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Perez ferraris vs. Ferraris, G.R. No.

. 162368, July 17, 2006 Facts: The Regiona Trial Court denied the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage between petitioner Ma. Armida-Ferraris with Brix Ferraris. It found that his "violence" during episodes of epilepsy did not constitute psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and cited that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already presen t at the inception of the marriage. Dr Dayan's testimony of the respondent's mixedpersonality was unsufficiently arrived at. It was alleged that he had Schizoid characteristics in his persona. The testimony however failed to establish how this was arrived at or that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the essential marital obligations. The petitioner then filed a motion to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Can epilepsy constitute psychological incapacity?

Ruling: The Supreme Court denied the petition with finality. The Supreme Court found respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code should not be confused with Divorce or with Legal Separation.

JOCELYN M. SUAZO vs. ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES Facts: Jocelyn and Angelito were married when they were 16 years old where they lived with Angelitos parent. Jocelyn took odd jobs while Angelito refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged him to find work but this often resulted to violent quarrels. Jocelyn left, after 10yrs Jocelyn filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36. Jocelyn testified on the alleged beating made by her husband. The expert witness corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony. Both her testimony and report by the expert concludes that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated. However, B was not personally examined by the expert witness. The RTC annulled the marriage but the Court of Appeals reversed it. Issue: Whether or not there is basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with Angelito under Art. 36. Held: Jocelyns evidence is insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological incapacity The psychologist, using meager information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelitos psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyns psychological condition, this is not true for Angelitos. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both the psychologists report and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelitos purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. Jocelyns testimony regarding the habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations.

Virgilio Maquilan vs. Dita Maquilan, G.R. No. 155409, June 8, 2007 Facts: The spouse was happily married and they were blessed to have a son. However, Virgilio found out that Dita was having extra-marital affair. Dita and her paramour were convicted of adultery and were sentenced to suffer imprisonment. On June 15, 2001, private respondent, through counsel, filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, dissolution and liquidation of conjugal partnership of gains and damages. During pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a compromise agreement. The compromise agreement was given judicial permission, which was erroneously dated January 2, 2002. However, petitioner filed an Omnibus motion dated January 15, 2002 praying for the rejection of the said agreement. With the lower courts continuously denying rejection, petitioner eventually came to the Supreme Court with the same motion citing among his reasons that the agreement is void for having failed to secure the presence of the State through the Office of the Solicitor General during its enactment.

Issue: When is State presence required in Marital Cases (as defined under Art. 48 of the Family Code)?

Ruling: The Supreme Court denied the petition and validated the compromise agreement. The purpose of the active participation of the public prosecutor or the OSG is to ensure that the interest of the state is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriage by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication, or suppression of evidence. Nothing in the subject compromise agreement touched into the very merits of the case of nullity of marriage. It merely pertains to an agreement between petitioner and private respondent to separate their conjugal properties partially.

Dino vs. Dino, G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011 Facts: Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) got married on 14 January 1998,. On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and roaming around with her friends that consumed the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him. The trial court ruled that petitioner was able to establish respondents psychological incapacity. Thus, their marriage was declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether or not the property relations of the parties should fall under 147 of the Family Code. Held: Yes. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in these case. In the case at bar, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Therefore, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In the Valde case, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership.