Brazil, Chile and the Inter-American Cold War, 1970-1975

Tanya Harmer (LSE)

Two days after the Chilean coup in 1973, nervous Chilean representatives in Brasilia arrived at Itamaraty to seek formal recognition of Santiagos new military government. In a somewhat emotional cable back to Santiago, the Chilean embassys brand new Charg dAffaires, Rolando Stein, recounted the tension he felt as he had then waited all day to find out how the Brazilian government was likely to respond. Finally, at 8.30 that evening, he was called back to Itamaraty to receive the answer he had been hoping to hear. Not only was Brazil poised to recognise Chiles new government, but President Emlio Garrastazu Mdici had telephoned from So Paulo to issue personal instructions that he wanted his country to be the first to do so. This gesture alone, Stein cabled back to Santiago, demonstrated Brazils profound friendship towards Chile. He also rightly suggested that Brazil would become a powerful ally in weeks and months ahead.1 As it turned out, by the end of the following month the Brazilian government had already provided the new military regime in Chile with diplomatic assistance, medical supplies, sugar and credits totalling over $100 million dollars. Brazilian officers had also assisted their Chilean counterparts in interrogating and torturing some of the 7,000 prisoners held by coup leaders in Chiles National Stadium. As Brazils Foreign Minister knowingly explained in private at the end of 1973, his country had been through a similar experience in 1964 and its leaders therefore deeply sympathised with the Chilean junta and what it was trying to do.2 With the benefit of hindsight and new access to archival documents the most surprising aspect of this story is not the news that Brazil leapt into action to support the Chilean junta, but that Chilean representatives in Brasilia in September 1973 were nervous that it would not. Unbeknownst to Stein, it now seems clear that the Mdici government had been working secretly to undermine Allendes government and facilitate a Chilean coup for three years. With active encouragement and gratitude from Washington, Brazils military regime had certainly been exchanging information with members of Chiles Armed Forces and sending undercover intelligence officials to Santiago since early 1971. It had also been playing an increasingly successful and activist role in combating left-wing trends in Bolivia and Uruguay, containing Cuban and Chilean influence within the inter-American system and engaging in its own so-called diplomatic offensive throughout Latin America to boost Brasilias standing in the region.
1

Oficio, Rolando Stein, Encargado de Negocios, Embachile Brasilia to Seor Ministro, 13 September 1973 and Oficio, Stein to Seor Ministro, 27 September 1973, Oficios Conf. E y R, Embajada de Chile en Brasil, 1973, Archivo General Histrico, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Santiago, Chile [Hereafter: Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE]. 2 Record of Conversation, Gibson Barboza and Hernn Cubillos, 7 December 1973, in Oficio, Embajador Hernn Cubillos, Embachile Brasila to Sero Ministro, 7 December 1973, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE. For reference to Brazilian officers being in Chile after the coup, see J. P. McSherry, Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America, (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 57, J. Dinges, The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents, (New York: The New Press, 2004), 264 and Gaspari, E. A Ditadura Derrotada, (So Paulo: Comapnhia das Letras, 2003), 357-58. For information about Brazilian credits and support for Pinochet, see below.

Although there is much still to learn about Brazils intervention in Chile and its involvement in other South American countries, this paper outlines what we know to date about the Brazilian dimension of the Allende story, regional developments during the early 1970s, the Chilean coup and the early Pinochet regime. With the caveat that far more remains to be uncovered in Brazilian archives once they are fully open, it also examines how Brazils intervention in Chile and different perceptions of that intervention fitted in to a broader context of what I see as having been an inter-American Cold War struggle. In this struggle, 11 September 1973 was without a doubt the biggest counter-revolutionary victory in Latin America since the Brazilian coup of 1964 almost a decade before. Before the Chilean coup proved them right, many on the Left also drew direct parallels between Allendes beleaguered government and the challenges faced by Joo Goulart.3 After the coup, allusions to these parallels and Brazils role in Chile were then made by a number of other commentators, most notably by the U.S. ambassador in Chile at the time, Nathanial Davis.4 Yet, beyond these references, the story has never been fully investigated. In fact, overall, we tend to know far less about the internationalism and solidarity that existed between rightwing groups and governments across Latin America than we do about the relationships between different Latin American left-wing circles. Much of this has to do with the problems of penetrating secrets that have long-since been closely guarded by military and intelligence establishments. However, it also has a lot to do with prevailing ideas about the United States overbearing hegemony in Latin America and its power to make, shape and control right-wing allies during the Cold War, which in turn has led historians to focus their attention all too often on the view from Washington. With the opening of archives throughout Latin America, new research into ties between Cold Warriors within Latin America, as well as the ties that regional right-wing leaders established with the United States, is nevertheless now possible.5 The picture that begins to emerge is both intriguing and illuminating insofar as it demonstrates the need to move beyond the view from Washington and to place the betterknown story of U.S. intervention in Latin America during the Cold War years into a more complex regional context. As we shall see, it is true that the Mdici government shared many of the same goals and fears as the United States, and discussed these with senior members of the Nixon administration. But Brazils leaders during this period also quite clearly had their own perception of the threat of communist and in particular, Cuban subversion in the Southern Cone, together with their own agenda and policies when it came to doing something about it. This very often involved trying to persuade the United States to get more involved in hemispheric affairs on the grounds that Brasilia believed Washington had been neglecting left-wing gains in Latin America. In fact, what is so interesting about the story of Brazils relationship to Chilean events and the inter-American Cold War is that it shows quite categorically that the hemispheric variant of a global ideological struggle to determine
3

For example, see Fidel Castro, Speech at National Stadium, Santiago, 2 December 1971 published as Acto de Despedida, Cuba-Chile, 477 and Salvador Allende, Speech at National Stadium, Santiago, 2 December 1971, published as Farewell Address to Fidel Castro, in Chiles Voice of Democracy: Salvador Allende Reader edited by J. D. Cockcroft (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 2000), 137. 4 N. Davis, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende (London: I.B Tauris & Co. Ltd 1985), 331-32 and G. MacEoin, Chile, The Struggle For Dignity, (London: Conventure, 1975), 194-99. 5 For example, see A. C. Armony, Transnationalizing the Dirty War: Argentina in Central America in In From the Cold: Latin Americas New Encounter with the Cold War edited by Gilbert Joseph and Daniela Spenser, (Durham and (London: Duke University Press, 2008) and Dinges, The Condor Years.

