The SAGE Handbook of Power

Power to and Power over

Contributors: Gerhard Ghler Editors: Stewart R. Clegg & Mark Haugaard Book Title: The SAGE Handbook of Power Chapter Title: "Power to and Power over" Pub. Date: 2009 Access Date: October 14, 2013 Publishing Company: SAGE Publications Ltd City: London Print ISBN: 9781412934008 Online ISBN: 9780857021014 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9780857021014.n1 Print pages: 27-40 This PDF has been generated from SAGE knowledge. Please note that the pagination of the online version will vary from the pagination of the print book.

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http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9780857021014.n1 [p. 27 ]

Chapter 1: Power to and Power over

The distinction of power to and power over has featured prominently in the discussion of power inthe last few decades. This may seem surprising, since bothpower to and power over appear to be simple phrases, the term power merely extended by two prepositions. After all, Hanna Pitkin coined both terms almost by chance in 1972, but it soon became clear that they express a fundamental distinction in our understanding of power, with the result that the distinction between power over and power to has been no less than groundbreaking in the years since. Power, then, is either a property or actually exercised. Why has this distinction proved to be so successful? There appear to be two reasons. The first is that experiences of power are particularly complex. Among the concepts that describe fundamental social phenomena, the concept of power seems to be one of the most unclear and controversial. There have been countless endeavors to define power more precisely and conclusively, all of their results remain as unsatisfactory as ever (Morriss 1987: 1). Initially this sounds surprising, since we think of power as distinctly experienceable and identifiable in everyday life. However, the academic discussion of power can demonstrate that this impression is misleading, since a more penetrating analysis is consistently able to discover new characteristics of power. The work since the 1980s has contributed greatly to this, which is the second reason for the increasing use of power to and power over. The complexity of power, which has, in any case, long been acknowledged in the discussion of power, became a main focus of social science's discussion of power in the 1980s. In the 1960s and 70s the concern was still to broaden empirical research on dimensions of power over that had hitherto escaped immediate perception. Thus, new faces of power were discovered (Bachrach/Baratz 1977, Lukes 1974 and 2005) as part of an endeavor to tighten the elements of critique against an affirmative understanding of power. Since the 1980s things have become less straightforward. The discussion about power has widened and become even more complex. Manifold,
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formerly unconsidered aspects have been introduced, new perspectives opened. More often than stemming from [p. 28 ] professional empirical analysis, these were byproducts of broader social theories: Talcott Parson's structural functionalism, Hannah Arendt's description of the conditio humana, Michel Foucault's discourse analysis, Pierre Bourdieu's exposition of the concepts of capital and hegemony as put forward byWestern Marxism, Niklas Luhmann's subtle system theoretical modeling. All in all, it seems, the new elements in the discussion of power in the 1980s and 90s have brought about a muddled situation that is hard to disentangle. It becomes increasingly difficult to incorporate the different approaches of analysis into a comprehensive concept or a common definition of power. Consequently, it becomes more difficult to give a systematic overview of the current ideas of power.
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In this situation, it proves to be extraordinarily helpful to distinguish power to and power over as the two fundamental dimensions of power. This differentiation having become prominent in the last 20 years allows to better place different approaches to the current discussion of power, and to grasp the coherence of the concept despite its multifold aspects. Therefore, I will take the distinction between power to and power over as a starting point for structuring the newer concepts of power, and I will explore this direction as far as possible. It has to be acknowledged, however, that in some respects even the distinction between power to and power over is not unproblematic and needs further clarification. As will be seen, the power to and power over framework does not always bring clarity to the multiple ramifications of contemporary understanding of power and recent discussions often progress beyond the initially illuminating distinction between power to and power over. Therefore, in my final analysis, I will argue in favor of restructuring the concept of power in a way that goes beyond power to and power over. I propose to use the distinction between transitive and intransitive power for further differentiations. The analytic value of this elaboration can be illustrated using the classic opposition of Max Weber's and Hannah Arendt's concepts of power. Seen as transitive and intransitive power, they turn out to be complementary to each other and refer to an integrative concept of power.
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The Power to and Power over Distinction and its Limits

