counters with its own excerpts of the legislative record in support of their own view.[57] It will not be difficult, especially as to heavily-debated legislation, for two sides with contrapuntal interpretations of a statute to highlight their respective citations from the legislative debate in support of

their particular views.[58] A futile exercise of second-guessing is happily avoided if the meaning of the statute is clear on its face. It is evident from the text of Section 5 that there must be a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission that a product is being imported into the country in increased quantities (whether absolute or relative to domestic production), as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat to the domestic industry . Any disputation to the contrary is, at best, the product of wishful thinking. For the same reason that Section 5 is explicit as regards the essentiality of a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission, there is no need to refer to the Implementing Rules of the SMA to ascertain a contrary intent. If there is indeed a provision in the Implementing Rules that allows the DTI Secretary to impose a general safeguard measure even without the positive final determination by the Tariff Commission, said rule is void as it cannot supplant the express language of the legislature. Respondents essentially rehash their previous arguments on this point, and there is no reason to consider them anew. The Decision made it clear that nothing in Rule 13.2 of the Implementing Rules, even though captioned Final Determination by the Secretary, authorizes the DTI Secretary to impose a general safeguard measure in the absence of a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission.[59] Similarly, the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Conduct of Investigation by the Tariff Commission Pursuant to Republic Act No. 8800 now cited by the respondent does not contain any provision that the DTI Secretary may impose the general safeguard measures in the absence of a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission. Section 13 of the SMA further bolsters the interpretation as argued by Southern Cross and upheld by the Decision. The first paragraph thereof states that [u]pon its positive determination, the [Tariff] Commission shall recommend to the Secretary an appropriate definitive measure, clearly referring to the Tariff Commission as the entity that makes the positive determination. On the other hand, the penultimate paragraph of the same provision states that [i]n the event of a negative final determination, the DTI Secretary is to immediately issue through the Secretary of Finance, a written instruction to the Commissioner of Customs authorizing the return of the cash bonds previously collected as a provisional safeguard measure. Since the first paragraph of the same provision states that it is the Tariff Commission which makes the positive determination, it necessarily follows that it, and not the DTI Secretary, makes the negative final determination as referred to in the penultimate paragraph of Section 13.[60] The Separate Opinion considers as highly persuasive of former Tariff Commission Chairman Abon, who stated that the Commissions findings are merely recommendatory. [61] Again, the considered opinion of Chairman Abon is of no operative effect if the statute plainly states otherwise, and Section 5 bluntly does require a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission before the DTI Secretary may impose a general safeguard measure.[62]Certainly, the Court cannot give controlling effect to the statements of any public officer in serious denial of his duties if the law otherwise imposes the duty on the public office or officer. Nonetheless, if we are to render persuasive effect on the considered opinion of the members of the Executive Branch, it bears noting that the Secretary of the Department of Justice rendered an Opinion wherein he concluded that the DTI Secretary could not impose a general safeguard measure if the Tariff Commission made a negative final determination.[63] Unlike Chairman Abons impromptu remarks made during a hearing, the DOJ Opinion was rendered only after a thorough study of the question after referral to it by the DTI. The DOJ Secretary is the alter ego of the President with a stated mandate as the head of the principal law agency of the government.[64] As the DOJ Secretary has no denominated role in the SMA, he was able to render his Opinion from the vantage of judicious distance. Should not his Opinion, studied and direct to the point as it is, carry greater weight than the spontaneous remarks of the Tariff Commissions Chairman which do not even expressly disavow the binding power of the Commissions positive final determination? III. DTI Secretary has No Power of Review Over Final Determination of the Tariff Commission

We should reemphasize that it is only because of the SMA, a legislative enactment, that the executive branch has the power to impose safeguard measures. At the same time, by constitutional fiat, the exercise of such power is subjected to the limitations and restrictions similarly enforced by the SMA. In examining the relationship of the DTI and the Tariff Commission as established in the SMA, it is essential to acknowledge and consider these predicates. It is necessary to clarify the paradigm established by the SMA and affirmed by the Constitution under which the Tariff Commission and the DTI operate, especially in light of the suggestions that the Courts rulings on the functions of quasi-judicial power find application in this case. Perhaps the reflexive application of the quasi-judicial doctrine in this case, rooted as it is in jurisprudence, might allow for some convenience in ruling, yet doing so ultimately betrays ignorance of the fundamental power of Congress to reorganize the administrative structure of governance in ways it sees fit. The Separate Opinion operates from wholly different premises which are incomplete. Its main stance, similar to that of respondents, is that the DTI Secretary, acting as alter ego of the President, may modify and alter the findings of the Tariff Commission, including the latters negative final determination by substituting it with his own negative final determination to pave the way for his imposition of a safeguard measure.