India Intelligence and Security Agencies

Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of the government of India analyzes intelligence data from the Intelligence Bureau and the RAW, Directorate of Military Intelligence, Directorate of Naval Intelligence, Directorate of Air Intelligence. JIC has its own secretariat that is under the Cabinet Secretariat, The National Security Council (NSC), established on 24 August 1990, includes the Prime Minister as Chairman, and the Home Minister, External Affairs Minister, Defence Minister and Finance Minister as members. Since its inception the Council has met just once, on 05 October 1990.

Research and Analysis Wing [RAW] The Cabinet Secretariat Research and Analysis Wing [RAW], India's most powerful intelligence agency, is India's external intelligence agency. RAW has become an effective instrument of India's national power, and has assumed a significant role in formulating India's domestic and foreign policies. RAW has engaged in disinformation campaigns, espionage and sabotage against Pakistan and other neighboring countries. RAW has enjoyed the backing of successive Indian governments in these efforts. Working directly under the Prime Minister, the structure, rank, pay and perks of the Research & Analysis Wing are kept secret from Parliament. Current policy debates in India have generally failed to focus on the relative priority given by RAW to activities directed against India's neighbors versus attention to domestic affairs to safeguard India's security and territorial integrity. The RAW has had limited success in dealing with separatist movements in Manipur and Tripura in the northeast, Tamil Nadu in the south, and Punjab and Kashmir in the northwestern part of the country. Indian sources allege the CIA has penetrated freedom fighters in Kashmir and started activities in Kerala, Karnataka, and other places, along with conducting economic and industrial espionage activities in New Delhi. In 1968 India established this special branch of its intelligence service specifically targeted on Pakistan. The formation of RAW was based on the belief that Pakistan was supplying weapons to Sikh terrorists, and providing shelter and training to the guerrillas in Pakistan. Pakistan has accused the Research and Analysis Wing of sponsoring sabotage in Punjab, where RAW is alleged to have supported the Seraiki movement, providing financial support to promote its activities in Pakistan and organizing an International Seraiki Conference in Delhi in November-December 1993. RAW has an extensive network of agents and anti-government elements within Pakistan, including dissident elements from various sectarian and ethnic groups of Sindh and Punjab. Published reports allege that as many as 35,000 RAW agents have entered Pakistan between 1983-93, with 12,000 are working in Sindh, 10000 in Punjab 8000

in North West Frontier Province and 5000 in Balochistan. As many as 40 terrorist training camps at Rajasthan, East Punjab, Held Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh and other parts of India are run by the RAW's Special Service Bureau (SSB). Throughout the Afghan War RAW was responsible for the planning and execution of terrorist activities in Pakistan to deter Pakistan from support of Afghan liberation movement against India's ally, the Soviet Union. The assistance provided to RAW by the KGB enabled RAW to arrange terrorist attacks in Pakistani cities throughout the Afghan War. The defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan did not end the role of RAW in Pakistan, with reports that suggest that India has established a training camp in the town of Qadian, in East Punjab, where non-Muslim Pakistanis are trained for terrorist activities. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has blamed India for funding the current upsurge of terrorism in Pakistan, and senior ministers have blamed the Research and Analysis Wing for the sectarian violence between Shias and Sunnis which has resulted in thousands of deaths every year. The Government of Pakistan frequently assigns responsibility for terrorist activity to the Indian Government, even when no evidence can be verified. It is evidently in the interest of the Pakistani government to blame terrorist actions on external rather than internal sources, just as it would be in the interest of Indian services to obscure their hand in such actions. Terrorist activities in Pakistan attributed to the clandestine activities of Indian and Afghan intelligence agencies include:

A car bomb explosion in Saddar area of Peshawar on 21 December 1995 caused the deaths of 37 persons and injured over 50 others. An explosion at Shaukat Khanum Hospital on 14 April 1996, claimed the lives of seven persons and injured to over 34 others. A bus traveling from Lahore to Sahiwal was blown up at Bhai Pheru on 28 April 1996, causing the deaths of 44 persons on the spot and injuring 30 others. An explosion in a bus near the Sheikhupura hospital killed 9 persons and injured 29 others on 08 May 1996. An explosion near Alam chowk, Gujranwala on 10 June 1996 killed 3 persons and injured 11 others. A bomb exploded on a bus on GT Road near Kharian on 10 June 1996, killing 2 persons and injuring 10 others. On 27 June 1996, an explosion opposite Madrassah Faizul Islam, Faizabad, Rawalpindi, killed 5 persons and injured over 50 others. A bomb explosion in the Faisalabad railway station passenger lounge on 08 July 1996 killed 3 persons and injured 20 others.