The distinction of the two concepts was introduced by Hanna Pitkin, who formulated it for political science in a study on Wittgenstein and justice:
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One may have power over another or others, and that sort of power is indeed relational () But he may have power to do or accomplish something all by himself, and that power is not relational at all; it may involve other people if what he has power to do is a social or political action, but it need not. (Pitkin 1972: 277) Power over means power over other people, enforcement of one's own intentions over those of others, and is thus only conceivable in a social relation. Power to, on the other hand, is not relatedto other people. Itis an ability to do or achieve something independent of others. It is not a social relation. This distinction corresponds to a different normative judgment of power. Exercising power over within a social relation always produces a negative result for those subjected to it, because it narrows their field of action. This is the case regardless of the possibly noble intentions or positive outcomes of the exercise of power. A's autonomy within a power relationship necessarily means correspondingly less power for B. Power to, on the other hand, is generally considered favorably. The reason for this is that power to is [p. 29 ] not directed at others, but at the individual or the group as actors themselves. The focus is not on the effects of power on others, those subjected to it, but on power as the ability to act autonomously. In this sense, power is constitutive for society. Pitkin's conceptual distinction is the starting point for further differentiation which has become definitive for the contemporary discussion of power. Even when power over and power to are not explicitly mentioned as terms, contemporary accounts of power typically no longer define it merely as a social relation which one may or may not view critically. It is also seen as a precondition for communal life, in which individuals may then be constituted as such. Acommon expression of this point of view is the idea of the productivityof power. Power to produces the social relations through which
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power acts and in which the individual is thus also produced. For those concerned, the results of this are contradictory. On the one hand, power to creates autonomy while, on the other, power over limits the field of action. Modern concepts of power can be placed on either one side or the other, but there are cases in which both aspects can be united. Then ambiguities emerge which are hard to reconcile in everyday speech. Foucault demonstrates this using the word sujet(subject): There are two meanings of the word subject: subject to someone else by control or dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge (Foucault 1982: 212). Hence, power operates as power over and power to; it is repressive and productive at the same time. In the following, we will see how far the contemporary discussion of power can be structured according to the terms power over and power to, and where the distinction is not adequate.

Power over
Power over covers all concepts of power which in keeping with the everyday use of the term define having power as prevailing over others. Power over is subjective when imposing one's will, interests or preferences, or objective when carrying out inherent necessities or given norms. Here, the self-referential definition of power to is either silently implied or explicitly excluded (Wartenberg 1990). A classic power over analysis is the debate on faces or dimensions of power, which took place in the 1960s and 1970s. Its starting point is Robert A. Dahl's empirical study on actually exercised power. He aims to show that American society is not ruled by elites but that it is pluralist despite the criticism suggesting otherwise (Dahl 1961, 1968). This point of view is questioned by Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz on the basis that Dahl only addresses the openly exposed face of power. Bachrach and Baratz present an additional, second dimension of power, the dimension of non-decisions which can have tremendous consequences just because they are not apparent. Non-decisions are provisions which ensure that some issues do not even make it onto the agenda. In this respect, American society is indeed ruled by elites and not at all pluralist (Bachrach and Baratz 1970). Steven Lukes adds a third dimension: power is not only the suppression of subjective, but also of objective interests interests that those subjected to power are not aware of, but would

