The World of 1898: The Spanish-American War

1898 HOME > Introduction

Introduction

The Battleship Maine Photographic History of the Spanish American War, p. 36.

On April 25, 1898 the United States declared war on Spain following the sinking of the Battleship Maine in Havana harbor on February 15, 1898. The war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898. As a result Spain lost its control over the remains of its overseas empire -- Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines Islands, Guam, and other islands.

Background Beginning in 1492, Spain was the first European nation to sail westward across the Atlantic Ocean, explore, and colonize the Amerindian nations of the Western Hemisphere. At its greatest extent, the empire that resulted from this exploration extended from Virginia on the eastern coast of the United States south to Tierra del Fuego at the tip of South America excluding Brazil and westward to California and Alaska. Across the Pacific, it included the Philippines and other island groups. By 1825 much of this empire had fallen into other hands and in that year, Spain acknowledged the independence of its possessions in the present-day United States (then under Mexican control) and south to the tip of South America. The only remnants that remained in the empire in the Western Hemisphere were Cuba and Puerto Rico and across the Pacific in Philippines Islands, and the Carolina, Marshall, and Mariana Islands (including Guam) in Micronesia. Cuba Following the liberation from Spain of mainland Latin America, Cuba was the first to initiate its own struggle for independence. During the years from 1868-1878, Cubans personified by guerrilla fighters known as mambises fought for autonomy from Spain. That war concluded with a treaty that was never enforced. In the 1890's Cubans began to agitate once again for their freedom from Spain. The moral leader of this struggle was Jos Mart, known as "El Apstol," who established the Cuban Revolutionary

Party on January 5, 1892 in the United States. Following the grito de Baire, the call to arms on February 24, 1895, Mart returned to Cuba and participated in the first weeks of armed struggle when he was killed on May 19, 1895.

The Philippines Islands The Philippines too was beginning to grow restive with Spanish rule. Jos Rizal, a member of a wealthy mestizo family, resented that his upper mobility was limited by Spanish insistence on promoting only "pure-blooded" Spaniards. He began his political career at the University of Madrid in 1882 where he became the leader of Filipino students there. For the next ten years he traveled in Europe and wrote several novels considered seditious by Filipino and Church authorities. He returned to Manila in 1892 and founded the Liga Filipina, a political group dedicated to peaceful change. He was rapidly exiled to Mindanao. During his absence, Andrs Bonifacio founded Katipunan, dedicated to the violent overthrow of Spanish rule. On August 26, 1896, after learning that the Katipunan had been betrayed, Bonifacio issued the Grito de Balintawak, a call for Filipinos to revolt. Bonifacio was succeeded as head of the Philippine revolution by Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, who had his predecessor arrested and executed on May 10, 1897. Aguinaldo negotiated a deal with the Spaniards who exiled him to Hong Kong with 400,000 pesos that he subsequently used to buy weapons to resume the fight. Puerto Rico During the 1880s and 1890s, Puerto Ricans developed many different political parties, some of which sought independence for the island while others, headquartered like their Cuban counterparts in New York, preferred to ally with the United States. Spain proclaimed the autonomy of Puerto Rico on November 25, 1897, although the news did not reach the island until January 1898 and a new government established on February 12, 1898. United States U.S. interest in purchasing Cuba had begun long before 1898. Following the Ten Years War, American sugar interests bought up large tracts of land in Cuba. Alterations in the U.S. sugar tariff favoring home-grown beet sugar helped foment the rekindling of revolutionary fervor in 1895. By that time the U.S. had more than $50 million invested in Cuba and annual trade, mostly in sugar, was worth twice that much. Fervor for war had been growing in the United States, despite President Grover Cleveland's proclamation of neutrality on June 12, 1895. But sentiment to enter the conflict grew in the United States when General Valeriano Weyler began implementing a policy of Reconcentration that moved the population into central locations guarded by Spanish troops and placed the entire country under martial law in February 1896. By December 7, President Cleveland reversed himself declaring that the United States might intervene should Spain fail to end the crisis in

Cuba. President William McKinley, inaugurated on March 4, 1897, was even more anxious to become involved, particularly after the New York Journal published a copy of a letter from Spanish Foreign Minister Enrique Dupuy de Lme criticizing the American President on February 9, 1898. Events moved swiftly after the explosion aboard the U.S.S. Maine on February 15. On March 9, Congress passed a law allocating fifty million dollars to build up military strength. On March 28, the U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry finds that a mine blew up the Maine. On April 21 President McKinley orders a blockade of Cuba and four days later the U.S. declares war.