RAW has responded to Pakistani arms and training for Muslim militants in the disputed region of Kashmir state. RAW allegedly executed a hijacking of an Indian Airliner to Lahore in 1971 which was attributed to the Kashmiris, to give a terrorist dimension to the Kashmiri national movement. However soon the extent of RAW's involvement was made public. RAW has a long history of activity in Bangladesh, supporting both secular forces and the area's Hindu minority. The involvement of RAW in East Pakistan is said to date from the 1960s, when RAW promoted dissatisfaction against Pakistan in East Pakistan, including funding Mujibur Rahmanh's general election in 1970 and providing training and arming the Mukti Bahini. During the course of its investigation the Jain Commission received testimony on the official Indian support to the various Sri Lankan Tamil armed groups in Tamil Nadu. From 1981, RAW and the Intelligence Bureau established a network of as many as 30 training bases for these groups in India. Centers were also established at the high-security military installation of Chakrata, near Dehra Dun, and in the Ramakrishna Puram area of New Delhi. This clandestine support to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), some of whom were on the payroll of RAW, was later suspended. Starting in late 1986 the Research and Analysis Wing focused surveillance on the LTTE which was expanding ties with Tamil Nadu separatist groups. Rajiv Gandhi sought to establish good relations with the LTTE, even after the Indian Peace Keeping Force [IPKF] experience in Sri Lanka. But the Indian intelligence community failed to accurately assess the character of the LTTE and its orientation India and its political leaders. The LTTE assassination of Rajiv Gandhi was apparently motivated by fears of a possible re-induction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka and a crackdown on the LTTE network in Tamil Nadu. The RAW and the Ministry of External Affairs are provided Rs 25 crore annually as "discretionary grants" for foreign influence operations. These funds have supported organisations fighting Sikh and Kashmiri separatists in the UK, Canada and the US. An extensive network of Indian operatives is controlled by the Indian Embassy in Washington DC. The Indian embassy's covert activities are reported to include the infitration of US long distance telephone carriers by Indian operatives, with access to all kinds of information, to r blackmail relatives of US residents living in India. In 1996 an Indian diplomat was implicated in a scandal over illegal funding of political candidates in the US. Under US law foreign nationals are prohibited from contributing to federal elections. The US District Court in Baltimore sentenced Lalit H Gadhia, a naturalised US citizen of Indian origin, to three months imprisonment. Gadhia had confessed that he worked as a conduit between the Indian Embassy and various IndianAmerican organisations for funnelling campaign contributions to influence US lawmakers. Over $46,000 from the Indian Embassy was distributed among 20 Congressional candidates. The source of the cash used by Gadhia was Devendra Singh, a RAW official assigned to the Indian Embassy in Washington. Illicit campaign money received in 1995 went to Democratic candidates including Sens. Charles S. Robb (DVa.), Paul S. Sarbanes (D -Md.) and Reps. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-Md.) and Steny H. Hoyer (D-Md.).

Intelligence Bureau (IB)

The Intelligence Bureau (IB) is the Indian government's domestic intelligence agency, and reputedly the world's oldest intelligence agency. It is rather difficult to ascertain what the IB does, since its operations are outside the purview of audit or inquiry. In addition to domestic intelligence responsibilities, the IB is particularly tasked with intelligence collection in border areas, following the 1951 recommendations of the Himmatsinhji Committee (also known as the North and North-East Border Committee), a task entrusted to military intelligence organizations prior to independence in 1947. The IB was also tasked with other external intelligence responsibilities as of 1951. The Indian Telegraph Act authorizes the surveillance of communications, including monitoring telephone conversations and intercepting personal mail, in case of public emergency or "in the interest of the public safety or tranquility." These powers have been used by every state government. It has been reported that as many as 5,000 letters from abroad are intercepted every day by the Intelligence Bureau under the provisions of the Indian Post Office Act. Indian courts do not issue warrants or accept wiretaps as evidence, giving the police little incentive to intercept. Many wiretaps are conducted "informally" by agencies such as the Intelligence Bureau, and the targets are frequently opposition politicians. From time to time a few such cases have come to light, been furiously debated in Parliament, and declared illegal. The IB has also employed officers, who submit letters and opinion pieces under assumed names, to ensure that newspapers carry the government's point of view. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) procures information which is more often than not related to the security of the current Government rather than of the nation. The DMK government led by M. Karunanidhi in Tamil Nadu was dismissed in 1990 on grounds of having encouraged the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) movement in the state. karunanidhi had portrayed the fellow Tamils' cause in Sri Lanka as just and noble. Imposition of central rule in Tamil Nadu, a political step taken under pressure from the Congress (I) Party, was taken following a series of reports filed by the Intelligence Bureau (IB) that reveale the growing informal relationship between the followers of the DMK and the LTTE. Although the IB had established Karunanidhi's sympathy towards the LTTE, it was unaware of the group's plan to assasinate Rajiv Gandhi.

Defense Ministry Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Joint Cipher Bureau Army

Directorate of Military Intelligence Defence Security Corps

Special Frontier Force Special Security Bureau

Air Force

Directorate of Air Intelligence

Navy

Directorate of Naval Intelligence Coast Guard

Minister of State for Home Affairs Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) Department of Internal Security

Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) National Security Guards (NSG) Rapid Action Force (RAF) Special Protection Group (SPG) Central Industrial Security Force Border Security Force (BSF) Indo-Tibetan Border Police Home Guards

Ministry of Finance Economic Intelligence Council Department of Revenue Central Economic Intelligence Bureau Directorate General of Revenue Intelligence Directorate of Enforcement

Directorate General of Anti-Evasion Directorate General of Income Tax Investigation Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB)

Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) was created in March 2002. The new agency combines the intelligence networks of all three armed services of India (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and is the product of long-standing demands by the armed forces for such an organization and the recommendation of the Group of Ministers's report investigating the intelligence failures leading to the Kargil incident of 1999. According to Defence Ministry officials, the DIA, unlike the previous Directorate of Military Intelligence, is to benefit from ample resources and manpower to allow it to fulfil its role. The agency's primary task it to track troop movement in countries neighbouring India. The agency, unlike the Directorate General of Military Intelligence, is also assigned the mission of monitoring terrorist groups operating both within and outside of the country and is to have a section dedicated to gathering intelligence on terrorist groups and monitoring the internal security threat. The agency's mission is to be accomplished using satellite and high-altitude aerial reconnaissance imagery. The creation of the DIA significantly reduces the reliance of the Indian Armed Forces on civilian intelligence agencies such as IB and RAW for information and enemy troop assessments, as was the case during the conflicts of 1948 with Pakistan, 1962 with China, 1965 and 1971 with Pakistan and during the Kargil intrustion of 1999. During these operations, intelligence products were often found to contain discrepancies. Prior to the creation of the Defence Intelligence Agency, the Armed Forces' military intelligence capability was limited to a few Field Intelligence Units (FIU) tasked only with gathering intelligence during ongoing operations and with maintaining liasion with foreign military forces. The head of the Agency is the Director General; the first of which was Lt Gen Kamal Davar, an armoured corps officer and former Director General of Mechanized Forces. The Director General reports to the Defence Minister and, should the position be created, to the Chief of Defence Staff. The post is to rotate among all three of the armed services. The Director General of the Agency is assisted by the Deputy Director General. The first to hold that position is Air Marshal S C Malhan.