the future shape of the world was multidimensional, de-centralized and interactive. It was certainly not a struggle that was dominated exclusively by Washington (or Moscow for that matter) and the relationships that were forged between different actors in the region were dynamic and changing as opposed to static predetermined patterns of engagement as some of those who see the Cold War a simplistic battle between two sides or indeed those who see Uncle Sam as having pulled all the strings in Latin America during the Cold War period would have have us believe. To put it another way, Latin American leaders had their own agency in the way in history unfolded and their own reasons for fighting a Cold War struggle within Latin America, which in turn had particularly Latin American consequences and repercussions. The focus of what follows is therefore to explore one case study of how, where, and why this occurred together what this means for our understanding of the Cold War in the Americas and the way that historians write about it. Tragedy strikes It is still very difficult to pinpoint precisely what the Brazilian military regime thought of Allendes democratic electoral victory on 4 September 1970. Faced with what was commonly regarded as having been the most important revolutionary victory in the Americas since Fidel Castro walked into Havana a decade earlier, it is nevertheless clear that the Brazilian dictatorship was profoundly shocked and fearful. In the months that followed, Chilean diplomats in Brasilia observed a heightened interest in Chilean affairs, Cuban influence and the prospects of revolutionary upheaval in the Southern Cone. There were also indications that Brazils Army headquarters had become a hive of activity concentrating specifically on the hypothetical prospect of a forthcoming continental war against revolutionary Chile and its supposed sponsorship of guerrilla warfare across the Andes. The Chilean embassy in Brasilia certainly reported that the Brazilian Army had staged a number of military exercises that were designed around the premise of fighting guerrilla forces residing in Chile.6 And Santiago also received news that Brazilian secret intelligence agents had been sent to Chile in early 1971.7 Indeed, news of Brazilian attitudes towards Chile that reached Washington also appear to suggest that Brasilia was on a par with the Nixon administration when it came to trying to turn back the clock on Allendes election. This news, in turn, encouraged the new emphasis that the White House was placing on strengthening ties with Brazil in the immediate context of Chiles election results. Brazil had (and has) traditionally been an ally of Chiles. With Argentina as a common enemy in between them, the two countries and their military establishments had naturally gravitated towards each other. Yet this had not meant a great deal in terms of concrete bilateral diplomatic cooperation in the period leading up to Allendes election. To the contrary, Brazil had pursued a rather cautious and conservative foreign policy since 1964 and, in this context, ties with Chile had been relatively low down on Brasilias list of priorities. As Brazilian media depicted, Chile had been a traditionally friendly nation where nothing really very important happened until tragedy struck in the form of Allendes democratic election.8 Henceforth, alarmist coverage of Chile in the heavily censored Brazilian media tripled. One press report
Oficios, Rettig to Seor Ministro, 30 March 1971, Oficios Conf., E/R, Brasil/1971/AMRE. Oficio Conf., Rettig to Seor Ministro, 23 March 1971, Oficios Conf., E/R, Brasil/1971/AMRE. 8 See oficio, Embajador Raul Rettig, Embachile Brasilia to Seor Ministro, 14 May 1971, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1971/AMRE.
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cited a Brazilian officer as warning that Russian flotillas were on their way to the Chilean port of Valparaiso while O Estado do So Paulo argued that Allendes absolute priorities lay in socialist loyalty and submission to Fidel Castros continental revolutionary leadership.9 Brazilian military leaders also began referring to Chile as yet another country on the other side of the Iron Curtain, only more dangerous because it was so close and because of its place within a larger regional struggle for power.10 As one Brazilian Air Force General proclaimed: ..the international communist offensive, planned a little more that two years ago in Cuba, through OLAS [the Cuban-sponsored Organization of Latin American Solidarity], finds itself in marked development in this continentTaking advantage of the painful state of underdevelopment or disagreements from some and the most pure democratic idealism from others, international communism comes demonstrating its flexibilityin the conquest of power, using either violence and coup dtats, or legal electoral processesWe will be, without doubt, overtaken by the ideological struggle that we face, [which is] now more present, more palpable and more aggressive.11 Based on these fears, it seems that the Brazilians even briefly considered breaking of diplomatic relations with Santiago, before they decided this might offer Allende a convenient enemy around which he could rally support.12 Although Brasilia pulled back from confrontation in this case, rumors nevertheless began circulating about the improvement of U.S.-Brazilian relations to counteract Chilean developments. When Allende unilaterally re-established relations with Cuba shortly after he was inaugurated, therefore going against collective OAS sanctions against Castro, the Brazilians worked diplomatically with the United States to ensure this move would not prove contagious.13 Following the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs visit to Brazil in March, Brazilian newspapers then reported that he and Brazils Foreign Minister had discussed Cuban infiltration in Chilean internal affairs and the future transformation of that country into a base of support for the export of terrorism and subversion.14 Only a
O Estado de So Paolo, 10 November 1970, as quoted in Oficio Conf., Embachile Rio, 23 November 1970. See also Oficio Conf., Embachile Rio, 13 November 1970, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1970/AMRE. 10 Oficio, Embachile Rio to Seor Ministro, 26 October 1970, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1970/AMRE. 11 Speech, General Canaverro Pereira on the occasion of Argentine General Alcides Lpes Aufrancs visit to Brazil, October 1970, as quoted in Embachile Rio to Seor Ministro, 26 October 1970, Brasil/Oficios Conf./1970/AMRE. 12 This possibility and the decision not to break relations were later conveyed to U.S. Secretary of the Treasury John Connally during conversations with President Mdici on 8 June 1972 in Brasilia. For an account of this conversation, see Telegram, Amembassy Wellington to SecState, 23 June 1972, Executive Secretariat, Briefing Books, 1958-1976, Lot 720373, Box 135, Record Group 59, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland [Hereafter RG59/NARA] 13Telegram, Brazilian Embassy, Washington to Secretaria de Estado das Relaes Exteriores, 14 August 1971, Rolo 423, Telegramas recibidos da Embaixada em Washingon, Ministerio de Relaes Exteriores, Arquivo Histrico, Brasilia. On U.S.-Brazilian co-operation on this issue, see Record of Conversation, William Rountree, U.S. Ambassador, Brasilia, and Gibson Barbosa, 22 December 1970, Telegram, Rountree, to SecState, 23 December 1970 Box 2199/RG59/NARA. 14 Paises Latinoamericanos no han contestado consulta de EE.UU para bloqear a Chile; Departamento de Estado inici contactos en noveimbre. Norteamrica y Brasil observan Gobierno de Allende, El Diario and
9

year before, Brasilias relations with Washington had appeared to be suffering from serious tensions on account of U.S. congressional investigations into allegations of torture in Brazil.15 Now, outsiders began to suggest that the U.S.-Brazilian relationship was improving. Moreover, the Chileans feared that increasingly active Brazilian diplomacy within Latin America in 1970 and 1971 was aimed at isolating Chile and assuming a dominant position in South America. As Clodormiro Almeyda, Chiles Foreign Minister during the Allende years, later explained to Polish leaders, not only was Brazil the United States most loyal collaborator, but there was also evidence to suggest Brazils Foreign Minister had gathered together all his friends from Latin America to organize an anti-Chilean campaign in early 1971.16 In view of these apparent manoeuvres, Santiago had ordered its diplomats throughout Latin America to report on Brazilian activity in their host countries.17 In response, Chiles ambassador in Buenos Aires argued that Brazils increased regional diplomacy suggested the United States was distributing different geographic regions of the world to strong regional allies.18 As Raul Rettig, Allendes new ambassador in Brasilia, echoed this possibility in March 1971, concluding that because the United States wanted to rescue its faltering position in Latin America but was reluctant to be the one to intervene directly in regional affairs for fear of a domestic or regional backlash, it was using Brazil to do its dirty work and taking advantage of Brasilias new diplomatic offensive to prevent another Cuba.19 In reality, the dynamics of the U.S.-Brazilian relationship and its interaction Latin American affairs were far more fluid and interactive than this picture of a junior partner being taken advantage of suggest. However, the idea of working with or through Brazil to achieve certain goals in Latin America was certainly a popular one in Washington. Following Allendes election in September 1970, the White House had explicitly pushed for improving relations with Brasilia as a counterweight to Chilean events. And as a result, Brazils relative importance as a key player in inter-American affairs underwent a significant reappraisal in U.S. policymaking circles during last two months in 1970.20 This was then spelt out in full in a Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) prepared by the U.S. embassy in Brasilia in January 1971:

La Prensa, 13 March 1971, enclosures, Telex, Pedro Vuskovic Bravo (Ministro Subrogante de MRE) and Daniel Vergara Bustos (Under Secretary of the Interior) to Letelier, 13 March 1971, Telex E:1-367, EEUU/1971/AMRE. 15 Oficio Conf., Embachile Rio to Seor Ministro, 29 April 1970, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1970/AMRE. 16 Almeyda as quoted in Urgent Note, Summary of Visit of the Chilean Delegation, 2 June 1971, wiazka 3, 40/75, Archiwum Ministerstwa Zagranicznego, Warsaw, Poland. I am grateful to Anita Prazmowska for sharing this document with me and translating it. 17 On Brazils diplomatic offensive see Oficios, Rettig to Seor Ministro, 2 June 1971, and MRE to Seor de Chile en Brasil-Brasilia, 11 June 1971, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1971/AMRE. On Brazilian diplomatic outreach to Peru, see Oficio, Raul Rettig to Seor Ministro, 27 March 1971, enclosure, Oficio, MRE to Embachile Washington, 15 April 1971, Oficios Conf./EEUU/1971/AMRE. 18 Letter, Embajador Ramon Huidobro, Embachile Buenos Aires, to Seor Ministro, 16 July 1971, Oficios Conf./EEUU/1971/AMRE. 19 Oficio, Rettig to Seor Ministro, 26 March 1971, enclosure, Oficio, MRE to Embachile Washington, 15 April 1971, Oficios Conf./EEUU/1971/AMRE. 20 See M. Spektor, Equivocal Engagement: Kissinger, Silveira and the Politics of U.S.-Brazil Relations (19691983) PhD, Oxford University, 2006, 57-69 and T. Harmer, The Rules of the Game: Allendes Chile, Cuba and the United States, 1970-1973, PhD, LSE, 2008, 77-79

