Cayetano v. Monsod G.R. No.

100113, September 3, 1991 Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void. Issue: Whether the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution? Held: The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C, that there shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 197273. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years.

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called "associates." Hence, the Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown. Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, he Court said that, Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.

Cayetano v. Monsod FACTS Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC on April 25, 1991. Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsods nomination, petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void because Monsod did not meet the requirement of having practiced law for the last ten years. ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. HELD: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyereconomist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyernegotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

RENATO L. CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD September 3, 1991 | G.R. No. 100113 Facts: - President Corazon Aquino Appointed Christian Monsod as the chairman of COMELEC. - Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because according to him, the respondent fall short of the ten year requirement for the position. - The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied) - June 5, 1991: COA approved the appointment. - June 18, 1991: Monsod took his oath and assumed office. - Petitioner prayed for certiorari and prohibition against Monsod. Issue: Whether or not Monsod is engaged in the practice of law for more than ten years. Held: Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyermanager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsods confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commissions judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Courts corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would

amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.

CAYETANO VS. MONSOD comelec practice of law

Christian Monsod was nominated by President Cory as Chairman of Comelec. Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years. According to the Consti, members of Comelec must have been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years The CA nevertheless confirmed the nomination of Monsod. He took his oath of office and assumed office as Chair. Cayetano, as citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for Prohibition, praying tha the confirmation and appointment of Monsod be declared null and void.

ISSUE: Whether Monsod possessed the qualification that he had engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years?

SC: YES. The practice of law is defined as the rendition of services requiring the knowledge and application of legal principles and techniques to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising or assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the

preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising persons as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective before any court, commission, referee, board, body committee, etc, and in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. As long as the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions, then it is a practice of law.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform the acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generaly, the practice of law is to give notice or render any kind of service which requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.

PRIVATE PRACTICE = means an individual or organization (firm) engaged in the business of delivering legal services. But most lawyers do not only spend time in litigation or courtrooms. Substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time business counseling rather than trying cases.

Background of Atty Monsod:

After graduating from UP College of Law, he worked in the law office of his father. He then worked for the World Bank as operations officer in Costa Rica y Panama. After returning to the Philippines, he worked with Meralco, served as CEO of bank, and subsequently of a business conglomerate. In 1986, he has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or adviser. He was also Sec-Gen and Chairman of Namfrel, and in fact appeared before the Comelec during the hearing for accreditation. He became a member of the Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body investigating on the coup detats. He was a member of the Con-Com, and Chairman of its Committee of Accountability of Public Officers.

Interpreted in the light of the modern concept of law practice, and taking into account the liberal construction of the Constitution, Atty Monsods past experience as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, lawyer-negotiator, lawyer-legislator, verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement. He has engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.

Padilla Dissenting: Practice of law is commonly understood as actual performance or actual application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge. It connotes active, habitual, repeated or customary action. It would be like a doctor who is employed and habitually performing the tasks of a nurse, he cannot be said to be in the practice of medicine. Just as a CPA who works as a clerk, cannot be said to be practicing his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of the legal department, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

Gutierrez Dissenting:

To be engaged in the practice of law requires committed participation in something which is the result of ones decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in an enterprise, one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with an intent and attention. The practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional. Seasonal, intermittent, or extemporaneous.

MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO comelec temporary appointments

President GMA appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman,3 and Borra4 and Tuason5 as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all expiring on February 2, 2008. They all took their oath of office and assumed the positions. The Office of the President submitted to the Commission on Appointments the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for confirmation.6 However, the Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments. President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions and for the same term of seven years. They took their oaths of office for a second time. The Office of the President transmitted their appointments to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act on their appointments. In his capacity as Comelec Chair, Benipayo issued a Memorandum, reassigning Matibag to the from the Education Department to the Law Department Matibag sought reconsideration, arguing that transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period, both by the Election Code and a Civil Service Memorandum Matibag filed an administrative and criminal case against Benipayo. Matibag also questioned the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members. Petitioner posits the view that an ad interim appointment can be withdrawn or revoked by the President at her pleasure, and can even be disapproved or simply by-passed by the Commission on Appointments. For this reason, petitioner claims that an ad interim appointment is temporary in character and consequently prohibited by the last sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. The rationale behind petitioners theory is that only an appointee who is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments can guarantee the independence of the COMELEC. A confirmed appointee is beyond the influence of the President or members of the Commission on Appointments since his appointment

can no longer be recalled or disapproved. Prior to his confirmation, the appointee is at the mercy of both the appointing and confirming powers since his appointment can be terminated at any time for any cause. Petitioner also agues that assuming the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are constitutional, the renewal of the their ad interim appointments and their subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. Petitioner theorizes that once an ad interim appointee is bypassed by the Commission on Appointments, his ad interim appointment can no longer be renewed because this will violate Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution which prohibits reappointments. Petitioner asserts that this is particularly true to permanent appointees who have assumed office, which is the situation of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason if their ad interim appointments are deemed permanent in character.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution; 2. Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution; SC: 1. MATIBAG IS WRONG. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis.

