11.

Secularism in Iran:
A Hidden Agenda?
Nastaran Moossavi

I n a country where honest responses to simple questions such as “Are you a

Muslim? Do you believe in God? Is the Holy Koran the word of God? Do you
pray and read the Holy Koran? When you were growing up did your father pray,
fast, and read the Holy Koran?” led to mass executions in the late 1980’s,1 it is
very difficult to know who is secular and to what extent. In this kind of situation
people do not trust each other easily and often deny their true identity. It is
infinitely more complicated to conduct a survey that asks questions like “What
is your religion, if any?”2 Therefore, this assessment of religious identification
among Iranians has shortcomings in terms of a quantifiable evaluation.3
However, those living in Iran distinguish the extent of adherence to religion
among themselves by other means. They also use other measures to find out
who believes in a different interpretation of religion, even when people do not
identify themselves. One way to document such distinctions is through one’s
appearance, especially in the case of women.4 Another source of information on
the issue is the various life styles people take up.5 Furthermore, membership in
certain social organizations or affiliation to specific religious institutions separates
believers and non-believers from each other and also indicates differences among
believers.
A more direct way of knowing who is secular today in Iran, and in what
terms, is to look at the literature published in recent years on secularism, in its
broadest meaning, and follow the people who spoke up and expressed their ideas
on the issue. This chapter attempts to review this literature and come up with
clues for understanding the debate about secularism in Iran.
In the absence of a reliable social survey, the focus must be on reviewing the
writings of those who have considered themselves secular by whatever definition,

139
140 Secularism & Secularity

and also those who have raised certain doubts about the legitimacy of the existing
Islamic government from a religious point of view. It is widely believed that the
debates on issues such as secularism, Islamic government, and the proper role of
clergymen in the government date back to the years around the Constitutional
Revolution in Iran in 1906.
Certain articles of the Supplement to the Constitution Acts, approved then,
reflect how power was consolidated between religious and non-religious parties.
One of these articles asserted that the representatives of people in the parliament
would select five qualified clergymen from a list of twenty presented by the
high ranking clerics. The role of these clergymen was to ensure that every new
law and regulation in civic affairs was in accordance with Sharia’h. Observing
this agreement, some, like Ahmad Kasravi,6 decided that the Constitutional
Revolution had failed since it had offered the clerics the upper hand in super­vis­
ing the newly constitutional government. According to him, the Constitutional
Revolution was expected to put an end to the misery of Iranians, who were
suffering from despotism and “harmful” religious teachings equally. He is one
of those who believed “…religion is not something useless. We expect benefits
from religion… Religion is for the purpose of helping the people to advance and
religious people must be superior to irreligious people.”7
It is interesting to note that the debate on secularism which emerged again
in the mid-1990’s focused on two of Kasravi’s premises and tried to justify them.
However, there has been no direct reference to him or to his ideas. In 1943, he
wrote against the clerical establishment, saying:
Should this establishment remain, it will always be a shackle for the
nation; it will prevent progressing (as it has done so far).8
This statement is reminiscent of the criticism of “religious intellectuals”
against the Islamic government during the past decade, which claimed that
“Islam does not need clerics.”9 Kasravi, in his attempt to cleanse Islam from all
its faults, tries to reconcile it with science. He is against clergymen who believe
“God’s religion cannot be measured with the rational faculties.”10 Kasravi finds
Islam, science, and civilization compatible. Again, this is echoed in the recent
discussions that find a rational philosophical trend in Islam, and therefore assert
that Islam does not hinder scientific and technological progress.
The point in linking these periods is that secularism, as it began in 1906,
is still an “unfinished project.” It should be understood as an ongoing process,
with its ups and downs. Being a time bound phenomenon, people at different
times have articulated their ideas on secularism differently. The determination
to realize its goals has also differed in various periods. During the Constitutional
 11. Secularism in Iran 141