The War Following its declaration of war against Spain issued on April 25, 1898, the United States added the Teller Amendmentasserting that it would not attempt to exercise hegemony over Cuba. Two days later Commodore George Dewey sailed from Hong Kong with Emilio Aguinaldo on board. Fighting began in the Phillipines Islands at the Battle of Manila Bay on May 1 where Commodore George Dewey reportedly exclaimed, "You may fire when ready, Gridley," and the Spanish fleet under Rear Admiral Patricio Montojo was destroyed. However, Dewey did not have enough manpower to capture Manila so Aguinaldo's guerrillas maintained their operations until 15,000 U.S. troops arrived at the end of July. On the way, the cruiser Charleston stopped at Guam and accepted its surrender from its Spanish governor who was unaware his nation was at war. Although a peace protocol was signed by the two belligerents on August 12, Commodore Dewey and Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, leader of the army troops, assaulted Manila the very next day, unaware that peace had been declared. In late April, Andrew Summers Rowan made contact with Cuban General Calixto Garca who supplied him with maps, intelligence, and a core of rebel officers to coordinate U.S. efforts on the island. The U.S. North Atlantic Squadron left Key West for Cuba on April 22 following the frightening news that the Spanish home fleet commanded by Admiral Pascual Cervera had left Cadiz and entered Santiago, having slipped by U.S. ships commanded by William T. Sampsonand Winfield Scott Schley. They arrived in Cuba in late May. War actually began for the U.S. in Cuba in June when the Marines captured Guantnamo Bay and 17,000 troops landed at Siboney and Daiquir, east of Santiago de Cuba, the second largest city on the island. At that time Spanish troops stationed on the island included 150,000 regulars and 40,000 irregulars and volunteers while rebels inside Cuba numbered as many as 50,000. Total U.S. army strength at the time totalled 26,000, requiring the passage of the Mobilization Act of April 22 that allowed for an army of at first 125,000 volunteers (later increased to 200,000) and a regular army of 65,000. On June 22, U.S. troops landed at Daiquiri where they were joined by Calixto Garca and about 5,000 revolutionaries. U.S. troops attacked the San Juan heights on July 1, 1898. Dismounted troopers,

including the African-American Ninth and Tenth cavalries and the Rough Riders commanded by Lt. Col. Theodore Roosevelt went up against Kettle Hill while the forces led by Brigadier General Jacob Kent charged up San Juan Hill and pushed Spanish troops further inland while inflicting 1,700 casualties. While U.S. commanders were deciding on a further course of action, Admiral Cervera left port only to be defeated by Schley. On July 16, the Spaniards agreed to the unconditional surrender of the 23,500 troops around the city. A few days later, Major General Nelson Miles sailed from Guantnamo to Puerto Rico. His forces landed near Ponce and marched to San Juan with virtually no opposition. Representatives of Spain and the United States signed a peace treaty in Paris on December 10, 1898, which established the independence of Cuba, ceded Puerto Rico and Guam to the United States, and allowed the victorious power to purchase the Philippines Islands from Spain for $20 million. The war had cost the United States $250 million and 3,000 lives, of whom 90% had perished from infectious diseases.

The Battle of Manila Bay (Cavite)

May 1, 1898 by Patrick McSherry

Dewey's Flagship, OLYMPIA needs your help!! Click here to learn how you can help!

Admiral Dewey's Report ||| Admiral Montojo's Report ||| Admiral Montojo's Telegram to Spain (Spanish) Capt. Gridley's Report (OLYMPIA) ||| Capt. Gridley writes home ||| Capt. Gridley's Biography ||| Capt. Dyer's Report (BALTIMORE) First Shots ||| Ensign Pitt's Account (OLYMPIA) ||| Lt. Ellicott's Account (BALTIMORE) Lt. Dion Williams (USMC) Account (BALTIMORE) ||| Surgeon Kindleberger's Account (OLYMPIA) Lt. Cmdr Briggs' Account (BALTIMORE) ||| Cmdr. Wood's Account (PETREL) Gunner Joel Evans' Account (BOSTON) ||| Stoker Charles Twitchell's Account (OLYMPIA) Capt. Hodgsdon's Report (HUGH McCULLOCH) Col. George Loud's Account (HUGH McCULLOCH) ||| Col. George Loud's Diary of the battle (HUGH McCULLOCH) Harry A. Neithercott's Account (HUGH McCULLOCH) Apprentice Wayne Longenecker of the OLYMPIA writes home ||| Baymen Albert Woodward of the RALEIGH Writes Home U.S. Consul Williams' Account (BALTIMORE/OLYMPIA) A Spanish Newspaper Account ||| The New York World Reports on Dewey's Victory at Manila Bay Report of the Reina Cristina's second in command (Click here for English)(Click here for Spanish) Orders of Battle ||| American Losses Admiral Montojo's letter to Admiral Dewey ||| Dewey's response ||| Life of Lt. Thomas Brumby ||| Life of Ens. Harry Caldwell BOSTON Crew Roster ||| CONCORD Crew Roster ||| HUGH McCULLOCH Crew Roster ||| OLYMPIA Crew Roster PETREL Crew Roster ||| RALEIGH Crew Roster

GENERAL The Battle of Manila Bay was one of two major American naval victories in the Spanish-American War, both of which were very decisive, and, in hindsight, very one-sided. The Battle of Manila Bay occurred on the morning of May 1, 1898, only days after war had been declared between Spain and the United States. The battle is notable for several reasons. First, it was a complete and final victory, ending any threat from the Spanish naval forces involved. All major Spanish ships were destroyed or captured, without any significant damage occurring to the American Forces. Secondly, technically no Americans lost their lives in the battle (two American deaths did indirectly occur which may be attributable to the battle), though the lives of many Spaniards were lost. The result is that Americans look at the victory as a "bloodless" battle, whereas the Spanish obviously do not. Thirdly, the American attack was very daring and dangerous, based on what the Americans knew at the time, but not as risky when looked at in hindsight. Many world powers, who were not aware of the American naval build-up over the past decade and a half, considered the United States Asiatic Squadron to be little or no threat to the Spanish naval forces. The Americans also over-rated the Spanish navy's ability and determination to fight, and many authorities considered the fleet to be sailing into a veritable deathtrap. In addition to the naval forces, many Spanish gun batteries existed in the fortifications around Manila Bay. These guns alone should have been enough armament to destroy the American squadron. Lastly, the American Asiatic Squadron was not sufficiently supplied with ammunition for wartime service and the nearest site for resupply was California, seven thousand miles away! By far, the most notable aspect of the battle was that, as a result of this battle, the United States became a recognized world power overnight. The U.S. Navy had been a subject of derision internationally for years. The United States had begun to change that with the advent of its new steel navy, but, in a time when a country's military was rated according to the strength of its navy, this was the first time that the ability of both the U.S. warships and their well-trained crews were shown to be an important world force. OBJECTIVES OF THE COMBATANTS

