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Borja vs Comelec FACTS: Jose Capco ran for and was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros for the 1988-1992

term. On September 02, 1989, he became mayor by succession upon the death of Cesar Borja who was the incumbent mayor. On the 1992 and 1995 elections, he ran for and elected as Mayor. Capco filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor for the 1998 elections. Another candidate, Benjamin Capco Jr, filed a petition to disqaulify against Capco on the ground that the latter has already served three consecutive terms. COMELEC division ruled in favor of Borja declaring Capco disqualified torun for the 1998 elections. Capco filed a motion and COMELEC En Banc acting on the motion, reversed the ruling of COMELC Division. It ruled that Capcos succession into office is not counted as one term for purposes of the computation of the three term limitation under the Constitution and Local Government Code.


WON Capco is eligible to run for mayor


LATASA vs COMELEC FACTS: Arsenio Latasa was elected Mayor of Digos, Davao del Sur to 3 three consecutive terms (1992, 1995, 1998). During his third term, a plebiscite was held to convert Digos into a component city (2000). The ratification of the Charter of the City of Digos ended the tenure of Latasa as Mayor. However, he was still mandated as hold-over mayor of the city until the next election. For the election of 2001, Latasa filed his COC for his first term as mayor of the city. He acknowledges that he served as mayor of Digos when it was still a municipality. Sunga, also a candidate for mayor, filed a petition to disqualify Latasa as he already had served as mayor for three consecutive terms in violation of the Local Government Code and the Constitution. Comelec issued a resolution in favor of Sunga and disqualified Latasa. Latasa submitted a motion for reconsideration which was not acted upon by the Comelec until the end of the May 14 elections. As a result, Latasa was still able to continue his campaign and eventually won the election. Sunga now also sought to annul Latasas proclamation. Comelec only rendered its decision denying Latasas motion for reconsideration in 2002. Sunga claims that he should be proclaimed mayor as he holds the second most number of votes in 2001 ISSUE: WON Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. HELD: Latasa cannot serve as Mayor of the new city of Digos. Latasa having been elected as mayor in 1998, the conversion of Digos from a municipality to a city in 2000 falls within his term. As Digos acquired a new corporate existence, qualifications for its elective positions also change. As a result, the Office of the Municipal Mayor was abolished to make way for the creation of the Office of the City Mayor. However, under the Charter of the City of Digos, the elective officials of the Municipality of Digos shall have holdover power until a new election and the duly elected officials have assumed their office. Latasa never ceased to discharge his duties as Mayor during the conversion of Digos. Also, although Digos was converted into a city, Digos never redefined its territory, the inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years. Sungas cannot claim that he be proclaimed as mayor after the disqualification of Latasa, the SC already ruled that the disqualification of the winning candidate does not entitle the second highest vote earner the position of mayor. Vacancy be filled by succession.


Ong (incumbent) and Alegre are both running for mayor. Ongs certificate of candidacy was denied due course on ground of violation of three-term rule. Thus, he was substituted by Romeo Ong. Was the substitution valid?

The Supreme Court held that while there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited political party may substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this does not include those cases where the certificate of candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied due course and cancelled under sec. 78 of the Code.

Expression unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so easily and conveniently included those persons whose certificates of candidacy have been denied due course and/or cancelled under the provisions of sec. 78 of the Code.

NOTA BENE: A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered as a candidate, much the same as one who has no certificate of candidacy. And because Ong is not a candidate, then he cannot be substituted because substitution presupposes that the person to be substituted is a candidate.