THE GENERAL

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. . . a losing venture published bi-monthly, pretty close to the first day of January, March, May, July, September and November.
The General is edited and published by The Avalon Hill Con~panyalmost solely for the cultural edification of adult gaming. (It also helps to sell Avalon Hill products, tool) Articles from subscribers are considered for publication on a gratis contributory basis. Such articles must be typewritten and not exceeh 700 words. Examples and diagrams that accompany such articles must be drawn in black ink, ready for reproduction. N o notice can be given regarding acceptance of articles for publication. All back issues, except Vol. 1, Nos. 1 & 4, which 1 . O O per issue. are out of stock, are available at S Full-year subscriptions Q $4.98.
0 1966

r e a l campaign. You a r e to be c o n g r a t ulated", added the Colonel. In a l l f a i r n e s s , we f e e l that i t i s Colonel Dickson who i s to be congratulated. H i s p e r s o n a l i l l u s t r a t i o n s , photos, action s k e t c h e s and p i c t o r i a l histor y of this Island campaign a r e r e p r o duced f o r the f i r s t t i m e in L e a t h e r n e c k ' s I l l u s t r a t e d , a pamphlet t h a t i s included i n the g a m e itself. Colonel Dickson's a r t i s t i c ability i s r e f l e c t e d in the o i l painting t h a t p r o v i d e s the background you s e e in o u r p i c t u r e on the f r o n t cover. I t i s a f i r s t c l a s s a s is the m a g a z i n e that he job. e d i t s and publishes f o r the M a r i n e C o r p s .

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The T r u e P i c t u r e In Viet Nam L e a t h e r n e c k Magazine, with 100,000 p l u s circulation, i s a monthly m a g a z i n e of o v e r 90 pages. I t p r o v i d e s the only r e a l l y truthful c o m m e n t s of the Vietnam situation since the a r t i c l e s a r e w r i t t e n by M a r i n e C o r p s s o l d i e r s t h e m s e l v e s who have s e e n action t h e r e first-hand. Naturally the magazine i s w r i t t e n f o r M a r i n e C o r p s p e r s o n n e l however we f e e l t h a t i t would be of c o n s i d e r a b l e i n t e r e s t to the typical w a r game nut (like you) who is i n t e r e s t e d only i n getting to the h e a r t and c o r e of r e a l i s m . Guadalcanal i s a n official L e a t h e r n e c k bookstore i t e m and c a n a l s o be o r d e r e d d i r e c t l y f r o m L e a t h e r n e c k Magazine probably a t a l o w e r c o s t than when o r d e r e d d i r e c t l y f r o m Avalon Hill. We suggest that you w r i t e to Colonel Donald L. Dickson, c / o L e a t h e r n e c k M a g a z i n e , P.O. Box 1918, Washington. D. C. 2001 3 , f o r s u b s c r i p t i o n and individual copy c o s t s .

The Avalon Hill Company, Baltimore, Maryland. printed in U.S.A.

Cover Story.. .
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"I Was Blown to Bits. ..

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. b y the Japanese r i g h t h e r e o n Guadalcanal, " joshes Colonel Dickson to Avalon Hill personnel: A. E r i c Dott, Vice P r e s i d e n t ; T o m Shaw. Marketing D i r e c t o r and E d Adams, Publicity Dir e c t o r . Colonel Dickson points to the spot w h e r e h i s outfit w a s often pinned down by c o n s t a n t b a r r a g e of J a p a n e s e off-shore shelling. "This shelling n e v e r r e a l l y h u r t anyone, r e l a t i v e l y speaking of c o u r s e , but i t s u r e didn't help o u r m o r a l e any", s t a t e d the Colonel who supplied the Avalon Hill d e s i g n staff with m u c h h i s t o r i c a l d a t a d u r i n g the game's d e s i g n stages. Colonel Dickson proved quite a n authority o n the subject. He landed on opening day, h i m s e l f , and r a i s e d the f i r s t A m e r i c a n F l a g o n the Island. After a s s i m i l a t i o n of h i s p e r s o n a l obs e r v a t i o n s AvalonHill c a m e to the conclusion that the J a p a n e s e should have won. "Darn r i g h t they should have won, ' I commented Colonel Dickson. "But the Japanese w e r e a s i l l p r e p a r e d f o r jungle c o m b a t a s we w e r e ; we s i m p l y adjusted to conditions a l o t better", he f u r t h e r stated. "Those l i t t l e J a p s o l d i e r s w e r e r e a l tough to find i n the jungle but we o v e r c a m e this deficiency by n o t p a n i c k ing, and m o r e i m p o r t a n t , by taking advantage of the f a c t t h a t the J a p s s i m p l y couldn't organize. They w e r e f o r e v e r changing t h e i r m i n d s i n m i d - s t r e a m . I m i g h t add t h a t you fellows a t AvalonHill c e r t a i n l y w e r e n ' t i n m i d - s t r e a m when i t c a m e to producing s u c h a splendid game i n Guadalcanal. You have r e c a p t u r e d a l l the i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t s , even the psychological a s p e c t s of the

s e t s up with h i s and A m e r i c a n units a s they a p p e a r . Movement P r o c e d u r e : 1 ) A m e r i c a n b r i n g s h i s t r o o p s on b o a r d , d e c l a r i n g exact u n i t s and calling out m o v e m e n t , s q u a r e - b y - s q u a r e . Jap d u p l i c a t e s t h i s on h i s b o a r d a s g r i d coo r d i n a t e s a r e called out. 2 ) All b a t t l e s a r e r e s o l v e d . I t ' s e a s i e s t t o just l e t the guy r o l l and have h i m t e l l you the r e s u l t , but if you don't t r u s t h i m , r o l l t h e die on the floor so both c a n s e e . 3 ) J a p player move without telling A m e r i c a n l o c a t i o n s of a n y units except t h o s e i n open ( a s s u m i n g A m e r i c a n h a s H F ) . The Jap m u s t t e l l location of u n i t s a s they a r r i v e ; f r o m what square they originally move. 4 ) All b a t t l e s a r e r e s o l v e d . 5 ) Check t h e box, compute points, repeat T h i s m a k e s i t possible f o r the Jap t o t e l l a t a glance a t h i s b o a r d if a n A m e r i c a n unit h a s bumped into him. The s y s t e m a l s o provides f o r a continuous g a m e without a constant up-anddown a c t i o n on the A m e r i c a n ' s part. A s a suggestion f o r even m o r e of the l i m i t e d intelligence: don't have the A m e r i c a n t e l l what u n i t s a r e moving, only f o r instance, "2 u n i t s moving f r o m s q u a r e a to s q u a r e b . " T h i s provides f o r t h e m o s t p r a c t i c a l , 2-player limited intelligence g a m e y e t devised. C o m m e n t s to: Kenneth Hoffman, 266 C a r r o l l St., New Bedford, M a s s . 02740.

Results of AH Survey
H e r e a r e the final tabulations of the s u r v e y solicited in the May i s s u e . These results will largely determine what f u t u r e t i t l e s Avalon Hill will design and publish. Title Guns of August Jutland Battle of B r i t a i n Korea Vietnam Guerilla Warfare Basketball S t r a t e g y Shakespeare P e r c e n t a g e of Votes

Fast Hidden Movement for Guadalcanal

by R o b e r t Dieli and Kenneth Hoffman One of the g r e a t e s t stumbling blocks i n GUADALCANAL1s excellent Hidden Movement r u l e i s i t s ability t o take up a g r e a t e x c e s s of t i m e . H e r e a r e the r e q u i r e m e n t s and p r o c e d u r e f o r a f a s t e r hidden movement game: 1 ) 2 complete GUADALCANAL s e t s 2 ) two 44 X 14 b o a r d s ( s u c h a s AK o r DISPATCHER) o r a n o t h e r suitable screen 3) 2 O ~ p o n e n t s who t r u s t e a c h o t h e r (extremely r a r e ) Procedure The 2 b o a r d s a r e s e t up opposite each o t h e r , e a c h player with a complete OB f o r both A m e r i c a n and J a p t r o o p s . With people of a v e r a g e height, the s c r e e n will exclude any view of the o t h e r p l a y e r ' s b o a r d . The J a p player

Games Survey
by Donald Greenwood Due to a l a c k of such a r t i c l e s i n the G e n e r a l p r e v i o u s l y I have been prompted to s u b m i t the following. Below i s a l i s t of Avalon H i l l ' s 22 g a m e s in the o r d e r of t h e i r p e r c e n t a g e of ownership. To come up with t h i s r e s u l t I took m y p e r sonal r e c o r d s of m y P B M a s s o c i a t e s and o t h e r s o u r c e s and c a m e up with exactly 100 garners. The percentage following the n a m e of the g a m e is the

THE GENERAL
number of such g a m e s found i n e v e r y 100 w a r g a m e r s , a c c o r d i n g to m y s u r vey. Although t h i s i s not completely a c c u r a t e i t should give a f a i r l y a c c u r a t e p i c t u r e of which g a m e s the t r u e g a m e f a n a t i c s keep d e a r to t h e i r bedside. One must remember that this survey was taken among P B M w a r g a m e r s s o t h a t the non P B M and r e c e n t l y r e l e a s e d t i t l e s cdme up with a poor showing. But a l l in a l l the following i s a p r e t t y c l e a r p i c t u r e of what the P B M g a m e r needs. Stalingrad Afrika K o r p s D-Day T a c t i c s I1 Getty s b u r g Waterloo Battle of the Bulge Bismarck Midway Blitzkrieg U-Boat Chancellor s v i l l e Football S t r a t e g y Baseball Strategy Guadalcanal LeMans Civil War Dispatcher V e r d i c t I1 Nieuche s s $quander Word P o w e r Notice t h a t d e s p i t e i t s l a c k of play balance Stalingrad is a t the top of the heap. C o m m e n t s show that d e s p i t e the above p e r c e n t a g e s . F o o t b a l l , B a s e b a l l , D-Day and Midway p r e s e n t the m o s t e x citing, e v e n g a m e s . Any c o m m e n t s should be a d d r e s s e d to Donald G r e e n wood. 128 W a r r e n St., S a y r e , P a . AH COMMENT: Thanks a lot, Don. Your s u r v e y i s a c c u r a t e enough e x c e p t f o r Stalingrad and Blitzkrieg. While proving to be the popular s u b j e c t of "General" a r t i c l e s , S t a l i n g r a d ' s s a l e s off the counter have n e v e r c a u s e d o u r s a l e s m a n a g e r to do c a r t w h e e l s and h a n d s p r i n g s of joy. We g u e s s that i t i s popular only by the h a r d - c o r e , g a m e nut who s e e s quite a challenge i n taking the G e r m a n side. On the o t h e r side, Blitzkrieg h a s been the m o s t wellr e c e i v e d g a m e y e t introduced.. I t e v e n o u t s e l l s Guadalcanal which i s quite unusual i n a s m u c h a s the n e w e s t title always s e l l s the b e s t during i t s i n t r o duction y e a r . Of the g a m e s that have been o n the m a r k e t 2 y e a r s o r m o r e , those t h a t have held the b e s t sustaining i n t e r e s t a r e D-Day, T a c t i c s I1 and Football Strategy. complexity, and e s p e c i a l l y the m u l t i player gaming g r o u p s whose talented a d m i r a l e a r e sulking while t h e g e n e r a l s and a i r m a r s h a l l s a r e c o r n e r i n g a l l the g l o r y i n B l i t z k r i e g , h e r e i s a suggestion f o r optional r u l e s that provide that m i s s i n g dimension, the w a r a t s e a . It i s n e c e s s a r y t o add a few e x t r a counte r s , I suggest adapting c o u n t e r s f r o m Midway and B i s m a r c k , but you can just a s e a s i l y make your own. The only n e c e s s a r y addition to the b o a r d i s i m a g i n a r y - - simply a s s u m e t h a t the Zones (A through E ) that e x i s t on the p r e s e n t b o a r d extend indefinitely out f r o m i t s edges. I suggest t h a t a f l e e t c b n s i s t of t h e following v e s s e l s , and that both s i d e s have identical f l e e t s : 2 a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s which have no combat f a c t o r o t h e r than t h e a i r c r a f t which they c a r r y , the m a x i m u m complement f o r one c a r r i e r should be a total of 4 f a c t o r s of TAC a n d / o r F T R , no MDM o r SAC. T h e s e a r e a s s i g n e d f r o m the r e g u l a r a i r power a l l o t m e n t . They can, of c o u r s e , s t i l l fly r e g u l a r ground support m i s s i o n s , a c c o r d i n g t o the u s u a l r u l e s , f r o m t h e i r c a r r i e r b a s e s . The only r u l e modification r e q u i r e d i s that when flying m i s s i o n s a g a i n s t naval t a r g e t s , and naval t a r g e t s only (i.e. o t h e r s h i p s ) , the TAC i s allowed t o s t r i k e alone without being i n support of o t h e r u n i t s . T h r e e b a t t l e s h i p s p e r side i s a f a i r allowance. T h e s e have a n o r m a l c o m b a t f a c t o r of two and a s e c o n d a r y zone (like a r t i l l e r y in C h a n c e l l o r s v i l l e ) in which they have a f a c t o r of one. T h e r e should a l s o be t e n o r s o c r u i s e r s with a combat f a c t o r of one and no s e c o n d a r y zone. T h i s c o m p l e t e s t h e l i s t of ship t y p e s and t h e i r capabilities, except f o r t r o o p t r a n s p o r t s , which do not e x i s t a s s e p a r a t e c o u n t e r s but a r e r e p r e s e n t e d by r e g u l a r t r o o p c o u n t e r s which a r e placed on s e a s q u a r e s in a c c o r d a n c e with the r e g u l a r 40-factor l i m i t a t i o n on s e a movement. Movement T h e r e a r e two w a y s t o move. One i s in the r e g u l a r m a n n e r , f r o m s q u a r e to s q u a r e , i n which c a s e the movement f a c t o r f o r a l l t y p e s of v e s s e l s i s 20 s q u a r e s p e r t u r n . T h i s , of c o u r s e , m u s t s u p e r s e d e the r e g u l a r r u l e about s e a movement f r o m zone to zone. T h e second way i s t o move a t the r e g u l a r r a t e until the move c a r r i e s your p i e c e s off the edge of t h e board. Then you have t h r e e options: you c a n r e m a i n in t h e zone f r o m which you l e f t the b o a r d , o r you m a y move to e i t h e r adjacent zone. R e m e m b e r the i m a g i n a r y extens i o n s of the z o n e s ! R e c o r d the zone you a r e in on a s l i p of p a p e r so that you c a n prove i t t o your opponent l a t e r . In subsequent t u r n s you may p r o c e e d to e i t h e r a d j a c e n t zone, movement p r o ceeding one zone p e r t u r n . F l e e t s may split up, join, e t c . , so long a s a p r o p e r r e c o r d i s kept of the zone location of e a c h ship. Ships a r e brought back when d e s i r e d t o a n y s q u a r e on the edge of the b o a r d in the zone which they w e r e in on the preceding t u r n . F o r example, a ship could l e a v e the b o a r d f r o m zone A and p r o c e e d t o zone B i n one t u r n . The next t u r n it could r e t u r n td the b o a r d on a n y s q u a r e in zone B, o r r e m a i n off t h e b o a r d and move t o e i t h e r zone A o r C o r r e m a i n off the b o a r d i n Zone B: When a ship r e t u r n s to the b o a r d i t c a n p r o c e e d i n that t u r n a t the r e g u l a r 20 s q u a r e r a t e . The only r e s t r i c t i o n i s that amphibious invasions that t u r n a r e r e s t r i c t e d t o the zone to which the s h i p s r e t u r n e d . Combat Any n u m b e r of naval u n i t s may be stacked on one s q u a r e . Sea b a t t l e s on t h e b o a r d a r e fought in the s a m e way a s land b a t t l e s , using the T o u r n a m e n t A t t r i t i o n Table. The defender i n any engagement i s , however, allowed to a t t e m p t t o e s c a p e without fighting. To a c c o m p l i s h t h i s he r o l l s the d i e , if he rolls 1 o r 2 the escape i s successful and he m o v e s off t h e b o a r d in the m a n n e r d e s c r i b e d above. Sea b a t t l e s may, a l s o be fought with u n i t s off the b o a r d . In t h i s c a s e the a t t a c k e r a l s o m o v e s h i s units off the b o a r d . T o s e a r c h he c a l l s out the zones i n which he h a s ships. If the defender a l s o h a s v e s s e l s i n that a r e a he r e p l y s by showing the p r o p e r portion of h i s ship location r e c o r d s . The defender m a y t h e n a t t e m p t to e s c a p e i f he wishes, but t h i s t i m e the odds f o r e s c a p e a r e b e t t e r . 1, 2, 3 , o r 4 s p e l l s s u c c e s s , s i n c e c h a n c e s f o r e s c a p e would naturally b e b e t t e r on the high s e a s than.in coastal waters. Special P r o v i s i o n s F o r T r o o p Convoys T r o o p convoys m a y not r e m a i n a t s e a i n a zone in which the enemy h a s naval combat f a c t o r s , including c a r r i e r a i r c r a f t , totaling m o r e than half the f r i e n d l y naval combat f a c t o r s in that zone. If, f o r e x a m p l e , Blue h a s a batt l e s h i p and t h r e e c r u i s e r s ( 5 f a c t o r s ) with a t r o o p convoy in Zone C and R e d m o v e s t h r e e c r u i s e r s ( 3 f a c t o r s ) into that zone, even though Red d o e s not a t t a c k , Blue m u s t e i t h e r : 1 ) Remove the o a n o t h e r zone, o r land them, troops : 2 ) b r i n g a unit of a t l e a s t one naval f a c t o r into the zone o r 3) a t t a c k R e d ' s f l e e t and r e d u c e t h e m t o half o r l e s s of B l u e ' s total. If i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o fulf i l l t h e s e conditions, o r if Blue a t t a c k s a n d f a i l s to r e d u c e R e d ' s f o r c e , then B l u e ' s land u n i t s a t s e a l o s e one comb a t f a c t o r f o r e v e r y naval combat f a c t o r R e d h a s in the Zone.

