Public Organization Review: A Global Journal 1: 465486 (2001) # 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in The Netherlands.

Dissecting Public Sector Corruption in Bangladesh: Issues and Problems of Control

HABIB ZAFARULLAH hzafarul@metz.une.edu.au School of Social Science, University of New England, Armidale, NSW 2351, Australia NOORE ALAM SIDDIQUEE Department of Political Science, International Islamic University, Malaysia, 53100 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Key words: corruption, accountability, public sector, Bangladesh

Abstract
The public sector in Bangladesh is ridden with corruption of various dimensions and shades. Apart from bribery, rent-seeking and misappropriation of funds, the performance of public organizations is adversely affected by a host of other factors like excessive lobbying, delays in service provision, pilferage and larceny, irresponsible conduct of ofcials, bureaucratic intemperance, patronage and clientelism. The several institutional mechanisms to combat administrative malfeasance are rendered d bureaucracy, weak accountability ineffective by a non-committed political leadership, a blase structures, and unproductive legislative labors. The public body for controlling corruption is itself associated with all sorts of malpractices and conducts its affair most unprofessionally. Despite several attempts, the constitutionally authorized ombudsman is yet to nd its place in the governance framework.

The worldwide concern for public sector corruption is phenomenal. International organizations, donor agencies, civil society activists and, in particular, academics have been unrelenting in their crusade for making public representatives appreciate the damaging effects of corruption and urging them to take concrete and realistic measures to reduce its incidence in the public domain. Yet, very few governments, especially those in developing countries, appear to be totally committed in initiating strategic moves to make public organizations and their personnel corruption-free and unquestionably accountable for their conduct. The present concern with corruption can be attributed to a number of factors. First, there is a widespread perception that corruption is not only ubiquitous but has recently assumed dangerous proportions in some cases. Secondly, there is currently a greater awareness of the devastating effects of corruption on national life. Thirdly, corruption in administration is seen as a serious restraint on the ability of a government to accomplish some of its vital tasks and functions.

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The World Bank recognizes the harmful effects of corruption. It argues that the practice weakens public service delivery, misdirects public resources, and holds back the growth that is necessary to pull people out of poverty . . . [Corruption] undermines the driving forces behind reform . . . Vital resources are siphoned off shore. Foreign investors turn away in frustration . . . [It] reduces public revenue, undermines public trust, and weakens the credibility of the state (World Bank 2000a, p. xiv). It is common knowledge now that corruption retards economic growth, distorts the political system, debilitates administration and undermines the interests and welfare of the community. Corruption is a great impediment to development as it adversely impacts upon resource allocation and project design, selection and implementation. Public sector management is destabilized and rendered ineffective because of corrupt practices like kickbacks, patronage, and inconsistent application of rules and abuse of ofcial information (ADB, 1998, p. 23). The phenomenon leads to the forfeiture of public trust at the altar of private gain. Furthermore, any constructive initiatives toward political and economic liberalization are thwarted by both systemic and personal malfeasance in the public sector. Bangladesh presents a typical case where corruption has found a remarkably fertile ground, despite the existence of several mechanisms, albeit ineffective, for tackling it. Presently, corruption in Bangladesh is so pervasive that it has evoked widespread condemnation from within the country as well as from outside. Externally, it has already caused a national embarrassment as the country has been branded as the most corrupt nation in the world (Daily Star, 28 June, 2001). Internally, reports and evaluations prepared and commissioned by local think tanks have already painted an ominous picture of public sector integrity. The media and civil society groups are vociferous in denouncing the present level of corruption in administration. The gravity of the problem is conceivable, as public gures, including the countrys President and the Prime Minister, have spoken of corruption reaching endemic proportions (Daily Star, 2 August 1999; 10 July and 14 September 2000). International agencies such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the European Commission are concerned with the extent and intensity of corruption in the countrys public sector. The World Bank, in particular, has pointed to bribery, kickbacks and similar under-the-table payments on investment levels and misallocated resources as causes for denigrating the countrys developmental potential (Reported in the Holiday, 7 April 2000). According to Transparency International, Business International, Political Risk Services and the World Economic Forum, Bangladesh has ranked for several years now among the most corrupt nations in the world (Temple, 1999). All this reects the extent and depth of corruption in Bangladesh and the urgency of the need to control and

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combat the menace if the objectives of economic growth and social justice are to be realized. In this paper we view corruption in government not simply as misappropriation of funds, bribery or rent-seeking but also as a phenomenon that encompasses other aspects of administrative ethics. Any action that distorts normal administrative behavior is tantamount to corruption. Thus, a public ofcial who deviates from the prescribed norm, discriminately administers a law or adopts a subjective or partisan approach in dealing with clients is perceived to be morally irresponsible. The main objective of this paper, however, is not to conceptualize corruption but to present an overview of the malady in Bangladesh and examine the institutional mechanisms available to combat it. More specically, it seeks to critically examine and analyze the effectiveness of these mechanisms in the public sector. The paper argues that the existing mechanisms are grossly inadequate or futile and, therefore, there is a need for initiating a serious anti-corruption drive in conjunction with more denitive measures to reform public institutions and strengthen governance.

1. The nature and incidence of corruption Public sector corruption is not a new routine in Bangladesh. It has been an integral art of bureaucratic culture since pre-colonial times,1 but its incidence has intensied following the nations independence in 1971. Over the past few decades, it has assumed many forms2 and has engulfed the entire social fabric. While, in the past, only a few departments were known for corrupt ofcials and practices, the vice has now spread throughout the governmental structure and no public agency is spared of its inuence. A survey3 has revealed that corruption is now endemic, chronic and all pervasive. The police department is the most corrupt department, followed by customs, taxation and the national secretariat (Ahmad, 1997). Such ndings, by and large, have been supported by other subsequent studies/surveys conducted by Transparency International, Bangladesh (TIB) and other agencies. The conclusion that one may draw from the available evidence is that most of the services offered by the public sector are in the clasp of unfettered corruption.

