Theoretical Criminology

http://tcr.sagepub.com On the emotions of crime, punishment and social control

Willem De Haan and Ian Loader Theoretical Criminology 2002; 6; 243 DOI: 10.1177/136248060200600301 The online version of this article can be found at: http://tcr.sagepub.com

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Theoretical Criminology
2002 SAGE Publications London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi. 13624806(200208)6:3 Vol. 6(3): 243253; 026022

On the emotions of crime, punishment and social control

WILLEM DE HAAN AND IAN LOADER

University of Groningen, The Netherlands and Keele University, UK

The aim of this Special Issue is to stimulate theoretical debate on the relationship between human emotions and crime, punishment and social control. Intuitively, one is bound to think of this relationship as a close one. States of emotional arousalpleasure, anger, fear, sadness, disgust, remorse, resentment, shame, guilt and so forthseem somehow deeply and intimately implicated in (and hence vital to an understanding of) numerous elds of criminological enquiry; whether they be offender motivation, the dynamics of hate crime or domestic violence, fear of crime, victimization and its effects, the appeal of mass-mediated crime dramas or the impassioned demands of citizens for order. Indeed, it is hard to see how the analysis of crime and justice can adequately proceedin these and other domains of criminologywithout some serious attention being paid to the place of emotions in social life. For, as sociologist Norbert Elias has convincingly argued: Every investigation that considers only the consciousness of men, their reason or ideas, while disregarding the structure of drives, the direction and form of human affects and passions, can from the outset be of only limited value (Elias, 1994 [1939]: 486). Yet the emotions remain a somewhat peripheral topic within theoretical criminology. Many established and thriving modes of criminological reflection and research continue to proceed in ways that ignore entirely, or at best gesture towards, the impact of human emotions on their subjectmatterif you doubt this, take a quick glance at almost any criminology textbook, whether of a conventional, radical or integrating bent.1 This is not to gainsay the emergence in recent years of a number of more or less explicitly articulated attempts to make good the neglect of human emotions 243
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Theoretical Criminology 6(3) within criminological theorizing. Jack Katzs (1988) phenomenological dissection of the sensual pleasures of offending springs immediately to mind here; as does Scheff and Retzingers (1991) account of the interplay between violence, shame and rage, and some recent analysis of masculinities and crime (e.g. Messerschmidt, 1993; Jefferson, 2002). A urry of enquiries into the role of the passions in shaping contemporary penality has also ensued in the aftermath of David Garlands (1990) inuential work on penal sensibilities. Although it cannot be denied that much can beand has beenlearned about criminologys subject-matter without reference to the emotions, there remain sound reasons for thinking that approaching these topics from an emotional point of view might enrich criminological research and reection; helping us construct explanations of criminal behaviour and social censures that are neither unduly simplistic nor over-rationalized (Frazier and Meisenhelder, 1985). In this brief introduction, we indicate what some of these reasons might be, set out some possible new directions for theory and research in this eld, and proffer a summary of the substantive contributions that follow.

Emotions of crime
Several years ago, one of us came across the following statement, given to the police by a 68-year-old woman who had been the victim of a streetrobbery:
I was followed by a white male, approximately 22-years-old, who had come from behind. In his hand he held a six-inch long knife. I heard him say: Your money or Ill stab you. I took my purse from my left coat pocket, showed him there were only two bills of ten and one of twenty-ve in it and gave him the forty-ve guilder. Then he wanted my necklace as well, but I told him it was a fake. After this I saw him lean against the inner court wall and he started crying. I heard him say: Ive never done this before and I need a hundred guilder for my mother. Then he gave me back my money. I then gave him twenty guilders and went into my house.