Navies for Blitzkrieg

by John E. Dotson F o r t h o s e a m o n g u s who t h r i v e on

THE GENERAL
(the City C a p t u r e T a b l e m u s t b e u s e d ) , the m a j o r power moving l o s e s two c o m bat f a c t o r s . A s a n e x a m p l e , s a y Blue h a s captured a l l the c i t i e s , and R e d on h i s t u r n e n t e r s the country. R e d l o s e s two f a c t o r s on that t u r n , but Blue l o s e s nothing since he a l r e a d y had c a p t u r e d a l l the c i t i e s . All f a c t o r s l o s t m u s t of c o u r s e c o m e f r o m units in the country. I f e e l the addition of a l l i a n c e and neutrality a d d s much t o the g a m e , and m a k e s f o r a g r e a t d e a l of v a r i e t y in possible situations. The Initial P l a c e m e n t T a b l e below puts the bulk of the n e u t r a l a r m i e s i n the i m p o r t a n t c i t i e s , but a l a r g e p r o portion of the f o r c e s a r e a l s o in position on the f r o n t i e r s and by i m p o r t a n t r o a d ways to s c r e e n t h e i n t e r i o r . Neutral Country Initial P l a c e m e n t Table Yellow: M-14 112-3; U-11 112-3; V-20 313-3; X-27 112-3; CC-15 114-6, 212-3; EE-25 413-6, TAC, MDM, F T R ; P - 1 0 112-3; T-17 112-3; U-23 112-3 White: VV-25 312-2, TAC; WW-32 313-5, 112-6; UU-37 312-2; BBB-28 112-2; AAA-32 112-2; XX-34 112-2; RR-36 112-2; UU-38 112-2 Brown: HH-31 213-6; NN-33 213-3, F T R , TAC; 0 0 - 3 0 113-3; NN 36 113-3; OQ-35 113-3; JJ-28 113-3 Green: E E - 3 4 313-4, TAC; BB-31 412-4, F T R , MDM; CC-39 113-4; AA-42 113-4; X-22 112-4; - B B - 2 9 115-6, 213-6; CC-28 112-4; E E - 3 0 113-4; HH-35 113-6 Black: JJ-46 112-3; J J - 3 8 213-4, MDM, 1 F T R ; 0 0 - 4 0 , 1 1 5 - 6 , 114-6, 113-6, TAC, 1 FTR VV-42 313-5; F F - 4 2 113-4; LL-46 116-3-4 P l e a s e send a l l c o m m e n t s a n d / o r r e c r i m i n a t i o n s t o Steve L i s t , 4 C r a n f o r d Road, Plainview, New York 11803. Under the o r i g i n a l r u l e s , BULGE w a s heavily weighted in f a v o r of the G e r m a n s ; s o m e type of r e v i s i o n w a s obviously n e c e s s a r y , and AH, f o r once, exhibited e x c e l l e n t judgment i n the changes they made. W h e r e a s BULGE used to be m e r e l y a n e x e r c i s e of p u r e f o r c e by the G e r m a n s , i t i s now a g a m e r e q u i r i n g t a c t i c a l f i n e s s e , good s t r a t e g y and a good d e a l of boldness. I t i s now axiomatic f o r the G e r m a n s in BULGE t h a t "INITIATIVE EQUALS FORWARD IMPETUS. I t A s long a s the a x i s of advance i s f o r w a r d and outward, the A m e r i c a n s will be unable to find t i m e to m a k e a f i r m stand and stop the G e r m a n advance. It i s i m p e r a t i v e f o r the G e r m a n s to keep the battle fluid, and n e v e r give the A m e r i c a n s bn opportunity to stiffen into a solid line of r e sistance. The e s s e n c e of the B l i t z k r i e g Tactic is: "NOFLANKS! L E T THE PANZERS RUN!" The G e r m a n s m u s t flow endl e s s l y f o r w a r d , a r i v e r of a r m o r , sweeping weak r e s i s t a n c e b e f o r e t h e m and bypassing strongpoints. If heavy A m e r i c a n f o r c e s c a n be "fixed" by p a n z e r f o r c e s engaging a t 3 - 1 o r 4-1 i n one turn, they c a n be b y p a s s e d and l e f t f o r infantry following the p a n z e r a r m i e s to d e a l with a t 2-1, 1-1, o r e v e n 1 - 2 i n s u c c e s s i v e turns. A s long a s the p a n z e r f o r c e s continue to move f o r w a r d , gaining ground, s u r r o u n d i n g and fixing e n e m y troops, and s h a t t e r i n g defensive positions, always heading outw a r d s , the A m e r i c a n s c a n afford no large- scale operations a g a i n s t the G e r m a n r e a r a r e a s . Unless the s p e a r head c a n be blunted, the haft cannot be attacked safely. Using t h e s e t a c t i c s , i t i s not unusual f o r Bastogne to f a l l by the seventh o r eighth turn, with no f u r t h e r r e s i s t a n c e feasible. In a typical game, played a t W a r l o r d s , Inc. HQ h e r e i n Japan, Bastogne f e l l o n 19 AM, under the following conditions: twelve A m e r i c a n r e g i m e n t s d e s t r o y e d , eight c u t off by m a s s e s of G e r m a n infantry a dozen s q u a r e s behind the f r o n t l i n e s , s e v e n r e g i m e n t s engaged and fixed by a r m o r on the o u t s k i r t s of Bastogne and along the Outhre River--leaving in a l l only fifteen A m e r i c a n r e g i m e n t s i n the e n t i r e A r d e n n e s s e c t o r f r e e f o r action. G e r m a n c a s u a l t i e s totalled t h r e e Volksg r e n a d i e r r e g i m e n t s , one p a r a c h u t e r e g i m e n t , and one heavy p a n z e r r e g i ment. In s u c c e s s i v e t u r n s , the A m e r i c a n units t r a p p e d behind G e r m a n l i n e s succumbed gradually to the c e a s e l e s s 2-1 a t t a c k s by G e r m a n infantry and finally dwindled away. Leaving t h r e e divisions of V o l k s g r e n a d i e r s behind in the south, and detailing a l l r e i n f o r c e m e n t s f r o m 20 AM o n a s r e s e r v e s to p r o t e c t h i s l i n e s of communication, the German commander regrouped his f o r c e s and s m a s h e d o n w a r d s to the Meuse, which w a s successfully b r e a c h e d on 20 PM. In d e s p e r a t i o n , the A m e r i c a n s c o m m i t t e d t h e i r 22 AM r e i n f o r c e m e n t s d e e p o n the s o u t h e r n flank of the G e r m a n salient, but b e c a m e hopelessly involved with the V o l k s g r e n a d i e r s and P a n z e r g r e n a d i e r s l e f t behind a s flank guards. The battle ended, a decisive G e r m a n victory, o n 23 PM. Too many G e r m a n p l a y e r s s e e m unable to m a s t e r the subtle challenge of breakthrough t a c t i c s ; they become greedy, a n d d i v e r t the heavy p a n z e r units into time-consuming b a t t l e s of annihilation with i s o l a t e d A m e r i c a n units. Time is of the e s s e n c e to the G e r m a n s , and being s u r e of a quick "kill" d o e s not justify the tactically i m p r o p e r u s e of the vitally i m p o r t a n t p a n z e r t r o o p s - -for the p a n z e r units a r e fast, a s well a s heavy, and t h e r e i n l i e s t h e i r g r e a t e s t t h r e a t to the A m e r i c a n s . If the p a n z e r f o r c e s a r e u s e d p r o p e r l y , the A m e r i c a n s n e v e r g e t to d r a w the G e r m a n s into those crowded, t e r r i b l y a t t r i t i v e b a t t l e s in and a r o u n d m a s s e s of f o r t s and fortific a t i o n s that so often have proved the downfall of the G e r m a n offensive. Please a d a r e s s all commentslquestions to: Scott C. Berschig, CMR Box 1878, APO San F r a n c i s c o 96328.

Bulge: View from Berlin

by B r i a n Libby General Strategy The b a s i c G e r m a n s t r a t e g y in Bulge i s t o advance t o the Meuse R i v e r and c a p t u r e St. Vith, Bastogne, and Spa. Using the l a t e s t r u l e s ( a l l r u l e s except one-way t r a f f i c , deleted b e c a u s e i t just fouls things up, and the w e a t h e r v a r i a b l e ( g e n e r a l s c a n ' t r e a l l y control w e a t h e r ) , t h i s can b e v e r y difficult; a b s o r b i n g t h i s a r t i c l e m a y well enable the G e r m a n to h a s t e n h i s advance. The c u r r e n t p r a c t i c e of a m a s s i v e push between Wiltz and Houffalize with a l l a r m o r i s not n e c e s s a r i l y the b e s t policy. Using the second SS P a n z e r C o r p s (2SS & 12SS divs. ) to a t t a c k due w e s t of V i e l s a l m a n d / o r north t o T r o i s P o n t s will a t l e a s t f o r c e the A m e r i c a n s t o put r e i n f o r c e m e n t s into t h e s e a r e a s , and may c r a c k the whole f i r s t l i n e if t h e A m i s funnel a l l the r e i n f o r c e m e n t s south t o m e e t t h e m a i n t h r u s t , which should indeed be m a d e toward Houffalize with a l l the o t h e r a r m o r except the r e s e r v e s ( s e e T a c t i c s , below. ) Spa should not b e a s s a u l t e d directly; i t w i l l f a l l "by default" when t h e A m e r i c a n s pull b a c k t o t h e woods west of Rochefort, M a r c h e , and Werbomont, a s they m u s t when L a Roche, m a i n object a f t e r Houffalize, f a l l s . Bastogne can usually be taken by a combination f r o n t a l and south-we s t f r o m Houffalize a s s a u l t .