The objective of the American forces was to attack, and hopefully destroy, the Spanish forces in the Pacific. This would protect the American Pacific coast, and keep the Spanish forces in Cuba from being reinforced. The main objectives of the Spaniards were to defend the Philippine outpost of the Spanish Empire against the American forces, save the honor of the nation by fighting an honorable fight, and allow as many of its crewmen to survive as possible. The thought of actually defeating the American Asiatic Squadron with the Spanish forces available was not considered a realistic objective. PREPARATIONS The Americans' preparations for the Battle of Manila Bay actually began months, in some cases years, before the battle. The Navy War College had been studying a possible war with Spain for several years and had prepared several plans of attack as class problems. More recently there had been the appointment of Commodore George Dewey to the command of the Asiatic Squadron. Dewey was the choice of Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, but not that of the Secretary of the Navy, John Long. Some behind-the-scenes wrangling occurred with Dewey obtaining the appointment, but without the rank of rear admiral, a rank normally accorded the commander of the Asiatic Squadron. Before leaving his home in Washington D.C., where he was serving as chairman of the Board of Inspection and Survey, the Commodore began researching his new squadron. It consisted of the USS OLYMPIA, a cruiser; USS BOSTON, a small cruiser; USS PETREL, a gunboat; and the USS MONOCACY, a paddle wheel steamer. This fleet was not formidable. The MONOCACY was only fit for river service. The largest vessel, the OLYMPIA, was fairly new, but was not "state of the art" and could not compete in firepower with the newer U.S. Navy battleships, such as the OREGON. Dewey discovered another very serious concern - his squadron did not have even a peacetime allotment of ammunition, and war could be approaching. The major Spanish landholding in the Pacific was the Philippine Islands, and it was here where Dewey could expect to find the Spanish fleet. A search for information revealed that no U.S. naval vessels had visited the islands in twentytwo years, so there were no modern official intelligence reports available! Still, commerce did continue and this was one major source of information as to the state of the Philippines defenses. Another source of information in Manila was U.S. Consul Williams, who stayed on in Manila until he last moment, though subject to death threats. Dewey, while in Hong Kong had Lt. Upham of

the OLYMPIA dress in civilian clothes and spook around vessels arriving from the Philippines, talking to their crews, etc. Upham was able to give Dewey valuable and up-to-date intelligence based on the interviews he conducted, including that the Spanish were claiming to have mined the entrance to the Bay. Lastly, Dewey had an American businessman acquaintance who periodically visited the Philippines when special information was needed by Deweyon a certain intelligence items. This man's identity has been lost to history. In short, Dewey was able to gain fairly accurate intelligence on conditions as they existed in the Philippines. Dewey immediately began acting to rectify the problems of lack of ammunition as he had the lack of intelligence information. His ammunition, a dangerous cargo which commercial shipping companies would not haul, was to be shipped via the USS CHARLESTON. This vessel, however, was undergoing repairs which would not be completed for six months. The commodore found that the USS CONCORD was being fitted out to be sent to the Asiatic Squadron. He obtained orders for this vessel to carry a portion of the needed ammunition. He reinforced the urgency of this order by personally visiting the navy yard and convincing the authorities to pack as much ammunition as possible aboard the vessel. He explained that additional space could be saved if the vessel stopped at Honolulu for resupply rather than carrying enough stores for shipboard use for the entire journey. Also, he recommended purchasing some supplies in Japan, rather than taking up space with them for the long voyage. In this way, he had about half of the available ammunition sent to the Asiatic Squadron. The remainder was sent to Honolulu via the sloop USS MOHICAN and then transferred to the USS BALTIMORE. The BALTIMORE was being sent at the last hour to reinforce Dewey. The ammunition from this vessel was finally distributed to the other vessels only the night before the squadron steamed out of Mirs Bay for the Philippines! In spite of these efforts, at the Battle of Manila Bay, the squadron's magazines were only sixty per cent filled. Dewey's force continued to grow. The USS RALEIGH was sent the squadron, and the U.S. Revenue Cutter HUGH McCULLOCH, which happened to be in the area, was ordered to join Dewey also. Lastly, the squadron gained the NANSHAN and the ZAFIRO as support vessels which were merchant vessels purchased outright. These vessels were maintained officially as merchant vessels and cleared for trade through Guam. This move would allow Dewey a way to purchase supplies after war broke out and neutrality laws would forbid the selling of wartime allotments of supplies to vessels of war. As the tension between the United States and Spain grew, Dewey prepared his fleet. The men were drilled. The ships were mechanically reviewed to get them in best working condition possible. Dewey's planning and efficiency is well