This case of a crying street-robber is, of course, an exception; not because of the mans desperate act but because the perpetrator so clearly evinced mixed feelings over his actions. It is not altogether clear what these feelings were; perhaps he cried out of helplessness, perhaps he was ashamed, maybe he was feeling guilty. We willin this particular casenever know. However, the example brings to the fore what most criminological theory still struggles to explain: that criminal behaviour is deeply and ambiguously shot-through with emotions of various kinds, including those of guilt and shame. This is how one of us initially came to be interested in the emotions as a subject relevant to criminology. This interest emerged out of a dissatisfaction with those dominant theories of crimecontrol theory, routine activities theory and, especially, rational choice theorythat simply

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de Haan & LoaderEmotions of crime, punishment and social control assume or take for granted offender motivation; theories that appear to lack the intellectual curiosity and conceptual resources needed to get-togrips with, and adequately understand, how and why people are animated to commit crimes. Some time ago, Jock Young (1986) wrote about an aetiological crisis in criminology that occurred because extant theoretical paradigms could not convincingly explain why crime increased rather than decreased in welfare states in which social inequality and social deprivation had clearly diminished. In order to understand better the reality of crime a new realism in criminology was, he argued, needed, one that took crime more seriously, especially from the victims point of view. This was also an answer to the widely heard popular complaint that criminology had gone too far in understanding offenders while neglecting the victims of crime. In the meantime, the parameters of this aetiological crisis have changed to the point that the victim of crime has become the symbol par excellence of the late modern condition, and protecting victims rights the predominant ideological justication of criminal justice (Boutellier, 2000). Today we are confronted with a different aetiological crisis, one in which an inability (or unwillingness) to understand what motivates offenders impairs, in different ways, both academic and public discourse about crime and justicesomething that popular responses to so-called crimes of senseless violence makes especially apparent. As criminologists we can hardly fail to notice that such responses, replete as they are with a host of theoretical assumptions and claims about offender motivations, are seldom predicated on a convincing portrayal of the reality of crime. Yet (self) doubt seems somehow to prevent criminologists from entering meaningfully into such debates, as if they are no longer sure that current criminological theories have much if anything to contribute to public deliberation about crime. Steve Hall, for instance, has argued in the pages of this journal that standard criminological explanations are proving inadequate in this period of rapid, qualitative and unprecedented change (1997: 471). Bart van Hoorebeeck similarly bemoans the fact that much criminology as we know it does not seem to have a clue about the world out there (1997: 515). If criminological theorizing is to begin to transcend these doubts and charges it needs, we think, to take more serious account of the affective dimensions of criminal behaviour; something that requires a more active engagement withand inthe sociology of emotions. It is only by doing this, van Hoorebeeck argues, that we [can] start to think of understanding the practices that weas criminologistsare supposed to talk about (1997: 515). We need to insist that perpetrators of crime are moral subjects striving reexively to give meaning to their actions before, during and after the crime. This requires theories that operate with a broader conception of practical and discursive consciousness and moral agencytheories that do justice to the feelings of the offender, the normative meanings that law-

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Theoretical Criminology 6(3) breakers attribute to their own behaviour and the social and cultural contexts within which such meanings are activated. It is these considerations that have animated us in putting this Special Issue of Theoretical Criminology together in order to addressor at least prompt further consideration ofthe following questions: What does the relative neglect of human emotions tell us about the domain assumptions of criminological theory? What happens to various theoretical perspectives (e.g. on motivation, subculture, strain, rational choice, masculinities) once the question of emotions is introduced? Can a focus on the emotions help to construct more adequate (embodied) accounts of crime as social action? Might recent encounters between criminology and social theory (and the concern to think through the value in criminology of concepts such as habitus, structuration, discursive and practical consciousness, risk, etc.) be enriched by a focus on emotions?

Emotions of punishment and social control

In Holland in 1999, a judge passing sentence in the case of a multiple child molester could be seen on national television breaking down in tears. As with the crying robber, the crying judge appeared possessed of mixed feelings. It is also, once more, uncertain what these feelings comprised. Were his tears prompted by empathy or compassion with the young victims (reminding him perhaps of his own children)? Or was it the pressure created by the intense media attention that he could no longer handle? Again, we will never know. But this examplewhich also stands as an exception (legal ofcials do not usually cry)illustrates the moral ambiguity of public reactions to crime. In this case, a question was immediately raised concerning whether such an outpouring of emotion is compatible with the impersonality that professional judges are expected to uphold as impartial legal gures. The law demands that judges do not openly show any sign of bias concerning the guilt or innocence of the accused, something that requires his or her emotions to be kept under tight rein during the course of the trial. However, it is less clear (and more controversial) whether this continues to hold at the moment of verdict and sentence when moral condemnation is at stake. Is judicial self-control even more vital here because an uncontrolled public display of emotionality by a legal gure would reinforce the trauma of victims and stoke irrational responses among the public at large? Or is it, conversely, entirely tting for a judge to give authoritative voice to the emotions invoked by the offence in order to redraw and reafrm the boundaries of moral and political community? Questions of this nature have been accorded greater prominence of late as the passionswhich Durkheim over a century ago described as the soul of punishmenthave come, or been brought, to the fore in shaping the contours of contemporary cultures and practices of crime control. This, in

