AMENDED RULES ON EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION Statement of Authority By virtue of the powers vested upon the Employees' Compensation Commission

under the Labor Code of the Philippines, the following Rules are hereby adopted to implement the provisions of Title II, Book IV of this Code. RULE I Coverage Section 1. Nature Coverage shall be compulsory. Sec. 2. Scope (a) Every employer shall be covered. (b) Every employee not over sixty (60) years of age shall be covered. (c) An employee over sixty (60) years of age shall be covered if he had been paying contributions to the System prior to age sixty (60) and has not been compulsorily retired. (d) An employee who is coverable by both the GSIS and SSS shall be compulsorily covered by both Systems. Sec. 3. Employer (a) The term shall mean any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries on in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment. (b) Any employer shall belong to either: (1) The public sector covered by the GSIS, comprising the National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, the Philippine Tuberculosis Society, the Philippine National Red Cross and the Philippine Veterans Bank; or (2) The private sector covered by the SSS, comprising all employers other than those defined in the immediately preceding paragraph. Sec. 4. Employee (a) The term shall mean any person who performs services for an employer as defined in Section 3 hereof. (b)An employee shall belong to either: (1) The public sector comprising the employed workers who are covered by the GSIS, including the members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, elective officials who are receiving regular salary, and any person employed as casual, emergency, temporary, substitute, or contractual. (2) The private sector comprising the employed workers who are covered by the SSS. Sec. 5. Foreign Employment (a) Filipinos working abroad in the service of an employer as defined in Section 3 hereof shall be covered by the System, and entitled to the same benefits as are provided for employees working in the Philippines. (b) Medical services, including appliances and supplies for Filipinos employed abroad rendered or provided in such place of employment, shall be paid in accordance with, and subject to the limitations fixed in, these Rules; provided that the Rules on Accreditation shall not apply in these cases. (c) The notice requirement under these Rules shall be strictly applied. (d) Medical certifications of physicians, and statement of accounts of hospitals, when duly authenticated, are acceptable as basis for payment, provided that the standards and rates payable by the System shall be those provided for under these Rules. Sec. 6. Effectivity (a) Coverage of employers shall take effect on the first day of operation but not earlier than January 1, 1975.

(b) Coverage of employees shall take effect on the first day of employment. RULE II Registration Sec. 1. Requirement (a) Every employer shall register with the System by accomplishing the prescribed forms. (b) Every employee shall be registered with the System through his employer by accomplishing the prescribed forms. Sec. 2. GSIS The following guidelines shall apply to the public sector: (1) Every employer operating before January 1, 1975 shall register not later than March 31, 1975; (2) Every employer operating on or after January 1, 1975 shall register within one month from the first day of operation; and (3) Every employee shall be registered through his employer within one month from the date of employment. Sec. 3. SSS (a) The following guidelines shall apply to the private sector: (1) Every employer already registered need not register again, for he is automatically registered. (2) Every employer not yet registered shall register not later than the first day of operation; (3) Every employee already registered need not register again, for he is automatically registered. (4) Every employee not yet registered shall register not later than the date of employment; and (5) Only one registration is needed for SSS, Medicare and Employees' Compensation. (b) In case the employee has not yet been registered, he shall be reported by his employer according to the following guidelines: (1) Every employer already registered need not register again, for he is automatically registered. (2) Every newly hired employee shall be reported by his employer not later than thirty (30) days from the date of employment; and (3) Every employee shall be deemed as having been duly reported for coverage if the System has received a report or written communication paid in his name by his employer, before a compensable contingency occurs. Sec. 4. Penalty Any violation under this Rule shall be penalized as follows: (1) In case of failure or refusal to register employees, the employer or responsible official who committed the violation shall be punished with a fine of not less than P1,000 nor more than P10,000 and/or imprisonment for the duration of the violation or non-compliance or until such time that rectification of the violation has been made, at the discretion of the Court. (2) In case a compensable contingency occurs after thirty (30) days from employment and before the System receives any report for coverage about the employee or EC contribution on his behalf, his employer shall be liable to the System for the lump sum equivalent of the benefits to which he or his dependents may be entitled.

