A Social Network Analysis Approach to Modeling Social-Economic Complexity in Traditional Kin-Based Systems Brian D.

Jones Introduction This paper explores changes in the organization of kin-based social-economic networks utilizing methods from Social Network Analysis. Social Network Analysis (SNA) is a growing approach to investigating large, complex data sets comprised of linked actors. SNA provides tools for the researcher interested in network topology, that is, the morphology and structure of a network. Analytical software provides a means to visualize large data sets as sociograms, and more importantly, to quantify many of their characteristics. Some important network variables include group cohesion, number of components (cliques), brokerage roles of actors, measures of centrality, information diffusion, and measures of prestige and rank. Although these variables have clear application to anthropological theory, social network analysis has remained primarily a research tool among sociologists. The networks I will describe are intended to model changing social-economic organization among traditional (non-state-level) kin-based social groups. A constant power-law based economic organization underlies the model. Power-law distributions typify many complex social and economic networks and are referred to in the literature as scale-free because they express the same organization at any scale of analysis (Barabsi and Albert 1999). Scale-free networks consist of actors among whom many are loosely linked to others, and very few are quite strongly linked. Such relationships express themselves as straight lines on log-log plots that summarize the number of links and their cumulative proportion in a population (Bentley 2003). Power-law distributions are considered ubiquitous, appearing in a variety of networked systems as diverse as modern corporate organizations, Hollywood actor networks, numbers of sexual human partners, connections between airline hubs, the electrical power grid structure, and university research funding (Barabasi 2002, Bentley and Maschner 2007: 15-4). Barabasi and Albert (1999) established that that scale-free organization typifies networks that grow over time based on a rich get richer algorithm. This means that the probability of a new actor linking to an existing one is based on the proportion of links the established actor already controls. Thus, if one university has a long-standing track record of attaining NSF grants, it has a greater probability of receiving new ones. I use this underlying principle to model traditional human economies because it has become increasingly evident that even the simplest foraging economies are underlain by a high degree of variation in terms of individual hunted meat yield, or access to trade partners (e.g. Bentley 2003: 39-40). Bentley (2003) has determined the existence of scale-free social-economic organization among Somali and Gabbra pastoralists, and in the size of Neolithic long barrows, while Maschner and Bentley (2003) discuss scale-free organization among Northwest Pacific house floor sizes as it relates to social rank. In all of these cases, the presence of scale-free relationships points to the existence of significant variation in levels of social prestige, rank (Frieds positions of valued status [1967: 109]) and/or social stratification (Frieds unequal access to basic resources [1967: 186]). Other classic examples would likely include the Trobriand Kula exchange

network in which one or two high-status participants have hundreds of trade partners, while most have one or two (Malinowski 1920). Among foragers, where social pressures may exist to promote cooperation rather than competition, differential prestige among actors will nevertheless likely be present because of the rich get richer phenomenon inherent to growing networks. I would anticipate, for example, that among Khoisan women, very few have collections of beaded necklaces acquired through social contacts that weigh in the kilogram range, while most have tens of grams of beads in their possession. In the scenarios explored here, each model is seeded with 2 linked trade partners, each with an initial 50% probability of acquiring the next partner. This particular power law relationship results in a best linked actor with between about 44 and 86 incoming links after all of the 1,000 trade ties have been established (based on a 1-sigma range of 15 sampled networks). The exact number varies in each iteration because of the probabilistic nature of the model. In addition to a scale-free economic organization, the model is grounded in a simple kinship-based organization. Each actor in the model represents an 8-person household consisting of two grandparents, a married couple and four sub-adult children. In the model, the spouse who marries into the household represents a directed link in, while the marriage of a son or daughter into another family represents a directed link out (Fig. 1). Such households could be patrilocal or matrilocal in organization, such that a daughter marries in, in the first example, or a son marries out in the second. The simple assumption for the model is that each household produces a marriageable son and daughter. This is meant to represent a mean condition in a stable population. It is assumed that two of the four subadults would not survive to adulthood. While the model could have been created to reflect more variability, this modal form was selected for the sake of simplicity. The 8-person household size of each actor in the network of kin is used to calculate larger-scale populations. The complete model consists of 1,000 actors representing a population of 8,000 individuals. Three related computer programs were written using FreeBasic, an opensource variant of the BASIC computer language. The program permits the user input of certain variables, such as the number of exogamous bands, or the proportion of elite in the population. Graphic output is produced, largely to reassure the user that the program did what it was asked to do (Fig. 2). The programs produce three types of additional output in the form of ascii text files. These include a comma-delimited csv file that can be imported into a spreadsheet or database, and network and partition files that can be read by Pajek social network analysis software (de Nooy et al. 2005). These files summarize the network, characterizing the kinship and economic links of each actor, or family unit. Every actor produces an outgoing economic link and an outgoing kinship link. All actors receive one kinship link, but may receive many or no economic ties (Fig. 3). The model was developed to examine the effects of increasing kinship restrictions on the topology of the resultant social network. Kinship restrictions are utilized to model change between very open, exogamous systems as occur among small-scale foraging societies, through tightly-controlled endogamous ranked systems where an elite class makes up as little as 1% of the population, as might occur among chiefdom levels of socio-political organization. Two basic systems are thus explored. The first models exogamous societies with a decreasing number of clans. Beginning with 100 clans, 99%