demonstrated by the late arrival of the BALTIMORE. Within forty-eight hours, she was placed in an awaiting drydock, her bottom cleaned of the speed-stealing barnacles, and she was completely repainted in wartime gray, just in time to join in the expedition to Manila. With the declaration of war, Dewey moved his ships out of neutral Hong Kong to Mirs Bay, about 30 miles away. While at Mirs Bay, the squadron received a small gift. Reputedly, one of the lookouts spotted something floating on the water surface a few miles away. It was investigated and found to be several lighters of coal. Dewey put the coal to use. Later it was found that the coal was a gift from one of the Hong Kong merchants for the American fleet. From Mirs Bay, the squadron left for the Philippines and destiny. Dewey, however makes no note of this event in his report. The Spanish were preparing for action too. They had attempted to fortify their position by taking guns from their vessels and placing them in positions at critical locations along the shore. The VELASCO was being overhauled, her boilers and steering gear removed, so her guns were considered to be more useful in the fortifications. Some of the GENERAL LEZO's battery and the port-side guns of the DON ANTONIO DE ULLOAwere also removed. Orders were given for the fortification of Subic Bay, and the entrances to both it and Manila Bay were to be mined. Several vessels were sunk in the eastern entrance to Subic Bay to block passage by that route. On April 25, 1898, Admiral Montojo took his squadron, consisting of the REINA CRISTINA, DON JUAN DE AUSTRIA, ISLA DE CUBA, ISLA DE LUZON, CASTILLA, MARQUES DEL DUERO from Manila Bay and headed for Subic Bay. The CASTILLA, already unable to maneuver on her own, was leaking badly through her propeller bearings. The leak was stopped by using cement, which rendered her engines completely useless. Upon arriving, he found that the four 15 cm (5.9") guns which were to have been installed in a fortified position were still lying on the beach. The mines which had been laid were of doubtful condition and could not be relied upon. Both Dewey and Montojo recognized that the best location for the defending squadron was Subic Bay from a tactical standpoint. Even after Montojo arrived in Subic Bay, he hoped that there was still time to fortify the necessary positions. However, on April 28, Montojo learned that Dewey's squadron was on it way to the Philippines, and that the Americans knew that Subic Bay was defenseless. Faced with no time to fortify, and knowing that if his ships were lost something Montojo considered a strong possibility - the crew would drown in the deep waters of Subic Bay. Montojo ordered the squadron back to Manila Bay. The Spanish admiral decided that returning the squadron to the anchorage at Manila, which was surrounded by many batteries and fortifications, would be

unwise, since this would invite the destruction of the city itself by the guns of the enemy's squadron. Manila was home to the families of his crew and many other non-combatants. Instead, he opted for the shallow waters off Cavite's Sangley Point. Here he could combine the gunfire from his vessels with that of the batteries of Sangley Point and Ulloa. Also, in this location, if his ships went down, they would settle into the bottom of the Bay while still allowing major portions of the vessels to remain above water. His men would be able to get to shore and rescue themselves. Montojo had lighters loaded with sand brought over to be placed in front of the CASTILLA to protect the wooden vessel. Preparation continued as the sound of gunfire at the entrance to Manila Bay announced the arrival of Dewey''s Asiatic Squadron. THE BATTLE On arriving off the Philippine Island of Luzon on April 30, Dewey ordered a reconnaissance of Subic Bay by the BOSTON and CONCORD. After there were reports of gunfire coming from the direction of Subic Bay,BALTIMORE was sent to determine if the other ships had made contact. The reports were found to be in error and Spanish forces were not found in Subic Bay. On hearing the news, Dewey' commented to Commander Lamberton, his chief of staff, that "Now we have them!" The Asiatic Squadron's course was set for Manila Bay. In the meantime, Spanish Admiral Montojo received a telegram that evening notifying him that the Americans had reconnoitered Subic Bay, and had left, heading toward Manila Bay. Aboard the American vessels, last minute preparations continued. The ships' crews continued throwing anything made of wood overboard, since the danger from splintering and fire was very serious. On board theHUGH McCULLOCH, virtually all of the mess tables were tossed into the water, leaving the crew eating off the deck for a long time after the battle. The same was true of almost all of the ships except for theOLYMPIA. Dewey, wisely or unwisely, left much of the wood intact, simply covering it with canvas and splinter netting. Many of the items to which the OLYMPIA's crew had direct access, were, however, thrown overboard. Sand was sprinkled on the decks for traction in battle. There were two major channels which led into Manila Bay - Boca Chica and Boca Grande. Boca Chica was the main shipping route, however it was narrower and more heavily defended by shore batteries than Boca Grande. Boca Grande which, according to recent reports (suspected to be part of a Spanish disinformation campaign), was said to be dangerously rocky. Dewey believed the water to be deep in this area. Reports were also heard that this entrance to Manila Bay was mined. Dewey also discounted the rumors of mines stating the the report was probably untrue, and if it was true, that the Spanish did not have

the capability to mine in deep water. Also, the Commodore believed that the mines, if placed, would deteriorate rapidly in the trpoical waters. Later, based on captured Spanish officers and records, indications were that Dewey was wrong in that the channel was mined. The mines, however, must have deteriorated, as Dewey's vessels, as well as subsequent visitors, reported no damage from mines.