Revolution, there was a range of demands expressed by different political figures

and parties. These demands included the complete separation of religion from
government (and sometimes its elimination), as well as an emphasis on the right
of supervision by clerical institution over legislation.
At the present time, the demands that can be expressed in public may
not have the same radical intonation, but they raise deeper concerns about the
relationship between religion and government, the role of clerics in Shi’ism, the
significance of rational thinking, and other relevant issues. The process that has
begun is more problematic and painstaking for those who want to replace the
existing interpretation of Shi’ism with another one.
It is unknown how far redefining and reinterpreting the sources of Islam
will create reliable grounds for criticizing the official religion. Ever since the
Constitutional Revolution, attempts to formulate an alternative interpretation
of Islam and the struggle of “Religion against Religion” have continued in Iran.11
It was repeated by people like Kasravi until the 1940’s, taken up as an agenda
by Mujahedin-e Khalgh12 in the mid 1960’s, and elaborated by Shariati13 in the
1970’s. Once again we hear the same voice, but in a different variation.
This new round of effort is said to be due to the changes that Iranian society
underwent after the domination of Islamists in the 1979 revolution. For the first
time, the Shi’ite clerics got the opportunity to run a government. It was then
time to see how a certain interpretation of Shi’ism is able to adjust itself to the
requirements of modern-day Iran.
Though it took some time for the Islamist leaders of the revolution to gain
control over all the dissidents and either wipe them out physically or silence
them, the revolution had to demand that the people acknowledge its legitimacy
from the outset. The first and second articles of the new Constitution explain
explicitly that the basis of the government is a combination of Islamic values and
republicanism. The very act of establishing an Islamic government was posed
to people in a referendum vote.14 The amazing endorsement of 98.2 percent of
voters solidified the new government’s position.
The disillusionment with the clerical authorities and criticism against their
interference in every aspect of life occurred in the years following the end of the
war with Iraq in the late 1980’s. Now the dismay went beyond the “outsiders”—
apostates, and secularists who had struggled to undermine the clerics since
the beginning of the Constitutional Revolution. The heart of Islamism was
attacked by its own children, from within. This process has its advantages and
disadvantages since it is such an internal conflict. On one hand, it is unlikely to
cut off its own roots, for fear of losing a firm basis on which to promote Islamic
values, and in fear of absolute denial by its “spiritual fathers.” On the other
142 Secularism & Secularity

hand, these internal opposition groups know the limitations of Islamism better
than their intellectual and political rivals outside the governing circles.
The final decision to be taken was, of course, individual for “religious
intellectuals,” but prior to making this choice they tried to deal with the issue
collectively. One strategy was to speak up and tell their audiences and readers
how another interpretation of Islam could exist; an interpretation that has as its
primary requirement curtailing the power of the clerics. Exploring the history
of Islam, as well as adopting different ways of argument with more emphasis
on rational thinking and a positivist outlook, served them well in making their
points.
One of the prominent figures of the new trend, better known to the West
than others, is Abdolkarim Soroush.15 Some of his basic views can be formulated
as follows:
• Religion, due to its celestial nature, is not limited to historical and human
decrees. However, our understanding of religion is time dependent and
changes as the human knowledge is transformed.
• Islam (and any other religion) is modified by its essence, not its change­
able formal components. Therefore, a true Muslim is one who is devoted
and committed to the essence of Islam.16
• There is a distinction between political secularity and philosophical
secularity. The tension between these two distinctions has always existed
in Shi’ism in Iran, though Shi’ism is alien to secular politics.
• Authorization to reinterpret Islam is allowed for the most highly learned
man of the time. Such a person is not necessarily a clergyman who is most
educated in Islamic theology. Men with high qualifications in modern
knowledge and education are in a better position to revise Islamic
thought and practice.
For the religious critics of Islamic government, the problem of reconciling
Islam and democracy, intellectualism and religiosity, rationality and faith,
and similar issues are yet to be worked on.17 Among themselves they discuss
whether rationalism is only a tool that an intellectual is equipped with. Does
it mean that anybody may be wrong and subject to questioning, that one can
keep on questioning about anything without restriction? Do human beings need
evidence of proof to believe things are right? On the other hand, does religiosity
necessitate that one simply believe in the sayings of one specific person and/or
some specific people? If the essence of Islam is absolute obedience to God, is
then the term “religious intellectualism” paradoxical?
 11. Secularism in Iran 143

