INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL. VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMELEC CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS, SR., ET AL.

G.R. No. 159139. January 13, 2004 Facts: On June 7, 1995, Congress passed R.A. 8046 (An act authorizing the COMELEC to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and pilot-test it in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and for other purposes). On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. 8436 (An act authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system in the May 11, 1998 national or local elections and in subsequent national and local electoral exercises, providing funds therefore and for other purposes). On October 29, 2002, COMELEC adopted its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three phases of its Automated Election System: namely, Phase I-Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II-Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase III-Electronic Transmissions. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO No. 172, which allocated the sum of P 2.5 billion to fund the AES for May 10, 2004 elections. She authorized the release of an additional P 500 million, upon the request of COMELEC. The COMELEC issued an Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid. There are 57 bidders who participated therein. The Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) found MPC and the Total Information Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible. Both were referred to Technical Working Group (TWG) and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST). However, the DOST said in its Report on the Evaluation of Technical Proposals on Phase II that both MPC and TIMC had obtained a number of failed marks in technical evaluation. Notwithstanding these failures, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 6074, awarding the project to MPC. Wherefore, petitioners Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines wrote a letter to the COMELEC chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. They protested the award of the contract to respondent MPC. However in a letter-reply, the COMELEC rejected the protest. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in awarding the contract to MPC in violation of law and in disregard of its own bidding rules and procedure. Held: The Court has explained that COMELEC flagrantly violated the public policy on public biddings (1) by allowing MPC/MPEI to participate in the bidding even though it was not qualified to do so; and (2) by eventually awarding the contract to MPC/MPEI. It is clear that the Commission further desecrated the law on public bidding by permitting the winning bidder to alter the subject of the contract, in effect allowing a substantive amendment without public bidding. ITF VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 159139. January 13, 2004. Facts: On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which authorized Comelec to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election System; namely, Phase I Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase III Electronic Transmission. On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the request of Comelec, she authorized the release of an additional P500 million.

On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid". On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a letter to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and procedural requirements (many of which have been discussed at length in the Petition), they sought a re-bidding. Issue: Whether the bidding process was unconstitutional; Whether the awarding of the contract was unconstitutional; Whether the petitioner has standing; and Whether the petition is premature. Held: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares NULL and VOID Comelec Resolution No. 6074 awarding the contract for Phase II of the CAES to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC). Also declared null and void is the subject Contract executed between Comelec and Mega Pacific eSolutions (MPEI). 55 Comelec is further ORDERED to refrain from implementing any other contract or agreement entered into with regard to this project. Ratio: Comelec awarded this billion-peso undertaking with inexplicable haste, without adequately checking and observing mandatory financial, technical and legal requirements. It also accepted the proferred computer hardware and software even if, at the time of the award, they had undeniably failed to pass eight critical requirements designed to safeguard the integrity of elections: 1. Awarded the Contract to MPC though it did not even participate in the bidding 2. Allowed MPEI to participate in the bidding despite its failure to meet the mandatory eligibility requirements 3. Issued its Resolution of April 15, 2003 awarding the Contract to MPC despite the issuance by the BAC of its Report, which formed the basis of the assailed Resolution, only on April 21, 2003 31 4. Awarded the Contract, notwithstanding the fact that during the bidding process, there were violations of the mandatory requirements of RA 8436 as well as those set forth in Comelec's own Request for Proposal on the automated election system IHaECA 5. Refused to declare a failed bidding and to conduct a re-bidding despite the failure of the bidders to pass the technical tests conducted by the Department of Science and Technology 6. Failed to follow strictly the provisions of RA 8436 in the conduct of the bidding for the automated counting machines After reviewing the slew of pleadings as well as the matters raised during the Oral Argument, the Court deems it sufficient to focus discussion on the following major areas of concern that impinge on the issue of grave abuse of discretion: A. Matters pertaining to the identity, existence and eligibility of MPC as a bidder B. Failure of the automated counting machines (ACMs) to pass the DOST technical tests C. Remedial measures and re-testings undertaken by Comelec and DOST after the award, and their effect on the present controversy In view of the bidding process Unfortunately, the Certifications from DOST fail to divulge in what manner and by what standards or criteria the condition, performance and/or readiness of the machines were re-evaluated and re-appraised and thereafter given the passing mark.

The Automated Counting and Canvassing Project involves not only the manufacturing of the ACM hardware but also the development of three (3) types of software, which are intended for use in the following: 1. Evaluation of Technical Bids 2. Testing and Acceptance Procedures 3. Election Day Use." In short, Comelec claims that it evaluated the bids and made the decision to award the Contract to the "winning" bidder partly on the basis of the operation of the ACMs running a "base" software. That software was therefore nothing but a sample or "demo" software, which would not be the actual one that would be used on election day. What then was the point of conducting the bidding, when the software that was the subject of the Contract was still to be created and could conceivably undergo innumerable changes before being considered as being in final form? In view of awarding of contract The public bidding system designed by Comelec under its RFP (Request for Proposal for the Automation of the 2004 Election) mandated the use of a two-envelope, two-stage system. A bidder's first envelope (Eligibility Envelope) was meant to establish its eligibility to bid and its qualifications and capacity to perform the contract if its bid was accepted, while the second envelope would be the Bid Envelope itself. The Eligibility Envelope was to contain legal documents such as articles of incorporation, business registrations, licenses and permits, mayor's permit, VAT certification, and so forth; technical documents containing documentary evidence to establish the track record of the bidder and its technical and production capabilities to perform the contract; and financial documents, including audited financial statements for the last three years, to establish the bidder's financial capacity. However, there is no sign whatsoever of any joint venture agreement, consortium agreement, memorandum of agreement, or business plan executed among the members of the purported consortium.So, it necessarily follows that, during the bidding process, Comelec had no basis at all for determining that the alleged consortium really existed and was eligible and qualified; and that the arrangements among the members were satisfactory and sufficient to ensure delivery on the Contract and to protect the government's interest. In view of standing On the other hand, petitioners suing in their capacities as taxpayers, registered voters and concerned citizens respond that the issues central to this case are "of transcendental importance and of national interest." Allegedly, Comelec's flawed bidding and questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified entity would impact directly on the success or the failure of the electoral process. Thus, any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of the people would inevitably affect their faith in the democratic system of government. Petitioners further argue that the award of any contract for automation involves disbursement of public funds in gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest requires that the laws governing the transaction must be followed strictly. Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of public funds," 22 or if public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; 23 or when petitioners seek to restrain respondent from "wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law."

In view of prematurity The letter addressed to Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. dated May 29, 2003 28 serves to eliminate the prematurity issue as it was an actual written protest against the decision of the poll body to award the Contract. The letter was signed by/for, inter alia, two of herein petitioners: the Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol. Such letter-protest is sufficient compliance with the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies particularly because it hews closely to the procedure outlined in Section 55 of RA 9184. Paat v. Court of Appeals enumerates the instances when the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies may be disregarded, as follows: "(1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention." Ricardo Santiago vs Commissioner Bautista of Immigrations Constitutional Law Judicial Power Justiciable Controversy Citizenship Santiago was considered an alien as evidenced by his alien certificate of registration. He averred that this is erroneous. He was born of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father here in the Philippines. He was sent to China when he was 4 years old by his dad. He returned in 1925 and in his Landing Certificate he was already labeled as a Filipino. Hence, he would like to cancel the alien certificate that was issued by the Bureau of Immigrations. In his original petition however in the lower court he was praying for a declaratory relief for him to be declared as a Filipino. He was favored by the court. The fiscal appealed averring that a declaratory relief is not the proper remedy. The lower court amended the decision not stating the declaratory statement but rather focusing on the cancellation of the alien certificate. The fiscal appealed before the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not declaratory relief is a proper remedy to have a judicial declaration of citizenship. HELD: The SC ruled against Santiago. Although amended, the proceeding initiated and originally prayed for is a declaratory relief to have him be declared as a Filipino. Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justifiable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an accident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. Thus, for instance, no action or proceeding may be instituted for a declaration to the

effect that plaintiff or petitioner is married, or single, or a legitimate child, although a finding thereon may be made as a necessary premise to justify a given relief available only to one enjoying said status. At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given status, such as naturalization, by judicial decree. But, there is no similar legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. 216. SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA judicial power and judicial function Teodoro Santiago was a Grade 6 pupil at Sero Elem. School. He was adjudged 3 rd Honors (3rd placer). 3 days before graduation, Teodoro and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of honor students. They filed a CERTIORARI case against the principal and teachers who composed the committee on rating honors. They contend that the committee acted with grave abuse of official discretion because they claim that o the 1st and 2nd placers had never been a close rival of Santiago before, except in Grade 5 only. o That Santiago was a consistent honor student from Grade 1 to 5 o that the 1st placer was coached and tutored by grade 6 teachers during the summer (gaining unfair advantage) o The committee was composed only of Grade 6 teachers. o That some teachers gave Santos a 75% with an intention to pull him to a much lower rank o That in the Honors Certificate in Grade 1, the word first place was erased and replaced with second place o That the Principal and district supervisors merely passed the buck to each other to delay his grievances. The respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was improper, and that even assuming it was proper, the question has become academic (because the graduation already proceeded). Respondents also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions. (under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial functions)

ISSUE: may judicial function be exercised in this case? What is judicial power? SC: A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to exist, (TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A TRIBUNAL OR BOARD EXERCISES JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS) 1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and determination. , and 2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision.

3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at least the not the legislative nor the executive) It maybe said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy. The phrase judicial power is defined: as authority to determine the rights of persons or property. authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication. The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them. The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights. The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring therefrom is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of contending parties. There is nothing about any rule of law that provides for when teachers sit down to assess individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors. Worse still, the petitioners have not presented the pertinent provisions of the Service Manual for Teachers which was allegedly violated by the Committee. The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges. And for that matter, it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests, and similar competitions. In re LAURETA IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. No. 68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL G.R. No. L-68635 May 14, 1987 Facts: Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of the her case (a land dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it was an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1st Division, that it was railroaded with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics. Illustre also threatened in her letter that, there is nothing final in this world. This case is far from finished by a long shot. She threatened that she would call for a press conference. Illustres letter basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was established that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents. The letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution was issued, the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to retire), and that Justice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was also made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case. Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz), again with more threats to expose the kind of judicial performance readily constituting travesty of justice. True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging the Justices

with knowingly rendering an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also charged of using their influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution. Atty LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to the press, without any copy furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were charged with graft and corruption. The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint. Now, the SC is charging them with contempt. They claim that the letters were private communication, and that they did not intend to dishonor the court. Issue : WON privacy of communication was violated Held : The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court. There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Courts authority and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession. We re not convinced that Atty Laureta had nothing to do with Ilustres letters, nor with the complaint filed with the tanodbayan. Atty Laureta repeated disparaging remarks such as undue influence, powerful influence in his pleadings. This was bolstered by the report that Laureta distributed copies of the complaint to the newspaper companies in envelopes bearing his name. He was also heard over the radio. Lastly, as Illustres lawyer, he had control of the proceedings. SC resolutions are beyond investigation from other departments of the government because of separation of powers. The correctness of the SC decisions are conclusive upon other branches of government. 219. In re LAURETA power to preserve judiciary s honor Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of the her case (a land dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it was an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1st Division, that it was railroaded with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics. Illustre also threatened in her letter that, there is nothing final in this world. This case is far from finished by a long shot. She threatened that she would call for a press conference. Illustres letter basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was established that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents. The letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the minuteresolution was issued, the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to retire), and that Justice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was also made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case. Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz), again with more threats to expose the kind of judicial performance readily constituting travesty of justice. True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging the Justices with knowingly rendering an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also charged of using their influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution.

Atty LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to the press, without any copy furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were charged with graft and corruption. The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint. Now, the SC is charging them with contempt. They claim that the letters were private communication, and that they did not intend to dishonor the court.

SC: The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court. There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Courts authority and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession. We re not convinced that Atty Laureta had nothing to do with Ilustres letters, nor with the complaint filed with the tanodbayan. Atty Laureta repeated disparaging remarks such as undue influence, powerful influence in his pleadings. This was bolstered by the report that Laureta distributed copies of the complaint to the newspaper companies in envelopes bearing his name. He was also heard over the radio. Lastly, as Illustres lawyer, he had control of the proceedings. In short, SC resolutions are beyond investigation from other departments of the government because of separation of powers. The correctness of the SC decisions are conclusive upon other branches of government. NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151, he is entitled to the same compensation, emoluments, and privileges as those of a Judge of CFI. He approved a subdivision plan covering certain areas that are in excess of those covered by the title The Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas, requiring him to explain. Noblejas answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to that of a Judge, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as an ordinary Judge, under the Judiciary Act. He claims that he may be investigated only by the Supreme Court Nevertheless, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES) Noblejas filed this case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse of discretion. ISSUE: Whether the Commissioner of Land Registratoin may only be investigated by the Supreme Court (in view of his having a rank equivalent to a judge)? SC: NO. If the law had really intended to include the general grant of rank and privileges equivalent to Judges, the right to be investigated and be suspended or removed only by the Supreme Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers because it would charge the Supreme Court with an administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto, the control of the Chief Executive over such officials. There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative to charge the Judiciary with administrative functions

except when reasonable incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties. The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory, nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions. As such, RA 1151 while conferring the same privileges as those of a judge, did not include and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon the Courts recommendation. Said rights would be violative of the Constitution. The suspension of Noblejas by the ES valid. Also, the resolution of the consulta by a Register of Deeds is NOT a judicial function, but an administrative process. It is conclusive and binding only upon the Register of Deeds, NOT the parties themselves. Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not automatically mean that they are judicial in character. Still, the resolution of the consultas are but a minimal portion of the administrative or executive functions. 217. NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151, he is entitled to the same compensation, emoluments, and privileges as those of a Judge of CFI. He approved a subdivision plan covering certain areas that are in excess of those covered by the title The Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas, requiring him to explain. Noblejas answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to that of a Judge, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as an ordinary Judge, under the Judiciary Act. He claims that he may be investigated only by the Supreme Court Nevertheless, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES) Noblejas filed this case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether the Commissioner of Land Registratoin may only be investigated by the Supreme Court (in view of his having a rank equivalent to a judge)? SC: NO. If the law had really intended to include the general grant of rank and privileges equivalent to Judges, the right to be investigated and be suspended or removed only by the Supreme Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers because it would charge the Supreme Court with an administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto, the control of the Chief Executive over such officials. There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative to charge the Judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonable incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties. The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory, nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any

power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions. As such, RA 1151 while conferring the same privileges as those of a judge, did not include and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon the Courts recommendation. Said rights would be violative of the Constitution. The suspension of Noblejas by the ES valid. Also, the resolution of the consulta by a Register of Deeds is NOT a judicial function, but an administrative process. It is conclusive and binding only upon the Register of Deeds, NOT the parties themselves. Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not automatically mean that they are judicial in character. Still, the resolution of the consultas are but a minimal portion of the administrative or executive functions.

DIRECTOR OF PRISONS V ANG CHIO KIO ZALDIVAR; June 23, 1970 NATURE Petition by certiorari, by the Solicitor General in behalf of the Director of Prisons and the Executive Secretary, to render judgment ordering the striking out from the CA decision of the portions recommending to the Executive Secretary 'to allow the respondent Ang Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy to leave this country in the first available t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a b r o a d ' b u t o t h e r w i s e a f f i r m i n g t h e dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus, with costs in all instances against respondent Ang Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy." FACTS - A f t e r s e r v i n g s i x a n d o n e - h a l f ( 6 1 / 2 ) y e a r s o f h i s sentence for various offenses in the Philippines, Ang Cho Kio was granted conditional pardon on July 4, 1959 by the President of the Philippines. The condition was that he will voluntarily leave the Philippines upon his release and never to return to the country. Ang Cho Kio duly accepted the conditions of his pardon and actually left the Philippines for Taipei, Nationalist China, on July 28, 1959. - In the evening of June 26, 1966 Ang Cho Kio arrived at the Manila International Airport on a Philippine Air Lines plane from Taipeh, travelling under the name "Ang Ming Huy." It appears that Manila was merely his transit point and that his ultimate destination was Honolulu. While he was in the Philippines, two friends invited him to stay longer. On June 28, 1966 he and his two friends went to the Bureau of Immigration, where his friend Lim Pin s i g n e d a l e t t e r a d d r e s s e d t o t h e C o m m i s s i o n e r o f Immigration requesting for a fourteen-day extension of s t a y i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s f o r h i m . A n g C h o K i o w a s identified by inspector Mariano Cristi of the Immigration Bureau as the Ang Cho Kio who was deported to Taipeh on July 28, 1959. His identity having been established, A n g C h o K i o w a s a r r e s t e d , a n d t h e i m m i g r a t i o n authorities conducted an investigation regarding his presence in the Philippines. The immigration authorities did not allow him to proceed with his trip to Honolulu. On July 5, 1966 the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, ordered him recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence that were imposed on him, for having violated the condition of his pardon. - Ang Cho Kio filed for petition for habeas corpus. After d u e h e a r i n g t h e C o u r t o f F i r s t I n s t a n c e o f R i z a l , o n January 31, 1967, rendered a decision dismissing the petition for habeas corpus. Ang Cho Kio appealed to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Court of First I n s t a n c e o f R i z a l . C A a f f i r m e d b u t t h e C A j u s t i c e s inserted opinions recommending to the Exec. Sec. to allow the respondent to leave the country.

ISSUE W O N i t w a s p r o p e r f o r t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s t o recommend the release of Ang Cho Kio HELD - NO. The recommendatory power of the courts in this jurisdiction are limited to those expressly provided in the law - and such law is the provision of Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows: "Whenever a court has k n o w l e d g e o f a n a c t w h i c h i t m a y d e e m p r o p e r t o r e p r e s s a n d w h i c h i s n o t p u n i s h a b l e b y l a w , i t s h a l l render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief E x e c u t i v e , t h r o u g h t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f J u s t i c e , t h e reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation. "In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice such statement as m a y b e d e e m e d p r o p e r , w i t h o u t s u s p e n d i n g t h e execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration t h e d e g r e e o f m a l i c e a n d t h e i n j u r y c a u s e d b y t h e offense." - Certainly, the recommendation in the majority opinion of the special division of the Court of Appeals, now in q u e s t i o n , i s n o t a u t h o r i z e d u n d e r t h e a f o r e q u o t e d provision of Art 5 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals was not called upon to review any sentence that was imposed on Ang Cho Kio. It was simply called upon to determine whether Ang Cho Kio was illegally confined, or not, in the insular penitentiary, under the Director of Prisons. We do not consider it proper that the majority of the justices in the special division make a recommendation that would suggest a modification or a correction of the act of the Chief Executive, after the same justices have said in their opinion "that the Chief Executive may determine alone and by himself, whether the condition attached to a pardon given by him had been violated; and in the exercise of this prerogative, the courts may not interfere, however erroneous the findings may be." When the Chief Executive, exercising h i s p o w e r s p u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 6 4 ( i ) o f t h e R e v i s e d Administrative Code, ordered Ang Cho Kio recommitted to prison, it is assumed that the Chief Executive had decided that Ang Clio Kio should be dealt with that way under the circumstances. For the court to suggest to the Chief Executive to modify his decision to recommit Ang Cho Kio to prison by allowing him to leave the country instead is indeed to interfere with the functions of the Chief Executive. It would be, as urged by the Solicitor General, an interference on, or an attempt to influence, t h e e x e r c i s e b y t h e C h i e f E x e c u t i v e o f t h e p o l i t i c a l powers of his office. The matter of whether an alien who violated the laws in this country may remain or be deported is a political q u e s t i o n t h a t s h o u l d b e l e f t entirely to the Chief Executive to decide. Under the principle of separation of powers, it is not within the province of the judiciary to express an opinion, or express a suggestion, that would reflect on the w i s d o m o r p r o p r i e t y o f t h e a c t i o n o f t h e C h i e f Executive on matters purely political in nature. Disposition However, of the ten members of the Court, as presently constituted, only five are of the opinion that the recommendation embodied in the decision of the majority of the special division of the Court of Appeals, now in question, should be deleted front the decision. Two members of the Court are of a different opinion, and three others did not take part in the decision because of t h e i r o f f i c i a l a c t u a t i o n s r e l a t i v e t o t h e c a s e o f respondent Ang Cho Kin before it reached this Court. There is therefore, one vote less than the majority of the Court that is necessary to grant the certiorari prayed for. WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of certiorari is denied, and the decision of the special division of the Court of Appeals stands. No costs. SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs.COMELEC G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996 FACTS:

On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declared national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses. On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippines government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy. On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong , Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President. On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify Pambayang Kapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone, b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met. The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by Promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227. Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991. On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance. On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong. On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845 and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari Contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law ISSUE: 1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10 2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of Morong to enact; i .e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law." HELD: 1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the word "referendum" is repeated at

least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE. As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law. In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation. 2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage and not yet an approved law. The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers Tano vs Socrates 278 SCRA 154 Facts The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princessa enacted ordinance no. 15-92 banning the shipment of live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princessa City for a period of 5 years. In the same light, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan also enacted a resolution that prohibits the catching, gathering, buying, selling and possessing and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of 5 years within the Palawan waters. The petitiones Airline Shippers Association of Palawan together with marine merchants were charged for violating the above ordinance and resolution by the city and provincial governments. The petitioners now allege that they have the preferential rights as marginal fishermen granted with privileges provided in Section 149 of the Local Government Code, invoking the invalidity of the above-stated enactments as violative of their preferential rights. Issue Whether or not the enacted resolutions and ordinances by the local government units violative of the preferential rights of the marginal fishermen ? Held

No, the enacted resolution and ordinance of the LGU were not violative of their preferential rights. The enactment of these laws was a valid exercise of the police power of the LGU to protect public interests and the public right to a balanced and healthier ecology. The rights and privileges invoked by the petitioners are not absolute. The general welfare clause of the local government code mandates for the liberal interpretation in giving the LGUs more power to accelerate economic development and to upgrade the life of the people in the community. The LGUs are endowed with the power to enact fishery laws in its municipal waters which necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances in order to effectively carry out the enforcement of fishery laws in their local community. 11 Tanov. Socrates[ Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 7 )Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Puerto Princesa City from 1 January 1993 to 1 January 1998, and providing exemptions; penalties and for other purposes thereof). To implement said ordinance, Acting Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order 23 (series of 1993) dated 22 January 1993 authorizing the inspection of cargoes shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Wharf, and any other port within the jurisdiction of the City. On 19 February 1993, the Sangguniang Lalawigan of Palawan enacted Resolution 33 [A resolution prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit: Family: Scaridae (Mameng), Epine Phelus Fasciatus (Suno), Cromileptes Altivelis (Panther or Senorita), Lobster below 200 grams and spawning, Tridacna Gigas (Takllobo), Pinctada Margaritefera (Mother pearl, Oysters, Giant clams, and other species), Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn, Breeder size or mother), Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green grouper), and Family: Balistidae (Tropical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of 5 years in and coming from Palawan waters]. Puerto Princesa City and the province of Palawan implemented said ordinances. Tano, et. al., who were criminally charged with violating Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution 33 and Ordinance 2 of Palawan in Criminal Case 93-05-C of the 1st MCTC of Palawan; and Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, who were charged with violating City Ordinance 15-92 of Puerto Princesa City and Ordinance 2 of Palawan before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa, questioned the validity of the said ordinances before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the ordinances in question, which prohibit the fishing of certain marine species in Palawan, are constitutional and/or valid. Held: Laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well-founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain. In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the Local Government Code (LGC) and the powers granted therein to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458(a)(1)(vi) and 468(a)(1)(vi), which involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the Ordinances cannot be doubted. The ordinance also find full support under Republic Act 7611 (Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan Act), approved on 19 June 1992; which adopts a comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and endangered environment of the province, which serve to guide the local government of Palawan and the government agencies concerned in the formulation and implementation of plans, programs and projects affecting said province. The first objective (to establish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years) is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters which allows the establishment of "closed seasons." The second objective (to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction

due to illegal fishing activities) falls within both the general welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment. Ma. Elena Malaga, et. al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., et.al. GR No. 86995 03 September 1992 Chartered Institution and GOCC, defined. FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late. On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint. On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after the bidding had been awarded and closed. On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of the subject law. ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD 1818? RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows: Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions). The same Code describes a chartered institution thus: Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory

Provisions). It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818. There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law. Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the award of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito). MALAGA vs. PENACHOS, JR. (p.561) Facts o The controversy involves the extent and applicability of PD 1818 which prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects of the government o The present controversy of the case is the non-compliance of the petitioner with the procedural rules on bidding which required strict observance o The purpose of the rules implementing PD 1594 is to secure competitive bidding and to prevent favoritism, collusion and fraud in the award of these contracts to the detriment of the public. This purpose was defeated by the irregularities committed by PBAC Issue Whether the restraining order was properly issued and the writ of preliminary injunction was rightfully denied in accordance to PD 1818 Held o The restraining order was properly issued by the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction should not have been denied Ratio o The prohibition in PD 1818 pertained to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by courts against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases o However, on issues outside this dimension and involving questions of law, court could not be prevented by the decree from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts o Apparently, the controversy in the present case did not arise from the discretionary acts of the administrative body nor does it involve merely technical matter that is why the court has the right to prohibit the petitioners non-compliance with the procedural rule on bidding. o PD 1818 wasnt intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative agencies such as the anomalies above described. Ernesto Francisco, Jr. vs. The House of Representatives G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003 Facts: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). Then on June 2, 2003, former President Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices. The complaint was endorsed and was referred to the House Committee in accordance with

Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. On October 23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Issues: 1. Can the Court make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense? 2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional. 3. Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution. Held: 1. No. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. 2. Yes. The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing." 3. Yes. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed on June 2, 2003 and the second impeachment complaint filed was on October 23, 2003, it violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period JOYA VS. PCGG [225 SCRA 568; G.R. No. 96541; 24 Aug 1993] F acts: Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the auction sale scheduled on 11 January 1991 by Christie's of New York of the Old Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed in the custody of the Central Bank. On 15 August 1990, PCGG through Chairman Caparas, signed the Consignment Agreement with Christie's of New York. PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction the eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings then found at the Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as the silverware contained in seventy-one (71) cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and such other property as may subsequently be identified by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions of the agreement. On 26 October 1990, the COA through Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo submitted to Pres. Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA on the Consignment Agreement of 15 August 1990 to the effect that: (a) the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the Agreement was of doubtful legality; (b) the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government; (c) PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, (d) the assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance, hence, their disposal was prohibited by law. On 15 November 1990, PCGG through a new Chairman David M. Castro, wrote Pres. Aquino defending the Consignment Agreement and

refuting the allegations of COA Chairman Domingo. 3 On the same date, Director of National Museum Gabriel S. Casal issued a certification that the items subject of the Consignment Agreement did not fall within the classification of protected cultural properties and did not specifically qualify as part of the Filipino cultural heritage. January 9, 1991, we issued immediately our resolution denying the application for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks on the ground that petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a restraining order and that proper parties had not been impleaded. On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.Issue: Petitioners raise the following issues: (a) whether petitioners have legal standing to file the instant petition; (b) whether the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are embraced in the phrase "cultural treasure of the nation" which is under the protection of the state pursuant to the 1987 Constitution and/or "cultural properties" contemplated under R.A. 4846, otherwise known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act;" (c) whether the paintings and silverware are properties of public dominion which can be disposed of through the joint concurrence of the President and Congress; (d) whether respondent PCGG has the jurisdiction and authority to enter into an agreement with Christie's of New York for the sale of the artworks; (e) whether PCGG has complied with the due process clause and other statutory requirements for the exportation and sale of the subject items; and, (f) whether the petition has become moot and academic, and if so, whether the above issues warrant resolution from this Court. Held: For lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED.Ratio: The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and Non-stock Corporation established to promote non-Philippine arts. On this basis, the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit. If these properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true owners thereof whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. 16 A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, 17 such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date 11 January 1991 which is long past, the issues raised in the petition have become moot and academic.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Sec. 1: Santiago vs Bautista - The courts may not exercise judicial power when there is no applicable law. - Case at bar: An award of honors to a student by a board of teachers may not be reversed by a court where the awards are governed by no applicable law. Malaga v Penachos, Jr. - It was previously declared the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by courts against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. The Court observed that to allow the courts to judge these matters would disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. On issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts could not be prevented by any law (in this case, P.D. No. 605) from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts. PACU v Secretary of Education - Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies.

(Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy.) - Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein however intellectually solid the problem may be. This is especially true where the issues "reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion. J. Joya v PCGG - The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the most important are the first two (2) requisites. - Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Legaspi v Civil Service Commission - It becomes apparent that when a Mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right. -"Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it embraces every person. Kilosbayan v Morato - The voting on petitioners' standing in the previous case was a narrow one, seven (7) members sustaining petitioners' standing and six (6) denying petitioners' right to bring the suit. The majority was thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be maintained in any subsequent litigation. In addition, there have been charges in the membership of the Court, with the retirement of Justice Cruz and Bidin and the appointment of the writer of this opinion and Justice Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist on the maintenance of the ruling as to petitioners' standing.

SECTION 6 Maceda v Vasquez - In the absence of any administrative action taken against a person by the Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. - Where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

221. LINA VS. PURISIMA power to dispense rules Lualhati Lina was a bookkeeperat PVB. Petitioner files for mandamus to compel Cabanos (President of Phil. Veterans Bank) to restore Lina to her position. Lina claims she was removed from office by Cabanos who acted in gadalej. It appeared from the annexes of the amended petition that Lina was dismissed by Cabanos pursuant to LOI # 13 / LOI # 19 for being notoriously undesirable. The RTC dismissed the petition because: o Since the removal of Lina was pursuant to LOI issued by the President pursuant to Proclamation 1081, the validity or legality of said act is beyond the power of the courts to review, much less modify, or reverse. This is one of the express limitations upon the power of the Courts in GENERAL ORDER # 3 by President Marcos. o The General Order provides that the courts cannot rule upon the validity or legality of any decree order or act issued by President Marcos, pursuant to Proclamation 1081.

SC: The petitioners right to redress is beyond dispute. When the RTC invoked General Order #3, it was nothing short of an unwarranted abdication of judicial authority. The judge was apparently unaware that the Court has always deemed General Order # 3 as

practically inoperative even in the light of Proclamation 1081. There is unanimity among Us in the view that it is for the Court rather than the Executive to determine whether or not We make take cognizance of any given case involving the validity of the acts of the Executive purportedly under the authority of martial law proclamations. Also, the President has publicly acknowledged that even if there was martial law, it is still subject to the authority and jurisdiction of the SC. Thus, the RTC committed grave error in not taking jurisdiction over the case. Ordinarily, the case should be remanded to the judge to be tried on the merits. Yet, this Supreme Court, whose power and duty to do justice are inherent, plenary and imperative, extends to all instances where it appears that final resolution of the parties involved full opportunity to be heard. Thus, the SC may at its option, whenever it feels the best interest of justice would be thereby subserved, dispense with the usual procedure of remanding the case to the court of origin for its own judgment, and instead, the SC may already resolve the issues and rended the final judgment on the merits. SC reinstated Lina to work. 222. TAN VS, MACAPAGAL judicial review for adjudication Tan et. al (as taxpayers) filed a petition for declaratory relief assailing the validity of the LAUREL LEIDO RESOLUTION which deals with the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to declare that it has no power to consider and adopt proposals which seek to revise the constitution through the adoption of a new form of government. Under the Resolution, the Con-Con is merely empowered to propose amendments to the Consti, without altering the general plan. The SC dismissed it. Tan filed a MR. The members of the Con-Con claim that Tan has no personal and substantial interest in the case.

ISSUE: Whther the petitioners had the standing to seek a declaration of the nullity of the resolution of the Con-Con. SC: NO. The rule is, Any person who impugns the validity of the statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. However, there are many instances where taxpayers can nullify laws. But this is upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds for purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. Hence, it may be enjoined at the instance of taxpayers. Nevertheless, the Court has the discretion whether to entertain a taxpayers suit. In the Gonzales case, it was held that taxpayers must wait before filing the suit until AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF THE STATUTE. It was only then that the matter was ripe for

adjudication. Prior to that stage, the judiciary had to keep its hands off. The judiciary will neither direct nor restrain executive or legislative action (separation of powers). Hence, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for judicial oversight. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction. Here, what is being asked was that the judiciary inquire into the validity of the acts of the Con-Con. However, it is a pre-requisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed before court may inquire. What the Con-Con did was merely to propose an amendment to the Consti. There is no room for judicial review. 223. TELECOMS VS. COMELEC locus standi Telecoms and Broadcast Attorneys of the Phils (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and tv companies. They are suing as taxpayers and citizens and registered voters. They assail the validity of BP 881 which requires that radio and tv companies provide free airtime to Comelec for the use of candidates in the campaign and for other political purposes. Telebap claims that the law takes property without due process and that it violates the eminent domain clause which provides for payment of just compensation. GMA Network, also filed a similar case.

ISSUE: Whether Telebap and GMA have locus standi SC: Telebap No standing as CITIZENS. A Citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of government, that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. In this case, it has not shown that they will suffer or have suffered harm as a result of the operation of BP 881. Telebap No standing as REGISTERED VOTERS. No interest as registered voters since this case does not concern their right to suffrage. Their interest in BP 881 should be precisely in upholding its validity. Telebap No standing as TAXPAYERS. No interest as taxpayers since this case does not involve the execise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. A party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain direct injury as a resulf of the enforcement of the questioned statute. Telebap No standing as CORPORATE ENTITY No standing to assert the rights of radio and television companies which they represent. The mere fact that Telebap is composed of lawyers in the broadcast industry

does not entitle them to bring this suit in their name as representatives of the affected companies. Standing jus tertii will be recognized only if it can be shown that the party suing has some substantial relation to the third party, or that the third party cannot assert his constitutional right. GMA7 has standing. Since GMA operates radio and tv broadcast stations, they will be affected by the enforcement of BP 881. It suffered losses amounting to several millions in providing Comelec time in connection with the 1992 and 1995 electoins. Now, its stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year (1998 elections). GMAs allegations that it will suffer losses again is sufficient to give it standing to question the validity of BP 881. 224. JOYA vs. PCGGG locus standi private funds Petitioners are artists (Joya, Nakpil, Armida Siguion Reyna, Malang, Ang Kiu Kok, Polotan, Kasilag, Almario, et. al). They seek to enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the Auction Sale by Christies of New York of Old Masters Paintings and 18 th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacanang during people power. They claim that the items are part of protected cultural properties and part of Filipino CULTURAL HERITAGE and hence cannot be disposed. They contend that the items are PUBLIC PROPERTIES collectively owned by Filipinos. And that they have legal personality to protect and preserve the countrys ARTISTIC WEALTH. They allege that some of the items were in fact donated by private persons, and that the real ownership of the paintings belongs to the foundation or corporations, only that the public has been given the chance to view and appreciate the items on exhibit. First, the PCGG wrote to President Aquino to request authority for the consignment agreement between the Philippines and Christies COA however made an audit and found that the agreement was of doubtful legality, and that it was highly disadvantageous to the Philippines. The Director of National Museum issued a certification that the items were NOT part of protected cultural properties. President Cory also approved it. The sale proceeded earning $13M.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners have locus standi SC: NO LOCUS STANDI. The rule is that before the court may inquire into any matter, 1) the question must be raised by the proper party 2) there must be an actual case or controversy 3) that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity 4) that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

The courts will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has legal standing. LEGAL STANDING means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as the result of governmental act. INTEREST means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. Moreover, it must be PERSONAL and not based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third or unrelated party. The exceptions to this rule are : 1) CITIZENSs SUIT, 2) TAXPAYERs SUIT IT IS NOT A TAXPAYERS SUIT. A taxpayers suit can only propsper if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes misapplication of funds, which may be enjoined at the instance of a taxpayer. MOOT AND ACADEMIC. For the court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual controversy, one which involves a conflict of legal rights. The case must not be moot or academic. A case is moot and academic if the purpose has become stale. Since the purpose of this petition is to enjoin the sale, the case has become moot since the sale has long been consummated. However, it should be emphasized that the Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing when PARAMOUNT PUBLIC INTEREST IS INVOLVED. 225. KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATO locus standi Kilosbayan is an organization of civil spirited citizens, priests, pastors, nuns and taxpayers. They are joined by some members of Congress. (Tanada, Joker A.) They assail the lease of lottery equipment by the PCSO on the ground that it was similar to the one earlier nullified by the SC. There was a lease contract between PCSO and Phil. Gaming Mgt. Corp. The equipment lease agreement covers online lottery equipment to be leased to PCSO. The agreement was invalidated by the SC for it violated the Charter of PCSO. An Amended Lease Agreement was later made providing for 4.3% of the gross sales as consideration. PCSO and PGMC claim that the Amended Lease Agreement is a different lease contract. They claim that the Agreement did not have to be submitted for public bidding because it fell within the exception under EO 301. They also claim that the power to determine whether the Agreement is disadvantageous belongs to the Board of Directors of PCSO. Thus they question the petitioners standing. PCSO and PGMC claim that the petitioners have no standing since they are not parties to the contract, and have no personal or substantial interest likely to be injured by the enforcement of the Contract.

Petitioners however contend that the earlier case sustained their standing to challenge the validity of the first contract, and as such, that is now the law of the case (that they have standing).

SC: The law of the case is not applicable in this case because this case is NOT a sequel to the previous case. It is not its continuation. This proceeding is essentially different from the 1993 Lease Contract. Hence, a prior case that petitioners had standing to challenge that 1993 Contract does NOT PRECLUDE their determination of their standing in the present suit. Concern for stability in decisional law does not call for adherence to what has recently been laid down as rule since the previous ruling sustaining petitioners intervention may itself be considered a departure from settled rulings on REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. (It seems here that the real issue is not lack of legal standing but whether they are real parties in interest.) Standing is not even an issue in this case since standing is a CONCEPT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, and here no constitutional question was actually involved. Standing has constitutional underpinnings. It is very different from questions relation to whether a party is the real party in interest. Party in interest ensures that only certain parties can maintain an action, Standing requires partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader public policy concerns. The question in standing is whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largele depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. NO STANDING. Here, petitioners have not in fact shown what particularized interest they have for bringing the suit. It does not detract from the high regard for petitioners as civic leaders to say that their interest falls short of the required to maintain an action. It is true that the present action involves not a mere contract between private individuals but one made by a government corporation. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO ALLEGATION THAT PUBLIC FUNDS ARE BEING MISSPENT SO AS TO MAKE THIS ACTION A PUBLIC ONE, and justify the relaxation of the requirement that an action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Because this is an action for annulment of contracts, the real parties in interest are those who are parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the deteriment which would positively result to them from the contract even though they did not intervene in it. The phrase present substantial interest means such interest of a party in a subject matter of action as will entitle him to recover if the evidence is sufficient. Petitioners

here DO NOT HAVE SUCH PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST in the Lease Agreement as would entitle them to bring this suit. Questions as to the nature or validity of public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding can be raised in an appropriate case before the COA, or before the Ombudsman. Requisites of TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE: 1) public funds involved 2) utter disregard for the constitution 3) lack of party who can bring a suit. 226. PHIL ASSOC. COLLEGES VS. SEC OF EDUCATION justiciable controversy / locus standi Petitioners assail Act 2706 requiring the inspection and recognition of private schools. It makes it obligatory upon the Secretary of Educ to inspect said schools. They contend that the law deprives the school owners of liberty and property without due process, and they deprive the parents of their natural right and duty to rear their children. They claim that requiring previous governmental approval before they could exercise their right to own and operate a school amounts to censorship of prior restraint. Solgen countered that the matter has no justiciable controversy. The government argues that the petitioners suffered no wrong, nor allege any, from the enforcement of the statute. The government insists that for the past 37years the DepEd has supervised and regulated private schools with the general acquiescence of the public. Solgen claims that there is no cause of action because all of them have permits to operate and are actually operating schools already. There is no threat that the permits will be revoked, hence they have suffered no wrong.

Issue: Is there a justiciable controversy? SC: NONE. As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of parties concerned. When the private schools are actually operating by virtue of the permits issued by the Secretary, who is not shown to have threatened to revoke their permits, there is no justiciable controversy that would authorize the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of said Act.. Mere apprehension that the Secretary might under the law withdraw the permit of the petitioners DOES NOT CONSTITUTE JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY. An action must be brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual and positive relief. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, no matter how intellectually solid the problem may be. This is specially true where the issues reach constitutional dimensions, for then there come into play regard for the courts duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues UNLESS AVOIDANCE BECOMES EVASION.

*the textbooks were also not shown by petitioners. They claimed that the Board prohibited certain types of textbooks. 227. DE AGBAYANI VS. PNB effects of constitutionality **Justice Fernando ponente kaya wordy at magulo** Agbayani obtained a loan P450 from PNB secured by a REM, which was to mature 5 years later. 15 years later, PNB sought to foreclose the REM. Agbayani filed a complaint claiming that it was barred by prescription. She also claims that she obtained an injunction against the sheriff. PNB argued that the claim has not yet prescribed if the period from the time of issuance of EO32 to the time when RA 342 was issued should be deducted. o E0 32 was issued in 1945 providing for debt moratorium o RA 342 was issued in 1948 - extension of the debt moratorium The RA 342 was declared void and since it was an extension of EO 32, EO 32 was likewise nullified. Here, RA 342 (the debt moratorium law) continued EO 32, suspending the payment of debts by war sufferers. However RA 342 could not pass the test of validity. (I think what Justice Fernando was saying is that the law was later declared unconstitutional because it violates the non-impairment of contractual obligations clause in the constitution). PNB claims that this period should be deducted from the prescriptive period since during this time the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As such, the action has not yet prescribed. ISSUE: Has the action prescribed? SC: NO. The general rule is that an unconstitutional act because it suffers from infirmity, cannot be a source of legal rights or duties. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. However, prior to the declaration of nullity of such challenged legislative act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Such legislative act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect the awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether a legislative act is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would e to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.

The past cannot always be erased by judicial declaration. (OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE). The existence of a statute prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. During the 8 year period that EO 32 and RA 342 were in force, prescription did not run. Thus, the prescriptive period was tolled in the meantime prior to such adjudication of invalidity. 228. PEOPLE VS. GUTIERREZ transfer of venue to avoid miscarriage of justice This is the case of Bingbong Crisologo. A group of armed men set fire various inhabited houses in Bantay, Ilocos Sur. Bingbong was charged but pleaded not guilty. AO 221 the Secretary of Justice authorized Judge Anover of San Fernando La Union, to hold special term in Ilocos Sur. AO 226 Secretary of Justice authorized Judge Gutierrez (Vigan) to transfer the case to Judge Anovers Court in La Union. Prosecution moved that Judge Gutierrez allow a transfer of the case to the La Union Circuit Court by virtue of said AOs and for security and personal safety of the witnesses. The accused obviously opposed the transfer of the case, claiming that the transfer of the case would be railroading them into a conviction. Judge Gutierrez denied the transfer. Prosecution now imputes gadalej on Judge Gutierrez. SC: The Secretary of Justice has no power to assign cases to be heard. Any such power even in the guise of AOs trenches upon the time-honored separation of the Executive and Judiciary. The law creating the transfer of cases to Circuit Criminal Courts should be effected by raffle. Nevertheless, the COURT WILL ORDER THE TRANSFER. There is a justified refusal by the witnesses in Ilocos Sur to testify where they felt their lives would be endangered. Judge Gutierrez failed to consider the possibility of miscarriage of justice may result. The witnesses had earlier manifested of the imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial outside of Ilocos Sur, in the interest of truth and justice, and the State is to be given a fair chance to present its side. Here, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process. The exigencies of justice demand that the general rule should yield to occasional exceptions wherever there are weighty reasons therefor. Anyway, regardless of the place where the case is tried, the prosecution will always be obligated to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On of the incidental and inherent powers of the courts is that of TRANSFERRING THE TRIAL OF CASES from one court to another of equal rank, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice so demands.