[65] Fatally, this conclusion is arrived at without considering the fundamental constitutional precept under Section 28(2), Article VI, on the ability of Congress to impose restrictions and limitations in its delegation to the President to impose tariffs and imposts, as well as the express condition of Section 5 of the SMA requiring a positive final determination of the Tariff Commission. Absent Section 5 of the SMA, the President has no inherent, constitutional, or statutory power to impose a general safeguard measure. Tellingly, the Separate Opinion does not directly confront the inevitable question as to how the DTI Secretary may get away with imposing a general safeguard measure absent a positive final determination from the Tariff Commission without violating Section 5 of the SMA, which along with Section 13 of the same law, stands as the only direct legal authority for the DTI Secretary to impose such measures. This is a constitutionally guaranteed limitation of the highest order, considering that the presidential authority exercised under the SMA is inherently legislative. Nonetheless, the Separate Opinion brings to fore the issue of whether the DTI Secretary, acting either as alter ego of the President or in his capacity as head of an executive department, may review, modify or otherwise alter the final determination of the Tariff Commission under the SMA. The succeeding discussion shall focus on that question. Preliminarily, we should note that none of the parties question the designation of the DTI or Agriculture secretaries under the SMA as the imposing authorities of the safeguard measures, even though Section 28(2) Article VI states that it is the President to whom the power to impose tariffs and imposts may be delegated by Congress. The validity of such designation under the SMA should not be in doubt. We recognize that the authorization made by Congress in the SMA to the DTI and Agriculture Secretaries was made in contemplation of their capacities as alter egos of the President. Indeed, in Marc Donnelly & Associates v. Agregado[66] the Court upheld the validity of a Cabinet resolution fixing the schedule of royalty rates on metal exports and providing for their collection even though Congress, under Commonwealth Act No. 728, had specifically empowered the President and not any other official of the executive branch, to regulate and curtail the export of metals. In so ruling, the Court held that the members of the Cabinet were acting as alter egos of the President.[67] In this case, Congress itself authorized the DTI Secretary as alter ego of the President to impose the safeguard measures. If the Court was previously willing to uphold the alter egos tariff authority despite the absence of explicit legislative grant of such authority on the alter ego, all the more reason now when Congress itself expressly authorized the alter ego to exercise these powers to impose safeguard measures. Notwithstanding, Congress in enacting the SMA and prescribing the roles to be played therein by the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary did not envision that the President, or his/her alter ego, could exercise supervisory powers over the Tariff Commission. If truly Congress intended to allow the

traditional alter ego principle to come to fore in the peculiar setup established by the SMA, it would have assigned the role now played by the DTI Secretary under the law instead to the NEDA. The Tariff Commission is an attached agency of the National Economic Development Authority,[68] which in turn is the independent planning agency of the government.[69] The Tariff Commission does not fall under the administrative supervision of the DTI.[70] On the other hand, the administrative relationship between the NEDA and the Tariff Commission is established not only by the Administrative Code, but similarly affirmed by the Tariff and Customs Code. Justice Florentino Feliciano, in his ponencia in Garcia v. Executive Secretary[71], acknowledged the interplay between the NEDA and the Tariff Commission under the Tariff and Customs Code when he cited the relevant provisions of that law evidencing such setup. Indeed, under Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code, the rates of duty fixed therein are subject to periodic investigation by the Tariff Commission and may be revised by the President upon recommendation of the NEDA.[72] Moreover, under Section 401 of the same law, it is upon periodic investigations by the Tariff Commission and recommendation of the NEDA that the President may cause a gradual reduction of protection levels granted under the law.[73] At the same time, under the Tariff and Customs Code, no similar role or influence is allocated to the DTI in the matter of imposing tariff duties. In fact, the long-standing tradition has been for the Tariff Commission and the DTI to proceed independently in the exercise of their respective functions. Only very recently have our statutes directed any significant interplay between the Tariff Commission and the DTI, with the enactment in 1999 of Republic Act No. 8751 on the imposition of countervailing duties and Republic Act No. 8752 on the imposition of anti-dumping duties, and of course the promulgation a year later of the SMA. In all these three laws, the Tariff Commission is tasked, upon referral of the matter by the DTI, to determine whether the factual conditions exist to warrant the imposition by the DTI of a countervailing duty, an anti-dumping duty, or a general safeguard measure, respectively. In all three laws, the determination by the Tariff Commission that these required factual conditions exist is necessary before the DTI Secretary may impose the corresponding duty or safeguard measure. And in all three laws, there is no express provision authorizing the DTI Secretary to reverse the factual determination of the Tariff Commission.[74] In fact, the SMA indubitably establishes that the Tariff Commission is no mere flunky of the DTI Secretary when it mandates that the positive final recommendation of the former be indispensable to the latters imposition of a general safeguard measure. What the law indicates instead is a relationship of interdependence between two bodies independent of each other under the Administrative Code and the SMA alike. Indeed, even the ability of the DTI Secretary to disregard the Tariff Com missions recommendations as to the particular safeguard measures to be imposed evinces the independence from each other of these two bodies. This is properly so for two reasons the DTI and the Tariff Commission are independent of each other under the Administrative Code; and impropriety is avoided in cases wherein the DTI itself is the one seeking the imposition of the general safeguard measures, pursuant to Section 6 of the SMA. Thus, in ascertaining the appropriate legal milieu governing the relationship between the DTI and the Tariff Commission, it is imperative to apply foremost, if not exclusively, the provisions of the SMA. The argument that the usual rules on administrative control and supervision apply between the Tariff Commission and the DTI as regards safeguard measures is severely undercut by the plain fact that there is no long-standing tradition of administrative interplay between these two entities. Within the administrative apparatus, the Tariff Commission appears to be a lower rank relative to the DTI. But does this necessarily mean that the DTI has the intrinsic right, absent statutory authority, to reverse the findings of the Tariff Commission? To insist that it does, one would have to concede for instance that, applying the same doctrinal guide, the Secretary of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) has the right to reverse the rulings of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) or the issuances of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA). As with the Tariff Commission-DTI, there is no statutory authority granting the