Back to the Bulge

by Scott G. B e r s c h i g Despite the advent of BLITZKRIEG, Battle of the Bulge i s s t i l l queen of the AH battle games. In m a n y w a r g a m i n g c i r c l e s these days, t h e r e is s t r o n g s k e p t i c i s m that the G e r m a n s have any chance a t v i c t o r y with a l l of the r e vised andoptional r u l e s in effect. Howe v e r , much of t h i s s k e p t i c i s m i s e x p r e s s e d by individuals who have been unable to m a k e the t r a n s i t i o n i n G e r m a n s t r a t e g y and t a c t i c s n e c e s s i t a t e d by the r u l e s r e v i s i o n s .

THE GENERAL
Sedan, M e z i e r e s , a n d / o r Montherme should be taken t o d e l a y A m e r i c a n r e i n f o r c e m e n t s coming a r o u n d through Dinant. However, a m a i n effort i n t h e south-west is not a d v i s a b l e b e c a u s e i t i s e a s i l y c u t off. Tactics The G e r m a n F e l d h e r r should r e m e m b e r that a r m o r i s not m a d e f o r b a t t e r i n g a t f o r t r e s s e s (except w h e r e i t i s unavoidable a n d a t t h e R o c h e f o r t , M a r c h e , and Werbomont bottlenecks. ) When he c o m e s t o a f o r t i f i e d c r o s s r o a d o r city, the m o d e r n F u h r e r should not b e held up f o r many moons; he should a t t a c k the place a t 2- 1 odds with infantry while sending the a r m o r a r o u n d and into the A m i s . In t h e v a s t m a j o r i t y of c a s e s , the f o r t r e s s will f a l l i n two o r t h r e e t u r n s with no l o s s t o t h e h e r renvolk, and the a r m o r c a n a l m o s t a l ways m a n a g e t o find a supply r o u t e seven s q u a r e s away. F r e q u e n t l y , the m o d e r n M a r s h a l Model puts a l l h i s t r o o p s into battle; t h i s is i n c o r r e c t . A f t e r 20 A. M . , t h e G e r m a n player h a s enough a r m o r t o put one o r two d i v i s i o n s i n r e s e r v e in, f o r i n s t a n c e , Houffalize o r Hotton c l o s e enough t o b e shifted t o a n a r e a r e q u i r i n g a l i t t l e e x t r a p r e s s u r e , but f a r enough behind t h e l i n e s s o a s not to b e engaged i n battle. When a t t h e Meuse bottlenecks, h e c a n u s e s o m e a r m o r to b a t t e r h i s way through t h e fortifications and f o r t r e s s e s , a n d s a v e o t h e r a r m o r t o exploit t h e a r e a s w h e r e a hole is f i r s t made. When a hole i s made, r e m e m b e r t o completely s u r r o u n d bypassed f o r t r e s s e s - otherwise a n A m e r i c a n unit c a n pop out a n d cut a supply l i n e . In t h e south, the r e s u r r e c t e d Rundstedt should build f o r t i f i c a t i o n s (not f o r t r e s s e s ) j u s t n o r t h of Diekirch a n d Martelange (defending t h e c i t i e s p r o p e r leads to encirclement), and protect a l l i m p o r t a n t r o a d s leading into h i s l i n e s . In the n o r t h , Spa c a n be abandoned if n e c e s s a r y , but defend t h e l i n e E l s e n born-Aywaille-Ourthe. E x a c t conduct of both f l a n k b a t t l e s , if they m a t e r i a l i z e , depends o n t h e weight a n d d i r e c t i o n of Ami thrusts. F i r s t Turns The G e r m a n should, I think, get a 6- 1 a g a i n s t NN-25, a 5- 1 a g a i n s t 0 0 - 2 7 , a 1- 1 a g a i n s t T T - 3 1 (to cut off t h e 4th div. ), and a 1- 1 a g a i n s t R R - 9 ; t h e s e a r e key a t t a c k s - t h e o t h e r s a r e up t o the individual. Clervaux should b e s m a s h e d - t h i s i s , p e r h a p s , t h e only t i m e when a r m o r should b e delayed - but d o i t with inf a n t r y if possible. I don't a d v i s e attacking t h e a r m o r e d c a v a l r y in t h e f o r t r e s s . Timetable Below is a t i m e t a b l e which i s a c o m posite of the r e c o r d s of 17 Bulge g a m e s . It can s e r v e a s a rough c h a r t on G e r m a n p r o g r e s s . If the F e l d h e r r i s v e r y f a r behind i t , h e ' l l no doubt l o s e : St. Vith- l 6 P M o r 17AM Houffalize- 18PM L a Roche- 19PM Bastogne- 19AM Conclusion The G e r m a n a t t a c k i s difficult; the odds a r e a g a i n s t a G e r m a n victory. If he wins 5070 of h i s g a m e s , t h e G e r m a n i s good. T h i s a r t i c l e h a s t r i e d to view and s e t f o r t h the m o s t advantageous Nazi a t t a c k plans. Any c o m m e n t s o r c o n s t r u c t i v e c r i t i c i s m would be v e r y g r e a t l y a p p r e c i a t e d . B r i a n Libby, 16 William St. , P o r t l a n d , Maine 041 03. whole unit i n evacuation and s e a t r a n s f e r . In t h e s e c a s e s one unit c a n be designated a s 60 p a r t s (113 square). Steve Torkelson, 619 Leo Drive, Santa Rosa, Calif. 95401.

Message from the AH1KS

THE AVALON HILL Intercontinental K r i e g s p i e l Society forthrightly s t a t e s that it i s unique! T h i s s t a t e m e n t i s not m a d e , b e c a u s e we a r e a Play-by-Mail group, f o r t h e r e a r e s e v e r a l of t h e s e a l r e a d y existing, and s o m e of t h e m a r e v e r y good. I s it b e c a u s e , a s p a r t of o u r i n t e r n a l competition, we r a t e the ability of o u r m e m b e r s ? Once again, no. It i s b e c a u s e we a r e a group of adults banded together with a belief that, a s t h e P r e a m b l e t o the AHIKS Constitution s t a t e s , "adults s h a r e a community of i n t e r e s t s . . . . . ' I Nor i s t h i s our only c l a i m t o uniqueness. Banished a r e p i l e s of collected stock m a r k e t clippings, gone a r e q u e s t i o n s of t h e i r authenticity, forgotten is the wait f o r "that c e r t a i n date" t o r e s o l v e a battle, s t o r e d away i s the die-throwing cup. The Individual Combat Resolution Key (ICRK) - pion e e r e d and developed by AHIKS - i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s . Our m e m b e r s a r e i s s u e d a r e g i s t e r e d ICRK f o r each and e v e r y s e t of g a m e s they play. And, not to b e forgotten i s a n o t h e r a r e a of difference: To the b e s t of o u r knowledge, o u r s i s the only Avalon Hill c e n t e r e d c o r r e s p o n d e n c e group to go out of i t s way t o a t t r a c t p l a y e r s f r o m foreign lands. T h e s e , then, a r e t h e r e a s o n s why we believe that we a r e unique. We make no c l a i m s t o g r e a t n e s s , t o having m a s s e s of m e m b e r s , n o r t o a l l - i n c l u s i v e n e s s . We m a k e no s e c r e t of it: We a r e r e s t r i c t i v e . Our m e m b e r s h i p is composed of, and r e s t r i c t e d to, those who a r e a d u l t s , t h o s e who have a steady job o r profession, t h o s e who a r e lastingly s e r i o u s about t h e i r hobby. AHIKS IN THE FAR EAST S/SGT CHRIS R. WAGNER, Box 6008, A P O San F r a n c i s c o , h a s been appointed a s AHIKS R e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o r the F a r E a s t . SISGT. Wagner, a v e r y e n t h u s i a s t i c and well i n f o r m e d Avalon Hill w a r g a m e r , will t r y to r e c r u i t new m e m b e r s i n Japan. GUADALCANAL DEFENSE F I R E AHIKS HAS DEVISED a p r o c e d u r e that m a k e s i t possible t o u s e the defense f i r e ruling i n a m a i l g a m e , without having t o r e t u r n the opponent's battle sheet twice. A r t i l l e r y units m u s t be f i r e d i n a p r e - d e t e r m i n e d sequence, s t a r t i n g with the one on the l o w e s t g r i d s q u a r e , and r e s u l t s a r e taken f r o m the selected

GuadalcanalCombat Power by Steve Torkelson

F i r s t I would like to s a y that Guada l c a n a l i s a n e x c e l l e n t g a m e f o r enjoym e n t and i t i s v e r y a c c u r a t e h i s t o r i c a l l y . The unique Casualty Table provides the ultimate in t a c t i c s and s t r a t e g y . Howe v e r the C a s u a l t y Table b r i n g s about a p r o b l e m in Guadalcanal. The r u l e s insinuate t h a t a unit, any s t r e n g t h o r s i z e , fully o c c u p i e s 113 of a s q u a r e ( t h r e e units p e r s q u a r e ) . T h i s r u l e , I feel, i s i n a c c u r a t e b e c a u s e of the following r e a s o n s ; ( 1 ) Many of the units a r e originally different i n s i z e s a c c o r d ing to manpower and weapons and ( 2 ) the C a s u a l t y Table m a y r e d u c e the units to one f a c t o r and s t i l l they will be t r e a t e d a s one unit.

A New Rule
After s o m e r e s e a r c h on the s u b j e c t of Guadalcanal. I have c o m e up with a workable r u l e f o r the m a x i m u m s t r e n g t h potential allowed i n a single s q u a r e . 1. Both p l a y e r s a r e allowed to combine units of any kind in a s t a c k totaling up to 180 p a r t s . a. One f a c t o r of the M a r i n e infant r y contains 12 p a r t s . b. One f a c t o r of n o r m a l infantry (U. S. & J a p ) contains 15 p a r t s . c. One f a c t o r of a l l a r t i l l e r y and specialized units (engineers, pioneers, etc. ) contains 20 parts. You w i l l notice t h a t a m o r e p o w e r ful s t a c k of m a r i n e s c a n be m a d e than a r m y . In r e a l i t y , the s t r e n g t h d i f f e r ence is b e c a u s e of the s u p e r i o r i t y of the m a r i n e s . Also the two J a p a r t i l l e r y s e c t i o n s no longer u s e 113 of a s q u a r e . Different than before, one f a c t o r of a unit i s no l o n g e r a s i m p o r t a n t a s the

PAGE 7
column of the d e f e n d e r ' s Individual Combat Resolution Key. F u r t h e r m o r e , M r . J. K. N o r r i s , AHIKS Representative in Great B r i t a i n , has found a way to apply hidden Japanese movement in correspondence g a m e s . This method depends on an honor s y s t e m , however, and may be used upon mutual consent in official AHIKS g a m e s . MEMBERSHIP APPLICATIONS Adult Avalon Hill w a r g a m e r s , that would like to join the Avalon Hill I n t e r continental Kriegspiel Society, a r e invited to send f o r a n application blank and a copy of the AHIKS Constitution to AHIKS, P.O. Box 809, F r e e h o l d , N. J. vulnerable in your disposition should be unimportant; beyond your opponent's range to s t r i k e , o r a t l e a s t beyond h i s immediate capability to do anything decisive about it; o r , a s an invitation f o r h i m to defeat you in detail. You have to know the various movement r u l e s of the game and r e a l i z e the importance of anything that m a k e s f o r o r r e d u c e s rapid movement on the gameboard. A s f a r a s the t e r r a i n i t self i s concerned, l i n e s of communications; c i t i e s that a r e communications c e n t e r s such a s p o r t s , c r o s s r o a d s o r a i r d r o m e s ; and t e r r a i n b a r r i e r s such a s f o r e s t s , r i v e r s , swamps, l a k e s and rough t e r r a i n , a r e important tools. With r e s p e c t to f o r c e s available, you m u s t make b e s t u s e of combinations of movement f a c t o r s , such a s a i r and s e a movement possibilities. In those g a m e s where i t i s a f a c t o r , even the weather b e c o m e s a consideration for movement or mass. T o a r r i v e a t the Time-Distance F a c t o r , you consider the number of t u r n s ( t i m e ) i t should take you to move any unit o r stack to anyplace on the b o a r d ( d i s t a n c e ) that you might be int e r e s t e d in. H e r e i s how you can calculate it: Distance to d e s i r e d point in number of squares A;erage Movement Rate to desired point, (including normal, restricted and bonus )