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pursue if they knew that they corresponded with their objective situation (Lukes 1974, 2005). The debate can by now be considered to have ended (Ball 1988; Clegg 1989). It developed mainly in the context of left-wing, essentially Marxist social critique, which could not be continued without strain in the 1990s in the face of increased awareness of the oppressive practices of Eastern bureaucracies in the name of socialism. (Phillips 1991: 12) [p. 30 ] Still unconcluded is the question of who exercises power over: agency or structure? Also, what is the status of power to and power over in the feminist discussion of power? Agency or structure: From the actor's perspective, power relationships are mainly oriented toward acting persons or collective actors (agency). From the perspective of the system, they are mainly impersonal mechanisms (structure). Both perspectives address very different aspects, and it would make little sense to reduce them to the same thing. Thus, both perspectives will continue to exist alongside each other. This remains certain, despite mediations. Since Gidden's theory of structuration at the latest, it can be argued that agency and structure must be seen as complementary. Structuration means that society is the product of a reciprocal process: Human agency produces structures which simultaneously serve as the conditions for reproduction of human agency in a continuing process (Clegg 1989). For instance, the feminist discussion of power sees agency and structure together from the beginning. The power women are submitted to the subjection of women as the conditions for reproduction of human agency in a continuing process. (Clegg 1989: 139) Power is exercised in two ways. Actors limit the field of action of others. If they are continually successful in doing this, existing structures are either reinforced or changed. At the same time, these structures purport all personal exercise of power within one field of action. Therefore, the feminist discussion of power sees agency and structure together from the beginning. The power women are submitted to the subjection of women (John Stuart Mill) relates to actions as well as to structures: it is both the direct suppression of women by men and the overpowering of women by the structural asymmetry of the sexes which results from patriarchy and is often also internalized by women themselves. Undoubtedly power affects women through discrimination on the basis
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of sex, which must be abolished either by establishing equality between the sexes (equality feminism) or by acknowledging the intrinsic value of womanhood (difference feminism). The starting point of these analyses is power as power over, but the feminist discussion of power does not stop there. It includes power as power to (see below) or destroys sometimes in connection with power to the basis of the simple idea of power over in relations between the sexes. This inevitably leads to difficulties. Anyone who wants to measure the exercise of power must establish who exercises it and who endures it. From the feminist perspective, this signifies a clear identification of sexes; but this premise has been questioned by postmodern, post-structuralist approaches since the 1980s. Sexes are mostly culturally conditioned and socially constructed. Sex consists of (biological) sex and (social) gender, and even this differentiation is questionable (Butler 1993). Nothing solid, substantial remains. Because of this, power can no longer simply be seen as power over, no matter whether it results from male actions or structures. It is no longer enough to insist on a fundamental and universal difference between those exercising power and those submitted to it, as does point-of-view feminism (Dunker 1996). Critics of this development fear that the feminist concept of power may lose its bite, with violence and dominance becoming diffuse (Holland-Cunz 1998) and the previously welldefined subject disappearing rather than resisting (Benhabib 1996). Nancy Hartsock (1990), analyzing this from a Marxist position, argues similarly: within the manifold relations of power, one loses sight of the real suppression of the acting subject. Emphasizing the social construction of gender differences, searching for new feminist strategies which draw less on the common experience of oppression than on a diversity of [p. 31 ] coalitions (Mouffe 1998, 2000) all this has made locating power over in gender relations increasingly difficult (Butler 1993).