DOST Secretary the right to overrule the CAB or the PCA, such right presumably arising only from the position of subordinacy of these bodies to the DOST. To insist on such a right would be to invite department secretaries to interfere in the exercise of functions by administrative agencies, even in areas wherein such secretaries are bereft of specialized competencies. The Separate Opinion notes that notwithstanding above, the Secretary of Department of Transportation and Communication may review the findings of the CAB, the Agriculture Secretary may review those of the PCA, and that the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources may pass upon decisions of the Mines and Geosciences Board.[75] These three officers may be alter egos of the President, yet their authority to review is limited to those agencies or bureaus which are, pursuant to statutes such as the Administrative Code of 1987, under the administrative control and supervision of their respective departments. Thus, under the express provision of the Administrative Code expressly provides that the CAB is an attached agency of the DOTC[76], and that the PCA is an attached agency of the Department of Agriculture.[77] The same law establishes the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau as one of the Sectoral Staff Bureaus[78] that forms part of the organizational structure of the DENR.[79] As repeatedly stated, the Tariff Commission does not fall under the administrative control of the DTI, but under the NEDA, pursuant to the Administrative Code. The reliance made by the Separate Opinion to those three examples are thus misplaced. Nonetheless, the Separate Opinion asserts that the SMA created a functional relationship between the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary, sufficient to allow the DTI Secretary to exercise alter ego powers to reverse the determination of the Tariff Commission. Again, considering that the power to impose tariffs in the first place is not inherent in the President but arises only from congressional grant, we should affirm the congressional prerogative to impose limitations and restrictions on such powers which do not normally belong to the executive in the first place. Nowhere in the SMA does it state that the DTI Secretary may impose general safeguard measures without a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission, or that the DTI Secretary may reverse or even review the factual determination made by the Tariff Commission. Congress in enacting the SMA and prescribing the roles to be played therein by the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary did not envision that the President, or his/her alter ego could exercise supervisory powers over the Tariff Commission. If truly Congress intended to allow the traditional alter ego principle to come to fore in the peculiar setup established by the SMA, it would have assigned the role now played by the DTI Secretary under the law instead to the NEDA, the body to which the Tariff Commission is attached under the Administrative Code. The Court has no issue with upholding administrative control and supervision exercised by the head of an executive department, but only over those subordinate offices that are attached to the department, or which are, under statute, relegated under its supervision and control. To declare that a department secretary, even if acting as alter ego of the President, may exercise such control or supervision over all executive offices below cabinet rank would lead to absurd results such as those adverted to above. As applied to this case, there is no legal justification for the DTI Secretary to exercise control, supervision, review or amendatory powers over the Tariff Commission and its positive final determination. In passing, we note that there is, admittedly, a feasible mode by which administrative review of the Tariff Commissions final determination could be had, but it is not the procedure adopted by respondents and now suggested for affirmation. This mode shall be discussed in a forthcoming section. The Separate Opinion asserts that the President, or his/her alter ego cannot be made a mere rubber stamp of the Tariff Commission since Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution denominates the Chief Executive exercises control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices.[80] But let us be clear that such executive control is not absolute. The definition of the structure of the executive branch of government, and the corresponding degrees of administrative control and supervision, is not the exclusive preserve of the executive. It may be effectively be limited by the Constitution, by law, or by judicial decisions.

The Separate Opinion cites the respected constitutional law authority Fr. Joaquin Bernas, in support of the proposition that such plenary power of executive control of the President cannot be restricted by a mere statute passed by Congress. However, the cited passage from Fr. Bernas actually states, Since the Constitution has given the President the power of control, with all its awesome implications, it is the Constitution alone which can curtail such power.[81] Does the President have such tariff powers under the Constitution in the first place which may be curtailed by the executive power of control? At the risk of redundancy, we quote Section 28(2), Article VI: The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. Clearly the power to impose tariffs belongs to Congress and not to the President. It is within reason to assume the framers of the Constitution deemed it too onerous to spell out all the possible limitations and restrictions on this presidential authority to impose tariffs. Hence, the Constitution especially allowed Congress itself to prescribe such limitations and restrictions itself, a prudent move considering that such authority inherently belongs to Congress and not the President. Since Congress has no power to amend the Constitution, it should be taken to mean that such limitations and restrictions should be provided by mere statute. Then again, even the presidential authority to impose tariffs arises only by mere statute. Indeed, this presidential privilege is both contingent in nature and legislative in origin. These characteristics, when weighed against the aspect of executive control and supervision, cannot militate against Congresss exercise of its inherent power to tax . The bare fact is that the administrative superstructure, for all its unwieldiness, is mere putty in the hands of Congress. The functions and mandates of the particular executive departments and bureaus are not created by the President, but by the legislative branch through the Administrative Code. [82] The President is the administrative head of the executive department, as such obliged to see that every government office is managed and maintained properly by the persons in charge of it in accordance with pertinent laws and regulations, and empowered to promulgate rules and issuances that would ensure a more efficient management of the executive branch, for so long as such issuances are not contrary to law.