The route of the Asiatic Squadron into Manila Bay

The Asiatic Squadron steamed into Boca Grande at about 11:00 P.M. The men were at their guns, and the situation was very tense. All lights were out, except for one veiled stern light on each ship, to enable the vessels to follow one another. The men knew of the rumors of mines, of the reported shoals, and of Spanish shore batteries. They expected to meet a squadron ready for battle. They also knew that they were low on ammunition and seven thousand miles from resupply. What they did not know was the Dewey had also underestimated the number of Spanish vessels present. The vessels, with OLYMPIA in the lead and NANSHAN and ZAFIRO bringing up the rear, steamed past the little island of El Fraile. The island had a battery of guns taken from the GENERAL LEZO. When almost all of the American vessels were past El Fraile, flames shot from the HUGH McCULLOCH's funnel as some soot caught fire briefly. She had been supplied with Australian coal which did not burn as cleanly as the Welsh coal provided for the other vessels in the Squadron. HUGH McCULLOCH had experienced periodic flare-ups as the coal

soot burned in her funnel. The battery on the island saw the most recent flame and opened up, sending a shot between the RALEIGH and the PETREL. The BOSTON, McCULLOCH, RALEIGH and CONCORD returned fire, and the battery fell silent. It has never been explained why the El Fraile battery did not put up more of a fight or fire earlier. The American vessels were plainly visible in spite of the darkness. Some claimed that there were not enough men present to man the fort's guns. The gunfire from the El Fraile skirmish was heard in Manila. Montojo knew what it meant. At 2:00 a.m., he received a telegram confirming that the Americans had passed El Fraile. He notified army commanders, ordered all artillery loaded, and sent all soldiers and sailors to their battle stations. The Spanish waited. They had already removed masts, yards and boats to avoid splintering from the projectiles of the American guns, a major source of injury. The Asiatic Squadron set off across Manila Bay with a goal of arriving at Manila, where Dewey expected to find the Spanish Fleet, at dawn. To meet this schedule, the squadron slowed to four knots. The men were given a chance to catch some sleep at their guns, if the tension of the situation would allow it. The crews on board the vessel saw flares, beacons, rocket and fires dot the shoreline as their movements were tracked. The Commodore sent signals to his squadron using his ardois lights....secrecy was no longer a possibility. At 4:00 A.M., Montojo signaled his forces to prepare for action. At this same moment, coffee was being served to the men of the American squadron. At 4:45 A.M., the crew of the DON JUAN DE AUSTRIA spotted the American Squadron. Sending the NANSHAN, ZAFIRO under protection of the HUGH McCULLOCH to a safer location in the bay, the Americans headed directly for Manila, where they expected the Spanish warships to be. This was a logical location since the strong shore batteries would greatly augment the firepower of the Spanish vessels. Not seeing anything but merchant vessels in the anchorage, the American vessels turned toward Cavite. At 5:05 A.M., the guns of the three of the Manila batteries opened fire. Only the BOSTON and CONCORD replied, since the limited ammunition was to be used against the Spanish fleet and not the forts. Montojo had the REINA CRISTINA slip its cables and begin to move. To clear his path, he ordered several mines, which could have been a hazard to his ships, blown. Their explosions were spotted by the American crewmen. Dewey misinterpreted the reason for the reason for the explosion of the mines, commenting "Evidently the Spaniards are already rattled." The Squadron moved ahead in battle order - OLYMPIA, followed by BALTIMORE, RALEIGH, PETREL, CONCORD, and BOSTON at two hundred yard intervals.

The Americans finally spotted the Spanish vessels in their Cavite anchorage between Sangley Point and Las Pinas. At 5:15 a.m. the guns of the Cavite fortifications and the Spanish fleet opened fire. Dewey had his ships hold their fire until 5:40 A.M. Then, standing on the vessel's open bridge, he quietly told the OLYMPIA's captain, "You may fire when ready, Gridley." The OLYMPIA's forward eight inch turret fired. The other ships of the column followed suit. The Americans kept the Spanish vessels off their port bow during their initial attack, since this allowed the maximum number of guns on each ship to fire. Though it was not obvious to the Americans, who noted that the damage to the Spanish vessels must not have been too great since the fire from their vessels did not slacken, destruction came quickly to the Spanish fleet. Montojo commented that the first three ships seemed to direct their fire mainly on his flagship, REINA CRISTINA. Soon a shot hit her forecastle, put the crews of four rapid fire guns out of action, shattering the mast, and injuring the helmsman, who had to be replaced. Another shell set flew into the vessel's orlop deck, starting a fire which was rapidly put under control. The American ships came in as close as they thought the depth of the water would allow, first passing the Spanish position from west to east, and then countermarching east to west. Five passes were made along the two and a half mile course by the Asiatic Squadron at a speed of six to eight knots.