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de Haan & LoaderEmotions of crime, punishment and social control turn, has generated a burgeoning body of criminological work more or less explicitly concerned with the interplay between the emotions and lay and ofcial responses to crimesomething one nds reected in the balance of articles contained in this volume. A number of analysts have, for instance, discerned and documented a heightened emotional tone within contemporary Anglo-American political discourse and public policy on crime (Garland, 2001: 1011); and detected signs that legal institutionsin criminal justice and beyondare becoming more attuned to, and minded to accept, the claims for recognition made by angry, vengeful or traumatized victims (Laster and OMalley, 1996). Several authors have alsorelatedlybegun to probe more searchingly that hitherto rather unquestioned category fear of crime, and endeavoured to make more adequate sense of citizens often impassioned demands for order. Richard Sparks (1992) account of how mass media discourse resonates with, and rearticulates, doxic public sentiment towards dis/order and justice springs readily to mind here; as does recent work which situates crime-related anxietiesand their associated demandsin relation to either peoples sense of place (Girling et al., 2000) or a set of biographically embedded, often unconscious fears and desires (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000). The emotions have, in these ways, become inescapably implicated in both the volatile and contradictory nature of late modern penality, and in our efforts to understand and explain it (OMalley, 1999). This is most apparent in respect of what Tony Bottoms (1995) has called populist punitiveness; a term that has come to signify the return, in the USA and Britain especially, of certain antique penal practicesmass incarceration, boot camps, chain gangs, sex offender notication, zero tolerance, etc. that consciously give voice and legislative effect to the emotive demands of citizens (e.g. Simon, 1995; Pratt, 2000). At the same time, however, we have witnessed the emergence of police and criminal justice policies and practicesactuarialism, new public management, intelligence-led policing and so onthat either operate at some remove from these passions, or else actively strive to avoid, modulate or neutralize excited popular demandsoften at the cost of legitimation contests in which the appropriate role of emotionality in criminal justice is pivotally at stake. And in a different (more progressive?) register, mention must be made ofnow globalprogrammes in restorative justice; developments that have helped accord emotionsand shame in particular (Braithwaite, 1993; Masters and Smith, 1998)a more central and acceptable place within criminal justice practice. The recent advent of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions most prominently, in Chile and South Africahas cognately served to place questions of anger, forgiveness and remorse at the heart of contemporary conict resolution processes. Against this backdrop, our second aim in putting this Special Issue together was to further theoretical discussion of the intersection between emotions, punishment and social control. Among the questions that struck

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Theoretical Criminology 6(3) us as signicant here are the following: How are the emotions shaping contemporary cultures of control? What emotions are being mobilized in this respect? Which are being rendered marginal? Are we witnessing an emotionalization of justice within late modern societies? If so, with what effects? What is the proper relationship between law, criminal justice and emotion? What roleif anymight emotions play in the democratization and/or humanization of justice?

