Analytical Buddhism The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self Miri Albahari (First published 2006 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke,

Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010) Contents Abbreviations from the Sutta Pitaka of the Pali Canon ix Preface x Introduction: The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self 1 1 Some Central Distinctions and the Four Noble Truths 6 (1) Subject and object 6 1.1 Subject 7 1.2 Object 10 (2) Distinguishing self from sense of self 16 2.1 What is the difference between self and, sense of self? 16 2.2 What is meant by sense in sense of self? 18 2.3 The Buddhist perspective on the sense of self 21 (3) Defining person 21 (4) The essence of Buddhist teaching: The Four Noble Truths 22 2 Nibbana 31 Introduction 31 (1) Unconditioned nibbana is real 34 (2) Unconditioned nibbana is experienced directly by the mind of the Arahant 35 (3) The mind of the Arahant is (intrinsically) luminous, involving percipience and witnessing 36 (4) The intrinsic mind of the Arahant is identical to unconditioned nibbana 36 (5) By indiscernability of identicals, what is true of unconditioned nibbana is true of the Arahants mind and vice versa 40 5.1 Unconditioned by quality 40 5.2 Unconditioned by space 42 5.3 Unconditioned by time 42 5.4 Unconditioned by relation 45 (6) Nibbanic consciousness and the khandhas 45 6.1 The Arahant with proximate nibbanic consciousness 46 6.2 Pre-nibbanic consciousness of the ordinary person 48 3 The Definition and Status of Self in Buddhism 50 Introduction 50 (1) Defining the self in Buddhism 51 1.1 Ownership and identification as reciprocal assumptions of self 51 1.2 Identification and the self 56 1.3 Personal ownership, the self and identification 60 1.4 The sense of self (through reciprocal senses of personal ownership and self-identification) co-arises with tan.ha 61 1.5 Further features Buddhism ascribes to the reflexively assumed self 63 1.6 What nibbanic consciousness could bring to the sense of self 69

1.7 The definition and status of self in Buddhism 73 (2) The misportrayal of Buddhism as endorsing a bundle theory of persons 75 Conclusion 79 4 The Reflexively Assumed Self 81 (1) An EastWest convergence on the description of self 81 1.1 Roles ascribed reflexively to the self 87 1.2 Attributes ascribed reflexively to the self 87 (2) Role: Knower/observer/witness; Attribute: Mental/aware/conscious 88 (3) Roles: Owner, agent, thinker, seeker of happiness; Attribute: Bounded 90 3.1 Identification as general evidence for boundedness 92 3.2 Four common modes of assumed self-identity: This-ness, autonomy, consistent self-concern and personal ownership 94 3.3 Integrating modes of identification into an overall conception of personality 105 3.4 Identification, ownership, boundedness and tan. ha 107 (4) Attribute: Elusiveness 110 (5) Attribute: Unity (singularity) 111 (6) Attributes: Unbrokenness and invariability 113 6.1 Unbrokenness 113 6.2 Invariability 117 (7) Attribute: Unconstructedness 118 Conclusion 120 5 How Do We Construe The Self Lacks Reality? 121 Introduction 121 (1) What does it mean to deny reality to the self? 121 1.1 What is an illusion? 122 1.2 The self as construct and illusion 126 1.3 An intersection of agreement for those who deny reality to the self 130 (2) Western thinkers who deny reality to the self 132 (3) Buddhist and the Western accounts of no-self: Summarising the similarity and differences 138 Conclusion 139 6 Linking Problems of Consciousness with Awareness 140 Introduction 140 (1) Awareness as a concept of consciousness 142 1.1 More on the modus operandi of witnessing 142 1.2 The intrinsic phenomenal character of awareness 143 (2) Linking problems of consciousness with awareness 145 2.1 Elusiveness 146 2.2 The synchronic unity of consciousness 151 2.3 Unbroken and invariable unity 155 2.4 Unconstructedness 158 (3) Awareness as central to phenomenal consciousness 159 (4) Why boundedness is not implied by awareness 160 Conclusion 161 7 The Unconstructed Reality of Awareness 162 Introduction 162 (1) The central argument (2) The spectre of eliminative materialism 165 (3) The object-knowledge thesis 167 8 How the Self Could Be a Construct 170

Introduction 170 (1) Revisiting evidence that awareness purports to be a bounded self 171 (2) Is the bounded self a construct? 172 2.1 Can awareness exist without sense of bounded self? 172 2.2 The next steps to arguing that the self is a construct 177 2.3 The shortfalls of Damasios theory 188 2.4 Identification revisited in light of self as illusion 189 2.5 Integrating concept of identification with Damasios analysis to yield the two-tiered illusion of self 191 9 The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self 193 (1) A schema for the two-tiered illusion of self 193 (2) Witnessing presence 196 (3) Unity 197 (4) Elusiveness 199 (5) Unbrokenness 200 (6) Invariability 202 (7) Summary 205 Conclusion 205 Glimpses Beyond 206 Notes 211 Bibliography 220 Index 228