Joint Cipher Bureau

The inter-services Joint Cipher Bureau has primary responsibility for cryptology and SIGINT, providing coordination and direction to the other military service organisations with similar mission. Most current equipment providing tactical intelligence is of Russian origin, including specialised direction finding and monitoring equipment. The Joint Cipher Bureau is also responsible for issues relating to public and private key managment. The cryptographic situation in India is in the early stages of development. Cryptographic products are export-controlled licenced items, and licences to India are not generally available for products of key length of more than 56 bits. The domestic Indian computer industry primrily produces PCs, and PCcompatible cryptographic products have been developed and are being used commercially. More robust cryptologic systems are not commercially produced in India, and progress of in this field has been slow due to the general inavailability of technology and know-how. Customised cryptographic products have been designed and produced by organisations in the defense sector are engaged in the implementation of cryptographic techniques, protocols and the products.

The Directorate of Military Intelligence (MI)

is the intelligence arm of the Indian armed forces. The agency was set up in 1941 (then as part of the British Indian Army) to generate field intelligence for the army. The agency is based at Sena Bhavan in Delhi. MI was initially tasked with generating only tactical or field intelligence in all countries bordering India. Its geographical mandate was set to 50 km from the border. These limits were quickly crossed in the mid-1990s when the organisation began playing an increasing role in countries within the subcontinent and its outer periphery. MI's mandate also includes counter-terrorism in the north and North-east and generating pinpoint intelligence for small team operations. It is also tasked with counterintelligence in the army, which entails detecting spies in military areas. The agency was set up in 1941 to generate field intelligence for the Indian army. After India gained independence in 1947, it became a small army department primarily that investigated corruption within the force. Little is known about its activities. In 1978, the directorate was embroiled in the Samba spy scandal, wherein it was later found that the directorate had falsely implicated three Indian Army officers as being Pakistani spies. The agency gathered momentum in the 1990s especially after the Kargil conflict with Pakistan. The army had to handle the poor quality tactical intelligence provided by theIntelligence Bureau (IB) and R&AW. Hence the MI's mandate was ultimately boosted.

MI operatives moved into Tajikistan and later Afghanistan in support of the Ahmad Shah Massoudled Northern Alliance that overthrew the Taliban in 2001 with aid of US-led coalition forces in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and the subsequent War On Terror. MI was also active in Myanmar, which nurtured insurgent groups. In 1998, an MI operative impersonated a Khalistani terrorist and infiltrated a gun-running Myanmarese insurgent group. He led them into a death trap in the Andaman islands. Operation Leech, as the operation was called, marked the start of the Indian Army outreach to the Myanmarese juntain the 1990s. It also aimed to offset China's expanding footprint on India's eastern border. MI Has carried out operations in Bangladesh too because of safe sanctuaries provided to insurgent groups like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the United National Liberation Front of Manipur (UNLF) and the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation of Assam. Within months of the Hasina government taking over in 2009, the entire leadership of the ULFA and UNLF was handed over to Indian authorities. MI officials say these 'third country operations' allowed the agency to peep into countries of their immediate interest besides furthering national goals. In January 2012, the MI warned Sheikh Hasina, the then prime minister of Bangladesh, about a coup brewing in the Bangladeshi Army which was ultimately foiled

Organisation
The organisation comprises just over 700 officers, including women officers, and over 3,000 men. It is still tiny when compared to R&AW and IB, whose staff is over 25,000. MI's operating budget, too, is a tiny fraction of the well-entrenched IB and R&AW, though all three agencies have somewhat overlapping mandates vis-a-vis trans-border tasks. The director-general, MI, a lieutenant general-rank officer who reports directly to the army chief, is indispensable when it comes to furthering Indian Army's diplomacy and exchanging intelligence with friendly countries like Myanmar, Israel, Afghanistan and Vietnam

Post-Kargil Changes
Indian Intelligence agencies have been often embroiled in turf wars, with the Intelligence Bureau and the Research and Analysis Wing locked in constant power struggle. The MI too has lost turf to two new intelligence agencies, the National Technical Research Organisation and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), created in the aftermath of the Kargil Conflict to address the intelligence failures that led to massive cross border infiltration. Defence Intelligence Agency took away some of its signal monitoring capabilities and foreign military attaches who used to report to the MI.

Samba spy scandal

The Samba Military Spy Scandal[1][2] was a cold war military intelligence program which would eventually emerged as a scandal in 1979. According to the Indian Army, the military program was run by the MI of Pakistan to seek information on Indian Army's deposition in Western India. The Indian Army and associated intelligence agencies led the arrest of 168 active duty army officers and personnel on suspicion of working for the Military Intelligence of the Pakistan Army from Samba in the northern disputed state of Jammu & Kashmir. Samba, Jammu is a sleepy town in the Jammu region of the state. The region bordering with Pakistan. Revelation of scandal led to a serious breach in foreign relationsof India and Pakistan. Between August 24, 1978 and January 23, 1979, 50-odd persons who had worked in the 168 Infantry Brigade and its subordinate units at Samba, 40 km from Jammu on the international border, were arrested on charges of spying for Pakistan at the instance of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (MI). Its investigations involved practically the whole officer cadre of the Brigade. Those arrested included a Brigadier, three Lieutenant Colonels and a number of Majors, Captains, Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs), Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and personnel of other ranks, plus 11 civilians who had worked in the Samba sector. They were all taken into custody at the instance of two self-confessed Pakistani spies who worked as gunners in the Indian Army - Sarwan Dass and Aya Singh. In December 1994, Sarwan Dass swore an affidavit and appeared at a press conference to admit that he had falsely implicated the men. In December 1990, Aya Singh was shot - while crossing the India-Pakistan border. The falsely implicated victims received justice only in December 2000, and not fully either.[3] The whole story, written by A. G. Noorani, was published in Frontline. The book The Price of Loyalty, written by Captain Ranbir Singh Rathaur, is a first hand account of the brutal and inhuman torture inflicted on the officers and men who were falsely implicated in the so-called Samba Spy Case.