*judicial power includes the transfer of cases. It is one of the incidental or inherent attributes necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government.* 229. PNB Vs. ASUNCION power to promulgate rules / procedural vs. substantive rights PNB granted credit accommodations and advances to Fabar Inc, for the importation of machinery and equipment. The outstanding balance was P8.4M The credit accommodations are secured by the joint and several signatures of Barredo, Borromeo (respondents). For failure to pay their obligations, PNB instituted a collection suit against Fabar and the Barredo, Borromeo. Before the case could be decided, one of the respondents, BARREDO, died. So the court issued an order of dismissal of the case, since money claim is a personal action, it is extinguished upon death, and that the remedy is to file a claim with the estate during settlement proceedings. The case was dismissed against ALL defendants. PNB filed a MR claiming that the dismissal should only be against the deceased Barredo. Hence they file this certiorari.

SC: According to the Rules of Court, nothing therein prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors. Said provision merely sets up the procedure in enforcing collection in case a creditor choose to pursue his claim against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor. What is applicable in this is Art 1216 of the Civil Code. The creditor has the right to proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The choice is left to the solidary creditor to determine against whom he will enforce collection. In case of death of one of the solidary debtors, the creditor can choose to proceed against the surviving debtors, without necessity of filing a claim in the estate of the deceased debtor. To require the creditor to proceed against the estat would deprive him of his substantive rights under the Civil Code. If the Rules of Court (Rule 86) would be applied literally, in effect, it would repeal the Civil Code (Art 1216), because the creditor would have no chose but to proceeed against the estate of Barredo only. Obviously, this would diminish the PNBs right under the Civil Code to proceed against any one, some or all of the solidary debtors. Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle that, SUBSTANTIVE LAW CANNOT BE AMENDED BY PROCEDURAL LAW. The rules of Court cannot be made to prevail over the Civil Code, the former being merely procedural, while the latter substantive. Moreover, the Constitution provides that the rules promulgated by the SC should not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. 230. SANTERO VS. CAVITE

rules of court vs. civil code Pablo Santero was had 2 sets of children from 2 different wives. He died. The respondents were the Santero Children, the children by the 2nd wife, although she was not married to the father. A motion for allowance was filed by the Santero children, through their guardian/mother Diaz. The filed the motion for support, education, clothing, and medical allowance. This was granted by the court. This was opposed by the other set of Santero Children (petitioners), the children by the 1st wife, who was also not married to the father. They claim that the wards are no longer schooling and have already attained the age of majority. Diaz countered that the reason why the children were not enrolled was due to lack of funds. She cited Art 290/188 of the Civil Code (on support), as well as Rule 83 of the Rules of Court (allowance to the widow and family in estate proceedings). The allowance was granted by the court. Another motion for allowance was filed by Diaz for 3 additional children. These 3 additional children were already of age, but Diaz claims that all of her children have the right to receive allowance, as advance of the shares in their inheritance. Again, this was opposed by the other Santero Children (petitioners), claiming that the children are employed and married, and that there is insufficient funds. They claim that under the Rules of Court, they are no longer entitled to allowance. SC: The controlling provision should be Art 290/188 of the Civil Code (support) and not Rule 83 of the Rules of Court (allowance to widow and family). The fact that respondents are of age, and are gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art 290/188. While the Rules of Court limits allowances to the widow and only the minor children, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, even the children who are no longer minors are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father. Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. 231. DAMASCO VS. LAGUI speedy disposition of cases. Atty Damasco was charged with grave threats. He pleaded not guilty but was convicted only of light threats. He was order to pay a fine of P100. Damasco filed a motion to rectify and set aside the dispositve portion of the decision. He claims that he cannot be convicted of light threats, necessarily included in the grave threats charge, as the lighter offense had already prescribed when the information was filed. (light offenses prescribe in 2 mos, but the information was filed 70 days after) The lower court denied the motion, explaining that since the Court had acquired jurisdiction to try the case because the information was filed within the prescriptive

period for grave threats, the same cannot be lost by prescription, if after the trial what has been proven is merely light threats. SC: Prescription of a crime is the loss or waiver by the State of its right to prosecute an act prohibited or punished by law. While it is a rule that an accused who fails to move to quash before pleading is deemed to waive all objections, this rule cannot apply to the defense of prescription, which under Art 69 of the RPC extinguishes criminal liability. To apply the suggestion could contravene said Art, which is part of substantive law. This position is further strengthen by the Rules on CrimPro, which added the extinction of offense as one of the exceptions to the general rule regarding the effects of a failure to assert a ground of a motion to quash. The claim that when an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within a graver offense charged, he cannot be convicted of a lesser offense if it has already prescribed can only be done through an overhaul of some existing rules on crimpro to give prescription a limited meaning (ie, a mere bar to the commencement of criminal action and therefore waivable). BUT this will have to contend with the Constitutional provision that while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of rights..such rules shall not diminish, modify or increase substantive rights. THE ACTION HAS PRESCRIBED! PETITION IS GRANTED! (Damasco wins.) 232. PEOPLE VS. LACSON Lacson et al were charged with multiple murder for shooting and killing 11 male persons who were members of the Kuratong Baleleng. SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes had claimed that the killing of the eleven (11) gang members was a "rub-out" or summary execution and not a shootout. The Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 11 Informations for MURDER, against respondent Panfilo M. Lacson and twenty-five (25) other accused. All twentysix (26) of them were charged as principals.10 Upon motion of the Lacson, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman for reinvestigation. The participation of Lacson was downgraded from principal to accessory. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferred to the Regional Trial Court.12Arraignment then followed and respondent entered a plea of not guilty. On March 29, 1999 Judge Agnir issued a Resolution25 dismissing Criminal Cases because: o with the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants, there is no more evidence to show that a crime has been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof. On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice the new affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos regarding the Kuratong Baleleng incident for preliminary investigation. On the strength of this indorsement, Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez formed a panel to investigate the matter.

Lacson, et al., invoking, among others, their constitutional right against double jeopardy, filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, primarily to enjoin the State prosecutors from conducting the preliminary investigation. Judge Pasamba denied the TRO (meaning the case could continue). The decision stated that the preveious dismissal of Criminal Cases is not one on the merits and without any recorded arraignment and entered plea on the part of the herein petitioners. The arraignment had with the Sandiganbayan does not put the case in a different perspective since the Sandiganbayan was adjudged to be without any jurisdiction to try the cases. It is the People of the Philippines who is the complainant in the Kuratong Baleleng case and remains to be the complainant. Thus, June 6, 2001 11 information for Murder were again filed before the RTC Judge Yadao. Lacson now assails the decision of Judge Pasamba mainly on the ground of : illegality of the proceedings of the respondent State Prosecutors as they cannot revive complaints which had been dismissed over two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was issued. He claims, under Section 8, Rule 117, cases similar to those filed against the petitioner and others (where the penalty imposable is imprisonment of six (6) years or more) cannot be revived after two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was issued.

ISSUE: The issue is whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang. The rule of provisional dismissal took effect only on December 1, 2000 (in between the period of dismissal and revival). More specifically, 1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party, (3) whether the 2-year period to revive has already lapsed, and (4) whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period. SC: NO. NOT BARRED. 1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; 2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; 3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; 4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the timebar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar

him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein. Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning.7 Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. 8 The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case 9 or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal10 does not amount to express consent. In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed the cases. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses. The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of the cases. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases. The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal the cases or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before said hearing. There is as well no proof in the records that the public prosecutor notified the heirs of the victims of said motion or of the hearing. Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-9981689 or file new Informations for multiple murder against the respondent. Even on the assumption that the respondent expressly consented to a provisional dismissal, and all the heirs of the victims were notified before the hearing the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-accused would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the States substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder. Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the State had twenty years within which to file the criminal complaints against the accused. However, under the new rule, the State only had two years from notice of the public prosecutor of the order of dismissal within which to revive the said cases. When the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000, the State only had one year and three months within which to revive the cases or refile the Informations. The period for the State to charge respondent for multiple murder under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code was considerably and arbitrarily reduced. In case of conflict between the Revised Penal Code and the new rule, the former should prevail.

The time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused. 35 The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law.36 It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. If a criminal case is dismissed on motion of the accused because the trial is not concluded within the period therefor, the prescriptive periods under the Revised Penal Code are not thereby diminished. 40 But whether or not the prosecution of the accused is barred by the statute of limitations or by the lapse of the time-line under the new rule, the effect is basically the same. Also, It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the Court. In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years under the new rule should not be applied retroactively against the State. A mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of innocence. 55 He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.56 The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only. The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-9981689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed under the new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice. 233. MACEDA VS. VASQUEZ administrative supervision of inferior courts

Abrera was from the Public Attorneys Office. He alleged that Maceda, the Judge of RTC-Antique, falsified his certificate of service. Maceda was said to have certified all criminal and civil cases have been decided within a period of 90 days. Abrera claims that in truth and in fact, no decision has been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases. Macedas defense is that he had been granted by the SC an extension of 90 days to decide the said cases. He also argues that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over him since the offense charged arose from the performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the SC. (He claims that the Ombudsman encroaches on the SCs power of supervision over inferior courts).

ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction? What is scope of SCs power of supervision? SC: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and inefficiency, AS WELL AS criminally liable to the State under the RPC for felonious act. However, in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the SC with regard to his certificate of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. The SCs administrative supervision includes all courts and all court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA, down to the lowest MTC clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter to the SC for determination whether the said certificates reflect the true status of his pending case load, since only the Court has the necessary records to make such determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter. Should a judge, having been granted by the SC an extension of time, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal case that requires the resolution of said question? In fine, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must DEFER ACTION on said complaint and REFER THE SAME to this Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. 234. NITAFAN VS. CIR salaries of judges

The judges here seek to perpetually prohibit the CIR from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. They submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitute a decrease or diminution of their salaries which is contrary to the Constitution mandating that their salaries shall not be decreased during their term. They also contednt that this is anathema to an independent judiciary.

ISSUE: Are the salaries of judges exempt from income tax? SC: NO. The clear intent of the Con-Com was to delete an express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to give substance to the EQUALITY AMONG THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT. The Court has since then authorized the continued deduction of withholding tax from the salaries of all the members of the Judiciary. The Court has discarded the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer which exempted them from payment of income tax. The Court thus reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to the general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such taxes does not fall within the constitutional protection against the decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office. (there was a discussion on the intent of the framers.. Fr. B in the deliberations proposed an amendment that the salaries shall not be diminished but may still be subject to the general income tax. The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the Constitution was to make the salaries of the Judiciary taxable. In the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government, they must all share in the burden of general income taxation equitably. 235. VARGAS VS. RILLORAZA security of tenure Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Sec 14 of the Peoples Court Act. Section 14 provides: SEC. 14. Any Justice of the Supreme Court who held any office or position under the Philippine Executive Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic may not sit and vote in any case brought to that Court under section thirteen hereof in which the accused is a person who held any office or position under either or both the Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine Republic or any branch, instrumentality and/or agency thereof. "If, on account of such disqualification, or because of any of the grounds of disqualification of judges, in Rule 126, section I of the Rules of Court, or on account of illness, absence or temporary disability the requisite number of Justices necessary to constitute a quorum or to render judgment in any case is not present, the President may designate such number of Judges of First Instance,Judges-at-large of First Instance, or Cadastral Judges, having none of the disqualifications set forth in said section one hereof, as may be necessary to sit temporarily as Justices of said Court, in order to form a quorum or until a judgment in said case is reached."

They claim that: (a) It provides for qualifications of members of the Supreme Court, other than those provided in section 6, Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution. "(b) It authorizes the appointment of members of the Supreme Court who do not possess the qualifications set forth in section 4, Article VIII, of the Philippine Constitution. "(c) It removes from office the members of the Supreme Court by means of a procedure other than impeachment, contrary to Article IX, of the Philippine Constitution. "(d) It deprives the' Commission on Appointments of Congress of its constitutional prerogative to confirm or reject appointments to the Supreme Court. "(e) It creates two Supreme Courts. "(f) It impairs the rule making power of the Supreme Court, contrary to section 13, Article VIII, of the Philippine Constitution. "(g) it is a Bill of Attainder, for it punishes by disqualification members of the Supreme Court who rendered said public service during the Japanese occupation. "(h) it denies the equal protection of the laws "(i) It is an ex post pacto legislation. "(j) it amends the Constitution by a procedure not sanctioned by Article XV, of the Philippine Constitution. "(k) It destroys the independence of the Judiciary, and it permits the 'packing' of the Supreme court in certain cases, either by Congress or by the President." The Solgen countered that: "1. Power of Congress to enact section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682. "2. Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 does not and is not intended to provide an additional qualification :for members of the Supreme Court, much less does it amend section 6, Article VIII, of the Constitution of the Philippines. "3. Qualifications of members of the Supreme Court prescribed in section 6, Article Vill of the Constitution 'apply to permanent "appointees"--not to temporary 'designees.' "4. Section 5, Article Vill of the Constitution is not applicable to temporary designations under section 14, commonwealth Act No. 682. "5. It does not remove but merely disqualifies the members of the Supreme Court affected to sit and vote in the particular class of cases therein mentioned. "6. It does not create an additional 'Special Supreme Court,' "7. It does not impair the rule-making power of the - Supreme Court but merely supplements the Rules of Court. "8. It is not a bill of attainder. "9. It is not an ex post pacto law. "10. It does not deny equal protection of the laws either to the Justices of the Supreme Court affected or to the treason indictees; concerned. "11. It does not amend any constitutional provision. "12. It does not destroy the independence of the judiciary or curtail the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court."

ISSUES: 1) Whether the Congress had power to add to the pre-existing ground for disqualification of a Justice.

