A Basic form of Good: Knowledge

Basic values are good reasons for action and a description of human conduct. They are self-evident. Knowledge or speculative knowledge is what we are examining in this chapter. This means knowledge as sought for its own sake and not knowledge as sought only instrumentally. Another way of describing the basic value of knowledge is truth. Any proposition whatever the subject matter may be inquired into either: i. ii. Instrumentally Out of curiosity (the desire to know or find out the truth and to avoid ignorance and error) Finnis says that by knowledge he means that the pursuit of a subject matter out of curiosity to find out the truth about it simply out of an interest for the truth.

From Inclination to Grasp of Value Curiosity is the name given to our desire or inclination when, just for the sake of knowing, we want to find out something. On reflection it becomes clear that knowledge is a good thing to have and ignorance and muddle are to be avoided therefore we pursue knowledge because we consider it a good thing to have. The well-informed and clearheaded persons are well-off. The misunderstandings to be avoided are: 1. To think of knowledge as a value is not to think that every true proposition is equally worth knowinge.g. it is more worth while knowing whether the contents of this summary are true, than knowing how many milligrams of ink were used to print it.

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2. To think of knowledge as a basic form of is not to think knowledge, for example, of the truth about these contents, would be equally valuable for all. 3. Nor is it thought that knowledge has any priority of value. 4. Just as knowledge is good does not mean that the knowledge should be pursued by everyone at all times and in all circumstances, it does not mean that knowledge is the only general form of good, or the supreme form of good. 5. Knowledge, although thought of as a value, must not be thought of as a moral value. 6. Knowledge is an intrinsic good. It is considered to be desirable for its own sake and mot merely as something sought after under some such description. 7. Reference to the value of knowledge makes intelligible any particular instance of human activity and commitment involved in such pursuit.

Practical Principle and Participation in Value A practical principle is any expression through which we may understand more clearly a value and provides the starting point for reasoning about what to do. An example of a practical principle is Knowledge is a good thing to have and ignorance should be avoided. A basic principle serves to orient ones practical reasoning and can be instantiated in indefinably many, more specific, practical principles. It suggests new horizons for human activity. One may participate in the basic goods through particular projects or commitments.

The Self-Evidence of the Good of Knowledge The good of knowledge is self-evident (obvious.) It cannot be demonstrated but it needs no demonstration. The value of knowledge is not something innate and the value of truth

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becomes obvious only to persons who have experienced the urge to question, who have grasped the connection between question and answer, who understand that knowledge is constituted by the correct answers to particular questions, and who is aware of the possibility of further questions and of other questioners who could enjoy the advantage of attaining correct answers. A new born child has not passed through such experiences. A value cannot be deduced simply from the possibility of wanting to know the truth about something. No value can be deduced from a fact or set of facts. However, saying for example that knowledge must be a real value because intelligent men have regarded it as value, is not making an inference because the premis of the apparent deduction rests on its conclusion. Besides, the universality of a desire does not mean that it is objectively good for all. The fact that knowledge, or any other basic good may be pursued by all, does not mean that ALL desire to pursue it! Not all men might desire that particular value and pursue throughout their lives. Conversely, it does not mean that because all men do not pursue the value, then that value is to be rejected Principles of theoretical rationality are not demonstrable, for they are presupposed or deployed in anything that we would count as a demonstration. They do not need demonstration as they are obvious. To defy such principles is only being unreasonable. The basic values are self-evident in the same way as these principles of logic are. Such self- evident principles are not validated by feeling, but rather they are themselves the criteria whereby we discriminate between feelings and discount some of our feelings no matter how intense they might be.

Object of desire and Objectivity When we reach a point where it is not possible for any interferences to be made, we are then faced with the self-evident.

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The skeptics say that mans desire and decision to pursue the object are consequential to his judgment that: A. The object is good and; B. He will really be better-off for getting or doing or effecting it. The belief that our practical judgments of value are no more than expressions of our feelings and desires. However, we should not be deflected by this. It is obvious that a man who is well informed is better off than a man who is muddled or ignorant. The state of the first is better than that of the second in all cases. One must admit that knowledge is better than ignorance in all cases, even though I may not desire to know truth. The affirmation of a practical principle has nothing to do with any expression of desire of mine. It is a rational judgment about a general form of human well-being, about the fulfillment of a human potentiality In conclusion it is quite unreasonable for the skeptic to point out that the basic value may not be desired by all as Finnis is saying nothing about the principle being universally affirmed. He is only saying that that if one takes into account the relevant human possibilities one can understand that the realization of those possibilities is good and desirable for all; and that ones understanding needs no further justification.

Skepticism about this Basic Value is Indefensible Finnis adopts a defensive strategy since he does not intend to show the objectivity or selfevidence of the basic value of knowledge but only to illustrate the inconsistency of the counter-arguments by the skeptics. He restricts himself to the value of knowledge, but is aware that, by defending this one basic value, he may also be contributing towards the collapse of the skeptical doubts about all the other values.

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The self evidence of the basic value of knowledge therefore applies to the other values too. Most arguments against the self evidence of knowledge can be proved wrong due to their contradicting notions. (it can be proved that nothing can be proved.) Other arguments do not hold due to their false assertions (one states I do not exist.) The skeptical assertion that knowledge is not a good is operationally self refuting. For one to make such an assertion, intending it as a serious contribution to rational/objective discussion, is implicitly committed to the proposition that he believes in his assertions worth making, and worth making qua true. He thus is committed to the proposition that he believes that the truth is a good worth pursuing or knowing. Thus he is implicitly committed to formally contradictory beliefs. The skeptic view is therefore a self-refuting one and should be abandoned, also in relation to other values. A judgment or belief is objective if it is correct. Thus as a conclusion, we have proved that as assertion (that knowledge is good, that knowledge is self-evident and should be pursued), has its right to be called objective in so much as its opposing propositions are contradictions due to their inevitably falsity by the acting of asserting it.

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