Okar Decline of Jordanian Pol Parties

Int. J. Middle East Stud. 33 (2001), 545–569.
Printed in the United States of America
Ellen M. Lust-Okar
T H E D E C L I N E O F J O R DA N I A N P O L I T I C A L
PA RT I E S : M Y T H O R R E A L I T Y ?
Going back to the early beginnings of democracy in Jordan in the [1950s], the Jordanian people,
particularly the youth and the activist forces, were very enthusiastic about political parties,
despite the fact that the level of political awareness then was not as advanced as it is now.
Conditions on the domestic, Pan-Arab, and international levels were encouraging. Pan-Arabism
was on the rise. There were goals for the Arabs to achieve, and there was a consensus that it
was feasible to achieve those goals. Political parties at that time had a vast popular base. They
were large and effective due to the large-scale popular participation in these parties. The situa-
tion at present is the opposite. When political parties were born again, they looked as if they
were parties in the stage of formation.
Samir Habashneh1
Following the re-emergence of Jordanian political parties since 1989, academics and
policy-makers have emphasized the difference between parties of the 1950s and those
of the 1990s.2 They commonly argue that current political parties are dramatically
weaker than their earlier counterparts. Before the king outlawed them in 1957, Jorda-
nian political parties were vibrant organizations. They were connected to the masses;
based on solid, ideological foundations; and demanded real political gains. In contrast,
the parties of the 1990s lack an ideological foundation and mass support, and they
are unable to provide political leadership or make effective political demands.
Although there are some differences between political parties in the 1990s and
those in the 1950s, the Jordanian party system itself has not experienced a dramatic
decline. As we shall see, party-system continuity can be examined through two sepa-
rate components: the existence and strength of parties of various ideologies and the
ability of the political-party system to provide a conduit between the masses and
the government. The first component, party strength, is important in determining the
likelihood that different policies will be legislated and then implemented, which then
may affect both foreign and domestic politics. The second component, party-system
strength, is critical in determining when the political parties may become active part-
ners in policy-making. It is this character that is most important in determining when
further political liberalization, or even democratization, is more or less likely. It is
also this strength that scholars, policy-makers, and observers clearly see as having
Ellen M. Lust-Okar, Department of Political Science, Yale University, 124 Prospect Street, New Haven,
Conn. 06511, USA; e-mail: ellen.lust-okar@yale.edu.
 2001 Cambridge University Press 0020-7438/01 $9.50

546 Ellen M. Lust-Okar
declined in Jordan today. Yet a closer examination of Jordanian parties suggests that
this is not the case.
Clearly, there have been some significant differences in the strength of different
political tendencies over time. In the 1950s, secular, leftist, and Pan-Arab opposition
parties gained high levels of popular support. In contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood
and Hizb al-Tahrir, the two main Islamist groups, were relatively weak. This situation
is reversed in the 1990s. Today, the secular, leftist, and Pan-Arab parties are struggling
to maintain themselves, while the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the Islamist party
closely related to the Muslim Brotherhood, is the single strongest party in the king-
dom. These changes appear to be a reflection of regional changes and the development
of parties’ infrastructures during the period in which parties were banned.
However, there has not been a significant change in the ability of Jordanian political
parties to act as a conduit between the masses and the palace. Ideally, political parties
play an important role in governance by transmitting public preferences to the govern-
ment. When they successfully join government, political-party elites are also impor-
tant participants in the formulation of policies. Finally, parties play an important role
in expressing and promoting government policies to the people. In short, effective
political parties enhance the communication between the masses and the government,
and they should play an active role in shaping government policies.
Yet in both the 1950s and the 1990s, Jordanian political parties have largely failed
to play this role. The linkages between political parties and the masses appears weak,
whether measured by the parties’ success at the polls, their ability to mobilize the
masses in the streets, or their success in establishing media outlets. Further, political
parties have been largely unable to join government and influence government poli-
cies. Rather, Jordanian parties in both the 1950s and the 1990s are clearly subordinate
to the palace. The common observation that the Jordanian party system is significantly
weaker today than it was in the 1950s is simply wrong. Unfortunately, the party
system was weak in the 1950s and remains so today.
The continuity in the party system exists because Jordanian opposition–government
relations are largely unchanged. In both the 1950s and the 1990s, the “good will” of
the Hashemite monarchy was critical to allowing the Jordanian political parties to
participate openly in the political system. Although the struggle between the monarch
and his loyalist allies against opposition parties was somewhat more intense in the
1950s, the palace clearly determined and limited the political parties’ ability to mobi-
lize against it. The same situation exists in the 1990s. Political liberalization in Jordan
was a defensive move, intended to shore up the monarchy,3 it was not a reaction to
the pressures of already well-mobilized political parties. Indeed, opposition parties
were in a weak position to push for greater change. In addition, traditional loyalists
continue to act, as they did in the 1950s, to thwart the erosion of the monarchy.
Recognizing the continuity between party-system strength in the 1950s and 1990s
aids in understanding the prospects of political liberalization in Jordan. Although the
strengthening of some civil associations may encourage hope for democratization, the
fact that political parties—a primary building block in political contestation—remain
weak limits the expectations for democratization.4 History need not repeat itself, but
much can be learned about contemporary Jordanian politics by understanding the poli-
The Decline of Jordanian Political Parties 547
tics of the 1950s. The prospects for continued liberalization, let alone democratization,
in Jordan are not good.
Understanding the continuity in the Jordanian party system also illustrates an im-
portant point about comparing political systems. In many ways, Jordanian political
parties are similar to those found in other liberalizing states of the “Third Wave.” As
in many liberalizing states, Jordanian parties are weak institutions.5 Also similar to
these works, we find that Jordanian parties were relatively weak both before and after
the 1957 abolition of political parties. Yet despite this continuity, there are important
changes in the strength of individual political parties: the strength of various political
parties is independent from the strength of the party system.
The shift in the strength of various parties, even in the midst of striking party-
system continuity, provides an important caution to current discussions of political-
party continuity. Scholarship examining the strength of political-party systems before
and after periods of closure has been of two types. Some scholars have focused on
the correlations between the popular support for political parties across time. For
instance, Timothy Scully and G. Samuel Valenzuela focus on support for the left,
right, and center parties in Chile, finding strong continuity in support before 1973
and after 1988. Although they recognize some changing alliance patterns between
parties, their general conclusion is that the Chilean party system demonstrates conti-
nuity.6 Similarly, discussions of post-communist states often focus on the ability of
communist parties to maintain their strength.7 Although these factors are undoubtedly
important, the continuity of support for individual parties or political tendencies
should not be understood as representing the level of continuity or change in the party
system. Continuity in the level of support for individual political parties or tendencies,
and for the political-party system as a whole, are two separate and independent fac-
tors. Fully understanding continuity and change in party systems requires looking at
changes in both institutionalization and party affiliation.
Thus, this paper examines the similarities and differences between the current Jor-
danian party system and that of the 1950s. It begins by evaluating the common wis-
dom that political parties in the 1950s were extraordinarily strong while those of the
1990s are weak. It considers two important aspects of party system strength, mass-
party linkages and party–government influences, and concludes there is little change
in either aspect. Next, it compares the relative strength of individual political tenden-
cies existing in Jordan, finding that there has been a significant shift away from leftist
ideologies and toward Islamist tendencies. Finally, the article concludes by consider-
ing the reasons for these changes and the extent to which the lessons of the 1950s are
applicable to Jordan in the late 20th century.
S T R E N G T H O F T H E J O R DA N I A N PA RT Y SY S T E M : 1 9 5 0 s V E R S U S 1 9 9 0 s
Theoretically, political parties play an important role as a conduit for communication

between the masses and governmental elite. The level of political-party institutional-
ization thus is determined in part by the strength of linkages between political parties
and the masses. The parties’ ability to gain votes at the polls, mobilize masses in the
streets, and shape public opinion through the media are critical in influencing and
representing constituents. At the same time, the parties’ relationships with the govern-
ment also influence their abilities to affect and articulate government policies. Analy-
sis of political parties’ strength in each of these areas demonstrates that Jordanian
political parties are weak in both the 1950s and 1990s. In both periods, parties are
characterized more by dependency on the palace than by influence over it.
Mass–Party Linkages
At the Polls Polling data demonstrate that seats in the Jordanian legislative system
are not strongly determined on a partisan basis. Evidence on voter turnout is sketchy,
and until 1990 only estimates are available to assess the level of electoral participa-
tion. However, it appears that the level of participation was similar in the 1950s and
the 1990s. By 1950, voter participation rose from an estimated 3 percent of the elec-
torate in 19298 to approximately 45 percent of the electorate.9 This is not considerably
different from the voter turnout in the post-liberalization period of the 1980s. Voter
turnout was 41 percent in the 1989 elections, 52 percent in the 1993 elections, and
40.7 percent in the 1997 elections.10 There does not appear to be a significant decrease
in voter participation.
More important, voting for political-party candidates is also similar in the 1950s
and 1990s. In the elections of the early 1950s, we find that voting for political-party
candidates was not considerable. As shown in Table 1, party candidates received fewer
than 20 percent of the votes in the 1950, 1951, and 1954 elections. It was not until
1956 that the party candidates—particularly, the national socialists and the commu-
nists11 —received a significant portion of the votes. In part, voting for party candidates
may be somewhat muted in the first three elections because the regime manipulated
these elections more than the 1956 suffrage. However, it is also likely that party
TABLE 1 Number and percentage of votes for all party candidates: 1950s
1950 Election 1951 Election 1954 Election 1956 Election

% % % %
No. of Total No. of Total No. of Total No. of Total
Party Votes Votes Votes Votes Votes Voters Votes Votes
Bath 5,061 1.6 21,120 6.2 10,474 2.3 34,000 8.4

Socialist Nationalists — — — — 29,427 6.6 72,467 17.9
Communists — — 37,902 11.05 21,250 4.8 51,398 12.7
Nation Party — — — — 17,113 3.8 — —
Arab Constitutional Party — — — — — — 32,083 7.9
Liberation Party — — 3,596 1.04 6,920 1.6 6,130 1.5
Muslim Brotherhood — — — — — — 33,518 8.3
Total voters 304,000 342,714 445,928 405,000
% Total votes for party
candidates 1.6 18.29 19.1 56.7
Source: Aqil Hayder Abadi, “al-Ihzab as-Siyyassi fil-Urdunn (Fitra al-Khamsinat),” al-Urdunn al-Jadid, 7, 17–18 (1990):
87.
support was not quite as strong or widespread as it is remembered to be, particularly

not before 1955.
Similarly, it appears that current Jordanian parties are not as much weaker than
their 1950s counterparts as the common wisdom suggests. Unfortunately, the compari-
son with the 1990s is limited. The 1989 elections occurred before parties were legal,
and although candidates with party affiliations ran in them, there are no available data
by which to gauge party-level voting. Similarly, in 1997, a large number of important
political parties boycotted the elections. Thus, determining the level of party voting
by these elections is also problematic. Only the 1993 elections provide a useful com-
parison to the 1950 elections. However, as shown in Table 2, about 25 percent of the
votes went to party candidates. The 1993 results look similar to those of the 1950–54
elections.
Yet regardless of the similarities in voter turnout and party voting, parties were
much more successful in gaining seats in the 1950s than they have been in the 1990s.
As Table 3 demonstrates, the proportion of seats held by members of political parties
rose from 60 percent to 75 percent in the Lower House from 1950 to 1956. In contrast,
political parties have failed to gain even 50 percent of the total seats in the 1989 or
TABLE 2 Number and percentage of votes for successful

party candidates: 1993
Party No. of Votes % Total Votes
Islamic Action Front 126,202 15.5

Jordanian National Unity Party 13,090 1.6
Future Party 11,602 1.4
al-Ahd 11,170 1.3
Yaqatha 10,684 1.3
Jordanian Democratic Unity Party 9,726 1.2
al-Watan (Homeland) Party 9,769 1.2
Democratic Socialist Party 5,399 0.7
Waad 5,028 0.6
Arab Socialist Bath Party 4,128 0.5
Democratic People’s Party 3,900 0.5
Jordanian Arab Democratic Party 3,650 0.45
Communist Party 2,535 0.3
Justice and Progress 1,282 0.15
Democratic Progress Party 819 0.1
Freedom Party 638 0.00008
Arab Progress Party 531 0.00006
Citizens’ Party 410 0.00005
Dua 335 0.00004
People’s Unity Party 283 0.00003
Total 221,181 27.1
Sources: Votes for candidates compiled from al-Urdunn al-Jadid Research Center,
Intikhabbat 1993: Dirasa Tahliliyya Raqmiyya (The 1993 Elections: An Analytical
Study) (Amman: al-Urdunn al-Jadid, 1993), Table 7 and Appendix; Hani Hourani,
Hamed Dabbas, and Mark Power-Stevens, Who’s Who in the Jordanian Parlia-
ment, 1993–1997, trans. George Musleh (Amman: Sindbad Publishing, n.d.).
TABLE 3 Electoral seats gained by parties, 1950–93
No. of Seats % Seats

Election: Parliament, Year Party Obtained Obtained
2nd Parliament, 1950 Bath Party 2 5

Communist Party 2 5
Nationalist Socialist Party 10 25
Arab Constitutional Party 8 20
Community/Nation Party 2 5
Independents 16 40
3rd Parliament, 1951 Bath Party 3 7.5

Communist Party 2 5
Nationalist Socialist Party 11 27.5
Arab Constitutional Party 9 22.5
Community/Nation Party 1 2.5
Independents 14 35
4th Parliament, 1954 Bath Party 0 0

Communist Party 2 5
Nationalist Socialist Party 1 2.5
Arab Constitutional Party 17 42.5
Muslim Brotherhood 4 10
Hizb al-Tahrir 1 2.5
Independents 15 37.5
5th Parliament, 1956 Bath Party 2 5

National Front 3 7.5
Nationalist Socialist Party 12 30
Arab Constitutional Party 8 20
Muslim Brotherhood 4 10
Hizb al-Tahrir 1 2.5
Independents 10 25
11th Parliament, 1989 Islamic Action Front 23 30

Hashd 1 1.25
Democratic Popular Unity Party 1 1.25
Socialist Democratic Party (Unionist
Democratic Party) 1 1.25
Socialist Arab Bath Party 1 1.25
al-Yaqatha Party 1 1.25
al-Mustaqbal Party 3 3.8
Jordanian National Alliance 3 3.8
al-Ahd Party 0 0
Progress and Justice Party 0 0
al-Watan (Homeland) Party 0 0
(continued)
TABLE 3 Continued
No. of Seats % Seats

Election: Parliament, Year Party Obtained Obtained
12th Parliament, 1993 Islamic Action Front 16 20