1.1

Corruption large and small and the magic of Tadbir

There is a common allegation that the bureaucracy in Bangladesh is corrupt to the extent that even the simplest things like obtaining birth and death certicates from relevant authorities, ling a complaint with the police, obtaining a passport, getting a driving license, registering a vehicle, getting admission into public hospitals, acquiring a statement on bank and housing loans require some lubrication or monetary inducements. Other complex matters like getting utility connections, getting a contract or lease, obtaining approval for a building plan, obtaining jobs in

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government departments and/or managing transfers to preferable locations invariably require strong lobbying, often accompanied by sizeable bribery. This culture usually known as tadbir (promoting ones case) has immobilized the administration as virtually nothing happens without the application of this device. Files wait for tadbir and in its absence they have a strange tendency of getting misplaced or even lost forever (Anisuzzaman, 1985, p. 21). At times, delays in providing service, lack of easy access to service providers and procedural complications force many clients to use tadbir. It has a magical power of facilitating action and making possible what is apparently improbable.4 This has created a group of professional brokers and middleman in every government agency. A citizen in need of a service at any public agency (land ofce, police or magistracy at the eld level or passport, electricity, water supply and telephone departments, municipal bodies or education boards) is sure to be intercepted by these agents/brokers who offer their service for a fee. While the clients use brokers for their skills in getting things done rapidly, many ofcials, particularly those who are corrupt also prefer their clients to come through the agents/brokers. The awkward work of negotiating bribes is dealt with by these brokers. Since the administration is deliberately inexible or inaccessible, the brokers and the accompanying bribes serve as a lubricant to overcome the access encounter, bureaucratic inexibility or indolence. This is how the public service is managed by the common people, especially those without any political clout or strong connections at higher levels. As elsewhere, corruption in Bangladesh takes many forms and public servants of all types and levels are engaged in corrupt practices. Bribery is, perhaps, the most ubiquitous and damaging form of corruption in the public sector in Bangladesh. Practically nothing can be done without bribing the concerned ofcials. In a sense, it has become a standard practice in most departments. A businessman cannot expect to obtain a license without commission or a contractor cannot look forward to getting a work order or payment of his bill without satisfying the concerned ofcials. Payments are also required simply to obtain an application form or a signature, to secure a copy of an approved sanction, to ensure proper services and billing from telephone, gas and water departments (Kochanek, 1993; see also Zafarullah, 1987). Bribes related to agricultural loans are said to range between 10 to 20 percent of the loan amount. In some departments it is as high as 50 percent. The TIB survey revealed that contractors in the Roads and Highways Department (RHD) are required to pay 4052 percent of the contract value in order to secure a job. A recent TIB study has uncovered how bribes are extorted from students and institutions in the education sector, from patients in the health sector, from redressseekers in the judicial system and police administration, from clients in landadministration and from subscribers and users in utility departments (see, TIB, 1997). Though departments like customs and taxation and banking and nancial institutions were always known for indulging in corrupt practices, this routine has now been rmly established in the Bangladesh public sector as a whole.

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With corruption becoming a way of life and almost unavoidable, some people argue in favor of legalizing it to ensure proper delivery of services. However, others strongly oppose the idea, as it would mean a complete surrender to illegality and immorality. While it is true that bribery expedites the delivery of services and facilitates action, the problem is that in the process civil servants get into the habit of delaying decisions until payment is made. Secondly, it means that it is the quantity of bribe and not the merit of the case that matters most.

1.2

Pilferage and larceny

Another most familiar expression of corruption in Bangladesh is waste and pilferage in the public sector. Many of the public sector agencies are in total shambles mainly because of excessive depletion and organized larceny sustained over the years. The much discussed system loss in the power sector is an example of larceny and deliberate dereliction of ofcial responsibility. Despite so much talk about system loss, it has remained as high as 35 percent (TIB, 2000). A rough estimate suggests that a mere 10 percent reduction in system loss would yield Tk5 3 billion savings annually. While part of the loss can be considered to be technical, the bulk is due to massive irregularities committed by those involved at different levels. Apart from meter readers, supervisors, ledger keepers and others connected with billing and consumer accounting, many lower level engineers and some high level ofcers are believed to be involved in this process. On the consumer side, some people are involved in dishonest practice of stealing electricity, often in connivance with the ofcials (TIB, 2000, p. 4). Arguably, this has compounded the problem thereby rendering the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) incapable both in terms of reducing system loss and meeting the growing demands for electricity. This, however, is not unique to the BPDB; other utility agencies (water, gas, telephone) are equally known for the system loss syndrome. Pilferage and larceny are also widespread in the rural works program (RWP)6 and the construction departments like RHD and Public Works. Due to pilferage and larceny, between 40 and 60 percent of the development budget is lost every year. This is conrmed by ofcial statistics, which shows that between 1972 and 1993 the public sector, due to misappropriation, lost a total of almost Tk 180 billion (Alam, 1996). All this indicates the gravity of the problem, which is compounded further by the recurring losses in the state-owned enterprises (Muhith, 1999).

