Greece: Selective Secularization and The Deprivatization of Religion?

3.
Greece:
Selective Secularization and the
Deprivatization of Religion?
Lina Molokotos-Liederman
Introduction
his chapter addresses the question of how the secularization thesis applies to
T the case of Greece. This question is particularly relevant given the weight of
Greek Orthodoxy on the country’s religious and cultural landscape and on the
historical circumstances that have shaped the nation’s political and social life. First
we shall look briefly at some of the definitions of and debates on secularization and
then highlight specific aspects of Eastern Orthodoxy in relation to the process of
secularization. Then we shall continue with an introduction to the larger context
in which the Greek case should be viewed, including a brief description of the
religious landscape. Finally the conflict over national Identity Cards is used as a
case study in order to highlight the ambiguity of the secularization thesis with
regard to Greece.
Bryan Wilson’s original definition of secularization as a “process whereby
religious thinking, institutions, and practice lose social significance” is an
important starting point in defining the concept.1 Secularization includes
numerous social processes, such as:
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also subjective aspects of religiosity, such as church attendance, religious
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41
42 SECULARISM, WOMEN & THE STATE: THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD IN THE 21ST CENTURY
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individual, and, thus, its marginalization from public life.5
The notion of secularization is currently viewed more as “a theory with
relatively limited application, particularly suited to the European case, but very
much less helpful elsewhere.”6 Increasingly, scholars are questioning the validity
of the secularization argument, especially outside the Western European context.
A related criticism that concerns the specific topic of this chapter is the extension
of the secularization thesis beyond the Protestant and Catholic cases, from which
sociologists of religion originally developed the concept. Furthermore, Jose
Casanova’s argument on the “deprivatization of religion in the modern world,”7
with religious traditions exiting the private sphere and entering public life is
particularly relevant to the Greek case, as this chapter will illustrate.
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by a civil war, the fall of the dictatorship in 1974 and EU membership in
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development has also left its mark. Economic prosperity and consumerism
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and structural differentiation, rationalization, and increasing social and cultural
diversity. But it has done so in its own way, and at its own pace, given its particular
historical circumstances and political and social development. In this respect,
Greece is a country that is undergoing a selective process of secularization, as
there are points where the Greek case can give “pause for thought.” The next
sections illustrate this point and highlight the weight of Greek Orthodoxy
on the country’s religious and cultural landscape, and the particular historical
circumstances that have shaped Greece’s political and social life.
The Secularization Thesis and Eastern Orthodoxy

Orthodox Christianity is marked by the absence of a strong centralized and
hierarchical administrative structure, such as we find in the Catholic Church.8
Orthodox churches are autocephalous entities headed by autonomous Patriarchates
that have the right to elect bishops in each administrative jurisdiction. Local
churches are decentralized, but united in spirit through the Ecumenical Patriarchate
3. GREECE: SELECTIVE SECULARIZATION AND THE DEPRIVATIZATION OF RELIGION? 43
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“Unity of the Church is a unity in faith, not an administrative unity,” wrote
Jean Meyendorff.9 This type of organization affects how the Orthodox faith is
practiced and lived today.
The decentralized structure of Eastern Orthodox Churches allows fairly
flexible religious practices, associated with an absence of strictly applied religious
regulations and prohibitions. The lack of rigid application of religious rules,
accompanied by some degree of elasticity when necessary, is the result of the
concept of oikonomia in Greek Orthodoxy. This permits various possible ways
of practically implementing Orthodox law, thus implying a certain degree of
flexibility, conciliation, discussion and openness. One example is the relatively
mild language against divorce, abortion or contraception by higher Orthodox
clergy that we often find in speeches by the Catholic Church and the Pope
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of Orthodox Christianity also relates to the close link between the Orthodox
faith and the nation. Eastern Orthodox Churches tend to identify themselves
with specific national and ethnic characteristics. The Church is usually thought
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between church and nation in many Balkan countries, such as Greece and Serbia.
In this sense, Orthodoxy acts as a marker of collective and individual identities,
a “genre of identity,”11 whereby religion is used symbolically, thus diluting or
losing its religious content.
When thinking about the relationship between secularization and Eastern
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and nation are factors that can collectively determine the extent to which
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The relationships between secularization and Eastern Orthodoxy have to
be examined in depth through different case studies. But there are indicators
suggesting some secularizing tendencies in countries with Orthodox majorities.
First, the flexibility of religious practices and lack of strict religious rules
oikonomia
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Second, Eastern Orthodoxy acts as a collective “genre of identity”12BOEBOBMM
encompassing force, “a religious tradition that has been absorbed into different
national identities.”13 This may suggest a propensity towards a certain degree of
secularization.
However, there are also indicators suggesting the contrary, thus not in
alignment with the secularization thesis. The intertwining of religion and politics
in countries with Orthodox majorities and close relations between religious and
state institutions also suggest a more visible and public role of religion. These
factors point to a weaker institutional and structural differentiation between
the sacred and secular spheres in such societies and, thus, a more diluted
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countries with Orthodox majorities points to close relations between religion and
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groups based on the correlation among their religion, ethnicity, and nationality.
Collectively, these contrasting hypotheses suggest, at best, an uneasy
relationship between Orthodoxy and the processes of globalization, secularization,
and rationalization. They also indicate a partialBDDPNNPEBUJPOPGBOEBEBQ
tation to the values of modernity. Looking more closely at data on religiosity in
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would be useful in verifying and testing these hypotheses. Further examination,
using case studies, would also help highlight the complexities and contradictions
in applying the secularization thesis to Eastern Orthodoxy. Greece is taken here
as an indicative example illustrating these processes, among others.
The Greek Religious Landscape

Greece has a special place in the European religious landscape. It can be viewed
as the daughter of a mixed marriage: it looks towards and espouses elements from
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the West and East on account of Greece’s mixed religious, cultural, and historical
profile. Greece has been strongly shaped and influenced by both its ancient
heritage, which was the historic originator of what became Western democracy
and rationalism, and its Byzantine legacy. Yet, it did not directly experience the
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predominantly Orthodox country not to have lived under Communism. Having
joined the European Community in 1981, it is one of the older European Union
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most eastern edge of the Union. It also marks the border between Europe and the
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profile compared to the Western European religious model of secularization and
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Orthodoxy constitutes Greece’s cultural and religious heritage, dating to
before the creation of the modern Greek state in the 19th century. It goes back to
the Byzantine Empire, when Emperor Constantine made Christianity the official
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Orthodox Christianity became the glue uniting the Byzantine Empire.
Subsequently, during the era of the Ottoman Empire, the Eastern Orthodox
Church was the guardian of Greek language and culture under Ottoman rule.
These important factors have cemented the historic link that developed between
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identify Greek citizenship with the Orthodox faith.
How does the legacy of the Eastern Orthodox Church translate into
today’s Greek political and social life? The independence of the Church in 1833
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were formalized under Article 3 of the Greek Constitution, which stated that
the “prevailing” religion of the Greek population is Eastern Orthodoxy under
the authority of the autocephalous Church of Greece, united spiritually with
the Ecumenical Patriarchy.15 But the independence of the OCG from the
Ecumenical Patriarchy also meant its subordination to the authority of the Greek
State. The close relationship that developed between Church and State and
between religious and political leaders entangled the OCG in Greece’s turbulent
political history. However, if this situation limited the OCG’s independence by
placing it under the authority of the Greek State, it did offer the Church special
privileges, especially financial support by the Ministry of National Education
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Beyond the formal relationship between Church and State, the OCG and the
Greek State are also interconnected symbolically today. The Church is generally
considered to be a homogenizing and unifying force that can be solicited by the
State. The power of the OCG, both as a religious institution with a political
weight and a cultural and spiritual force, is still taken into consideration in
Greek political life, as evidenced by the presence of the Archbishop and other
members of clergy during several national holidays and political occasions,
for example during the swearing in ceremony of the President or of a new
government. The OCG does not have a direct influence on State affairs, but it
can exercise a rather implicit and diffused influence on government. Inevitably,
given such close Church and State relations, there have been many tensions.
Throughout modern Greek history, Church and State have confronted each
other in a variety of conflicts, including over the establishment of civil marriage