Hashd 1 1.25
Democratic Popular Unity Party 0 0
Socialist Democratic Party (Unionist
Democratic Party) 1 1.25
Socialist Arab Bath Party 1 1.25
al-Yaqatha Party 2 2.5
al-Mustaqbal Party 1 1.25
Jordanian National Alliance 4 5
al-Ahd Party 3 3.75
Progress and Justice Party 0 0
al-Watan (Homeland) Party 2 2.5
Sources: Naseer Aruri, Jordan: A Study in Political Development (1921–1965) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1972); Hani Hourani, Hamed Dabbas, and Mark Power-Stevens, Who’s Who in the Jordanian Parliament 1993–
1997.
1993 Lower Houses, and largely due to the boycott, party candidates gained only 10
percent of the legislative seats in 1997.
Although it is true that there has been a notable change in the number of party
members elected to legislative seats, this change should not be associated with a
weakening of potential opposition parties. In the 1950s, the Hashemite loyalists Samir
al-Rifai and Tawfiq Abul Huda12 countered leftist and Islamist parties by creating
the Nation and Arab Constitutional parties, respectively. These parties held more than
20 percent of the party seats in 1950, 1951, and 1956, and more than 40 percent of
the seats in 1954. Indeed, the percentage of seats held by non-loyalist parties is similar
in the two periods. The percentage of seats held by the Islamic Action Front13 in 1989
is identical to that held by the National Socialists in 1956. Both parties held 30 percent
of the legislative seats, making them the largest single bloc in the legislature; both
represented the most powerful ideological position of their time, and both participated
under extremely similar electoral laws. The dramatic change in the percentage of seats
held by party members in the 1950s and 1990s appears to reflect primarily the weak
state of loyalist parties (until the formation of al-Ahd before the 1993 elections).14
After 1993, this change may also reflect the influence of the “one-person, one-vote”
electoral law.15
That the change in the number of deputies elected on party labels is better explained
by a change in the support for loyalist parties than for opposition parties is surprising.
In addition to the changed electoral law, the post-1990 party system represents the
loss of the West Bank electorate. Because the leftist parties had been clearly associated
with Jordanians of Palestinian origin in the 1950s,16 we may have expected the reduc-
tion of this electorate to contribute to a weakening of these parties in the current
period. The data suggest, however, that this change is not dramatic.
In the Streets Even if parties of the 1950s and 1990s fare comparably at the polls,
they may still differ in their popular appeal. Indeed, scholars and policy-makers com-
paring party politics of the 1950s and the 1990s argue there has been a dramatic
change in street-level support for political parties. They portray the 1950s as a period
of intense politics. Marches, demonstrations, and riots forced the establishment to pay
attention to the demands of opposition parties. In contrast, parties of the 1990s lack
the popular support or will to mobilize such contestation.
There is an element of truth to this portrayal. Political parties did mobilize popular
movements against the king. On election day in 1950, demonstrations turned violent
in the West Bank, leading the Arab Legion to intervene and leaving three killed in
Nablus. The Arab Legion stepped in a second time in 1953 when, following a dispute
over Abul Huda’s government, demonstrators took to the streets of Nablus, Jerusalem,
and Ramallah. On election day in 1954, demonstrators marched through Amman and
cities in the West Bank, again criticizing Abul Huda and shouting slogans against the
Hashemites. At least ten demonstrators were killed in Amman, but the elections con-
tinued. Finally, opposition flared in 1955, following the increasing repression of Prime
Minister Abul Huda and the apparently determined acquiescence of King Hussein to
the Baghdad Pact. In October, protesters marched through Amman, Nablus, and Ra-
mallah. They were briefly repressed until two months later, when negotiations on the
Baghdad Pact were announced. In Amman, as many as 10,000 persons marched
through the streets, and in Nablus, Jerusalem, and other major cities, opposition
groups followed suit. The struggle with the opposition intensified until April 1957,
when, after a final showdown between Military Commander Abu Nuwar and the king,
the king regained control.17
Although these confrontations—and, particularly, the heady period between Octo-
ber 1956 and April 1957—are evidence of the highly politicized populace in the
1950s, they do not demonstrate the parties’ organizational strength. First, during much
of this period the streets remained quiet. More important, when demonstrations did
erupt, they took place primarily on the West Bank and in Amman, where a sizable
Palestinian refugee population existed. This is not surprising. The West Bank’s popu-
lation differed from that of the East Bank.18 Many saw themselves as more urban and
educated than their East Bank counterparts, and they did not place their political
allegiances with Hashemite monarchs. Both as a result of and contributing to this
opposition, it became clear in the early 1950s that Palestinians were not given equal
access to parliamentary seats, government posts, or the Arab Legion.19
In short, although party elites may have succeeded in mobilizing opposition to the
regime, it is not clear that their success was due to organizational strength. Parties
mobilized opposition primarily in the West Bank, where hostility to the regime was
already greater than across the Jordan River. Further, they did so in a period of intense
regional politics—with Egypt’s Free Officers deposing King Farouk, Nasser broad-
casting Pan-Arab messages, and the West struggling with the Soviet Union for influ-
ence in the region. Regional and international factors helped to mobilize the popula-
tion. Although these factors do not diminish the importance of the mobilization in the
1950s, they also suggest that it may not be party strength per se that explains the
different levels of mobilization in the 1950s and 1990s.
Indeed, Jordan’s recent history demonstrates that mass mobilization does not neces-
sarily denote strong political parties. Recent surveys show the weak popular support
of current parties. Although party recognition may be increasing, the percentage of
people who see the parties as successful hovers at about one-third of respondents.20
Further, less than 3 percent of the population participates in political parties or intends
to participate in parties.21
Despite this, even traditionally loyal East Bank Jordanians have increasingly taken
to the streets to express their dissatisfaction with the government. Riots erupted in
Yarmouk in 1986. Demonstrations and riots spread through such southern cities and
traditional regime strongholds as Salt, Maan, and Karak, as well as Amman in 1989,
leading to the initially dramatic efforts at liberalization. Similar riots erupted in 1996
when difficult price rises were again instituted. In addition, a series of smaller-scale
incidents has occurred, such the riots in Maan in February 1998. In many of these
cases, political parties have been blamed for stimulating, if not initiating, the mobiliza-
tion.22 Observers would agree, however, that this does not demonstrate that current
Jordanian parties are strong.
Jordanian Parties and the Media Finally, political parties can shape public opinion
through the media, and in both the 1950s and 1990s they have played this role. Often
restricted from government-controlled media, political opposition parties have pub-
lished their own papers. These papers have provided important forums through which
opposition voices can be heard and the masses mobilized. However, inadequate re-
sources and government restrictions have limited their success.
In the 1950s, political parties published some of the most important daily newspa-
pers. By the 1950s, there were seven major dailies.23 Opposition political parties pub-
lished three of these: Filastin, Difa, and al-Jihad. With less circulation but still impor-
tant were weeklies and semi-weeklies such as al-Sarih and al-Mithaq (published by
the National Socialist Party), Hawadith (by the National Front), and al-Hadaf and al-
Yaqathah (by the Bath Party). Other papers existed, but they were published sporadi-
cally or were short-lived, suffering from their party’s lack of resources.
Throughout the 1950s, these papers helped raise awareness of and support for alter-
native policies and positions, particularly the Palestinian cause and Arab nationalism.
Their exact impact is difficult to measure, but it is clear that the government found
them threatening. Although there were periods of relative freedom (such as during
Samir al-Rifai’s prime ministership from December 1950 to July 1951), the govern-
ment generally restricted these publications. Papers were suspended for articles criti-
cizing government policies or defaming important personalities. In 1952, the govern-
ment enacted emergency regulations permitting the prime minister to revoke licenses
of any journal belonging to a non-authorized group and to jail the publisher or editor
for up to six months. Despite the sanctions, the party-related press would print pointed
and controversial articles, only to be suspended and then, once the ban on activities
was lifted, resume publication.24
When hostility toward the regime rose, however, the palace demonstrated both its
will and ability to clamp down on party papers. Jordan passed its first Press and
Publications Law (PPL) in 1953. Although the fairly liberal law gained the king some
popular support, it also unleashed an increase in hostility and attacks against the
regime that soon appeared threatening.25 Consequently, in August 1954, Abul Huda
revived defense regulations that allowed the minister of the interior to ban “hostile”
newspapers.26 Subsequently, the 1955 PPL passed, giving the cabinet further authority
over publications. According to Article 8, the Council of Ministers could grant or with-
hold publication permits, and decisions taken by the body were final. Further, the press
law gave the cabinet the authority to prohibit the distribution of local and foreign publi-
cations in the country. Although party papers would experience periods of more or less
stringent restrictions until 1957, it was clear that the palace could limit both their publi-
cation and their contents, thus limiting their ability to mobilize opposition support.
Political parties face the same difficulties in the 1990s. Once again, political parties
have turned to newspapers to provide a conduit to the masses. By 1990, government
control over the major daily newspapers was consolidated, and thus dailies gave lim-
ited access to opposition voices.27 As a result, political parties have turned to weeklies
and semi-weeklies to promote their positions. These party presses emerged quickly
after the PPL of 1993 allowed the establishment of new papers on a relatively easy
basis. Party presses flourished, including papers such as al-Mustaqbal (by the Future
Party), al-Jamahir (by the Jordanian Communist Party), al-Watan (by the Progress
and Justice Party), al-Ahali (by the Jordan People’s Democratic Party), and al-Ribat
and al-Sabeel (connected to the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Action Front). A
number of other weeklies and semi-weeklies were more short-lived,28 once again suf-
fering from poor funding and low public interest.
As in the 1950s, however, it is clear that these papers’ operation depends on the
regime’s tolerance. When the regime finds itself under increasing opposition, as it has
since the 1994 Jordanian–Israeli peace treaty, it restricts the party press. Thus, the
government has banned and confiscated editions of papers printing materials it finds
objectionable and jailed journalists and editors. Between 1993 and 1997, the govern-
ment made sixty-six prosecutions for violations of the PPL. Nine of these were against
al-Ahali, published by the Jordan People’s Democratic Party.29
As it had in 1954, the Jordanian regime has once again sought to strengthen its
legal ability to prosecute violations in the media. In 1997, the government introduced
amendments that significantly increased the penalties imposed for violating the PPL.
Although the court would overturn the amendments in January 1998, a new PPL was
passed later that year that increased press restrictions. For instance, the 1998 law
increased monetary fines for violations from a maximum of 6,000 Jordanian dinars in
the 1993 law to 25,000 Jordanian dinars in the 1998 law. Further, the 1998 PPL
toughened censorship provisions, expanding the “no-go” areas, and increased capital
requirements for newspapers. New capital requirements made it more difficult to open
papers and led to the demise of many small, controversial venues. The government
suspended thirteen newspapers after the passage of the amendments in 1997.30
Although the party press—and other small papers—plays a clear role in stimulating
debate and shaping public interest, it is clearly subordinate to and dependent on the
regime. As Adam Jones notes, the political parties in Jordan are weak and financially
strapped. Thus,
the party press is vulnerable and often short-lived. All of these challenges must be confronted
before the issue of regime tolerance can even be addressed; but the regime, too, is capable of
delivering a death-blow to even a flourishing party publication. On balance, while the party
press can be seen as an offshoot of the liberalization process in Jordan, it has played only a
marginal role in that process—except to serve as a useful scapegoat when the regime is in a
reactionary mood.31
Government–Party Linkages: Public Policy-making and Influence

Government–party linkages also demonstrate that the party remains a subordinate
partner in the political sphere. Governance in Jordan is not a cooperative enterprise
between the palace and the parties. Rather, it is a largely one-sided game that the
palace clearly controls. This was true in both the 1950s and the 1990s.
From 1950 until 1956, political parties were marginalized from the political process
in Jordan. Opposition parties fared poorly, gaining few seats and remaining outside
the sphere of policy influence. Even loyalist parties were not important institutions.
Rather, the king chose the prime minister during these intense years,32 and all political
appointments were based on loyalty and personal influence.33 Political parties were
not consulted with regard to the establishment, or conduct, of government.
This remained the case even in 1956, when King Hussein attempted to bring the
opposition under his influence by appointing Sulayman al-Nabulsi, leader of the Na-
tional Socialists, to form the government. Although this represented an important
change in the strength of opposition parties, it did not represent a shift in the strength
of Jordan’s party system. The king chose Nabulsi as prime minister because he wanted
the leader of the largest political party to form the government. He did not negotiate
with the parties over the formation of government. The Parliament did not elect Na-
bulsi as prime minister; in fact, Nabulsi had not won a legislative seat. The parties
did not have direct influence over the king’s decision.
Parties have also had little influence on government in the new era of liberalization.
Parties are routinely ignored in the formation of government. Not only does the king
appoint the prime minister; he never negotiates with political parties before making
the appointment. Further, although prime ministers then negotiate with some political
parties over joining the government, there is no formal process of consulting with all
political parties before forming the government. Indeed, the first meeting between a
sitting prime minister and the secretary-generals of political parties occurred with
Prime Minister Abd al-Karim Kabariti in April 1996.
Thus, political parties have no formal, institutionalized access to the government.
The king does not routinely negotiate with political parties before forming govern-
ments or in choosing to terminate them. Members of Parliament, although given a
vote of confidence on the newly formed government, certainly do not elect the prime
minister.
Political parties have also had a limited policy-making role. For vast periods in both
decades, political parties—and, certainly, opposition members—have been limited in
their ability to make policies or challenge existing policies. Although Parliament can
initiate and pass legislation, the king has the power to veto it. Perhaps more important,
the king also has the power to dissolve Parliament. The king gave Nabulsi a long
reign in the initial months of his government, but he dissolved Parliament and called
new elections when it became clear that the Nabulsi government posed a threat to
him. In the 1990s, when the IAF began to make policies with which the palace
disagreed, the regime responded by promoting cabinet changes and, finally, dis-
solving Parliament.34 Political parties clearly cannot challenge the king through the
legislature.
In short, the Jordanian party system does not appear significantly different in the
periods before and after martial law. Political parties fared better at the polls in the
1950s than in the 1990s, but this should not be attributed to the strength of opposition
parties. Loyalist party members received the majority of votes and seats obtained by
political parties in the 1950s. More important, in both periods political parties did not
have real political influence. Parties had no significant control over the formation of
government or policy-making. Finally, although parties in the 1950s were successful
at mobilizing the populace, it is not entirely clear whether this reflected a strong party
system, a highly mobilized populace, or both. Indeed, although we are well aware that
the current party system is weak, the events of the 1990s could someday be viewed,
in hindsight, as a period of increasing popular mobilization.
T H E S T R E N G T H O F J O R DA N I A N P O L I T I C A L PA RT I E S : 1 9 5 0 A N D 1 9 9 0
The nature of individual Jordanian political parties, and the relationships among them,
is also similar in the 1950s and 1990s. Parties in the 1950s and 1990s have similar
ideologies and organizational structures. The relationship between political parties and
the government is similar. The major difference between parties in the two periods,
as noted earlier, is that Islamists have gained popular support in the 1990s while
leftists have lost support. The strength of non-traditional, loyalist parties has changed
little, with both Islamists and leftists clearly less powerful than the palace and its
allies. Given this, the tactics used by parties in both periods are similar. In both the
1950s and the 1990s, broad opposition coalitions form to contest the limits of domes-
tic sovereignty and Jordan’s foreign policy.
Ideologies and Organizational Structures

Despite extraordinary changes in international and regional politics over the past forty
years, the ideologies and organizational structures of Jordanian political parties dis-
play marked continuity. In both the 1950s and 1990s, there are three types of major
political parties: Islamist; conservative loyalist; and secular leftist and Pan-Arab.
However, the relative strength of these parties has changed. In the 1950s, secular,
leftist, and Pan-Arab parties clearly dominated the role of opposition; in the 1990s,
these parties are relatively weak. In their place now stands the Islamic Action Front.
Conservative Loyalist Parties35 In both periods, Jordanian elites with close ties to
the palace have formed conservative, loyalist parties to protect their interests. As
noted earlier, the primary loyalist parties in the 1950s were the Nation Party, led by
Samir al-Rifai, and the Arab Constitutional Party, in support of Abul Huda.36 Simi-
larly, Abd al-Hadi al-Majali has led the most prominent loyalist party of the 1990s,
al-Ahd. This party led the merger of eight loyalist and centrist parties into the Na-
tional Constitutional Party before the 1997 elections.37
Although these parties are relatively successful at obtaining legislative seats, they
are organizationally weak. They center on prominent politicians, such as al-Rifai,
Abul Huda, and al-Majali, and gain resources from their ties to these elite families
and the palace. The party organizations are also ideologically weak. They espouse
East Bank nationalism and support for the Hashemite monarchy, but beyond this their
economic and social platforms are relatively vague. As Lamis Andoni notes, these
parties rely on tribal and family structures for support, with no real economic, politi-
cal, or ideological programs.38 They reluctantly exist because legislative politics has
become an important game in town. As one party leader put it, they would prefer to
lobby the palace outside the party structure.39
These members begrudgingly play the party game, and we can expect that their
parties would dissolve if participatory politics were again restricted. The Nation Party
and Arab Constitutional Party dissolved when the king banned political parties in
1957. Similarly, after opposition parties withdrew from the legislative scene following
the 1997 elections, the National Constitutional Party weakened considerably.40
Leftist and Pan-Arab Parties Of the re-emerging political parties, secular leftist and
Pan-Arab parties have experienced the greatest change in popular support. In the
1950s, these were the strongest opposition parties in the Jordanian system. Leftist and
Pan-Arab ideologies were rising throughout the Arab world, and they were particu-
larly strong in the West Bank. Consequently, leftist and Pan-Arab parties exploded in
the 1950s, including the Movement of Arab Nationalists, the Jordanian Communist
Party (later called the National Front Party), and the Bath Party. The National Social-
ist Party, founded by Sulayman Nabulsi, was the most moderate of this group.41
The leftist parties were strongly linked to the West Bank. The majority of these
parties were founded and led by Palestinians such as George Habbash and Wadi Had-
dad, but this did not preclude important East Bank leadership and membership in
these organizations. Indeed, prominent East Bank members included Issa Madanat
and Sulayman al-Nabulsi.42 However, the strong Palestinian presence meant these par-
ties did reflect the general West Bank opposition to the Jordanian monarchy. In addi-
tion, the regional strength of these leftist and Pan-Arab ideologies promoted a power-
ful opposition base. Despite the regime’s attempt to repress these parties, they were
the core of political opposition in the 1950s These parties have faced difficulties in
the 1990s. Their ideological bases have weakened considerably since the 1950s. Pan-
Arabism was largely discredited after the 1967 war and has continued to decline since
the death of Nasser, the Camp David Accords of 1979, the Iran–Iraqi War, and most
recently at elite levels, in the Arab response to the second Gulf War. Leftist ideologies
have experienced similar blows, most notably with the fall of the USSR and the
democracy movement in Eastern Europe. This discrediting of their ideological bases
comes precisely when they begin to operate as legal political parties. By joining the
political system, they lost much of their legitimacy as underground, opposition forces,
and these parties are scrutinized in new light. Their political platforms, or lack thereof,
are criticized on functional grounds, and the party elite find it difficult to respond.43
Domestic circumstances also hurt the leftist parties. Initially, Islamists actively tar-
geted and weakened their secular opponents. For instance, in the 1989 elections Islam-
ists in Amman’s third district threw their political support behind Fakhri Kawwar, a
candidate for the district’s Christian seat. In doing so, they defeated the Communist
Party’s general secretary, Yaqub Zayadin, previously considered the district’s favor-
ite.44 In general, such tactics weakened secular parties and contributed to a rocky
relationship between the Islamists and the leftists. In addition, the Political Parties
Law of 1992 made it illegal for parties to have external ties and funding. For secular
parties with long ties to external organizations—in Iraq, Syria, Palestine and the for-
mer Soviet Union—these regulations are particularly damaging. Not surprisingly, the
parties and the Interior Ministry have often sparred over the extent to which maintain-
ing relations with other countries is acceptable, and the belief that the government
could suddenly shut down a party that oversteps these boundaries pervades party life.
Finally, internal divisions weaken the parties. The parties’ difficulties have led,
paradoxically, to fragmentation.45 Unable to gain political influence through the old
party organization, individuals are willing to defect from these parties. They leave to
form new, even smaller entities because the selective benefits for forming and then
leading their own political party outweigh the marginal costs of leaving an already
impotent organization.46 Individuals also break away from these parties for ideological
reasons. The decline of the left has not only hurt the popular base of the party; it has
also led to a debate among the elite over the parties’ ideologies. Disagreements over
appropriate changes in policies and platforms have led to further political splits.47
Factionalism and splits have increased within the former leftists at a dizzying rate.48
Islamists Like the leftist and Pan-Arab parties, the third major political trend, Islam-
ists, have also experienced a reversal in fortune. For them, however, the 1990s have
seen a major upswing in political support. In the 1950s, Islamist groups were primarily
represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, founded by Abd al-Latif Abu Qura in 1946.
Shaykh Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani formed a more radical Islamist party, Hizb al-Tahrir,
in 1952. Neither was officially licensed as a political party. The Muslim Brotherhood
obtained a license as a charitable organization, which would help shield it from the
ban on political parties in 1957. Hizb al-Tahrir faired less well with the regime. After
being denied a party license, it applied unsuccessfully for recognition as a charitable
organization. Denied all requests, it operated as a clandestine party, although party
members participated in elections during the 1950s.
Islamists fared much better at the polls in the 1990s than they did in the 1950s.
Throughout the 1950s, the Muslim Brotherhood never gained more than four seats, or
10 percent, of Parliament in any one election. Hizb al-Tahrir fared worse, gaining
only one seat in the 1954 and 1956 elections. Since 1989, Hizb al-Tahrir has boycotted
Jordanian elections, arguing that it sees no benefit in participation and refuses to
recognize the constitution, as required by Article 18(e) of the 1986 Electoral Law.49
It has nevertheless developed relatively strong ties with the Muslim Brotherhood,
which has chosen to participate in the system. The Muslim Brotherhood helped estab-
lish, and dominates, the Islamic Action Front Party, the most popular political party
in Jordan in the 1990s. It won twenty-two seats in the 1989 elections and sixteen in
the 1993 elections. Although it boycotted the 1997 elections, a number of prominent
Islamists still ran in the elections and managed to win seats.50
There are three reasons for the Muslim Brotherhood’s success. First, unlike the
secularist political parties, the Muslim Brotherhood operated openly during the 1970s
and 1980s. Technically, the Muslim Brotherhood continued to function openly because
it was registered as a social organization, not a political party. More important, it
operated aboveground because of its loyalty to the monarchy and importance as a

buffer against leftist nationalists. Partly due to this long history of organizational
activity, the Brotherhood maintained close ties with the masses. It has also helped
shape and has been shaped by the changing political tide among various social groups.
Second, the Brotherhood has gained organizational strength that other groups
lacked. While underground parties often maintained headquarters in other states, the
Brotherhood operated domestically. During this time, it built social-service organiza-
tions such as hospitals and charities that raised its profile and strengthened its rela-
tionship with the masses. It was able to capitalize on this strength in the post-1989
elections.
Finally, the Islamists have benefited from favorable regional conditions. As the
appeal of Pan-Arabism and the left declined in the 1970s and 1980s, political Islam
increased its regional credibility. The Iranian Revolution and the increased activity of
Islamist political organizations across the region has favored the Muslim Brotherhood.
Its associated political party, the IAF, was able to capitalize on this regional rise in
popularity.51
In short, the majority of political parties in the 1950s and 1990s fall into three main
groups: loyalists, secular leftist and Pan-Arab parties, and Islamists. Although the
strength of the secularists and Islamists has changed dramatically across this period,
these two groups continue to represent the opposition. Further, the overall support of
opposition parties does not appear significantly changed.
Issues and Policies

There is also a striking similarity in the most salient disputes between the palace and
the opposition. Although both periods saw increasingly difficult economic situations,52
economic policies have not been the most highly contested issues. Rather, broad-based
opposition coalitions have formed to contest international policies and the domestic
balance of power between the executive and legislative branches. These two issues,
as we shall see, unite the opposition. However, they also challenge the fundamental
bases of the Jordanian regime.
In the 1950s, the two most contentious issues for the palace and the opposition
were the nature of the monarch’s relationship with Israel and the West and the level
of legislative oversight the opposition could exercise. The relationship with Israel and
the West naturally took center stage after the 1948 Arab–Israeli War and the establish-
ment of an Israeli state. King Abdullah saw in this crisis the opportunity to expand
the Jordanian state.53 Consequently, he dissolved Parliament and prepared elections for
a new, forty-member legislature representing both the East and West Banks. Potential
incorporation into the Jordanian monarchy as well as rumors that Abdullah was nego-
tiating a five-year, non-aggression pact with Israel heightened opposition by February
1950. Additional criticism of the Rhodes Agreement54 and Jordan’s dependence on
Britain for financial and military support further exacerbated the opposition’s anger.
The opposition claimed the monarchy was a pawn of the British and John Glubb, a
less-than-loyal commander. In October 1950, the Jordanian cabinet joined in this criti-
cism when Glubb failed to use the Arab Legion to oust an Israeli settlement estab-
lished in southern Jordan.
In addition to the discontent over foreign policy, the opposition demanded greater
domestic political power. Following the 1950 legislature’s ratification of the East and
West Banks of the Jordan River into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the cabinet
formed a council to oversee unified legislation. In addition, Parliament’s displeasure
with its limited role and the strong British influence reached a critical point in May
1951, when the legislature rejected the budget and expressed its lack of confidence in
the government. King Abdullah responded that Jordan’s future depended on British
support and, in any case, the legislature’s role was limited. He would not tolerate such
opposition. When the opposition still refused to grant its consent, King Abdullah and
Prime Minister al-Rifai dissolved Parliament and called for new elections. To reduce
the mounting opposition, King Abdullah promised that constitutional revisions would
follow the elections.
The assassination of King Abdullah on 20 July 1951 did nothing to quell the oppo-
sition’s anger. After Abdullah’s much weaker son, King Talal, took the throne, the
palace loyalists shouldered much of the burden in defending the status quo.55 Never-
theless, the primary international and domestic issues remained sources of intense
struggle against the opposition parties.56 Borders with Israel were not secure, and
when Israel countered Palestinian raids with attacks on Jordanian villages, the masses
blamed Glubb’s Arab Legion for not effectively defending against the attacks.57 On
the domestic front, the promised constitutional revisions took center stage. The oppo-
sition aimed to establish the people as the source of all power and sovereignty. For
the loyalists, however, such a revision challenged the very power of the crown. A
compromise constitution was finally established, which granted increased power to
the House of Deputies. However, the crown maintained the right to dissolve the house
and, consequently, the ultimate power. The issue was far from resolved.
Indeed, these very same issues of foreign policy and relative legislative power
would lead to the crisis of 1957. Although King Hussein initially experimented with a
liberal approach to the opposition, he was also ultimately forced to repress opposition
demands. The conflict over foreign affairs finally erupted after King Hussein at-
tempted to sign the Baghdad Pact and then accept the Eisenhower Doctrine. Like his
grandfather, King Hussein believed that cooperation with the West was critical to a
strong Hashemite Kingdom in Jordan. Like his grandfather, as well, he faced intense
opposition to this approach. Indeed, the popular mobilization intensified from October
1956 through April 1957 as a result of the interminable clash between the king and
opposition over foreign policy.
The intense politics of 1957 was also a result of the continued conflict over domes-
tic policy. Although King Hussein attempted to reduce his opposition by appointing
Sulayman al-Nabulsi, the leader of the National Socialist Party, prime minister, he
found the conflict over domestic policy irresolvable. Not only did Nabulsi demand a
relatively weak role for the king, but it became clear he could quite easily envision a
state without the king. Nabulsi, Abu Nuwar, and their supporters represented the ex-
treme demand of popular sovereignty over the king’s will. King Hussein could not
afford to concede. In April 1957, Hussein overcame governmental opposition and a
coup attempt, ultimately eliminating legal political parties and beginning a long period
of martial law.
Thus, King Abdullah, King Talal, King Hussein and their loyalist supporters faced
opposition based on two sets of demands. The first arena of opposition was foreign
policy. Opponents decried Jordan’s dependence on Britain and its inability or unwill-
ingness to defend against Israel. The second arena of opposition was domestic policy.
Here, despite increased economic and social problems in the 1950s, the opposition
focused on the relative power of the crown and the people. These conflicts frequently
took the forms of disputes over the budget or the constitution.
The issues of contention in 1990 have mirrored those of the 1950s. In foreign
policy, the most important immediate conflicts have been over Jordan’s roles with
Iraq and Israel. The opposition managed to win the first battle over support for Iraq,
weighing heavily in King Hussein’s decision not to join the allied forces against Iraq
in the second Gulf War. However, more recently the palace has turned from Iraq and
called to repress additional calls for Saddam’s support. For instance, although the
government allowed pro-Iraqi demonstrations to be held in 1990 and 1991, in Febru-
ary 1998 it warned parties not to demonstrate or hold public rallies in support of Iraq.
Interior Minister Natheer Rashid announced the policy to “safeguard the country’s
interest and avoid any attempt harboring ill-intentions against the country to infiltrate
our ranks.”58
The conflict over normalization with Israel has been even more severe. Opposition
groups have not ceased in criticizing the treaty and calling for its abrogation. At the
same time, the palace has responded with increasing repression. Changes in the 1993
Electoral Law and the Press and Publications Law and substantial reversals in liberal-
ization are closely linked to the opposition to this treaty.59 Importantly, as in the 1950s,
at the core of the issues with Iraq and Israel are questions not only about the immedi-
ate policies, but also about the king’s relationship with the West. Despite a signifi-
cantly different regional and international environment, the monarch’s apparent reli-
ance on Western forces raises the opposition’s ire.
At the domestic level, calls for greater legislative or popular sovereignty once again
overshadow a dire economic situation. Perhaps the single most important domestic
issue is the Electoral Law of 1993. The Electoral Law is important in part because it
has had important effects on the legislative elections. More important, however, the
very process of changing the Electoral Law has demonstrated that the palace remains
in control. Fearing increased opposition to normalization and unhappy with the Islam-
ists’ performance in Parliament, the king dissolved Parliament before the end of its
term. He then decreed a new Electoral Law, which greatly reduced the opposition
presence in Parliament. Not only did Parliament then ratify the peace treaty with
Israel, but it also passed a substantially unchanged version of the 1993 electoral de-
cree. This law, the presence of Parliaments dominated by loyalist deputies, and rever-
sals in liberalization, such as the revised Press and Publications Law, have increased
opposition anger. At stake, once again, is the level of legislative parity with the palace.
Tactics: Broad Alliances and National Conferences