1.3

Responsibility lapses

Negligence of ofcial duties is another familiar expression of corruption in Bangladesh. Coming to ofce late and leaving early, absence or unauthorized leave are rampant in government ofces. Often ofcials who do report for work are

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hard to be found or accessed for services. This is simply because they either take extended hours for tea and lunch breaks, prayers and meetings (mainly meaningless) of various types (Khan et al., 1995) or employ their time/energy elsewhere to advance their personal interests. The spirit of public service does not inspire them. Since there are no measurable performance standards, a tendency among ofcials to dupe the system is not uncommon. Thus, doctors in government hospitals are engaged in private practice to the utter neglect of their ofcial duties. While some of the specialists are always on their toes expecting summons for a surgery from private clinics, others remove kidneys in place of ovaries causing death of innocent patients. Agricultural extension workers hardly visit farmers, health and family welfare assistants bother little to keep contact with local people and police personnel remain reluctant to take any action against criminals unless some incentives are on offer or pressure originates from above. This is indicative of the status of work ethics in Bangladesh. Though it is difcult to quantify the impact of such willful dereliction and fraudulent practice, it is indisputable that such behavior causes untold public misery. It also defrauds the government nancially for many employees are paid for work they do not perform. The total person-hours lost in this process every year would be huge by any estimate.

1.4

Bureaucratic intemperance

Administrative excesses, arbitrary behavior and harassment add to the suffering of the people. The people have developed fear and wariness about the police because of the excesses they perpetrate on them and the way they abuse power. Reports of atrocities committed by law enforcing agencies are routine and frequent mysterious deaths in police custody indicate the extent of power abuse in the police department (USDS, 2001). Thus the overall quality of administration has deteriorated. Not surprisingly, public ofcials are increasingly seen as unresponsive to public needs and bereft of any moral and ethical values.

1.5

Raging patronage

Yet another dominant mode of corruption in Bangladesh is the patronage system, a feature of Bangladeshi society. This often explains why the process of awarding major contracts bypasses competitive norms, and instead, is governed by the criterion of personal linkages with key decision makers in government departments. It is not surprising that the lowest bidder for the lease of a market place or a ferry ghat (quay) or the highest bidder for a construction project wins the contract at the intervention of a patron at the policy level (Khan et al., 1995). Civil servants, however, are not to be blamed alone. At times, the political factor becomes crucial as politicians get involved in the process.7 More often than not, pressure from

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politicians to carry out their unfair orders and the fear of retribution in the form of transfer to a less important position or even threats of removal force ofcials to sacrice professional ethics and the public interest. Even honest ofcials known for their courage and integrity, may feel utterly helpless and succumb to such pressures. Some, of course, nd it convenient to collude with politicians and share the booty generated from the abuse of power.

1.6

Impact of corruption

The price that society pays for all unethical practices in the public sector is considerable in terms of cost and inconvenience. The impact is clearly visible in social, political and economic spheres. Though billions of dollars have been injected by major international aid agencies as development assistance over the years and nearly half a dozen ve-year plans have been implemented, Bangladesh has remained one of the poorest countries measured by most socioeconomic indicators. Apart from public inconvenience and hassle, bureaucratic corruption and inefciency are taking a heavy toll on the countrys economy causing hundreds of millions of dollars worth of loss in terms of unrealized investment and income (Financial Express, 31 July 1997). An estimate shows that during the rst six months of 2000 alone, a total of Tk 115.3 billion has gone missing in the public sector due to 1,345 corruption incidents in various agencies (Daily Star, 26 September 2000). According to a very conservative estimate, the per-capita income in corruption-free Bangladesh would have been double of the current gure (World Bank, 2000b). It is obvious, therefore, that corruption has been grinding down the economy and hindering the process of growth and development. Corruption has social costs as well; it tends to hit the basics of society destroying moral and ethical values.

2. Combating corruption: institutional mechanisms, policies and performance Recent years have witnessed a heightened awareness about the venality and scale of corruption. Yet, attempts at combating the vice are by no means new. As elsewhere, successive governments in Bangladesh have expressed their commitment to wipeout corruption from every sphere of administration and proclaimed executive orders, introduced rules and regulations, enacted anti-corruption legislation and installed institutional mechanisms. A plethora of rules and regulations framed from time to time in order to deter public ofcials from undesirable behavior and action is now extant. The Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1979, Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1986 are among the rules that allow disciplinary actions8 against errant civil servants for inefciency,

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misconduct, desertion, corruption, deviance from expected behavior and subversive activities. The most signicant measure to counter corruption in Bangladesh, however, is the Bangladesh Anti-Corruption Act, 1974 which provides for the Bureau of AntiCorruption (BAC). This Act (modied over the years), along with the Prevention of Corruption Act, also enacted in 1974, provides detailed framework for dealing with and controlling bribery and other forms of corruption in the public service. Also, there is a range of other mechanisms (e.g. Comptroller and Auditor General or CAG, legislative committees) designed to stamp out corruption in administration. Nonetheless, despite the prevalence of all these measures, corruption seems to have outpaced fairness in the disposal of business in the public sector.

2.1

Bureau of anti-corruption

BAC is the most important mechanism responsible for combating corruption. Headed by a Director General, the Bureau operates through a network of ofces at the district and eld levels. It has eight Regional Ofces and 66 district and eld ofces. Being authorized to investigate into and prosecute cases of corruption, BAC was expected to play a signicant role in curbing malfeasance and abuse of power in government administration. However, the performance of the agency has been far from satisfactory. Despite several decades of its existence and changes9 brought about in its status and structure, BAC has failed to emerge as an effective body in controlling and combating administrative corruption. Currently, it stands as a toothless organization lacking adequate authority to effectively discharge its responsibilities. BAC is also ridden with a host of other deciencies and problems. It has been rendered ineffective in undertaking investigation and initiating cases against many individuals and agencies. An estimate shows that, given the abundance of corruption cases, the Bureau has failed to investigate and le sufcient numbers of cases annually. Table 1 shows that the annual average during the period was 1,023 (cases investigated), 777 (charge-sheets led) and 252 (number convicted). Other estimates suggest an equally depressing record in terms of the number of cases led by BAC per year (see Rahman et al., 1993). This is partly because of inadequate personnel and poor logistics and partly because of lengthy and rigid bureaucratic procedures BAC is required to follow. The system of obtaining sanction for instituting an inquiry, ling an ejahar (rst information report) and a charge sheet is highly bureaucratic and thus time-consuming. Often BAC holds other agencies responsible for delays but the small number of convictions that it is able to carry out demeans the quality of BAC investigations and the ling of cases. In most instances, the accused are acquitted by the court because of poor framing of cases, lack of clear evidence and absence of seriousness on the part of public prosecutors (GOB, 2000).

