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Why not pursue this folly? The following is the first attempt at creating the solution space (ref: (Canter, George), Set Theory)
BitsPerByte 8 8
The number of bits per byte is a reminder of how large the byte space (8-bit) can be.
8 ByteFieldMaxFull 256 2 ^ BitsPerByte
To make this calculation possible, we reduce the field to the bare minimum
MaxAlphabets 26 26 AllAlphabetCases MaxAlphabets 1 26 NumericSymbolCount 10 10 SpecialCharacterCount 10 10 ReducedCharacterSpace AllAlphabetCases 46 ByteFieldMax ReducedCharacterSpace 46 PasswordWidth 8 8 PrecisionDecimals 5 5
NumericSymbolCount
SpecialCharacterCount
KiloByte 2 ^ 10 1024 MegaByte KiloByte 1 048 576 GigaByte KiloByte 1 073 741 824 TeraByte KiloByte 1 099 511 627 776 PetaByte KiloByte 1 125 899 906 842 624
^2 ^3 ^4 ^5
BruteForceCrackDeath.nb
ByteFieldMax
PasswordWidth
PasswordWidth
PasswordWidth
Calculation Complexity
RefExponent = N[(ByteFieldMax)*PasswordWidth] 368.` ThetaBase = N[(RefExponent / MaxOrderedPermutations)] 8.675171561905634`*^-16 MaxLinearTheta = N[(ByteFieldMax)!] 5.502622159812089`*^57 ThetaMax = N[(MaxLinearTheta/RefExponent)] 1.4952777608185024`*^55
BruteForceCrackDeath.nb
Conclusion
In Conclusion, one must draw that a brute force cracking of any character field is only as good as the field size with disastrous failings if applied in the sense of combinatrics to the extreme. However, this mathematical understanding is by no means pointing the weakest link in a password, (the human mind.) Further failing here is by the fact that computers do not use diurnal or ephemeris or any form of real time, they merely use ticks in the clock-driven model proposed by Von Nuemann. The alternative, therefore is to reduce field size as demonstrated above. However, that is the first reduction (that may also result in error.) In further work, a dictionary would further impose another limit that would aid in cracking passwords. These can be further aided by dictionaries empowered by "rainbow-hashes" that make challenges faster. The assumed 0.01 second per challenge, can be further reduced to 1 millisecond, but not much lesser than that even in extreme ideal scenarios. Even the idea of a 0.01 second challenge is to first crunch all passwords and thereby render the challenge time as less as possible. These are "archaic" techniques and may serve as an introduction to the novice as to why indulging in brute force cracking might never yield results. To further complicate passwords, the field length of the password is just increased thereby reducing the possibility. This must in no way be confused with the idea of cracking AES or DES keys who have a dependence on the existence of large, mutually prime numbers that can thereafter be combined with a psuedo-random seed (usually entropy and not a password) to attempt to strengthen encryption. Unfortunately entropy techniques on many SOHO / Personal Computers can be replicated far too easily. The "Siren Trojans" (if I may coin such a term) would be a series of programs running in the background of the OS (perhaps part of the OS itself) that forces entropy convergence and therefore defeats the randomness of the seed. This of course is for later discussion.