The fundamental differences between the palace and the opposition in foreign and
domestic policies provide the catalysts for broad opposition alliances. Consequently,
in both the 1950s and 1990s, Islamists and secularists, Jordanians of East and West
Bank origin, have joined together to challenge the king. These coalitions have used
similar tactics in the two periods, as well. Despite the extraordinary levels of popular
activism in the late 1950s, national conferences and low-intensity struggles character-
ize opposition politics during most of this decade.
Since the 1920s, opposition parties have used national conferences to develop plat-
forms and demonstrate political demands. Pan-Arabists led by Syrian nationals and
Jordanian intellectuals such as Husayn al-Tarawna, Subhi al-Ghanima, and Adil al-
Azma organized the first national conference in 1929. This led to the founding of the
executive committee of the National Congress Party and subsequent conferences in
1930, 1932, and 1933.
Similarly, political opposition in the 1950s mobilized national conferences to rally
political demands. Even in 1956, when mass mobilization was at its height, opposition
leaders called for national conferences. In December 1956, activists opposing the
Baghdad Pact met in the Old City of Jerusalem and organized the National Committee,
led in part by Nabulsi. The committee aimed to keep Jordan out of the Baghdad Pact,
cancel the Anglo-Jordanian treaty, oust Lieutenant-General John Glubb, and
strengthen the alliance between Jordan and its Arab neighbors in the struggle against
Israel. In April 1957, following Abu Nuwar’s failed coup and the dissolution of the
Nabulsi government, nationalists and communists organized another national confer-
ence in a last attempt to press their demands. Twenty-three parliamentary deputies
and 200 delegates from political parties drew up a set of demands, asking the prime
minister for a federal union with Egypt and Syria, the rejection of the Eisenhower
Doctrine, and reinstatement of dismissed officers. The following days, however, saw
a general strike and massive demonstrations throughout the West Bank. The newly
formed government resigned, and King Hussein charged Ibrahim Hashim with the
new government. The prime minister immediately announced martial law, dissolved
political parties, and re-established King Hussein’s and the loyalists’ control over
Jordan.
Political parties in the 1990s have formed similar broad alliances using national
conferences to coordinate their positions and draw support. By early 1995, an Anti-
Normalization Committee formed that included both Islamists and nationalists of Jor-
danian and Palestinian origin. It organized, and finally held, a national conference to
draw attention to the opposition to normalization. As the reversal in domestic political
liberalization has become more obvious, with such changes as those in Electoral Law
and the Press and Publications Law, a wide spectrum of political opposition groups
have formed a standing committee, the Higher Committee for Coordination of Opposi-
tion Parties. Although it experiences difficulties in maintaining its internal cohesion,
it has held two national conferences. It has also expressed its united opposition to
numerous issues, including the Press and Publications Law, Jordan’s policy toward
Iraq, the peace treaty, and, most recently, the repression of Hamas in Jordan.
In short, in both the 1950s and 1990s, broad alliances have formed to express
opposition to domestic and foreign policies. The alliances are possible largely because
the opposition issues are all-encompassing. The relative weakness of political par-
ties—and, indeed, mass participation more generally vis-à-vis the king in domestic
affairs—provokes all parties but the loyalists, who have alternative access to the pal-
ace. Similarly, and as an outcome of this, these parties often see Jordan’s foreign-
policy positions as antithetical to their preferred policies. Thus, broad coalitions are
likely. As Shaul Mishal notes with regard to the 1950s:
[W]hile opposition groups in the West Bank differed over other issues, they were unanimous
in their hostility to Jordan’s close ties with Britain. Antagonism to the British presence was
shared by the socialist-oriented Bathists, by the Communists, and later by al-Qawmiyyun, as
well as by the pan-Islamic grouping in the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Tahrir. All of them saw
the British presence as a symbol of the Arab world’s political, economic and social inferiority.60
Similarly, the Muslim Brotherhood’s leader Khalil al-Shawbaki explained the Brother-
hood’s cooperation with leftist parties:
It is coordination over a common cause. It does not mean that we recognize the legitimacy of
their thoughts. We believe in political pluralism as long as it is within the general Islamic
framework. What we want for ourselves, we want it for others too.61
The Islamists’ cooperation with opposition groups over other issues is similarly
understood.
C O N C L U S I O N : U N D E R S TA N D I N G PA RT Y C H A N G E A N D T H E F U T U R E O F
PA L A C E – PA RT Y R E L AT I O N S I N J O R DA N
Jordan’s current experiment with liberalization resembles its previous experience. The
forces that have emerged in the 1950s and 1990s are not fundamentally different.
Although the relative strength of Islamist and secular opposition parties has changed
between the 1950s and the 1990s, the parties’ ideologies and organizational structures
remain much the same. More important, the opposition parties’ willingness to form
broad coalitions challenging the monarchy on domestic and regional issues is also
unchanged.
The high degree of party-system continuity is both surprising and informative. This
continuity stands in stark contrast to the dramatic social and political changes that
have occurred in the kingdom in the past fifty years. In the late 1940s, Jordan was a
new state undergoing significant political and social transformations. Reacting to the
outcome of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, King Abdullah was trying to annex the West
Bank and incorporate a more literate, largely urban Palestinian population into the
kingdom. This population, as noted earlier, created significant political opposition
channeled primarily through leftist parties.
In the period of illegal party politics from the 1950s through the 1990s, the Jorda-
nian social system would be transformed even more. First, in the response to the 1967
war, the population of Jordan would increase with a new wave of refugees from the
West Bank. Second, the split between populations of Transjordanian and Palestinian
origin would widen dramatically during the next five years, when the kingdom would
see increased hostilities, finally emerging in a civil war in 1970–71 over the role of
Palestinians in Jordan. By 1971, Palestinian–Transjordanian hostilities reached a
height, and even with the exodus of Palestinian Liberation Organization fedayeen
from Jordan in 1971 the rifts would not be fully healed. Finally, in addition to in-
creased populations from Palestinian origin and an increasing rift between popula-
tions, the kingdom also experienced increased social mobilization. The population in
general became increasingly literate, educated, and urban. The social bases of the
kingdom in the 1990s, as the king sought to re-create space for political parties, were
very different from those that had existed in the 1950s.
These changes appeared to have little influence on the Jordanian party system.
Despite the increase in factors traditionally thought to promote political mobilization
(i.e., literacy, education, etc.), the mass–party linkages remain weak. In addition, the
changing social bases give little explanation for the most significant change in the
Jordanian system: the strengthening of Islamist parties relative to secular, leftist par-
ties. Although the strengthening of Christian, Islamist, and Hindu parties throughout
much of Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia have shown them to be wrong, social
scientists once expected exactly the opposite: that religious parties would decline in
strength with the increased mobilization. Further, the increased population of Jordanians
from a Palestinian origin does not help explain the shift away from secular, leftist par-
ties. These groups were once, and some of their elites remain, staunch leftists.
Rather, international forces have a stronger influence on the relative strength of
Jordanian parties than the nature of Jordanian society. The importance of regional
influences is evident not only in Jordan, but across the Middle East where Islamist
parties have outrun leftist parties. As noted earlier, this is in many ways a result of
the declining left, most evident in the fall of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
As a result, leftists have lost important material support from international movements
and been forced to re-evaluate their ideology. In contrast, Jordan’s Islamists have been
strengthened by the relative success of Islamists elsewhere, first in Iran and more
recently in Afghanistan. Islamists have gained from international success and been
encouraged by the surge of political Islam. In addition, in Jordan the Muslim Brother-
hood had gained from its ability as a charitable society to participate during the period
of party closure. Consequently, the Muslim Brotherhood is clearly the best-organized
Jordanian party, able to provide constituent services that far outstrip its leftist counter-
parts.62 Even had this not been the case, however, Islamists probably would have fared
better than the secular opposition parties. The success of Islamist parties in states in
which regimes had not favored Islamic parties prior to liberalization—most notably,
Algeria—suggests that this is the case.
That international changes have stimulated a change in the relative strength of Is-
lamist and leftist forces, however, does not mean that there has been a significant
change in the strength of the political-party system. Rather, the strength of the politi-
cal-party system has remained relatively unchanged, even while there have been im-
portant changes in individual political parties. This outcome suggests that much of
the literature, which tends to equate continuity in the strength of individual political
parties with continuity in party systems, may be misleading. These two factors are
clearly independent from each other.
Not only are these two characteristics of political parties independent, but the Jorda-
nian case suggests that different factors influence the extent to which there is continu-
ity in the strength of individual political tendencies and in the strength of the political-
party system. Although international variables explain changes in the relative strength
of Islamist and secular parties, they do not explain the weakness of Jordanian parties
more generally. The weakness of the Jordanian party system is best understood as a
reflection of the Jordanian political system and an outcome of the nature of liberaliza-
tion. The Jordanian political system continues to operate with a wide base of loyalist
support, which frequently turns to tribe rather than party to represent its interests.63
The regime therefore has no overwhelming interest in supporting and strengthening
the role of political parties. Further, political liberalization in Jordan comes in re-
sponse to increasing domestic threats. It is intended to preserve the regime, not foster
political change. These appear to have been the same goals in the 1950s. Thus, in
both the 1950s and the 1990s, the parties were weak at the beginning of liberalization.
Although they may attempt to change the system, they are in a weak position to
challenge the status quo. Consequently, they have begun the process of liberalization
as subordinate partners to the palace, and they are likely to remain so.
The dynamics of political liberalization in the 1990s are likely to resemble those of
the 1950s. In both periods, initial optimism over political reform stimulated a rise in
political demands. Opponents strongly criticized both foreign and domestic policies,