The fundamentally most important U.S. interest in Brazil is the protection of U.S. national security through the cooperation of Brazil as a hemispheric ally against the contingencies of: an intra-continental threat, such as a serious deterioration in the Chilean situation (example Chile adopting a Cuba-style export of revolution policy) or the formation of an Andean bloc which turned anti-US; or an admittedly more remote extra-continental threat, such as Soviet penetration of the South Atlantic. The danger posed by recent events in Chile and Bolivia establishes a hemispheric security threat which did not exist at anywhere near the same level as this time last year. The maintenance, therefore, of Brazil as a potential ally in hemispheric security affairs could be of critical interest to the U.S.21 Nixon was especially insistent on improving and strengthening the U.S.-Brazilian alliance, and instructed that he wanted President Mdici to visit Washington within six months.22 Indeed, as he privately told Kissinger and his Chief of Staff, Bob Haldeman, he wanted the Brazilians to know that we are just about the best friend Brazil has had.23 Even so, the increasing emphasis that U.S. policymakers placed on the importance of Brazil within an inter-American context was mirrored by a separate, parallel and autonomous feeling in Brasilia that the Brazilians had to encourage the United to work more closely with them in the light of threatening new hemispheric developments. As far as they saw things or at least the impression that they gave to senior U.S. officials in 1971 and 1972 Brazil needed a powerful partner to ensure that imminent Cold War threats were effectively quashed in Latin America. Believing Nixon was not paying sufficient attention to Latin America, the Medici regime therefore targeted the U.S. administration to persuade it to follow Brasilias lead or, at the very least, to think of Brazil as a serious partner. In November 1970, for example, Brazils Foreign Minister, Mario Gibson Barbosa, had told the United States Ambassador, William Rountree, that he realized that [the] U.S. was far more important to Brazil than Brazil was to [the] U.S. Nevertheless he regarded Brazils success as [a] large, dynamic, and successful country with [an] economy based on [a] free enterprise system, and serving as an important counter [weight] to trends in certain other Latin American countries, to be important to [the] U.S. and [the] free world.24 Then, in early February, Gibson Barbosa, stressed the potential for U.S. cooperation when he raised further concerns about new trends in the Southern Cone region directly with U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers in Washington. Specifically, he underlined Allendes impact on leftleaning nationalist military governments in Peru and Bolivia, and on Uruguay where Brazil was particularly concerned about marked leftist gains. Although Gibson acknowledged that direct intervention in Chile would be counterproductive, he urged the United States to work with Brazil to meet the threats posed by these developments(1) to counter the Chilean situation; (2) to help rebuild friendship for the United States which has waned in
21

Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP), 30 November 1970, enclosure, Airgram, Ambassador William Rountree, AmEmbassy Brasilia to Department of State, 19 January 1971, Box 2136/RG59/NARA. 22Handwritten Note, Kissinger, on Memorandum, Nachmanoff and Kennedy to Kissinger, 5 December 1970, Box H050, National Security Council Institutional Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, NARA [Hereafter: NPMP]. Although Mdici was invited in early 1971, Mdici finally visited in December. 23 White House Tape, Nixon, Kissinger and Haldeman, 11 June 1971, Doc.139, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. E-10: Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972. 24 Record of Conversation, Rountree and Mario Gibson Barbosa, 12 November 1970, Telegram, AmEmbassy Brasilia to SecState, 12 November 1970, Doc.129/FRUS, 19691976: E10

certain sectors in Brazil.25 Around the same time, one Brazilian Vice Admiral spoke to Rountree, at length and almost emotionally about the prospects for U.S.-Brazilian military cooperation and dangerous potentialities in Latin America (he highlighted Chile, other Andean states, and Uruguay for particular attention).26 Overall, then, the Brazilians and U.S. policymakers had similar views about the growing urgency of combating left-wing gains in the Southern Cone. Yet, the United States increasing focus on Brazil revolved almost exclusively around combating what was happening in Chile, while the Brazilians growing emphasis on working with the United States centred on a much broader range of developments in the Southern Cone. As far as we know, Brasilia and Washington went about pursuing their concerns vis--vis these separate problems in an uncoordinated way. Even so, this did not stop them from beginning to talk effusively to each other about the possibility of cooperating with each other more effectively in the future. To the contrary, the more the Nixon administration learnt about Brazilian intervention in other South American countries, the more it reached out to the Mdici government to improve bilateral ties and explore avenues for burden sharing when it came to fighting the Cold War. In turn, the Brazilians had more and more leverage to exert pressure on the United States to pay more attention to what they perceived as being left-wing threats in the Southern Cone aside from Chile. A visit to Washington Specifically, at the end of 1971, Nixon acknowledged Brazils help in having turned back left-wing advances in Bolivia and Uruguay.27 As it turns out, his knowledge of both countries had actually been rather limited before President Medicis visit to Washington in early December. Now, thanks to his Brazilian counterpart filling him in, he not only had a greater understanding of the situation in Bolivia and Uruguay, but he also had a better grasp of Brasilias intervention in the Southern Cone as a whole. The more he learnt, particularly with regards to revelations about the Brazilian involvement in Chile, the more he enthused about what the United States and Brazil might achieve together for the common good of hemispheric anti-communist interests. And, in return, Mdici was able to raise the issues of specific concern to Brazil that he felt the US should engage with more. We should not lose sight of the situation in Latin America which could blow up at any time, Mdici warned his host, thereby imploring Nixon to get more involved in ensuring that it would not. In addition to the urgent tone of his remarks, the Brazilian presidents conceptualization of the Cold War in the Americas during his talks with Nixon is particularly interesting for those of us trying to determine the nature and dimensions of that struggle. U.S. General Vernon Walters, who served as an interpreter for two conversations between Nixon and Mdici, later recorded the Brazilian president as saying, both the U.S. and Brazil should do everything in
Memorandum of Conversation, Rogers, Meyer, Robert W. Dean (Brazil Country Director), Gibson Barbosa and Celso Diniz (Charg daffaires, Brazilian Embassy), 1 February 1971, Box 2134/RG59/NARA. 26 Record of Conversation, Rountree and Admiral Figueiredo, c.14 January, Sao Paulo, Telegram, Rountree to SecState, 14 January 1971, Box 1697/RG59/NARA. 27 Telephone Conversation, Nixon and Rogers, 7 December 1971, Conversation 16:36, White House Tapes, NPMP and Memorandum of Conversation for the Presidents File from Henry Kissinger, 20 December 1971, in Argentine Military Believed U.S. Gave Go-Ahead for Dirty War edited by C. Osorio, August 2002, online at: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB73/index3.htm
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their power to assist the other countries of South America. [Mdici] did not believe that the Soviets or the Chinese were interested in giving any assistance to these countries Communist Movements; they felt that Communism would come all by itself because of the misery and poverty in these countries. The implication of this observation is obvious. If the Cold War conflict in the Americas was a regional variant of a bigger global ideological struggle, as opposed to one theatre of a superpower struggle, then its solutions also lay in the region itself and not in superpower negotiations of the U.S. opening to China. To the contrary, by underlining the Latin American dimensions to the struggle and emphasising Brazils role in having contained or rolled back left-wing advances to date, Mdici appears to have been willing the Nixon administration to pay close attention to regional affairs and treat them as a separate problem, distinct from broader global concerns and requiring special, urgent attention. Indeed, the Brazilian president painted a grim picture of the situation in Latin America for his U.S. counterpart. True, he was able to inform Nixon about Brazils initiatives and assistance to counter this panorama, particularly when it came to ensuring the defeat of a left-wing coalition in Uruguay in the countrys recent presidential elections and a coup detat against Bolivias left-leaning nationalist president Juan Jos Torres in August 1971. However, sitting in the Oval Office during two intimate summit meetings with Nixon, Mdici also noted that the future of Latin America looked pretty bleak. As he stated, it was true that the Broad Front had been defeated [in Uruguays 1971 elections] and the traditional parties had led the election, but if one looked at the other side of that coin one would see that the Communists and their friends, who had polled 5% of the votes in the preceding election, had polled 20% this time[Meanwhile] Bolivia was in desperate straitsif the present Bolivian government did not succeed it would be the last moderate government in Bolivia, which would then fall into the arms of the Communists and become another Cuba or Chile. To ensure that it did not, Mdici specifically mentioned his efforts to persuade Paraguays dictator, Alfredo Stroessner, to give Bolivia access to power supplies from the hydroelectric damn Brazil was financing on the Paran River. Nixon, who seems to have been even less up to date on the Bolivia than on Uruguay, appreciated his guests analysis. He was very happy to hear about Brasilias efforts to combat these seemingly dangerous regional trends, he told his guest. Nevertheless, there were obvious costs associated with such efforts that Mdici pointedly suggested the United States could help with. First and foremost was the issue of funding for Brazils Armed Forces in the light of their new requirements for dealing with these developments in neighbouring countries. As Mdici lamented, the Brazilian Armed Forces were a third of the size of Italys despite Brazil having double Italys population. When Nixon then asked if military contacts should continue between U.S. forces and their Latin American counterparts, Mdici replied affirmatively, arguing that this was the only way to ensure the stability that was essential to economic development. 28 Essentially, this confirmed conclusions that had already been reached as a result of an internal U.S. review on military relations with the region at the beginning of 1971. When instructed by Kissinger to review U.S. military presence in Latin America, an Interdepartmental Group on Inter
28