2. An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. Thus, a by-passed appointment can be considered again if the President renews the appointment. In short, an ad interim appointment ceases to be effective upon disapproval by the Commission, because the incumbent can not continue holding office over the positive objection of the Commission. It ceases, also, upon "the next adjournment of the Congress", simply because the President may then issue new appointments - not because of implied disapproval of the Commission deduced from its inaction during the session of Congress, for, under the Constitution, the Commission may affect adversely the interim appointments only by action, never by omission. If the adjournment of Congress were an implied disapproval of ad interim appointments made prior thereto, then the President could no longer appoint those so by-passed by the Commission. But, the fact is that the President may reappoint them, thus clearly indicating that the reason for said termination of the ad interim appointments is not the disapproval thereof allegedly inferred from said omission of the Commission, but the circumstance that upon said adjournment of the Congress, the President is free to make ad interim appointments or reappointments." The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under

Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A bypassed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.

Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that "[t]he Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed x x x for a term of seven years without reappointment." (Emphasis supplied) There are four situations where this provision will apply. The first situation is where an ad interim appointee to the COMELEC, after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, serves his full seven-year term. Such person cannot be reappointed to the COMELEC, whether as a member or as a chairman, because he will then be actually serving more than seven years. The second situation is where the appointee, after confirmation, serves a part of his term and then resigns before his seven-year term of office ends. Such person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or as a chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more than seven years. The third situation is where the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired term of someone who died or resigned, and the appointee completes the unexpired term. Such person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more than seven years. The fourth situation is where the appointee has previously served a term of less than seven years, and a vacancy arises from death or resignation. Even if it will not result in his serving more than seven years, a reappointment of such person to serve an unexpired term is also prohibited because his situation will be similar to those appointed under the second sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. This provision refers to the first appointees under the Constitution whose terms of office are less than seven years, but are barred from ever being reappointed under any situation. Not one of these four situations applies to the case of Benipayo, Borra or Tuason.

To foreclose this interpretation, the phrase "without reappointment" appears twice in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the present Constitution. The first phrase prohibits reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of seven years. The second phrase prohibits reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of five or three years pursuant to the first set of appointees under the Constitution. In either case, it does not matter if the person previously appointed completes his term of office for the intention is to prohibit any reappointment of any kind. However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral action could start and complete the running of a term of office in the COMELEC without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of the Commission on Appointments. The phrase "without reappointment" applies only to one who has been appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not such person completes his term of office. There must be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the previous appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can apply. To hold otherwise will lead to absurdities and negate the Presidents power to make ad interim appointments. In the great majority of cases, the Commission on Appointments usually fails to act, for lack of time, on the ad interim appointments first issued to appointees. If such ad interim appointments can no longer be renewed, the President will certainly hesitate to make ad interim appointments because most of her appointees will effectively be disapproved by mere inaction of the Commission on Appointments. This will nullify the constitutional power of the President to make ad interim appointments, a power intended to avoid disruptions in vital government services. This Court cannot subscribe to a proposition that will wreak havoc on vital government services.

The prohibition on reappointment is common to the three constitutional commissions. The framers of the present Constitution prohibited reappointments for two reasons. The first is to prevent a second appointment for those who have been previously appointed and confirmed even if they served for less than seven years. The second is to insure that the members of the three constitutional commissions do not serve beyond the fixed term of seven years.

As to the transfer of Matibag COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel should carry the concurrence of the COMELEC as a collegial body. Interpreting Resolution No. 3300 to require such concurrence will render the resolution meaningless since the COMELEC en banc will have to approve every personnel transfer or reassignment, making the resolution utterly useless. Resolution No. 3300 should be interpreted for what it is, an approval to effect transfers and reassignments of personnel, without need of securing a second approval from the COMELEC en banc to actually implement such transfer or reassignment. The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized by law to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel. The person holding that office, in a de jure capacity, is Benipayo. The COMELEC en banc, in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, approved the transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel during the election period. Thus, Benipayos order reassigning petitioner from the EID to the Law Department does not violate Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code.