It is said that though materials are written and translated on the differen­
tiation between reason and intellect, between discursive reason and intellectual
intuition, there is no conflict between religiosity and intellectual intuition.18
Some scholars are not sure what intellectual intuition exactly means and implies.
So they recommend that it is preferable to dismiss the whole idea and stay safe in
the domain of religion or, at most, rephrase the current attempt as “Revisionism.”19
This trend emphasizes the right of Ijtihad 20 in Shi’ism, saying that the new wave
of revising Islam in Iran has nothing to do with the Enlightenment as it emerged
in Europe. Despite different ways of articulation, the “religious intellectuals” all
agree that religion should be separated from government, but not from politics.
On other issues, such as the negation of Velayat-e Faqih,21 or denial of the right
of clerics for mediating between God and people, their ideas and commitment
to religious reform varies in degrees.
In addition to these internal debates, certain journals started asking opinions
of some intellectuals that were known as “non-religious.” The Iranian Diaspora
was also encouraged to join the debate on secularism. The fact that some of these
“non-religious” intellectuals were welcome to participate in the debates showed a
change in attitude among people who had once helped with the construction of
the Islamic government, but then changed into its mild critics. They were seeking
allies in order to push for reform and challenge the governing clerical power.22 In
their attempt to increase the scope of their influence, they turned to their rivals
at the eve of the 1979 revolution,23 and sought their intellectual assistance to
enrich the process of dialogue. Some of these “old” rivals (i.e., remaining leftists
and seculars from the suppressions of the 1980’s onward) were in a mood of self
defeatism, and some had already started to revise their previous beliefs. It is now
believed that the new coalition includes religious reformers from one side and
secular neo-liberals from the other side.
The product of such exchanges of views has been a significant number of
articles, books, and interviews published inside and outside Iran and posted
on various Web sites. One could add the number of participants in discussion
meetings to the circulation figures for those books; the number of subscribers
to the journals that publish such articles; and finally, the number of visitors
to these Web sites, in order to estimate the percentage of secular persons in
Iran with respect to the whole educated population. But the major part of the
current students’ movement and women’s movement has been dominated by the
religious reformist discourse. This is not to deny the existence of other tendencies
or believe they will permanently remain marginalized since the social dynamism
incurred in these years is still operative.
Of course, some people find the literature on secularism confusing and
144 Secularism & Secularity

comment that Iranians do not know what we precisely mean by terms like
secular, laïcité, modernity, secularization, etc., especially when we apply it to
our own society.24 This might be true, especially when one notes that no exact
equivalent of these words exist in the Persian language. This situation creates
frequent misinterpretations and misunderstandings, but also forces writers and
readers to explain themselves as clearly as possible. Therefore, there is a set of
common questions; whether “secularism implies separation of religion from
government or from politics,” if “laïcité is the same as secularism,” and in what
ways “modernity, modernization, and modernism are different from each other.”
It is not to say that all these challenges are happening in the domain of language.
On the contrary, the need for naming these phenomena properly specifies how
crucial it is to understand the options the religious reformers are offering to the
society.25
“Religious intellectuals” have been repeatedly asked to respond and clarify
in what ways their interpretation of Islam guarantees freedom of expression and
how women and non-believers are to be treated. When terms such as “Islamic
democracy,” “Islamic civil society,” and “religious secularism” are created, one
doubts the possibility of mixing these concepts. One “non-religious” scholar
claims that in the late 1970’s Iranians combined religion and revolution and
shaped one of the most extraordinary revolutions in history. According to him, it
is not surprising that an unexpected intertwining of intellectualism and religion
was created.26 The desire to benefit from Enlightenment values and remain a
faithful Muslim and/or an Iranian patriot still permeates the intellectuals’
minds. Despite all that has happened in the last 100 years, Iranian intellectuals
continually face the same challenges.
The debate over secularism has brought together some intellectuals, who
have made revisions in their previous theories and practice, from both sides
of the religious and non-religious spectrum. Their main agenda is to recreate
secularism in an Islamic way and turn it into the ideology of the opposition
movement in Iran. Meanwhile, ordinary people have been dealing with the
pressure of Islamism in different ways. Deeply rooted middle-class values, and
the revival of them in public life in recent years, have offered options to people,
especially to youth, to experience different life styles. Many visitors from the
West are surprised by the emergence of a youth culture in such a restricted
country like Iran. On the other hand, the authorities have taken the issue of
regulating the youth problem more seriously.27 They are aware that the concept
of secularism has its own attraction for many young people.
Therefore, the youth have become the battlefield between secularists and
fundamentalists. Struggles over women preceded this new conflict, and are still
 11. Secularism in Iran 145