[83] Yet the legislature has the concurrent power to reclassify or redefine the executive bureaucracy, including the relationship between various administrative agencies, bureaus and departments, and ultimately, even the power to abolish executive departments and their components, hamstrung only by constitutional limitations. The DTI itself can be abolished with ease by Congress through deleting Title X, Book IV of the Administrative Code. The Tariff Commission can similarly be abolished through legislative enactment. [84] At the same time, Congress can enact additional tasks or responsibilities on either the Tariff Commission or the DTI Secretary, such as their respective roles on the imposition of general safeguard measures under the SMA. In doing so, the same Congress, which has the putative authority to abolish the Tariff Commission or the DTI, is similarly empowered to alter or expand its functions through modalities which do not align with established norms in the bureaucratic structure . The Court is bound to recognize the legislative prerogative to prescribe such modalities, no matter how atypical they may be, in affirmation of the legislative power to restructure the executive branch of government. There are further limitations on the executive control adverted to by the Separate Opinion. The President, in the exercise of executive control, cannot order a subordinate to disobey a final decision of this Court or any courts. If the subordinate chooses to disobey, invoking sole allegiance to the President, the judicial processes can be utilized to compel obeisance. Indeed, when public officers of the executive department take their oath of office, they swear allegiance and obedience not to the President, but to the Constitution and the laws of the land. The invocation of executive control must yield when under its subsumption includes an act that violates the law. The Separate Opinion concedes that the exercise of executive control and supervision by the President is bound by the Constitution and law.[85] Still, just three sentences after asserting that the exercise of executive control must be within the bounds of the Constitution and law, the Separate Opinion asserts, the control power of the Chief Executive emanates from the Constitution; no act of Congress may validly

curtail it.[86] Laws are acts of Congress, hence valid confusion arises whether the Separate Opinion truly believes the first proposition that executive control is bound by law. This is a quagmire for the Separate Opinion to resolve for itself The Separate Opinion unduly considers executive control as the ne plus ultra constitutional standard which must govern in this case. But while the President may generally have the power to control, modify or set aside the actions of a subordinate, such powers may be constricted by the Constitution, the legislature, and the judiciary. This is one of the essences of the check-and-balance system in our tri-partite constitutional democracy. Not one head of a branch of government may operate as a Caesar within his/her particular fiefdom. Assuming there is a conflict between the specific limitation in Section 28 (2), Article VI of the Constitution and the general executive power of control and supervision, the former prevails in the specific instance of safeguard measures such as tariffs and imposts, and would thus serve to qualify the general grant to the President of the power to exercise control and supervision over his/her subalterns. Thus, if the Congress enacted the law so that the DTI Secretary is bound by the Tariff Commission in the sense the former cannot impose general safeguard measures absent a final positive determination from the latter the Court is obliged to respect such legislative prerogative, no matter how such arrangement deviates from traditional norms as may have been enshrined in jurisprudence. The only ground under which such legislative determination as expressed in statute may be successfully challenged is if such legislation contravenes the Constitution. No such argument is posed by the respondents, who do not challenge the validity or constitutionality of the SMA. Given these premises, it is utterly reckless to examine the interrelationship between the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary beyond the context of the SMA, applying instead traditional precepts on administrative control, review and supervision. For that reason, the Decision deemed inapplicable respondents previous citations of Cario v. Commissioner on Human Rights and Lamb v. Phipps, since the executive power adverted to in those cases had not been limited by constitutional restrictions such as those imposed under Section 28(2), Article VI.[87] A similar observation can be made on the case of Sharp International Marketing v. Court of Appeals,[88] now cited by Philcemcor, wherein the Court asserted that the Land Bank of the Philippines was required to exercise independent judgment and not merely rubber-stamp deeds of sale entered into by the Department of Agrarian Reform in connection with the agrarian reform program. Philcemcor attempts to demonstrate that the DTI Secretary, as with the Land Bank of the Philippines, is required to exercise independent discretion and is not expected to just merely accede to DAR-approved compensation packages. Yet again, such grant of independent discretion is expressly called for by statute, particularly Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 6657 which specifically requires the joint concurrence of the landowner and the DAR and the [Land Bank of the Philippines] on the amount of compensation. Such power of review by the Land Bank is a consequence of clear statutory language, as is our holding in the Decision that Section 5 explicitly requires a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission before a general safeguard measure may be imposed. Moreover, such limitations under the SMA are coated by the constitutional authority of Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Nonetheless, is this administrative setup, as envisioned by Congress and enshrined into the SMA, truly noxious to existing legal standards? The Decision acknowledged the internal logic of the statutory framework, considering that the DTI cannot exercise review powers over an agency such as the Tariff Commission which is not within its administrative jurisdiction; that the mechanism employed establishes a measure of check and balance involving two government offices with different specializations; and that safeguard measures are the exception rather than the rule, pursuant to our treaty obligations.[89] We see no reason to deviate from these observations, and indeed can add similarly oriented comments. Corollary to the legislative power to decree policies through legislation is the ability of the legislature to provide for means in the statute itself to ensure that the said policy is strictly implemented by the body or