Matibag vs Benipayo GR No. 149036 April 2, 2002 Maria J. Angelina G. Matibag questions the constitutionality of the appointment by President Arroyo of Benipayo (Chairman of the Commission on Elections), and Bora and Tuason (COMELEC Commissioners). She questions the legality of appointment by Benipayo of Velma J. Cinco as Director IV of the Comelecs EID and reassigning her to the Law department. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Issues: Instant petition satisfies all requirements Assumption of office by Benipayo, Bora and Tuason; ad interim appointments amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Sec 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution Renewal of ad interim violated the prohibition on reappointment under Sec 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution Benipayos removal of petitioner is illegal OIC of COMELECs Finance Services Department acting in excess jurisdiction Matibags Argument: Failure to consult for reassignment Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No 7; transferring and detailing employees are prohibited during the election period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001 Reassignment violated Sec 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258 Ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Bora and Tuason violated the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC Illegal removal or reassignment Challenges the designation of Cinco Questions the disbursement made by COMELEC No ad interim appointment to the COMELEC or to Civil Service Commission and COA Sec 1 (2) of Article IX-C; an ad interim appointee cannot assume office until confirmed by the Commission on Appointments Benipayos Argument: Comelec Resolution No. 3300 Petitioner does not have personal interest, not directly injured Failure to question constitutionality of ad interim appointments at the earliest opportunity. She filed only after third time of reappointments Ad interim is not the lis mota because the real issue is the legality of petitioners reassignment.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

1. 2. 3. 4.

Rules of Court: Real issue is whether or not Benipayo is the lawful Chairman of the Comelec 2. Petitioner has a personal and material stake. 3. It is not the date of filing of the petition that determines whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest point. The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleading. 4. Questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue before a competent body. 5. Ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn. It is not the nature of appointment but the manner on which appointment was made. It will avoid interruptions that would result to prolonged vacancies. It is limited the evil sought to be avoided. 6. Termination of Ad interim appointment (Sword of Damocles); (1) disapproval (2) recess 7. Two modes of appointment: (1) in session (2) in recess 8. By-passed appointments (1) lack of time/failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize, (2) subject of reconsideration, (3) can be revived since there is no final disapproval 9. Four situations in for a term of seven years without replacement: (1) serves his full seven-year term, (2) serves a part of his term and then resigns before his seven-year term, (3) served the unexpired term of someone who died or resigned, (4) served a term of less than seven years, and a vacancy arises from death or resignation. Not one of the four situation applies to the case of Benipayo, Borra or Tuason 10. Reappointment cannot be applied; (1) appointed by president, (2) confirmed by Commission on Appointments 11. Without reappointment means: (first phrase) prohibits reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of seven years (second phrase) prohibits reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of 5 or 3 years pursuant to the first set of appointees 12. Reasons for prohibition of reappointments: (1) prevent second appointment (2) not serve beyond the fixed term 13. Two important amendments: (1) requiring the consent by Commission of Appointments (2) prohibition on serving beyond the fixed term of 7 years 14. Twin Prohibition (ironclad): (1) prohibition of reappointments (2) prohibition of temporary or acting appointments 15. Third issue not violation because the previous appointments were not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. 16. Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC Chairman. He is not required by law to secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc. 1.

17. The petitioner is acting only temporary because a permanent appointment can be issued only upon meeting all the requirements. COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 refers only to COMELEC field personnel not to head office personnel.

PANGILINAN VS. COMELEC jurisdiction of comelec

Kiko Pangilinan and Sonny Belmonte were both candidates for congressman in the 4th District of QC during the 1992 elections. Cadano, as registered voter, filed a petition for disqualification against Belmonte, for allegedly violating Sec 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, by giving money and other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters. (that Belmonte gave sack of rice, medicine, P5000 cash, free trip for 2 to HKG) Kiko and Cadano filed an urgent motion to suspend the canvassing and/or proclamation of Belmonte, so that their petition for disqualification would not become moot and academic. During the Canvass, Kiko objected to over 120 election returns being canvassed, alleging that they were tampered, altered or spurious. The City Board of Canvassers overruled the objections of Kiko. The reason was that under Sec 15 of Ra 7166, pre-proclamation controversies are not allowed in the election of Congressmen. Thus the canvassing continued. Thus, Kiko assailed the constitutionality of RA 7166, disallowing preproclamation controversies in the election of Congressmen. Kiko argues that this is violative of Sec 3, Art IX-C of the Constitution which vests in the Comelec the power to hear and decide pre-proclamation controversies without distinction as to whether the controversy involved the election of Congressmen, or local elective officials. According to him, the phrase pre-proclamation controversies in Art IX-C embraces all kinds of preproc controversies such as those of the election of Congressmen. over pre-proclamation

ISSUE; Does the Comelec have jurisdiction controversies for the election of Congressmen?