going on. Undoubtedly, women and youth have tried to organize independently
and find an outlet for their problems with the clerical establishment, but there
are certain limitations in going beyond the offered options given censorship and
the exclusion of alternatives. The need to hear more voices is crucial now. It is
not fruitful to compel Iranians to choose between the dichotomies of “bad” and
“worse” that are expressed in the current discussions on secularism. Iranians have
sought their independence from foreign powers, political freedom, and social
justice since the Constitutional Revolution. Yet the right to keep religion away
from government has yet to be fought for.
Organizing scholarly debates and raising social awareness on secular values
requires relatively peaceful conditions. The road towards setting up a democratic
society in Iran is already rough. It may be completely blocked if the existing
dispute over the Iranian government’s nuclear program keeps on threatening,
and if no diplomatic resolution is found. If the U.S. government takes coercive
military measures against Iran all the attempts that have been made so far will
be in vain. As in the early 1950’s it will constrain the emergence of internal
alternatives to our problems.28
I believe any plan for taking military action against Iran will strengthen
fundamentalism within the country and the region. All the other social and
political groups will be forced to withdraw their demands under the threat
of a foreign invasion. It is obvious that the debate on the role of religion and
democracy cannot be carried on in a wartime situation, as the example of Iraq
indicates. On the other hand, any future arrangement between the U.S. and the
Iranian governments that keeps silent about human rights violations in Iran will
undermine the democratization process and weaken the secular movement.

Endnotes
1. For more details, see Abrahamian, Ervand, Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public
Recantations in Modern Iran, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.
2. American Religious Identification Survey, 2001. < http://www.trincoll.edu/Academ-
ics/AcademicResources/values/ISSSC/research/ARIS+2001.htm>.
3. Actually, there exists a mechanism in Shi’ism that lets Muslims conceal their faith
in anticipation of damage or injury. Taqiyyah becomes the norm of public behavior
when ordinary people fear the danger of being persecuted for their belief.
4. Men are distinguished from their clothing, such as wearing a tie or letting their shirt
fall loose over their pants, and the way they shave.
5. There are certain public spaces that the fundamentalists avoid, especially if they are
not segregated for men and women. The way one manages her/his leisure time is
determined, to a large extent, by how adherent one is to religious beliefs.
146 Secularism & Secularity