Defence Security Corps (India)

The Defence Security Corps (DSC), previously known as Defence Department Constabulary Centre, was founded on 25 April 1947 at Mathura in Uttar Pradesh state in north India. The Defence Security Corps, with 31,000 personnel, provides security at Defence Ministry sites. The role of Defence Security Corps is to ensure the protection and security of designated Defence Installations against sabotage and pilferage. The Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) and the Defence Security Corps (DSC) provide security at Indian Ordnance Factories, India's nuclear laboratories and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) establishments, respectively. The CISF is purely a civilian Central government security force and though the DSC is a force under the Ministry of Defence and it comprises mainlysuperannuated soldiers who are re-employed for a few years.[1] On 3 May 1947, the centre moved to Delhi. The DSC was formed in the form of a semi-police force with police titles and badges of ranks. In 1948, these were replaced with military titles and badges of ranks.

In August 1958, the Corps was re-organised and brought under the control of Indian Army Headquarters. The DSC and Records moved from Delhi to Chakrata in Uttar Pradesh (Presently in Uttarakhand) in April 1959 and then to Kannur on 21 November 1961. Today, the DSC Centre and DSC Records is located in Kannur town, on the road to Payyambalam Beach. The area is a part of the Cannanore Cantonment and is well-maintained by the Cantonment Board. The DSC centre at Kannur is the mother depot to all platoons in the country. The centre imparts training to ex-service personnel of the Indian Army, Navy, Air Force and Territorial Army and recruits them to various agencies under the Army, Navy, Air Force and Territorial Army and to the Directorate General of Ordnance Factories and Directorate General of Research and Development.

Special Frontier Force

The Special Frontier Force (SFF) is a paramilitary special force of India created on 14 November 1962. Its main goal originally was to conduct covert operations behind Chinese lines in the event of another IndoChina war. The SFF came to be known as 'Establishment 22' due to its first Inspector General, Major General (Retd.) Sujan Singh Uban of Indian Army,[1] who used to be commander of 22 Mountain Regiment during World War II,[2] a Military Cross holder and a legendary figure in the British India Army. Singh commanded the 22nd Mountain Regiment during World War II in Europe and a Long Range Desert Squadron (LRDS) in North Africa. Based in Chakrata, Uttarakhand,[3] the force was put under the direct supervision of the Intelligence Bureau, and later, theResearch and Analysis Wing, India's external intelligence agency. Special Frontier Force Founded Country Type Role 14 November 1962 present India special force Primary tasks:

Special reconnaissance, Direct action, Hostage rescue,

Counter-terrorist, Unconventional warfare, covert operations.

Size Part of

10000 active personnel Ministry of Defence Indian Armed Forces Chakrata, Uttarakhand, India Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, Operation Blue Star, Operation Cactus, Operation Pawan, Kargil War (1999), Operation Rakshak

Headquarters Engagements

Aircraft flown Helicopter HAL Dhruv, HAL Chetak, HAL Cheetah,HAL Lancer, Mi-17V-5 Gulfstream III, IAI Astra 1125

Transport

History
Ethnic Tibetans have been a part and parcel of the modern Indian Army for as long as it has existed. Independent formations of Tibetan (including Ladakhi, Bn, and Sikkimese) units were to patrol and police the lands they were native to. During the time of the Great Game, the British Indian Army began to employ Tibetans as spies, intelligence agents, and even covert militia in northern India and Tibet proper. At the time of Indian independence, the Northern Hills of India remained the most isolated and strategically overlooked territory of the subcontinent. During the 1950s, the AmericanCentral Intelligence Agency and the Indian Intelligence Bureau established Mustang Base in Mustang in Nepal,[5] which trained Tibetans in guerilla warfare. The Mustang rebels brought the 14th Dalai Lama to India during the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion.

Formation
After the Sino-Indian war and towards the end of 1962, after hectic lobbying by Intelligence Bureau (IB), the Nehru government ordered the raising of an elite commando unit and specialized mountain divisions primarily composed of Tibetan resistance fighters. Chushi Gangdruk leaders were contacted for recruitment of Khampas into this new unit. An initial strength of 5000 men, mostly Khampas were recruited at its new Mountain Training Facility at Chakrata, Dehradun. The SFF made its home base at Chakrata, 100 km from the city of Dehra Dun. Chakrata was home to the large Tibetan refugee population and was a mountain town in the foothills of the Himalayas. Starting with a force of 12,000 men, the SFF commenced six months of training in rock climbing and guerrilla warfare. The Intelligence agencies from India and the US also helped in raising the force; namely CIA & RAW. The SFF's weapons were all provided by the US and consisted mainly of M-1, M-2 and M-3 machine guns. Heavy weapons were not provided.[2] Established under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister, the unit under the operational command of IB and later R&AW, was designated the Special Frontier Force (SFF), and was primarily used for conducting clandestine intelligence gathering and commando operations along the Chinese Theatre. Initial training was conducted by the CIA paramilitary officers and the IB's own special operations unit. In 1968 SFF, with the help of the Aviation Research Centre which provided airlift facilities, became fully airborne-qualified and a dedicated mountain and jungle warfare unit. During this period, the Indian government also formed the Ladakh Scouts and the Nubra Guards paramilitary force on similar lines. SFF was later incorporated in the Special Services Bureau (SSB) of R&AW. By late 1963, inter-service rivalry led to severe criticism by the Indian Army. To prove that the SFF's worth, the Inspector General sent 120 men from the SFF for a field exercise, codenamed Garuda, with the Army. The exercise proved to be a dramatic success for the SFF and the Army was now less inclined to criticise the force. In 1964, the SFF led by the Inspector General, began its airborne training at Agra. The SFF then began its own airborne training program at Sarsawa airbase near Saharanpur. By the late 1960s, the SFF was organised into six battalions for administrative purposes. Each battalion, consisting of six companies, was commanded by Tibetan who had a rank equivalent to a lieutenant colonel in the Army. A Tibetan major or captain commanded each company, which was the primary unit used in operations. Females also participated in the force and they were in the signal and medical companies. During this time, the SFF was never used against its intended enemy, China. However, the unit did conduct limited cross-border reconnaissance operations, as well as highly classified raids to place sensors in the Himalayas to detect Chinese nuclear and missile tests