SC: NO JURISDICTION. Sec 2 of Art IX-C vests in the Comelec exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of all elective REGIONAL, PROVINCIAL, AND CITY OFFICIALS. It has no jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the House. Under Article VI, it is the HRET who is the sole judge of all

contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House.

Thus the phrase pre-proc controversies in Art IX-C, should be construed as referring only to those falling within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of Comelec, that is, election pertaining to regional, provincial and city officials.

RA 7166 is still VALID.

Since Sonny Belmonte has already been proclaimed winner, and has taken oath and assumed office, the remedy of Kiko was to file an electoral protest with the HRET.

SARMIENTO VS. COMELEC comelec pre-proc controversies/ division vs. en banc

This is a consolidated special civil action for certiorari seeking to set aside the various Comelec Resolutions in special cases. Among the resolutions were: o Ordering the exclusion of election returns from the canvass o Dismissing petitioners opposition to the composition of the Board of Canvassers o Rejecting the petitioners objection to certain election returns. Petitioners claim that these decisions were in gadalej, and that the Comelec sitting en banc, took cognizance of the cases without first referring them to any of its divisions. Petitioners claim that under Sec 3, Art IX-C, election cases shall be heard and decided in divisions, provided hat MR of the decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

ISSUE: Whether the pre-proclamation controversies should be decided first by division

SC: It is clear from the provision of the constitution that election cases included pre-proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the Comelec. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance.

Under the Comelec Rules of Procedure, with respect to pre-proc controversies, the 2 Divisions of the Comelec are vested with the authority to hear and decide those special cases. It is recognized that the appeals from the rulings of the Board of Canvassers are cognizable by any of the Divisions, to which they are assigned, and not by the Commission en banc.

A MR on the decision of the Division may be filed within 5 days from its promulgation, after which the clerk of court will notify the Presiding Commissioner, who shall certify the case to the Comelec En Banc.

Here, the Comelec En Banc acted in gadalej when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the special cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Said resolutions are therefore null and void. Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a Division.

**Note the cases have been rendered moot and academic because RA 7116 provides that all pre-proc controversies pending shall be deemed terminated once the term of office has begun. The term of office involved in the special cases commenced at noon of June 30, 1992. Thus, the petitions are dismissed.

ATIENZA vs. COMELEC Case Digest ATIENZA vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 108533, Dec. 20 1994 Facts: Private respondent Antonio G. Sia was elected mayor of the Municipality of Madrilejos, Cebu in the 1998 local elections. Following Sias proclamation, petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court questioning the results of the elections in a number of precincts in the municipality. Consequently, in the revision ordered by the lower court, petitioner obtained a plurality of 12 votes over the private respondent. The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision declaring petitioner the winner of the municipal elections and ordering the private respondent to reimburse petitioner the amount of P300,856.19 representing petitioners expenses in the election protest. Private respondent appealed. Meanwhile, the Regional trial Court granted petitioners motion for execution pending appeal, which was opposed by respondent. The Comelec issued a preliminary injunction stopping the enforcement of the order of execution. The Comelec, en banc, on April 7, 1992 issued an Order setting aside the preliminary injunction and thereby allowing petitioner to assume as mayor of the Municipality of Madrilejos pending resolution of his appeal. However, following the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, the Presiding Commissioner of the Comelecs Second Division issued an Order dated July 18, 1992 dismissing petitioners appeal for being moot and academic. Issue: Whether or not the Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion in reversing the lower courts judgment. Held: The dismissal of an appeal in an election protest case for having become moot and academic due to the election of new municipal officials referred only to that part of the appealed judgment which was affected by the election and not to that portion relating to the award of damages. However, it would appear virtually impossible for a party in an election protest case to recover actual or compensatory damages in the absence of a law expressly providing for situations allowing for the recovery of the same. This, petitioner has been unable to do. The intent of the legislature to do away with provisions indemnifying the victorious party for expenses incurred in an election contest in the absence of a wrongful act or omission clearly attributable to the losing party cannot be gainsaid in fine, Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code merely provides for the granting of actual and compensatory damages in accordance with law. The intent, moreover, to do away with such provisions merely recognizes the maxim, settled in law

that a wrong without damage or damage without wrong neither constitutes a cause of action nor creates a civil obligation.

