G.R. No. 170289 April 8, 2010 ROSIE QUIDET vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES DEL CASTILLO, J.

: Conspiracy must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself for it is a facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold. In case of reasonable doubt as to its existence, the balance tips in favor of the milder form of criminal liability as what is at stake is the accuseds liberty. W e apply these principles in this case. Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the CAs Decision(July 22, 2005) which affirmed with modifications the Decision(March 11, 1999 )2 of the Regional RTC. On January 13, 1992, petitioner Rosie Quidet (petitioner), Feliciano Taban, Jr. (Taban), and Aurelio Tubo (Tubo) were charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 92-079 for the death of Jimmy Tagarda (Jimmy). On even date, the aforesaid accused were charged with frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 92-080 for the stab wounds sustained by Jimmys cousin, Andrew Tagarda (Andrew), arising from the same incident. Upon arraignment, all the accused entered a plea of not guilty in Criminal Case No. 92-080 (frustrated homicide). Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 92-079 (homicide), Taban entered a voluntary plea of guilt while petitioner and Tubo maintained their innocence. Accordingly, the trial court rendered a partial judgment 5 sentencing Taban to imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordering him to pay the heirs of Jimmy P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.6 Thereafter, joint trial ensued. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court: The RTC rendered a judgment finding petitioner and Tubo guilty of homicide8 and all three accused (petitioner, Tubo and Taban) guilty of frustrated homicide. The trial court found that the stabbing of Jimmy and Andrew was previously planned by the accused. The active participation of all three accused proved conspiracy in the commission of the crimes. Furthermore, the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses cannot be offset by the defense of plain denial. From this judgment, only petitioner appealed to the CA. Ruling of the Court of Appeals: The CA promulgated the assailed Decision, affirming with modifications. In upholding the conviction of the accused for homicide, the CA held that conspiracy was duly established as shown by the concerted acts of the accused in inflicting mortal wounds on Jimmy. Hence, all of the accused are guilty of homicide for the death of Jimmy. The CA, however, disagreed with the trial courts finding that the accused are liable for frustrated homicide with respect to the injuries sustained by Andrew. According to the CA, the accused failed to inflict mortal wounds on Andrew because the latter successfully deflected the attack. Andrew suffered only minor injuries which could have healed within five to seven days even without medical treatment. The crime committed, therefore, is merely attempted homicide. Issue: Whether the Decision of the CA finding petitioner to have acted in conspiracy with the other accused (Taban and Tubo) in the commission of the offenses charged is in accordance with law and/or jurisprudence. Petitioners Arguments: Petitioner claims that the evidence merely established that: (1) Taban went ou t of Oseps store while petitioner and Tubo remained inside; (2) a commotion took place between Taban and Andrew; (3) after this altercation, petitioner and Tubo stepped out of Oseps store; and (4) petitioners participation in the incident is limited to boxing Andrew after the latter had already been stabbed by Taban, and boxing Jimmys mouth after the latter had been stabbed by Taban and Tubo in succession. Petitioner insists that it cannot be said that he had the same criminal purpose and design as Taban and Tubo. His participation was not necessary to the completion of the criminal acts because by the time he boxed Andrew and Jimmy, the stabbing had already taken place. The evidence further established that the stabbing incident was purely accidental and that the accused had no grudge against the victims. Also, petitioner was unarmed negating his intent to kill. Petitioner also cites People v. Vistido13 where it was ruled that conspiracy was not established under facts similar to the present case. In Vistido, the accused was merely convicted of slight physical injuries. Respondents Arguments: Respondent contends that conspiracy was duly established. Petitioner was not merely present during the commission of the crime but he aided Taban and Tubo by inflicting blows on Andrew and Jimmy after the latter were stabbed. The simultaneous movement of the accused towards the victims and their successive escape from the crime scene clearly evince conspiracy. Respondent also stresses that the factual findings of the trial court should be accorded respect for it is in a better position to evaluate testimonial evidence. Held: The petition is partly meritorious.