New directions
The relative failure of criminologists to pay serious theoretical attention to the emotions involved in crime, punishment and social control seems especially peculiar given the interest in theories of emotions that has surfaced recently elsewhere across the humanities and social sciences.2 This has encompassed works in psychology (Frijda, 1986), analytic and social philosophy (Elster, 1999; Wollheim, 1999; Goldie, 2000), as well as treatises in social theory informed variously by literature (Duncan, 1996), evolution theory (Turner, 2000) and developments in neuroscience (Damasio, 1994, 2000). Of interest also are the attempts of Norbert Elias and his followers to construct an historical sociology which describes the (self) regulation of impulses and drives that characterized the coming of modernity, and more recent (20th-century) processes of informalization and decivilization (Wouters, 1986; Elias, 1994 [1939]). Mention must be made too of the development of a robust and diverse sociology of emotions in Britain, Europe and North America (Kemper, 1990; Wouters, 1992; Williams and Bendelow, 1998). A variety of ethnographic studies concerned with how emotions work (Katz, 1999) and/or are managed across the settings of everyday life (Hochschild, 1983) are similarly noteworthy; not least because they offer a conceptual vocabulary (including terms like metamorphoses of self, feeling rules and emotion-control) that potentially has much to offer criminological theorizing. Emotion has, nally and importantly, been accorded a central place in recent sociological theorizing at both micro and macro levels (see Scheff, 1990; Barbalet, 1998). In the midst of these developments, debate persists within and across disciplines about what emotions are (How should they be characterized? How many are there? What relations obtain between them? Under what circumstances does emotional arousal occur?), and about how best to study them (see, generally, Williams, 2001). As such, there clearly exists a signicant and lively body of research on emotions upon which the social analysis of crime and justice might benecially draw. The trafc here need not however be all one-way. There are, in our view, also grounds for thinking that criminology can contribute in specic but by no means insignicant ways to these wider debates, and that things can be learned about the place of emotions in social life through a substantive focus on questions of crime, punishment and social control. Our hope for this

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de Haan & LoaderEmotions of crime, punishment and social control Special Issue is that it can make some worthwhile contribution to both of these tasks. In the opening article, Jack Katz explains his deep dissatisfaction with conventional theories of crimee.g. those offering demographic explanations and theories that explain crime rates as a product of social inequalitieswhich have fared poorly in the face of declining crime rates in the 1990s. According to Katz, theories that attribute causal forces independent of observable behaviour are not only ineffective but also destructive because they deect attention from serious deciencies in the description of the phenomena to be explained. On the basis of three universal aspects of social lifesymbolic interaction, pragmatics of communication and embodiment of social actionKatz develops an alternative, theoretically grounded research strategy. It is a research strategy based on a theory of social ontology that urges researchers to describe how social conduct is created through symbolic interaction, constituted as part of a practical course of action, and shaped by corporeal processes. While Katz specically focuses on the emotions directly involved in committing offences, other contributions to this Special Issue touch on the issue of crime and the emotions indirectly by focusing on the emotions implicated in the social censure of crime. Conventional accounts of the relationship between human emotions and crime, punishment and social control assume that emotions like anger and hatred are repressed in the operations of criminal law. Legal institutions and, in particular, the criminal justice system have as their main function to deal with intense emotions resulting from criminal victimization and the cry for revenge. In order to prevent vigilantism and self-help, feelings of anger and vengeance are channelled into more rational and orderly criminal procedures. In his contribution on the work of a little-known Danish sociologist, Svend Ranulf, Jack Barbalet offers a different perspective on the emotional underpinnings of criminal law. His analysis posits the advent of a disinterested tendency to inict punishment in terms of an emotional dispositionmoral indignationprevalent among the lower middle class. In reworking Ranulf in ways that also draw attention to the shame-inducing aspects of the lower middle-class condition, Barbalet presents a specic account that nicely demonstrates a more general theoretical proposition concerning emotion as a mechanism linking structure and agency. In Susanne Karstedts contribution, contemporary theories of emotion are discussed and applied in order to explore the role of emotions in criminal justice against the backdrop of the emotionalized culture of late modern societies; one in which emotions pervade public and legal discourse about crime and justice even more than in Ranulfs days. In her article, Karstedt analyses the ways in which the recent process of emotionalization of law has permeated and altered the criminal justice system. She identies and examines a number of core problems in the relationship between morality, crime and criminal law that result from the reassertion of emotionality in law.