Atienza vs. Comelec FACTS: Private respondent Antonio G. Sia was elected mayor of the Municipality of Madrilejos, Cebu in the 1988 local elections obtaining a plurality of 126 votes over his nearest rival, herein petitioner Lou A .Atienza. Following Sia's proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court questioning the results of the elections in a number of precincts in the municipality. Consequently, in the revision ordered by the lower court, petitionerobtained a total of 2,826 votes, a plurality of 12 votes over theprivate respondent. On April 12, 1989 the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision declaring petitioner the winner of the municipal elections and ordering the private respondent to reimburse petitioner the amountof P300,856.19 representing petitioner's expenses in the election protest. Private respondent appealed the trial court's decision to the COMELEC raising as errors 1) the computation of the number of votes received by the candidates; and 2) the alleged award of "excessive damages" in favor of the petitioner. The case was docketed and assigned to the COMELEC's Second Division. The COMELEC, en banc , issued an Order setting aside the preliminary injunction and thereby allowing petitioner to assume as mayor of the Municipality of Madrilejos pending resolution of his appeal.

 However, following the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, the Presiding Commissioner of the COMELEC's Second Division issued an Order dated July 18, 1992 dismissing petitioner's appeal for being moot and academic pursuant to the Commission's decision in Resolution No. 2494 declaring the election protest and appeal cases
as well as petitions for special relief
arising out of the January18, 1988 elections dismissed and terminated as of June 30,1992. On January 28, 1993, respondent Commission en banc released its questioned resolution, the dispositive portion of which states: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that the dismissal of the appeal by the Commission( Second Division ) f o r b e i n g m o o t a n d a c a d e m i c b e c a u s e o f t h e expiration of the term of office of the contested position did not thereby revive the vacated judgment of the Regional Trial Court, said appealed judgment to remain vacated, not having been resolved on the merits by the Commission for or against any of the parties; and the judgment directing the protestee-appellant to reimburse the protestantappellee the amount of P300,856.19 representing his expenses in the election protest, is hereby REVERSED , said judgment not being in accordance with law in the absence of any evidence of a n y w r o n g f u l , o r n e g l i g e n t a c t o r o m i s s i o n o n t h e p a r t o f t h e protestee appellant to justify the award. ISSUE(S)/HELD: Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it issued its Resolution of January 28, 1993 reversing the lower court's judgment awarding damages to herein petitioner after it had earlier dismissed for being moot and academic. NO.RATIO: The Omnibus Election Code provides: Actual or compensatory damages may be granted in all election contests or in quo warranto proceedings in accordance with law. Provisions for actual or compensatory damages under the law areembodied in various Civil Code articles allowing claims for damages under specific circumstances. Thus, Article 2176 provides: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault o rnegligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the

parties is called a quasi delict , and is governed by the provisionsof this chapter. Specifically, Article 2199 of the Civil Code mandates that: Except asprovided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. Given this setting, it would appear virtually impossible for a party in an election protest case to recover actual or compensatory damages in the absence of the conditions specified under Articles 2201 and2202 of the Civil Code, or in the absence of a law expressly providingfor situations allowing for the recovery of the same . I t f o l l o w s , naturally, that in most election protest cases where the monetary claim does not hinge on either a contract or quasi -contract or atortious act or omission, the claimant must be able to point out to a specific provision of law authorizing a money claim for election protest expenses against the losing party . This, petitioner has been unable to do. Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code merely provides for the granting of actual and compensatory damages in accordance with law. That it was the intent of the legislature to do away w i t h provisions indemnifying the victorious party for expenses incurred in an election contest in the absence of a wrongful act or omission clearly attributable to the losing party cannot be gainsaid. The intent ,moreover, to do away with such provisions merely recognizes themaxim, settled in law that a wrong without damage or damage without wrong neither constitutes a cause of action nor creates a civil obligation.