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under occasional discussion but it is unlikely that any constitutional change will
be approved by Parliament in the foreseeable future.
The strong visibility of the OCG in Greece’s political life extends to Greek
society, where it still enjoys a deeply rooted social and cultural influence: Greek
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component of national identity and acts as a main reference point, a chain of
national memory, linking the country’s historical past and cultural heritage. It is
also regarded as a symbolic safety net protecting against a globalizing world that
might threaten to erase the national, ethnic, cultural and religious characteristics
of Greece.
The OCG has responded to the process of European integration by developing
various European initiatives. These have included opening a representation office
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some links and a basic dialogue with other European Churches and religious
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strong ideologically based discourses by the late Archbishop Christodoulos, who
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Following the death of Archbishop Christodoulos, Archbishop Ieronymos II was
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is viewed as a moderate religious leader. It remains to be seen how his leadership
will influence the Church’s position in Greek society, its outlook towards the rest
of Europe, and the process of European integration.
In religious and ethnic terms, Greece is considered one of Europe’s most
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data, approximately 93% of the Greek population of 11 million is Orthodox
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number of immigrants from different religious and ethnic backgrounds, so its

demographic composition is diversifying. There are historic religious and ethnic
minorities that have lived in Greece for many decades and generations. Judged
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of church attendance during Easter and popular religious and national holidays.
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19 However, if Greeks go to Church only occasionally, they pray
more often. Up to 44% of Greek respondents say they pray every day. Greeks
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21 Furthermore,
46% of Greek respondents indicate that religion is extremely important in
their lives.22 Therefore, the level of religiosity seems uneven. On the one hand,
some religious behavior is relatively weak. On the other hand, religion plays a
significant role, as more than half the population defines itself in religious terms.
According to the above statistics, what distinguishes Greece from most European
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Calendarists, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Evangelical Churches and some Pentecostal
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Article 13 of the Greek Constitution protects the freedom of conscience and
religious worship for “known” religions.25 Most “known” religious groups are
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procedure and approval by the local bishop and the Ministry of Education
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religion, including Orthodoxy. In practice, this rule has almost exclusively been
used against religious minorities. Since the mere distribution of literature by
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definition of proselytism in Greece seems problematic.
Women’s Issues
The position of women both in the Church and in society has been viewed statically
by the Greek Orthodox Church, as not requiring any substantive revisions or
changes. Greek Orthodoxy has been rather skeptical or critical towards feminist
concerns and issues, viewing them as Western ideological products threatening
the authentic character and unbroken continuity and tradition of the Church
and of what it means to be Greek. In both theological and social terms, women
are considered equal to but different from men in terms of their unique social
functions in the family, in the Church and in society at large. 26
The OCG has rejected the ordination of women as priests, considering it
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amounting more to traditional Church practice, rather than substantive
theological reasons. However, due to the extensive and growing supporting
roles of women in the Church in a variety of educational, administrative and
philanthropic functions within the OCG, there have been some attempts to
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has created a special Synodical committee for women’s issues and reinstituted
the female diaconate. Ordained ministry is not viewed by Orthodoxy as the
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of deaconesses by the Church can be viewed as one step in strengthening the
position of women in the OCG. But its restriction to the monastic order so far,
limiting the work of female deacons from the wider society,27 suggests that there
is plenty of room for further action and reform.
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evaluate gender roles, but not to drastically overturn the overall balance.28
Women in Greek society are viewed as equal to but different from men,
following a prevailing socially accepted model of women as homemakers,
spouses, mothers and the primary caregivers for the whole family. This paradigm
may be progressively evolving as more Greek women are gradually entering the
work force, thus potentially altering established gender roles and the traditional
model of the Greek family. Nonetheless, in this respect, compared to other

European countries, the pace of social change in Greece may take some time,
partly because Greek women still remain below the European average of female
participation in the labor force.29 Within this context, the position of Greek
women and their sense of self as individuals, mothers, spouses, workers and
citizens suggests a dynamic tension in trying to reconcile cultural tradition and
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How Far Does the Secularization Thesis Apply to Greece?