The Organization
SFF is headed by the Inspector General (IG) who works under the supervision of Director General of Security, Cabinet Secretariat (this post is held ex-officio by the Secretary,Research and Analysis Wing) (R&AW). The current SFF force levels are around 10,000 men.

Battalions have a strength of around 900, are composed of six companies each company consisting of 123 men. There is also a force of around 700 Gorkhas in the SFF at any given time. Transport is provided by the Indian Air Force's Sarasawa based 117 Helicopter Unit Himalayan Dragons which provides airlift capability with its HAL Dhruvs and Mi-17ShTransport Helicopters. ARC also provides air surveillance facilities through the Chakrata Air Base near SFF HQ.

Training
Most training is still conducted at Chakrata, initial training lasting nine months and is similar to Indian Army training, with extensive additional courses on guerrilla tactics, mountain and jungle warfare. All commandos are parachute qualified after five jumps, with three refresher jumps every year. SFF personnels are trained in four basic areas:

Mountain: Experts in mountain and Arctic warfare, these men are trained to survive and fight in extreme conditions. Mountain troops' skills can be called on anywhere from the Siachen Glacier to the Himalayan ranges in the east. They are also known to have trained in the famed German Alpine Guides course at the Mountain Warfare School at Mittenwald and the High Altitude Warfare School atGulmarg reaching proficiency levels that rival the best climbers in the world. Amphibious: These troop's combat divers are the outfit's amphibious experts. In essence, it provides a comparable amphibious warfare capability to the SFF as the MARCOS provide to the Indian Navy. While they have overlapping mission profiles, the Special Group clearly does not have as extensively maritime roles. There is close cooperation and cross-training between its amphibious troops and the MARCOS and a rivalry exists between them. Air: Air Troop is the Special Group's free-fall parachuting specialists, tasked with jumping behind enemy lines, either on their own missions or to pave the way for other squadron troops. Air Troop also employ less conventional forms of air insertion such as micro-lites and powered parachutes. For HALO/HAHO combat jumps skydivers use square-type RAM parachutes which are more maneuverable also allow for softer, controlled landings than the standard round chutes. Jungle warfare: Jungle operations are considered to be one of the toughest in the world and more men here fall to nature than the enemy. The Special Group's Jungle troopers are the masters in jungle craft. They are skilled at carrying out deep interdiction and search and destroy operations for extended periods of time.

SFF operations
SFF was raised with covert operations in mind, mainly along the Indo-China border, however SFF has been fielded by R&AW and the Indian government in various covert and overt operation theatres.[2]

China In 1964 intelligence reports kept indicating that China was preparing to test a nuclear bomb at its Lop Nor nuclear installation in Xinjiang. On October 16, 1964 China tested a nuclear weapon in Xinjiang. It was expected but not enough details were known. Later in November 1964, the CIA launched a U2 flight out of Aviation Research Centre (ARC)'sCharbatia Air Base in Orissa, but its return turned out to be a bit of a mishap.[7][8] The U2 overshot the runway and got stuck in slushy ground caused by heavy rain in themonsoons. Getting it unstuck and out of India without being noticed by the Indian press, then even much more subject to leftist influences and hence antagonistic to the USA, was another clandestine operation. This gave all concerned quite a scare and it was decided to rely on other technical means.[9] So CIA decided to launch an ELINT operation along with R&AW and ARC to track China's nuclear tests and monitor its missile launches. The operation, in the garb of a mountaineering expedition to Nanda Devi involved celebrated Indian climber M S Kohli who along with operatives of Special Frontier Force and CIA (most notably Jim Rhyne, a veteran STOL pilot), was to place a permanent ELINT device, a transceiver powered by a plutonium battery, that could detect and report data on future nuclear tests carried out by China.[10] The plan to install a snooping device was hatched far away in Washington D.C., in the offices of the National Geographic Society. Barry Bishop, a photographer with the magazine, interested Gen. Curtis LeMay of the US Air Force in the idea. The actual efforts called for to place a permanent electronic intelligence (ELINT) device powered by a nuclear SNAP 19C power pack fuel cell. The first attempt to place this device on the Nanda Devi, by a Kohli-led SFF team under the cover of a mountaineering expedition failed as the team had to retreat in the face of adverse conditions and left the device in a small unmarked mountain cave after having hauled the device to just short of the 25,645 feet peak. When another Kohli-led expedition returned the following year to recover the device, it was found to be missing.[7][11][12] In the meantime the Chinese not only kept testing nuclear weapons at regular intervals but also ballistic missiles. The urgency to gather information was never greater. Another mission was launched in 1967 to place a similar device on the Nanda Kot. This mission was successful but a couple of years later another problem cropped up; snow would pile up over the antenna and render it blind. So Kohli and a SFF team were sent once again to bring it down, this time they retrieved it successfully. In October 1967 the Chinese began testing an ICBM capable of reaching targets 6000 miles away. There was renewed urgency to find out more. So SFF mountaineers went off on one more mission in December 1969 to successfully place a gas powered device on an undisclosed mountain supposedly in Chinese controlled areas. But by the following year, the US had the first generation of the TRW spy satellites in place and did not have to rely on the old ELINT devices.