of the population is potentially marriageable, while with just two clans (essentially a moiety-based system) only 50% of the population is marriageable. The second system examines the effects of prestige-based rank on the network. A transitional system is explored in which actors are ranked into two moieties, but marriage remains exogamous (e.g. following a Natchez marriage pattern [Tooker 1963]). Increasing restrictions on marriage, now based on rank rather than clan affiliation, are then further explored by incorporating endogamous marriage rules. Models start with a ranked endogamous moiety-based system, and then examine social organizations in which an endogamous elite represent an ever-shrinking portion of the population, while the pool of commoners grows proportionally. I use increasing marriage restriction rules as a proxy of increasing social complexity, and secondarily, growing population density. If we allow the simple assumption that at least 200 individuals are required within a human breeding population to maintain longterm viability (Wobst 1974), then group size must increase to compensate for the decreasing proportion of available marriageable partners. This relationship is summarized in Table 1. It indicates that marriage regulations may become more restrictive only as populations grow. Table 1: Modeled Relationship Between Marriage Restriction and Base Population assuming a 200-person minimum breeding population
exogamous endogamous 100 clans 10 clans 2 clans 25% elite 10% elite 5% elite 1% elite % marriageable 99% 90% 50% 25% 10% 5% 1% minimum population 202 222 400 800 2,000 4,000 20,000 modeled family actor units 25.25 27.78 50 100 250 500 2500

The changes observed can be seen as paralleling different levels of socio-political organization. Where few or limited marriage restrictions exist, the modeled exogamous clan-based societies can be described as bands in Services (1962) original terminology. Such societies are centered on small, mobile kin groups, loosely linked to others across a landscape. These societies may have rather low group numbers, falling between at least 200 and 400 individuals. Social systems anchored in moiety-based marriage restrictions and those in which an endogamous ranked elite represent a portion of the population falling between about 50% and 10% are best described as tribes. Tribal societies are typically settled in villages with populations in the hundreds to one or two thousand. As modeled based on the imposed marriage restrictions, these societies are expected to number between, at a minimum, 400 and 2,000 members. Finally, large endogamous ranked systems where the elite represent a small portion of the overall population (e.g. less than 10%) are best described as chiefdoms. In this case, elite marriage partners are likely to come from affiliated neighboring villages, or potentially from within a single large urbanized center, such as Cahokia. Such social systems are likely to number in the thousands or tens of thousands. While these dated terms have been the subject of much anthropological debate since Service first described them, they provide a heuristic, if simplistic, framework for understanding some of the underlying goals of this study. No attempt was made to model