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Theoretical Criminology 6(3) Claire Valier is also concerned with the emotionalization of late modern penality. In her contribution, she argues that gothic horror has become an important feature of contemporary punitive populism in ways that undermine the critical purchase of what she calls the catastrophic register of moral panic. Valier advances this case through a reading of Pat Barkers novel Border Crossing (a ctionalized reopening of the James Bulger case), and proposes that Kristevas concept of abjection represents a more fertile means of making sense of the erosion of boundaries that characterize thegothicizedpresent. Bas van Stokkom is concerned with the interplay of emotions like shame, guilt and remorse in restorative justice conferences; events in which friends and relatives of offender and victim are brought together to confront the offender with the consequences of his or her act, and discuss what should be done to remedy the harm done. In his article, he focuses on the functions of emotions like shame and guilt. More specically, van Stokkom analyses the extent to which shaming is desirable in conferences and examines whether feelings of guilt or remorse are more conducive to achieving reconciliation between victims, offenders and their communities of family and friends. The Issue concludes with a review symposium on Jack Katzs recent book, How Emotions Work comprising critical treatments of the text by Tom Scheff, Betsy Stanko and Cas Wouters, and a rejoinder by the author. We present this Special Issue in the hope that it might further a multi-disciplinary dialogue capable of deepening our understanding of those efcacious emotions that resonate most closely with questions of crime, punishment and social controlpleasure, anger, fear, resentment, disgust, honour, shame, guilt. In so doing, our analytical aim is to reinvigorate some stagnant areas of theory and research within criminology and to instigate new lines of substantive enquiry. In particular, by trying to integrate emotion theory into our explanations and understandings of crime, punishment and social control we hope to enhance understanding of moral agency and the embodiment of social action, develop theoretical accounts of crime that better link structure and agency and (re)connect criminology to the realities of crime, punishment and social control. In this latter respect a more adequate grasp of the emotions involved in contemporary criminal justice has a political edge and potential pay-off. It is our contention that, in order to have a more rational debate about crime and criminal justice, we paradoxically need to pay more attention to their emotional dimensions. Emotionsas the contributors to this volume variously demonstrateare an important structuring dynamic of criminal justice and punishment. They must be acknowledged as such within any political project that seeks forms of social control that are both more reasonable and more just.

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de Haan & LoaderEmotions of crime, punishment and social control Notes

We would like to take this opportunity to thank our contributors for making the production of this Special Issue a both stimulating and enjoyable enterprise. Thanks are also due all those who participated in the Crime and Emotions Workshop held at Keele University in May 2001, and to Tony Jefferson, the journal co-editor, for his encouragement and assistance in bringing this project to fruition. 1. It is intriguing to reect upon why this should be so. One plausible explanation lies in the tendency of sociologically oriented criminologists to think of emotions as psychological entities, with the consequent fear that paying systematic attention to them might return the discipline to the realm of individualistic etiological explanations of criminal behaviour. This, of course, to some extent overlooks the emergence within psychology of a social constructionist perspective on emotions (Harr e, 1986). 2. This increasing interest in theories of emotions itself raises a further questionof the kind a sociologist of knowledge might askabout the socio-historical conditions that have generated it. Candidate explanations here must surely include: contemporary trends towards consumerist lifestyles and attitudes; new forms of ontological insecurity experienced by citizens under late modern conditions; and reactions to inhabiting a lifeworld that has been colonized by instrumental, rational, bureaucratic modes of thinking.

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References
Barbalet, J. (1998) Emotion, Social Theory and Social Structure: A Macrosociological Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bottoms, A. (1995) The Philosophy and Politics of Punishment and Sentencing, in C. Clark and R. Morgan (eds) The Politics of Sentencing Reform, pp. 1749. Oxford: Clarendon. Boutellier, H.J. (2000) Crime and Morality: The Signicance of Criminal Justice in Postmodern Culture. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Braithwaite, J. (1993) Shame and Modernity, British Journal of Criminology 33(1): 118. Damasio, A.R. (1994) Descartes Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain. New York: Quill. Damasio, A.R. (2000) The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. London: Heinemann. Duncan, M.G. (1996) Romantic Outlaws, Beloved Prisons: The Unconscious Meanings of Crime and Punishment. New York: New York University Press. Elias, N. (1994 [1939]) The Civilising Process. Oxford: Blackwells. Elster, J. (1999) Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Theoretical Criminology 6(3)