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Table 1. Corruption cases handled by BAC, 19721998. Period 19721975 19761981 19821990 19911994 19951998 Total No. of cases investigated 2,857 6,791 11,102 4,746 2,126 27,622 No. of charge-sheets led 1,957 4,369 7,176 4,403 3,062 20,967

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No. of convictions 938 735 3,349 989 806 6,817

Source: Adapted from (Alam, 1996), World Bank (2000b).

What is more signicant to note is that BAC seems to be pre-occupied with snaring small fries and processing cases of petty corruption while leaving the big players uninterrupted and matters of grand corruption unexplored. Though sensational news of blatant corruption (the Alcatel telephone system deal, the Japanese investment or KAFCO debacle, purchase of aircraft for the national airline, the MIG-29 bungling, among others) often makes headlines in the print media, very few such cases are investigated by BAC. This failure or inability of the agency raises a host of questions about its sincerity and that of the government in combating corruption. Indeed, BACs authority to investigate allegations against high government ofcials has been greatly circumscribed, as it cannot proceed without the green signal from the higher political echelons. The institutional location of BAC under the Prime Ministers ofce and its subservience to political caprice with regard to ling cases or indictment against senior ofcials and important individuals in political circles, is seen as a major deterrent to its task. Even though it is necessary to insulate BAC from ruling party pressures and to accord it a very high status within the administrative structure (Siddiqui, 1996), the agency is fraught with the danger of politicization. The fear that it may be used as a tool for intimidating and punishing dissenting people in politics and bureaucracy has been corroborated by recent evidence. Indeed, there are instances of political considerations swaying the decisions of the government to enable BAC to initiate action against corrupt ofcials. There are many corrupt ofcials and politicians who have managed not only to escape conviction but also to obtain important positions by aligning themselves with the ruling party (Alam, 1996; Siddiquee, 1999). Thus, instead of helping curb malfeasance and abuse of power, BAC serves as a political tool in the hands of the government. This statutory public body amply complements the bureaucrat-politician nexus in corruption. Apart from its institutional weaknesses and the lack of independence, BAC has a very poor image in society. Despite half a century of its existence, it has failed to establish any reputation as an effective organization and to generate condence among the people. There is a common allegation that BAC inspectors and other ofcials use their positions mainly to advance their personal gain. Often they harass the people including public ofcials, extort money from them and threaten

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them of roping in corruption cases against them. Indeed, it is so intensely ridden with corruption, irregularities and venalities that at times it is seen as the most corrupt wing of the government (New Nation, 21 June 2000). In such circumstances, BAC cannot serve its purposes well.

2.2

Fiscal and administrative mechanisms

The collection and utilization of public funds are among the most important responsibilities of public servants. However, they tend to be vulnerable to nancial irregularities and indiscipline. Apart from formulating a set of rules and regulations, the government has devised an elaborate institutional framework in order to maintain nancial discipline and to control the misappropriation of public money by government ofcials. The system of audit and accounts is at the center of scal accountability and control. As elsewhere in the British Commonwealth, the ofce of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) is responsible for keeping the accounts of the government and for detecting irregularities in terms of compliance of relevant rules and regulations and/or fraud and embezzlement in public expenditure. In many respects CAG is the nancial ombudsman and is empowered to audit the accounts of all government departments, state owned enterprises (SOEs) and development projects. The Comptroller General or any other person authorized by him has access to all records, books, vouchers, documents, cash, securities and other government property in the possession of any person in the service of the republic. Audit ofcials are expected to detect cases of nancial irregularities, malpractice, deviation from scal rules, waste and extravagance and reect this in CAGs annual reports submitted to the government. However, there is a wide discrepancy between CAGs stipulated functions and its actual operation. Evidence suggests that the audit and accounts system is faulty and there is a series of problems that render the whole exercise ineffective. Like BAC, CAG does not enjoy the independence and operational autonomy required for the proper discharge of its functions although the Auditor General and his ofce have been accorded constitutional status. This status has been subsequently downgraded by making it subservient to the executive (Zafarullah, 1994). Currently, CAG is seen more as an appendage to the Ministry of Finance rather than as an autonomous body to enforce scal discipline in public departments and scrutinize their nancial activities. Furthermore, inadequate resources including skilled and professionally competent personnel and logistics severely limit its capacity to undertake systematic and comprehensive auditing of government accounts.10 In the absence of professionally accredited chartered accountants (World Bank, 1996), CAG mostly relies on under-trained clerks who are neither efcient nor committed to their jobs. They are generally noted for being either highly fastidious at one extreme, and for being highly amenable at the other, depending on how they are treated by the organisations and ofcials being audited (Siddiqui, 1996, p. 158).