RULE III Compensability Sec. 1. Grounds (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. (ECC Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984). (b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. Sec. 2. Occupational Diseases (a) The diseases listed in Annex "A" [herein below] of these Rules are occupational when the nature of employment is as described therein. (b) The employer shall require pre-employment examination of all prospective employees; provide periodic medical examination to employees who are exposed to occupational diseases and take such other measures as may be necessary. (c) The periodic medical examination for the early detection of occupational diseases shall be in accordance with the minimum standards prescribed in Annex "B" hereof. Sec. 3. Authority of the Commission The Commission is hereby authorized to determine and approve additional occupational diseases and work-related illnesses with specific criteria based on peculiar hazards of employment. RULE IV Liability Sec. 1. Limitation No compensation shall be allowed to the employee or his dependents when the injury, sickness, disability, or death was occasioned by any of the following: (1) his intoxication; (2) his willful intention to injure or kill himself or another; or (3) his notorious negligence. Sec. 2. Extent of Liability (a) Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the state insurance fund, shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee or his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or is dependents. (b) The payment of compensation under this title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, Republic Act No. 6111, as amended, Republic Act No 1161, as amended, Republic Act No. 610, as amended, Republic Act No. 4864, as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System or by other agencies of the government. (ECC Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984), Sec. 3. Third Parties When disability or death is caused by circumstances creating a legal liability against a third party, the disabled employee or the dependents in case of his death shall be paid benefit from the System under these Rules. In case benefit is claimed and allowed under these Rules, the System shall be subrogated to the rights of the disabled employee or the dependents in case of his death in accordance with existing laws. Sec. 4. Unauthorized Changes The System shall not be liable for compensation for unauthorized changes in medical services, appliances, supplies, hospitals, rehabilitation services, or

physicians. Should there be any reason for such changes, the employee or his dependents shall notify the System and secure its prior consent before the change may be effected. Sec. 5. Medical Reports (a) An employee enjoying temporary total disability benefits shall submit to the System a monthly medical report on his disability certified by his attending physician, otherwise his benefit shall be suspended until such time that he complies with this requirement. (b) An employee enjoying permanent disability benefit where the disability resulted from a disease shall submit to the System a quarterly medical report on his disability certified by his physician, otherwise his benefit shall be suspended until such time that he complies with his requirement. RULE V Employer's Contribution Sec. 1. Rate and Amount Subject to the following conditions, contributions under these Rules shall be paid in their entirety by the employer and any contract or device for the deduction of any portion thereof from the wages or salary of the employees shall be null and void: (1) For a covered employee in the public sector, his employer shall remit to the GSIS a monthly contribution equivalent to one percent of the actual wages or salary received by him as of the last day of the month but not to exceed P30 per employee. (ECC Resolution No. 1451 dated December 27, 1979). (2) For a covered employee in the private sector, his employer shall remit to the SSS a monthly contribution equivalent to one percent (1%) of his monthly salary credit as of the last day of the month, in accordance with the following schedule: Salary Range of Wage Monthly Employer's Bracket or Salary Contribution I bra P1 P49.99 P25 P0.25 II br 50 99.99 . 75 0.75 III 100 149.99 125 1.25 IV 150 199.99 175 1.75 V b 200 249.99 225 2.25 VI 250 349.99 300 3.00 VII l 350 499.99 425 4.25 VIII 500 699.99 600 6.00 IX 700 899.99 800 8.00 X b 900 over 1,000-3,000 10.00 (3) When a covered employee dies during employment, or is separated from employment, his employer's obligation to pay the monthly contribution arising from that employment shall cease on the last day of the month of contingency. (4) When a covered employee becomes disabled during employment, his employer's obligation to pay the monthly contribution arising from that employment shall be suspended during such months that he is not receiving salary or wages. (5) No refund of contribution shall be allowed under these Rules. Sec. 2. Remittance Contributions shall start in January 1975 and every month thereafter for as long as the employee has earnings. The initial contribution for the month of January 1975 shall be remitted by employer to the System in February 1975, unless some other arrangement has been agreed by the System and the employer.

Sec.