MISON VS. COA coa decisions

Mison was the Commissioner of Customs. He declared the seizure of a Japanese vessel, MV Hyojin as invalid. He thus ordered the release of said vessel. However, the vessel was not released. It sank while in the custody of the Bureau of Customs Chan then filed a claim with the COA for the value of the sunken vessel. ($50,000) By authority of the Acting Chair, Mr. Espiritu (who was the Manager of the Technical Services), denied the claim. The claimants thus questioned the authority of Mr. Espiritu in denying the claim. Thru their lawyer Atty David, moved for the reconsideration, writing a letter to the Acting COA Chair Tantuico. He argued that the decision in the case was rendered only by the Manager, and not by the Acting Chairman, much less the COA itself. He contends that the decision is void because the matter should be acted upon only by the COA duly constituted (ie, by the Chair and the 2 Comm.) (at this time, the COA is not yet fully constituted) Acting COA Chair Tantuico denied the claim as well. Tantuico adopted the Espiritu decision. Again, Atty David moved for reconsideration, now arguing that Acting Chair Tantuico also had no authority to act on the case. He requested that the same be submitted for resolution by the COA itself, after the appointment of 2 commissioners. Later, the COA was finally fully constituted. Atty David still wrote another letter, for the payment of their claims. In a 4th Indorsement, Chairman Domingo, acting for the Commission, reconsidered the decision of Acting Chairman Tantuico. Chairman Domingo granted the claim. He forwarded the decision to grant the claim to Mison. Mison now sought clarification on the legal implication of the 4th Indorsement. He contends that the first COA decision, although signed only by a Manger Espiritu, was ratified or made valid because it was adopted in toto as a decision of the COA in the subsequent letters.

SC: INVALID.

In the first place, the decision by the Manager Espiritu was void ab initio. As Manager of the Technical Services, Mr. Espiritu obviously had no power to render or promulgate a decision of or for the Commission. Even the Chairman alone, had not that power. As clearly set out in the Constitution, the power was lodged in the COA, composed of a Chairman and 2 Commissioners, to decide any case brought before it.

Hence, the adoption or ratification of the Espiritu decision by Acting Chair Tantuico was inconsequential. Ratification cannot validate an act void ab initio because it was done absolutely without authority. The act has to be done anew by the person or entity duly endowed with authority to do so.

Further, no proper ratification or validation could have been effected by Acting Chair Tantuico, since he was not the Commission, and he himself had no power to decide any case brought before the COA. That power, is lodged on the in the COA itself, a collegial body.

(it was argued that how about the hundreds of decisions signed by Acting Chair Tantuico alone since at that time there was an interval during which only he had been designated and no other Commissioner had been appointed.. what would happen to those decisions?)

SC: The principle should logically apply only to those particular instances where there was a timely and specific challenge to the authority of the Acting COA chair in the exercise of adjudication. It should not affect all other cases where the parties expressly or by implication accepted the adjudicative authority of the Acting COA Chair.

(Mison further argued that Atty David already waived the objection on lack of collegiality when he failed to raise it in his MR. His MR merely reiterated the arguments on the merits of the claim, but did not raise the ground of lack of collegiality)

SC: No waiver. Atty David in fact reiterated his challenge to Tantuicos authority in his subsequent letters. He insisted that the same should be submitted for resolution by the COA, only after full constitution of the COA.

Also, it must be made clear that the Espiritu decision was not merely technically invalid for lack of collegiality. IT WAS SUBSTANTIVELY VOID AB INITIO. It was rendered without jurisdiction, Hence, it has an essential and inherent defect which could not have been waived.

(Finally, Mison argued that the 4th INdorsement should also be invalid because COA Chair Domingo was the only one who signed it).

SC: 4th INdorsement VALID. When the 4th Indorsement Decision was rendered, there were already 2 Commissioners (meaning the COA was fully constituted already), clearly a number sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement for collegial action. Even so, the 4th Indorsement made it clear that it was the Decision of the Commission, when Chairman Domingo placed FOR THE COMMISSION in the decision. Records also show that the other commissioners concurred in the decision.

Mison vs COA Section 1: Purpose, composition, appointmentDoctrine: COA as a collegial bodyCase: Mison v COA Facts: The case is about customs case no. 813 where the commissioner of customs,MIson, declaring illegal the seizure by elements of the Philippine Navy of the M/V"Hyojin Maru" a vessel of Japanese registry, and ordered the release of the vessel andits cargo to the claimants, Chan Chiu On and Cheung I.However, the vessel was never released because it sank while in the custody ofthe bureau of customs and it could not be salvaged. The claimants filed a claim with theCommission on Audit for the payment of the vessel.Acting thereon "(b)y authority of the Acting Chairman," Mr. Rogelio B. Espiritu,Manager, Technical Service Office of the COA, denied the claim for the reasons setforth in his registered letter to the claimant's lawyer dated November 3, 1977-captioned"Decision No. 77-142." In a letter dated May 10, 1978, claimants counsel, Mr. David replied that said Decision No. 77-142-rendered only by the Manager, Technical Service Office of theCOA, and "not (by) the Acting Chairman, much less . . . the Commission on Audit" was void because the matter could validly be acted upon only by "the Commission onAudit duly constituted, by the appointment and qualification of its Chairman and twoCommissioners," "as specifically provided by Section 2, Article XII-D of the (1973)Constitution. In a 4th Indorsement dated June 22, 1987 addressed "to the Auditor,Bureau of Customs," Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, acting "FOR THECOMMISSION," reconsidered Decision No. 77-142 of Acting Commissioner of AuditTantuico, supra. He declared that the vessel sank while in illegal custody of the Bureau ofCustoms, which "should have pre-eminently taken adequate measures to preserve" itbut did not.; hence, he declared that "this Commission will interpose no objection" to theinstant claim, subject to the usual auditing and accounting requirements." Petitionerseasonably filed with this Court a petition for certiorari to nullify said COA Decisionspursuant to Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution.Issues:Whether or not the decision to reverse the Espiritu Decision was proper? Decision:In the first place the "Espiritu decision" was void ab initio. As manager of theCOA Technical Service Office, Mr. Espiritu obviously had no power whatever to renderand promulgate a decision of or for the Commission. Indeed, even the Chairman, alone,had not that power.