The existence of conspiracy was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, petitioner is criminally liable only for his individual acts. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.14 The essence of conspiracy is the unity of action and purpose.15 Its elements, like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests.16 However, in determining whether conspiracy exists, it is not sufficient that the attack be joint and simultaneous for simultaneousness does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of will or unity of action and purpose which are the bases of the responsibility of the assailants.17 What is determinative is proof establishing that the accused were animated by one and the same purpose.18 As a general rule, factual findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to evaluate the testimonial evidence, are accorded respect by this Court. But where the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which can affect the result of the case, this Court is duty-bound to correct this palpable error for the right to liberty, which stands second only to life in the hierarchy of constitutional rights, cannot be lightly taken away. In the instant case, we find that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo in committing the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide. Both the trial court and the CA ruled that the evidence duly established conspiracy. We disagree. To determine if petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo, the focus of the inquiry should necessarily be the overt acts of petitioner before, during and after the stabbing incident. From this viewpoint, we find several facts of substance which militate against the finding that petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo. Taken together, the evidence of the prosecution does not meet the test of moral certainty in order to establish that petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo to commit the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide. We agree with petitioner that this case is similar to People v. Vistido25 and the ruling there applies with equal force here. In Vistido, we held thus There is no question that "a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another where, between them, there has been conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime charged." It is, likewise, settled that "to establish conspiracy, it is not necessary to prove previous agreement to commit a crime, if there is proof that the malefactors have acted in consort and in pursuance of the same objective." Nevertheless, "the evidence to prove the same must be positive and convincing. As a facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold, conspiracy requires conclusive proof if we are to maintain in full strength the substance of the time-honored principle in criminal law requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt before conviction." In the case at bar, the evidence for the prosecution does not comply with this basic requirement. To begin with, there is no evidence that appellant and his co-accused had any enmity or grudge against the deceased. On the contrary, the cousin of the deceased, Reynaldo Pagtakhan, testified that prior to the stabbing incident, they did not have any quarrel with them. In the absence of strong motives on their part to kill the deceased, it can not safely be concluded that they conspired to commit the crime involved herein. Moreover, although the appellant and his co-accused acted with some degree of simultaneity in attacking the deceased, nevertheless, the same is insufficient to prove conspiracy. The rule is well-settled that "simultaneousness does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of will nor the unity of action and purpose which are the basis of the responsibility of two or more individuals." To establish common responsibility it is not sufficient that the attack be joint and simultaneous; it is necessary that the assailants be animated by one and the same purpose. In the case at bar, the appellant Raymundo Vistido and the accused Pepito Montao, did not act pursuant to the same objective. Thus, the purpose of the latter was to kill as shown by the fact that he inflicted a mortal wound below the abdomen of the deceased which caused his death. On the other hand, the act of the appellant in giving the deceased one fist blow after the latter was stabbed by the accused Pepito Montao an act which is certainly unnecessary and not indispensable for the consummation of the criminal assault does not indicate a purpose to kill the deceased, but merely to "show off" or express his sympathy or feeling of camaraderie with the accused Pepito Montao. For failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, petitioners liability is separate and individual. Considering that it was duly established that petitioner boxed Jimmy and Andrew and absent proof of the extent of the injuries sustained by the latter from these acts, petitioner should only be made liable for two counts of slight physical injuries. In addition, he should pay P5,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of Jimmy and another P5,000.00 as moral damages to Andrew.27 Actual damages arising from said acts cannot, however, be awarded for failure to prove the same.