Memorandums of Conversation, Mdici, Nixon, and Vernon Walters, 11.30a.m, the Presidents Office, 7 December 1971 and Mdici, Nixon and Walters, 10am the Presidents Office, 9 December 1971, Docs.141 and 143/FRUS, 1969-1976: E-10.

American Affairs had already found that military missions, attach staffs, training, and other programs were highly effective for diplomatic and political purposes. To clear up any ambiguity, the Interdepartmental Group had also recommended sending definitive guidance removing any doubts about the permissibility, propriety and desirability of utilizing mission personnel and attaches for purposes of influencing host governments military leaders toward U.S foreign policy objectives. In addition, it advised overcoming legislative restrictions on military sales and according Latin America a high priority over other regions.29 Mdicis views therefore added another voice to the emphasis Washington was placing on military relations with Latin America. However, in other areas, the Brazilian presidents comments had a greater impact on shaping U.S. policy. Indeed, given the Generals view of the desperate situation in Bolivia, Nixon appears to have been very taken by Mdicis insistence that Brasilia and Washington should coordinate their efforts to improve the balance of forces in the region. As the CIA noted, President Nixon took great interest in this proposal and promised to assist Brazil when and wherever possible.30 When it came to Chile, Nixons interest in some sort of coordination and assistance to help the Brazilians do what they already seemed to be doing was even greater. As a memorandum of their conversation recorded: [Nixon] asked whether President Mdici thought that the Chilean Armed Forces were capable of overthrowing Allende. President Mdici replied that he felt that they were, adding that Brazil was exchanging many officers with the Chileans, and made clear that Brazil was working towards this end. The President said that it was very important that Brazil and the United States work closely in this field. We could not take direction but if the Brazilians felt that there was something we could do to be helpful in this area, he would like President Mdici to let him know. If money were required or other discreet aid, we might be able to make it available. This should be held in the greatest confidence. But we must try and prevent new Allendes and Castros and try where possible to reverse these trends. President Mdici said that he was happy to see that the Brazilian and American positions and views were so close.31 Kissinger followed up on this acknowledgement of Brazilian intervention in Chile and the prospect of a U.S.-Brazilian partnership in dealing with Latin American affairs when he met with Mdici. As he reportedly explained, the United States needed advice and cooperation of the largest and most important nation in South America. In areas of mutual concern such as the situations in Uruguay and Bolivia, close cooperation and parallel approaches can be very helpful for our common objectives. He felt it was important for the U.S. and Brazil to coordinate, so that Brazil does some things and we do others for the common good.32 To facilitate such coordination, Nixon offered Mdici a direct channel of communication to the
Study, U.S Military Presence in Latin America, enclosure, Memorandum, Charles Meyer (Chairman, Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs) to Kissinger, 12 January 1971, Box H178/NSCIF/NPMP. 30 Memorandum, Acting Director of Central Intelligence (Cushman) to Kissinger, 29 December 1971, Doc.145/FRUS, 1969-1976: E10. 31 Memorandum of Conversation, Mdici, Nixon and Walters, 9 December 1971. 32 Memorandum of Meeting, Mdici, Gibson Barbosa, Amb Araujo Castro, Kissinger, Walters, Nachmanoff, Blair House 5.15, 8 December 1971, Doc.142/FRUS, 1969-1976: E10.
29

White House, outside the normal diplomatic channels.33 Kissinger had actually broached the possibility of a special consultation arrangement with Brazil six months earlier when he and the president had been discussing their fears that misguided liberals in Congress and the State Department might undermine the United States relationship with Brazil.34 But the success of the Brazilian presidents visit to Washington in December 1971 now added impetus to the idea. Subsequently, when Nixon named Kissinger as the U.S. contact for this channel, Mdici immediately reciprocated, nominating his Foreign Minister, Gibson Barbosa, as his respective interlocutor (he explained that he already handled selected private matters outside the Brazilian Foreign Ministry with him). For extremely private matters, Mdici also recommended that the White House could contact the Brazilian Colonel Manso Netto. Even so, the channels precise purposes were far harder to define than the act of setting it up in the first place and, certainly, no agreement as to who should do what when it came to undermining Allendes government was discussed. When Mdici enthusiastically suggested it could be used a way of discussing how Brazil and the United States might help the million Cuban exiles throughout the Americas to overthrow Castro, Nixon agreed to look into this but offered no commitment. Instead, he returned to the idea of burden sharing (or offloading the U.S. burden in Latin America), rather vaguely suggesting there were many things that Brazil as a South American country could do that the U.S. could not.35 As Nixon privately told Rogers, he wished the General was running the whole continent and the Secretary concurred.36 He also conveyed a similar sentiment in public: where Brazil goes, Latin America will follow, he proclaimed as he toasted Mdicis good health during a banquet thrown in his honour. So what became of the Nixons special agreement with Mdici and how, if at all, did it relate to Chile? As memorandums of the summit conversations that took place in Washington demonstrate, it appears that both presidents had a tendency of talking past each other when it came to practicable plans for future collaboration. On the one hand, the Brazilian clearly wanted concrete assurances of support and assistance, while on the other hand, Nixon wanted to offload the continent on to someone else in line with the so-called Nixon Doctrine of sharing foreign policy burdens with key regional allies. And yet, although there is little evidence to suggest that the U.S.-Brazilian channel worked as a detailed coordinating mechanism when it came to joint operations in Latin America, it nevertheless kept U.S. officials and the Brazilians informed, primed and aware of each others actions. A meeting in Brasilia The next high-level U.S.-Brazilian consultations on Latin American affairs occurred in Brasilia six months the Nixon-Mdici summit between U.S. Secretary of the Treasury John Connally and high-level Brazilian officials. Arriving in Brazil in June 1972, Connally, once again underlined Nixon administrations admiration for the country: Brazils political
Memorandum of Conversation, Mdici, Nixon and Walters, 9 December 1971. White House Tape, Nixon, Kissinger and Haldeman, 11 June 1971, Doc.139/FRUS, 1969-1976: E10. 35 Memorandum of Conversation, Mdici, Nixon and Walters, 9 December 1971. 36 Telephone Conversations, Nixon and William Rogers, 7 December 1971, Conversation 16:36/WHT/NPMP and Telephone Conversation, Nixon and John Connally, 8 December 1971, Conversation 16:44/WHT/NPMP.
33 34