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The effectiveness of audit as a tool for controlling nancial mismanagement depends, among other things, on the quality of reports prepared, the thoroughness of probes and enquiries and the sincerity of the legislature in getting the report implemented. The Controller General of Accounts (CGA) is expected to exercise accounting control in respect of government receipt and expenditure at different levels. However, the impact of accounts control in general and the pre-audit in particular appears to be very limited, if not non-existent. The well-known study undertaken by an inter-ministerial Committee on Reforms in Budgeting and Expenditure Control observes a plethora of weaknesses of this approach: CAOs have an ineffective accounting control; and PAOs/Secretaries are more concerned with administrative management than nancial propriety and nancial accountability. The creation of DAOs and UZAOs within a short space of time have expanded the accounts administration outt which have been lled up by persons without adequate training and experience (GOB, 1993, p. 43). Departmental accounting system, introduced in the early 1980s as a step for separating accounts from audit is yet to take an institutional shape. Serious anomalies like the power of the Secretary to overrule the CAO have not only rendered the latter powerless but also virtually abolished effective accounting and internal audit within the government. On the other hand, there are many who argue that rather than helping reduce corruption the so-called pre-audit system has expanded opportunities for rent seeking. The internal control system is designed to minimize corruption in terms of administrative behavior and expenditure. But for various reasons, this is either weak or non-functional in the Bangladesh public sector. The numerous rules and regulations have hardly altered bureaucratic culture and work ethics. In many cases, willingness of senior ofcials to enforce these rules seems to be lacking. Higher ofcials often tend to protect themselves and their subordinates as spoils of corruption are shared. As such, outing of regulations and violation of rules and procedures are commonplace in administration. Whistle blowing from within the bureaucracy itself is limited, if not missing altogether. There are examples that indicate that whistle blowing is indeed a risky occupation and whistle blowers have to suffer as a result of sounding the alarm. All these weaknesses facilitate fraud of various kinds, colossal levels of waste and misuse of resources in the public sector.

2.3

Legislative mechanisms

Legislative accountability is the bedrock of good governance. Parliamentary debates, questions and motions are among the devices that are available to members of Parliament (MPs) to scrutinize the activities of various ministers and

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those of senior bureaucrats within these ministries. The purpose of question hour is to enable MPs to ventilate public grievances and to draw the attention of the people toward the failure of the government and its administration. Also there can be unscheduled debates on any specic issue. However, the Bangladesh experience shows that the impact of debates and questions has been minimal. Rarely, if ever, parliamentary debates and question hours focus on administrative lapses, cases of corruption and other malpractices. Indeed, the Parliament in Bangladesh is yet to establish itself as a scrutineer of administrative actions and bureaucratic excesses and corruption (Ahmed and Khan, 1995; Siddiquee, 1999). The effectiveness of legislative committees is greatly reduced by a number of factors (Ahmed, 1998). The important committees like the Public Accounts Committee rely on CAG reports. However, as already noted, nancial and management control within the government being generally weak and the public accounts and audit reports being inadequate, unrealistic and almost always behind schedule, these have an incapacitating effect on the Committees operations. Until recently, parliamentary committees were ineffective entities as they were headed by relevant ministers who had a propensity to inuence their deliberations. These committees also suffered from the lack of requisite authority and resources. Even after some reorganization, they continue with restricted power and various ministries are unwilling to act upon their directives in terms of checking nancial irregularities (World Bank, 2000b). Thus legislative oversight, in general, and the committee system, in particular, has failed to play any notable role in checking bureaucratic corruption and venality.

2.4

Media and civil society

Since the transition to democracy began in the early 1990s, emerging civil society organizations are increasingly becoming active in building public opinion against the violation of human rights, breaches of law and discipline, administrative corruption and mal-governance, among other things. The Bangladesh chapter of Transparency International (TIB), Civic Watch, Association of Development Agencies in Bangladesh, Ain-O-Salish Kendro are among the prominent civil society organizations, which, apart from keeping the public informed about the pervasiveness of waste and corruption in the state sector, have come up with concrete ideas to confront governmental maladies. TIBs Survey of Corruption in Bangladesh and subsequent workshops, discussions and roundtables have generated a considerable interest in different circles and prompted the government to initiate some changes, albeit minor, in regulatory and administrative procedures to reduce administrative discretion and the scope for corruption. The electronic media has always been state property and continually abused by all ruling parties. The print media, on the other hand, has shown much fortitude and buoyancy in investigating and exposing both political and administrative corruption. The latter has been playing a noteworthy role in highlighting public

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grievances and mal-administration. Some newspapers are active and well-timed in publishing reports on bureaucratic irregularities, highhandedness, abuse of power, mismanagement, inefciency and corruption. To some extent, this acts as a deterrent for public servants as they constantly remain cautious while discharging their ofcial responsibilities (Siddiquee, 1999). However, the impact of such exercises is bound to be limited. Having no executive authority, the media and civil society cannot go beyond exposing cases of corruption except in arousing public opinion against the vice. Instances of remedial measures initiated by the government following reports by the print media are few and far between.

3. Combating corruption in Bangladesh: issues and experiences The preceding discussion leads one to the conclusion that corruption has been rampant and deep-rooted in every sphere of administration in Bangladesh. It also shows that the performance of existing instruments for controlling and uprooting corruption has fallen far short of expectations and intended objectives. As a matter of fact, there are some formidable barriers that render the institutional mechanisms weak and virtually ineffective. Neither BAC nor CAG, the two most important agencies, is endowed with adequate power and authority to discharge its responsibilities effectively. This means that neither is in a position to handle the onerous task of auditing all transactions made by public authorities and investigating an ever-increasing number of cases. An estimate shows that BAC takes an average of three years to investigate cases, of which only 15 percent actually get to the courts and the rest are disposed off at lower levels. Only four percent of the cases sent to the courts end up in some kind of sentence (TIB, 2000). Even more disconcerting is the number of cases pending in the courts of law.11 What this reects is the fundamental aw in the institutional capacity of BAC and the law courts to deal promptly with corruption cases. The Bangladesh experience also shows that the merit of an investigating body relies, among other things, on its institutional capacity, operational freedom and the sincerity of the political leadership. A weak and vulnerable anti-corruption outt is not effective in combating corruption. Lack of qualied and trained manpower have made it difcult for BAC to make any headway in investigating ofcials known for massive corruption in various departments.12 On the other hand, successive governments failed to display their commitment for a strong and effective surveillance regime. Instead of permitting BAC to operate independently, they merely used it as a tool for intimidating political opponents. The government also remained oblivious to allegations of massive corruption within BAC itself, which is not only a further source of corruption but has expanded the web of corruption to previously untainted areas. The scal measures have not met with much success in controlling the situation. On the one hand, CAG has remained crippled and unable to undertake a detailed and comprehensive audit of government expenditure, on the other, departmental