As clearly set out in the Constitution then in force, the power waslodged in the Commission on Audit, "composed of a Chairman and woCommissioners." 20 It was the Commission, as a collegial body, which then as now, hadthe jurisdiction to "(d)ecide any case brought before it within sixty days from the date ofits submission for resolution," subject to review by the Supreme Court on certiorari . 21 Hence, the adoption or ratification of the Espiritu decision by the Acting COAChairman was inconsequential. Ratification cannot validate an act void ab initio because done absolutely without authority. The act has to be done anew by the personor entity duly endowed with authority to do so.Moreover, even conceding the contrary, no proper ratification or validation couldhave been effected by the Acting Chairman since he was not the Commission, and hehimself had no power to decide any case brought before the Commission, that power, torepeat, being lodged only in the Commission itself, as a collegial body. it must be madeclear that the Espiritu Decision was not merely "technically invalid," as the petitionerdescribes it. It was substantively void ab initio, because rendered without jurisdiction. Ithad an essential inherent defect that could not be cured or waived.

PHIIL OPERATIONS VS. AUDITOR GENERAL Coa accounts and money claims PhilOps entered into a barter agreement with the Bureau of Prisons, where it agreed to deliver to the Bureau a sawmill, complete with diesel engine and a saw, and other accessories. While the Bureau was to deliver 70,000 feet of lumber The receipt that the employee of the Bureau of Prisons issued for the items disclosed that there were unsatisfactory conditions on the items (three was no belt in the main saw, broken frames, lack of hooks, no rope cables, worn out rusty, etc) The Bureau of Prisons claim that when the barges were examined, PhilOps were advised verbally about the defects therein, and so were they with respect to the parts of the sawmill when it was found. Around a year later, it became evident that it was not feasible for the Bureau of Prisons to deliver lumber. PhilOps proposed to obtain surplus from the Surplus Property Commission in lieu of the lumber so as to finally liquidate the obligation contracted with the Bureau of Prisons. It turned out however that no equipment could be found in the Commission which could be usable by PhilOps, so it proposed that the corporation be credited with an amount of P70,000 and be allowed to bid in future surplus offerings. PhilOps later filed a claim with the Auditor General. The Bureau of Prisons offered to deliver the first installment of the lumber. But this was rejected by PhilOps on the ground that the offer came too late, and that it demanded payment of cash. The Auditor General denied PhilOps claim for payment. It was mentioned that the Auditor General did not have jurisdiction. PhilOps appealed to the SC. The Auditor General claims that the Commonweal Act 327 which imposed upon the Auditor General the duty of acting and deciding on cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims other than those of accountable officers, does NOT authorize or empower the Auditor General to pass upon the PhilOps claim for P105,000 because the term claims used in the said Act can refer to no other than liquidated claims. (In short, the Auditor General claims that it has jurisdiction only over liquidated claims) PhilOps on the other hand contend that the Auditor General had been granted additional power upon any money claim involving liability arising from contract which could serve as a basis for civil action between the parties. It also argued that assuming that the Auditor General has jurisdiction only over liquidated claims, the claim of P70,000 should be considered liquidated, since this has been accepted by both parties.

SC: AUDITOR GENERAL HAS NO JURDXN FOR UNLIQUIDATED CLAIMS. The reason for denying jurisdiction over unliquidated claims for breach of contract is because these claims often involve a broad filed of investigation and require the application of judgment and discretion upon the measure of damages and the weight of conflicting evidence.