stability and economic growth provided a superb example for other developing nations, Connally marvelled. Following Nixons instructions, he also sought his hosts views on a number of international issues ranging from Vietnam to the Middle East and, crucially, U.S.Latin American relations. Should the United States pursue a regional Latin American policy, Connally asked, or focus on bilateral relationships with individual countries? Pandering to his hosts sense of importance and recognizing a mutual antipathy toward leftwing trends in the hemisphere, he acknowledged that Brazil was obviously different to Uruguay and Chile but noted there were general issues that were of importance to the whole region which might warrant a broader approach. Unsurprisingly, Mdici rejected the idea of a blanket policy, preferring to emphasise the strengthening bilateral ties, and responding emphatically that it would be an injustice to equate.small countries with Brazil, which was far larger in area and population and was making heroic efforts to transform itself into a developed country.37 This Brazilian sense of exceptionalism did not prevent Connally and his hosts discussing broader regional problems. To the contrary, coming from a country they saw as being above and distinct from other Latin American states, the Brazilians saw their role as being to engage the United States more in regional affairs, all the while advising and informing its representatives about what was needed to combat the Left in the Southern Cone. When it came to Chile, Connally encountered affirmation of the United States covert approach to destabilising Allendes government. As Brazils Foreign Minister Gibson Barbosa counselled, more direct intervention in Chile at this point would only strengthen Allendes position. President Mdici also repeated the general thrust of his comments to Nixon the United States had to act, albeit very discreetly and very carefully.38 However, the Brazilians continued to urge greater U.S. action when it came to Bolivia. Following up on their meeting in Washington, President Mdici had written to Nixon in March 1972 warning: Political chaos, or the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist regime in Bolivia, would entail I would not hesitate to say for South America as a whole, consequences far more serious, dangerous and explosive than the Cuban problem, due to the geo-strategic position of Bolivia. He had also urged Nixon to help support General Hugo Banzers regime from Bolivian exiles stationed in Chile.39 The U.S. embassy had echoed this message: The rapid and efficient Brazilian assistance to [the] Banzer government in its early days reflected not only concern over [an] active security threat GOB felt Torres government posed, but also genuine enthusiasm for and sense of affinity with Banzer government. This enthusiasm aside, the Brazilians now expected the United States to step up to the mark and carry the bulk of the load when it now came to economic and budgetary assistance.40 When they met in Brasilia, Mdici was able to tell Connally that he had heard back from Nixon and had been pleased to hear that the United States was helping Bolivia in a very substantial manner. Although Connally reaffirmed the U.S. commitment, Mdici nevertheless took the opportunity of having Nixons envoy in Brasilia to underscore
Memorandum of Conversation, Connally, Mdici et al., 8 June 1972, Telegram, Amembassy Brasilia to SecState, 17 June 1972, Executive Secretariat, Briefing Books, 1958-1976, Lot 720373, Box 135/RG59/NARA. 38 Ibid. 39 Letter, Mdici to Nixon, 27 April 1972 as quoted in Spektor, Equivocal Engagement, 101. 40 Telegram, Amembassy Brasilia to SecState, 7 March 1972, Doc.147/FRUS, 1969-1976: E-10.
37

once more that Bolivia was a permanent worry to Brazil, that Brazil was assisting Bolivia as best she could but that the U.S. must play a major role in supporting Bolivia or else that nation would fall to the QTE other END QTE side. He also expressed his certainty that Cuba and Chile were aiding subversion in Bolivia.41 When Connally landed in La Paz, he also then received direct and repetitive pleas from President Banzer himself for more assistance. As a memorandum of the long conversation between them records, the Bolivian president stressed emphatically that his government had to: make economic and social progress in order to immunize Bolivians from the appeal of Communists and extremiststhe needs, ambitions and aspirations of Bolivians are really modest and it does not take much to satisfy them. At the present time, however, these modest ambitions are unsatisfied and it is necessary to keep many political prisoners as a means of preventing these people from taking advantage of the situation of Bolivia in general. But if his administration is able to make progress, then the Bolivians will be naturally immunized from the appeal of the extremists. To make this progressBolivia desperately needs help from the United States. Bolivia also felt entitled to this because the revolution of last August [Banzers coup] represented an important defeat for communists, and as such, an important victory for the United States and its objectives in Latin America. He noted in this exposition the strategic location of Bolivia in the heartland of South America.42 Even before Banzers pleas, the United States had already committed itself to loaning Bolivias new government $20 million and Connally now emphasized this point, making clear that Washington would prefer La Paz to first use this loan wisely and follow advice on devaluing the Bolivian peso before the Nixon administration handed out yet more assistance. However, assuring Banzer that the United States was committed to helping him, he also promised to see what he could do to limit conditions on U.S. loans to Bolivia so as to make the Bolivian governments task of consolidating its hold over the country easier. Indeed, overall, despite not giving Banzer all that he desired, U.S. aid to Bolivia increased by 600 percent in the new governments first year in power.43 The United States Defense Secretary, Melvin Laird, also publicly used the prospect of Chilean support to anti-Banzer forces to justify increased U.S. military assistance to Bolivia in 1972 even though Washington had no precise or compelling evidence that this was being granted.44 As the State Department noted, some extra-legal support, principally from the Socialist Party, has already been given, and aid to subversives from Castro or other sources will almost certainly transit through Chile but beyond these suppositions, there was no known direct GOC support for subversives against other neighboring countries.45
41 42

Memorandum of Conversation, Connally, Mdici et al., 8 June 1972. Memorandum of Conversation, Connally, Banzer et al., 13 June 1972, Telegram Amembassy La Paz to SecState, 23 June 1972, Executive Secretariat, Briefing Books, 1958-1976, Lot 720373, Box 135/RG59/NARA 43 K. Lehman, Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership, (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1999), 165-66. 44 Telex, Letelier to MRE (Direccin General), 8 June 1972, Telex R, EEUU/1972/AMRE . 45 Options Paper, DOS, Next Steps Options on Chile, 4 April 1972, enclosure, Memorandum, Jorden to Kissinger, 10 April 1972, Box H064/NSCIF/NPMP.

The Mdici government seems to have been pleased with this growing U.S. attention to Bolivia and the Southern Cone as a whole. By September 1972, Banzers position appeared more secure and when Gibson Barbosa met Secretary of State Rogers, he also reflected on the much improved situation in Uruguay. Back in June, the Brazilian president had already told Connally that Juan Mara Bordaberrys government had taken hold very well and was manifesting a strong hand with respect to the terrorist problem.46 Now, three months later, Barbosa celebrated the fact that the Tupamaros leadership had virtually disappeared following a government crackdown with Brazilian and Argentine help (In just three months, Uruguays civilian-military regime took 2,600 prisoners, while a considerable number of Tupamaros sought exile in Chile). As Gibson Barbosa put it, the Southern Cones revolutionary snowball had been reversed. Pivotally, Chiles road to socialism also looked increasingly as if it was nearing its end. In fact, like Mdici before him, Gibson Barbosa commented that Chile at the end of 1972 resembled Joo Goularts final days in 1964.47 A meeting of minds? Following a failed coup attempt against Salvador Allende on 29 June 1973, Brazilian TV and newspapers had been increasingly showing constant images of the Chilean truckers strike, violent clashes in Santiagos streets and long queues for scarce commodity products throughout the country. Headlines pointed to severe food shortages in Chile asked whether Allende was nearing the end (O Estado de So Paulo, 9 September).48 Reporting back to Santiago, Chiles Ambassador in Brasilia also noted that there was no doubt that the concept of ideological frontiers continued to be highly relevant to Brazils foreign policy in Latin America.49 Indeed, Brasilias attachment to ideology as a basis for determining the countrys international relations was just about to serve as the logical basis for its new relationship with Chiles military regime. In the months leading up to the coup, the Brazilian ambassador in Santiago certainly made no secret of his antipathy for Allende. At a dinner party he hosted for Latin American diplomats in 1973, he very quickly took to criticizing Allende and making crude jokes about the presidents wife. So much so, that ten minutes after the Mexican Ambassador and his wife had arrived, they broke protocol and left the party, shocked by the tone of conversation and refusing to take any part in it.50 The Brazilian ambassador also propositioned Nathaniel Davis, the United States Ambassador in Santiago, about cooperative planning, interembassy coordination, and joint efforts to overthrow Allende in the months leading up to September. As Davis later concluded, he had no real doubt the Brazilians were actively
46 47

Memorandum of Conversation, Connally, Mdici et al., 8 June 1972. Memorandum of Conversation, Rogers and Barbosa, 29 September 1972, Waldorf Hotel, Telegram, USMission, UN to SecState, 6 October 1972, Box 2130/RG59/NARA and Gaspari, Ditadura Derrotada, 34951. On serious Brazilian government and military concerns regarding the Tupamaro threat and the security situation in Uruguay, see Telegram, AmEmbassy Brasilia to SecState, 7 March 1972, Doc.147/FRUS, 19691976: Vol.E-10. 48 Oficio, Rolando Stein, Encargado de Negocios, EmbaChile Brasilia to Seor Ministro, 13 September 1973, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE. 49 Oficio Conf., Rettig to Seor Ministro, 5 September 1973, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE. 50 Authors interview with Gonzalo Martnez Corbal, 30 December 2009, Mexico City, Mexico.