THE GENERAL
develop what professional s o l d i e r s call the "calibrated eyeball" where you can look a t the gameboard and do the whole thing rapidly in your head with acceptable a c c u r a c y . But you have to develop the thinking p r o c e s s e s properly before you can t r u s t your "calibrated eyeball". In effect, the Time-Distance F a c t o r properly utilized m e a n s that you operate f r o m places where you can maximize your own movement f a c t o r s to suit the situation and deny this to the enemy. A frequent by-product of this i s s u r p r i s e , even against the most competent of opponents. Napoleon's formula for victory was a r e m a r k a b l y simple m a s t e r y of t h i s f a c t o r . The ability to move rapidly, unite h i s f o r c e s and s t r i k e quickly was h i s motto. Because he did not do this a t Waterloo, he l o s t . Since your opponent h a s only to study the gameboard to d e t e r m i n e your dispositions and capabilities, you must play the Time-Distance F a c t o r with a n eye toward confusing him. As you can s e e , a g r e a t deal of detail thinking i s n e c e s s a r y . You m u s t plan ahead, s e e a l l the possibilities and have your objectives thought out. If your opponent i s the a g g r e s s o r , i t s o m e t i m e s happens that he will come where you a r e seak, even over the m o r e difficult t e r r a i n . The m o r e he commits himself to this c o u r s e of action the m o r e you gain Time-Distance superiority until he b r e a k s out. You may be able to capitalize on t h i s and immobilize him still more. In connection with this concept, we have h e a r d the t e r m s "interior lines of comm~nications'~versu "exterior s lines of communications" kicked around. They r e l a t e closely to the Time-Distance F a c t o r . When you a r e operating on int e r i o r l i n e s of communications you tend to maximize the T - D F a c t o r and a r e able to move anything f r o m one place to another on time, which i s a favorable situation. On e x t e r i o r lines of communications however, T-D begins to work against you. Although you still may have a continuous line, you can get s o pulled a p a r t that you can't move enough, anywhere on time. This i s a situation to avoid against a n opponent who h a s good i n t e r i o r lines, f o r if you l o s e control, you m a y be liable to defeat in detail. One m o r e rule you might s e t for yourself, i s to k e e p u n i t s with special movement capabilities a s f r e e a s possible f r o m routine commitment. They should be l o c a t e d c l o s e to o r i n p o r t s o r cities, o r even a t s e a where they can put their special movement capabilities to work f a s t a s a p a r t of a decisive action. T r y to u s e them only for decisive action. When they a r e committed, they should be replaced on line a s soon a s possible by r e g u l a r units moved up for that purpose ahead of time. Provide f o r getting

Principles of War
by Myron Brundage KEY CONCEPTS FOR MASS AND MOVEMENT The two P r i n c i o l e s of War. Mass and Movement fit well together in a d i s cussion since we normally achieve m a s s through movement. M a s s in war m e a n s combat power which i s the s u m total of n u m b e r s , f i r e p o w e r , fighting ability, etc. Success r e s u l t s f r o m throwing enough m a s s a t the p r o p e r place a t the right t i m e to accomplish a definite objective. In AH g a m e s , m a s s r e l a t e s to the total value of the combat power we a r e able to place a t any given point. The P r i n c i p l e of Movement m e a n s the movement of your pieces a s advantageously a s possible. We u s e the t e r m movement r a t h e r than maneuver for t h i s principle because movement i s m o r e all-inclusive, w h e r e a s maneuver s e e m s to connotate only t a c t i c a l movement involving combat. T h i s l a t e r definition i s only a p a r t of the total concept of t h i s principle, although many think the m o s t important. You should a l s o consider that t h i s principle a l s o includes no movement in o r d e r to r e m a i n in the b e s t place. The m o s t important b a s i c concept Mass that m u s t beaoolied to b e s t u s e of and Movement i s the Time-Distance F a c t o r . Defined: the Time-Distance F a c t o r i s the number of t u r n s it will take you to move a unit to any d e s i r e d point on the board. In p r a c t i c e , t h i s involves land, s e a and a i r movement, and a l l of your units of a l l types, o r A I I - ~ r m s . No m a t t e r how s c a t t e r e d your units become, you m u s t be able to m a s s a decisive f o r c e a t the p r o p e r place and t i m e . A glance a t the gameboard m a y show your f o r c e s relatively s c a t t e r e d and vulnerable. A c l o s e r look should r e v e a l however, that m o s t of what looks weak i s actually within immediate striking r a n g e of decisive f o r c e s . Those a r e a s that r e a l l y a r e

Time-Distance F a c t o r o r number of

turns get des i r e d point. (Answ e r rounded off to next highest full
)

..

EXAMPLE: L e t ' s say t h a t b e f o r e moving a stack you want to make s u r e that you place i t within immediate range of a c e r t a i n c r i t i c a l a r e a . You check the proposed location and find i t i s 10 s q u a r e s f r o m that a r e a . You have 4 s q u a r e s of woods and 6 s q u a r e s o r n o r m a l movement r a t e t e r r i t o r y to c r o s s . How quickly could you get the stack t o the c r i t i c a l a r e a f r o m the proposed location? F i r s t get the a v e r a g e movement r a t e for the 10 s q u a r e s . You have 6 s q u a r e s n o r m a l time 4 (the n o r m a l r a t e in this c a s e ) , that gives you 24. Then you have 4 s q u a r e s woods t i m e s 2 (the r e s t r i c t e d r a t e ) , that gives you 8. Add these f o r 32, divided by 10 (the number of s q u a r e s ) and the a v e r a g e movement r a t e i s 3. 2. Now into the main formula:

-10 -

- 3 . 1 rounded off to 4 t u r n s , T i m e Distance F a c t o r .

3.2

4 t u r n s i s a long t i m e so the proposed location probably wouldn't be a good one. This i s a n involved procedure but a f t e r a little p r a c t i c e using i t you will

THE GENERAL
t h e s e u n i t s back into p o r t s o r c i t i e s f o r i m m e d i a t e r e - u s e . The t r u e value of t h e s e s p e c i a l u n i t s l i e s i n w h a t they c a n do i n combination with r e g u l a r f o r c e s . They seldom have sufficient s t r e n g t h i n t h e m s e l v e s t o be t r u l y d e c i s i v e , they a r e o f t e n h a r d to get out once c o m m i t t e d , and they a r e e a s y to f r i t t e r away. T h e i r m e r e existence in some strength, in a r e a d y attitude t o s t r i k e , p o s e s many p r o b l e m s f o r your opponent. A good battle disppsition then, i s one t h a t h a s good s e c u r i t y and m a x i m i z e s t h e T i m e - D i s t a n c e F a c t o r . Next we will d i s c u s s offensive c o n s i d e r a t i o n s with M a s s and Maneuver. i n t e r e s t i n g , stimulating, unstereotyped c o n t e s t ? I have a Prussian-Anglo-Allied defense f o r Waterloo you should know about. P r e v i o u s c o m m e n t a t o r s such a s B e r n a r d Bopp i n Quandry a t Q u a t r e B r a s (Sept. '65, p. 7 ) have s t r e s s e d d e l a y and the defensive by positioning u n i t s w h e r e coordinated offensives a r e i m p o s s i b l e and swift r e a c t i o n t o F r e n c h initiative v e r y difficult. Often what happens i s a d i e throwing contest--will F r e n c h 3 to 1 ' s work b e f o r e soak-offs and P r u s s i a n 5 t o 1 ' s r e d u c e the F r e n c h to i m p o t e n c e ? With t h i s defense a t t h e v e r y w o r s t you have gained one e x t r a t u r n and then c a n fall back t o the s a m e old positions. At b e s t - - y o u c a n s u r r o u n d , cut off and d e s t r o y i n d e t a i l the bulk of the F r e n c h a r m y . In one g a m e a g a i n s t a n u l t r a cautious Napoleon, the P i e t o n R i v e r w a s u s e d a s a defense l i n e f o r s e v e r a l t u r n s and a c o r p s (15 p t s ) of c a v a l r y w a s s u r r o u n d e d a t 3 t o 1. You m a y have s i m i l a r r e s u l t s - - t r y i t and s e e . T h e b e s t defense i s a good offense--this defense l e t s you get t h e r e 'Ifustest with the m o s t e s t t l and prove i t ! SETUP Main Body

PAGE 8
a playing b o a r d which i s adaptable to m o s t s t r a t e g i e s . Moves a r e made quickly, f e w e r m i s t a k e s a r e made, and they a r e of higher quality because of the l a c k of confusion. A p l a y e r ' s ability i s u s e d to i t s g r e a t e s t extent under t h e s e conditions, which a r e found in Gettysburg '64. At f i r s t glance, Gettysburg looks heavily weighted in f a v o r of the Union f o r c e s . They have a definite advantage i n combat f a c t o r s , b e s i d e s which they a r e not r e q u i r e d to a t t a c k in o r d e r to win. Thus you have a situation w h e r e the n u m e r i c a l l y s u p e r i o r f o r c e i s o n the defensive, which i s c l e a r l y a n advantageous position. The C o n f e d e r a t e s o n the o t h e r hand not only have a s m a l l e r f o r c e , but they have the b u r d e n of a t t a c k upon them. However, the South a l s o h a s c e r t a i n advantages which, I believe, o v e r c o m e a l l i t s disadvantages, and give h i m a 50-50% chance of winning (given p l a y e r s of equal ability). F i r s t , he c a n get m o r e f a c t o r s o n a s q u a r e ( s i x to the Union p l a y e r ' s five) than the Union player. Second, h i s t r o o p s a r e of a l l a r o u n d b e t t e r quality. H i s units have a n a v e r a g e s t r e n g t h g r e a t e r than that of the F e d e r a l f o r c e ' s units, and a l s o h i s units have a g r e a t e r a v e r a g e movement r a t e . T h e s e advantages m a k e i t possible f o r the Confederate g e n e r a l to o v e r w h e l m any position in the Yankee line if he r e a l l y p u t s h i s mind to it. The only r e a s o n why the South should l o s e i s if the t i m e r u n s out before the m o p up of surviving F e d e r a l units is finished. T h i s unfortunately happens quite often; e v e n a s u c c e s s f u l battle will end with only a few h o u r s remaining.

More BlitzkriegOptionals
by C h r i s Harvey I s B l i t z k r i e g t o s i m p l e f o r you? T r y adding s o m e of t h e s e r u l e s t o it f o r a more modernized game. E a c h side begins with 60 R a d a r f a c t o r s . One f a c t o r g i v e s a zone of view of one s q u a r e r a d i u s . So a s i x R a d a r station can s e e a c i r c l e of twelve s q u a r e s d i a m e t e r . Six i s t h e m o s t f a c t o r s a l lowed on one s q u a r e . Any planes not flying through a r a d a r zone a r e not s e e n , and s o cannot be i n t e r c e p t e d . R a d a r units c a n move half a s quickly a s Infantry. To u s e Anti A i r c r a f t m i s s i l e s and ICBM's a i r movement m u s t b e r e v i s e d . E a c h t u r n s move i s made i n FOUR s t a g e s . SAC five p e r s t a g e , MDM t h r e e p e r stage, ICBM f o u r p e r s t a g e , AntiA i r c r a f t f o u r p e r s t a g e and T r a n s p o r t twenty p e r s t a g e . T h e a t t a c k e r m o v e s h i s units f i r s t and a l l u n i t s m u s t move t h e i r full d i s t a n c e . Then t h e defender m o v e s h i s u n i t s t o i n t e r c e p t t h e enemy. Bombers can therefore be attacked bef o r e they r e a c h t h e i r t a r g e t s . F i g h t e r s c a n s t i l l only fight one b a t t l e p e r F U L L move. When a m i s s i l e i n t e r c e p t s bombe r s i t d e s t r o y s one b o m b e r f a c t o r f o r e a c h m i s s i l e f a c t o r . Once launched a m i s s i l e i s l o s t whether o r not it r e a c h e s a t a r g e t . The i d e a then i s t o outrun a m i s s i l e by c l e v e r positioning. ICBM's move exactly t h e s a m e a s b o m b e r s and c a n only be d e s t r o y e d by A n t i - m i s s i l e s . ICBM's c a n b e u s e d a g a i n s t t r o o p s (SAC t a b l e ) c i t i e s , R a d a r , a s interdiction o r a g a i n s t o t h e r ICBM b a s e s (SAC t a b l e ) . Of c o u r s e you could u s e t h e m with Nuclear w a r h e a d s . Miss i l e s c a n of c o u r s e be moved on the ground a s infantry.