How does the brief overview of Eastern Orthodoxy and the Greek religious
landscape help us address more specifically the question of secularization in
Greece? The answer seems ambiguous. "UBQPMJUJDBMJOTUJUVUJPOBMMFWFM UIFMBDL
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the Greek State, indicate that religion still benefits from a strong public visibility
in Greece’s political life. The current situation in Greece seems to contradict the
secularization thesis. During the leadership of the late Archbishop Christodoulos,
the OCG activated its public role both in Greek society and politics, and it
deployed its symbolic power when it saw fit. Some argue that Greek Orthodoxy
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the secular and sacred spheres. However, the new Archbishop Ieronymos
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other European states: Greece is somewhat similar to a number of countries,
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and national identity often overlap.
Another element that seems to contradict the secularization argument in
(SFFDF JT UIF iEFQSJWBUJ[BUJPO PG SFMJHJPOw31 Orthodoxy still benefits from a
strong visibility in the Greek State and the public consciousness. Archbishop
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the marginal public role of religious institutions in Europe32 and by trying to
breathe new life into public religion in Greece. This situation originated well
before Archbishop Christodoulos assumed the public role of head of the OCG
and promoted his vision of the Greek Orthodox Church. It remains to be seen if
and how the leadership of Archbishop Ieronymos II, who is known to keep a low
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SECULARISM, WOMEN & THE STATE: THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD IN THE 21ST CENTURY
and political terms. Whether the secularization of social and political life in
Greece will also eventually mean the privatization of religion is another question
that remains to be answered in the future.
The National Identity Cards Issue

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allows us to observe more concretely the specific ambiguities in the process of
secularization in Greece. The national Identity Cards conflict that erupted in
EJWJEFE(SFFLTPDJFUZPWFSXIFUIFS*%DBSETTIPVMEDPOUJOVFUPMJTUUIF
DBSEIPMEFSTSFMJHJPVTBċMJBUJPOCFMPXIJTIFSOBNF*UXBTBEFCBUFUIBUUPVDIFE
a sensitive issue between the Greek population and the Church of Greece and
TIPPL$IVSDI4UBUFSFMBUJPOT.33
On the one hand, the fact that the ID cards conflict even took place, and
the strong role of the Church in the controversy, refutes the secularization
arguments in the Greek case. On the other hand, the resolution of the conflict
UIF EFDJTJPO UP mOBMMZ ESPQ SFMJHJPO GSPN *% DBSET TFF CFMPX
JT FWJEFODF
for the secularization thesis, as it suggests a step towards the privatization of
religion. Both the mapping of public opinion in Greece, and an analysis of the
arguments that shaped the ID cards debate, suggest that the applicability of the
secularization thesis in the Greek situation remains ambiguous at best. The ID
cards is not the only example of the challenges of applying the secularization
UIFTJTJO(SFFDFCVUJUJMMVTUSBUFTUIJTQPJOURVJUFXFMM
Most Greeks favored citing religious affiliation on ID cards. According to
(SFFLQVCMJDPQJOJPOQPMMTDPOEVDUFEJOBOEPOBWFSBHFBQQSPYJNBUFMZ
UISFFRVBSUFSTPGUIPTFTVSWFZFEXFSFJOGBWPSPGJODMVEJOHSFMJHJPOPO*%DBSET
BOEPOMZPOFRVBSUFSXFSFBHBJOTUJU34 This trend is also consistent with a sample
of letters to the editor, drawn from seven Greek mainstream newspapers between
BOEBTQBSUPGBOJOEFQUITUVEZPGUIF*%DBSETDSJTJTJO(SFFDF35
This seems to confirm a widely held perception of ID cards as highly symbolic
BOE TZOPOZNPVT XJUI (SFFL JEFOUJUZ BT B XIPMF *U BMTP DPOmSNT UIF EF
privatization of religion thesis as it indicates a desire to keep religious affiliation
public on a state document. It also suggests a refusal to confine religious identity
to the private sphere.
Yet the positive views of the general public are in contrast to the critical
stance of Greek mainstream news media, as indicated by two content analyses
of the ID cards debate in the Greek daily press.36 The discrepancy indicates a
EJWFSHFODFCFUXFFOFMJUFTBOEPQJOJPOMFBEFST JODMVEJOHKPVSOBMJTUT BDBEFNJDT
JOUFMMFDUVBMTBOEQPMJUJDBMmHVSFTJOUIFFMJUFQSFTT
BOEUIFNBKPSJUZPGUIFHFOFSBM
QVCMJDJO(SFFDF BTFYQSFTTFEJOQVCMJDPQJOJPOQPMMTBOEMFUUFSTUPUIFFEJUPS