Suddenly, around 7:30 A.M., Commodore Dewey had a rude awakening. Captain Gridley relayed a report that the vessel was down to only fifteen rounds of ammunition for each five inch gun. The five inch guns were the OLYMPIA's most effective gun, since they could fire much more quickly than the 8" turret guns. Fifteen rounds of ammunition could, under rapid fire condition, be expended in two minutes! Realizing that running out of ammunition could spell the end of his squadron, and not being able to determine the extent of the damage to the Spanish vessels amidst the smoke of battle, Dewey decided to withdraw to redistribute ammunition and assess the entire situation. To avoid having the Spanish realize his plight and give them additional reason to hold out

longer, the commodore had the signal sent to his squadron that the ships were breaking off to allow the men time for breakfast. The men greeted this with consternation. It was later noted in the American press as an example of the nonchalance the Americans exhibited in the battle by stopping in the middle for a bite to eat, while still within range of the enemy's guns in their fortifications. Very quickly, though, it was found that the report was in error. Instead, only fifteen rounds per five inch gun had been expended. This indicated that the men were showing unusual restraint by firing only after taking time to aim, and trying to make every shot count. A call went out for the commanders of the ships of the squadron to report their damage, casualties and ammunition status. The men, somewhat confused by this turn of events, ate and rested. The engine room crewscame up on deck to get away from the stifling heat below decks and survey the carnage which was becoming evident from the direction of the Spanish fleet. During the morning's battle, twice the OLYMPIA believed it was under attack from small torpedo boats. One of these it sunk, the other was run aground. Torpedoes were greatly feared weapons, because, with them a small vessel could conceivably sink a large vessel. However, the Spanish reports make no report of these attacks, and it now appears that these vessels, military or civilian, were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time and were not torpedo boats. Twice, near the end of the battle's morning phase, Spanish men-of-war had made attempts to close on the American squadron. First, the DON JUAN DE AUSTRIA attempted to charge the OLYMPIA. The heavy gunfire of the fleet had forced her to abandon the effort. Shortly after this action, the Spanish Flagship, REINA CRISTINA also tried to close on the OLYMPIA, possibly to try to ram her. While making this attempt that the REINA CRISTINA's steering gear was detroyed as she again became the focus of the galling fire of the American squadron. Unbeknownst to the Americans, the Spanish fleet was already defeated when Dewey "broke for breakfast." Very close to the end of the morning's phase of the battle, the REINA CRISTINA was hit by a number of projectiles. In addition to the shot that destroyed her steering gear, another shot, sadly, hit her in the area that was being used as a hospital, killing many already wounded men. One shot fatally hit a stern ammunition handling room, hampering further steering attempts, and resulting in the flooding of the nearby magazines. Fire broke out elsewhere while the broadside guns continued firing, though only one gunner and one seaman remained unhurt and able to work the guns. Half of her crew was out of action, and seven officers were lost. Montojo ordered the vessel scuttled, and tried to save his men. The Spanish admiral transferred his flag to the ISLA DE CUBA. Now, in the lull of the American "breakfast break" he could survey the damage. The DON

ANTONIO DE ULLOA had been sunk, and half of her crew and her commander were put out of action. Some of her remaining crew may have stayed aboard refusing to abandon her. The CASTILLA had been set afire in the action and riddled with shot. She was abandoned and sunk, with a loss of 23 men killed and 80 wounded. The ISLA DE LUZON had three guns dismounted, while the MARQUES DEL DUERO was "sadly cut up." Montojo ordered the remainder of the fleet, those that could still maneuver, to retreat back into Bacoor Bay, fight on as long as possible, and then scuttle the ships before surrendering. Dewey's guncrews had found their marks, in spite of actually hitting their targets only about one to two percent of the time. This hit rate was low, but not unusual in the period. . In fact, it was higher than the American hit rate at the later naval Battle of Santiago, a fact attributable to the Spanish vessels being generally stationary targetsThe Spanish, of course, hit their targets much less than the Americans. Meanwhile, the reports from Dewey's subordinates began to arrive aboard the OLYMPIA. The information was shocking. In spite of what seemed to be a strong Spanish barrage, there were no lives lost aboard the American vessels. Two officers and seven men were injured, most only slightly. Eight of the injuries were from a single hit on the BALTIMORE, with the remaining injury occurring aboard the BOSTON.

The path of the shell that hit the BALTIMORE

By 11:16 A.M., the lull was over. The Asiatic Squadron went back on the attack. It was now evident to the Americans that the Spanish fleet was ablaze and sinking. The BALTIMORE led the attack the second time, switching places in line with the flagship. She had been sent to intercept a vessel which turned out to be a merchant vessel, and was closer in to the enemy. As the remainder of the fleet was considerably behind her, the BALTIMORE requested and obtained permission to shell the Canacao Battery and Fort Sangley. The spirited exchange went on for ten minutes, with the Canacao and then Fort Sangley being silenced. As the American ships got within range, some reports indicate that the crew that remained aboard the DON ANTONIO DE ULLOA, already a wreck, may have opened fire. Whether this was indeed fire or merely the "cooking off" of

ammunition is not clear. However, she was answered by the fleet, and savagely raked. The Spanish crew, if they were still on board, won the respect of the Americans for their bravery, and must have finally decided to abandon ship. The Asiatic Squadron received orders from the flagship to break ranks. The CONCORD was ordered to destroy the beached ISLA DE MINDANAO, mail steamer thought by the Americans to be a transport. ThePETREL, because of her shallow draft, was ordered to perform the risky duty of proceeding into the shallow waters of Cavite to capture or fire any vessels there. After a few shots from her six inch guns, the forces on Cavite itself surrendered. The PETREL also captured the transport MANILA and several smaller vessels. The American losses were minor, consisting of nine men injured. In addition, Captain Gridley of the OLYMPIA, already gravely ill, would pass away about a month after the battle, his condition worsened by his hours spent in the hot conning tower aboard OLYMPIA that morning. Chief Engineer Randall of the HUGH McCULLOCH had passed away from a heart attack as the squadron entered Manila Bay, but may be considered a casualty of the battle also, since his conditon may have been the result of the tension of the moment and the heat of the engine rooms. The Spanish losses were much higher. Admiral Montojo reported a loss of 381 men killed and wounded as a result of the battle. However, the battle was over. The Spanish vessels had been destroyed. Though the guns of the fortifications around Manila still had the power to sink the American squadron, the threat of a return bombardment of the city kept the guns silent. That evening, the USFS OLYMPIA Brass Band serenaded the crowds of people teeming along the Manila waterfront with a selection of music including many Spanish numbers, punctuated by continued explosions of ammunition aboard the still-burning Spanish vessels. It was an strange end to a strange day.