Indo-Pakistan Military Conflict of 1971 SFF was extremely successful against Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan Military Conflict of 1971. Elements of the force were sent toMizoram in late November 1971. A strong Task Force was deployed and conducted pre-emptive strike operations in support of the Indian army formations along the Chittagong Hill Tracts. 1971 saw the SFF being used in major combat in the Indo-Pak war. Elements of the force were sent to Mizoram in late October. By November 1971, around 3000 SFF members were deployed next to the Chittagong Hill Tracts. With cross-border attacks becoming more frequent, the SFF was then ordered to attack the Chittagong Hill Tracts. For this operation, code-named 'Eagle', the SFF members were given Bulgarian AK-47s and US carbines. This operation saw the first Dapon, Tibetan equivalent of a Brigadier, to command part of the SFF task force. With war right around the corner, the SFF was given several mission plans, including the destruction of the Kaptai Dam and other bridges. The Inspector General urged that the SFF be used to capture Chittagong, but this was found not favourable, since SFF members did not have artillery or airlift support to conduct a mission of that magnitude. After three weeks of border fighting, the SFF divided its six battalions into three columns and moved into East Pakistan on 3 December 1971. After capturing several villages in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the Tibetans were given mortars and recoilless rifles and also two Indian Air Force Mi-4 helicopters. With the Pakistani Lt. General A.A.K. Niazi signing the ceasefire on 17 December, the SFF had lost 56 men and nearly 190 wounded. The SFF was able to block a potential escape route for East Pakistani forces into Burma. They also halted members of Pakistan's 97 Independent Brigade and 2 Commando Battalion in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. For their bravery and courage in battle, 580 SFF members were awarded cash prizes by the Indian Govt. In 1973, the original Inspector General of the SFF was replaced and in 1975 a new rule pertaining to the SFF was issued. This prohibited the SFF from being deployed within 10 km of the Indo-Chinese border. This came about after several incidents in which SFF commandos had crossed the border and conducted unsanctioned cross-border operations. They trained the Bangladeshi underground unit, Mujib Bahini for their secret missions. For the Bangladeshi campaign, designated Operation Mountain Eagle, the SFF members were issued Bulgarian AK-47's and US carbines. SFF conducted several mission, including the destruction of the Kaptai Dam and other bridges. Internal operations SFF was used in combating communal riots in mid 1970s and later was used in Operation Blue Star in 1984. It was also used briefly for VIP security in late 1984 around the Prime Minister following the assassination of Indira Gandhi. Later this role fell upon the Special Protection Group. In 1975 a new rule pertaining to the SFF was issued, this prohibited the SFF from being deployed to within 10 km of the Indo-Chinese border unless under explicit instructions. This came about after several

incidents in which SFF was found to be conducting unsanctioned cross-border raids and intelligence operations. Currently, one SFF battalion is stationed in the Siachen Glacier.

Current roles
With warming of Indo-Chinese relations, SFF has expanded out from covert operations into various other fields like counter-terrorism. The major functions of SFF in the present day scenario are as follows: Counter-terrorism One Squadron is responsible for counter-terrorism duties, with a team in a constant state of alert. The four squadrons rotate through this role on a six-monthly basis. Special Group teams regularly conduct CT operations in troubled Kashmir against militants on specific intelligence inputs. Special Group The Director General (DG) Security, Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) in 1982 dispatched 500 SFF operatives along with over 500 Indian Army special forces to Sarsawa for Counter Terrorist training. It is also thought that the selected troopers thereafter were sent to Israel for highly specialized training. These men formed the nucleus of an ultra-elite and highly classified new detachment, known as the Special Group. It is a volunteer force and persons are inducted only after a very tough probation and selection process. Alone among the 'Vikas regiments' or SFF battalions, it is not made up of Tibetans but exclusively recruits Indians volunteering from Indian Army units. The SFF Special Group's headquarters is supported by an Intelligence and Planning wing, a Training wing and a specialist Signals Troop which is solely responsible for support operations. Having four squadrons each made up of around 100 troopers, which are further divided into four troops. Each troop has a specialized role. The Special Group has a wide range of responsibilities, each requiring specific training and disciplines. Special Group is also the parent unit of elite National Security Guards (NSG). The NSG was raised after SG participated in Operation Bluestar. It was thought that a paramilitary force not under the Ministry of Defence should be used for counter terrorism operations internally. The NSG is thus led by an IPS officer and comes under the Ministry of Home Affairs, even though the commandos who lead operations are themselves from the army. After the formation of NSG, the Special Group is no longer directly involved in hostage rescue and counter terrorism. Intelligence Gathering Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols or Pathfinders must be able to remain hidden in close proximity to the enemy for days or weeks on end. The outfit was trained to do this against the Chinese but actually used the technique to great success in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and the fields of the northern state of Punjab. Combat Air Control

With the emphasis on air power in modern warfare there comes a need for skilled combat air controllers, men on the ground calling in air strikes. There is usually a trooper specially trained to guide in attack aircraft for a strike, verbally or using laser designators. SFF Special Group troopers effectively demonstrated this capability during India's Kargil conflictwith Pakistan in the summer of 1999. Close Protection The Special Group, along with the Special Protection Group (SPG) were the pioneers at close protection (CP) duties in India, having developed many of the protocols themselves, unique to the Indian subcontinent. Nowadays much of the VIP protection is the sole responsibility of the National Security Guards (NSG) and other specialized provincial units. Training Foreign Military Over the years, the Special Group has shared their expertise with a few friendly nations like Maldives and Nepal, training their own special forces.