Anent the penalty imposed on Taban and Tubo, in Criminal Case No. 92-080, the CA correctly modified the same. The crime committed was attempted homicide and not frustrated homicide because the stab wounds that Andrew sustained were not life-threatening.28 Although Taban and Tubo did not appeal their conviction, this part of the appellate courts judgment is favorable to them, thus, they are entitled to a reduction of their prison terms. 29 The rule is that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. 30 WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. G.R. No. 169519 July 17, 2009 IRENORIO B. BALABA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES CARPIO, J.: A petition for review1 assails the Decision(15 Dec 200) 2 Resolution(24 Aug 2005) 3 of the CA. In its Decision, the CA dismissed petitioner Irenorio B. Balabas (Balaba) appeal of the Decision 4 of the RTC, finding him guilty of Malversation of Public Funds. In its Resolution, the CA denied Balabas MR. State Auditors Arlene Mandin and Loila Laga of the Provincial Auditors O ffice conducted an examination of the cash and accounts of the accountable officers of the Municipality of Guindulman, Bohol. The State Auditors discovered a cash shortage of P56,321.04, unaccounted cash tickets of P7,865.30 and an unrecorded check of P50,000 payable to Balaba, or a total shortage of P114,186.34. Three demand letters were sent to Balaba asking him to explain the discrepancy in the accounts. Unsatisfied with Balabas explanation, Graft Investigation Officer I Miguel P. Ricamora recommended that an information for Malversation of Public Funds, as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, be filed against Balaba with the Sandiganbayan.5 In an Information, the Office of the Special Prosecutor charged Balaba with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.7 The Information against Balaba reads as follows: That on or about October 19, 1993, in the Municipality of Guindulman, Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Assistant Municipal Treasurer of Guindulman, Bohol and accountable public officer for the funds collected and received by virtue of his position, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, embezzle and take away from said funds, the total amount of P114,186.34, which he converted to his personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the government.CONTRARY TO LAW.8 During his arraignmenT, Balaba entered a plea of not guilty. Trial soon followed. The trial court found Balaba guilty. On 14 January 2003, Balaba filed his Notice of Appeal, where he indicated that he would file his appeal before the Court of Appeals. Balaba filed his Appellants Brief.11 The Office of the Solicitor General, instead of filing an Appellees Brief, filed a Manifestation and Motion12 praying for the dismissal of the appeal for being improper since the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal. In its Decision, the CA dismissed Balabas appeal. The CA declared that it had no jurisdiction to act on the appeal because the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the case. Balaba filed a MR and asked that he be allowed to pursue his appeal before the proper court, the Sandiganbayan.13 In its Resolution, the CA denied Balabas motion. Balaba filed the present petition. Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing his appeal instead of certifying the case to the proper court. Balaba claims that it was due to inadvertence that the notice of appeal was filed before the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan. Balaba adds that his appeal was dismissed on purely technical grounds. Balaba asks the Court to relax the rules to afford him an opportunity to correct the error and fully ventilate his appeal on the merits. Held: The petition has no merit. Upon Balabas conviction by the trial court, his remedy should have been an appeal to the Sandiganbayan . Paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249 (RA 8249 ),14 which further defined the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, reads: The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. (Emphasis ours) There is nothing in said paragraph which can conceivably justify the filing of Balabas appea l before the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, the Court of Appeals is bereft of any jurisdiction to review the judgment Balaba seeks to appeal. In Melencion v. Sandiganbayan,15 we ruled: An error in designating the appellate court is not fatal to the appeal. However, the correction in designating the proper appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal. Once made within the

said period, the designation of the correct appellate court may be allowed even if the records of the case are forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of court would apply. The second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court reads: "An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright." (Emphasis ours) In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal only after the expiration of the period to appeal. The trial court promulgated its Decision on 9 December 2002. Balaba filed his notice of appeal on 14 January 2003. The Court of Appeals issued the Decision declaring its lack of jurisdiction on 15 December 2004. Balaba tried to correct the error only on 27 January 2005, clearly beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the decision of the trial court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it dismissed Balabas appeal because of lack of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 130335 January 18, 2001 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESSIE OLIVO, JR. MENDOZA, J.: An appeal from the decision(Feb 27, 1997), of the RTC finding accused-appellant Jessie Olivo, Jr. 2 guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim Jane Lorielinda Tacyo y Balongay3 the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity, P63,800.