office tasked so tasked with the duty. As earlier stated, our treaty obligations dissuade the State for now from implementing default protectionist trade measures such as tariffs, and allow the same only under specified conditions.[90]The conditions enumerated under the GATT Agreement on Safeguards for the application of safeguard measures by a member country are the same as the requisites laid down in Section 5 of the SMA.[91] To insulate the factual determination from political pressure, and to assure that it be conducted by an entity especially qualified by reason of its general functions to undertake such investigation, Congress deemed it necessary to delegate to the Tariff Commission the function of ascertaining whether or not the those factual conditions exist to warrant the atypical imposition of safeguard measures. After all, the Tariff Commission retains a degree of relative independence by virtue of its attachment to the National Economic Development Authority, an independent planning agency of the government,[92] and also owing to its vaunted expertise and specialization. The matter of imposing a safeguard measure almost always involves not just one industry, but the national interest as it encompasses other industries as well. Yet in all candor, any decision to impose a safeguard measure is susceptible to all sorts of external pressures, especially if the domestic industry concerned is well-organized. Unwarranted impositions of safeguard measures may similarly be detrimental to the national interest. Congress could not be blamed if it desired to insulate the investigatory process by assigning it to a body with a putative degree of independence and traditional expertise in ascertaining factual conditions. Affected industries would have cause to lobby for or against the safeguard measures. The decision-maker is in the unenviable position of having to bend an ear to listen to all concerned voices, including those which may speak softly but carry a big stick. Had the law mandated that the decision be made on the sole discretion of an executive officer, such as the DTI Secretary, it would be markedly easier for safeguard measures to be imposed or withheld based solely on political considerations and not on the factual conditions that are supposed to predicate the decision. Reference of the binding positive final determination to the Tariff Commission is of course, not a fail-safe means to ensure a bias-free determination. But at least the legislated involvement of the Commission in the process assures some measure of measure of check and balance involving two different governmental agencies with disparate specializations. There is no legal or constitutional demand for such a setup, but its wisdom as policy should be acknowledged. As prescribed by Congress, both the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary operate within limited frameworks, under which nobody acquires an undue advantage over the other. We recognize that Congress deemed it necessary to insulate the process in requiring that the factual determination to be made by an ostensibly independent body of specialized competence, the Tariff Commission. This prescribed framework, constitutionally sanctioned, is intended to prevent the baseless, whimsical, or consideration-induced imposition of safeguard measures. It removes from the DTI Secretary jurisdiction over a matter beyond his putative specialized aptitude, the compilation and analysis of picayune facts and determination of their limited causal relations, and instead vests in the Secretary the broad choice on a matter within his unquestionable competence, the selection of what particular safeguard measure would assist the duly beleaguered local industry yet at the same time conform to national trade policy. Indeed, the SMA recognizes, and places primary importance on th e DTI Secretarys mandate to formulate trade policy, in his capacity as the Presidents alter ego on trade, industry and investmentrelated matters. At the same time, the statutory limitations on this authorized power of the DTI Secretary must prevail since the Constitution itself demands the enforceability of those limitations and restrictions as imposed by Congress. Policy wisdom will not save a law from infirmity if the statutory provisions violate the Constitution. But since the Constitution itself provides that the President shall be constrained by the limits and restrictions imposed by Congress and since these limits and restrictions are so clear and categorical, then the Court has no choice but to uphold the reins. Even assuming that this prescribed setup made little sense, or seemed uncommonly silly,[93] the Court is bound by propriety not to dispute the wisdom of the legislature as long as its acts do not violate the Constitution. Since there is no convincing demonstration that the SMA contravenes the Constitution, the Court is wont to respect the administrative regimen propounded by the law, even if it allots the Tariff

Commission a higher degree of puissance than normally expected. It is for this reason that the traditional conceptions of administrative review or quasi-judicial power cannot control in this case. Indeed, to apply the latter concept would cause the Court to fall into a linguistic trap owing to the multifaceted denotations the term quasi-judicial has come to acquire. Under the SMA, the Tariff Commission undertakes formal hearings,[94] receives and evaluates testimony and evidence by interested parties,[95] and renders a decision is rendered on the basis of the evidence presented, in the form of the final determination. The final determination requires a conclusion whether the importation of the product under consideration is causing serious injury or threat to a domestic industry producing like products or directly competitive products, while evaluating all relevant factors having a bearing on the situation of the domestic industry.[96] This process aligns conformably with definition provided by Blacks Law Dictionary of quasi-judicial as the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.[97] However, the Tariff Commission is not empowered to hear actual cases or controversies lodged directly before it by private parties. It does not have the power to issue writs of injunction or enforcement of its determination. These considerations militate against a finding of quasi-judicial powers attributable to the Tariff Commission, considering the pronouncement that quasi -judicial adjudication would mean a determination of rights privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation.[98] Indeed, a declaration that the Tariff Commission possesses quasi-judicial powers, even if ascertained for the limited purpose of exercising its functions under the SMA, may have the unfortunate effect of expanding the Commissions powers beyond that contemplated by law. After all, the Tariff Commission is by convention, a fact-finding body, and its role under the SMA, burdened as it is with factual determination, is but a mere continuance of this tradition. However, Congress through the SMA offers a significant deviation from this traditional role by tying the decision by the DTI Secretary to impose a safeguard measure to the required positive factual determination by the Tariff Commission. Congress is not bound by past traditions, or even by the jurisprudence of this Court, in enacting legislation it may deem as suited for the times. The sole benchmark for judicial substitution of congressional wisdom is constitutional transgression, a standard which the respondents do not even attempt to match. Respondents Suggested Interpretation Of the SMA Transgresses Fair Play Respondents have belabored the argument that the Decisions interpretation of the SMA, particularly of the role of the Tariff Commission vis--vis the DTI Secretary, is noxious to traditional notions of administrative control and supervision. But in doing so, they have failed to acknowledge the congressional prerogative to redefine administrative relationships, a license which falls within the plenary province of Congress under our representative system of democracy. Moreover, respondents own suggested interpretation falls wayward of expectations of practical fair play. Adopting respondents suggestion that the DTI Secretary may disregard the factual findings of the Tariff Commission and investigatory process that preceded it, it would seem that the elaborate procedure undertaken by the Commission under the SMA, with all the attendant guarantees of due process, is but an inutile spectacle. As Justice Garcia noted during the oral arguments, why would the DTI Secretary bother with the Tariff Commission and instead conduct the investigation himself.[99] Certainly, nothing in the SMA authorizes the DTI Secretary, after making the preliminary determination, to personally oversee the investigation, hear out the interested parties, or receive evidence.[100] In fact, the SMA does not even require the Tariff Commission, which is tasked with the custody of the submitted

evidence,[101] to turn over to the DTI Secretary such evidence it had evaluated in order to make its factual determination.[102] Clearly, as Congress tasked it to be, it is the Tariff Commission and not the DTI Secretary which acquires the necessary intimate acquaintance with the factual conditions and evidence necessary for the imposition of the general safeguard measure. Why then favor an interpretation of the SMA that leaves the findings of the Tariff Commission bereft of operative effect and makes them subservient to the wishes of the DTI Secretary, a personage with lesser working familiarity with the relevant factual milieu? In fact, the bare theory of the respondents would effectively allow the DTI Secretary to adopt, under the subterfuge of his discretion, the factual determination of a private investigative group hired by the industry concerned, and reject the investigative findings of the Tariff Commission as mandated by the SMA. It would be highly irregular to substitute what the law clearly provides for a dubious setup of no statutory basis that would be readily susceptible to rank chicanery. Moreover, the SMA guarantees the right of all concerned parties to be heard, an elemental requirement of due process, by the Tariff Commission in the context of its investigation. The DTI Secretary is not similarly empowered or tasked to hear out the concerns of other interested parties, and if he/she does so, it arises purely out of volition and not compulsion under law. Indeed, in this case, it is essential that the position of other than that of the local cement industry should be given due consideration, cement being an indispensable need for the operation of other industries such as housing and construction. While the general safeguard measures may operate to the better interests of the domestic cement industries, its deprivation of cheaper cement imports may similarly work to the detriment of these other domestic industries and correspondingly, the national interest. Notably, the Tariff Commission in this case heard the views on the application of representatives of other allied industries such as the housing, construction, and cement-bag industries, and other interested parties such as consumer groups and foreign governments.[103] It is only before the Tariff Commission that their views had been heard, and this is because it is only the Tariff Commission which is empowered to hear their positions. Since due process requires a judicious consideration of all relevant factors, the Tariff Commission, which is in a better position to hear these parties than the DTI Secretary, is similarly more capable to render a determination conformably with the due process requirements than the DTI Secretary. In a similar vein, Southern Cross aptly notes that in instances when it is the DTI Secretary who initiates motu proprio the application for the safeguard measure pursuant to Section 6 of the SMA, respondents suggested interpretation would result in the awkward situation wherein the DTI Secretary would rule upon his own application after it had been evaluated by the Tariff Commission. Pertinently cited is our ruling in Corona v. Court of Appeals[104] that no man can be at once a litigant and judge. [105] Certainly, this anomalous situation is avoided if it is the Tariff Commission which is tasked with arriving at the final determination whether the conditions exist to warrant the general safeguard measures. This is the setup provided for by the express provisions of the SMA, and the problem would arise only if we adopt the interpretation urged upon by respondents. The Possibility for Administrative Review Of the Tariff Commissions Determination The Court has been emphatic that a positive final determination from the Tariff Commission is required in order that the DTI Secretary may impose a general safeguard measure, and that the DTI Secretary has no power to exercise control and supervision over the Tariff Commission and its final determination. These conclusions are the necessary consequences of the applicable provisions of the Constitution, the SMA, and laws such as the Administrative Code. However, the law is silent though on whether this positive final determination may otherwise be subjected to administrative review. There is no evident legislative intent by the authors of the SMA to provide for a procedure of administrative review. If ever there is a procedure for administrative review over the final determination of the Tariff Commission, such procedure must be done in a manner that does not contravene or disregard legislative prerogatives as expressed in the SMA or the Administrative Code, or fundamental constitutional limitations.