Special Security Bureau

v.1.0 April 28, 2002 Ravi Rikhye

The Special Security Bureau is often called the Special Services Bureau in the press. For all we know, there might well also be an organization by the later name. The writer welcomes any corrections: part of this is written from memory, which decades later can prove quite faulty. The SSB as first conceived was a stay-behind force in the event of another war with China, then the concept was extended to the Pakistan border. Battalions had a professional cadre of about 30 men, many of them short service commission military officers who had finished their army service. This cadre provided arms training to border-resident locals, usually a platoon at a time, and maintained secret weapons caches, usually company sized. With war impending, these battalions would be activated, the arms caches broken out, some last minute additional training done, and the stay-behind guerilla force was in place. The SSB was quite a joke along the China border. Indians, much like Italians, are anarchic, highly individualistic, and exceptionally resistant to discipline at all levels of society. They excel in resistance by half measure. When threatened they tend to adapt themselves to the threat rather than directly confront it. The notion that after the enemy has overrun the border area these men would metamorphose into guerillas in the mode of the Russian partisans or Viet Cong was as absurd as it was impractical, the lack of real training, proper weapons, and good leadership only compounded the potential problem. The article reproduced below shows how the SSB functioned.

Of course, the SSB had another mission, that of spying on Indian citizens in the border areas. This was intended to keep a watchful eye on border crossers, foreign infiltrators united by ethnicity and kin with locals on the Indian side, troublemakers who could create disaffection and perhaps even rebellion in the border areas. The SSB cadres also served to remind the remote border locals that a central government very much existed, and they messed with it at their risk. To outsiders this mission may seem odd, but even today a quick visit to the mountain areas will show the visitor how isolated the regions were. At one time, the SSB numbered over 100 battalions; by the time the 1971 War was fought, Delhi began to wonder if there was really much point to this organization. Like any other bureaucracy, the SSB had its own life, and continued, even though battalion after battalion was deactivated. No wonder then that after Kargil 1999, when a central government that was considerably more powerful than had been the case in earlier decades, and vastly more efficient, reviewed Indias border security, the government decided to disband the SSB entirely. That is why if you review Indian Budget Demand Number 47, Major Head 2055, under Ministry of Home Affairs Police you will see an allocation of exactly zero for the Fiscal Year 2001-02. But come Fiscal Year 2002-03, the allocation is Rs 342 crores. What happened was simple. The Indo-Nepal border, which had been a neglected backwater for centuries, had been coming slowly live. Disaffected and insurgent groups from both Nepal and India took to hiding across the border when pressed by security forces. The Maoist rebellion in Nepal was building up. None of this mattered much to Delhi: the Indian Government contains unrest in this vast, turbulent land by tolerating a level of opposition that no western country could accept for a minute. But then the Pakistan ISI, seeking to open new fronts against India because of the failure to win in Kashmir, and because the vast ISI bureaucracy could gain even more power and influence this way, started operating along the Indo-Nepal border. Of a sudden, Delhi woke up and decided the Indo-Nepal border had to be manned. Indias 1,590-kilometer long border with Nepal across the states of Uttranchal, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Sikkim is a destabilizing situation for India. The 1950 Indo-Nepal Friendship Treaty does not permit the deployment of Indian paramilitary force to man the border. This provision has become a major irritant since Pakistan uses Nepal as conduit to infiltrate terrorists, and conduct smuggling activities including narcotics. India has furnished details of such activities to Nepalese authorities on several occasions who have shown no inclination to act. There has been a 12-15 percent growth of Muslim population in Nepal thanks to the influx of Muslims from Bihar and Bangladesh. Muslims now comprise 12 percent of the population in the Hindu Kingdom; they run madrassas and other charities, now have members of Parliament who have called for lifting the ban on cow slaughter. This is similar to the situation along the Rajasthan border where there is a marked demographic change, to the extent that even the dress code of the men has changed from the typical Indian turban to blue Sherwanis. There is reason to believe that the Mumbai underworld is active in these communities.

The other problems include incessant Nepalese migration to India in addition to Bangladeshi migrants. Nepalese migration has an impact on the Gorkhaland agitation and is bound to intesify the conflict.. The informal channel of financial flows between Nepal and India is considerable. Source: www.icps.org. It may be recalled that the porous Indo-Nepal border has been a cause of deep concern for New Delhi over the past few years. Reports of cross-border infiltration by the agents of ISI, which is reportedly using Nepal as a launching pad to create disturbances in India, have provoked loud demands for effective patrolling of the border here. The deployment of SSB along the Nepal border is expected to provide a shot in the arm for intelligence agencies, hard pressed for additional resources in light of the mounting threat of trans-border terrorism. Intelligence sources stated that several mafia gangs have set up base in the border towns of Nepal. "With ISI support, they have been carrying on acts of terror inside India, apart from smuggling arms, narcotics and fake Indian currency," an intelligence official added. He recalled that the members of the Tyagi gang, who were nabbed in New Delhi, had in fact moved from the border here with arms in their bid to eliminate tehelka.com journalists. The ISI has of late been trying to spread terrorism inside Indian territory by sponsoring local mafia gangs based near the border, the sources added. As such, the deployment of SSB along the border is being considered crucial. Official sources stated that the deployment of the para-military force will prove beneficial to citizens living in the remote villages along the border. For instance, the medical units attached to the SSB will prove helpful in providing timely medicare in the inaccessible and remote border villages. The Royal Nepal army has been deployed along the border on the other side to curb smuggling activities since last March. With the deployment of SSB on the Indian side of the border, cross-border infiltration of arms and mercenaries, it is being hoped, will be effectively curbed. From The Times of India Under the guiding principle of One Border, One Force developed by the reviewers of the 1999 Kargil fiasco, a new force was required for the Indo-Nepal border, and the SSB logically suggested itself. It was the only force that violated the One Border principle, because it overlapped the Border Security Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, and Assam Rifles. Understandably so, because the SSB was originally conceived as a stay-behind organization, not a permanent border police organization. Instead of disbanding the SSB and absorbing its permanent cadres into other border police organizations, the SSB has been revitalized. It has 32 battalions as far as this writer knows, with a strength of 30,000+. Before the recent transformation of missions, it appeared to have a cadre of 7,000 for the same number of battalions. The SSB has been taking up position along the Indo-Nepal border, a process accelerated by the 2001-02 confrontation with Pakistan. Eight battalions were scheduled for redeployment by January 2002, clearly this can only be a beginning.