Reserves DD22 DD19 X27 2-6, 1-6 2-6, 2-6, 2-6, 1-6 Anglo-Allied u n i t s

Flank Force DD14 DD13 FFlO 4-4, 2-6 6-4 4 - 4 , 1-6

Gettysburg Reversal
by L e o n a r d G r e e n e The g a m e of Gettysburg '64 s e e m s to be neglected by the G e n e r a l and w a r g a r n e r s f o r the n e w e r , m o r e complex g a m e s , such a s Blitzkrieg. These g a m e s c e r t a i n l y have t h e i r advantages and a r e enjoyable to play. However, they tend to become too complex a t t i m e s , a s a r e s u l t of the g r e a t n u m b e r of units and complicated r u l e s found i n them. T h i s c a u s e s e a c h move to take e x c e s s i v e time, o r e l s e m i s t a k e s w i l l be made. Gettysburg h a s f e w e r units, like Afrika Korps. G e t t y s b u r g a l s o h a s

The Defensive Offense

by R i c h a r d A. Shagrin A r e you t i r e d of seeing y o u r gallant c a v a l r y b r i g a d e s d e s t r o y e d by 30 to 1 a t t a c k s ? Do you enjoy leaving the initiative to the F r e n c h ? Do you want a n

I will now a t t e m p t to d e m o n s t r a t e that t h i s i s so. The f i r s t p a r t of the game, before the North's a r t i l l e r y a r r i v e s on the scene, i s the m o s t i m p o r t a n t to the South. A s the g a m e begins, you should d r i v e steadily to the south and southeast, blocking any a t t e m p t of Union advance, eliminating any c a v a l r y o r o t h e r unit that c o m e s too close. H i s infantry will advance p r e t t y f a r up C e m e t e r y Ridge, before you r e a c h the scene. However, your infantry i s s t r o n g e r and you should advance south o n C e m e t e r y Ridge with s o m e s t r o n g units and blockany F e d e r a l a t t e m p t of advance toward S e m i n a r y Ridge o r around y o u r e a s t flank with the r e m a i n d e r of your force. When y o u r a r t i l l e r y a r r i v e s o n the scene, you c a n do the m o s t to avenge Lee's defeat. F o r a considerable length of t i m e you will be able to g e t six f a c t o r s o n a s q u a r e to the Union's three. At those odds even a fortified s q u a r e i s n ' t safe. F o r c e h i m off the ridge to the southeast, attacking any unit that i s exposed off the ridge. Be s u r e to m a k e no a t t a c k s that m i g h t r e s u l t in. a s t r o n g f r i e n d l y unit being ex-

PAGE 9
posed to counterattack. You should find i t b e s t to s t r i k e a t the flanks of the union line. Split y o u r f o r c e in two, one f o r c e f o r e a c h union i t won't flank. F o r g e t the middle need any defense, any Union advance t h e r e will w o r k in your favor. Your opponent will extend h i s l i n e and r e t r e a t h i s f l a n k s to keep o u t of your reach. T r y and g e t a r o u n d the f l a n k s before they extend to the end of the mapboard, o r e l s e you will find y o u r self a g a i n s t a line with "no end" f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l p u r p o s e s . E v e n if this d o e s happen. you will have gotten the b e s t side of the d e a l anyway. H i s l i n e will be s p r e a d out and w e a k e r , and w i l l be r o l l e d back o n itself. On a s q u a r e grid, a s in GETTYSBURG, you c a n e a s i l y g e t a n enfilade o n u n i t s in a d i a g onal battle line, e v e n i n the c e n t e r of t h e s e lines. Soak-off s a r e inevitable, but i t is w o r t h it. P a r t of the Yankee line should now be in t h i s position, if not a l l of it. H i s f o r c e s should extend diagonally a c r o s s the s o u t h e a s t c o r n e r of the board. Continue with t h i s action, and by the t i m e he g e t s h i s a r t i l l e r y you will have h i m backed up c l o s e to the Taneytown Road. A g a i n s t a r e a l l y p o o r U.S. g e n e r a l you m a y have even won. If your opponent is killed, he m a y be strong enough to mount a n offensive. Keep your units o u t of r e a c h until you have m a d e a s t r o n g defensive position. Then hold up t h e r e . Make s u r e 'the Yank d o e s n ' t g e t onto the h i l l s o r you &re doomed. By controlling h i s r a t e of advance you will be a b l e to g e t h i m to f o r m a diagonal o r c u r v e d l i n e with the c e n t e r t o w a r d s you. I t will now be impossible f o r h i m to p r e v e n t you f r o m getting enfilades o n h i s units, e v e n those in the m i d d l e of h i s line. You should now be a b l e to m a s s a c r e him. H i s whole l i n e i s probably weakened by 2-2's i n a s s o r t e d locations, h i s strong u n i t s will b e s c a t t e r e d . C e n t e r your a t t a c k o n o n e of t h e s e s t r o n g units. G e t a n enfilade o n i t with a 4 - 2 and a 2-4 i n combination. B r i n g up a s s o r t e d units to h e l p o u t and a c a v a l r y o r two f o r any n e c e s s a r y soak-offs on neighboring units and watch the a m a z e d look o n your opponent's face. He will find i t h a r d to believe that h i s s e e m i n g l y invincible l i n e , s t r e t c h i n g f o r m i l e s a c r o s s the m a p b o a r d , with a million units in c o u n t l e s s r o w s i s a c t u a l l y quite vulnerable. The r e a s o n i s s i m p l e : 314 of h i s units a r e n ' t w o r t h anything! When you d i s c o u n t h i s 2-2's and c a v a l r y , he doesn't have m u c h left. Even h i s s t r o n g i n f a n t r y - a r t i l l e r y combinations a r e d e f e n s e l e s s b e f o r e you. J u s t keep o n attacking, until he s t a r t s running a l l o v e r the b o a r d i n a n e f f o r t to k e e p a unit o r two alive until noon J u l y 4. T h i s is w h e r e y o u r c a v a l r y b e c o m e s important. If you have been saving i t e a r l i e r , it will now pay off. You m u s t c a t c h the r e m a i n s of h i s a r m y with t h e s e f a s t u n i t s before the t i m e r u n s out. A combination of a r t i l l e r y and c a v a l r y o n one s q u a r e should c h a s e any r e m a i n i n g 3-2's. An efilade will r e s u l t i n a 3 to 1 battle. Methodically go a f t e r and t r a p the U. S. c a v a l r y and a r t i l l e r y with your c a v a l r y , i n a c o r n e r . Then go i n f o r the kill. If you a r e lucky with the dice, you should win the game, and if not, you won't l o s e by much. T h a t w i l l s t i l l e m b a r r a s s your opponent considerably, which is a l l you want anyway. A d d r e s s a l l c o m m e n t s , denials, i m p r o v e m e n t s and the like to L e o n a r d G r e e n e , 8307 Cool Spring Lane, Adelphi, Maryland.

THE GENERAL
if the B r i t i s h d o e s n ' t send s o m e units by s e a . B e c a r e f u l w i t h the fuel, though; i t and R o m m e l will f a l l behind two s q u a r e s e a c h t u r n , and thus be unprotected. ( R o m m e l will have to f a l l b e hind twelve s q u a r e s b e f o r e he c a n no l o n g e r give the R e c c e s a bonus. T h i s will n e v e r happen on the length of the board. ) Revise Rules? I might mention i t c l a r i f y s the r u l e s t o simply s a y R o m m e l i s unaffected by e n e m y u n i t s and zones of control, and c a n even r u n o v e r t h e m if he l i k e s , a s long a s he d o e s n ' t stop on top of them. T h i s i s done with the understanding R o m m e l cannot c a p t u r e fuel, f o r t r e s s e s , o r h o m e b a s e s , cannot block r e t r e a t s , and cannot b r e a k isolation by running into the s t a c k of i s o l a t e d units. R e a l i s m f a n a t i c s should not complain, b e c a u s e in re51 life R o m m e l w a s p r e t t y slippery. T h e a l r e a d y p r e s e n t Avalon Hill r u l e about placing R o m m e l in zones of cont r o l could b e modified t o "if a B r i t i s h piece m o v e s s o that i t c o m e s to r e s t on top of R o m m e l , he i s placed with n e a r e s t f r i e n d l y unit. I' C o m m e n t s ? Allan Wood, 5969 Univ e r s i t y Avenue, Indianapolis, Indiana

Rommel Rides Again

by Allan Wood T h i s a r t i c l e is about a s m a l l and probably neglected f a c t o r i n A f r i k a K o r p s , the R o m m e l unit. Many p l a y e r s seldom u s e i t , and t h o s e t h a t do often l e a v e it i n the r e a r , shuttling fuel. T h e t w o - s q u a r e bonus i t o f f e r s c a n s o m e t i m e s give the G e r m a n player the vital edge in a battle, and the "edges" in many b a t t l e s can m e a n victory. Methods of Use One u s e is, of c o u r s e , the speeding up of your supply line. Undeniably t h i s i s a v e r y valuable function, but not enough t o w a r r e n t placing R o m m e l f a r i n the r e a r . C a r e f u l u s e of R o m m e l can give the bonus t o many A x i s units, thus getting t h e r e " f i r s t e s t with t h e m o s t e s t . I ' Don' t r u n a l l o v e r t h e b o a r d touching your u n i t s , t h i s w a s t e s R o m m e l t s m o v e s . R a t h e r stand s t i l l a n d l e t the u n i t s "pick-up1' R o m m e l , give t h e m the two s q u a r e s , then l e t t h e m "drop1' h i m f o r a n o t h e r s t a c k to u s e . Obviously t h i s i s effective only if t h e units a r e going the s a m e direction; don't go four s q u a r e s out of the way t o gain two! It is e s p e c i a l l y effective on t h e c o a s t r o a d , a s i n the f i r s t t u r n when e v e r y A x i s unit gains the bonus. T h i s i s not done illegally by t r y i n g t o move the e n t i r e initial placement s t a c k a t once, but r a t h e r by using the "pick-up, d r o p w method outlined above. R o m m e l and R e c c e G r e a t Note that a R e c c e unit c a n move 14 s q u a r e s i n the d e s e r t w i t h R o m m e l , just a s f a s t a s m o s t B r i t i s h u n i t s on t h e c o a s t r o a d ! When you get t o Tobruk, r u n R o m m e l and the R e c c e s a r o u n d the B r i t i s h ; send a fuel with t h e m , if you c a n s p a r e i t , s o that you can a t t a c k a s well a s .threaten. T h e B r i t i s h will have t o weaken t h e i r d e f e n s e s t o defend t h e i r home b a s e . The speedy R o m m e l - R e c c e combination m a y even get t h e r e f i r s t ,

Schwerpunkt in Tactics I 1
by Keith W. Bennett R e c e n t c o m m e n t i n the General, S. P. Duncan and T . B o s s e l e r indicated a d e e p s e a t e d d i s g u s t with t h e "perfect t r o o p placement" concept, o r "the p e r f e c t plan" concept. No a t t a c k e r can move out without s o m e kind of l i s t of key objectives. But why plan to the point of o b s e s s i o n ? Duncan a n d B o s s e l e r m a k e a good point, and one proven by m i l i t a r y hist o r y - -that a good battlefield c o m m a n d e r i s one who i s p r e p a r e d to fight a w a r of movement. He s e t s up a b a s i c plan that i s quite s i m p l e a n d then u s e s a n y numb e r of methods of executing that plan. In T a c t i c s 11, i t could b e a s b a s i c a s c r e a t i n g a n a r m o r e d schwerpunkt using a n a r m o r e d f o r c e built up f r o m the r e s e r v e s , a n d e a c h of the f o u r C o r p s . T h e initial penetration into enemy t e r r i t o r y i s m a d e with t h e l i m i t e d number of tank divisions available i n the f i r s t t u r n , probably two divisions. To hold t h e flanks and build t h i s s m a l l unit up t o C o r p s s t r e n g t h , we designated one i n f a n t r y division i n e a c h of the four C o r p s a s a "mechanized infantry division", c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o the G e r m a n " P a n z e r - G r e n a d i e r " u n i t s i n having the f i r e p o w e r of a n infantry unit, but the movement f a c t o r of a tank division. T h i s puts f o u r divisions into the Schwerpunkt--two tank divisions with