The term used in the Commonwealth Act is moneyed claims or only liquidated claims. An account is something which may be adjusted or liquidated by arithmetic process. But Treasury officials cannot pass upon accounts where the amount is not the result of a numerical computation. Claims for unliquidated damages require for their settlement the application of the qualities of judgment and discretion. They are frequently sustained by extraneous proof. The results to be reached in such cases is not merely an account and are not committed by law to the contro and decision of Treasury officers.

Another reason why the AG cannot entertain unliquidated damages is because the liability or non-liability of the government is put in issue. In these cases, the most important question to be deterined are judicial in nature, involving the examination of evide and the use of judicial discretion.

An administrative officer like the AG cannot assume this jurisdiction, because it would amount to an illegal act, a delegation of judicial power to an executive officer.

An examination of the provisions of the Constitution fails to disclose any power vested in or granted to the AG to consider these claims. All that is vested in the AG is the SETTLEMENT OF ACCOUNTS (see earlier definition of Accounts).

INSURANCE COMPANY VS. REPUBLIC money claims The Plaintiff Insurance Company filed an action for recovery of P86,000 the insured value of 82 cartons of goods, allegedly lost in the custody of the carrier, US Lines, or the vessel operator, Luzon Stevedore, or the arrestre operator, the Bureau of Customs (an agency of the Republic) The Republic of the Philippines filed a MTD, claiming the State immunity from suit. CFI denied the MTD. However later, the case was dismissed against the Republic and the Bureau. Plaintiff appealed.

ISSUES: Suability of the RP and the BOC SC: The BOC in operating the arrastre service, does so in the performance of a necessary incident to the prime governmental function of taxation. Thus it is not suable for alleged loses resulting therefrom. Thus, neither is the Republic suable for said activity.

ISSUE: It is claimed that the money claims that may be filed with the Auditor General (AG) under Act 3083, are only those which are subject to liquidation by an arithmetic computation and only where the liability of the government is no longer an issue. (a prior case of Tabacos was cited) SC: It is precisely for the AG to determine whether the same claim is tenable or not, and if not, to deny the same. The ruling in the Tabacos case cannot apply in this case, since there, the issue was the offsetting of an unliquidated claim for damages against a specific liquidated debt. The ruling in Tabacos was that offsetting cannot be made. Here, there is no question of offsetting. The only issue was simply that of allowing or disallowing a specific and liquidated claim against the government.

Since in the present case, the amount of claim is already fixed and readily determined from the bill of lading and other shipping papers, they can be filed with the AG. Thus, we sustain the power of the Ag to take cognizance of

the claim, for if the same be found in order and allowable, the amount recoverable is fixed and liquidated, as determined or readily determinable from the papers and invoices available to him,

Stated otherwise, where the existence of a specific and fixed debt is the issue, the AG has the power to act on the claim, but when not only the existence but also the amount of the unfixed and undetermined debt is involved, the AG has no competence to consider such claim.

- in short, the dismissal of the case against the Republic and the BOC was proper because the claim should have been filed with the AG.

Section 2: Power and Functions Examine and audit government revenues Examine and audit government expenditures Doctrine: post-audit authority Case: Blue Bar Coconut Phils v Tantuico Facts: Sometime in 1976, the respondent Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit initiated a special audit of coconut end-user companies, which include herein petitioners, with respect to their Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund levy collections and the subsidies they had received. As a result of the initial findings of the Performance Audit Office with respect only to the petitioners, respondent Acting COA Chairman directed the Chairman, the Administrator, and the Military Supervisor of PCA and the Manager of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund, in various letters to them (Annexes G-2 H, I, J, L and Nof petition) to collect the short levies and overpaid subsidies, and to apply subsidy claims to the settlement of short levies should the petitioners fail to remit the amount due. Issues: Whether or not the respondent COA Chairman may disregard the PCA rules and decions have become moot. Decision: In the case at bar, the petitioners have failed to show that acts were done withgrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Case dismissed. Petitioners contend that they are outside the ambit of respondents' "audit" power which is confined to government-owned or controlled corporations. Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution provides that "The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporation with original charters, and on a post-audit basis. ... (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity directly or indirectly from or through the Government which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity ." (Emphasis supplied) The Constitution formally embodies the long established rule that private entities who handle government funds or subsidies in trust may be examined or audited in their handling of said funds by government auditors. n view of the above considerations, we apply the principle o fprimary jurisdiction:In cases involving specialized disputes, the trend has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special

competence. As early as 1954, theCourt in Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc. (94 Phil.932,941), held that under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction ... the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving aquestion which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to the decision of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the Purposes of the regulatory statute administered." Recently, this Court speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee said that "In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become wellnigh indispensable." The court reminds us that The legal presumption is that official duty has been duly performed.