Three identifiable opinion groups emerged: the negative, the neutral and the
QPTJUJWFɨFJSQPTJUJPOTNJSSPSFEUIPTFPOPUIFSCSPBEJTTVFT TVDIBT$IVSDI
State relations, Greek identity, globalization and European integration,37 and
are somewhat representative of the diversity of perspectives and views on what
it means to be Greek.
Those groups that supported the inclusion of religious affiliation on ID
cards chose their position for cultural and historical reasons, namely the existence
of an inseparable link between Orthodoxy and Hellenism and, thus, between
OBUJPOBOESFMJHJPOɨFZBSHVFEUIBU0SUIPEPYZJTPOFPGUIFGFXFMFNFOUT
BOEBEJTUJODUJWFPOFIPMEJOH(SFFLJEFOUJUZUPHFUIFS BOEUIFZFOEPSTFEBO
BMMFNCSBDJOHWJFXPG)FMMFOP0SUIPEPYZ"DDPSEJOHMZ they viewed the close
$IVSDI4UBUFSFMBUJPOTJO(SFFDFBTSFnFDUJWFPGUIFIJTUPSJDMJOLTCFUXFFOOBUJPO
and religion, and they supported an active public role for the Greek Church.
Because of this, they consider the removal of religious affiliation from ID cards
as an attempt to dilute national cohesion, and a first step towards a separation
of Church and State, which they view as incompatible with the Greek social and
political situation.38 For this opinion group, the ID cards became an important
symbol for preserving Orthodoxy as an integral part of Greek identity, and a
contribution to Europe’s overall spiritual void. They viewed Orthodox faith as a
spiritual shield against the threat of homogenization, cultural absorption by the
EU, and globalization.
The critics of religion on ID cards acknowledged the historic connection
between Orthodoxy and Hellenism but restricted its scope to Greece’s historic
heritage, and, thus to the cultural and spiritual sphere. They distinguished
between Hellenism and Orthodoxy, which they regarded as separate entities
forming modern Greek identity, and they rejected the exclusivity of Orthodoxy
in defining Greekness. Accordingly, they argued that mixing political and
religious power eroded the State and the Church and democracy itself. Thus, they
viewed the removal of religion from ID cards positively, as a first step towards
UIF MJCFSBMJ[BUJPO PG $IVSDI4UBUF SFMBUJPOT For this opinion group, Greece’s
Orthodox heritage should not become a defensive mechanism preventing
European integration. They wanted Greece to be an active partner in Europe and
viewed the European Union as multicultural and diverse, rather than a threat to
national identities and cultures.
Groups with a neutral stance acknowledged the link between nation and
religion as a strong element of national identity. However, they underlined the
GBJMVSFPG(SFFLTQPMJUJDBMQBSUJFTUPBEESFTTTPDJPFDPOPNJDJTTVFT and criticized
the Greek left’s habit of dismissing the attachment of large segments of Greek
society to Orthodoxy, thus underestimating the role of faith and tradition in an
era of increased insecurity and accelerated change. They argued that because of
the political parties’ failure to address key problems, the Church’s advancement
of Orthodoxy has become a safety net against a variety of insecurities. For this
opinion group, the ID cards controversy represented a wider confrontation
between secular and religious ideologies. The OCG’s position on the ID
cards issue reflected its weakness and its fear that the EU might accelerate the
secularization process in Greece and erode the importance of Orthodoxy in
Greek society and public life.
ɨF EJWJEJOH MJOFT PO JTTVFT SBOHJOH GSPN UIF *% DBSET UP $IVSDI4UBUF
relations, to Greek identity, to European integration, by no means reflect binary
PQQPTJUJPOT CFUXFFO SFMJHJPVT BOUJ&VSPQFBO USBEJUJPOBMJTUT BOE TFDVMBS QSP
European modernizers. They are representative of the complex social, political,
and ideological rifts within Greek society. There are rifts between various types
of elites and segments of Greek society along degrees of secular and Orthodox
orientation. They are indicative of contrasting dynamics in a society that is going
UISPVHIBDPODPNJUBOUQSPDFTTPGTFMFDUJWFTFDVMBSJ[BUJPOBOEEFQSJWBUJ[BUJPOPG
religion collectively leading to an “identity crisis.”
Concluding Remarks
" CSJFG PWFSWJFX PG TUSVDUVSBM DIBSBDUFSJTUJDT PG 0SUIPEPYZOBNFMZ JUT
decentralized structure, its flexibility and adaptability and its strong links between
$IVSDI/BUJPOBOE$IVSDI4UBUFQSPWJEFTBHFOFSBMDPOUFYUJOXIJDIUPQMBDF
the Greek case. It also offers the opportunity for some initial reflections on the
relationship between Orthodoxy and the process of secularization, which needs
further investigation. Greece has provided a specific case study that illustrates
the complexities of the secularization thesis, particularly given the country’s
VOJRVF IJTUPSZ BOE HFPQPMJUJDBM MPDBUJPO TJUVBUFE CFUXFFO &BTU BOE 8FTU