THE GENERAL
two mechanized infantry divisions in i m m e d i a t e support. T h e infantry divis i o n s of the second and t h i r d C a r p s follow on the flanks of the schwerpunkt a t t h e i r b e s t s p e e d s , echeloning out on e i t h e r flank t o widen t h e point of t h e breakthrough. A s s e t up f o r the beginning of the g a m e , the s t a n d a r d A r m y C o r p s in T a c t i c s I1 c o r r e s p o n d t o a n e a r l y World War I1 p a t t e r n . The tank f o r c e s a r e p a r c e l l e d out a m o n g infantry divisions, and u s e d to stiffen the f i r e p o w e r of a s t a n d a r d c o r p s , r a t h e r than c o n c e n t r a t ed into a mobile f o r c e of g r e a t f i r e power and g r e a t f r e e d o m of movement. It i s t h e s a m e organization u s e d by the B r i t i s h , F r e n c h , and o t h e r f o r c e s until the effectiveness of c o n c e n t r a t e d G e r m a n a r m o r m a d e it c l e a r that a defending f o r c e of equal s t r e n g t h had t o b e created. The r u l e r e q u i r i n g a C o r p s headq u a r t e r s h a s to b e b r o k e n , a s t h e o r i g i nal C o r p s h e a d q u a r t e r s would move f o r w a r d with t h e o r i g i n a l I1 and I11 Inf a n t r y C o r p s . The I C o r p s , and IV C o r p s move f o r w a r d i n the second t u r n , throwing t h e i r a r m o r f o r w a r d t o join the Schwerpunkt, i n the c r e a t i o n of a second a r m o r e d c o r p s . They have t h e double job of developing the f r o n t outw a r d t o the flanks s o a s to s e a l off e n e m y counter a t t a c k s , and occupying p o r t s t o slow down a n e n e m y s e a - l a n d ing. So i t would s e e m h e r e that t h e s i m p l e s t and m o s t p r a c t i c a l plan would b e nothing m o r e than t h e a s s i g n m e n t of a n objective in t h e f i r s t a n d second t u r n s and then throwing t h e schwerpunkt f o r w a r d t o w a r d t h a t objective a s r a p i d l y a s p o s s i b l e . The a g r e s s o r i s s i m p l y t r y i n g t o p e n e t r a t e s o deeply t h a t h e c u t s the e h e m y a r m y g r o u p i n half, i n to i t s two component a r m i e s ; b e f o r e it i s n e c e s s a r y to do a n y fighting. T h e b u r d e n of a t t a c k then a c t u a l l y f a l l s on the defender. P a r a t r o o p divisions, and amphibian divisions would b e c o m m i t t e d a h e a d of t h e schwerpunkt t o hold b r i d g e c r o s s ings. When t h e a g r e s s o r f e e l s h e ' s penetrated d e e p enough t o cut off c o m munications between t h e divided h a l v e s , o r whatever f r a c t i o n h e ' s s p l i t off, of the e n e m y f o r c e , he swings h i s s c h w e r punkt t o e i t h e r flank to a t t a c k the w e a k e r e l e m e n t s of the e n e m y , defending, f o r c e . Proof of t h e f a c t t h a t one m a n ' s plan i s a n o t h e r m a n ' s Waterloo i s that, though the schwerpunkt w a s used v e r y effectively by t h e G e r m a n Wehrmacht in both a t t a c k and d e f e n s e with equal success, other successful commanders have divided t h e i r f o r c e s d e l i b e r a t e l y . C a e s a r , i n t h e Gallic campaigns, r e peatedly u s e d a s y s t e m of t h r e e supporting columns. George Washington t r i e d the s a m e thing a t Brandywine and f o r a t i m e , did quite well. But a concentration of a r m o r - - f a s t moving and hardhitting, and d e e p into a n e n e m y defensive s y s t e m - - i s a p t t o find a n enemy who's a l r e a d y somewhat shaken b e f o r e any r e a l fighting begins. If n u c l e a r capacity i s u s e d , t h e s c h w e r punkt s e e m s to s t i l l be effective, though i t m u s t t r a v e l in a m o r e d i s p e r s e d o r d e r . The a t t a c k e r , in h i s opening t u r n , c a n knock out defending a r m o r that might be moved into the a r e a of h i s intended a t t a c k ; so that he s t i l l h a s a s t r o n g l o c a l s u p e r i o r i t y of f i r e p o w e r in the f i r s t few c r i t i c a l t u r n s . Such a plan i s simple, and it could help win. But w a r , l i k e T a c t i c s 11, i s s t i l l p a r t l y a gamble. No plan c a n do m o r e than help shift the odds. Keith W. Bennett, 49 Lakeview P l a c e , Lake Z u r i c h , Ill. 60047. of and p a s t Minsk u n l e s s good odds can b e obtained on it. When n e a r i n g the Smolensk a r e a , and if you have not a l r e a d y done so, b r e a k the Divina! If the R u s s i a n i s s t r e t c h e d out t o a n extent, you m a y get a c r a c k a t Leningrad o r a t l e a s t s t r e t c h the R u s s i a n line m o r e than i t can safely b e and a l s o will r e m o v e a t h r e a t t o your flanks. The s q u a r e s R-24 and 5-25 a r e excellent f o r t h i s p u r p o s e . A r e t r e a t to the Luga will open a hole i n the l i n e s that t h e R u s s i a n m a y have t r o u b l e in filling. I have no s e t plan f o r taking Moscow but t r y t o get a s wide a f r o n t a s you can handle before the final d r i v e . If it i s c l e a r that Moscow will not f a l l to your l i m i t e d f o r c e s in the A r m y Group C e n t e r , you should be a b l e to hook t o w a r d s t h e E a s t e r n Volkhov and a t t e m p t t o s u r r o u n d Leningrad o r c a p t u r e it. T h e junction of the n o r t h e r n f o r c e s and the l o s s of a city will enable you to lengthen the Moscow F r o n t so that a weak spot will of n e c e s s i t y a p p e a r s o m e w h e r e . Now the final a t t a c k m u s t be m a d e a n d hopefully will succeed. The Stalingrad a t t a c k i s perhaps only the s e c o n d a r y objective of the southern f o r c e . The f i r s t duty of the a r m i e s i s t o d r a w out the R u s s i a n l i n e s and to kill units. If t h e s o u t h e r n front i s only the s e c o n d a r y d r i v e , the main d r i v e should be through t h e flat Ukraine with a t t a c k s on the D n e s t r e a t 2-1. The d r i v e to the Dnepr should be m a d e costly f o r the R u s s i a n s u n l e s s he wishes t o give you the t e r r a i n which would be costly t o h i s t i m e t a b l e . B r e a k the r i v e r between Kiev and Dnepro P e t r o v s k . If the Moscow d r i v e i s slowing, a f o r c e should head f o r K u r s k and north f r o m t h e r e to Moscow. T h i s f o r c e would a l s o b e helpful to c o v e r the flank of a d r i v e t o Stalingrad. If the R u s s i a n h a s s u r r e n d e r e d Stalingrad, send a s m a l l f o r c e t o occupy the city and r e - i n f o r c e the K u r s k f o r c e . In t h i s event Mos cow will be your p r i m a r y objective; you will b e a b l e to obtain a r a t h e r l a r g e f r o n t on t h e city. If he holds t h e city, approach t h e city f r o m R o s t o v and down the Moscow-Stalingrad R a i l r o a d . You should have no p r o b l e m s closing t o the city f r o m t h e n o r t h , but the Doenets and Don will c a u s e p r o b l e m s on your Weste r n a p p r o a c h . If c a p t u r e i s difficult, c r o s s the Volga and s u r r o u n d the city. In g e n e r a l , c o m m i t your a r m o r equa l l y until you c r o s s t h e Dnepr o r if you intend t o have a s t r o n g southern offensive in which c a s e d r i v e a c r o s s the r i v e r s by attacking 5 - 7 ' s a t 2- 1 a n d 4 - 6 ' s a t 3- 1. With a n effective Ukraine d r i v e the Southern Bug i s outflanked. P l a c e two 4 - 4 - 6 ' s i n Finland. In the d r i v e s , pile a r m o r i n g r o u p s of 8, 7 , 6, and in two g r o u p s of 8 , 6 , 4. It enables you t o get the p r o p e r n u m b e r of f a c t o r s in the place you need t h e m . T r y to place t h e 8-7-6 p i l e s w h e r e t h e m a j o r i t y of

Success in Stalingrad
by R i c h a r d Shalvoy It i s a n a d m i t t e d f a c t that u n d e r the p r e s e n t r u l e s the G e r m a n side i s quite difficult in Stalingrad. I have a plan which c a n somewhat e a s e the G e r m a n p l a y e r ' s t r o u b l e s . Since the G e r m a n offense depends on the initial R u s s i a n p l a c e m e n t , I will deal with t h e t h r e e g e n e r a l combat a r e a s and with g e n e r a l combat. It i s the f o r t u n a t e G e r m a n who c a n launch a r a p i d and s u c c e s s f u l Finnish offense. Usually the b e s t c o u r s e of action i s t o u s e the delaying defense a s d e s c r i b e d by C a r l Knabe when f a c e d by a powerful R u s s i a n f o r c e . If your opponent i s not o v e r l y lucky o r a g g r e s sive, a g a i n s t a f o r c e of l e s s than five o r s i x a r m i e s (not including t h e Lening r a d defensive f o r c e which s t i l l m u s t b e taken into account), you m a y be a b l e t o hold t e r r i t o r y o r a t l e a s t delay h i s advance by placing a pile of a 2-2-4 and a 3-3-4 o r m o r e initially in B-34 and E-33. Unless a p r o t e c t e d 3- 1 c a n b e obtained, I r a r e l y t r y a n a t t a c k i n Finland until the R u s s i a n h a s withdrawn a p a r t of h i s f o r c e . Delay i s your keynote in Finland and l a t e r the r e m a i n i n g units, if your m a i n d r i v e s have m e t with s o m e s u c c e s s , will b e a b l e t o h a r r a s s t h e R u s s i a n s i n a n d n e a r Leningrad. In the a r e a n o r t h of the P r i p y a t M a r s h e s , the Nemunas R i v e r i s the m a j o r o b s t a c l e and if any chance of s u c c e s s i s t o be obtained i t should b e b r o k e n a s soon a s possible, though t h i s c a n take s o m e t i m e a g a i n s t a competent opponent. The b e s t way t o do t h i s i s t o launch a n u m b e r of 1 - 2 ' s c o n c e n t r a t ed in a s m a l l a r e a f o r the m a x i m u m effect. A 3-1 c a n be achieved on a 4-6 a c r o s s the r i v e r i n a s t a c k of two with m i n i m u m l o s s . If a l l e l s e f a i l s , a t t a c k f r o m 2 - 1 8 to c r e a t e b a s i c odds. When the r i v e r i s c l e a r e d , a t t a c k n o r t h

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5 - 7 ' s a r e . With a l i t t l e l u c k and p r o p e r handling of t h i s g e n e r a l guide t o R u s s i a , you can r a i s e your f l a g i n the K r e m l i n . C o m m e n t s and whatever c a n be sent to: R i c h a r d Shalvoy, 15 Ludlow Manor, E. Norwalk. Conn. 06855. A s t h e situation looked b a d f o r the All i e s a t f i r s t , he might (and often d i d ) l e a v e the "mop-up" t o the t r o o p s behind the b e a c h e s . If t h i s i s the only r e a c t i o n , the A l l i e s can c a r r y t h e day by making c o n s e r v a t i v e 1: 1 o r 2: 1 a t t a c k s t o w a r d s Switzerland. The d e e p e r the l i n e s go. the f a r t h e r a n d l o n g e r the G e r m a n h a s to go t o shift u n i t s f r o m the north t o t h e south, and v i c e v e r s a . If he d o e s throw a heavy a t t a c k a g a i n s t the beachhead, he m u s t have t o weaken h i s positions e l s e w h e r e . A s speed i s of t h e u t m o s t , t h e G e r m a n would b e foolish t o u s e South F r a n c e t r o o p s t o s q u a s h the P a s de C a l a i s a s s a u l t , the b e s t move would probably be t o u s e the a n t i - p a r a t r o o p units behind North Sea. L e H a r v e a n d possibly Normandy, with the units i n G e r m a n y coming up f a s t . T h e s e maneuv e r s will undoubtedly make the o t h e r n o r t h e r n b e a c h e s considerably w e a k e r , and if the beachhead c a n hold out to t h e 6th o r 7th week, the G e r m a n could not possibly get h i s "impregnable" defense back in o r d e r , a t b e s t , it would b e l i k e a c o n c r e t e wall on the b r i n k of a p r e c i pice. One heavy blow a g a i n s t i t , a n d t h e Allied units pour t h r u and d r i v e f o r the Fatherland. If the G e r m a n u s e s the 'Hoffman' d e f e n s e , the situation i s r e m a r k a b l y m o r e f a v o r a b l e f o r a n Allied landing i n P a s de C a l a i s . Once a suitable f o r c e h a s been accumulated, go a f t e r t h e s t a t i c s and d e s t r o y a s many of the flank units a s possible. A s Allied units s t r e a m int o F r a n c e , the t e m p o of Allied advance will quicken, a n d the S t a t i c s ' R e t r e a t will t u r n into a route. Then move slowl y a g a i n s t t h e Siegfried Line, a i m e d a t Verdun. You have the option t o a t t a c k , and a s t h e r e a r e c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s movement b a r r i e r s w e s t of t h e Line, you c a n shift your a t t a c k e i t h e r t o w a r d s Achen o r Nancy, while he h a s but a v e r y s m a l l r e s e r v e s i n c e m o s t of h i s combat u n i t s w e r e exhausted i n F r a n c e , o r a r e t i e d down on the Line. If the Line is stoutly held, he c a n ' t have many a n t i - p a r a . units, so u s e a two-pronged a t t a c k a g a i n s t h i s L i n e , continually hitting the l i n e i n s e v e r a l s p o t s . Soon both s i d e s will b e badly weakened, but if t h e a l l i e d s t i l l h a s 20 divisions, h i s speed will get 10 divisions a c r o s s the l i n e well a h e a d of the G e r m a n r e p l a c e m e n t s ' a r r i v a l . With the o t h e r 10 divisions holding open a supply l i n e , G e r m a n d e f e a t i s now a definite r e a l i t y . A d d r e s s t h o s e c r i t i c i s m s of y o u r s t o R . William Smith, 6N654 P i n e A v e . , Bensenville, Illinois 601 06.