specific societies, such as Algonquian or Iroquoisan social organizations that I have discussed elsewhere (Jones 2010), rather, my intent was to examine more general network dynamics that likely relate to these, and many other kin-based systems. My primary goal to introduce some of the advantages of a social network analysis approach to studies of social complexity and I hope that the reader will consider how my general conclusions may relate to their own specific areas of interest. Methods Three basic measures were made of the modeled networks. The first ranks actors in terms of in-coming network links. This measure is referred to as the indegree or simply popularity of a vertex (actor) (de Nooy et al. 2005: 189). The number of incoming links is easily quantified for each actor and provides a measure of social prestige. Sorting the indegrees of all network actors provides a way to assess each actors rank within the population. Arbitrary cut-offs permit the ranked list of actors to be divided into classes of elites and commoners based on the desired proportion of each in a given model simulation. Rank divisions only apply to the second group of models, not to clan-based kinship systems. The second measure determines how well the network is integrated. The simplest measure of integration is the network diameter. The diameter is most often understood (somewhat confusingly) as the longest shortest path between all vertices in the network. A shortest pathway through other actors links every two actors in a social network. The diameter therefore represents the longest of all of these most efficient paths through the entire network. The diameter is measured in terms of the number of steps required to reach a desired point. This term reflects the popular concept of six degrees of separation, between two individuals. The difference is that degrees of separation usually indicates the average distance between all actors in a network. (This measure has only recently been mathematically verified to be 6.6 among the global human network, as has long been suggested in the popular press.) Average network distance is a useful value because it reduces much of the variation inherent in modeled networks. The average network distance is generally significantly less than its actual diameter (for example, the diameter of the global human social network is about 29). Both measures are used here to quantify network integration. A third measure of network integration is the proportion of actors not reachable from another actor. This can occur in loosely integrated networks, and is also more likely in networks with directed links between actors. In undirected networks, information between actors can move either direction along a link (such undirected links are referred to as edges), but in directed networks, links define the direction of movement (these are referred to as arcs). The networks modeled are all directed networks, so under some conditions, actors may fall out of reach of other actors within the network. When networks become fragmented in this way, information can no longer pass to all of its members, and the network can be qualified as broken or poorly integrated. These measures can all be provided by a single function within Pajek (Net>Paths between two vertices>Distribution of distances>From all vertices). Simulations were run through the BASIC programs based on each model parameter. The resultant .net files were then analyzed within Pajek. Because there was no way to iterate this process automatically, this study is limited to the analysis of 10 samples from each of the nine

model parameters. Resultant raw data was incorporated into Excel spreadsheets for statistical analysis and visualization. Because of the probabilistic nature involved in the creation of each network, some variation in the results of each test is expected. Nevertheless, the sample of 10 networks under each condition proved sufficient to assess levels of significance between model parameters. Additional program output (partition files in the .clu format) was used to define both clan and elite-commoner sub-networks within Pajek. These partitions allowed the data to be visualized more effectively with Pajeks Draw function (Figure 4). In some cases, commoner sub-networks were extracted from the complete network using the partition files (Operations>Extract from network>Partition) to permit additional analysis of the sub-network. Pajeks Net>Partitions>Degree>Input function was utilized to produce vector files that were used to scale vertices in the draw window based on their number of incoming links. Image files were exported to Encapsulated PostScript (.eps) from within the Draw window (Export>2D>EPS/PS). Results The baseline for all model comparisons consists of a network with no marriage restrictions and a perfectly even distribution of trade links. This perfect world network consists in part of a ring-formed chain-like trade network. In graph theory terms, such networks are described as highly clustered, that is, actors are exclusively connected to their nearest neighbors (Watts 2003). The network also consists of random kinship links. While the raw trade network has an average distance of 500 steps between its actors, the random kin ties produce a small world effect (Watts and Strogatz 1998) that create shortcuts, reducing the average network distance to just 8.66 steps (Figure 5). The network diameter (longest of all most efficient paths between actors) is just 14 steps. As we constrain the network, these distances will increase, indicating a drift from a nearly random network to one in which there is increasing organization. The first model consists of 100 exogamous clans, seeded by the two pre-established trade relationships used throughout all of the systems examined. This model of a very open exogamous clan organization with few marriage restrictions is intended to model small-scale social-economic organization as might be found among highly mobile foraging societies. Less restricted marriage rules such as these are expected under low population density conditions where finding an appropriate mate may be logistically challenging. In North America, Paleoindian and Early Archaic foraging groups were likely organized in this way. This network organization expresses a significant increase in average network distance, which is now about 11.7 steps between any two actors. Most of this change is actually associated with the introduction of the scale-free trading network rather than the increased restriction on marriage partners. The introduction of the 100 exogamous clans under a balanced trade scenario results in no significant change from the perfect world results noted above. As marriage restrictions are further increased in the exogamous 10-clan system, there is an insignificant decline (p=0.477 based on a 2-tailed T-test) in the average network distance to 11.62. In fact, the same average distance is expressed by the system with just two exogamous clans. This indicates that none of these exogamous models have any significant effect on the network structure once a power-law economic organization is introduced.