Power to
The analysis of power relations described as power over presupposes that at least one of the parties is able to execute more power than the others. Here, power is a precondition: it first has to exist before it can be exercised; but it is really power if it is
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not exercised over others? Obviously, power is not only the realization of options to act; it is these options. Therefore, it is useful to not only analyze the effects of power on others but also as a property or ability. This is the aspect of power to. In analyses that relate to power to, power to either precedes power over and defines the preconditions for power relations (Dowding 1996; Morriss 1987), or it is not considered simply as a precondition but as a form of power in itself, a fundamental aspect of social relations. As far as the preconditions for exercising power are concerned, power is primarily a disposition: it is a capacity as opposed to exercised power; while it remains unexercised it is latent, still invisible, and only potential, not actual (Wrong 1979; Morriss 1987; Dowding 1996). In essence, all these descriptions of power to are similar, even though they appear with different connotations within the discussion. When power is considered as a disposition, it is also latent and only potential. Concepts that deal primarily with power to reject a hasty analysis of power relations along the lines of power over (Morriss 1987). There is indeed a problem in so far as a simple examination of the effects of power remains too superficial to recognize the real underlying social and political connections. On the other hand it is argued that empirical research on power can only be conducted by examining its effects, and that the analysis of power to therefore has a merely heuristic value (Wartenberg 1990; Dowding 1996). One wonders whether the discussion could not be ended by the simple suggestion that both aspects of power belong together. Power over can only be effective if it also exists as a potential on the other hand, the mere potential of power remains undefined and therefore nonexistent unless it is realized and becomes visible in social relations. In this context, power to is generally analyzed in terms of the resources needed to make power relations effective, and power over is analyzed in terms of the effects of power capacities on social relations. It makes sense, nevertheless, not to approach power analysis via this symmetrical question, but first to pursue the aspect of power to alone. The starting point is the observation that power is not always a zero-sum game as supposed in all concepts of power over. In a zero-sum game, the purpose of exercising power is to strengthen one's own position and to diminish the power of the addressee. However, this idea is not adequate for analyzing power processes in which both sides may gain. The transition from a concept of power as a zero-sum game to a concept of power as productive for all participants is most clearly demonstrated by Talcott Parsons
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and Niklas Luhmann: in relationships of reciprocal interaction, power engages with counterpower in such a way that the power of A is strengthened by the power of B and vice-versa. The increases in power on both sides of the relationship are mutually dependent on one another (see Ghler 2000: 45). For Parsons (1963), power, like money, is a circulating [p. 32 ] medium by which obligations are exchanged within the political system. It is in this way that the possibility of common action is created and increased: power is the generalized medium of mobilizing resources for effective collective action (Parsons 1963: 108, cf. Clegg et al. 2006: 1917). For Luhmann, power is a symbolically generalized medium of communication. Via the medium of power, credit is given and performance is expected: the high performance expected of leaders by those being governed demands an investment in the form of increased support. The result is a joint increase in power. (Luhmann 1975, 2000; cf. Clegg et al. 2006: 2013). Finally, the transition to productive power is given a radically normative twist by Hannah Arendt. She defines power exclusively as people speaking and acting in concert (Arendt 1970: 44) meaning fundamentally that the public and political sphere exists and people are constituted as individuals only by speaking and acting in human society (Arendt 1958, 1970). Thus, Arendt takes an extreme position by explicitly limiting her definition to power to and rejecting power over as violence, that is to say the opposite. Power is a purely self-referential relation, not referring to one individual, but to a group and therefore to a community of individuals. Since human cohabitation and politics are produced by power, it is not only a potential but exactly the opposite: realized power through communication. Power isnot onlya capacity but also empowerment, people gaining the abilityofautonomous action. Here, making a difference between potential and actual power is meaningless. The normative approach is the decisive antipole to our basic understanding of power over in the everyday sense of the words. At the same time, it radically questions the common differentiation of the two terms. If it is even the slightest bit convincing, the seemingly helpful concept of power over and power to becomes obsolete.
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Power to and Power over