THE GENERAL
quality a s F I R E , World Conquest, I n c . , and the Confederate A r m y of C e n t r a l Appalachia. T h e s e t e a m s a t t a c k each o t h e r , s o m e t i m e s l o s e and r e f u s e t o a d m i t it openly, d i s a g r e e on who c o n t r o l s what s t a t e s , and d i s i n t e g r a t e with monotonous r e g u l a r i t y . T e a m s which hate e a c h o t h e r p a r t i c u l a r l y handle each o t h e r ' s challenges between f i n g e r t i p s a t a r m ' s length, one hand pinching t h e i r n o s e s . T h e r e s u l t i n g chaos i s enough t o d r i v e the w a r g a m e r insane. I propose Feudalism--a system for t h e w a r g a m e r who enjoys fighting h i s way t o the top, founding h i s own s t a t e within the mighty E m p i r e of Avalon o r joining t h e s t a t e of a n e x p e r t w a r g a m e r , and collecting v a s s a l s ( o t h e r w a r g a m e r s who owe a l l e g i a n c e t o h i m and m u s t fight whom h e p l e a s e s ) . F e u d a l i s m off e r s w a r s between s t a t e s , p e r s o n a l combat with high r a n k a s the r e w a r d and low r a n k and v a s s a l a g e a s the punishment,friendly t o u r n a m e n t s between w a r g a m e r s of equal r a n k , and rebellion. What m o r e c a n the p r e s e n t s y s t e m offer? P e e r a g e i s the ranking of w a r g a m e r s . The beginner i s a knight, and f r o m t h e r e he m a y r i s e t o b a r o n , viscount, e a r l , m a r q u i s , duke, and a t the top, prince. All m e m b e r s a r e nobles; a l l but the knights a r e l o r d s . Respectively, the l o r d s r u l e a barony, a viscountcy, a n e a r l d o m , a m a r q u i s a t e , a duchy, and a principality. Changes in r a n k , a s well a s t h e r e s u l t s of g a m e s between s u b j e c t s of t h e E m p i r e , a r e r e g i s t e r e d a t the C h a n c e r y , 423 Manor, G r o s s e Pointe F a r m s , Michigan 48236. ( T h i s i s also where interested wargamers should w r i t e t o join, and w h e r e , f o r a self-addressed, stamped envelope, l i s t s of m e m b e r s may be obtained.) T o u r n a m e n t s between nobles do not change t h e i r r a n k s o r s t a t u s , m a y be of a n y length, a n d a r e the only g a m e s that need not b e r e g i s t e r e d . P e r s o n a l combat a n d w a r combat between two nobles l a s t t h r e e g a m e s - -the winner of two wins the combat. The challenger h a s choice of s i d e s but the challenged c h o o s e s t h e g a m e s . In both w a r and p e r s o n a l combat two things a r e a t stake: r a n k and v a s s a l a g e . The winner of a p e r s o n a l combat-that i s , combat between two nobles whose s t a t e s a r e not a t w a r - - t a k e s the r a n k of the l o s e r u n l e s s h i s own i s highe r . The l o s e r b e c o m e s the w i n n e r ' s v a s s a l , and if h e o r i g i n a l l y h a d the winn e r ' s new r a n k h e i s demoted a rank. (You m a y not have a v a s s a l ranking highe r o r equal t o yourself. ) The winner g e t s a n y of the l o s e r ' s v a s s a l s who now r a n k h i g h e r o r equal t o t h e i r m a s t e r , t o k e e p a s h i s own. The winner i n a w a r combat changes r a n k i n t h e s a m e way, and m a y take a s h i s own o r s e t f r e e a n y of the l o s e r ' s v a s s a l s . The l o s e r i s d e m o t e d below

Maintain the Offensive

by R . William

kith

If you a r e given the option to m a k e an assault against a well-fortifiedbeachdefense-network, o r t o conduct a walkin, d r y landing a g a i n s t l i t t l e , if a n y opposition, do you find yourself choosing the l a t t e r just t o k e e p l o s s e s l o w ? If so, don't deny it. The a u t h o r a g r e e s that quite a few b e a c h positions a r e "impregnable, but no one c a n possibly stop a d e t e r m i n e d a t t a c k e r who a s s u m e s , then m a i n t a i n s the offensive. Don't m i s i n t e r p r e t the point t r y i n g t o b e m a d e . The a r t i c l e is not t o induce the r e a d e r to m a k e foolish 1: 1 o r 1:2 "banzai" charges. A s o - c a l l e d "impregnable ' I defense position w a s introduced t o the a u t h o r , and w a s s u m m a r i l y b l a s t e d , bent, then buckled a n d b u r s t . T h e g a m e w a s DDay, a n d along the c o a s t of P a s d e C a l a i s , the positions w e r e : 3 s t a t i c s on L 20 & L - 2 1 , e a . ; 2 s t a t i c s onM-22, M-23, & N-24 e a . ; 3 - 4 - 3 Inf. Divs. a t M-19. N-21, & 0 - 2 5 (one p e r hex. ); 4 - 4 - 3 Inf. Divs. a t 0 - 2 4 & Q - 2 5 (one p e r hex. ); 5-5-3 a t Q-27; and 6-6-4 a t P - 2 6 . With t h e p e r m i s s i o n of the G e r m a n defender, t h e a u t h o r e x p e r i m e n t e d with the s e t - u p a n d found that i n twenty r u n s , the a v e r a g e p r i c e f o r a b e a c h h e a d c o s t t h e A l l i e s 1. 5 A r m o r e d Divisions, 5- 3 Infantry Divisions, and 2. 5 A i r b o r n e Divisions. A s s a u l t a g a i n s t the f o r t r e s s e s i n t h i s beach network w a s heavily f a t a l , with only, a 29% chance of v i c t o r y . To the south, t h e r e w a s a 45% chance of getting a connected beachhead (two o r m o r e Hexs. ) between Dieppe a n d Boulogne. While defending t h i s beachhead, the G e r m a n l o s t a n a v e r a g e of 5. 1 S t a t i c s , . 7 A r m o r e d , . 6 A i r b o r n e , and 2 . 3 Inf a n t r y Divisions (both t y p e s ) e i t h e r d e stroyed o r routed. In the n e x t t h r e e t u r n s , Allied t r o o p s t r e n g t h on t h e continent s o a r e d t o 5 . 4 A r m ' d Divs, 6 . 2 Inf'y Divs, a n d 1. 1 A i r b o r n e Divs, by the s t a r t of July, '44, the beachhead p e r i m e t e r w a s f r o m Dieppe t o Q-24, t h e zig-zag b a c k t o Dunkirk. With p o r t f a c i l i t i e s f o r 36 Units, 23 m o r e d i v i s i o n s o r HQs could b e m a s s e d i n s i d e t h e l i n e s , and be u s e d f o r a b r e a k o u t , a g a i n a t c o s t , but don't f o r g e t t h a t t h e G e r m a n i s a l s o suffering losses. When t h e a g s a u l t t r o o p s touched down, the G e r m a n had a few c h o i c e s i n r e f e r e n c e t o h i s r e a c t i o n t o the Invasion.

Feudal Wargaming
by M a r s h a l l A. M a s s e y Common p r a c t i c e a m o n g w a r g a m e r s who enjoy playing by m a i l i s t o f o r m t e a m s with appelations of such dubious

THE GENERAL
the w i n n e r ' s new r a n k , losing a l l h i s v a s s a l s who now o u t r a n k o r equal h i m , a s f a r a s the winner l i k e s . (He m a y even go f r o m p r i n c e t o knight! ) L o r d s - - b a r o n s and u p - - m u s t have e i t h e r one v a s s a l one r a n k below t h e i r own o r two two r a n k s below, o r they m u s t l o s e rank. T h i s l e a d s , i n w a r , to a p r o c e s s of chipping away the foundations. If a l o r d d e f e a t s a n o t h e r l o r d ' s v a s s a l , the defeated v a s s a l switches allegiance. (He may not be v a s s a l to two a t once. ) T h i s m a y l e a d t o shuttling v a s s a l s back a n d f o r t h f o r awhile. In the middle of a l l t h i s , the v a s s a l may renounce h i s a l l e g i a n c e t o h i s l o r d , forcing the l o r d t o l i c k h i s own v a s s a l o r give h i m up. It i s l e g a l , but not sporting, f o r a v a s s a l t o a t t a c k h i s own l o r d . (Attacking l o r d s i n your own s t a t e i s a l s o 0. K. ) If i n e i t h e r c a s e , the r e belling v a s s a l l o s e s to h i s l o r d , h e m a y be t r e a t e d a s l o s e r i n a w a r combat. T h e r e a r e o t h e r a d v a n t a g e s to v a s s a l s than p r e s t i g e and keeping your r a n k . If a l o r d , v a s s a l to none, h a s two v a s s a l s one r a n k below h i s own, he r i s e s one r a n k . If a knight, v a s s a l to none, t a k e s a n o t h e r knight v a s s a l , he b e c o m e s b a r o n . If, i n s t e a d , the l o r d o r knight i s a v a s s a l t o a l o r d a t l e a s t two r a n k s h i g h e r , t h i s l o r d may promote the l o r d o r knight. (Note: If a v a s s a l d e f e a t s a noble of h i g h e r r a n k , but the v a s s a l ' s l o r d i s only one r a n k above h i s own, the defeated l o r d g e t s demoted below t h e v a s s a l and the v a s s a l i s not promoted. ) If a l o r d i s v a s s a l t o none, he r u l e s h i s own s t a t e and m a y d e c l a r e w a r on any o t h e r state. Having d e c l a r e d w a r , o r having had w a r d e c l a r e d on him, he may not only a t t a c k a n y of the e n e m y he l i k e s i n w a r combat but o r d e r h i s v a s s a l s i n t o the f r a y with h i m - - i f they haven't a l r e a d y joined the w a r . H i s v a s s a l s , if they l i k e , m a y o r d e r i n t h e i r v a s s a l s , e t c . A b a r o n y m a y fight a w a r with a principality. If t h e l o r d subjug a t e s a l l o t h e r l o r d s i n a city, s t a t e , county, o r r e g i o n , he m a y make i t a t i t l e , a s G e n e r a l L o r d R o b e r t E. L e e , E a r l of C e n t r a l A p p a l a c h i a , o r D r . L p r d No, Marquis of Jamaica. If he subjugates a l l o t h e r s t a t e s e v e r y w h e r e , he b e c o m e s the new E m p e r o r of Avalon, ruling not a s t a t e , but a n E m p i r e of states. Any v o l u n t e e r s ? The s y s t e m is v e r y simple. The 2 p l a y e r s m u s t f i r s t a g r e e upon a c e r t a i n number of d a y s of the month o n which a l l c o r r e s p o n d e n c e will be sent. The length of t i m e between the c h o s e n d a y s will, of c o u r s e , depend upon the amount of t i m e r e q u i r e d f o r m a i l d e l i v e r y f r o m one p l a y e r to the o t h e r . On these chosen d a y s , both p l a y e r s send c o r r e s pondence. One will send a t t a c k e r inf o r m a t i o n and the o t h e r will send d e f e n d e r information. Suppose that player A w i s h e s to send the m o v e m e n t and battle p o r t i o n s of h i s t u r n to p l a y e r B. He l i s t s the movem e n t , the battles, and the o r d e r in which they a r e to be fought, a s usual. He then c h o o s e s a l i s t of n u m b e r s b e tween 1 and 6. T h e r e m u s t be 1 numb e r f o r e a c h battle fought and i t m u s t be c l e a r which n u m b e r c o r r e s p o n d s with which battle. He s e n d s this information o n the specified day. On the e x a c t s a m e day, p l a y e r B c h o o s e s and s e n d s a s i m i l a r l i s t of n u m b e r s f r o m 1 to 6 with s o m e s p e c i fied o r d e r . When the p l a y e r s r e c e i v e t h e i r opponent's l i s t s , the n u m b e r s , in o r d e r , a r e added together modulo 6. This p r o d u c e s a "die roll". F o r those who do not know what i t m e a n s to add two n u m b e r s modulo 6, the following table will suffice: ATTACK NUMBER
D E

PAGE 12
1
l 2

2
3

3
4

4
5

5
6

6
1

s E N 0.

4 5 6

5 6 1

6 1 2

1 2 3

2 3 4

3 4 5

4 5 6

P l a y e r B (defense) m u s t be c a r e f u l to send enough n u m b e r s to take c a r e of a l l of the b a t t l e s that player A m a y wish to fight. If he r u n s s h o r t , a simple convention m a y be adopted such a s s t a r t i n g the l i s t o v e r again f r o m the beginning. The advantages to m y s y s t e m a r e many. 1) B a s e - 6 c o m b a t r e s u l t s t a b l e s m a y be u s e d i n s t e a d of the a r t i f i c i a l base-10 o n e s , 2) P l a y e r s a r e f o r c e d to m a k e t h e i r m o v e s o n time, 3) T h e r e i s no possibility of cheating - i t m a k e s no difference how the n u m b e r s a r e chosen. 4) although i t will c o s t twice a s m u c h i n postage, money will be saved f r o m not having to buy newspapers. I would be i n t e r e s t e d in h e a r i n g c o m m e n t s o n the s y s t e m . J u s t send a p o s t c a r d to Tony Leal. 207 W. Iowa, Urbana, Illinois.

Analytical Analysis of the "Perfect Plan" Controversy

by Doyle Donehoo A s a g e n e r a l rallying h i s f o r c e s . I m u s t a m a s s w o r d s and take offensive a g a i n s t c e r t a i n mal-contents who u t t e r l y deny the ' P e r f e c t P l a n ' . S e v e r a l a u t h o r s b l a s t with opinion without c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s o r e v e n a n a l y t i c a l r e s p o n s e . S e v e r a l plans I have s e e n have been quite c l e v e r and well thought out; o t h e r s have been quite shallow a n d n a r r o w minded. But, being n a r r o w minded i s no way t o e l i m i n a t e n a r r o w mindedness; and the a u t h o r s have been guilty of t h i s . They give no c r e d i t of a n a l y s i s o r c o m p r e h e n s i v e thought i n t h e i r judgement of plans i n g e n e r a l . T h e r e have been s o m e good points brought out by t h e a u t h o r s : i n developing plans, you m u s t have d i r e c t i v e s , a s t e p by s t e p development which you t r y t o m e e t . If plans go wrong, you m u s t develop o t h e r plans. But the a u t h o r s ' evaluation s t o p s t h e r e . Now, what d o e s a p e r f e c t plan need f o r it t o work w e l l ? The following i s a n a n a l y t i c a l a n a l y s i s of the p e r f e c t plan: Definition: P e r f e c t P l a n s a r e the b e s t evaluationof s t r a t e g i c possibilities, adapted to the b e s t t a c t i c a l line-up to b r i n g about the d e s i r e d r e s u l t s , t o e n a c t and achieve s t r a t e g i c a i m s . Note: No good c o m m a n d e r i s defeated by a f i r s t move: a t m o s t i t i n c r e a s e s offensive c h a n c e s lo%, o r the advantage of initiative o v e r the defensive. Note: The t e s t of the b e s t plan i s i t s ability t o w o r k u n d e r the stiffest competition and the w o r s t luck, and i t s ability t o be adaptable in changing and a d v e r s e situations. 1. T h e f i r s t and strongly s t r e s s e d r u l e is n e v e r u n d e r e s t i m a t e your opponent. C o n v e r s e l y , don't o v e r e s t i m a t e your opponent. P l a y a s if your opponent will u s e e v e r y loop-hole and t r i c k in t h e book. B e thorough! 2. Never be o v e r cautious o r you will bog down. Never take chances; take calculated r i s k s . I n s u r e a d e g r e e of safety to supply l i n e s , m i n o r f r o n t s , h o m e , i m m e d i a t e r e a r ; and a t l e a s t a neutralization in the a i r w a r . You will have to take calculated r i s k s i n s o m e a r e a s ; do so, but i n s u r e enough protection t o k e e p i t f r o m being a tempting target for attack. 3 . No plan will work well without the workings of the b a s i c p r i n c i p a l s of war. 4. P l a n for l i m i t e d objectives. Make no m i s t a k e in what i s wanted. P l a n your work, work your plan! 5. Now, with objectives in mind, work out your p e r f e c t plan. P l a c e units

New PBM System

by Tony L e a l The m a i n advantage that this s y s t e m h a s o v e r the c u r r e n t o n e is t h a t the b a s e 6 combat r e s u l t s t a b l e s m a y be used instead of the base-10 ones. That i s , i t i s possible to s i m u l a t e the r o l l of the die (without any cheating) and thus eliminate the u s e of n e w s p a p e r s .