Frazier, C. and T. Meisenhelder (1985) Exploratory Notes on Criminality and Emotional Ambivalence, Qualitative Sociology 8(3): 26684. Frijda, N.H. (1986) The Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Garland, D. (1990) Punishment in Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory. Oxford: Clarendon. Garland, D. (2001) The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Girling, E., I. Loader and R. Sparks (2000) Crime and Social Change in Middle England: Questions of Order in an English Town. London: Routledge. Goldie, P. (2000) The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. Oxford: Clarendon. Hall, S. (1997) Visceral Cultures and Criminal Practices, Theoretical Criminology 1(4): 45378. Harr e, R. (ed.) (1986) The Social Construction of Emotions. Oxford: Blackwell. Hochschild, A. (1983) The Managed Heart: The Commercialization of Human Feeling. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Hollway, W. and T. Jefferson (2000) The Role of Anxiety in Fear of Crime, in T. Hope and R. Sparks (eds) Crime, Risk and Insecurity: Law and Order in Political Discourse and Everyday Life, pp. 3149. London: Routledge. Jefferson, T. (2002) Subordinating Hegemonic Masculinity, Theoretical Criminology 6(1): 6388. Katz, J. (1988) The Seductions of Crime: Moral and Sensual Attractions of Doing Evil. New York: Basil Blackwell. Katz, J. (1999) How Emotions Work. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Kemper, T. (ed.) (1990) Research Agendas in the Sociology of Emotions. New York: SUNY Press. Laster, K. and P. OMalley (1996) Sensitive New-Age Laws: The Reassertion of Emotionality in Law, International Journal of the Sociology of Law 24(4): 2140. Masters, G. and D. Smith (1998) Portia and Persephone Revisited: Thinking about Feeling in Criminal Justice, Theoretical Criminology 2(1): 528. Messerschmidt, J. (1993) Masculinities and Crime. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littleeld. OMalley, P. (1999) Volatile and Contradictory Punishment, Theoretical Criminology 3(2): 17596. Pratt, J. (2000) Emotive and Ostentatious Punishment: Its Decline and Resurgence in Modern Society, Punishment and Society 2(4): 41740. Scheff, T. (1990) Microsociology: Discourse, Emotion and Social Structure. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Scheff, T. and S. Retzinger (1991) Emotions and Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conicts. Lexington: Lexington Books. Simon, J. (1995) They Died with Their Boots on: The Boot Camp and the Limits of Modern Penality, Social Justice 22(2): 2548.

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Sparks, R. (1992) Television and the Drama of Crime: Moral Tales and the Place of Crime in Public Life. Buckingham: Open University Press. Turner, J. (2000) On the Evolution of Human Emotion. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Van Hoorebeeck, B. (1997) Prospects for Reconstructing Aetiology, Theoretical Criminology 1(4): 50118. Williams, S. (2001) Emotions and Social Theory. London: Sage. Williams, S. and G. Bendelow (eds) (1998) Emotions in Social Life: Critical Themes and Contemporary Issues. London: Routledge. Wollheim, J. (1999) On the Emotions. Yale: Yale University Press. Wouters, C. (1986) Formalization and Informalization: Changing Tension Balances in Civilizing Processes, Theory, Culture and Society 3(2): 118. Wouters, C. (1992) On Status Competition and Emotion Management: The Study of Emotions as a New Field, Theory, Culture and Society 24(4): 699717. Young, J. (1986) The Failure of Criminology: The Need for a Radical Realism, in R. Matthews and J. Young (eds) Confronting Crime, pp. 430. London: Sage. WILLEM DE HAAN is Professor of Criminology in the Department of Criminal Law and Criminology, University of Groningen, The Netherlands. His current research interests include stranger violence, public safety and criminal policy. He is the author of The Politics of Redress. Crime, Punishment and Penal Abolition (1990, Unwin Hyman). [Email: w.j.m.de.haan@rechten.rug.nl] IAN LOADER is Reader in the Department of Criminology, Keele University, UK. His current research interests include public sensibilities towards crime, policing and justice. He is co-author (with Evi Girling and Richard Sparks) of Crime and Social Change in Middle England: Questions of Order in an English Town (2000, Routledge). [Email: i.loader@keele.ac.uk]

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