In order that such procedure of administrative review would not contravene the law and the constitutional scheme provided by Section 28(2), Article VI, it is essential to assert that the positive final determination by the Tariff Commission is indispensable as a requisite for the imposition of a general safeguard measure. The submissions of private respondents and the Separate Opinion cannot be sustained insofar as they hold that the DTI Secretary can peremptorily ignore or disregard the determinations made by the Tariff Commission. However, if the mode of administrative review were in such a manner that the administrative superior of the Tariff Commission were to modify or alter its determination, then such reversal may still be valid within the confines of Section 5 of the SMA, for technically it is still the Tariff Commissions determination, administratively revised as it may be, that would serve as the basi s for the DTI Secretarys action. However, and fatally for the present petitions, such administrative review cannot be conducted by the DTI Secretary. Even if conceding that the Tariff Commissions findings may be administratively reviewed, the DTI Secretary has no authority to review or modify the same. We have been emphatic on the reasons such as that there is no traditional or statutory basis placing the Commission under the control and supervision of the DTI; that to allow such would contravene due process, especially if the DTI itself were to apply for the safeguard measures motu proprio. To hold otherwise would destroy the administrative hierarchy, contravene constitutional due process, and disregard the limitations or restrictions provided in the SMA. Instead, assuming administrative review were available, it is the NEDA that may conduct such review following the principles of administrative law, and the NEDAs decision in turn is reviewable by the Office of the President. The decision of the Office of the President then effectively substitutes as the determination of the Tariff Commission, which now forms the basis of the DTI Secretarys decision, which now would be ripe for judicial review by the CTA under Section 29 of the SMA. This is the only way that administrative review of the Tariff Commissions determination may be sustained without violating the SMA and its constitutional restrictions and limitations, as well as administrative law. In bare theory, the NEDA may review, alter or modify the Tar iff Commissions final determination, the Commission being an attached agency of the NEDA. Admittedly, there is nothing in the SMA or any other statute that would prevent the NEDA to exercise such administrative review, and successively, for the President to exercise in turn review over the NEDAs decision. Nonetheless, in acknowledging this possibility, the Court, without denigrating the bare principle that administrative officers may exercise control and supervision over the acts of the bodies under its jurisdiction, realizes that this comes at the expense of a speedy resolution to an application for a safeguard measure, an application dependent on fluctuating factual conditions. The further delay would foster uncertainty and insecurity within the industry concerned, as well as with all other allied industries, which in turn may lead to some measure of economic damage. Delay is certain, since judicial review authorized by law and not administrative review would have the final say. The fact that the SMA did not expressly prohibit administrative review of the final determination of the Tariff Commission does not negate the supreme advantages of engendering exclusive judicial review over questions arising from the imposition of a general safeguard measure. In any event, even if we conceded the possibility of administrative review of the Tariff Commissions final determination by the NEDA, such would not deny merit to the present petition. It does not change the fact that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the negative final determination of the Tariff Commission, or that the DTI Secretary acted without jurisdiction when he imposed general safeguard measures despite the absence of the statutory positive final determination of the Commission. IV. Courts Interpretation of SMA In Harmony with Other Constitutional Provisions

In response to our citation of Section 28(2), Article VI, respondents elevate two arguments grounded in constitutional law. One is based on another constitutional provision, Section 12, Article XIII, which mandates that [t]he State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods and adopt measures that help make them competitive. By no means does this provision dictate that the Court favor the domestic industry in all competing claims that it may bring before this Court. If it were so, judicial proceedings in this country would be rendered a mockery, resolved as they would be, on the basis of the personalities of the litigants and not their legal positions. Moreover, the duty imposed on by Section 12, Article XIII falls primarily with Congress, which in that regard enacted the SMA, a law designed to protect domestic industries from the possible ill-effects of our accession to the global trade order. Inconveniently perhaps for respondents, the SMA also happens to provide for a procedure under which such protective measures may be enacted. The Court cannot just impose what it deems as the spirit of the law without giving due regard to its letter. In like-minded manner, the Separate Opinion loosely states that the purpose of the SMA is to protect or safeguard local industries from increased importation of foreign products.[106] This inaccurately leaves the impression that the SMA ipso facto unravels a protective cloak that shelters all local industries and producers, no matter the conditions. Indeed, our country has knowingly chosen to accede to the world trade regime, as expressed in the GATT and WTO Agreements, despite the understanding that local industries might suffer ill-effects, especially with the easier entry of competing foreign products. At the same time, these international agreements were designed to constrict protectionist trade policies by its member-countries. Hence, the median, as expressed by the SMA, does allow for the application of protectionist measures such as tariffs, but only after an elaborate process of investigation that ensures factual basis and indispensable need for such measures. More accurately, the purpose of the SMA is to provide a process for the protection or safeguarding of domestic industries that have duly established that there is substantial injury or threat thereof directly caused by the increased imports. In short, domestic industries are not entitled to safeguard measures as a matter of right or influence. Respondents also make the astounding argument that the imposition of general safeguard measures should not be seen as a taxation measure, but instead as an exercise of police power. The vain hope of respondents in divorcing the safeguard measures from the concept of taxation is to exclude from consideration Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution. This argument can be debunked at length, but it deserves little attention. The motivation behind many taxation measures is the implementation of police power goals. Progressive income taxes alleviate the margin between rich and poor; the so-called sin taxes on alcohol and tobacco manufacturers help dissuade the consumers from excessive intake of these potentially harmful products. Taxation is distinguishable from police power as to the means employed to implement these public good goals. Those doctrines that are unique to taxation arose from peculiar considerations such as those especially punitive effects of taxation,[107] and the belief that taxes are the lifeblood of the state.[108] These considerations necessitated the evolution of taxation as a distinct legal concept from police power. Yet at the same time, it has been recognized that taxation may be made the implement of the states police power. [109] Even assuming that the SMA should be construed exclusively as a police power measure, the Court recognizes that police power is lodged primarily in the national legislature, though it may also be exercised by the executive branch by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power.[110] Considering these premises, it is clear that police power, however illimitable in theory, is still exercised within the confines of implementing legislation. To declare otherwise is to sanction rule by whim instead of rule of law. The Congress, in enacting the SMA, has delegated the power to impose general safeguard measures to the executive branch, but at the same time subjected such imposition to limitations, such as the requirement of a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission under Section 5. For the executive branch to ignore these boundaries imposed by Congress is to set up an ignoble clash between the two coequal branches of government. Considering that the exercise of police power emanates from legislative authority, there is little question that the prerogative of the legislative branch shall prevail in such a clash.