PAGE 13
where they a r e in the b e s t position of f a r t h e r e s t r e a c h , and the b e s t t a c t i c a l l i n e u p t o "bring about d e s i r e d r e s u l t s " . You m u s t have taken c a r e of everything behind your f a r t h e r e s t penetration t o f u r t h e r exploit possibilities. The f i r s t move i s the m o s t important s t e p of the game. It h a s t o b e t a c t i c a l l y p e r f e c t . Even if i t i s not, you s t i l l have your g e n e r a l plan t o f a l l 'back on. Avoid doing the unbalancing a c t . 6. You can not make a l l the right decisions, o r b e tactical: only c a r e f u l study of your g a m e , principles and plans, c a n give you the fluidn e s s that you want and need in the cont e s t . But, the b e s t s t a r t possible t o fluidness i s complete knowledge of t h e r u l e s ! The w o r s t m i s t a k e possible i s to m i s i n t e r p r e t the r u l e s ; m a j o r q u e s tions will b e c o v e r e d in the r u l e s . 7. Most of the t i m e you will have t o play it by e a r ; l e t your e a r be your directive ! POINTS O F CONCLUSION A. D i r e c t i v e s a r e a l l i m p o r t a n t , but included in a l m o s t a l l d i r e c t i v e s a r e two i m p o r t a n t f a c t s : penetration and d i s t r u c t i o n of enemy units. Both a r e i m p o r t a n t in m o s t a l l g a m e s ; but usually one will have p r e c e d e n c e o v e r the o t h e r . B. Most of the t i m e , not a l l of the f o r c e s availably a r e needed f o r offensive o r defensive. P l a n r e s e r v e s , l a r g e r e s e r v e s , in a c e n t r a l communications a r e a ; but r e m e m b e r , don't make i t look like r e s e r v e s . R e s e r v e s a r e offense. Keep the opponent guessing! A sudden m a s s on a bled f r o n t can have d i s a s t r o u s effect on the enemy. Pulling r e s e r v e s i s the h a r d e s t thing t o b r i n g off of a l l ; the temptation i s g r e a t when you follow through with the p r o p e r r e s e r v e s . CONCLUSION: Any plan can b e d e feated with p r o p e r action, thought, a n d knowledge. You m u s t d r a w your own conclusions about plans ! REMEMBER: a n i n c r e a s e in c h a n c e s of 1070(60% t o t a l ) initiative i s not s o g r e a t a winning m a r gin. The t r i c k i s t o keep the initiative! Comments to: Doyle ( B a r o n B l i t z ) Donehoo. 38372 Moab Drive, F r e m o n t ( N i l e s ) , California 94536. s e l v e s shortly t h e r e a f t e r and the Jap l o s t anyhow. The point I wish t o m a k e h e r e i s that initial Japanese c a s u a l t i e s a r e usually needlessly high. T h i s r e s u l t s . I believe, f r o m t h r e e Japanese m i s t a k e s . F i r s t , the Japanese commander often divides h i s f o r c e s during t h e f i r s t day. Second, h e allows himself t o b e attacked, i. e . , t o be within r a n g e , m o r e than the one unavoidable period the f i r s t day; and finally, h e u s e s a poor defense posture. T h e f i r s t two m a y b e a s c r i b e d t o ignora n c e , accident, o r f a t a l i s t experimentation; the l a s t i s due only t o l a z i n e s s . Anyone who c a n doodle a checker design a n d play around with the a i r defense f a c t o r s should b e a b l e t o come up with a m a x i m u m defense-point and ship-placem e n t defense f o r h i s c a r r i e r s . I ' m s u r p r i s e d that no one h a s s o f a r publ i s h e d the r e s u l t , (to my knowledge i t h a s n ' t b e e n ) and s o I hope h e r e t o r e m e d y t h i s situation. Below i s the "best" initial placement, hopefully r e produced c o r r e c t l y :

THE GENERAL

Contest #I4 Winners

July's contest e n t r a n t s w e r e a sad l o t of D e s t r o y e r E s c o r t commanders. Over 80% of the e n t r a n t s had t o be d i s qualified b e c a u s e they violated the DE movement r e s t r i c t i o n s a s established in the U-BOAT game. Of those r e m a i n ing only t h r e e s c o r e d d i r e c t h i t s on the U-boat which w a s located on s q u a r e E a t 200 feet. The remaining winners w e r e t h o s e who s c o r e d n e a r m i s s e s t o round out the 10 w i n n e r s f o r the month. They a r e : 1. R i c h a r d Locke, 2232 Wesley, Evanston, Illinois. 2. Jeff B e r g s t r a n d . 1235 Swansea A v e . , Ventura, California. 3. B r i a n D o r r i s , 1037 Ewe11 Road, Virginia Beach, Virginia. 4. M a r k Dumdei, 4046 P a r k Lane. Dallas, Texas. 5. Bill Haggart, 9627 Maryknoll A v e . , Whittier, California. 6. L a r n e d E. Runnels. 206 Rock Valley, San Antonio, Texas. 7. I l m a r P a e g l e , 12 M a r i e Street, D o r c h e s t e r , Massachusetts. 8. C h r i s Thompson. 3302 High Meadows. Abilene, Texas. 9. B r i a n DeVries, 464 Kenwood, Grand Rapids, Michigan. 10. A r t h u r Negler, Rt. 2, Willerton. N. Carolina.

The four t h r e e s inside a r e the c a r r i e r s . Reading f r o m left to right, top t o bottom, I suggest they be Kaga, H i r yu, Soryu, Akagi. Playing your c a r d s r i g h t , your ships should b e subjected t o just one attack. I suggest you l e a v e your f i g h t e r s o v e r h e a d and send a l l o t h e r s to him. You should be able t o get a c a r r i e r and the Atlanta; m o s t likely you will l o s e one c a r r i e r , but only a t considerable c o s t of A m e r i c a n a i r c r a f t . T h e l a r g e number of s h i p s supporting each c a r r i e r demand this. If he m a k e s a r e a l a t t a c k a g a i n s t two of your c a r r i e r s , c h a n c e s of your s a v ing both ( a l l ) a r e a t l e a s t a s g r e a t a s your losing two. The above sketch-plan w a s designed f o r g a m e s allowing a l l - a r o u n d attack. How well the defense setup a p p l i e s t o the baby v e r s i o n , I wouldn't know. since I n e v e r play s o unrealistically. Before closing, I might t o s s out t h i s final suggestion. If, a s e i t h e r comm a n d e r , you d e s p e r a t e l y wish t o find the enemy f l e e t , t r y sending out ONE SQUADRON of a l l but your f i g h t e r s t o e v e r y likely s e c t o r ; you can always a b o r t , saving even the one squadron. If you want to cover a big a r e a without using nine squadrons p e r s q u a r e , u s e five in a c r o s s p a t t e r n instead. Send c o m m e n t s t o John Michalski, 341 E. Schiller S t . , Milwaukee. Wis. 53207.

Suggestions with Merit.. .

F r o m Joel Davis, 4920 E. Willock R d . , P i t t s b u r g h , c o m e s the suggestion that movement onto a s q u a r e vacated by the l o s e r should b e allowed always r e g a r d l e s s of whether o r not the d e f e n d e r h a s been doubled ( o r t r i p l e d ) in combat. The ability t o s e i z e captured positions t h r o w s a n e n t i r e l y different s t r a t e g y into many g a m e s . Henry Bodenstedt. 86 Manalapan Ave. , F r e e h o l d , New J e r s e y , suggests that a m o r e r e a l i s t i c approach t o Avalon Hill gaming .would be in the ruling that f o r b i d s p l a y e r s to uncover stacked enemy Units to d e t e r m i n e t h e i r exact s t r e n g t h . He a r g u e s that in r e a l life, a battle commander n e v e r knows what the e n e m y ' s exact strength i s . Involking t h i s r u l e would a l s o . help speed up the play of many g a m e s such a s Staling r a d , Bulge. D-Day and those which have many Units in play a t one time. Attacking under t h i s s y s t e m would r e q u i r e p l a y e r s t o make educated g u e s s e s a s t o exact enemy strength and if one happens t o end up with a n a t t a c k of, s a y 29-10, then t h a t ' s the way the cookie crumbles. Many of o u r s u b s c r i b e r s dislike having t o cut out the Opponents W-anted F o r m s f r o m The General. Okay, fell o w s , w e ' l l a c c e p t photostats o r facsimile's.

Midway the First Day

by John Michalski Most people would a d v i s e that Japan e s e t a c t i c s i n Midway should b e t h o s e of waiting f o r the Atago group and then going f o r w a r d t o Midway l i k e a s t e a m r o l l e r ; well, t h e y ' r e right! I have s e e n just one g a m e i n which a n a l t e r n a t i v e s t r a t e g y w a s u s e d with any d e g r e e of s u c c e s s . The J a p s e n t the Hiryu a n d Soryu s t r a i g h t t o Midway undetected and reduced i t f a s t . N e e d l e s s t o say, Hiryu and Soryu w e r e reduced t h e m -

PAGE 15

THE GENERAL

OPPO~ Wanted ~ ~ ~Form S

Capt. Marvin L. Worley, J r . , A Digest of New Developments: ~ a r r i s y b u r g , P a . ; M i l i t a r y S e r v i c e Publishing Company, 1958. Dewey Decimal Numb e r 35582 WR L i b r a r y of C o n g r e s s Number 58-6977. Good f o r d e s c r i p t i o n of c u r r e n t weapons and a r t i l l e r y r a n g e table pp 19-20; a l s o s o m e c o m p a r i s o n of 1955 units with 1948 units. Col. Lewis B. Elv. ,. T h e R e d A r m v Today; H a r r i s b u r g ; M i l i t a r y S e r v i c e Publishing Company, 1949. 1951, 1953. Check the Appendices on pp 239, 249, & 254 f o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s of World War I I u n i t s . It w a s a v e r y i n f o r m a t i v e book. PP 249-53 c o m p a r e s US and R u s s i a n 1948 organizations. E d g a r O'Ballance, T h e R e d A r m y , London: F a b e r & F a b e r . 1964. Check the World War I1 s e c t i o n on pp 156-188 a n d post w a r developments. He d o e s give the p r e s e n t a n d 1948 Soviet divisional o r g a n i z a t i o n s and strength estimates.
-- -

B e c a u s e s u b s c r i p t i o n s to this m a g a zine have quadrupled i n the p a s t y e a r t h e r e h a s been a flood of opponents

wanted a d s . We now find i t n e c e s s a r y to l i m i t t h e m i n o r d e r t o get t h e m a l l published. Beginning with the Septemb e r i s s u e , t h e r e f o r e no a d will be ins e r t e d u n l e s s w r i t t e n on the following

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CONTEST NO. 15
I
You, a s C o r p o r a t i o n P r e s i d e n t i n Management, a r e f a c e d with a s t r a n g ling inventory problem. The fate of your company hinges o n your e x a c t "prediction" of what next month's M a r k e t Values will be. The Raw M a t e r i a l and F i n i s h e d Inventory M a r k e t Values f o r next month will be d e t e r m i n e d by the c l o s i n g New York Stock Exchange t r a n s a c t i o n s of O c t o b e r 10, 1966. The l a s t digit of the s a l e s-in-hundreds column will be consulted: Goodyear f o r Raw M a t e r i a l M a r k e t Value; I. B. M. f o r F i n i s h e d Inventory M a r k e t Value. The o b j e c t is two-fold: ( 1 ) to p r e d i c t a s c l o s e a s p o s s i b l e what the Raw M a t e r i a l M a r k e t Value will be without bidding under the value.. a n underbid m e a n s disqualification; ( 2 ) to p r e d i c t a s c l o s e a s p o s s i b l e what the F i n i s h e d Inventory M a r k e t Value will be without bidding o v e r the value.. a n o v e r b i d m e a n s disqualification. All p r e d i c t i o n s should be m a d e using only those d o l l a r v a l u e s shown o n the M a r k e t Value Chart. Last Digit M a r k e t Value C h a r t Goodyear Raw Material

I. B. M. Finished Inventory

' Market Prediction Sheet

I
Raw Material F i n i s h e d Inventory

I
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