Some published information weve collated: Transfers The SSB has left Jammu and Kashmir and is in the process of moving battalions and training centers out of Gujarat, Rajasthan, Himachal, and the Northeast. All three of the battalions in Himachal are moving. The Northeast looks like it had ten battalions, many at full strength, based on state capitals at Itanagar (Arunachal), Shillong (Meghalaya), Imphal (Manipur), and Tezpur (Assam); in view of the security situation, some battalions are likely to remain for some time. Redeployments It appears to us that 15 battalions, and not 8, are either deployed or in the process of doing so. Uttranchal State (a new state carved out of Uttar Pradesh) (250 km border with Nepal) 15 platoon posts in the districts of Pithoragarh, Champawat, and Udham Singh Nagar, 250 km border. The size of the deployment suggests one battalion. Utter Pradesh State (560 km border with Nepal) 4 battalions along the 560 km border with Nepal. Previously protected by 42 posts, each manned by a sub-inspector of police, two head constables, and about 15-18 constables, from the Provincial Armed Constabulary. This is only an initial deployment, more battalions will be sent as needed. Bihar State (753 km boorder with Nepal) Kishanganj District, 5 posts Darbangha District, 63 posts. This suggests 5 battalions

East Champaran District, 27 posts manned by a battalion each at Raxaul and Ghorasaran, 80 km border, manned in July 2001 Sitamarhi District, 31 posts for a 93 km border, 20 personnel each; this suggests two battalions.

The density of posts in Uttranchal State, 1 per 17 km, as opposed to Sitamarhi District in Bihar States, one per 3 km, reflects the level of infiltration and disturbance, as well as the terrain. In Uttranchal there are high mountains, so that only a few passes need to be watched around the clock; in Sitamarhi there is a great deal of insurgent activity and trans border passage is easier. Article The article below has all the earmarks of a leak, done to discredit the SSB and add momentum to its disbandment. The possible culprit would be a senior police officer, for various purposes we can only speculate on. Unfortunately, we have lost the publication reference. August 26, 1999

Report exposes para force that costs country Rs 300 cr a year Swati Chaturvedi NEW DELHI, Aug 25: The Special Service Bureau (SSB) is the fourth largest para-military force in the country with an annual budget of Rs 300 crore. But for the past 29 years, the SSB has not conducted a single joint exercise with the Army -- as it was supposed to do as per its charter -- and several trained volunteers of the SSB have joined the ranks of militants in the North-East. These are some findings of a secret report which has examined the role of the 33,000-strong force. The report comes after two years of investigation by a review panel nominated by the Cabinet Committee on Security Affairs (CCSA). It comprises K Padmanabhaiah, former home secretary, A S Syali, former director general of security and K K Mitra, former principal director, directorate general of security. The report is currently being examined by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee after which it will be placed before the CCSA. The CCSA will take a decision on the SSB review. The SSB was set up in 1963 in the wake of the Chinese aggression in 1962. According to its charter, it was to generate a sense of national belonging and to prepare the border population for a ``stay-behind'' role in the event of a war, to organise resistance by activating guerrilla bands, to collect intelligence on enemy movement and to prevent infiltration, sabotage and subversion. It was also meant to perform guard duties and provide security cover to sister organizations such as the Intelligence Bureau (IB), Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and Aviation Research Center (ARC). The secret report recommends that the SSB be wound up in southern areas of Himachal Pradesh such as Kangra, Shimla and Mandi as well as Pauri in Uttar Pradesh since these are ``quite far from the international borders''. Initially, the SSB started functioning in Arunachal Pradesh, North Assam and Ladakh. It was extended to Manipur and Tripura in 1965 and some areas of Rajasthan and Gujarat in 1985. Now the SSB covers 15 states and has ten divisions. The report has observed that ``the real wartime role of the SSB has not been rehearsed for the past decade and more''. It reveals that operational groups and the guerrilla bands have not been formed and no tactical exercises held in several sensitive border states such as West Bengal, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Jammu & Kashmir (Rajouri and Poonch), Assam (north), Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram. The committee discovered that while the SSB has claimed to have trained 900 guerrilla bands all over the country, only 453 groups exist. And they only meet and take part in exercises once a year. While the SSB has claimed to have trained 2.6 lakh men and women, the report wonders if they can actually be mobilised. [2.6 lakh is 260,000. Editor] The SSB has spent 90 per cent of its budget on salaries, the review committee says. A Cabinet direction in 1986 had asked the SSB to pay more attention to development, motivational and welfare activities.

As far as intelligence gathering is concerned, investigations by the committee reveal that they are mainly performed at the level of constables in the SSB. [The implication is that the intelligence is very low-level. Editor] The report points out that though the large combatant elements of the SSB resemble a para-military force, they ``neither enjoy any police powers nor has the SSB been declared an armed force of the Union''. The SSB ``units have never been deployed in actual law and order or counter-insurgency operations, therefore the combat ability of the SSB has never been tested.'' NEPAL CIA Factbook 2001 To the extreme west of Nepal lies Uttranchal State. Along the southern border with India, Uttar Pradesh is to the left and Bihar to the right. On the extreme east lie Indias West Bengal State and then Sikkim State. We have not heard anything yet about SSB deployments to West Bengal, though these are sure to be taking place. Some nominal deployment, perhaps a battalion, will be needed in Sikkim, though the terrain here is very rough.

Directorate of Air Intelligence (India)

The Directorate of Air Intelligence is the intelligence arm of the Indian Air Force. Air Force intelligence responsibilities include imagery intelligence collection MiG-25R and Jaguarreconnaissance aircraft. During the 1971 war with Pakistan, Russian satellite imagery provided India with information on Chinese force deployments. And with advances in the Indian space program, the Indian Air Force will be acquiring independent space-based imagery intelligence capabilities.