A subtle, though significant (p=0.0012) change does occur in the system when identity based on rank is first introduced. This marks an important change in the value system of the society, as suggested by Frieds (1967) original definition of rank as indicating access to positions of valued status. Until this time, clan affiliation was randomly based, and no realized social value was placed on ones prestige. Some clan members enjoyed many trade links, while others had few, but this did not affect ones social identity per se. The ranked 2-clan (moiety) system divides actors into two groups based on the number of trade links they receive. The half of the population that receives the most trade partners belongs to the elite clan, and the half that controls the least belongs to the commoner clan. While this organization seems peculiar, it is not unprecedented in the ethnographic literature (e.g. as expressed in the ranked Natchez moiety). Based on the power law distribution of trade links, about two-thirds of actors receive no trade link at all, while the remaining third receive one or more links. The net effect of a bimodal social organization is that the commoner class is isolated from incoming trade links, while the elite class receives them all. Under exogamous marriage rules, the isolated commoners are reunited with the dense elite network. The net effect is that the average distance between actors in the network is actually reduced slightly from that of the unranked exogamous system. The next scenario reflects a second value transition within the society. In this scenario, the elites redefine the marriage rules and enforce an endogamous system to better maintain control over the trade network. Instead of elites marrying commoners, elites now marry one another, and commoners do the same. This small change in the rules results in a drastic reorganization of the social-economic network. Under endogamous marriage rules, the commoners now form an isolated kin-network with all trade links directed toward the elite group. This network is likely to be comprised of a number of disassociated loops with an average (but highly variable) network distance of about 170+/-50. The elite enjoy a complex, dense small-world network of kinship and trade ties. This close network has an average network distance of about 10.15+/-0.18. Not only does this represent a very effective communication network, it also controls 100% of the trade economy. The 1000 trade links are divided unequally among the 500 elite, but provide a mean per-capita wealth of 2 trade ties. As a whole, the endogamous network comprised of a 50% elite, 50% commoner ratio must be considered broken. Its average network distance is 30.38, and is highly variable (+/-17.2). Thus, while the elite sub-network may be enjoying an optimal structure, the network as a whole is fragmented and communication between many of its members based on exchange and kin networks cannot occur. On average, 39.8+/-4.5% of the networks members cannot be reached by its other members. Such a disrupted socialeconomic structure is not likely to function for any length of time. There are two options for change. The first is to return to the prior system of ranked exogamy. This will require the elite to relinquish their complete control over the economic wealth in trade partners. The second option is to increase the size of the commoner network by redefining the cutoff point for elite status. This option actually benefits both the elites and commoners. The commoners need to attract additional members from among the elite if they hope to participate in the full social-economic network. The elites can increase their per-capita wealth in trade ties by shrinking their

numbers so that only those with the greatest number of trade links are counted among themselves. The net effect of these two goals is likely to move the network in the direction of additional increased restrictions on marriage. As the definition of who qualifies as an elite becomes narrower, network functionality is gradually restored. Under the powerlaw that underlies this particular system, the benefits of a smaller elite to the overall network are only realized after the elite comprise less than 33% of the network. After this point, some individuals receiving trade links will be counted among the commoners. At first, their numbers are few and the links they provide are also limited, but by the time the network defines the elite class as comprising the upper 20% of incoming trade wealth, the number of isolated network actors falls on average well below one individual (0.26+/0.41). At this point, the network can be seen as restored. With a 20% elite, the average network distance is still high and remains quite variable (23.6+/-3.5). Elite wealth is reduced to about 88% of the total (that is, the commoners now have access to 12%), and per-capita trade ties have increased to 4.4. As the definition of elites is constrained to the wealthiest 10% of the population, the average network diameter drops to 17.3+/-1.2. Elite per capita wealth is increased to about 7 links, and the commoners now have access to about 31% of the trade network. When the elite comprise 5% of the population, the average network diameter drops to 15.5. Elite per capita wealth in incoming trade links is raised to about 10 links, and the commoners have access to about 49% of the total trade economy. At 1% of the population, the average network diameter is 12.6, and variation about the mean is quite low (+/-0.28), indicating the establishment of a relatively robust and efficient network. Elite per capita wealth averages close to 21 incoming links, while the commoners control nearly 80% of the remaining network. After this point, increasingly narrowed definitions of the elite continue to reduce the average network slightly, but even at 0.2% of the population (two individuals in a thousand) the value is 11.97+/-0.23, and additional change comes very slowly as the limit is approached. This limit can be calculated using an exogamous network with no marriage restrictions and an initial seed of two trade links. Its value is 11.81+/-0.26 based on a sample of 10 such networks, which is not significantly different from the sample of 0.2% elite networks at this sample size. In sum, the effectiveness of ranked endogamous networks with elites making up to 1% or less of the overall population begins to approach that observed under exogamous conditions. Discussion The societies modeled above go through two important social transitions based on 1) a revaluation of prestige and a redefinition of identity based on rank and 2) a redefinition of marriageable partners based on rank. In the first transition, group membership is linked to ones level of prestige. This is a critical value change that marks the emergence of rank as an aspect of identity. In the second transition, endogamy provides a means for one group to monopolize its economic status. The transition to an endogamous marriage custom redefines group solidarity so that the definition of us and them becomes more explicit. Neither of these should be seen as simple transitions, as they are likely to conflict with the established sense of cosmological order, as expressed in most moiety organizations.