Greece is a modern European society with secularizing elements, but is also a
society that maintains distinctive and, sometimes traditionalist, aspects. Greece
is undergoing a process of secularization at its own pace and according to its
own religious, political, social and historical profile. The OCG has clearly not
been marginalized or excluded from public life in Greece. At a political level,
the Greek state is not a secular state per se, as there is no separation of Church
and State and the OCG is technically a department of the State. The OCG has
political clout but the Greek case is not in any way an example of a theocracy, as
the OCG has no direct influence on state affairs.
At a societal level, Greece cannot be considered as strictly secular, since
religion is not confined to the private sphere. But it is also unclear whether
(SFFDFDBOCFDPOTJEFSFEBQSPGPVOEMZSFMJHJPVTTPDJFUZ BTDBOPUIFSSFMJHJPVTMZ
homogeneous countries, such as Poland and Ireland, where individual religiosity,

DIVSDIBUUFOEBODFBOENFNCFSTIJQBSFIJHI
ɨFSFJTBTPNFXIBUTVQFSmDJBM
level of church attendance and religious practices in Greece, but a relatively
deeper attachment to Orthodoxy, as a cultural, spiritual and historical point of
reference in defining Greek identity. This is even the case among Greeks who
have a minimal connection with the Church.
ɨF DPODFQU PG TFDVMBSJ[BUJPO JT NVMUJGBDFUFE BOE NVMUJEJNFOTJPOBM
If we can speak about secularization in Greece, then we must distinguish
among different or even contradictory processes of secularization occurring in
different phases and spheres. In this, the Greek case is an example of “selective
secularization.” Orthodoxy is salient as a marker of self and collective definition.
Moreover, the continued deployment of the Church as a defender of national
identity suggests a diffused, but also very public, form of religion. Therefore, if
there is “diffused” religion, according to which Orthodoxy is dispersed into a
broad “cultural melting pot of Greekness losing its religious specificity,”39 there
is also iEFQSJWBUJ[FEw SFMJHJPO QVUUJOH JOUP RVFTUJPO B DPNNPO BTTVNQUJPO
UIBUSFMJHJPVTJOTUJUVUJPOTBOEBDUPSTJOBTFDVMBSTUDFOUVSZ&VSPQFBSFUPCF
confined to the private sphere.
ENDNOTES
1. Bryan Wilson, Religion in Secular Society -POEPO$"8BUUTBOE$P

,BSFM%PCCFMBFSF i4FDVMBSJ[BUJPO".VMUJ%JNFOTJPOBM$PODFQU wCurrent Sociol-
ogy

3. Steve Bruce, “The Social Process of Secularization” in Sociology of Religion, edited by
3JDIBSE'FOO -POEPO#MBDLXFMM1VCMJTIJOH

4. %BOJÒMF)FSWJFV-ÏHFS La Religion pour Mémoire 1BSJT$FSG
(SBDF%BWJF
Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates 0YGPSE 0YGPSE 6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT

5. Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World $IJDBHP6OJWFSTJUZPG$IJDBHP
1SFTT

6. Grace Davie, The Sociology of Religion -POEPO4BHF1VCMJDBUJPOT

7. Ibid., 211.
8. 7JDUPS 3PVEPNFUPG i0SUIPEPYZ "T 1VCMJD 3FMJHJPO JO 1PTU (SFFDF w JO
Eastern Orthodoxy in a Global Age FET 7 3PVEPNFUPG " "HBEKBOJBO BOE +
1BOLIVSTUW 8BMOVU$SFFL 64""MUBNJSB1SFTT