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control is virtually non-existent.13 Thus, the overall impact of audit and other scal tools is limited. For many, combining accounts and the audit function into one and the lack of institutional separation in this regard is a serious anomaly that explains poor performance in government. Performance audit is almost unknown in Bangladesh as audit is rarely geared to examine whether a particular expenditure was made in the public interest and in the most efcient manner, or whether policy goals were at all achieved (GOB, 1993). There are allegations that rather than helping reduce corruption, the so-called pre-audit policy has contributed toward its aggravation. The effectiveness of legislative mechanisms in containing corruption, bureaucratic lapses and excesses has been greatly eroded by a number of factors. The Bangladesh parliament failed to serve as an effective watchdog for much of the period since independence as it remained either suspended or crippled under the presidential system. The reintroduction of the parliamentary system in 1991 and the subsequent policy changes have certainly invigorated the legislative arena by allowing it to play an important role in controlling the behavior of the executive in general and the bureaucracy in particular. But majoritarian rule and enduring boycott of parliamentary sessions by the mainstream opposition parties seriously undermined that prospect. Even when the Parliament has been vibrant with the opposition, questions and debates are usually less effective in addressing government failures and in exacting bureaucratic responsiveness and accountability. The Bangladesh experience also points to the ineffectiveness of ministerial control compared to that in other parliamentary democracies. Though ministers, as heads of executive departments, are assumed to exercise control over the members of the bureaucracy, they are unable to do so mainly for their lack of necessary knowledge, education and experience in running the administration. Consequently, they have to depend, at times heavily, on senior bureaucrats for advice and support. The superiority of senior bureaucrats in terms of education, training and experience and their monopoly in technical knowledge enable them to have considerable inuence on ministers and also at times to be cynical of ministerial control. This is complicated further by bureaucratic discretion permissible by rules and the absence of performance standards in the public service. This practically means that ministers have to turn a blind eye to the many failures and deviations of civil servants and seek explanations for only the most obvious and appalling lapses. Thus, the barriers of holding bureaucracy accountable are so formidable that the formal theory of accountability is clearly at odds with the reality (see Rosenbloom, 1998). This largely explains why the internal control mechanisms remain so weak despite the prevalence of so many regulations. In the prevailing administrative culture, ofcials often tend to protect each other, thus making hierarchical control irrelevant. Besides, superiors do not nd enough incentives to engage in fruitful and rigorous oversight on a regular basis. They prefer to avoid getting involved in the cumbersome and difcult process of staff discipline and instead allow

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deviations from administrative rules and cases of petty corruptions go unpunished. Further, there are serious defects in administrative measures for dealing with corrupt acts. In a few cases where disciplinary action is taken, punishment is too light and the person is rehabilitated too quickly either because of political connections or pressures from employee/trade unions. Long-term imprisonment, heavy nes and conscation of assets of the corrupt ofcials are rare. Though the BPDB, in particular, is well known for perennial corruption of various types, a recent study observes: There have been no signicant anti corruption drives within the BPDB nor any court actions against corrupt employees. On occasions, mid level ofcers have been suspended from duty on suspicion of moral turpitude and nancial irregularities. But most were reinstated for lack of evidence. Instances of departmental enquiries or disciplinary actions against lower grade employees are even rarer due to the supposed or real fear of retaliation by trade unions (TIB, 2000, p. 5). BPDB typies other public sector departments where corruption continues unabated. One of the toughest barriers in the wrestle against corruption is not the absence of laws/rules but the lack of their enforcement. Though laws require stern action against those public servants who (or their dependents) are in possession of money or property disproportionate to their known source of income or enjoy a lifestyle beyond their actual means, hardly anything is done to hold offenders accountable. Despite public pronouncements made by successive governments to root out corruption from the body politic of the country no single public ofcial has so far been imprisoned or had his property acquired through dubious means conscated. This reects a wide gap between rhetoric and reality, and policy and practice. Special anti-corruption drives mounted by the military rulers ended in asco as they or their supporters themselves resorted to massive corruption subsequently. This has emboldened government ofcials to indulge in systematic corruption. The political-bureaucratic nexus in corruption has its roots deep in the political history of the country. Ever since independence, democracy and democratic culture were hardly allowed to ourish. The country witnessed monolithic oneparty rule, prolonged military rule and overt and covert manipulation for superimposing one-party hegemony. Democratic practices like accountability and transparency in government business were overturned and press freedom was restricted. Military administrators not only failed to arrest the steady decline in the standard and quality of services, but in many ways also contributed to making corruption rampant and freewheeling in all tiers of administration. The military and quasi-democratic rulers often made use of public funds in the most arbitrary and non-transparent manner thus creating opportunities for themselves and their ge s to channel state resources for personal gain. As a result, numerous prote administrative irregularities, mismanagement and corruption were effectively kept