At this stage it seems that only two alternatives remain. The first alternative is to combine power over and power to. Indeed, there are concepts of power where the differentiation of power over and power to does not hold water, because they cover both aspects or at least it is not conclusive which side they are on. The second alternative is more far-reaching. In light of all the difficulties in distinguishing power over and power to, might it not be necessary to replace the power over/power to concept with something new to avoid these difficulties? In the following section we will look at the first alternative. Concepts of power in which the differentiation of power over and power to does not work have an ambiguous understanding of power to either as a capacity (1) or as empowerment (2). (1) The theories of international relations usually distinguish four approaches: realism, institutionalism, liberalism, and constructivism (e. g. Schimmelfennig 1998). Realist approaches focus on states as the main actors within the international system; institutionalist approaches on international centers of power in the form of organizations (the UN, the World Bank) or regimes (GATT, WTO); liberal approaches point to the domestic system as determining the behavior of a state within the international arena; and constructivist approaches to the structuring of the international system through ideas and norms. What does this mean for a theory of power? Realist, institutionalist and liberal approaches discuss whether power should be viewed as a capacity or a social relation (Baldwin 2002). Any capacity [p. 33 ] obviously becomes effective only in a relation between actors at the point where resources are unevenly distributed, so that threats suffice (see Morgenthau 1948). Here, institutionalist and liberal approaches look not only at actors, but are also interested in structures. For constructivist approaches the connection between agency and structure is central because ideas and norms are structural factors influencing actors' behavior. At the same time, actors are able to change guiding ideas and regulating norms within the international system it is not a one-sided dependency (Guzzini 1993, Wendt 1999). In this co-dependent relation, power to would be attributed to the structures, power over to the actors structures set the framework within which actors actually exercise power. But if this relation is generally open and interchangeable, it seems to make very little
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sense to preserve the differentiation of power over and power to. On the contrary, it almost seems consistent that the theories of international relations should take very little notice of the differentiation at all. (2) But power can bedefined not only as acapacity but also as empowerment, as gaining and retaining autonomous power to act. Theories that use power to in the sense of empowerment occasionally distinguish power over and power to but they see the two concepts as complementary to each other. Constructivist approaches within the theories of international relations already contain the idea of power as empowerment because ideas and norms not only structure actions, but also give them their initial power to act (Barnett and Duvall 2005). In the contemporary discussion of power in the social sciences, this aspect has gained in importance, especially in the theories of Foucault and Bourdieu, who call it productive power. Individuals are constituted as autonomous individuals only in the sense that they are subjects, i. e. subjected to social power relationships. In this case, then, power over and power to must be distinguished and preserved at the same time. Foucault and Bourdieu both view power critically as a means of domination, as power over. Foucault considers power a multiplicity of force relations (Foucault 1990: 92), in which the individual is entrapped not so much by repression as by the structures of discourse and social practices, which pervade him or her to the innermost. Bourdieu discusses structures of capital and emphasizes symbolic capital. Prevailing symbol systems are the dominating form of expression in every society. Accordingly, individuals are located within the social system of power by their form of expression, their habitus. This is also the individuals' own perspective of perception, so they accept the symbolically cemented power relations as legitimate, even if they are disadvantageously positioned within the social system by them (Bourdieu 1977, 1987). Power relations of this sort are constitutive for both societies and individuals. Foucault considers the fact that power pervades the body of the individual as a precondition for the constituting of subjects as individuals. They internalize the norms of social discourse and practice, but because of the tensions emerging in the process, they are also able to realize their individuality and develop potential for resistance against ruling social force relations. Bourdieu is more cautious in this respect; all the same, the individual can enhance his or her status and enlightened by intellectuals penetrate relations of dominance and fight them in symbolic struggles.

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Feminist concepts of power often refer to Foucault and Hannah Arendt with the aim of connecting power over and power to. Thus, Judith Butler interprets Foucault's concept of power in such a way as to allow norms of mutual acceptance between individuals to develop within force relations. All-pervading power affects the body in its self-preservation and its desires. Under these conditions, how can a form of individuality develop which depends [p. 34 ] on mutual acceptance? Power is the medium. It orchestrates [] the way in which we affectively reassure ourselves of our identity or give it up (Butler 1993: 66). Amy Allen referring to Foucault, Arendt and Butler explicitly takes up the problem of the distinction of power over and power to for the feminist discussion of power and attempts to resolve it by introducing a third dimension: power with (Allen 1999). She takes power over as the ability to limit other people's opportunities for choice; power to as the individual ability to achieve a goal or resist; power with as the ability to act jointly and in solidarity. In this way, she attempts to link Foucault and Arendt from a feminist perspective. In comparison with power over and power to, however, power with is a far more normative category, since joint actions of solidarity may well be urgently desired, but cannot be empirically presupposed to exist. Hence, the difficulties in distinguishing power over and power to remain, while power with begins at a whole different level. Amy Allen has worked through the contemporary discussion of power intensively and moved it on with impressive consistency. Nonetheless, simply adding another dimension leaves too many questions unanswered to restructure the concept of power in a useful way. A more fundamental approach is necessary.