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages, and costs. The information against accused-appellant alleged: That on or about the 13th day of June, 1996 or thereabouts, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab JANE LORIELINDA TACYO y BALONGAY with the use of a screw driver and smash her head with the use of two big rocks, thereby inflicting upon the latter neurogenic shock due to massive head crushing injuries and multiple stab wounds in the body, which injuries directly caused her death.1wphi1.nt That in the commission of the offense there was present the qualifying circumstances of taking advantage of superior superior strength in that the accused intentionally employed excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the offended party, and scoffing in that the victim was left to lie completely undressed and naked.4 Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and so the trial of the case followed. The trial court rendered its decision finding the accused, JESSIE OLIVO, JR., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act 7659 as charged, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the victim Jane Lorielinda Tacyo the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death; P63,800.00 as actual damages incurred in connection with her death; and P200,000.00 as moral damages all indemnifications are without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant alleges that the evidence on record does not satisfy the test of moral certainty to warrant his conviction for the crime of murder. Issue: Whether the evidence on record does not satisfy the test of moral certainty to warrant his conviction for the crime of murder. Held: The decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant guilty of murder should be affirmed. 1. While no eyewitness testified as to the killing of Lorie, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that accused-appellant committed the crime. To begin with, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove the elements of the crime if the following requisites are present: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.33 It has been held that the circumstances or a combination thereof should point to overt acts of the accused, which would then lead to only one conclusion, that is, that the accused is guilty of the crime charges. These should be inconsistent with the theory that the accused is innocent.34 The requisites necessary for circumstantial evidence to be deemed sufficient to convict accused-appellant are thus present in this case. First, there is more than one circumstance. Second, these circumstances were proven. Third, the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 2. Accused-appellant questions the way the trial court appreciated the following:44

1. The testimonies of friends of accused-appellant and the victims; 2. The fact that accused-appellant fled from Baguio City soon after the police found the victim's body. 3. The declaration of accused-appellant that he was involved in Lorie's death. It is settled that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally accorded great respect because it had the opportunity to hear them and to observe their demeanor and manner of testifying. The exception is when it overlooked or misapplied some facts which could have affected the result of the case. Indeed, the proximate contact of the trial court with those who take the witness stand places it in a more competent position to discriminate between a true and false testimony .45 3. With respect to declarations, acts, and omissions of accused-appellant after the crime, thee may be received in evidence against him. Rule 130, 26 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that "The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him." Accused-appellants claims that, if indeed he had committed the crime, he would not have returned to the Mountain Rock Disco that night or on subsequent evenings. Nor would he have gone to the morgue to help identify the dead body nor to the police station to help identify the owned of the recovered screwdriver. Instead, he would have fled to a place far from the police and the scene of the crime.46 Not all human beings react to similar events in the same way, however. The fact that accused-appellant did not immediately flee from Baguio City does not necessarily mean he had nothing to do with the killing. It is possible that he went to the morgue and the police station precisely to dispel any suspicion that he had anything to do with the death of Lorie. As observed in People v. Gordon,47 the fact that the accused does not flee from the scene of the crime does not necessarily indicate a clear conscience. In any event, after the body of the victim had been found and the screwdriver of accused-appellant had been recovered near the body, accused-appellant actually fled from Baguio City. The wicked fleeth, even when no man pursueth, whereas the righteous is as brave as a lion.48 The offense committed is murder, penalized by the Revised Penal Code, which provides, Art. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 248 shall kill another shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. ... taking advantage of superior strength 2. ... or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. The trial court correctly held that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was present since accused-appellant was taller and stronger than the victim.49 An attack made by an armed man upon a woman, who died as result thereof, is murder, because his sex and weapon gave him superiority of strength. 50 The information alleged that the qualifying circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse or the person of the victim was present as well. As the lower court correctly held, the evidence fails to show this. The word "outrage" means to subject to gross insult. "Scoff" means to show contempt by derisive acts or language.51 There is no proof showing that, in stabbing the dead body of the victim and stripping off her garments, the purpose of accused-appellant was to insult the victim or to show contempt for the dead. The prosecution having proven the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength, the trial court correctly ruled that accused-appellant committed murder. Murder is punished by reclusion perpetua to death. In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, accused-appellant should be punished with the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.52 WHEREFORE, the decision of the RTC, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim Jane Lorielinda Tacyo the amounts of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death and costs is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the amount of P200,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages is REDUCED to P50,000.00, while the award of P63,800.00 as actual damages is DELETED.