2) Whether a person may act as Justice of the SC who has not been duly appointed by the President and not confirmed by the CA, even only as DESIGNEE 3) Whether the manner of designation by the President can constitutionally sit temporarily as Justice of the SC. SC: NO. NO. NO. 1. NO. If section 14 were to be effective, such members of the Court who held any office or position under the Philippine Executive Commission, would be disqualified from sitting and voting in the instant case, because the accused herein is a person who likewise held an office under the PEC. In other words, what the constitution ordained as a power and a duty to be exercised and fulfilled by said members of the Court, the challenged law would prohibit them from exercising and fulfilling. IN short, what the constitution directs, the section 14 prohibits. This is a clear repugnancy to the fundamental law. Whatever modification the legislature may propose must not contravene the provisions of the constitution. Thus, the disqualification added by Sec 14 to those already existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution is arbitrary, irrational and violative of the constitution. 2. NO. No person not so appointed by the President WITH the consent of the CA, may act as Justice of the SC. The designation made by Section 14 does not comply with the requirement of appointment. An additional disqualifying circumstance of the designee is the lack of confirmation or consent by the CA. So, it may happen that a designee under Sec 14 sitting as a substitute Justice of the SC, and participating therein in the deliberations and functions of the SC, does not possess the qualifications of regular members of the SC. NO temporary composition of the SC is authorized by the Constitution. The phrase unless otherwise provided for by law does NOT authorize any legislation that would alter the composition of the SC, no matter how brief a time it may be imagined. In principle, what matters is not the length or shortness of the alternation of the constitutional composition of the Court, but the very permanence and unalterability of that constitution so long as the constitution which ordains it remains permanent and unaltered. 3. NO. No matter how brief or temporary the participation of the judge, there is no escaping that he would be participating in the deliberations of the the SC, and his vote would count as much as that of any regular Justice. A temporary member thereof is a misnomer, for that is not a position contemplated by the constitution. The Constitution is clear that the CJ and the Justices who compose the SC have to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the CA. Mere designation under Sec 14, does not satisfy said requirement. The designees cannot be such members in view of the fact that they have not been appointed nor confirmed. SEC 14. NULL AND VOID. DE CASTRO VS. JBC ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYOG.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively. The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice. A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. HELD:

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict. The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear,

would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) G. R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010. FACTS: This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing. 2. Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. 3. Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice. 4. Whether or not mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC.

HELD:

1.Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by the Court. Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised. 2. There is a justiciable issue. The court holds that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed. The resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process. 3.Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. 4.Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way. For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the

defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. De Castro v. JBC Facts: This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.

ISSUES

W/N the petitioners have legal standing? W/N there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination? W/N the incumbent President appoint the next Chief Justice? W/N mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC?

RULING

Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by the Court. Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.

There is a justiciable issue We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed. The resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging questions

that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.

PROHIBITION UNDER SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII DOES NOT APPLY TO APPOINTMENTS TO FILL A VACANCY IN THE SUPREME COURT OR TO OTHER APPOINTMENST TO THE JUDICIARY. Two constitutional provisions seemingly in conflict: The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Justification of the Supreme Court: First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the allocation of the awesome powers of government among the three great departments, the Legislative (Article VI), the Executive (Article VII), and the Judicial Departments (Article VIII). The arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of separation of powers that underlies the political structure As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall an imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution. The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was couched in stronger negative language.

Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary. There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive. Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments.

Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the constitutionality of xxx appointments to the Court of Appeals in light of the

forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commissions records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals. This confirmation was accepted by the JBC, which then submitted to the President for consideration the nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of Appeals.

Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section 16) concern the appointing powers of the President. Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.

Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010.

Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for the incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of Chief Justice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because anyway there will still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4(1), Article VIII remaining. The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from Chief Justice Punos retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to apply Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court. Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday of May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the

regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest possible period of the ban of 109 days and the 90day mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing President would be in no position to comply with the constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity.

Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the President any President to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court. Sec. 9, Article VIII says: xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. xxx The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-member of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the JBC.

WRIT OF MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE JBC Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is Fortich vs Corona 398 SCRA 685 Posted on December 6, 2012 100 SCAD 781298 SCRA 6851998 The Office of the President modified its decision which had already become final and executory. FACTS:On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President (OP) issued a win-win Resolution which reopened case O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424. The said Resolution substantially modified its March 29, 1996 Decision. The OP had long declared the said Decision final & executory after the DARs Motion for Reconsideration was denied for having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.The SC then struck down as

void the OPs act, it being in gross disregard of the rules & basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.The respondents contended in their instant motion that the win-win Resolution of November 7, 1997 is not void since it seeks to correct an erroneous ruling, hence, the March 29, 1996 decisioncould not as yet become final and executory as to be beyond modification. They further explained that the DARs failure to file their Motion for Reconsideration on time was excusable. ISSUE:Was the OPs modification of the Decision void or a valid exercise of its powers and prerogatives?1. Whether the DARs late filing of the Motion for Reconsideration is excusable.2. Whether the respondents have shown a justifiable reason for the relaxation of rules.3. Whether the issue is a question of technicality. HELD:1.No.Sec.7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated February 12, 1987, mandates that decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall become final after the lapse of 15 days from receipt of a copy therof xxx unless a Motion for Reconsideration thereof is filed within such period .The respondents explanation that the DARs office procedure made it impossibleto file its Motion for Reconsideration on time since the said decision had to be referred to its different departments cannot be considered a valid justification. While there is nothing wrong with such referral, the DAR must not disregard the reglementary period fixed by law, rule or regulation.The rules relating to reglementary period should not be made subservient to the internal office procedure of an administrative body . 2.No. The final & executory character of the OP Decision can no longer be disturbed or substantially modified. Res judicata has set in and the adjudicated affair should forever be put to rest.Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. The Constitution guarantees that all persons shall have a right to the speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.While a litigation is not a game of technicalities , every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly & speedy administration of justice . The flexibility in the relaxation of rules was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.A liberal interpretation & application of the rules of procedure can only be resorted to in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. 3.No. It is a question of substance & merit.A decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or tribunal which is declared void on the ground that the same was rendered Without or in Excess of Jurisdiction, or with Grave Abuse of Discretion, is a mere technicality of law or procedure. Jurisdiction is an essential and mandatory requirement before a case or controversy can be acted on. Moreover, an act is still invalid if done in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.In the instant case, several fatal violations of law were committed. These grave breaches of law, rules & settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of

technical nature. When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory, vested rights were acquired by the petitioners, and all others who should be benefited by the said Decision.In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Videogram Regulatory Board vs CA, et al., just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way. For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Fortich vs Corona Date: August 19, 1999 Petitioners: Hon. Carlos Fortich, Hon Rey Baula, et al Respondents: Hon. Renato Corona, Hon. Ernesto Garilao, et al Ponente: Ynares Santiago Facts: Concerns the MR of the courts resolution dated November 17, 1998 and motion to refer the case to the Court en banc. In previous case, the Court voted two-two on the separate motions for reconsideration, as a result of which the decision was affirmed. The Court noted in a resolution dated January 27, 1999 that the movants have no legal personality to seek redress before the Court as their motion to intervene was already denied and that the motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is akin to a second MR which is prohibited. In this motion, both respondents and intervenors prayed that the case be referred to the case in banc inasmuch as their earlier MR was resolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision under the Constitution (3 votes) was not met. Issue:WON failure to meet the three votes justifies the referral of the case to the court en banc H e l d : N o Ratio:A careful reading of the constitutional provision reveals the intention of the framers to draw a distinction between cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the other hand, such that cases are decided while matters, which include motions, are resolved. Otherwise put, the word decided

must refer to cases; while the word resolved must refer to matters, applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis . With this interpretation, it is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a MR. Hence, the second sentence of the provision speaks only of case and not matter. The reason is simple. Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc . On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a MR, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17, 1998. Issue:WON the referral to the court en banc is justified on the ground that the issues are of first impression H e l d : N o Ratio: The issues presented before us by the movants are matters of no extraordinary import to merit the attention of the Court en banc . The issue of whether or not the power of the local government units to reclassify lands is subject to the approval of the DAR is no longer novel, this having been decided by this Court in the case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of Appeals wherein we held that local government units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use. Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a unanimous vote of all five (5)

members of the Second Division of this Court. Stated otherwise, this Second Division is of the opinion that the matters raised by movants are nothing new and do not deserve the consideration of the Court en banc. Thus, the participation of the full Court in the resolution of movants motions for reconsideration would be inappropriate. Issue:WON the referral to the court en banc partakes of the nature of a second MR H e l d : Y e s Ratio: The contention, therefore, that our Resolution of November 17, 1998 did not dispose of the earlier MR of the Decision dated April 24, 1998 is flawed. Consequently, the present MR necessarily partakes of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration which, according to the clear and unambiguous language of Rule 56, Section 4, in relation to Rule 52, Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is prohibited. True, there are exceptional cases when this Court may entertain a second motion for reconsideration, such as where there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons. Even then, we have ruled that such second MRs must be filed with express leave of court first obtained. In this case, not only did movants fail to ask for prior leave of court, but more importantly, they have been unable to show that there are exceptional reasons for us to give due course to their second motions for reconsideration. Stripped of the arguments for referral of this incident to the Court en banc , the motions subject of this resolution are nothing more but rehashes of the motions for reconsideration which have been denied in the Resolution of November 17, 1998. To be sure, the allegations contained therein have already been raised before and passed upon by this Court in the said Resolution. Issue:WON the Win-Win Resolution was valid H e l d : N o Ratio: This refers to the resolution by authority of the President modifying the Decision dated 29 March 1996 of the OP through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres. NQSRMDCs (Norberto Quisumbing) Application for Conversion is approved only with respect to 44 hectares as recommended by the DA. The remaining 100 hectares found to be suitable for agriculture shall be distributed to qualified farmer beneficiaries (FBs) in accordance with RA 6657 The resolution is void and of no legal effect considering that the March 29, 1996 decision of the Office of the President had already become final and executory even prior to the filing of

the MR which became the basis of the said Win-Win Resolution. While it may be true that on its face the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution was grounded on a procedural rule pertaining to the reglementary period to appeal or move for reconsideration, the underlying consideration therefor was the protection of the substantive rights of petitioners. Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case. In other words, the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly vested appurtenant rights to the land in dispute on petitioners as well as on the people of Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to be benefited by the development of the property. Before finally disposing of these pending matters, we feel it necessary to rule once and for all on the legal standing of intervenors in this case. In their present motions, intervenors insist that they are real parties in interest inasmuch as they have already been issued certificates of land ownership award, or CLOAs, and that while they are seasonal farmworkers at the plantation, they have been identified by the DAR as qualified beneficiaries of the property. These arguments are, however, nothing new as in fact they have already been raised in intervenors earlier motion for reconsideration of our April 24, 1998 Decision. Again as expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez, intervenors, who are admittedly not regular but seasonal farmworkers, have no legal or actual and substantive interest over the subject land inasmuch as they have no right to own the land. Rather, their right is limited only to a just share of the fruits of the land. Moreover, the Win-Win Resolution itself states that the qualified beneficiaries have yet to be carefully and meticulously determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform. Absent any definitive finding of the DAR, intervenors cannot as yet be deemed vested with sufficient interest in the controversy as to be qualified to intervene in this case. Likewise, the issuance of the CLOA's to them does not grant them the requisite standing in view of the nullity of the Win-Win Resolution. No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and void. Melo: By mandate of the Constitution, cases heard by a division when the required majority of at least 3 votes in the division is not obtained are to be heard and decided by the Court En Banc.

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission disclose that if the case is not decided in a division by a majority vote, it goes to the Court En Banc and not to a larger division In a situation where a division of 5 has only 4 members, the 5th member having inhibited himself or is otherwise not in a position to participate, or has retired, a minimum of 3 votes would still be required before there can be any valid decision or resolution by that division. There may, then, be instances when a deadlock may occur, i.e., the votes tied at 2-2. It is my humble view that under the clear and unequivocal provisions of the 1986 Constitution, if the required majority is not reached in a division, the case should automatically go to Court En Banc.

I submit that the requirement of 3 votes equally applies to motions for reconsideration because the provision contemplates cases or matters (which for me has no material distinction insofar as divisions are concerned) heard by a division, and a motion for reconsideration cannot be divorced from the decision in a case that it seeks to be reconsidered. Consequently, if the required minimum majority of 3 votes is not met, the matter of the motion for reconsideration has to be heard by the Court En Banc, as mandated by the Constitution (par. 3, Sec. 4, Art. VIII). To say that the motion is lost in the division on a 2-2 vote, is to construe something which cannot be sustained by a reading of the Constitution. To argue that a motion for reconsideration is not a case but only a matter which does not concern a case, so that, even though the vote thereon in the division is 2-2, the matter or issue is not required to elevated to the Court En Banc, is to engage in a lot of unfounded hairsplitting. Baker v. Carr (1962) A Summary Majority The complaint, Baker alleged that by means of a 1901 statute of Tennessee apportioning the members of the General Assembly among the state's 95 counties, "these plaintiffs and others similarly situated, are denied the equal protection of the laws accorded them by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by virtue of the debasement of their votes. Carr, the Tennessee secretary of State was the named defendant. The suit was dismissed by a three-judge court in the Middle District of Tennessee. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and also that no claim was

stated upon which relief could be granted. The U. S. Supreme Court took jurisdiction of the case and in a -2 decision overruled the Tennessee federal judges.The Court noted provisions in the Tennessee Constitution that require the legislature to carry out decennial redistricting based on the number of qualified voters in each county.The Court noted that since 1901 the Tennessee legislature had failed to carry out the required redistricting. Justice, William Brennan, speaking for the Court's majority, declared, "In light of the District Court's treatment of the case, we hold today only (a) that the court possessed jurisdiction of the subject matter; (b) that a justifiable cause of action is stated upon which appellants would be entitled to appropriate relief; and (c) because appellees raise the issue before this Court, that the appellants have standing to challenge the Tennessee apportionment statutes. "A citizen's right to a vote free of arbitrary impairment by state action has been judicially recognized as a right secured by the Constitution, when such impairment resulted from dilution by a false tally, cf. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, or by a refusal to count votes from arbitrarily selected precincts, cf. United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, or by a stuffing of the ballot box cf. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371. "We conclude that the complaint's allegations of a denial of equal protection present a justifiable constitutional cause of action upon which appellants are entitled to a trial and adecision. The right asserted is within the reach of judicial protection under the FourteenthAmendment." Dissent - Justices John Harlan, joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter I can find nothing in the Equal Protection Clause or elsewhere in the Federal Constitution which expressly or impliedly supports the view that state legislatures must be so structured as to reflect with approximate equality the voice of every voter. Not only is that proposition refuted by history, as shown by my Brother Frankfurter, but it strikes deep into the heart of our federal system. Its acceptance would require us to turn our backs on the regard which this Court has always shown for the judgment of state legislatures and courts on matters of basically local concern. In the last analysis, what lies at the core of this controversy is a difference of opinion as to the function of representative government. It is surely beyond argument that those who have the responsibility for devising a system of representation may permissibly consider that factors other than bare numbers should be taken into ' account. The existence of the United States Senate is proof enough of that. To consider that we may ignore the Tennessee Legislature's judgment in this instance because that body was the product of an asymmetrical electoral apportionment would in effect be to assume the very conclusion here disputed. Hence we must accept the present form of the Tennessee Legislature as the embodiment of the State's choice," or, more realistically, its compromise, between competing political philosophies. The federal courts have not been

