Oct 6, 2013 Neha Pinto | Semester 3 | M.A.

Philosophy, Part 2 Summary: A Critical Look At Speech Act Theory-Jens Allwood(Dept Linguistics, Gteborg University) The paper begins with mentioning how linguistic communication is in actuality only a special case of a general theory of human action. The differences between various linguistic subdisciplines such as phonology, morphology, etc should relate the properties of the phenomenon being examined to the function of a communicative action. According to funtionalist if this is achieved, then the linguistic theory would achieve both increased exhaustiveness and simplicity and internal coherence. The author adds that in order to achieve the above placed proposition a conceptual framework for the description of action must be established along with an internal structure that describes the relationship between linguistic phenomena and action in a detailed way. The paper is a critical discussion of Austin and Searles models, and the authors inputs on how each of their methods can be improved. I have summarized my understanding of the critical discussion of Austins model by the author.

Austin The author begins with quoting Austins distinctions between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects. Austin 1962, 108: performing a locutionary act is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference which is equivalent to meaning in the traditional sense. Second, we said that we also perform illocutionary actsutterances which have a certain conventional force. Thirdly, we may also perform perlocutionary actssurprising or misleading. The author criticizes the use of the term act by Austin. Austin uses the term act in a way that it seems like he is talking about temporally distinct activities rather than simultaneous aspects of the same action. Austin also doesnt discuss the distinction as applied to linguistic utterances. The author feels that Austins distinctions are really concerned with the locutionary aspect: e.g. 1. The bus is crowded. The locutionary aspect of the sentence speaks of the number or density of people in the bus. But in the case of a sentence like: 2) I assure you that I will come for the party. When the speakers utter such a statement he is obliged to vouch for the ttruth of all statement he makes as he is committing himself for a future action. The actual force of this action is derived from the

conventions governing the making of statements in conjunction with the conventional context of the word assure Therefore recognition of illocutionary force is often a function of among other things, comprehension of the locutionary dimension of an utterance. Next the author discusses in what sense are illocutionary forces conventional. 3) Theres a fire in the forest. 4) I warn you theres a fire in the forest. The discussion that follows is highly complicated, as the author brings in the lexical context and complicates the entire matter by discussing it at length without articulating what exactly it wants to establish. Sentence 4 is a warning and it is clear that it has the force of a warning. But the author goes ahead and discusses religion obligations which seem to be in no way related to what it was trying to discuss in the first place. The author then further divides the illocutionary force that are not tied to so-called performatives that occur in highly institutionalized contexts: a.Lexcical Conventions and b. Modal Conventions (a certain syntactic arrangement) The author then brings about the problem of what makes a certain utterance or, into a communicative action of a specific type? And suggests an answer by saying that the identity of a communicative action should be determined in exactly the same way as the identity of other actions. To the extent that our ordinary concept of actions suffers from a certain unclarity, so will the notion of communicative action. The author then suggests four common ways of identifying an action. One way is to identify an action through the effects or results of the action. An agent who is driving a car can be said to be polluting the air even though this is not his intention in driving the car. A second type of identification relies on the intentions and purposes an agent connects with an action. For example, it is possible to say of a person A that he is making a chair before the chair has been finished. A third type of identification is tied to the form of behavior an agent exhibits in performing an action. Fourthly, identification can sometimes be accomplished solely on the basis of contextual extrapolation. Some behavior can be classed as action of a specific type just because it occurs in a certain context.

But the question that remains is whether the illocutionary force of a warning be identified with 1. the intention to warn, i.e. with the intention of evoking awareness of danger in somebody,

2. some specific type of overt behavior, 3. certain specific contexts or 4. some person actually being warned, i.e. becoming aware of danger connected with his course of action? The author believes that it is difficult to see just what role the notion of illocutionary force can play in a theory of communication which includes non-institutionalized communicative actions. Austin's Notion of Perlocutionary Act Quoting the author: It should perhaps be noted that the difficulty of distinguishing between intended and achieved effect would also adhere to an attempt to characterize illocutionary force in terms of the social consequences of an action, since one should then distinguish between intended and achieved social consequences. Thus, while I fully acknowledge Austin's pioneering contribution to the study of the relationship between action and communication, I am somewhat critical of certain aspects of his account. The author expects Austin to either further explicate the concepts he has proposed or give a new terminology and conceptual framework to his works. All in all, the author proposes that the features of communicative and other actions be considered as a more suitable conceptual framework for the study of communicative actions.