3. Penalty Any violation of the provisions on

(2) Where death or permanent disability falls within the month of coverage, it is the actual salary received during the calendar month or its corresponding monthly salary credit. (b) The day of injury or sickness which caused the disability shall be vested as the reckoning date for the purpose of computing the average monthly salary credit. (c) In the case of the GSIS, the average monthly salary credit is the quotient after dividing the aggregate compensations received by the member or employee for the last three years immediately preceding his death, permanent disability, injury or sickness, by the number of months he received said compensation, or three thousand pesos, whichever is smaller. Sec. 6. Average Daily Salary Credit (a) In the case of the SSS, it is the result obtained by dividing the sum of the six (6) highest monthly salary credits in the 12-month period immediately preceding the semester of sickness by 180, except for the following cases: (1) Where the injury falls within 12 calendar months from the month of coverage, it is the result obtained by dividing the sum of all monthly salary credits by 30 and by the number of months of coverage, excluding the month of injury; and (2) Where the injury falls within the month of coverage, it is the actual salary received during the calendar month or its corresponding monthly salary credit divided by 30. (b) In the case of the GSIS, the average daily salary credit shall be determined as follows: (1) If the salary or wage is based on an hourly rate, it is the hourly rate times the number of hours required to work during the month of contingency divided by 22. (2) If the salary or wage is based on a daily rate, it is the daily rate times the number of days required to work per month divided by 22. (3) If the salary or wage is based on a monthly rate, it is the monthly rate divided by 22. (4) If the employee has worked for less than one month, his daily salary credit is the actual daily wage or salary of the monthly wage or salary divided by the actual number or days worked during the month of contingency. Sec. 7. Replacement Ratio In the case of the SSS, it is the sum of twenty percent (20%) and the quotient obtained by dividing three hundred by the sum of three hundred forty and the average monthly salary by credit. Sec. 8. Credited Years of Service For a member covered prior to January 1975, nineteen hundred seventy five minus the calendar year of coverage, plus the number of calendar years in which six or more contributions have been paid from January 1975 up to the calendar year containing the semester prior to the contingency. For a member covered in or after January 1975, the number of calendar years in which six or more contributions have been paid from the year of coverage up to the calendar year containing the semester prior to the contingency. Sec. 9. Monthly Income Benefit (a) In the case of the SSS, it is the amount equivalent to one hundred fifteen percent (115%) of the sum of: The average monthly salary credit multiplied by the replacement ratio and one and a half percent (1-1/2%) of the average monthly salary credit for each credited year of service in excess of ten years: Provided, That the monthly income benefit shall in no case be less than P250. Provided, However, That the monthly pension

contribution under these Rules shall be penalized as follows: (1) Any employer who is delinquent in his contributions shall be liable to the System for the benefits which may have been paid to his employees or their dependents, and any benefit and expenses to which such employer is liable shall constitute a preferred lien on all his property, real or personal, over any credit except taxes; (2) The payment by the employer of the lump sum equivalent of such liability shall absolve him from the payment of the delinquent contributions due and payable during the calendar year of the contingency and penalty thereon with respect to the employee concerned, but said employer shall be subject to criminal liability; (3) In case of such delinquency, the employer or responsible official who committed the violation shall be punished with a fine of not less than P1,000 nor more than P10,000 and/or imprisonment for the duration of the violation or non-compliance or until such time that a rectification of the violation has been made, at the Court's discretion; (4) If any contribution is not paid to the SSS as prescribed under these Rules, the employer shall pay, besides the contribution, a penalty thereon of three percent (3%) a month from the date the contribution falls due until paid. (Note: Under ECC Resolution No. 1243 dated Jan. 18, 1979, the System shall pay the employee or his dependents all benefits due them under P.D. No. 626, as amended, without prejudice on its part to proceed against the erring employer). RULE VI Definitions Related to Credited Earnings Sec. 1. Quarter A period of three consecutive calendar months ending on the last day of March, June, September and December. Sec. 2. Semester A period of two consecutive quarters ending in the quarter of contingency. Sec. 3. Monthly Salary Credit The wage base for contributions or the actual salary, as provided in Section 1 of Rule V hereof. If earnings are derived from more than one employment, it shall be determined on the basis of the aggregate earnings from all employments, but not exceeding P1,000 in the case of SSS and P3,000 in the case of GSIS. Sec. 4. Wages or Salary Insofar as they refer to the computation of benefits, means the monthly remuneration as defined in Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, for SSS and Presidential Decree No. 1146, as amended, for GSIS, respectively, except that part in excess of Three Thousand Pesos. (ECC Resolution No. 3682, July 21, 1987). Sec. 5. Average Monthly Salary Credit (a) In the case of the SSS, it is the result obtained by dividing the sum of the monthly salary credits in the 60-month period immediately preceding the semester of death or permanent disability, injury or sickness, by the number of months of coverage in the same period, except: (1) Where death or permanent disability falls within eighteen (18) months from the month of coverage, it is the result obtained by dividing the sum of all monthly salary credits paid prior to the month of death or permanent disability by the number of calendar months of coverage in the same period; and