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out of the public eye. Military rulers needed funds to launch their own political parties and organize elections when pressures to civilianize their regimes mounted. Indeed, corruption during military rule was converted from a crime to a habit (Puchkov, 1989, p. 133; see also Kochanek, 1993, pp. 25862). Even under democratic rule, the nexus between corrupt ofcials and politicians is still pervasive in the administrative hierarchy. Politicians in Bangladesh are believed to have a direct hand in sustaining corruption in administration. They have lucrative shares in all state deals, they receive commissions from terrorists and smugglers and they patronise corrupt ofcials for personal gains. Sometimes, it is extremely difcult for someone to honestly discharge his/her responsibilities because of pressures from above. Most often pressures from political elites to carry out their illegal orders force bureaucrats to sacrice professional ethics and public interests. All this shows why the system of political control is weak and ineffective. This also explicates why superiors in political circles have lost the moral courage to question the ofcials under them for proven malfeasance and corrupt practices. There is no avenue for citizens to redress their grievances or lodge a complaint against any action of corruption or irregularity committed by public ofcials. Actually, they are demotivated to do so because the head of the agency against whom the complaint will be lodged would be the judge, the jury and the defendant. If a person is aggrieved at the action of any public ofcial such as the chief executive of a district or the chief ofcer of a police station, it will be hazardous to lodge a complaint against him. Of course, one can go to court but it is not only costly and time consuming but there is little chance for him to win the case against the mighty state ofcials. The higher courts have played a signicant role in delivering their verdicts against corruption mainly involving those who have held ofces of trust and responsibility. Even presidents and ministers were not spared. The higher judiciary thus continues to command the respect of the majority. However, there is a perception among the people that fair judgment in a lower court is hard to come by without money and/or inuence. Hence, the ordinary people accept bureaucratic malfeasance as fait accompli and rarely bother to seek any redress. The link between the executive and the judiciary, a legacy of colonial rule, has always served as an impediment to the independence of the courts, especially those at the lower levels. Unable to challenge government failures or administrative corruption at any stage, the people, especially the poor majority in rural areas, have opted to exit state services and have increasingly been using alternative channels to access credit, health and education (Hulme and Siddiquee, 1999). The phenomenal growth of non-governmental organizations (NGO) and the quality and growing popularity of the services offered by them and their widespread use by citizens reect their disillusionment with the public sector and the governments inability to adequately serve them. The NGOs have gradually become integral to the process of poverty alleviation and service delivery in rural Bangladesh. They are not only

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known for their huge size, coverage and innovations, but also for the international acclaim they have earned for their successes in different areas. Some of these NGOs (like Grameen Bank, BRAC and PROSIKA) have focused on poverty alleviation through the provision of micro-credit (Lovell, 1992), training and support services, as well as formal and non-formal education, environmental conservation, disaster management, human rights, policy advocacy and legal aid support services. The NGO strategy for empowerment has contributed to making the rural poor increasingly vocal and assertive in their demands for improved services from government agencies (Kramsjo and Wood, 1992). Some NGO groups and networks have achieved some degree of success in making the administration more responsive to the needs of the poor, but they are yet to have any lasting impact as far as bureaucratic corruption is concerned. In many cases, the NGOs and their groups face a range of problems in their quest for ensuring an accountable and transparent administration (Hoque and Siddiquee, 1998).

3.1

Recreating accountability structures

The entreaties for reforming the public integrity system in Bangladesh have emanated from both within and outside the country. One of the most pressing demands has been the appointment of the Ombudsman. In 1972, the original Bangladesh constitution provided for the ombudsman with the power to investigate public complaints against a ministry, an ofcial or a statutory public authority (GOB, 1972, Article 77). The ombudsman had the potential to become a viable tool to keep the public bureaucracy under constant surveillance as it was expected to be clothed with the authority to look into such administrative matters as serious delays in taking action, discriminatory behavior, insolence, harassment or failure to render services to the public. It also could serve as a useful device in fostering bureaucratic responsiveness and minimizing corrupt tendencies among ofcials. While other countries in the region forged ahead with this concept, successive governments in Bangladesh failed to establish an ombudsman even after a decade of the countrys transition to democracy and the professed commitment of major political parties and leaders in this regard. The strong plea made by all major administrative reform commissions/committees went unheeded and there is little indication that ombudsman will be put in place in the near future (PARC, 2000). There appears to be a deep-seated resistance from the bureaucracy to establish the ombudsman and political leaders are nervous of the role it is likely to take on in addressing the issue of corruption in the high political ofces. The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and other international organizations have also provided their suggestions for creating the structures to combat corruption and enforcing accountability in the public sector. Some specic ideas advanced include: the creation of an independent agency against corruption, simplifying governmental rules and regulations, constituting legislative committees on corruption; exposing corrupt ofcials, monitoring the accounts of politicians and

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civil servants, making mandatory the submission of asset reports of public organizations and performance reviews of agencies and projects, separating the judiciary from the executive, creating awareness among the citizens about their rights and ways of accessing government resources, involving grassroots level organizations in ghting the corruption menace and so on (PARC, 2000; World Bank, 1996; ADAB, 2000).