In non-judgmental terms reflecting the efficiency of the social networks in question, the first transition is a good one, because it reduces average network diameter, and thus increases the effectiveness of communication between its members. This strategy appears to increase small world network dynamics by effectively combining a pseudorandom kin network with a power-law-based economic network. The second transition is disastrous, however. In this case, through separating the two kinship networks, the strongly biased economic network only reaches half the members of the population. The society is rent asunder, and communication to half of its members becomes severely compromised. This may explain why such social constructs are very uncommon in the anthropological literature. Should the new endogamous rank-based identity structure remain intact (rather than reverting to the effective exogamous system typified by the example of the Natchez), the only way to repair the fabric of society is to reduce the overall proportion of those defined as elites. This benefits the commoners by allowing some members with incoming trade ties to be included in its kin network, reestablishing opportunities for society-wide communication. The benefit to the elite class is an increase in per capita wealth, at the cost of giving up some control over the economic system. In this way, the elite become more elite and can differentiate themselves more strongly from the commoner class. A notable transition in the behavior of the new network occurs when the proportion of elite approaches 1% of the population. At this point, the network is quite well integrated (with an average diameter of about 12.5) and very few members are likely to be isolated from the overall network. As summarized in Table 1, such a restricted marriage system is only sustainable in societies numbering about 20,000 members, that is, within chiefdoms. In fact, the transition to a ranked endogamous social organization is unlikely to occur until a local population reaches at least 4,000 members (a 5% elite class), at which point the transition to a very restricted endogamous elite can occur without compromising the overall social network stability. Ranked endogamous societies numbering less than 4,000 members (that is, with an elite proportion between 50% and 5%) are simply unlikely to sustain themselves for any period because of the inherently unstable and fragmented nature of the resultant kinship and economic networks. Importantly, a tipping point occurs in the economic organization of endogamous elite networks with an elite class comprising less than 5% of the overall population. At this time, elite control over the economic portion of the network rapidly falls below 50%. At 4% of the population, the elite control on average 45.3% of the economy, but at 2% they have access to only 35.4% and at 1% only 26.2% (based on 10 sampled networks). This indicates that in the system modeled above, when the elite comprise less than 5% of the society, the commoner class begins to control the majority of the economy. While this transition is occurring, the commoner class sub-network is becoming increasingly effective on its own. When the elite represent 5% of the population, the commoner network diameter approximates that of the full network (average diameter=16.5+/-0.4 vs. a complete network of 15.5+/-0.7). While the difference between the two values is significant (p=0.0013 with a 2-tailed T-test), the ranges overlap at 1-sigma. With a 1% elite, the difference between the two networks is less than 1 degree of separation, and there is little incentive for the commoners to continue to take part in the portion of the trade economy controlled by the elite. They now control on