supporting and enouraging military plotting in Chile prior to the coup.51 Although there is no specific evidence to suggest Davis accepted the Brazilians offer or that the U.S. directly encouraged Brasilia to intervene at this late stage of Allendes presidency in 1973, there is also no indication that Washington was critical either. On the contrary, U.S. policymakers increasingly emphasised the potential benefits of Brazilian assistance to coup plotters and any hypothetical future military government. Pivotally, the Nixon administrations Interagency Group on Chile was concerned that there did not seem to be an indication of any widespread sense of mission among the Chilean military to take over and run the country. To instil such a mission and to ensure that future Chilean leaders received the necessary equipment to carry it out, contingency planers therefore wanted to encourage future collaboration with Brazil. This was also envisaged as a way to reduce future pressures on and exposure of U.S. assistance to any unconstitutional regime that succeeded Allende. Indeed, three days before the coup took place, U.S. policymakers were suggesting that if successful military leaders asked for easily identifiable U.S. equipment i.e. helicopters etc., Washington would first seek to encourage support from other Latin American countries Brazil. 52 Parallels between an impending showdown in Chile and the Brazilian coup of 1964 including private sector-funding to opposition parties and paramilitaries, womens groups aggravating anti-government tension and the spectre of foreign subversion were also plain for all to see and, certainly, Chiles politicians were receptive to Brazils example. As Washingtons ambassador in Rio de Janeiro at the time of the 1964 Brazilian coup later recalled, Chiles ex-president, Eduardo Frei, had visited him in Washington during the Allende presidency and clearly told him that Chile needed a Brazilian solution.53 As well as providing an inspirational model to coup plotters and anti-Allende politicians, the Brazilian regime also responded positively to requests for intelligence information from Chilean military personnel. Pivotally, in mid-August 1973, a retired Chilean Admiral, Roberto Kelly, arrived in Brazil on a highly secret mission related to advanced Chilean coup plotting against Allende. Kelly had been sent by the leader of coup plotting within the Chilean Navy, Admiral Jos Toribio Merino, to obtain information from Brazilian intelligence sources about the possibility that Peru might take advantage of a coup in Chile to invade the country and recapture lands lost during the War of the Pacific. Brazilian intelligence officials were able to reassure him that Limas leaders had no such intention. Indeed, as he later recalled, he returned to Santiago with what was effectively a green light for military leaders to launch a coup against Allende as and when they had an opportunity to do so. 54 Two weeks later, at around 10 in the morning on 11 September, the Chilean embassy in Brasilia started to receive numerous questions about what was going on back in Santiago. At
Davis, Last Two Years, 331-32. Chile Contingency Paper: Possible Military Action, Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group on Chile, enclosure, Memorandum, Pickering to Scowcroft, 8 September 1973, Box 2196/RG59/NARA [Hereafter: IG Contingency Paper, 8 September 1973]. 53 Frei as recalled by Lincoln Gorden. Authors interview with Lincoln Gordon, 2 May 2005, Washington D.C. 54 P. Arancibia Claval ed., Conversando con Roberto Kelly V.: Recuerdos de una Vida (Santiago: Editorial Biblioteca Americana, 2005) 144-147.
51 52

least initially, it had very little information to share with press reporters that began gathering outside. Although the Jornal do Brasil announced the victory of the Military Movement for National Liberation along with the news that an almost certain re-approximation of relations between Brasilia and Santiago would follow, the Brazilian government also kept quiet about what its official reaction to the coup would be for a full two days.55 Then, on 13 September, things began to move very quickly. Now that the juntas seizure of power in Chile and the orientation of the new military government was blatantly clear, Chiles ambassador, Raul Retting, resigned his post leaving Stein in charge. It was in his new capacity as representative of the new military regime in Chile that Stein then arrived at Itamaraty early in the morning to deliver the juntas official request for international recognition. He then waited until he was called back to the Foreign Ministry at 8.30 that evening. Given the hour, he recalled that there were plenty of guards and very few functionaries left at Itamaraty when he arrived. Stein was also especially tense as he had just received news over the airwaves that a sector of the Army loyal to Salvador Allende might be on its way to Santiago. Although this news was false, Stein recalled weeks later that he was convinced that a full-scale civil war in Chile was imminent, which in turn made the question of getting immediate international recognition for the military junta even more urgent than it had been earlier that morning. When he was shown in to meet Ambassador Espedito Resende, third in command at Itamaraty, he encountered a serious atmosphere and newspapers with pictures relating to the coup and the possibility of a resistance movement developing in Chile strewn across the table. As Resende explained to him, the Brazilians had also just received news of a possible challenge to the juntas authority and Foreign Minister Gibson Barbosa was therefore personally studying the Chilean situation in great detail. In the meantime, however, President Mdici had telephoned Gibson and personally asked him to ensure that Brazils private assurances of support were delivered to the junta immediately. Ordinarily, the Brazilian government would have wanted to receive confirmation that a new government was fully in control of their country before offering recognition, Resende explained, but given the importance of what had happened in Chile and Brazils sympathy for the coups leaders, Medici personally wanted the process of recognition speeded up. Indeed, at precisely the moment that Stein sat anxiously waiting for a response to the juntas request for recognition at Itamaraty on the evening of 13 September, he now found out that Brazils Ambassador in Santiago was arriving at Chiles Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deliver the good news that the new government had Brasilias recognition and full support in person.56 As a concrete manifestation of this support, two Brazilian Air Force jets carrying 20 tons of medical aid, which had been on standby all day, now took off for Santiago. In the two weeks that followed, the Brazilian government also expressed its readiness to supply Chile with 40,000 tons of sugar. The Chilean junta also received Brazilian buses and a $5 million credit from the Banco do Brasil Agency in Santiago. As Chilean diplomats reported, such levels of support for Chile would have been unthinkable before the coup. Brazilian government functionaries were quite clearly under high-level instructions to respond quickly to requests from Santiago, they wrote back to Santiago, and were doing so with the habitual affection that they now felt for Chile.57 Then, at the end of October, an important Chilean economic
55 56

Oficio Conf., Rolando Stein, Encargado de Negocios to Seor Ministro, 13 September 1973 Oficio, Stein to Seor Ministro, 27 September 1973, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE. 57 Ibid.

delegation arrived in Brazil led by the new head of Chiles Central Bank, General Eduardo Cano, and Orlando Saenz, an advisor on economic affairs at the Chilean Foreign Office. In the course of their meetings with members of Brazils central bank, functionaries at Itamaraty and the Brazilian Finance Minister, the Chileans put forward requests for immediate and sizeable assistance that included lines of credits worth $100 million in hard currency and a further $150 million to purchase consumer goods and capital, facilities to renegotiate Chiles outstanding debt with Brazil (worth $9 million), and the possibility of reestablishing a mixed Chilean-Brazilian commission to channel bilateral agreements. Although the delegation did not receive nearly the full amounts that it asked for, the Brazilian response to such requests was nevertheless generous, comprising as it did of a credit worth $50 million in hard currency to be paid back over 3 years at 1.5 percent interest staring in 1976, a credit of $35 million to purchase Brazilian goods (expanded from the $22 million credit already offered to the Allende government but never used), a further $50 million credit on behalf of CACEX to by durable consumer goods (worth $10 million prior to the coup), and a further unspecified credit to Chiles Armed forces to be arranged separately.58 Indeed, looking back on the first weeks of Brazils relationship with the new military regime in Chile, Stein wrote to Santiago of his warm appreciation for Brasilias extremely favourable attitude and support.59 Subsequently, General Pinochets visit to Brasilia for the presidential inauguration of Ernesto Geisel in March 1974 the first international visit he had made after the coup publicly demonstrated the new alliance between both countries. While in Brasilia, Pinochet not only discussed prospects for strengthening bilateral political, cultural and economic relations with Geisel, but he also had the opportunity to meet at length with Paraguays Alfredo Stroessner, Bolivias military leader, Hugo Banzer, and Uruguays rightwing dictator, Jos Maria Bordaberry. On this occasion, Brazil seemed to have become the centre of a new anticommunist international that it had had a significant influence in putting together or, as press reports at the time put it, a new anti-Marxist axis.60 Certainly, Brazilian ideological sympathies with Chiles new regime were also reflected in practical collaboration between both countries to combat left-wing groups in Latin America and further afield. Thanks to Brazilian diplomatic presence in Soviet bloc countries (something that the Chileans no longer had), for example, Itamaraty passed on secret information to Santiago about left-wing Chilean exiles in the East and on activities being staged against the dictatorship abroad.61 Manuel Contreras, the head of the notorious Chilean Secret Intelligence Service responsible for the torture and disappearance of thousands of Chileans after 11 September also recently testified that he came to an arrangement with the Brazilian government by which Chilean military personnel would frequently travel to Brazil to receive instruction and training in
58