The Battle of Manila Bay

by Admiral George Dewey Once through the entrance, as I deemed it wise to keep moving in order not to be taken by surprise when the ships had no headway, and as, at the same time, I did not wish to reach our destination before we had sufficient daylight to show us the position of the Spanish ships, the speed of the squadron was reduced to four knots, while we headed toward the city of Manila. In the meantime the men were allowed to snatch a little sleep at their guns; but at

four o'clock coffee was served to them, and so eager were they that there was no need of any orders to insure readiness for the work to come. Signal lights, rockets, and beacon lights along the shore, now that we were sure of grappling with the enemy, no longer concerned us. We waited for dawn and the first sight of the Spanish squadron, which I had rather expected would be at the anchorage off the city of Manila. This seemed naturally the strong position for Admiral Montojo to take up, as he would then have the powerful Manila battery, mounting the guns which have already been enumerated, to support him. But the admiral stated in his report that he had avoided this position on account of the resultant injury which the city might have received if the battle had been fought in close proximity to it. The Nanshan and Zafiro, as there was no reserve ammunition for either to carry, had been sent, with the McCulloch, into an unfrequented part of the bay in order that they should sustain no injury and that they might not hamper the movements of the fighting-ships. When we saw that there were only merchantmen at the Manila anchorage, the squadron, led by the flag-ship, gradually changed its course, swinging around on the arc of a large circle leading toward the city and making a kind of countermarch, as it were, until headed in the direction of Cavite. This brought the ships within two or three miles of shore, with a distance of four hundred yards between ships, in the following order: Olympia (flag), Baltimore, Raleigh, Petrel, Concord, and Boston. About 5.05 the Luneta and two other Manila batteries opened fire. Their shots passed well over the vessels. It was estimated that some had a range of seven miles. Only the Boston and Concord replied. Each sent two shells at the Luneta battery. The other vessels reserved their fire, having in mind my caution that, in the absence of a full supply of ammunition, the amount we had was too precious to be wasted when we were seven thousand miles from our base. My captains understood that the Spanish ships were our objective and not the shore fortifications of a city that would be virtually ours as soon as our squadron had control of Manila Bay. With the coming of broad daylight we finally sighted the Spanish vessels formed in an irregular crescent in front of Cavite. The Olympia headed toward them, and in answer to her signal to close up, the distance between our ships was reduced to two hundred yards. The western flank of the Spanish squadron was protected by Cavite Peninsula and the Sangley Point battery, while its eastern flank rested in the shoal water off Las Pinas. The Spanish line of battle was formed by the Reina Cristina (flag), Castilla, Don Juan de Austria, Don Antonio de Ulloa, Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, and Marques del Duero.

The Velasco and Lezo were on the other (southern) side of Cavite Point, and it is claimed by the Spaniards that they took no part in the action. Some of the vessels in the Spanish battle-line were under way, and others were moored so as to bring their broadside batteries to bear to the best advantage. The Castilla was protected by heavy iron lighters filled with stone. Before me now was the object for which we had made our arduous preparations, and which, indeed, must ever be the supreme test of a naval officer's career. I felt confident of the outcome, though I had no thought that victory would be won at so slight a cost to our own side. Confidence was expressed in the very precision with which the dun, war-colored hulls of the squadron followed in column behind the flag-ship, keeping their distance excellently. All the guns were pointed constantly at the enemy, while the men were at their stations waiting the word. There was no break in the monotone of the engines save the mechanical voice of the leadsman or an occasional low-toned command by the quartermaster at the conn , or the roar of a Spanish shell. The Manila batteries continued their inaccurate fire, to which we paid no attention. The misty haze of the tropical dawn had hardly risen when at 5.15, at long range, the Cavite forts and Spanish squadron opened fire. Our course was not one leading directly toward the enemy, but a converging one, keeping him on our starboard bow. Our speed was eight knots and our converging course and ever-varying position must have confused the Spanish gunners. My assumption that the Spanish fire would be hasty and inaccurate proved correct. So far as I could see,, none of our ships was suffering any damage, while, in view of my limited ammunition supply, it was my plan not to open fire until we were within effective range, and then to fire as rapidly as possible with all of our guns. At 5.40 when we were within a distance of 5,000 yards (two and one-half miles) , I turned to Captain Gridley and said: "You may fire when you are ready, Gridley." While I remained on the bridge with Lamberton, Brumby, and Stickney, Gridley took his station in the conning-tower and gave the order to the battery. The very first gun to speak was an 8-inch from the forward turret of the Olympia, and this was the signal for all the other ships to join the action. At about the time that the Spanish ships were first sighted, 5.06, two submarine mines were exploded between our squadron and Cavite, some two miles ahead of our column. On account of the distance, I remarked to Lamberton:

"Evidently the Spaniards are already rattled." However, they explained afterward that the premature explosions were due to a desire to clear a space in which their ships might manoeuvre. At one time a torpedo-launch made an attempt to reach the Olympia, but she was sunk by the guns of the secondary battery and went down bow first, and another yellow-colored launch flying the Spanish colors ran out, heading for the Olympia, but after being disabled she was beached to prevent her sinking. When the flag-ship neared the five-fathom curve off Cavite she turned to the westward, bringing her port batteries to bear on the enemy, and, followed by the squadron, passed along the Spanish line until north of and only some fifteen hundred yards distant from the Sangley Point battery, when she again turned and headed back to the eastward, thus giving the squadron an opportunity to use their port and starboard batteries alternately and to cover with their fire all the Spanish ships, as well as the Cavite and Sangley Point batteries. While I was regulating the course of the squadron. Lieutenant Calkins was verifying our position by crossbearings and by the lead. Three runs were thus made from the eastward and two from the westward, the length of each run averaging two miles and the ships being turned each time with port helm. Calkins found that there was in reality deeper water than shown on the chart, and when he reported the fact to me, inasmuch as my object was to get as near as possible to the enemy without grounding our own vessels, the fifth run past the Spaniards was farther inshore than any preceding run. At the nearest point to the enemy our range was only two thousand yards. There had been no cessation in the rapidity of fire maintained by our whole squadron, and the effect of its concentration, owing to the fact that our ships were kept so close together, was smothering, particularly upon the two largest ships, the Reina Cristina and Castilla. The Don Juan de Austria first and then the Reina Cristina made brave and desperate attempts to charge the Olympia, but becoming the target for all our batteries they turned and ran back. In this sortie the Reina Cristina was raked by an 8-inch shell, which is said to have put out of action some twenty men and to have completely destroyed her steering-gear. Another shell in her forecastle killed or wounded all the members of the crews of four rapid-fire guns; another set fire to her after orlop; another killed or disabled nine men on her poop; another carried away her mizzen-mast, bringing down the ensign and the admiral's flag, both of which were replaced; another exploded in the after ammunition-room; and still another exploded in the sick-bay, which was already filled with wounded.

When she was raised from her muddy bed, five years later, eighty skeletons were found in the sickbay and fifteen shot holes in the hull; while the many hits mentioned in Admiral Montojo's report, and his harrowing description of the shambles that his flag-ship had become when he was finally obliged to leave her, shows what execution was done to her upper works. Her loss was one hundred and fifty killed and ninety wounded, seven of these being officers. Among the killed was her valiant captain, Don Luis Cadarso, who, already wounded, finally met his death while bravely directing the rescue of his men from the burning and sinking vessel. Though in the early part of the action our firing was not what I should have liked it to be, it soon steadied down, and by the time the Reina Cristina steamed toward us it was satisfactorily accurate. The Castilla fared little better than the Reina Cristina. All except one of her guns was disabled, she was set on fire by our shells, and finally abandoned by her crew after they had sustained a loss of twenty- three killed and eighty wounded. The Don Juan de Austria was badly damaged and on fire, the Isla de Luzon had three guns dismounted, and the Marques del Duero was also in a bad way. Admiral Montojo, finding his flag-ship no longer manageable, half her people dead or wounded, her guns useless and the ship on fire, gave the order to abandon and sink her, and transferred his flag to the Isla de Cuba shortly after seven o'clock. Victory was already ours, though we did not know it. Owing to the smoke over the Spanish squadron there were no visible signs of the execution wrought by our guns when we started upon our fifth run past the enemy. We were keeping up our rapid fire, and the flag-ship was opposite the centre of the Spanish line, when, at 7.35 , the captain of the Olympia made a report to me which was as startling as it was unexpected. This was to the effect that on board the Olympia there remained only fifteen rounds per gun for the 5-inch battery. It was a most anxious moment for me. So far as I could see, the Spanish squadron was as intact as ours. I had reason to believe that their supply of ammunition was as ample as ours was limited. Therefore, I decided to withdraw temporarily from action for a redistribution of ammunition if necessary. For I knew that fifteen rounds of 5-inch ammunition could be shot away in five minutes. But even as we were steaming out of range the distress of the Spanish ships became evident. Some of them were perceived to be on fire and others were seeking protection behind Cavite Point. The Don Antonio de Ulloa, however, still retained her position at Sangley Point, where she had been moored. Moreover, the Spanish fire, with the exception of the Manila batteries, to which we had paid little attention, had

ceased entirely. It was clear that we did not need a very large supply of ammunition to finish our morning's task; and happily it was found that the report about the Olympia's 5-inch ammunition had been incorrectly transmitted. It was that fifteen rounds had been fired per gun, not that only fifteen rounds remained. Feeling confident of the outcome, I now signalled that the crews, who had had only a cup of coffee at 4. A. M should have their breakfast. The public at home, on account of this signal, to which was attributed a nonchalance that had never occurred to me, reasoned that breakfast was the real reason for our withdrawing from action. Meanwhile, I improved the opportunity to have the commanding officers report on board the flag-ship. There had been such a heavy flight of shells over us that each captain, when he arrived, was convinced that no other ship had had such good luck as his own in being missed by the enemy's fire, and expected the others to have both casualties and damages to their ships to report. But fortune was as pronouncedly in our favor at Manila as it was later at Santiago. To my gratification not a single life had been lost, and considering that we would rather measure the importance of an action by the scale of its conduct than by the number of casualties we were immensely happy.