V. Assailed Decision Consistent With Ruling in Taada v. Angara Public respondents allege that the Decision is contrary to our holding in Taada v. Angara,[111] since the Court noted therein that the GATT itself provides built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and trade practices, which according to the public respondents, was a reason why the Honorable [Court] ruled the way it did. On the other hand, the Decision eliminates safeguard measures as a mode of defense. This is balderdash, as with any and all claims that the Decision allows foreign industries to ride roughshod over our domestic enterprises. The Decision does not prohibit the imposition of general safeguard measures to protect domestic industries in need of protection. All it affirms is that the positive final determination of the Tariff Commission is first required before the general safeguard measures are imposed and implemented, a neutral proposition that gives no regard to the nationalities of the parties involved. A positive determination by the Tariff Commission is hardly the elusive Shangri-la of administrative law. If a particular industry finds it difficult to obtain a positive final determination from the Tariff Commission, it may be simply because the industry is still sufficiently competitive even in the face of foreign competition. These safeguard measures are designed to ensure salvation, not avarice. Respondents well have the right to drape themselves in the colors of the flag. Yet these postures hardly advance legal claims, or nationalism for that matter. The fineries of the costume pageant are no better measure of patriotism than simple obedience to the laws of the Fatherland. And even assuming that respondents are motivated by genuine patriotic impulses, it must be remembered that under the setup provided by the SMA, it is the facts, and not impulse, that determine whether the protective safeguard measures should be imposed. As once orated, facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passions, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence.[112] It is our goal as judges to enforce the law, and not what we might deem as correct economic policy. Towards this end, we should not construe the SMA to unduly favor or disfavor domestic industries, simply because the law itself provides for a mechanism by virtue of which the claims of these industries are thoroughly evaluated before they are favored or disfavored. What we must do is to simply uphold what the law says. Section 5 says that the DTI Secretary shall impose the general safeguard measures upon the positive final determination of the Tariff Commission. Nothing in the whereas clauses or the invisible ink provisions of the SMA can magically delete the words positive final determination and Tariff Commission from Section 5. VI. On Forum-Shopping We remain convinced that there was no willful and deliberate forum-shopping in this case by Southern Cross. The causes of action that animate this present petition for review and the petition for review with the CTA are distinct from each other, even though they relate to similar factual antecedents. Yet it also appears that contrary to the undertaking signed by the President of Southern Cross, Hironobu Ryu, to inform this Court of any similar action or proceeding pending before any court, tribunal or agency within five (5) days from knowledge thereof, Southern Cross informed this Court only on 12 August 2003 of the petition it had filed with the CTA eleven days earlier. An appropriate sanction is warranted for such failure, but not the dismissal of the petition. VII. Effects of Courts Resolution Philcemcor argues that the granting of Southern Crosss Petition should not necessarily lead to the voiding of the Decision of the DTI Secretary dated 5 August 2003 imposing the general safeguard measures. For Philcemcor, the availability of appeal to the CTA as an available and adequate remedy would have made the Court of Appeals Decision merely erroneous or irregular, but not void. Moreover, the said Decision merely required the DTI Secretary to render a decision, which could have very well been a decision not to

impose a safeguard measure; thus, it could not be said that the annulled decision resulted from the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals Decision was annulled precisely because the appellate court did not have the power to rule on the petition in the first place. Jurisdiction is necessarily the power to decide a case, and a court which does not have the power to adjudicate a case is one that is bereft of jurisdiction. We find no reason to disturb our earlier finding that the Court of Appeals Decision is null and void. At the same time, the Court in its Decision paid particular heed to the peculiarities attaching to the 5 August 2003 Decision of the DTI Secretary. In the DTI Secretarys Decision, he expressly stated that as a result of the Court of Appeals Decision, there is no legal impediment for the Secretary to decide on the application. Yet the truth remained that there was a legal impediment, namely, that the decision of the appellate court was not yet final and executory. Moreover, it was declared null and void, and since the DTI Secretary expressly denominated the Court of Appeals Decision as his basis for deciding to impose the safeguard measures, the latter decision must be voided as well. Otherwise put, without the Court of Appeals Decision, the DTI Secretarys Decision of 5 August 2003 would not have been rendered as well. Accordingly, the Court reaffirms as a nullity the DTI Secretarys Decision dated 5 August 2003. As a necessary consequence, no further action can be taken on Philcemcors Petition for Extension of the Safeguard Measure. Obviously, if the imposition of the general safeguard measure is void as we declared it to be, any extension thereof should likewise be fruitless. The proper remedy instead is to file a new application for the imposition of safeguard measures, subject to the conditions prescribed by the SMA. Should this step be eventually availed of, it is only hoped that the parties involved would content themselves in observing the proper procedure, instead of making a mockery of the rule of law. WHEREFORE, respondents Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED WITH FINALITY. Respondent DTI Secretary is hereby ENJOINED from taking any further action on the pending Petition for Extension of the Safeguard Measure. Hironobu Ryu, President of petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation, and Angara Abello Concepcion Regala & Cruz, counsel petitioner, are hereby given FIVE (5) days from receipt of this Resolution to EXPLAIN why they should not be meted disciplinary sanction for failing to timely inform the Court of the filing of Southern Crosss Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals, as adverted to earlier in this Resolution. SO ORDERED.

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