of surviving pensioners shall be increased automatically and simultaneously to the extent that the fifteen percent (15%) difference in monthly income benefit between EC and SS and the twenty percent (20%) difference in monthly income benefit between EC and GSIS, be maintained. (L.O.I. 1286; ECC Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984). (b) In the case of the GSIS, the monthly income benefit shall be the basic monthly pension as defined in PD 1146 plus twenty percent (20%) thereof, but shall not be less than P250, nor more than the actual salary at the time of contingency. (ECC Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984). RULE VII Benefits Sec. 1. Types of Benefits The benefits under Employees' Compensation are in the form of income or services, and consists of the following: (1) medical services, appliances and supplies; (2) rehabilitation services; (3) temporary total disability benefit; (4) permanent total disability benefit; (5) permanent partial disability benefit; (6) death benefit; and (7) funeral benefit. Sec. 2. Disability (a) A total disability is temporary if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period not exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules. (b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules. (c) A disability is partial and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee suffers a permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his body. Sec. 3. Income Benefit The disability or death resulting from the injury or sickness is compensable by cash payments, and not the injury or sickness itself, except in the case of permanent partial disability. Sec. 3-A. Income Benefit for Permanent Partial Disability In the case where the period covered for payment of income benefit for permanent partial disability does not exceed twelve (12) months, the System may pay in lump sum or in monthly pension, otherwise income benefit shall be paid in monthly pension. Sec. 4. Services The injury or sickness is compensable by medical services, appliances, supplies and rehabilitation services. Sec. 5. Deprivation No contract, regulation or device whatsoever shall operate to deprive the employee or his dependents of any part of the income benefits, and medical or related services, except as provided under these Rules. Existing medical services being provided by the employer shall be maintained and continued to be enjoyed by his employees. Sec. 6. Prescriptive Period No claim for compensation shall be given due course unless said claim is filed with the System within three years from the time the cause of action accrued. (ECC Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984).

RULE VIII Medical Services, Appliances, and Supplies Sec. 1. Condition to Entitlement Any employee shall be entitled to such medical services, appliances and supplies as the nature of his disability and the progress of his recovery may require, subject to the expense limitation as contained in Annex "C" hereof, if all of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) He has been duly reported to the System; (2) He sustains an injury or contracts sickness; and (3) The System has been duly notified of the injury or sickness. Sec. 2. Period of Entitlement The medical services, appliances, and supplies shall be provided to the afflicted employee beginning on the first day of injury or sickness, during the subsequent period of his disability, and as the progress of his recovery may require, subject to Section 5 of Rule IV. Sec. 3. Extent of Services (a) The employee is entitled to the benefits only of the ward services of an accredited hospital and accredited physician. However, if the employee chooses accommodations better than ward services the excess of the total amount of expenses incurred over the benefits provided under Annex "C" hereof, shall be borne by the employee. For this purpose, "ward" means a hospital room that can accommodate six or more patients. (b) The hospital shall provide all the medicines, drugs, or supplies necessary for the treatment of the employee at a cost not exceeding the retail prices prevailing in local drug stores. (c) Payments shall be made directly to the providers of such services in such amount as are prevailing in the community for similar services or provided under the schedule set forth in Annex "C" of these Rules, whichever is less. RULE IX Rehabilitation Services Sec. 1. Definition of Terms As used in this Rule unless otherwise indicated by the context, the following definition of terms are hereby adopted. (a) Rehabilitation. The process by which there is provided a balanced program of remedial treatment, vocational assessment, and preparation, designed to meet the individual needs of each handicapped employee to restore him to suitable employment, including assistance as may be within its resources to help each rehabilitee to develop his mental, vocational, or social potential. (b) Rehabilitee. A disabled individual undergoing rehabilitation (student-rehabilitee or trainee) or who has finished a prescribed course in rehabilitation in which he is known as a graduaterehabilitee or trainee. (c) Rehabilitation Center. An organized service of varied rehabilitation Center). (d) Rehabilitation Facility. An organized service offering one or more types of service for the rehabilitation of the handicapped individual. (e) Governing Board. For this purpose, the Workers Rehabilitation Center Complex shall receive policy guidance from and shall be under the general management of, the measures usually located in one site for rehabilitation of disabled individuals. (E.g.: the WRCC-the

Employees'

Compensation

Commission,

which

is

hereby

(a) Grounds. For adequate and duly proven causes and upon recommendation of the rehabilitation counselor, the studentrehabilitee may be suspended or terminated by the Center. (b) Appeal. The decision of the Center may be appealed within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof to the Governing Board whose decision shall be final and executory. Sec. 10. Placement Arrangement for placement of the rehabilitee shall be an integral part of the rehabilitation program. Sec. 11. Participation of the System As incentive to the participating employers in the on-the-job training and possible employment of the rehabilitee, the System may enter into agreement with the employer to participate in the payment of wages of the placed rehabilitee as follows: (1) 50% of the wages for the first two weeks after the start of the on-the-job training; (2) 25% of the wages for the third and fourth weeks of the on-thejob training; (3) 10% of the wages for the fifth and sixth weeks of the on-thejob training; (4) 0% of the wages for the rest of the period of the on-the-job training. Sec. 12. Reports Reports to the Governing Board on the progress of activities of rehabilitation program shall be submitted by the Center once every 3 months as often as necessary. RULE X Temporary Total Disability Sec. 1. Condition to Entitlement An employee shall be entitled to an income benefit for temporary total disability if all of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) He has been duly reported to the System; (2) He sustains the temporary total disability as a result of the injury or sickness, and (3) The System has been duly notified of the injury or sickness which caused his disability. His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such illness or injury occurred before the employee is duly reported for coverage to the system. Sec. 2. Period of Entitlement (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System. (b) After an employee has fully recovered from an illness as duly certified to by the attending physician, the period covered by any relapse he suffers, or recurrence of his illness, which results in disability and is determined to be compensable, shall be considered independent of, and separate from, the period covered by the original disability. Such a period shall not be added to the period covered by his original disability in the computation of his income benefit for temporary total disability (TTD). (ECC Resolution No. 1029, August 10, 1978).