Oficio, Stein to Seor Ministro, Visita de Misn Econmica, 29 October 1973, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE. Brazils credit to Chile during the Allende years is puzzling given what we know about Brazilian efforts to encourage a coup against him. However, they must be viewed in terms of Brazils interests in expanding economic influence in Latin America during the same period and should be contrasted with the much higher offers that were provided to Chile after the coup (not to mention Brazils active support for Banzer in Bolivia). 59 Oficio, Stein to Seor Ministro, 27 September 1973 60 Oficio, Embajador Cubillos, Embachile Brasilia to Seor Ministro, 22 March 1974, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1974/AMRE. 61 Oficio, Cubillos, Embachile Brasilia to Seor Ministro, 1 August 1974, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1974/AMRE.

counterinsurgency techniques.62 And the Brazilians assisted with publication and distribution of Chilean books favorable to the coup and its leaders intentions.63 Nevertheless, below the surface, the ties that bound Brasilia to Santiagos new regime and vice versa soon came under significant strain both as a result of each side getting to know each other better and the expectations that both placed on their evolving relationship. Aside from having gained an ideological ally, for example, the late Mdici government quite clearly expected to reap concrete international dividends from its alliance with Chiles new military regime. Certainly, when the Chilean juntas newly appointed ambassador in Brasilia presented his credentials to Gibson Barbosa in December 1973, the latter made it quite clear that the Brazilian government expected some form of reward for the effusive support it had offered to the junta. After expressing profound concern and sympathy for the hostile way in which the Chileans were being treated in international circles and insisting that Brasilia was in the same trench as Santiago when it came to fighting off critics at the United Nations he then asked for assurances that Chile would alter a previous vote on the question of shared natural resources at the UN General Assembly to support Brazil (as opposed to Argentina). I want to be very frank with you, Ambassador, Gibson Barbosa underlined, This problem is vital for Brazil and our future policy towards Chile will be conditional on the position that you adopt. He did not want to modify the policy he had set in train of establishing intimate collaboration with Chile, he went on, but he would have to if Chile did not change its position. As Chiles new Ambassador, Hernn Cubillos, wrote back to Santiago, Gibson Barbosa had clearly laid Brazils cards on the table: the Chilean-Brazilian relationship, a central axis of Santiagos new foreign policy, was now apparently dependent on how Chile responded to this direct appeal for support in a bitter dispute between Brazil and Argentina at the United Nations over control of the Paran River and the waters leading down to the Rio de la Plata basin.64 The Chileans subsequent rejection of Gibson Barbosas direct plea therefore created strains below the surface of what was otherwise intimate relationship between Santiago and Brasilia and began to underpin the growing divergence between Chile and Brazil in the mid-1970s. Furthermore, following Geisels inauguration, a gulf began to appear between Brasilia and Santiago in terms of the way in which both viewed the urgency and methods to be used in fighting ideological enemies in the Southern Cone. For their part, the Chileans grew disenchanted with Geisels new policy of abertura and distenso and the implications this had for Brazils international policies. As one Chilean foreign ministry put it, this new approach was making it inconvenient for the Brazilians to join in as fully with Chile in a necessary ideological crusade against international Marxism and Soviet imperialism as
62 63

Marie-Monique Robin, Escuadrones de la Muerte: La Escuela Francesa, documentary film, (2003) Oficios, Cubillos to Seor Ministro (DINEX), 7 November 1974, Oficios Secretos y Reservados/Brasil/1974/AMRE. 64 Record of Conversation, Gibson Barboza and Hernn Cubillos, 7 December 1973, in Oficio, Embajador Hernn Cubillos, Embachile Brasila to Sero Ministro, 7 December 1973, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE. On the importance that the highest authorities in Brazil were paying to the Chilean vote on this question, see also Oficio, Cubillos to Seor Ministry, 30 November 1973, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE. As Cubillos wrote home, Brazils position was quite clearly a minority one (with 37 African countries and the majority of Asian voting against it) but only Chile and Peru fully supported Argentinas position within Latin America and 41 countries (including Uruguay) had previously abstained.

Santiago would like them to.65 Indeed, the Chilean regimes obsessive anti-communist agenda meant that it became increasingly suspicious of Brasilia and singularly focused on its crusade against the left to the exclusion of other hemispheric developments. For one, in August 1974, Santiagos representatives reported home that that the Brazilian media was curiously infiltrated with left-wing tendencies.66 Second, Chiles military regime increasingly (but wrongly) believed that Peru was on the verge of invading with direct encouragement from the Soviet Union and the Cubans, and that the Brazilians were not showing enough support. To be sure, Brasilias military leaders were said to view Cuban and Soviet support for Peru with seriousness. But Itamaraty made it clear that it thought a Peruvian strike would be madness and that Lima quite clearly understood that it had lost any opportunity after the coup to take advantage of Chilean vulnerability. Chiles ambassador in Brasilia also reported back home that although there were apparent Brazilian efforts to appease Chilean worries, significant steps were nevertheless still being made to improve ties between Brazil and Peru that seemed to take priority. As Brazils Foreign Minister told Cubillos, the Geisel regime believed was important to maintain a presence in Peru in spite of ideological differences. This was yet one more demonstration of Brazils new responsible pragmatism in international affairs and a clear move towards boosting the chances of Brasilias trade and development of raw material extraction with Lima, Chiles ambassador wrote back to Santiago.67 Wary of the fact that political and ideological factors mattered less and less when it came to Brasilias international decisions, the Chileans also observed that trade and economic ties were leading Brazil to improve its relations with the socialist world.68 As Cubillos had argued back in April 1974, From a political-economic point of view, Brazil has become aware of its importance, of its manifest destiny within hemispheric politics, in its preparationto transform itself into a world power. As a result, it was now acting cautiously, which was consequently placing it further and further away from Chiles virulent, obsessive Cold War outlook.69 Cubillos reading of this growing distance between Chile and Brazil in the context of the Geisel regimes reorientation of Brazilian foreign policy after March 1974 was astute. For their part, the Brazilians increasingly perceived themselves to dealing with unsophisticated Chilean Cold Warriors and became critical of the way in which the government in Santiago handled its ideological crusade abroad. According to Brazilian Foreign Ministry officials, the juntas representatives were certainly not playing their cards at the United Nations very well. Rather than brilliant polemicistswith a very poor capacity for dialogue, Brazilian diplomats advised their Chilean counterparts at the end of 1974, the Chile should have sent able negotiators to the 1974 UN General Assembly who could explain and convince other delegates of Santiagos cause as opposed to alienating them. As it was, the Brazilians believed that Santiagos approach to international diplomacy was extremely aggressive and