empowered by the Equal Protection Clause to judge whether this resolution of the State's internal political conflict is desirable or undesirable, wise or unwise. Baker v. Carr Case Brief Summary Summary of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962). Facts Charles Baker (P) was a resident of Shelby County, Tennessee. Baker filed suit against Joe Carr, the Secretary of State of Tennessee. Bakers complaint alleged that the Tennessee legislature had not redrawn its legislative districts since 1901, in violation of the Tennessee State Constitution which required redistricting according to the federal census every 10 years. Baker, who lived in an urban part of the state, asserted that the demographics of the state had changed shifting a greater proportion of the population to the cities, thereby diluting his vote in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Baker sought an injunction prohibiting further elections, and sought the remedy of reapportionment or at-large elections. The district court denied relief on the grounds that the issue of redistricting posed a political question and would therefore not be heard by the court. Issues 1. 2. 1. 2. 1. Do federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a legislative apportionment? What is the test for resolving whether a case presents a political question? Yes. Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a legislative apportionment. The factors to be considered by the court in determining whether a case presents a political question are: Is there a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department (i.e. foreign affairs or executive war powers)? Is there a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue? The impossibility of deciding the issue without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion. The impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government. Is there an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made? Would attempting to resolve the matter create the possibility of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question?

Holding and Rule (Brennan)

2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

The political question doctrine is based in the separation of powers and whether a case is justiciable is determined on a case by cases basis. In regards to foreign relations, if there has been no conclusive governmental action regarding an issue then a court can construe a treaty and decide a case. Regarding the dates of the duration of hostilities, when there needs to be definable clarification for a decision, the court may be able to decide the case. The court held that this case was justiciable and did not present a political question. The case did not present an issue to be decided by another branch of the government. The court noted that judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause were well developed and familiar, and it had been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine if an act is arbitrary and capricious and reflects no policy. When a question is enmeshed with any of the other two branches of the government, it presents a political question and the Court will not answer it without further clarification from the other branches. Brief Fact Summary. Appellants brought suit, challenging malapportionment of state legislatures under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Synopsis of Rule of Law. An apportionment case may be reviewed on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, so long as these grounds are independent from political question elements. Facts. Apportionment cases had often been brought under the Guaranty Clause of Article IV, Section: 4 of the United States Constitution (Constitution), in which the United States guarantees to the individual states a republican form of government. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) has long held that such challenges present a political question, not addressable by the courts. In the current case, Appellants challenged the state apportionment of legislatures under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Issue. Is it possible to bring a malapportionment claim without raising a nonjusticiable political issue? Held. Yes. Reversed and remanded.In the past, apportionment challengers have generally based their challenge on the Guaranty Clause of Art. IV, Section: 4 of the Constitution. These claims are nonjusticiable as they address issues solely directed to the political branches of the government by the Constitution. This is a separation of powers issue.In Baker v. Carr, the claim is that the Appellants are being denied equal protection of the laws by being underrepresented in the state legislature. The Supreme Court rules that the equal protection challenge in this case is separable from the political questions.Dissent. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Felix Frankfurter (J. Frankfurter) argues the political question is inseparable from the equal protection claim and that the Supreme Court has effectively overturned a century of apportionment jurisprudence. In particular, the dissent argues that the Supreme Court has opened up all state districting to judicial oversight. Discussion. Baker v. Carr is the first of the cases developing the Supreme Courts one person, one vote legislation. This line of cases helped equalize representation between country and city dwellers in an increasingly urbanized nation.

Torrecampo v. MWSS Doctrine: Despite the presence of judicial power under Article I, Section VIII of the Constitution, a review of Executive policy is not under the jurisdiction of the courts for such policies lies only within the wisdom of the Executive branch. Petition: Petition for Injunction in the Supreme Court Plaintiff & Appellees: Barangay Captain Beda Torrecampo Defendant & Appellant: Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System Date: May 30, 2011 Ponente: Justice Carpio Summary: B a r a n g a y C a p t a i n B e d a Torrecampo filed a petition for injunction in the Supreme Court regarding the C5 Road Extension Project for the said project would result to injury to the petitioner and eight million residents of Metro Manila. The project would endanger the health of the residents for aqueducts responsible for the water supply in the area could be d a m a g e d . T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t ruled, however, that Torrecampo is not entitled to an injunction for he s e e k s j u d i c i a l r e v i e w o f a n Executive policy which is outside of the wisdom of the courts. Facts: 1. Torrecampo filed the petition for injunction pursuant to Sec. 3 of R.A 8975 on July 1, 2009, a day after D P W H e n t e r e d a p o r t i o n o f Barangay Matandang Balara to implement the C-5 Road Extension Project. Torrecampo insists that the RI-PADA area is a better alternative to subject lots for the project. 2 . A t t y. A g r a f o r M W S S f i n d s t h e petition immature for the road project has yet to be implemented.

The entry of DPWH in the area is done to conduct study on the area a n d o n t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e aqueducts. 3 . T h r o u g h R A 6 2 3 4 , M W S S explains its participation in the C5 Road Expansion Project. The MWSS explains that they have jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all t h e s e w e r a g e a n d w a t e r w o r k s systems located in Metro Manila, Rizal province, and a portion of Cavite province. 4. MWSS issued Board Resolution No. 2009-052 on March 12, 2009 that allowed DPWH to use the 60meter Right-of-Way for preliminary s t u d i e s o f t h e r o a d e x p a n s i o n project. 5. DPWH entered the Right-of-Way o n J u n e 3 0 , 2 0 0 9 t o c o n d u c t necessary studies for the project. 6 . T h e c o u r t i s s u e d t h a t Torrecampo is not entitled to an i n j u n c t i o n . T h u s , To r r e c a m p o s petition is denied. Issue: 1. WON respondents should be enjoined from commencing with and implementing the C-5 Road E x t e n s i o n P r o j e c t a l o n g Ta n d a n g S o r a R o a d , a f f e c t i n g M W S S properties. Held: 1. The court rules that Torrecampo is not entitled to an injunction for judicial review does not apply to matters concerning the Executive branch Torrecampos contention Access to clean and potable water for residents of Metro Manila is at risk with the C5 Road Expansion Project and Section 16, Article II and Section 6, Article XII of the Constitution would b e v i o l a t e d b y D P W H a n d M W S S should the road expansion project proceed using MWSSs properties

instead of the RIPADA area Supreme court The Court determined that Torrecampo wants the Court to find out whether the Tandang Sora area f o r t h e p r o j e c t i s a m u c h b e t t e r alternative to the RIPADA area for the project. Despite the definition of judicial power, as present in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, an inquiry on t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d b y To r r e c a m p o would mean delving into matters that are solely within the wisdom of the Executive branch. There is also the possibility of committing judicial interference. The determination of where to construct a road extension project is not within the jurisdiction of the Court b u t ra t h e r t h a t o f t h e E x e c u t i v e branch Republic v. Gingoyon Facts: This case is a motion for reconsideration for a previous decision of the SC. In the assailed decision of the SC, it ruled that PIATCO should be justly compensated before the Government can take over the NAIA Terminal 3. Now, the Government is arguing that PIATCO should not be paid because it has pending obligations with Takenaka Corporation (Takenaka) and Asahikosan (Asahikosan) Corporation for services rendered by the said corporations in building the Terminal. It argues that the said corporations still has pending liens on the Terminal. The situation the Republic now faces is that if any part of its Php3,002,125,000 deposit is released directly to PIATCO, and PIATCO, as in the past, does not wish to settle its obligations directly to Takenaka, Asahikosan and Fraport, the Republic may end up having expropriated a terminal with liens and claims far in excess of its actual value, the liens remain unextinguished, and PIATCO on the other hand, ends up with the Php3,0002,125,000 in its pockets gratuitously. Issue: Should the Government pay PIATCO just compensation before taking over the Terminal? Held: Yes. The Court is wont to reverse its previous rulings based on factual premises that are not yet conclusive or judicially established. Certainly, whatever claims or purported liens Takenaka and Asahikosan against PIATCO or over the NAIA 3 have not been judicially established. Neither Takenaka norAsahikosan are parties to the present action, and thus have not presented any claim which could be acted upon by this Court. The earlier adjudications in Aganv. PIATCO made no mention of

either Takenaka or Asahikosan, and certainly made no declaration as to their rights to any form of compensation. If there is indeed any right to remuneration due to these two entities arising from NAIA 3, they have not yet been established by the courts of the land. It must be emphasized that the conclusive ruling in the Resolution dated 21 January 2004 in Agan v. PIATCO (Agan 2004) is that PIATCO, as builder of the facilities, must first be justly compensated in accordance with law and equity for the Government to take over the facilities. It is on that premise that the Court adjudicated this case in its 19 December 2005 Decision. While the Government refers to a judgment rendered by a London court in favor of Takenaka and Asahikosan against PIATCO in the amount of US$82 Million, it should be noted that this foreign judgment is not yet binding on Philippine courts. It is entrenched in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure that a foreign judgment on the mere strength of its promulgation is not yet conclusive, as it can be annulled on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. It is likewise recognized in Philippine jurisprudence and international law that a foreign judgment may be barred from recognition if it runs counter to public policy. Assuming that PIATCO indeed has corresponding obligations to other parties relating to NAIA 3, the Court does not see how such obligations, yet unproven, could serve to overturn the Decision mandating that the Government first pay PIATCO the amount of 3.02 Billion Pesos before it may acquire physical possession over the facilities. This directive enjoining payment is in accordance with Republic Act No. 8974, and under the mechanism established by the law the amount to be initially paid is that which is provisionally determined as just compensation. The provisional character of this payment means that it is not yet final, yet sufficient under the law to entitle the Government to the writ of possession over the expropriated property. There are other judicial avenues outside of this Motion for Reconsideration wherein all other claims relating to the airport facilities may be ventilated, proved and determined. Since such claims involve factual issues, they must first be established by the appropriate trier of facts before they can be accorded any respect by or binding force on this Court. REPUBLIC VS. GINGOYON, digested Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011 GR # 166429, December 19, 2005 (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Just Compensation) FACTS: NAIA 3, a project between the Government and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc (PIATCO) was nullified. Planning to put NAIA 3 facilities into immediate operation, the Government, through expropriation filed a petition to be entitled of a writ of possession contending that a mere deposit of the assessed value of the property with an authorized government

depository is enough for the entitlement to said writ (Rule 67 of the Rules of Court). However, respondents avers that before an entitlement of the writ of possession is issued, direct payment of just compensation must be made to the builders of the facilities, citing RA No. 8974 and a related jurisprudence (2004 Resolution). ISSUE: WON expropriation can be conducted by mere deposit of the assessed value of the property. HELD: No, in expropriation proceedings, entitlement of writ of possession is issued only after direct payment of just compensation is given to property owner on the basis of fairness. The same principle applied in the 2004 Jurisprudence Resolution and the latest expropriation law (RA No. 8974). Pascual vs Secretary of Public Works Case Digest WENCESLAU PASCUAL, AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS FACTS: On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 920, entitled "An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works", approved on June 20, 1953, an item of P85,000.00, "for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement" of "Pasig feeder road terminals"; that, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, the aforementioned feeder roads were "nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed, within the Antonio Subdivision situated at Pasig, Rizal" which projected feeder roads "do not connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway"; that the aforementioned Antonio Subdivision were private properties of respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, was a member of the Senate of the Philippines; that on May 29, 1953, respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate said projected feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig, Rizal; that, on June 13, 1953, the offer was accepted by the council, subject to the condition "that the donor would submit a plan of the said roads and agree to change the names of two of them"; that no deed of donation in favor of the municipality of Pasig was, however, executed; that on July 10, 1953, respondent Zulueta wrote another letter to said council, calling attention to the approval of Republic Act No. 920, and the sum of P85,000.00 appropriated therein for the construction of the projected feeder roads in question; that the municipal council of Pasig endorsed said letter of respondent Zulueta to the District Engineer of Rizal, who, up to the present "has not made any endorsement thereon"; that inasmuch as the projected feeder roads in question were private property at the time of the passage and approval of Republic Act No. 920, the appropriation of P85,000.00 therein made, for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of said projected feeder roads, was "illegal and, therefore, void ab initio"; that said appropriation of P85,000.00 was made by Congress because its members were made to believe that the projected feeder roads in question were "public roads and not private streets of a private subdivision'"; that, "in

order to give a semblance of legality, when there is absolutely none, to the aforementioned appropriation", respondent Zulueta executed, on December 12, 1953, while he was a member of the Senate of the Philippines, an alleged deed of donation copy of which is annexed to the petitionof the four (4) parcels of land constituting said projected feeder roads, in favor of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; that said alleged deed of donation was, on the same date, accepted by the then Executive Secretary; that being subject to an onerous condition, said donation partook of the nature of a contract; that, as such, said donation violated the provision of our fundamental law prohibiting members of Congress from being directly or indirectly financially interested in any contract with the Government, and, hence, is unconstitutional, as well as null and void ab initio, for the construction of the projected feeder roads in question with public funds would greatly enhance or increase the value of the aforementioned subdivision of respondent Zulueta, "aside from relieving him from the burden of constructing his subdivision streets or roads at his own expense"; that the construction of said projected feeder roads was then being undertaken by the Bureau of Public Highways; and that, unless restrained by the court, the respondents would continue to execute, comply with, follow and implement the aforementioned illegal provision of law, "to the irreparable damage, detriment and prejudice not only to the petitioner but to the Filipino nation." ISSUE: Whether or not the statute is unconstitutional and void? HELD: "It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public purpose. * * * It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental advantage to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of private interests and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use of public money." (25 R.L.C. pp. 398-400; Italics supplied.) The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum in the following language: "In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals." Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus Juris Secundum states: "Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the constitution, public funds may be used only for a public purpose. The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax, and, under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of state funds can be made for other than a public purpose. * * * "The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interests, as opposed to the furtherance of