4. Concluding observations Corruption in the public sector in Bangladesh does not work in isolation; it is fostered by corrupt acts of political leaders in power. Politicians of the country are believed to be involved in large-scale corruption. As such, administrative corruption is an appendage of political corruption. Often pressures from politicians to carry out their illegal orders, the fear of punitive transfers and perceived or real threats of removal force bureaucrats to sacrice professional ethics and the public interest. Since most ofcials do not want to risk losing their jobs/positions, they prefer to collude with their political masters and share the booty generated from the abuse of ofcial positions. It is now an open secret that there is a comfortable nexus between malevolent politicians and corrupt bureaucrats and that they have lucrative shares in most deals and undertakings made on behalf of the state. Such a nexus can be found throughout the administrative hierarchy. This is a mutually convenient arrangement in which private gains of both sides are protected. Needless to say that this renders the system of control weak and ineffective as the superiors, be they in ofcialdom or in political circles, lose moral fortitude to question their subordinates for negligent behavior and/or proven malpractice. The Bangladesh experience also shows that bureaucrats who establish god-fatherly relationships with political leaders are largely immune from external control as the latter come to their rescue in the event of any trouble. In this process, some ofcials become sacred cows and roam scot-free as hardly any authority has the courage to attack them even when they are clearly at fault. The culture of ministerial responsibility, as is seen in mature democracies, is either missing or weak in Bangladesh. Despite massive corruption, unusual delays in decision making, huge wastage and misappropriation of resources that characterize every department causing untold public inconvenience, rarely a minister chooses to accept responsibility for such lapses in his ministry and offer his/her resignation (Siddiquee, forthcoming). Instead, ministers have tended to defend themselves and their personnel. The public sector in Bangladesh has failed to perform to acceptable standards. The quality of service is poor and the level of client satisfaction is low. Apart from systemic defects the offshoot of outmoded structures and procedures, the bureaucracy is still entrenched in an administrative culture, which is inuenced by notions of clientelism and an attitude of paternalism toward the people. Public organizations lack a sense of mission, do not optimize their performance, are too

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protective of their organizational interests, are reluctant to expose themselves to accountability and control measures and are captives of parochial and groupcentered politics (Zafarullah and Khan 2001, p. 994) The ordinary citizens are the victims of poor governance, exemplied by mal-administration, bureaucratic disdain, wayward enforcement of rules and regulations, raging misdemeanor and slapdash implementation of public policies and programs. They are deprived of the wherewithal and the wisdom to make a claim to what is due to them by the state apparatus. The transition to democracy that began in 1991 is yet to be completed. Democratic consolidation requires more than periodic free elections and the meeting of legislators to approve executive choices. Among the several key components of consolidation is a sound national integrity system that will manage the accountability structures, monitor bureaucratic performance, correct administrative delinquency, keep a close watch on governmental operations, and facilitate public access to grievance mechanisms. Corruption can be rooted out of the administrative system by the combined efforts of an independent anti-corruption agency, the Parliament, civil society organizations, a responsible media and an informed public. This has not been happening in Bangladesh. Pervasive corruption, which has assumed immense proportions in recent years, has further added to the woes of the public. Although its prevalence is widely acknowledged in political, civil society and business circles, successive democratic governments have been lukewarm in making any concerted effort to combat corruption. The ruling political leadership ignores the continued overtures of the international donor community to address the issue and its failure to reform the public integrity system has resulted in policy failures, colossal economic waste, abortive projects, social degeneration and hence public suffering.

Notes
1. Bureaucratic corruption and embezzlement had been a part of the political and administrative system during the Mughal, British and Pakistan periods. It became so widespread during Ayub Khans military rule in Pakistan that hundreds of civil servants were dismissed from their services while close to another 900 were offered compulsory retirement in 195960 on various charges of corruption. 2. Bribery, nepotism and favoritism, misuse of power, neglect of ofcial duties, fraud, misappropriation of funds, false and inated invoicing are some common forms of corruption in the public sector. Other types of corruption like terrorism, extortion, defaulting of bank loans, black marketing, trafcking of children and women, adulteration of food and medicine and even contract killings are now common in Bangladesh society. 3. Conducted in 1997 on a sample of 2,197 individuals chosen proportionately from the countrys rural as well as urban population. 4. Tadbir is very effective in that it helps one to avoid the long delay and the hassles of being on the queue. For instance, the average waiting period for gas and water connection is 34 months but with speed-money of Tk 20,00030,000 one can get connections in a week. Until recently (before the cell/mobile telephone was introduced), the average waiting time for a

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5. 6.

7.

8. 9.

10.

11. 12.

13.

telephone connection was 1012 years, but one could obtain telephone connection instantly by paying an extra Tk 30,00070,000 under the table (see Muhith, 1999). Tk is the abbreviation of Taka, the currency of Bangladesh. One US dollar is roughly equivalent to Tk 53. While estimates vary, it has been found that up to 70 percent of the resources earmarked for RWP schemes get lost at different stages and both government ofcials and peoples representatives are involved in the process (Siddiquee, 1999). Politicians, while in power, use or abuse their positions by distributing patronage of various kinds. In fact, using positions to grant undue favor and benet to ones relatives, friends and key supporters is one of the hallmarks of Bangladesh politics. Penalties include censure, withholding promotion for specic period of time and reduction in pay, (minor) demotion and dismissal from the service (major). Established in the early 1950s, BAC witnessed a series of changes in its structure and institutional afliation. In the later part of the 1980s, the Bureau was transferred from the Cabinet Division to the Presidents Secretariat. Following the countrys transition to the Westminster type of government, BAC has been brought under the Prime Ministers Ofce. This is precisely the reason that the idea has been mooted in a recent conference that the CAG be totally separated from the executive branch and placed directly under the Parliament with independent budget and staff (see Daily Star, 16 September 2000). An estimate shows that thousands of cases are now pending in different courts of law. Though the Customs Department is one of the most corrupt departments, BACs impotency there is clear as not a single prosecution has resulted in successful conviction in recent years (TIB, 2000). In its 1998 annual report, CAG observes that for all practical purposes no internal control system exists in government ministries.

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Habib Zafarullah Habib Zafarullah teaches political science, public policy and Asian studies at the University of New England, Australia. His research interests are in Third World politics, comparative bureaucracy, policy analysis and development management with focus on South Asia. He has published several books and book chapters and numerous articles in international refereed journals. Noore Alam Siddiquee Noore Alam Siddiquee is Head of the Department of Political Science, International Islamic University, Malaysia. He has a PhD from the University of Manchester. He has published extensively on local government, decentralization, NGOs and development, public sector management and bureaucratic accountability.