Restructuring the Concept of Power: Transitive and Intransitive Power

In relation to Hanna Pitkin's distinction of power over and power to, how can the ability of an individual or a collective actor be considered effective at all without referring to the realization of power in a social relation? It seems clear that power over and power to cannot easily be separated. Nevertheless, there is evidence that - in a very different way -power over and power to must not necessarily be connected. Military strength is a form of power that must not necessarily be exercised in order to influence others'

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behavior and reach one's goals. Here, power is - in the sense of power to - the ability to accomplish something, but power is not only about its effect on others. As Hannah Arendt has shown, a group's power to act can only be won through its power over itself, and here, power to as a group's self-reference exists before its influence on the outside. So in addition to the difficulty in distinguishing power over and power to, the latter is ambiguous in itself. As we have seen already in the previous section, power to means In the first case, power to is potential. The possible effects of capacity can, of course, only be assessed when it is actualized, but when there is adequate experience, it does not need to be actualized to be effective (see military strength again); the threat suffices - and appears even more intense (Luhmann 1975). Power, then, is latent; it creates its effects without acting. The threat has to be visible to its addressee - possibly through earlier experiences -but is not actualized again to further influence actions (compare Bachrach and Baratz's non-decisions). In the second case, power to is actual. When speaking of empowerment, the power of an individual or a group is either existent or not. If existing, it is always actual; if potential, [p. 35 ] it is not. Autonomous power to act always has to be actualized to exist: through renewed integration of citizens (Smend 1928) or through the continuous communication of everyone concerned (Arendt 1958, 1970). It does not exist without being permanently actualized. But, power over, too, is ambiguous in this sense: Firstly, power over signifies a social relation in which one actor prevails over another. This relation is a manifest influence, i. e. an observable social event; actual and related to an addressee with a relationship of wills. But power over can also be self-referential and potential. This is the case when a society binds itself by obligating itself in a constitution not to substantially change certain inalienable rights of the individual or fundamental norms of the social system (how ever disputed they might be in a given case), and to tie important decisions to the consent of a substantial majority. The effect is potential, because it is only questioned in case of violation; at the same time, it influences the behavior of everyone within that society. They orient themselves in a certain way out of conviction or to avoid sanctions (Elster 1983). Both power over and power to mean different things, depending on their potentiality or actuality and on whether their point of reference is inside the group (self-reference) or outside:
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Potential Reference to the outside Self-reference power to capacity power over self-binding

Actual power over influence power to empowerment

So one can explain why the two dimensions of power over and power to are so hard to distinguish, even though they are intuitively illuminating. What they mean is in both cases ambiguous and mutually entwined. In view of these results, I propose structuring the concept of power differently (Ghler 1997, 2000). Power referring to the outside is transitive power, i. e. power which translates the will of an actor into another actor's will and thereby exercises influence. Power referring to the inside, i. e. power as self-reference, is intransitive power, i. e. power that is produced and preserved by itself, by society. Both transitive and intransitive power can be actual and potential: Potential Actual

Transitive power: reference influence to the outside Intransitive power: selfreference empowerment

Both tables do not differ concerning the contents, but using the differentiation of transitive and intransitive power, the two basic aspects of power potential and actual can be clearly distinguished. The intuition of the differentiation between power to and power over is maintained but its ambiguity banned. If the categories power over and power to are transferred to the categories transitive and intransitive power, all characteristics of power introduced by the distinction of power over and power to can be upheld. At the same time despite the similarities, distinguishing transitive and intransitive power solves some of the [p. 36 ] analytical difficulties the discussion of power has been faced with since the introduction of power to and power over.