average 73.8% of the economy. At this point, it is increasingly likely that the commoners will abandon the elite, unless other strong incentives keep them in the system. Conclusions The use of a Social Network Analysis approach has proven effective at examining a social-economic model designed to explore the network dynamics of a kin-based social organization overlain by a power-law-structured economy. The modeling process itself is rewarding, as it challenges one to deconstruct traditional (non-state-level) socialeconomic dynamics into just a few critical variables. The variables selected in this model were related to the definition of marriageable partners and the degree of social value placed on prestige. These alone appear to have a significant effect on the efficiency of the social networks examined, as measured by their average network diameters (degrees of separation between actors). Actor prestige was evaluated by the calculation of incoming economic links and provided a means of establishing the rank of each actor. The measure of network diameter quantified the efficiency of the movement of information across the entire network. Other factors measured by the Pajek SNA software included the proportion of actors unreachable by the rest of the network, which provided a measure of network viability. The proposed relationship between increased marriage restrictions and degree of social complexity is, to my knowledge, a new one, but it appears to have functioned well as a central variable in the models explored here. Underlying the organization of all of the networks examined was a power-law distribution in economic ties between actors. This structure was selected because it appears to underlie many natural and human systems that add elements over time. The nature of the power law was arbitrarily established, and was based on seeding a growing economic network with just two active participants. A more equitable power law distribution could have been modeled by seeding the trade network with a greater number of actors, but the simplest organization was selected. Only by seeding the population with more than 100 or so initial trade partners can one move beyond the general rule that only about a third of the population receives any incoming economic links at all. The primary effect of altering the strength of the power-law distribution in the economy is on the point at which the commoner class controls more than 50% of the economy. In the model presented above, this transition occurred when the elite class was comprised of the wealthiest four to five percent of the population. Given a more equitable distribution of wealth, the commoners will control the majority of the economy sooner (for example, with 300 seeded trade relationships, the commoners will already control over 50% of trade ties when the elites comprise about 10% of the population). The models examined suggest that exogamous kin systems become only slightly more efficient as marriage restrictions (based on a reduction in the number of clans) are introduced. A system comprised of just two exogamous clans is not very different in its network topology than a system comprised of 100 clans. Interestingly, a subtle, but significant improvement in exogamous network efficiency occurs when individuals become ranked based on their level of economic prestige, and when that rank defines their band membership. Such moiety-based exogamous ranked kinship systems typified groups such as the Natchez, likely descendants of a Mississippian chiefdom society. An important result of this study is the recognition that at some time, under a system of endogamous elite marriage and as marriage restrictions are increased (as the definition

of who qualifies as an elite is narrowed), some point will be reached where the commoners control the majority of the economy. If at this point their own kinship network is well enough integrated, the commoners may elect to remove themselves from the elite-controlled network at little organizational cost. A similar balance of elite vs. commoner control of the economy may underlie the dynamics of many traditional chiefdom-level organizations. The network study presented here may provide at least a partial explanation of the observed fragility of such systems in the archaeological record.

References Cited Barabsi, Albert-Lszl 2002 Linked: How Everything Is Connected to Everything Else. Perseus Publishing: Cambridge, MA. Barabsi, Albert-Lszl and Rka Albert 1999 Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks. Science 286: 509-512. Bentley, Alexander R. 2003 Scale-Free Network Growth and Social Inequality. In R.A. Bentley and H. D. G. Maschner, eds., Complex Systems and Archaeology, pp. 27-42. University of Utah Press: Salt Lake City. De Nooy, Wouter, Andrej Mrvar and Vladimir Batagelj 2005 Exploratory Network Analysis with Pajek. Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences 27. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Fried, Morton H. 1967 The Evolution of Political Society: an Essay in Political Anthropology. Random House: New York. Malinowski, B. 1920 Kula: the Circulating Exchange of Valuables in the Archipelagoes of Eastern New Guinea. Man 20: 97105. Maschner, Herbert D. G. and Alexander Bentley 2003 The Power Law of Rank and Household on the North Northwest. In R.A. Bentley and H. D. G. Maschner, eds., Complex Systems and Archaeology, pp. 47-60. University of Utah Press: Salt Lake City. Service, Elman 1962 Primitive Social Organization: An Evolutionary Perspective. Random House: New York. Tooker, Elisabeth 1963 Natchez Social Organization: Fact or Anthropological Folklore? Ethnohistory 10(4): 358-372. Watts, Duncan J. and Steven H. Strogatz 1998 Collective Dynamics of Small World Networks. Nature 393: 440-442. 2003 Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age. Random House: London.

Whoriskey, Peter

2008

Instant-Messagers Really Are About Six Degrees from Kevin Bacon, Big Microsoft Study Supports Small World Theory. Washington Post, Saturday, August 2, 2008.

Wobst, H. Martin. 1974 Boundary conditions for Paleolithic social systems: a Simulation Approach. American Antiquity 39(2):147-178.

Figure 1: The 8-individual kinship organization representing a single actor in the network. Assumes a stable modal population where two children survive to reproduce. The example shown is patrilocal, with females marrying out and into family units, forming the kinship links between actors.

Figure 2: Sample output of BASIC program used to produce the network models. The output summarizes a 10% elite endogamous kinship network seeded with two trade partners. The total number of incoming links and the calculated rank of the first 30 actors are summarized on the right.

Figure 3: The modeled kin-based economic network simplified with 12 actors.

Figure 4: Example of Pajek Draw output of 50% elite endogamous network (elite: red, commoner: green). Size of vertex reflects the rank of the actor. Note the isolated commoner kin chains resulting from this organization.

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