9. Jean Meyendorff, The Orthodox Church: Its Past and Its Role in the World Today
$SFTUXPPE /: 64"4U7MBEJNJST4FNJOBSZ1SFTT

7JDUPS 3PVEPNFUPG i(SFFL 0SUIPEPYZ 5FSSJUPSJBMJUZ BOE (MPCBMJUZ 3FMJHJPVT

3FTQPOTFTBOE*OTUJUVUJPOBM%JTQVUFT wSociology of Religion

3PVEPNFUPG
*CJE
"HBEKBOJBOBOE3PVEPNFUPG
14. The intertwining of Greek identity with Orthodoxy was coined in the term “Helle
OP$ISJTUJBOJUZw ellino-christianismos
XIJDIXBTmSTUVTFECZ4QJSJEPO;BNCFMJPT
JOUIFT
15. Constitution of Greece, Fifth Revisionary Parliament of the Hellenes, Basic Provisions:
IUUQXXXISJPSH.'"TZOUBHNB BDDFTTFEPO.BZ

16. ɨFPOJ 4UBUIPQPVMPV i3FMJHJPTJUZ and 5SVTU in Institutions: &NFSHJOH5SFOET JO
Greece and Europe,” in Politics and Religions FEJUFECZ,;PSCBT "UIFOT1BQB[JTJT
1VCMJTIFST
<JO(SFFL> 4FFCFMPXEBUBPOSFMJHJPTJUZJO
(SFFDF

17. Since 1951 the Greek National Statistical Service has not included questions based
on religious criteria in its national census and surveys. Additionally, estimates are
EJċDVMUHJWFOUIFDIBOHFJOJNNJHSBOUQPQVMBUJPOTTJODFUIFT4PNFVTFGVM
TPVSDFTJODMVEFBSFQPSUCZ(SFFL)FMTJOLJ.POJUPS.JOPSJUZ3JHIUT(SPVQ
UIFTPVSDFTMJTUFEJOUIFWPMVNFCZ3JDIBSE$MPHHPO.JOPSJUJFTJO(SFFDF
UIF644UBUF%FQBSUNFOUT*OUFSOBUJPOBM3FMJHJPVT'SFFEPN3FQPSUB
BSUJDMFCZ.#BMEXJO&EXBSETBOEJOUFSWJFXTXJUISFMJHJPVTNJOPSJUZHSPVQSFQ
SFTFOUBUJWFT DPOEVDUFE JO BT QBSU PG B -FWFSIVMNF GVOEFE QSPKFDU PO iɨF
3FMJHJPVT'BDUPSJOUIF$POTUSVDUJPOPG&VSPQF(SFFDF 0SUIPEPYZBOEUIF&6w
.PMPLPUPT-JFEFSNBO B

&44 BOE

&44EBUB BTRVPUFEJOɨFPOJ4UBUIPQPVMPV i3FMJHJPTJUZBOE5SVTUJO*OTUJUVUJPOT
&NFSHJOH5SFOET JO (SFFDF BOE &VSPQF w JO Politics and Religions, edited by K.
;PSCBT "UIFOT1BQB[JTJT1VCMJTIFST
<JO(SFFL>
*CJE
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
4UBUIPQPVMPV
,OPXOSFMJHJPOTJODMVEF0SUIPEPYZ 0ME$BMFOEBSJTUT 3PNBO$BUIPMJDJTN *TMBN
Judaism, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Adventists. There is no formal mechanism or
QSPDFTTGPSBSFMJHJPVTHSPVQUPCFDPNFSFDPHOJ[FEBTBiLOPXOwSFMJHJPOJO(SFFDF
this status can usually be achieved after approval of a permit to operate a place of
worship.
IUUQXXXISJPSH.'"TZOUBHNB
'PSBOPWFSWJFXPGUIFSPMFPGXPNFOJO(SFFL0SUIPEPYZTFF&MFOJ4PUJSJV GPSUI

DPNJOH
iɨF5SBEJUJPOBM.PEFSO3FUIJOLJOHUIF1PTJUJPOPG$POUFNQPSBSZ
Greek Women to Orthodoxy,” in Orthodox Christianity in 21st Century Greece: The
Role of Religion in Politics, Ethnicity and Culture FET .BLSJEFT BOE 3PVEPNFUPG
"MEFSTIPU"TIHBUF