6. Ahmad Kasravi (1890-1946) has been a controversial figure for his direct attack on
Shi’ite clergy. He was assassinated by the clandestine Devotees of Islam (Fedaiyan-
Eslam). Except for his books on the history of Constitutional Revolution, his other
works have been banned on and off since 1946. There is a bibliography of Kasravi’s
works in Kasravi, Ahmad, On Islam and Shi’ism, trans. M.R. Ghanoonparvar, Costa
Meza: Mazda Publishers, 1990, pp. 54-57.
7. Ibid. p. 95.
8. Ibid. p. 98.
9. Quoted from an interview with Abdolkarim Soroush published in www.BBCPer-
sian.com on August 22, 2004.
10. On Islam and Shi’ism, p. 99.
11. “Religious intellectuals” consider Jamal ad-Din Asad-abadi (d. 1879) and Hadi
Najmabadi (d.1902) as the leaders of the first generation of Shi’ite modernism.
12. An Islamic oppositional guerrilla organization formed in 1965 that considered the
establishment of a classless monotheist society as its ultimate goal.
13. Ali Shariati, the twentieth century Iranian sociologist and Islamologist differenti-
ates “religion of revolution” from “religion of legitimation.” He has discussed the
difference between them in Shariati, Ali, Religion vs. Religion, trans. Laleh Bakhtiar,
Chicago: ABC International Group, 2003.
14. “If democracy is invalidating any rule that people have not voted for it, naturally
this does not reconcile with religion. Nevertheless, asking for people’s consent and
the approval of majority for realization the rules of sharia’h is acceptable in Islam.
Actually, this is what religious democracy mean.” The quotation is from Mesbah
Yazdi, an orthodox conservative theoretician well known for his opposition with
Abdolkarim Soroush. www.mesbahyazdi.com
15. For more information, see Soroush, Abdolkarim, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in
Islam, trans. Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000. Moreover, many of his ideas can be searched for in his official website at the
following address: www.drsoroush.com/English.htm
16. Nikfar, Mohammadreza, “Zaat-e yek Pendar” {Essence of a Thought} Negah e-Nou,
13: 16-27.
17. It is worth mentioning that some clergy men have also joined the debate, but
with more cautious on how far intellectualism and religion can go along together.
Mohsen Kadivar, Mojtahed Shabestari, and Yousef Eshkevari joined the debate as
soon as it started in mid 1990’s.
18. Ideas of some scholars like Burkhart, Huston Smith, and Seyed Hossein Nasr have
been translated and read in these years.
19. Malekan, Mostafa, “Ho’zeh va Donyaye Jadid”{Seminaries and the New world},
Rah-e Nou, 1(13): 18-26.
20. The Shi’ite and the Sunni scholars believe that the Islamic law has derived its sources
from the Quran, the Sunna (the model behavior of the prophet, as related in collec-
 11. Secularism in Iran 147

tions of sayings or Hadith that are in variations and localized as necessary), the Qiyas
(analogical reasoning, subject to the clergymen’s determination), and the Ijma (Con-
sensus of the community, subject to the community leaders’ determination). Shi’ism
has added a fifth element to these sources that is Ijtihad, (ongoing reinterpretation
by religious authorities of the present time).
21. The Guardianship of the Jurisconsult in the absence of the Twelfth Imam has been
asserted in the Constitution Acts of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Article 110 ex-
plains the authorities given to the Grand Juriconsult, among which is the right to
appoint the highest rank of the Judiciary, the head of the Islamic Republic Broad-
casting Agency, the head of Military, and the General Commander of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards. It should be noted that there is less dispute over the authority
of the jurist in Shi’ism, but the extent of this authority has been questioned and
the Islamic theologians and clerics have differed on the issues of the leadership and
advisory role of the jurists.
22. The reformers participated in the political power and supported the Iranian presi-
dency from 1997 until their recent defeat in 2005.
23. Kashi, Ghlolamreza, “Bohran dar Roshanfekri-eh Dini” {Crisis in Religious Intel-
lectualism} in www.nilgoon.org, p.2.
24. Sometimes the interaction between the Iranian Diaspora and those living in Iran
happens through internet, for instance this criticism can be found in correspon-
dences in Persian posted to www.Secularismforiran.com
25. This paper does not mean to assess the class combination of the seculars, religious
reformers, and official ideologues. Therefore it takes the whole Iranian society as
listeners of the debates.
26. www.BBCPersian.com has conducted a series of interviews with prominent figures
of “religious” and “non-religious” intellectuals in 2005 and 2006.
27. More information on the official policies on the youth is available at: http://www.
nyoir.org/eng/default.htm
28 The coup d’etat against Muhammad Mossadeq in 1953 designed by the CIA and
carried out by the supporters of Muhammad Reza Shah prepared the ground for 25
years of dictatorship in Iran.