and the focus on external events brought together broad opposition coalitions. In the
1950s, this led to increased pressures for change and an eventual showdown between
the king and his opposition. Whether Jordan’s current experiment with liberalization
will end in a similar confrontation remains to be seen. In the short run, at least, we
have seen some turn to old policies of repression to minimize political demands.
Despite these threats, however, the Jordanian opposition continued to press for lib-
eralization. It could, perhaps, have been given new breathing room with King Hus-
sein’s death in 1999. Like his father before him, King Abdullah II has been thrust
into a difficult political situation, with rising domestic demands and thorny interna-
tional issues before him. In the transition from King Abdullah to King Hussein, the
opposition found—at least briefly—an opportunity to press political demands. In the
current transition, this measure of political liberalization has not yet been felt. How
the opposition and palace elite will fare in the future struggle remains to be seen.
NOTES
Author’s note: I thank Laurie Brand, Scott Greenwood, Amaney Ahmad Jamal, Curtis Ryan, Quintan
Wiktorowicz, two anonymous reviewers, and members of the panel at the Middle East Studies Association
Annual Conference, Washington, D.C., November 1999, for their extremely helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this article. I also acknowledge the generous support of the Social Science Research Foundation,
the Council of American Overseas Research Centers, and the American Center for Oriental Research in
Amman, Jordan. All shortcomings are, of course, my responsibility.
1
Samir Habashneh, “Political Liberalization and the Performance of Jordanian Parties,” in The Demo-
cratic Process in Jordan: Deliberations of the Conference on the “Democratic Process in Jordan—Realities
and Prospects” ed. Hani Hourani (Amman: Sindbad Publishing, 1996), 167–68.
2
See, for instance, other interventions in ibid.; Betty Anderson, “Liberalization in Jordan in the 1950s and
1990s: Similarities or Differences?” Jordanies 4 (1997): 207–17; Rex Brynen, “The Politics of Monarchical
Liberalism: Jordan” in Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Vol. 2: Comparative
Experiences, ed. Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen, and Paul Noble (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 71–100.
3
Glenn Robinson, “Defensive Democratization in Jordan,” International Journal of Middle East Studies
30 (1998): 387–410.
4
For discussions of the role of political parties in political mediation, see Leonardo Morlino, “Consolida-
tion and Party Government in Southern Europe,” International Political Science Review 16 (1995): 145–67;
Deborah Norden, “Party Relations and Democracy in Latin America,” Party Politics 4 (1998): 423–43;
Scott Mainwaring, “Party Systems in the Third Wave,” Journal of Democracy 9 (1998): 67–81; and Nicho-
las Van de Walle, “Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Africa” (paper presented at Yale University,
2 February 2000). On the limits of civil society in Jordan, see Laurie Brand, “‘In the Beginning Was the
State . . . ’: The Quest for Civil Society in Jordan,” in Civil Society in the Middle East, Vol. 1, ed. Augustus
Richard Norton (New York: E. J. Brill, 1995), 148–85; Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Civil Society as Social
Control: State Power in Jordan,” Comparative Politics 23 (2000): 43–61. On the limited role of parties
and civil society in pressing democratization in Jordan, see, for instance, Malek Mufti, “Elite Bargains and
the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan,” Comparative Political Studies 32 (1999): 100–29; Robin-
son, “Defensive Democratization”; Rex Brynen, “Economic Crises and Post-Rentier Democratization in
the Arab World: The Case of Jordan,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 25 (1992): 69–97.
5
See, for instance, Kirstin Hamam and Barbara Sgouraki-Kinsey, “Re-Emerging Electoral Politics,” Party
Politics 5 (1999): 55–77; Scott Mainwaring, “Party Systems”; Philippe Schmitter, “Transitology: The Sci-
ence or Art of Democratization?” in Consolidation and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Joseph Tulchin
and Bernice Romero (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner, 1995), 11–44.
6
J. Samuel Valenzuela and Timothy Scully, “Electoral Choices and the Party System in Chile: Continui-
ties and Changes at the Recovery of Democracy,” Comparative Politics (1997): 511–27.
7
Goldie Shabad and Kazimierz Slomczynski, “Political Identities in the Initial Phase of Systemic Trans-
formation in Poland,” Comparative Political Studies 32 (1999): 690–723. Much work on the strength of
communist parties in states of the post-Soviet bloc also suggests that the strength of former communist
states is largely determined by the ability of other leftist parties to draw support away from these parties.
In other words, this work suggests a continuity between the overall size of leftist constituents before and
after the fall of the Soviet Union.
8
Werner Goldner, The Role of Abdullah ibn Hussain in Arab Politics, 1914–1951 (Ph.D. diss., Stanford
University, Stanford, Calif., 1954), 167, cited in Naseer Aruri, Jordan: A Study in Political Development
(1921–1965) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972).
9
The estimate of participation in the 1950s is the author’s. It is based on the total population of 1,329,174
in 1952 and 304,000 electors in 1950: Aruri, Jordan, 67. The estimate is derived using an assumption that
50 percent of the population is not eligible to vote. This estimate for the population younger than 18 years
of age or otherwise ineligible is likely to be high. Consequently, I expect that the 45 percent voting rate
is a generous estimate.
10
Jordan Information Bureau, “Election Results of the 12th Jordanian Parliament, 8 November 1993,”
cited in Brynen, “Politics of Monarchical Liberalism,” 84.
11
For discussions of these parties, see Aruri, Jordan; Mawafiq Mahawin, al-Ihzab w-al-Qawi al-Siyassiya
fil-Urdunn: 1927–1987: Bibliografiyya (Parties and Political Forces in Jordan 1927–1987: A Bibliography)
(Beirut: Dar as-Sadiqa al-Tabaat wal-Nashr, 1988); Sulayman Musa and Munib al-Madi, Tarikh al-Urdunn
fil-Qarn al-Ashrin: 1900–1959 (Amman: Maktaba al-Madatasib, 1988); Abla Amawi, “Jordan,” in Political
Parties of the Middle East and North Africa, ed. Frank Tachau (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994):
259–96; Aqil Hyder Hasan Abidi, Jordan: A Political Study 1948–1957 (New York: Asia Publishing House,
1965).
12
Samir al-Rifai and Tawfiq Abul Huda were powerful politicians and staunch Hashemite supporters.
Abul Huda served as prime minister four times, for a total of nearly eleven years, between 1938 and 1955.
Rifai served for shorter periods six times between 1944 and 1963.
13
The IAF emerged as the political party associated primarily with the Muslim Brotherhood. For discus-
sion of this party, see works in Jillian Schwedler, ed., Islamic Movements in Jordan (Amman: al-Urdunn
al-Jadid Research Center, 1990); Hamed Dabbas, Al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fil-Urdunn (Islamic Political
Movements in Jordan) (Amman: al-Urdunn al-Jadid Research Center, 1995).
14
It should be noted that the importance of loyalist parties (versus independent loyalist candidates) is
heightened by the disproportionate number of seats per population allocated in regions of traditional loyalty:
see Louis-Jean Duclos, “Les elections legislatives en Jordanie,” Maghreb-Machrek: monde arabe 129
(1990): 47–75.
15
For a discussion of the one-person, one-vote law, see Robinson, “Defensive Democratization”; al-Ur-
dunn al-Jadid, al-Intikhabat 1993 al-Urduniyyah: Dirassat Tahliliyya Raqamiyya (The 1993 Jordanian Elec-
tions: An Analytical Study) (Amman, Jordan: al-Urdunn al-Jadid Research Center, 1995); Mufti, “Elite
Bargains”; Abdo Baaklani, Guilain Denouex, and Robert Springborg, Legislative Politics in the Arab
World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner, 1999), 133–68.
16
The level of East Bank participation in the opposition is a highly controversial topic. Clearly, Palestin-
ians had an additional grievance against the Hashemites: few considered themselves part of the unified
Jordanian state that King Abdullah advocated. Consequently, the bulk of political demonstrations during
this period took place in the West Bank. However, in the 1950s the parliamentary bloc included not only
Palestinians but also East Bank Jordanians, for reasons that will be discussed later. For a discussion of the
widening parliamentary opposition, see Ali Muhammad Saada, Al-Muarada al-Islamiyya al-Urdunniyya
fi Sabayn Aam: 1921–1991 (Jordanian Political Opposition Through Seventy Years: 1921–1991) (n.p.:
Matbaa al-Dustour al-Tijariyya, 1998).
17
Abidi, Jordan: A Political Study; Aruri, Jordan; Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab
Radicalism: Jordan, 1955–1967 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Musa and al-Madi, Tarikh
al-Urdunn.
18
Socio-economic statistics reflect some of this perceived difference. For instance, 22 percent of Transjor-
dan’s population was urban in 1946, as opposed to 34 percent urban in Palestine; the number of schools
had risen from 299 to 406 in Palestine between 1932 and 1944, while it had declined from 186 to 155 in
Transjordan from 1935 to 1944: A. Konikoff, Transjordan: An Economic Survey (Jerusalem, 1946), 18,
and Government of Palestine, A Survey of Palestine (Jerusalem, 1946), 137–39, 148–51. Both are cited in
Aruri, Jordan, 34.
19
Clinton Bailey, “The Participation of Palestinians in the Politics of Jordan” (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia
University, New York, 1966).
20
Istatla ar-Rai Hawal al-Dimuqratiyya fil-Urdunn 1998 (Opinion Polls on Democracy in Jordan, 1998)
(Amman: Markaz al-Dirassa al-Istratajiyya, al-Jamaat al-Urdunn, 1998), 18.
21
Ibid., 21, 24. Political parties’ general weakness was also reflected in the 1999 municipal elections:
see Curtis Ryan, “W(h)ither Democracy? The 1999 Municipal Elections and Political Liberalization in
Jordan” (paper presented at the Middle East Studies Association Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., No-
vember 1999).
22
Curtis Ryan, “Peace, Bread and Riots: Jordan and the International Monetary Fund,” Middle East
Policy 6 (1988): 54–66; Lamis Andoni, Washington Post, 22 April 1989, A1, 20.
23
These included Al-Urdun, Filastin, Difa, Jazirah, al-Jihad, Nisr, and Nahda.
24
See Bailey, “Participation of the Palestinians.”
25
See Abidi, Jordan: A Political Study.
26
Banned newspapers included al-Raye (Arab Nationalists), al-Yaqatha (Bath), al-Kifah al-Islami (Mus-
lim Brotherhood), al-Jabha (Communist), al-Watan, al-Ahad al-Jadid, and Sawt al-Shaab.
27
The government owns a controlling share of the major dailies in the 1990s. It holds 65 percent of the
shares, and nine of twelve seats on the board of directors of the Jordan Press Foundation, which publishes
al-Rai (the largest daily) and the English-language Jordan Times. The government also has a controlling
interest in al-Dustour, the only real competing daily after the demise of Sawt al-Shaab (in which the
government had also held a controlling interest.) As a result, the government appoints the general director
and chief editor of these papers, adding psychological incentives to the official censorship that the press
undergoes. Not surprisingly, a brief study by Nabil al-Sharif found that the mainstream press gave little
attention to opposition positions: see Nabil al-Sharif, “Opposition in the Print Media,” in The Role of the
Media in a Democracy: The Case of Jordan, ed. George Hawatmeh (Amman: University of Jordan, 1995).
28
Short-lived party-published periodicals included Al-Bath (by the Jordanian Arab Masses Party), Nida
al-Watan (by the Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party), and al-Asr al-Jadid (by the Democratic Arab
Islamic Movement Party—Dua).
29
Russell Lucas, “Institutions and Regime Survival Strategies: Collective Action and Path Dependence