27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. &ċF 'PLBT BOE /JLPT ,PLPTBMBLJT
i(SFFDF 0WFSWJFX PG UIF /BUJPOBM
Situation,” unpublished report part of the “Welfare and Values in Europe: Transitions
related to Religion, Minorities and Genderw 8B7&
QSPKFDU
.BQQB BTDJUFEJO3PVEPNFUPG
3PVEPNFUPG
32. Ibid.
33. For more details and analyses on the ID cards conflict, see Vasilios Makrides
i#FUXFFO/PSNBMJUZBOE5FOTJPO"TTFTTJOH$IVSDI4UBUF3FMBUJPOTJO(SFFDFJO
the Light of the Identity Cards Crisis,” in Religion, Staat und Konfliktkonstellationen
im Orthodoxen Ost-und Sudosteuropa FEJUFECZ.BLSJEFT 1FUFS-BOH

-JOB.PMPLPUPT-JFEFSNBO i-PPLJOHBU3FMJHJPOBOE(SFFL/BUJPOBM*EFOUJUZ
from the Outside: The National Identity Cards Conflict through the Eyes of Greek
Minorities,” Religion, State and Society B
-JOB.PMPLPUPT-JFEFSNBO
iɨF(SFFL*%$BSET$POUSPWFSTZ"$BTF4UVEZPO3FMJHJPOBOE/BUJPOBM*EFOUJUZ
in a Changing European Union,” Journal of Contemporary Religion C

BOE3PVEPNFUPG
4FF.PMPLPUPT-JFEFSNBO C
35. Ibid.
4FF.PMPLPUPT-JFEFSNBO CBOE/JLPT%FNFSU[JT AA1PMJUJDTBOE$PNNVOJ
DBUJPO'BDFUTPGUIF4FDVMBSJTBUJPOPG0SUIPEPYZ FET5-JQPXBUT /%FNFSU[JT
and V. Georgiadou, Religions and Politics in Modernity "UIFOT,SJUJLJ
o
<JO(SFFL>
'PSBNPSFEFUBJMFEBOBMZTJT TFF.PMPLPUPT-JFEFSNBO C
38. However, there were some individuals in this group that supported a separation of
$IVSDIBOE4UBUF'PSFYBNQMF 'BUIFS(.FUBMMJOPT XIPXBTJOGBWPSPGJODMVEJOH
SFMJHJPOPO*%DBSET BOEJOCSPVHIUUIF*%DBSETDBTFUPUIF&VSPQFBO$PVSU
PG)VNBO3JHIUT
IBEJOEJDBUFEIJTTVQQPSUPGBTUSJDUTFQBSBUJPOPG$IVSDIBOE
State in order to stop political parties from using the Church for their own political
interests.
39. 7BTJMJPT.BLSJEFTBOE-JOB.PMPLPUPT-JFEFSNBO i0SUIPEPYZJO(SFFDFUPEBZBO
introduction,” Social Compass %FDFNCFS

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The Secularization Thesis and Eastern Orthodoxy

JO *TUBOCVM$POTUBOUJOPQMF 5VSLFZ

The Greek Religious Landscape

number of immigrants from different religious and ethnic backgrounds, so its

model of the Greek family. Nonetheless, in this respect, compared to other

How Far Does the Secularization Thesis Apply to Greece?

The National Identity Cards Issue

homogeneous countries, such as Poland and Ireland, where individual religiosity,

7JDUPS 3PVEPNFUPG i(SFFL 0SUIPEPYZ 5FSSJUPSJBMJUZ BOE (MPCBMJUZ 3FMJHJPVT

'PSBOPWFSWJFXPGUIFSPMFPGXPNFOJO(SFFL0SUIPEPYZTFF&MFOJ4PUJSJV GPSUI

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The Secularization Thesis and Eastern Orthodoxy

JO *TUBOCVM$POTUBOUJOPQMF 5VSLFZ

The Greek Religious Landscape

number of immigrants from different religious and ethnic backgrounds, so its

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How Far Does the Secularization Thesis Apply to Greece?

The National Identity Cards Issue

homogeneous countries, such as Poland and Ireland, where individual religiosity,

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