Memorandum Confidencial de la Cancilleria Chilena [Distributed by Centro de Informaciones Comit Chileno de Solidaridad con la Resistencia Antifascista], 9 December 1974, Document 5, Folder 3, Box 2, Fondo Orlando Letelier, Archivo Nacional, Santiago, Chile. 66 Oficio, Cubillos, to Seor Ministro, 1 August 1974, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1974/AMRE 67 Oficio, Cubillos to Seor Ministro (DIRELAS), 31 October 1974, Oficios Secretos y Reservados/Brasil/1974/AMRE. 68 Oficio, Cubillos to Seor Ministro, 24 September 1974, Oficios Secretos y Reservados/Brasil/1974/AMRE. 69 Oficio, Cubillos to Seor Ministro, 5 April 1974, Oficios Conf/Brasil/1974/AMRE.
65

counterproductive given the unfavorable context in which Santiago was operating.70 Moreover, in late 1974 and 1975, Brazil no longer seemed as predisposed to help economically or financially as it had been immediately after the coup. As the U.S. Ambassador in Brasilia, John H. Crimmins, observed, the Chileans were frustrated with Brazil. Geisels regime was generally sympathetic but it was wary of getting too close to Chiles increasingly fanatical dictatorship, especially as the Chileans seemed extremely sensitive and unresponsive when Brasilia suggested that Santiago should work on enhancing its international image in the area of human rights.71 Indeed, all in all, U.S. diplomats had to admit that Brazilian assistance had turned out to be rather more limited and minor than they had initially expected.72 These changes in the relationship between Brazil and Chile happened gradually and were the result of internal shifts within the Brazilian leadership and policy orientation. However, they were also the result of Chiles extreme form of anti-communist authoritarian rule. Chiles regime after 1973 initially looked very much like Brazils dictatorship. But as one external observer noted two years later, there was a major difference: the level of oppressionChiles military junta has not only utilized the experience of Brazil but leapfrogged the early experimental stages of the Brazilian process.73 In the longer term, this meant that Chile began gravitating more naturally to the regimes in Uruguay, Paraguay and after 1976, Argentina, who would make up the core members of Operation Condor, while Brazil supported their Cold War crusades at a distance. Final Thoughts Much remains to be learnt about the relationship between Brazil and Chile after 11 September 1973 and indeed about other relations between right-wing Latin American Cold Warriors. Even so, available evidence relating to the growing divergence between Brasilia and Santiago is significant in helping us to unpick the heterogeneous dimensions of the Cold War in the Americas. Given the Brazilian military regimes ideological leanings, its response to Allendes election and its encouragement of a coup in Chile had been logical. Yet, the evolution of the effusive new relationship between Brasilia and Santiago, formalized on 13 September 1973, indicates that just as there were many different types of left-wing groups within Latin America there were also different degrees of anti-communism which shifted over time. Both the Chileans and the Brazilians quite clearly pursued their own national agendas that pulled them apart as they set about articulating their own approach to the international context they found themselves to be facing. And in the process, they drifted apart. For the Chileans, Brazils increasingly lukewarm reception to their publicly proclaimed ideas about fighting and hunting down communists throughout the region was simply not enough. For the new Geisel government in Brasilia, the Chilean connection was becoming something of a liability when it came to promoting a more open and measured foreign policy
Oficio, Stein, Encargado de Negocios, Embachile Brasilia to Seor Ministro, 27 December 1974, Oficios Secretos y Reservados/Brasil/1974/AMRE. 71 Electronic Telegram, AmEmbassy Brasilia to AmEmbassy Santiago, 11 April 1975, Electronic Telegrams, Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA, online at: Access to Archival Databases (AAD) http://.aad.archives.gov/add/ [Hereafter , DOS/CFP] 72 Electronic Telegrams, AmEmbassy Santiago to SecState, 27 March and 17 April 1975, DOS: CFP. 73 MacEoin, Struggle For Dignity, 194-99.
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as part of a more general policy of abertura. Indeed, Brazilian military rulers seem to have believed that the Chileans were incompetent when it came to navigating the corridors of the UN and positioning themselves worldwide. To put it another way, although the Brazilian response to the Chilean military juntas request for recognition was relatively automatic, the way in which the Chilean-Brazilian relationship then played out was complicated and by no means preordained. This story of the shifting ties between Cold Warriors in Santiago and Brasilia nevertheless needs further examination if we are to get to the heart of Brazils intervention in Chile during the Allende years and the subsequent relationship between both countries military regimes in the years that followed. Certainly, once Brazils documents are fully declassified numerous questions will need answering. Did Brazils military government provide Allendes opposition and Chilean coup plotters with financial assistance between 1970 and 1973, and if so how much? How extensive were the Brazilian military exercises around the hypothetical notion of guerilla warfare that were carried out in early 1971 and what was the result of them? How precisely did the special arrangement between Nixon and Medici develop and are there any records of special channel communications between Washington and Brasilia beyond the Connally-Mdici meeting in June 1972? Did the Nixon administration ever coordinate its destabilization efforts in Chile with the Brazilians as Nixon promised he would do and to what extent did the Brazilians share their own involvement in Chilean affairs or communication with members of Chiles armed forces with Washington? Was the Brazilian offer of coordination to bring down Allende that was made to Ambassador Davis prior to the coup relayed back to Washington and, if so, what was the response? Similarly, did the Brazilian ambassadors offer come directly from Brasilia or was it the result of a maverick an on the ground pushing his countrys agenda? Why were the Brazilians considered the best source of intelligence on the Peruvian militarys intentions in the period leading up to the coup? Did Brazilian officers who were in Chiles National Stadium after the coup arrive before or after the coup? These questions aside, the puzzle of why the Brazilian dimension of the Allende story has not received more attention to date is also intriguing. In spite of the many gaps in our knowledge, we now know enough to know that Brazils intervention and interaction with Chilean developments was serious and influential. And yet, it is clear that the Allende government, the Cubans and the Latin American left in particular did not pay attention to Brazils role in hemispheric affairs and try to counter it, which in turn begs the question as to why not. Although Rettig was pleading with the Chilean foreign ministry to regard Brasilia as a serious concern in 1971 and the Brazilian ambassador did little to hide his hostility to the Allende government within the Latin American diplomatic community in Santiago, they were both relatively ignored. Moreover, in numerous interviews either with Cuban intelligence officials operating in Chile at the time, or members of Allendes government and members of the MIR, I have raised the question of Brazils threat to the UP government and received the same reaction: Brazilwas simply not on their radar. Indeed, when I have then gone on to share details of U.S.-Brazilian conversations on Chile, Uruguay or Bolivia and the need to contain Allendes influence in Latin America, along with information on communications between coup plotters and Brasilia, they are surprised.

More than anything else, this surprise reveals a prevailing but misguided notion about the history of Brazils international relations during the period of authoritarian military rule. To the Chilean left, Brazils military regime was always perceived as a potential enemy but a tertiary one when compared to the far greater threat of U.S. intervention against Allende and the prospect of interstate conflict with one of Chiles more traditional enemies: Argentina or Peru. Moreover, by their calculations at the time, Brazils military leaders were simply Washingtons puppets portrayed quite literally in left wing caricatures of the time as Uncle Sams performing gorillas in military uniform. By this schema, Brazils hostility would be controlled by the United States, which was considered to be both the source of all hostility ranged against Allendes left-wing government and the key to neutralizing it. Never, does it seem, did the Chileans or the Cubans seriously look at the possibility that Brasilias military leaders might be acting autonomously in Bolivia or Uruguay or for that matter Chile. Nor, indeed, does it seem that they fully appreciated the model that Brazil provided for coup plotters as they prepared at once to overthrow Allendes peaceful democratic road to socialism and a long-standing Chilean tradition of liberal constitutional democracy. Even though Allende, his government and his supporters were increasingly fearful of U.S. intervention, it was not U.S. style democracy that Chiles armed forces turned, but Brazils authoritarian regime, even if they took their efforts to erase all vestiges of pluralistic governance to far greater extremes than Brazils military rulers ever did. To a certain extent, Cold War historians have all too often tended to fall into a similar trap of overemphasizing the United States when looking at the Chilean coup or, to the extent that they have looked at it, analyzing Brazils role in Latin America after 1964. Certainly, international histories of Allendes Chile have tended to concentrate almost exclusively on Washingtons opposition to the Popular Unity government and the extent to which it was responsible for the coup whilst ignoring the other countries that were simultaneously involved in Chilean events on all sides of the political spectrum. All of which in turn simplifies what was in fact a far more multidimensional and international struggle to determine the future character and destiny of the Southern Cone in which Latin Americans quite often drove the agenda or at the very least helped shaped it. This U.S.-dominated pattern has also tended to dominate historiography more broadly when it comes to the story of hemispheric relations and the inter-American system. An ongoing emphasis on the United States immense power to dictate what happens in Latin America also apparently continues to dominate thinking in the region. Indeed, watching Oliver Stones new film, South of the Border, I was recently struck by the persistence of this very idea among the left in Latin America today that the United States and U.S. imperialism is responsible for pretty much all opposition to the likes of Chvez, Evo Morales or Rafael Correa. True, U.S. intervention against left-wing movements and governments in Latin America during the Cold War and after it is a documented fact. But if history teaches us anything, it is that Washington is not the only pivot around which inter-American affairs are played out and conducted, and that regional and local actors have also played autonomous and consequential roles either directly or indirectly in determining how the hemispheres future evolved.