the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public. * * * ." (81 C.J.S. p. 1147; italics supplied.) The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed, subsequently thereto. Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected feeder roads in question, the legality thereof depended upon whether said roads were public or private property when the bill, which, later on, became Republic Act No. 920, was passed by Congress, or, when said bill was approved by the President and the disbursement of said sum became effective, or on June 20, 1953. Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to respondent Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.4 The donation to the Government, over five (5) months after the approval and effectivity of said Act, made, according to the petition, for the purpose of giving a "semblance of legality", or legalizing, the appropriation in question, did not cure its aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropriation. Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works PASCUAL vs. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS 110 PHIL 331 GR No. L-10405, December 29, 1960 "A law appropriating the public revenue is invalid if the public advantage or benefit, derived from such expenditure, is merely incidental in the promotion of a particular enterprise." FACTS: Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that RA No. 920, which apropriates funds for public works particularly for the construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Some of the feeder roads, however, as alleged and as contained in the tracings attached to the petition, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the Antonio Subdivision, belonging to private respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder roads do not connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway. The respondents' contention is that there is public purpose because people living in the subdivision will directly be benefitted from the construction of the roads, and the government also gains from the donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the streets, made by its owner to the government. ISSUE: Should incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the purpose of justifying an expenditure of the government? HELD: No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from the

promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use public money. The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public. LEGASPI VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (May 29, 1987 ) Digest Facts: -Civil Service Commission denied Valentin Legaspis (petitioner) request for information on the civil service eligibilities of 2 people employed as sanitarians, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, in the Health Department in Cebu. -Petitioner claims that his right to information is guaranteed by the Constitution prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information. -the Solicitor General challenges the petitioners standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any legal right to be informed of the civil services eligibilities of the government employees concerned. -SolGen further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks. Issue: WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service eligibilities of the Health Department employees. Held: Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligible for the position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi. Ratio: The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his standing to bring the present suit. In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter expressly mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records, documents, papers and in addition, government research data used as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.

But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security. It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. Legaspi vs. CSC G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987 Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspis request for information on the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas who were employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. Sibonghanoy and Agas had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians. Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent CSC to disclose said information. The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring the suit. It is asserted that the petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspis actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit Held: The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the person at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the

petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. The petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right. BOARD OF OPTOMETRY VS. COLET G.R. No. 122241, July 30 1996 FACTS: Republic Act No. 8050, entitled An Act Regulating the Practice of Optometry Education, Integrating Optometrists, and for Other Purposes, otherwise known as the Revised Optometry Law of 1995, was approved into law on 7 June 1995. On 31 July 1995, the private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a petition for declaratory relief and for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. Private respondents alleged in their petition that: 1. There were surreptitious and unauthorized insertion and addition of provisions in the Reconciled Bill which were made without the knowledge and conformity of the Senate panel;2. R.A. No. 8050 derogates and violates the fundamental right of every Filipino to reasonable safeguards against deprivation of life, liberty and property without due process of law;3. R.A. No. 8050 derogates and violates the principle against undue delegation of legislative power;4. R.A. No. 8050 suppresses truthful advertising concerning optical goods and services in violation of the guaranty of freedom of speech and press; and5. R.A. No. 8050 employs vague ambiguous terms in defining prohibitions and restrictions, hence, it falls within the ambit of void-for-vagueness doctrine which safeguards the guaranty of due process of law. When the petition (docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74770) was examined, it was found out that it merely listed the names of the alleged presidents as well as their profession and home addresses of Optometry Practitioner Association of the Philippines (OPAP); Cenevis Optometrist Association (COA); Association of Christian-Muslim Optometrist (ACMO); and Southern Mindanao Optometrist Association of the Philippines (SMOAP). They failed to indicate the details as to the juridical personality and addresses of these alleged associations, except for Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. ISSUES: Whether or not the private respondents have locus standi to question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8050; and Whether or not they have a valid cause of action for either declaratory relief or prohibition. HELD: 1. Only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, and every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Under Article 44 of the Civil Code, an association is considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its

members. By failing to provide juridical details in their petition, they cannot therefore claim that they are juridical entities. Consequently, they are deemed to be devoid of legal personality to bring an action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court - a real party in interest is a party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 3. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory. It cannot be disputed that there is yet no actual case or controversy involving all or any of the private respondents on one hand, and all or any of the petitioners on the other, with respect to rights or obligations under R.A. No. 8050. This is plain because Civil Case No. 95-74770 is for declaratory relief. The private respondents have not sufficiently established their locus standi to question the validity of R.A. No. 8050. The conclusion then is inevitable that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the implementation of R.A. No. 8050. Board of Optometry vs. Angel B. Colet G.R. No. 122241, July 30, 1996 Prayer of the Petitioners: The petitioners seek to annul and set aside the order rendered by herein public respondent Judge Angel B. Colet, who granted the writ of preliminary injunction restraining, enjoining, and prohibiting the herein petitioners in enforcing and implementing the Revised Optometry Law or any regulations or Code of Ethics issued thereunder . Prayer of Respondents: Herein private respondents prayed that the writ of preliminary injunction be made permanent. Facts: Congress enacted R.A. No. 8050, entitled An Act Regulating the Practice of Optometry Education, Integrating Optometrists, and for Other Purposes, " otherwise known as the Revised Optometry Law of 1995. Herein private respondents filed with a petition for declaratory relief and for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. They cited the following as grounds for their petition: 1. that there was derogation in the legislative process and vitiation of legislative consent; 2. that RA No. 8050 violates the due process clause of the Constitution; 3. that RA No. 8050 violates the principle against undue delegation of legislative power; and 4. that it is violation of the guaranty of freedom of speech and press. Meanwhile, upon examination of the petition, it was found out that the body of the petition gave no details as to the juridical personality and addresses of the alleged herein associations OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP, except for

Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. The petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74770, merely listed the names of the alleged presidents as well as their profession and home addresses. As to herein petitioners, they filed an opposition to the application for preliminary injunction and alleged that: 1. respondents do not possess the requisite right as would entitle them to the relief they sought; 2. respondents have no legal existence or capacity to file the case; 3. that the implementation of the questioned law carries no injurious effect; and 4. that herein respondents failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the questioned law. The Regional Trial Court granted the writ of preliminary injunction. The court was inclined to find prima facie , that petitioners have legal rights affected by the Revised Optometry Law, and that in its operation, said Law is likely to inflict serious and irreparable injury to such legal rights. Thus, herein petitioners filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order . Issue: Whether or not herein private respondents have legal existence or capacity (locus standi) to question the constitutionality of RA No. 8050. Ruling: Only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, and every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Under Article 44 of the Civil Code, an association is considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members. There is serious doubt as to the existence of private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP . For one, the body of the petition in Civil Case No. 9574770 makes no mention of these associations nor states their addresses. Further, nowhere is it claimed therein that they are juridical entities. These run counter to Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which provides that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party must be averred. Second, not even in the sworn statements of the alleged presidents representing the "associations," which were offered in evidence in support of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, were such "associations" mentioned or named. Finally, in their Comment on the instant petition, the private respondents chose to remain silent on the issue of the juridical personality of their "associations." For having failed to show that they are juridical entities, private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP must then be deemed to be devoid of legal personality to bring an action, such as herein questioned petition.

Therefore, since OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP were not shown to be juridical entities, they cannot, for obvious reasons, be deemed real parties in interest. Thus, petitioners prayer is granted. The questioned order rendered by the R e g i o n a l Tr i a l C o u r t g r a n t i n g t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t h e i s s u a n c e o f a writ of preliminary injunction, and the writ of preliminary injunction are hereby annulled and set aside. Principle: An association can only be considered as a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members Tondo Medical Center Employees Association vs Court of Appeals Tondo Medical Center Employees Association Vs CA GR NO 167324 Facts: DOH launched Health Sector Reform Agenda to reform the local health system. It was formed in order to provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals, secure funding for priority public programs, promote the development of local health systems and ensure its effective performance, strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies and expand the National Health Insurance program. However, the petitioners alleged that the implementation of the HSRA had resulted in making free medicine and medical services inaccessible to economically disadvantaged Filipinos. They alleged that the HSRA is void for being in violation of several constitutional provisions (e.g. Art III Sec 1, Art II Sec 5, Art II Sec, 9, etc.) EO 102 was the order to redirect the functions and operations of the Department of health which provided for the changes in the roles functions and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed order, DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of being the devolution of basic services to local government units. Petitioners alleged that this EO is in excess of the Presidential Authority. Issue: Whether or Not the HSRA and EO no. 102 are unconstitutional Ruling: No, HSRA and EO 102 are not unconstitutional. The HSRA cannot be nullified based solely on petitioners allegations that it violates the general principles. The argument that the EO 102 is in excess of the presidential authority due is without basis. Records are devoid of any explanation of how HSRA violated the equal protection and due process clauses that are embodied in the Sec 1 Art III of Consti. Petitioners failed to substantiate how the constitutional guarantees were breached and petitioners are

unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition. With the EO 102, the constitution clearly states that the president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Furthermore, DOH is among the cabinet level departments enumerated under the Book IV of the Administrative code mainly tasked with the functional distribution of the work of the president. PEOPLE VS. VERA G.R. No. L-45685, November 16 1937, 65 Phil. 56 FACTS: Petitioners, People of the Philippines and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case. Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of Cu Unjieng for probation. HSBC intervened in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial, the Court of First Instance rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, HSBC. Upon appeal, the court, on 26 March 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from 5 years and 6 months of prision correccional to 7 years, 6 months and 27 days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on 17 December 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on 18 December 1935. Cu Unjieng thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in November, 1936. The Supreme Court, on 24 November 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu Unjieng for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment. ISSUE: Whether or not the People of the Philippines is a proper party in this case. HELD: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the wellsettled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws

Political Law Delegation of Powers Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power. HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. PEOPLE v. VERA July 5, 2013 Leave a Comment PEOPLE v. VERA FACTS: Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is

innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the islands. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.HELD: The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. There is no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition. People of the Philippines V. Efren Mateo y Garcia G.R. No. 147678-87, 07 July 2004, En Banc (Vitug, J.) Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition. On October 30, 1996, ten (10) informations, one for each count of rape, were filed against appellant Efren Mateo. The lower court found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt, imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Solicitor General, however, assails the factual findings of the trial court and recommends an acquittal of the appellant. ISSUE: Whether or not the case should directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of the express provision in the constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death HELD: The case is REMANDED, and all pertinent records are ordered to be forwarded to the

Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition. Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. The same constitutional article has evidently been a thesis for Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659, as well as procedural rules contained in Section 3 of Rule 122, Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of rule 124 and Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Rules of Court. It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or review in favor of the accused. In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., theRECENT JURISPRUDENCE CRIMINAL LAW determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to review factual issues. While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition. Statistics would disclose that within the eleven-year period since the re-imposition of the death penalty law in 1993 until June 2004, the cases where the judgment of death has either been modified or vacated consist of an astounding 71.77% of the total of death penalty cases directly elevated before the Court on automatic review that translates to a total of six hundred fifty-one (651) out of nine hundred seven (907) appellants saved from lethal injection. Under the Constitution Article VIII, Section 5, the power to amend rules of procedure is

constitutionally vested in the Supreme Court. Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making prerogative of the Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress. The rule here announce additionally allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review, is such a procedural matter. Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of rule 124, Section 3 of rule 125, and any other rule insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposes is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated 19 September 1995, in Internal Rules of the Supreme Court incases similarly involving the death penalty, are to be deemed modified accordingly. AMENDED RULES ON DEATH PENALTY CASES REVIEW PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MATEO G.R. No. 147678-87, July 7, 2004 Facts: Appellant Efren Mateo was charged with ten counts of rape by his step-daughter Imelda Mateo. During the trial, Imeldas testimonies regarding the rape incident were inconsistent. She said in one occasion that incident of rape happened inside her bedroom, but other times, she told the court that it happened in their sala. She also told the court that the appellant would cover her mouth but when asked again, she said that he did not. Despite the irreconcilable testimony of the victim, the trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Solicitor General assails the factual findings of the trial and recommends an acquittal of the appellant. Issue: Whether or not this case is directly appeallable to the Supreme Court. Held: While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no case in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition. Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally vested in the Supreme Court Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts. Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making prerogative of the Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress. The rule here

announced additionally allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review is such a procedural matter. Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section of Rule 125, and any other rule insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated 19 September 1995, in Internal Rules of the Supreme Court in cases similarly involving the death penalty, are to be deemed modified accordingly. BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS ILUMINADA CABATO-CORTES, MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE vs HON.

For review[1] are the Orders[2] of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City finding petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative liable for payment of foreclosure fees. The Facts Petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (petitioner) is a credit cooperative organized under Republic Act No. 6938 (RA 6938), or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines.[3] Article 62(6) of RA 6938 exempts cooperatives: from the payment of all court and sheriff's fees payable to the Philippine Government for and in connection with all actions brought under this Code, or where such action is brought by the Cooperative Development Authority before the court, to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative.[4] In 2004, petitioner, as mortgagee, filed with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City (trial court) a petition to extrajudicially foreclose a mortgage under Act 3135, as amended.[5] Under Section 7(c) of Rule 141, as amended,[6] petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure are subject to legal fees based on the value of the mortgagees claim. Invoking Article 62 (6) of RA 6938, petitioner sought exemption from payment of the fees. The Ruling of the Trial Court In an Order dated 30 August 2004, Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (respondent), Executive Judge of the trial court, denied the request for exemption, citing Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended, exempting from the Rules coverage only the Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and certain suits of local government units.[7] Petitioner sought reconsideration but respondent denied its motion in the Order dated 6 October 2004. This time, respondent reasoned that petitioners reliance on Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is misplaced because the fees collected under Rule 141 are not

fees payable to the Philippine Government as they do not accrue to the National Treasury but to a special fund[8] under the Courts control.[9] Hence, this petition. Petitioner maintains that the case calls for nothing more than a simple application of Article 62(6) of RA 6938. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Manifestation (in lieu of Comment), joins causes with petitioner. The OSG submits that as the substantive rule, Article 62(6) of RA 6938 prevails over Section 22 of Rule 141, a judicial rule of procedure. The OSG also takes issue with respondents finding that the legal fees collected under Rule 141 are not fees payable to the Philippine Government as the judiciary forms part of the Philippine government, as defined under the Revised Administrative Code.[10] Although not a party to this suit, we required the Courts Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) to comment on the petition, involving as it does, issues relating to the Courts power to promulgate judicial rules. In its compliance, the OCAT recommends the denial of the petition, opining that Section 22, Rule 141, as amended, prevails over Article 62(6) of RA 6938 because (1) the power to impose judicial fees is eminently judicial and (2) the 1987 Constitution insulated the Courts rule-making powers from Congress interference by omitting in the 1987 Constitution the provision in the 1973 Constitution allowing Congress to alter judicial rules. The OCAT called attention to the Courts previous denial of a request by a cooperative group for the issuance of guidelines to implement cooperatives fees exemption under Article 62(6) of RA 6938. [11] Lastly, the OCAT recommends the amendment of Section 22, Rule 141 to make explicit the non-exemption of cooperatives from the payment of legal fees. The Issue The question is whether petitioners application for extrajudicial foreclosure is exempt from legal fees under Article 62(6) of RA 6938. The Ruling of the Court We hold that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 does not apply to petitioners foreclosure proceeding. Petitions for Extrajudicial Foreclosure Outside of the Ambit of Article 62(6) of RA 6938 The scope of the legal fees exemption Article 62(6) of RA 6938 grants to cooperatives is limited to two types of actions, namely: (1) actions brought under RA 6938; and (2) actions brought by the Cooperative Development Authority to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of cooperatives. By simple deduction, it is immediately apparent that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is no authority for petitioner to claim exemption from the payment of legal fees in this proceeding because first, the fees imposable on petitioner do not pertain to an action brought under RA 6938 but to a

petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act 3135. Second, petitioner is not the Cooperative Development Authority which can claim exemption only in actions to enforce payments of obligations on behalf of cooperatives. The Power of the Legislature vis a vis the Power of the Supreme Court to Enact Judicial Rules Our holding above suffices to dispose of this petition. However, the Court En Banc has recently ruled in Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees [12] on the issue of legislative exemptions from court fees. We take the opportunity to reiterate our En Banc ruling in GSIS. Until the 1987 Constitution took effect, our two previous constitutions textualized a power sharing scheme between the legislature and this Court in the enactment of judicial rules. Thus, both the 1935[13] and the 1973[14] Constitutions vested on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. However, these constitutions also granted to the legislature the concurrent power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules.[15] The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress subsidiary and corrective power.[16] This glaring and fundamental omission led the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice[17] that this Courts power to promulgate judicial rules is no longer shared by this Court with Congress: The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court [under] Section 5(5), Article VIII[18] x x x . The rule making power of this Court was expanded . This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress , more so with the Executive. x x x x (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied) Any lingering doubt on the import of the textual evolution of Section 5(5) should be put to rest with our recent En Banc ruling denying a request by the Government

Service Insurance System (GSIS) for exemption from payment of legal fees based on Section 39 of its Charter, Republic Act No. 8291, exempting GSIS from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or dues of all kinds.[19] Reaffirming Echegarays construction of Section 5(5), the Court described its exclusive power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure as one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence: [T]he payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence , the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain.[20] x x x (Emphasis supplied) WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Orders dated 30 August 2004 and 6 October 2004 of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts. SO ORDERED. In Re: Cunanan Resolution | March 18, 1954 Facts:- Controversies arose when Republic Act No. 972 Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 was enacted.- Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject. (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court).Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946.- The court expressed their unfavorable opinion about the bill passed by the Senate.- On June 21, 1953, the President allowed R.A. 972 to become a law without his signature.- After its approval, many unsuccessful bar candidates appealed and requested for the re-examination of their grades.

Issue:Whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.

Held:The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and

efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties.

To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated.

There is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of the judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the three great departments of government separate and independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of express constitutional provisions.

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of the court. On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government. The portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.

For lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.

The petitions of candidates who failed from 1946 to 1953 are denied. All candidates of obtained a general average of 71.5 without a grade 50% below any subject in the 1953 bar examinations, are considered having passed. Legal Profession- In re: Cunanan Resolution Cunanan, et. al 18March1954

FACTS OF THE CASE: In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners. In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations (194672%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 75%). Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953 Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams. ISSUES OF THE CASE: Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution recognizes continue to reside in this court. Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to cure are not the rules set in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not included in the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary. Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and

those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.) 4. It is a class legislation 5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void. HELD: Under the authority of the court: 1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect. 2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have filed petitions for admissions or not.) Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC. October 19, 2010. Post under Legal Ethics, villarama doctrines at Sunday, December 04, 2011 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Statement of UP Professors. While the statement was meant to reflect the educators opinion on the allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. They expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillos explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized. The statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. The authors also not only assumed that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism, they went further by directly accusing the Court of perpetrating extraordinary injustice by dismissing the petition of the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. They further attempt to educate this Court on how to go about the review of the case. The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of polluted sources, the Courts alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect. The publication of a statement by the faculty of the UP College of Law regarding the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance. Of public knowledge is the ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such allegations. More importantly, the motion for reconsideration of the decision alleged to contain plagiarized materials is still pending before the Court. We made it clear in the case of In re Kelly

that any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable. The UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the Vinuya decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC. October 19, 2010.

Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court. VILLARAMA, JR., J.: Plagiarism is the act of appropriating the literary composition of another, or parts or passages of his writings, or the ideas or language of the same, and passing them off as the product of ones own mind.[1] Allegations of this intellectual offense were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R. Bagares against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010. In said case, the Court denied the petition for certiorari filed by Filipino comfort women to compel certain officers of the executive department[2] to espouse their claims for reparation and demand apology from the Japanese government for the abuses committed against them by the Japanese soldiers during World War II. Attys. Roque and Bagares represent the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary , which is presently the subject of a motion for reconsideration. The authors and their purportedly plagiarized articles are: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent from their article, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens published in 2009 in the Yale Journal of International Law; (2) Christian J. Tams from his book, Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005; and (3) Mark Ellis from his article, Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law in 2006. The allegations of plagiarism centered on Justice Del Castillos discussion of the principles of jus cogens and erga omnes. On August 9, 2010, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul V. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva, and Dina D. Lucenario, members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law published a statement on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the Courts decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of Law, headed by its dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, calls for the resignation of Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo in the face of allegations of plagiarism in his work. Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators opinion on the allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillos explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized. Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads: An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed

against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war. The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. The authors also not only assumed that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism, they went further by directly accusing the Court of perpetrating extraordinary injustice by dismissing the petition of the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. They further attempt to educate this Court on how to go about the review of the case. The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of polluted sources, the Courts alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect. Paragraph 9 of their published statement reads, But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court decided this case based on polluted sources . By doing so, the Supreme Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy and nonchalance , belies (sic) [betrays] a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic values of decency and respect. (Emphasis supplied). The publication of a statement by the faculty of the UP College of Law regarding the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance. Of public knowledge is the ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such allegations. More importantly, the motion for reconsideration of the decision alleged to contain plagiarized materials is still pending before the Court. We made it clear in the case of In re Kelly[3] that any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable. While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. [4] The court must insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice.[5] The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the facultys less than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Courts honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort womens claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. [6]

Their actions likewise constitute violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 [7] and Rules 1.02 and 11.05[8] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[9] WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul V. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva, and Dina D. Lucenario, members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law, are directed to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Further, Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen is directed to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting, through his letter dated August 10, 2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230, Vinuya v. Executive Secretary and of the investigation before the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, for the consideration of the Court En Banc, a dummy which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the purported statement, entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court. Enclosed are copies of the said dummy and signed statement, respectively, attached to the said letter dated August 10, 2010 and to the Compliance dated August 31, 2010 filed by Roque & Butuyan Law Offices with the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards. Let this matter be DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter. Let service of this Resolution upon the above-named UP College of Law faculty members be effected by personal delivery. SO ORDERED. PEOPLE v. LACSON [October 7, 2003] Facts: Petitioner asserts that retroactive application of penal laws should also cover procedures, and that these should be applied only to the sole benefit of the accused. Petitioner asserts that Sec 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused in line with the constitutional guarantee to the right to speedy trial. Issues: 1. WON the 5 Associate Justices inhibit themselves from deciding in the MFR given they were only appointed in the SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral arguments. The rule should be applied prospectively. The court upheld the petitioners contention that while 8 secures the rights of the accused, it doesnt & shouldnt preclude the equally important right of the State to public justice. If a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a retroactive application. 2. WON the application of the time-bar under 8 RCP 117 be given a retroactive application w/o reservations, only & solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused.

The Court isnt mandated to apply rules retroactively just because its favorable to the accused. The time-bar under the new rule is intended to benefit both the State & the accused. When the rule was approved by the court, it intended that the rule be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for to do so would be tantamount to the denial of the States right to due process. A retroactive application would result in absurd, unjust & oppressive consequences to the State & to the victims of crimes & their heirs. Ampong vs. CSC, G.R. 167916, Aug. 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 293 FACTS: Petitioner Sarah P. Ampong and Decir were public school teachers under the supervision of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). Later, Ampong transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Alabel, Sarangani Province, where she was appointed as Court Interpreter III. On July 5,1994, a woman representing herself as Evelyn Decir went to the Civil Service Regional Office (CSRO) No. XI, Davao City, to claim a copy of her PBET Certificate of Eligibility. During the course of the transaction, the CSRO personnel noticed that the woman did not resemble the picture of the examinee in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP). Upon further probing, it was petitioner Ampong who took and passed the examinations under the name Evelyn Decir. ISSUE: What is the extent of the administrative jurisdiction the Civil Service Commission have over courts and judicial personnel? RULING: The answer to the question at the outset is in the negative but the Court rules against the petition on the ground of estoppel. It is true that the Civil Service Commission (CSC) has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. As defined under the Constitution and the Administrative Code, the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and government-owned or controlled corporations. Pursuant to its administrative authority, the CSC is granted the power to control, supervise, and coordinate the Civil Service examinations.This authority grants to the CSC the right to take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected with the examinations. However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It may take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. People vs. Gacott, Jr. G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995 Facts: For failure to check the citations of the prosecution, the order of respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the SC. The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. The judgment was made by the Second Division of the SC. Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the SC has the competence to administratively discipline respondent judge

Held: To support the Courts ruling, Justice Regalado relied on his recollection of a conversation with former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion who was the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986 Constitutional Commission of which Regalado was also a member. The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that the SC en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity. The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein. In this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself. Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc, a decision en banc is needed only where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than 1 year or a fine exceeding P10, 000.00 or both. Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc. Air France v Carrascoso Facts: Air France issued to Carrascoso, a civil engineer, a 1st class round trip ticket from Manila - Rome. During the stopover at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced plaintiff to vacate the 1st class seat because there was a "white man" who had better right to the seat. As a result, he filed a suit against Air France where the CFI Manila granted him moral and exemplary damages. Issue: Whether or not Carrascoso was entitled to the 1st class seat and consequently, whether or not he was entitled to the damages awarded. Held: Yes to both.

To achieve stability in the relation between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket issued is desirable. Quoting the court, "We cannot understand how a reputable firm like Air France could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of the tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not." Evidence of bad faith was presented without objection on the part of the Carrascoso. In the case, it could have been easy for Air France to present its manager to testify at the trial or secure his deposition but defendant did neither. There is also no evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a 1st class seat, worse he imposed his arbitrary will. He forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to tourist class just to give way to another passenger whose right was not established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal is conduct, injurious language, indignities and abuse from such employees. Any discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Exemplary damages were also awarded. The manner of ejectment fits into the condition for exemplary damages that defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. *Bad Faith - state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose G.R. No. L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966 When culpa aquiliana may arise even when there is a pre-existing contract between the parties FACTS: Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a first class passenger of Air France on his way to Rome for a pilgrimage. From Manila to Bangkok, he traveled in first class, but at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced him to vacate his seat in favor of a white man who had a better right to the seat. Carrascoso filed for moral damages, averring in his complaint the contract of carriage between Air France and himself. Air France claims that to authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith, upon which Carrascosos complaint is silent. ISSUE: 3. Whether or not Carrascoso is entitled to award for moral damages

HELD: The foregoing substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, That there was bad faith when petitioners employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth after he was already seated and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassment and humiliation, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there; it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion. Air France v. Carrascoso Facts Rafael Carrascoso was part of a group of pilgrims leaving for Lourdes. Air France, through PAL, issued to Carrascoso a first class round trip ticket. From Manila to Bangkok, he traveled in first class but at Bangkok, the manager of Air France forced him to vacate his seat, because a "white man" had a "better right" to it. He refused and even had a heated discussion with the manager but after being pacified by fellow passengers, he reluctantly gave up the seat. Air France asserts that the ticket does not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties, and that the issuance of a first class ticket did not guarantee a first class ride (depends upon the availability of seats). CFI and CA disposed of this contention. Issue and Holding WON Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat he claims. YES Ratio On CA's decision Air France charges that CA failed to make complete findings of fact on all issues presented. SC says that so long as CA's decision contains the facts necessary to warrant its conclusions, there is nothing wrong in withholding any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense. On the seat issue If a first-class ticket holder is not entitled to a corresponding seat, what security can a passenger have? It's very easy to strike out the stipulations in the ticket and say that there was a contrary verbal agreement. There was no explanation as to why he was allowed to take a first class seat before coming to Bangkok if indeed he had no seat or if someone had a better right to it. On contract to transport, QD, etc. This is different in kind and degree from any other contractual obligation because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Passengers do not contract merely

for transportation as they have a right to be treated by the employees with kindness, respect, courtesy, consideration. What happened was a violation of public duty by Air France--a case of QD, so damages are proper. A case was cited wherein it was said that although the relation of passenger and carrier is contractual in origin and nature, the act that breaks the K may be also a tort. On the issue of award of damages Air France assails CA's award of moral damages, claiming that since Carrascoso's action is based on breach of contract, there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith in order to avail of said award. While there was no specific mention of "bad faith," it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by evidence. Allegations in the complaint on this issue: There was a K to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering the Bangkok-Teheran leg This K was breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transpo at Bangkok There was bad faith when the manager compelled Carrascoso to leave his seat after he was already seated and to transfer to the tourist class, thereby making him suffer inconvenience, embarrassment, humiliation, etc. bad faith - state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes See NCC 21. Upon the provisions of NCC 2219 (10), moral damages are recoverable. Exemplary damages are well awarded also, since NCC gives the court power to grant such in K and QK, with the condition that the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.