in Jordan” (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., June 2000).
30
For a discussion of these changes, see Adam Jones, “Jordan: Press, Regime and Society since 1989,”
supplementary case study for The Press in Transition. Available from: http://adamjones.freeservers.com/
Jordan.htm.
31
Ibid., 8.
32
This is consistent with Jordanian constitutions. See Subhi J. M. el-Utebi, “The Politics of the Middle-
Ground: The Case of Jordan” (paper at presented at al-Albait University, Amman, Jordan, 1995).
33
Regional balancing plays an important role in appointing elite from the East Bank. Loyalty is a key
determinant in appointing individuals of West Bank origin: Bailey, “Participation of the Palestinians”; idem,
“Cabinet Formation in Jordan,” in The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank, ed. Anne Sinai
and Allen Pollack (New York: American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, 1977); Laurie
Brand, Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for the State (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1988).
34
On the changing relations between the Islamists and the Hashemites in the 1990s, see Beverly Milton-
Edwards, “A Temporary Alliance with the Crown: The Islamic Response in Jordan,” in Islamic Fundamen-
talisms and the Gulf Crisis, ed. James Piscatori (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 88–108;
Glenn E. Robinson, “Can Islamists Be Democrats? The Case of Jordan,” Middle East Journal 51 (1997):
373–87; Laurie Brand, Women, the State and Political Liberalization: Middle Eastern and North African
Experiences (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Christian Science Monitor, 21 June 1991, 7;
Christian Science Monitor, 13 November 1993, 1.
35
For more detail on these parties in a directory form, see Amawi, “Jordan.” More detail is also available
from the author, on request, in the unpublished manuscript “The Handbook of Jordanian Political Parties.”
36
Regarding the relationship among West Bank Palestinians, refugees, and parties in the 1950s, see Am-
non Cohen, Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1982), and Avi Plascov, The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan, 1948–1957 (London: Frank Cass, 1981).
37
Hani Hourani, al-Ihzab as-Siyassiyya al-Urdunniyya (Jordanian Political Parties) (Amman: al-Urdunn
al-Jadid Research Center, 1997); Hani Hourani, Taleb Awad, Hamed Dabbas, and Omar Shneikat, Jorda-
nian Political Parties (Amman: al-Urdunn al-Jadid Research Center, 1993).
38
Lamis Andoni, Christian Science Monitor, 8 November 1993, 2.
39
Member of National Assembly and Jordanian National Alliance Party, interview by the author, Amman,
20 August 1998. The conservative loyalists’ reluctance to form political parties is also seen in Jordan
Times, 22 June 1992, 1, 5; Abdullah Radwan, professor of Political Science (Independent), interview by
the author, Jordan University, 19 November 1995; interviews transcribed in Schirin H. Fathi, Jordan: An
Invented Nation? (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient Institut, 1994); and in Christian Science Monitor, 8 Novem-
ber 1993.
40
The weakening of the National Constitutional Party was recognized by party members and opposition:
interviews with party members by the author, Amman, Jordan, July–August 1998.
41
See Amawi, “Jordan”; Lust-Okar, “Handbook of Jordanian Political Parties” (unpublished ms. available
from the author).
42
For a more detailed discussion of the evolution of the Jordanian Nationalist Movement, see Betty
Signe Anderson, “The History of the Jordanian National Movement: Its Leaders, Ideologies, Successes and
Failures.” (Ph.D., diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1997).
43
Interviews with party members, Amman, Jordan, 1995 and 1998. Interviews with U.S. Political Office,
American Embassy, Amman, Jordan, 6 December 1995; Radwan, interview; Hani Hourani, director, al-
Urdunn al-Jadid Research Center, interview by the author, 28 November 1995; Saad Silawi, MBC, Bureau
Chief for Jordan, interview by the author, 20 November 1995; Amman. Yaqub Ziyadin interview, in Jordan
Times, 4 March 1993.
44
Stephen Hubbell, “King Hussein’s Surprise,” The Nation, 25 December 1989, 786.
45
The IAF has also faced crises that have threatened to split the party, most notably divisions over the
1997 election boycott and relations with the government during the recent Jordanian crackdown on Hamas.
In neither case, however, have these issues led to the fragmentation of the IAF: see, for instance, “Jordan:
Islamic Movement Reportedly Says Difficulties Settled,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 11 January 2000; ,
Jordan Times, 28 August 1997; , Jordan Times, 16 September 1997.
46
Such reasons are rarely given by those leaving to form new parties. However, a typical sentiment was
expressed by a Jordanian Democratic Unionist Party member, who charged that “[the dissenters] are trying
to get to the negotiating table as a separate party, thereby obtaining higher position in the new formation”:
Jordan Times, 11 June 1997. Varying views were expressed in interviews with Mazen Saket, 28 August
1998; Khalil Haddadine, 16 August 1998; and Jamil Nimri, 25 August 1998, all conducted in Amman.
47
The most notable split occurred when Issa Madanat, a former leader in the Communist Party, split
from the Jordanian Communist Party: interviews by the author with Issa Madanat, 1 September 1998;
Leila Nafa, 29 August 1998; and Rashid Shuqayr, 27 August 1998.
48
Jordan Times, 5 August 1998; Jordan Times, 4 March 1993; Jordan Times, 19 January 1995; and al-
Rai, 14 January 1995.
49
For a discussion of Hizb al-Tahrir in the 1990s, see Suha Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest (London:
Grey Seal Publishers, 1996).
50
Including independents, Islamists won approximately 32 seats in 1989 and 22 in 1993. An estimated
seven Islamists won seats in the 1997 elections: Middle East International (21 July 1995): 10–11; Baaklani
et al., Legislative Politics.
51
Jordan information Bureau, “Election Results”; also, interviews by the author with Ibrahim Gharaibeh,
29 August 1998; Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat, 26 August 1998; and Abd al-Aziz Shabanah, 18 August 1998,
all conducted in Amman.
52
Shwadran chronicles the economic difficulties in the 1950s: while export earnings remained stationary
at an average 2.5 million pounds per year from 1948 to 1954, expenditures for imports rose from 10 million
pounds in 1948 to about 20 million pounds in 1954. Jordan turned increasingly to international donors for
assistance. By 1954, more than half of Jordan’s foreign-exchange receipts were from foreign grants and
loans: Benjamin Shawdran, Jordan: A State of Tension (New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs
Press, 1959), 318. Ryan describes the recent economic crisis. Since 1988, Jordan’s debt reached twice its
gross domestic product, leading it to renegotiate its foreign debt in 1989 and 1996. In both periods, the
economic adjustment created widespread discontent: Ryan, “Peace, Bread and Riots.”
53
King Abdullah’s intentions toward Palestine were evident in his address at the opening of the new
Parliament. In the throne speech of 24 April 1948, he noted, “It is a source of satisfaction to me that I
should, for the first time in the constitutional life of Jordan, open this Parliament, which embraces members
from both sides of the Jordan—a Parliament drawn from the will of one people and one country with
identical aspirations”: Abdullah ibn al-Hussein, My Memoirs Completed Al-Takmilah, trans. Harold Glid-
den (New York: Longman, 1951), 22. See also Sir Alec Kirkbride, From the Wings: Amman Memoirs
1947–1951 (London: Frank Cass, 1976), 112–14; Joseph Nevo, King Abdallah and Palestine: A Territorial
Ambition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996); Schirin H. Fathi, Jordan: An Invented Nation? (Hamburg:
Deutsches Orient-Institut, 1994).
54
The Rhodes Agreement, or the Israeli–Jordanian Armistice Agreement signed on Rhodes on 3 April
1949, established a truce between the two parties and Jordanian control over the West Bank.
55
See Robert Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1994). Abidi, Jordan: A Political Study.
56
For a discussion of rising opposition through the 1950s, see Dann, King Hussein.
57
Arab discontent led to rioting in 14 October 1953. Israelis retaliated for a border raid on Tirat Yehuda
by invading the village of Qibya, which the Arab Legion failed to defend. To appease Arab anger partially,
John Glubb dismissed his British commander, Teal Ashton. Jordanian opposition mounted, increasingly
focused on Glubb himself. On 1 March 1956, King Hussein dismissed the lieutenant-general: see James
Lunt, Glubb Pasha: A Biography (London: Harvill Press, 1984); Trevor Royle, Glubb Pasha (London:
Little, Brown, 1992); Sir John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1957).
58
Star, 12 February 1998.
59
See Frederic Charillon and Alain Mouftard, “Jordanie: Les elections du 8 novembre 1993 et le processus
de paix,” Monde arabe Maghreb Machrek 144 (1994): 40–55.
60
Shaul Mishal, West Bank/East Bank: Palestinians in Jordan 1947–1967 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1978), 34.
61
Khalil al-Shawbaki, “Brotherhood Leader Affirms Commitment to Non-Violent Approach,” Jordan
Times, 12–13 October 1995, A1.
62
Despite the political-party weaknesses highlighted here, political parties are able to provide some im-
portant constituent services. Most notably, the Muslim Brotherhood provides kindergartens, nursery
schools, nutrition programs, medical care, and assistance to needy families. It also promotes Islamic educa-
tion through seminars and publications. For a directory of Islamic organizations, see Hamad Dabbas, “Is-
lamic Centers, Associations, Societies, Organizations and Committees in Jordan,” in Islamic Movements in
Jordan, ed. Jillian Schwedler (Amman: Sindbad Publishing, 1997), 195–262. For a useful discussion, see
also Ibrahim Gharaibeh, “The Political Performance and Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood,” in
Islamic Movements in Jordan , 47–80.
63
For a discussion of the roles of tribe and party, see Linda Layne, “Tribesmen as Citizens: ‘Primordial
Ties’ and Democracy in Rural Jordan,” in Elections in the Middle East: Implications of Recent Trends, ed.
Linda Layne (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), and Linda Layne, Home and Homeland: The Dialog-
ics of Tribal and National Identities (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). See also discussions
following the 1993 Electoral Law (e.g., Abla Amawi, “The 1993 Elections in Jordan,” Arab Studies Quar-
terly, 16 [1994]: 15–28) and the 1997 electoral boycott (e.g., Jean Christophe Auge, Riccardo Bocco, and
Louis-Jean Ducios, “Les elections du 4 novembre 1997 en Jordanie,” Monde Arabe Maghreb Machrek 160
[1998]: 30–50).

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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 33 (2001), 545–569.

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 2001 Cambridge University Press 0020-7438/01 $9.50

Theoretically, political parties play an important role as a conduit for communication

1950 Election 1951 Election 1954 Election 1956 Election

Bath 5,061 1.6 21,120 6.2 10,474 2.3 34,000 8.4

support was not quite as strong or widespread as it is remembered to be, particularly

TABLE 2 Number and percentage of votes for successful

Party No. of Votes % Total Votes

Islamic Action Front 126,202 15.5

TABLE 3 Electoral seats gained by parties, 1950–93

No. of Seats % Seats

2nd Parliament, 1950 Bath Party 2 5

3rd Parliament, 1951 Bath Party 3 7.5

4th Parliament, 1954 Bath Party 0 0

5th Parliament, 1956 Bath Party 2 5

11th Parliament, 1989 Islamic Action Front 23 30

No. of Seats % Seats

12th Parliament, 1993 Islamic Action Front 16 20

Government–Party Linkages: Public Policy-making and Influence

Ideologies and Organizational Structures

operated aboveground because of its loyalty to the monarchy and importance as a

Issues and Policies

Tactics: Broad Alliances and National Conferences

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