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Conclusion: Max Weber, Hannah Arendt and the Idea of an Integrative Concept of Power
The starting points of the distinction of transitive and intransitive power are the two classic theories of Max Weber and Hannah Arendt, which seem almost incompatible. Max Weber sees power as being transitive, while Hannah Arendt understands it to be intransitive. Max Weber understands power as enforcing one's own will within a social relation, which can also be done by using violence: Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests. (Weber 1978: 53) Exerting an influence over others is a widespread understanding of power within the social sciences. But Weber only speaks of a probability or a chance. Power for Weber is potential, a capacity, which hastobetranslated into actual influence. HannahArendtonthe other hand understands power as communicating with one another and acting in concert(Arendt 1970: 44). Power for her is the opposite of violence. Here, power is a relation people produce by acting and communicating together; it is not primarily directed on others. Were it only potential, it would not matter. The relation is only power when it is public; power is empowerment when realized. Both with Max Weber and with HannahArendt it would be too short sighted to only speak of power over (Max Weber) or of power to (Hannah Arendt). With Max Weber, power is capacity as well as influence, with Hannah Arendt power is self-binding as well as empowerment. Thus, Max Weber's concept of power is not only power over but it is transitive, while Hannah Arendt's concept is not only power to but it is intransitive. At the same time, both concepts are complementary. In this way, they are both starting points for an integrative concept of power covering both its transitive and intransitive dimensions. Power is the medium in social relations tostructure fields of action. When power emerges or is exercised, certain options to act are opened up or closed off to the parties involved. More precisely: there are significant disadvantages to be expected when disregarding opened up options to act or pursuing closed off options, or there are significant advantages to be expected when pursuing
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opened up options to act or disregarding closed off options. Even though it appears that other media, like money or love, might also structure the involved parties' options to act in other ways, at a closer look, the structuring medium is always power. If money is not only about earning and love not only about affection, but when they structure the participant's fields of action, it is the power of money or the power of love affecting this. Power can structure fields of action in a dual way, transitively or intransitively. In the transitive sense, power means that actor A influences actor B with the intention to open up or close off specific options to act to him or her. This can be done potentially by capacity or actually by influence. More difficult to understand is that intransitive power can also structure the fields of action of actors involved, especially and not least according to the understanding of power of Hannah Arendt. While transitive power interlocks the fields of action of the parties involved in social relations by executing influence, intransitive power creates a common field of action in the first place by speaking and acting in concert (further Ghler 2000: 489). By way of communication, a [p. 37 ] community is not only created, but structured because it opens up certain options to act and closes off others. It is the trademark of common action or a common basis for individual action that the options to act are not arbitrary but oriented toward a community or at least framed by common values. Who complies with them is included into the community, who does not is excluded. There are certainly other approaches than the normative concept of power by Hannah Arendt, which help to understand the intransitive dimension of power. Foucault can also help us comprehend how common power as a medium can generate structure (Ghler 2000: 46). But the opposition of Hannah Arendt and Max Weber illustrates especially well how transitive and intransitive power work, how they do not exclude each other, but how they are complementary. Altogether, they thereby open up the perspective on an integrative concept of power, even if each concept taken by itself may not suffice to incorporate all the differentiations of the contemporary discussion of power.
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Notes
1 As Haugaard notes, There is no single essence that defines the concept but there are a number of overlapping characteristics, as in a large family, which define membership.
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Each theory has local usage which makes sense for that theory but is not entirely applicable in a different context. (Haugaard and Lentner 2006: 9). 2 Recent overviews of the different concepts of power are given by Lukes (1986), Clegg (1989), Imbusch and Leutner (1998), Haugaard (1999, 2002, 2003), Scott (2001) and Clegg et al. (2006, see footnote 3). 3 Similarly, Clegg et al. (2006: 190227) present power to and power over as two major theoretical auspices for the social theory (190). They facilitate new insights in the understanding of power even if in the last analysis they cannotbe separated. Power will always consist in a complex contingent tension between a capacity toextend freedom of some to achieve something and an ability to restrict the freedoms of others in doing something or other. (191) 4 Pitkin hereby refers to the late Wittgenstein, to use the ordinary-language philosophy for the understanding of power: A Wittgensteinian approach will suggest that we begin by asking not what power is, but how the word power is used. (Pitkin 1972: 276) 5 In this context, Barnes, with Parsons, develops a concept of social power connected to the cognitive order of a society: Social power is the added capacity of action that accrues to individuals through their constituting a distribution of knowledge and thereby a society. (Barnes 1988: 57) 6 Here, Haugaard (Haugaard and Lentner 2006: 10) position Giddens, Morris, Foucault and himself. Presupposing that the understanding of power to is consensual, while that of power over is conflictual (Haugaard 2002: 4), he understands social reality as a system of meanings always constructed from confirming-structuration where power to capacitates action, and from destructuration where power over creates new hierarchies (Haugaard and Lentner 2006: 504, cf. Haugaard 1997, 2002). Gramsci's, Laclau's and Mouffe's concept of hegemony fulfils exactly these premises (Haugaard and Lentner 2006; with emphasis on autonomy: Lentner 2005). 7 This differs from structural theories in international relations. Dependency theories and modernization theories assume that the existing power gap between the First and the Third World cannot be explained by the actions of politicians. Rather, it is founded

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on structural conditions, namely the differing degrees of development, which lead to unequal conditions of exchange (Galtung 1971, Strange 1989). 8 Thus, power is not only the specific code of politics (Luhmann 1986, ch. XIII), it appears in all social relationships as a structuring medium (Foucault 1976). Gerhard Ghler

References
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Benhabib, Seyla (1996) From identity politics to social feminism: A plea for the nineties . In: Trend, David (ed.), Radical Democracy: Identity, Citizenship, and the State . New York: Routledge. pp. 2741. Bourdieu, Pierre Sur le pouvoir symbolique . Annales vol. 32 pp. 405411. (1977) Bourdieu, Pierre (1987) Espace social et pouvoir symbolique . In: Choses dites . Paris: Les ditions de Minuit, pp. 147166. Butler, Judith (1997) The Psychic Life of Power: Theories of Subjection . Stanford: Stanford University Press. Butler, Judith (2003) Noch einmal: Krper und Macht . In: Honneth, Axel, ed. , Saar, Martin (eds), Michel Foucault. Zwischenbilanz einer Rezeption . Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, pp. 5267. Butler, Judith (1993) Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex . New York, London: Routledge. Clegg, Stewart R. (1989) Frameworks of Power . London: Sage. Clegg, Stewart R., Courpasson, David and Phillips, Nelson (2006) Power and Organizations . London: Sage. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446215715 Dahl, Robert A. (1961) Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City . New Haven: Yale University Press. Dahl, Robert A. (1968) Power . In Shills, D. L. (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences . Vol. 12 . New York: Macmillan, pp. 405415. Dowding, Keith (1996) Power . Buckingham: Open University Press. Dunker, Angela (1996) Macht- und Geschlechterverhltnisse. 25 Jahre feministische Machttheorie aus heutiger Sicht . In: Penrose, Virginia, ed. and Rudolph, Clarissa (eds), Zwischen Machtkritik und Machtgewinn . Frankfurt, New York: Campus, pp. 1733.

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Haugaard, Mark (1999) Power, social and political theories of . In Kurtz, Lester (ed.), Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict . San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 1710 1724. Haugaard, Mark (2002) Power. A Reader . Manchester: University Press. Haugaard, Mark Reflections on seven ways of creating power . European Journal of Social Theory vol. 6 pp. 87113. (2003) http:// dx.doi.org/10.1177/1368431003006001562 Haugaard, Mark, ed. and Lentner, Howard H. (eds.) (2006) Hegemony and Power. Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics . Oxford: Lexington Books. Holland-Cunz, Barbara (1998) Die Wiederentdeckung der Herrschaft . In: Kreisky, Eva, ed. and Sauer, Birgit (eds), Geschlechterverhltnisse im Kontext politischer Transformation. Politische Vierteljahresschrift. Sonderheft 28 . Opladen, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 8397. Imbusch, Peter (ed.) (1998) Macht und Herrschaft . Opladen: Leske & Budrich. Lentner, Howard H. Hegemony and autonomy . Political Studies vol. 53 pp. 735752. (2005) http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00554.x Luhmann, Niklas (1975) Macht . 2nd edn. Stuttgart: Enke 1988. Luhmann, Niklas (1986) kologische Kommunikation . Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Luhmann, Niklas (2000) Die Politik der Gesellschaft . Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Lukes, Steven (1974) Power: A Radical View . London: Macmillan. Lukes, Steven (ed.) (1986) Power . New York: University Press. Lukes, Steven (2005) Power. A Radical View . (The Original Text with Two Major New Chapters.) Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

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