constituted as its Governing Board. Whenever necessary, the Governing Board may create an Advisory Council that shall act as a Consultative and Advisory Body, to be composed of representatives from the National Commission on Rehabilitation, the Ministry of Health, the Institute of Public Health of the University of the Philippines, and such other specialized associations and organizations on rehabilitation as may be needed. (f) Placement Officer. A person practicing the allied medical profession or discipline specialized in psychology of the handicapped and whose responsibility is to personally advise and guide the disabled individual to acceptance into a job. (g) Suitable Employment. Remunerative occupation giving the rehabilitee earnings at least equal to the statutory minimum wage. Sec. 2. Nature and effectivity of coverage. (a) Coverage under this Rule shall be voluntary. (b) Coverage under this Rule shall take effect upon completion of registration Sec. 3. Condition to Entitlement Any employee shall be entitled to rehabilitation services, if all of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) He has been reported to the System; (2) He sustains a permanent disability as a result of a compensable injury or sickness as defined in these Rules; (3) He has not been placed in suitable employment. Sec. 4. Period of Entitlement Rehabilitation services shall be provided during the period of the disability unless such services are suspended or terminated under any of the following conditions: (1) Upon suitable employment; (2) Upon suspension or termination of such services by the Rehabilitation Center; (3) By self-termination. Sec. 5. Extent of Services Rehabilitation services shall consist of medical-surgical management, hospitalization, necessary appliances and supplies, vocational training, and assistance for placement. (Transportation allowance between place of residence and the rehabilitation facility, lunch, and dormitory allowances in appropriate cases may be included in the extent of services). Sec. 6. Rehabilitation Centers There shall be established a Workers Rehabilitation Center Complex, and such other rehabilitation centers or services as the needs of occupationally disabled employees, whether from private or public sector, may require. Sec. 7. Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities Hospitals accredited under Rule XVII of these Rules; rehabilitation facilities, vocational and training centers and their personnel participating in the work of rehabilitation accredited by the Philippine Academy of Rehabilitation Medicine (PARM) may apply for accreditation. Sec. 8. Liability Limitations The System shall not be legally responsible when the injury, sickness, disability, or death during the rehabilitation is occasioned by any of the following: (1) his intoxication; (2) his willful intention to injure or kill himself or another; (3) his notorious negligence. Sec. 9. Suspension, Termination and Appeal

Sec. 3. Amount of Benefit Any employee entitled to benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid an income benefit equivalent to 90 percent (90%) of his average daily salary credit, subject to the following conditions: (1) The daily income benefit shall not be less than P10.00 nor more than P90.00 nor paid longer than 120 days for the same disability, unless the injury or sickness requires more extensive treatment that lasts beyond 120 days, but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability, in which case he shall be paid benefit for temporary total disability during the extended period. (2) The monthly income benefit shall be suspended if the employee fails to submit a monthly medical report certified by its attending physician as required under Sec. 5 of Rule IV hereof. (Resolution No. 3682, July 21, 1987). RULE XI Permanent Total Disability Sec. 1. Conditions to Entitlement (a) An employee shall be entitled to an income benefit for permanent total disability if all of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) He has been duly reported to the System; (2) He sustains the permanent total disability as a result of injury or sickness; and (3) The System has been duly notified of the injury or sickness which caused his disability. His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such injury or sickness occurred before the employee is duly reported for coverage to the System. (b) The following total disabilities shall be considered permanent: (1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X hereof. (2) Complete loss of sight of both eyes; (3) Loss of two limbs at or above the ankle or wrist; (4) Permanent complete paralysis of two limbs; (5) Brain injury resulting in incurable imbecility and insanity, and (6) Such cases as determined by the System and approved by the Commission. Sec. 2. Period of Entitlement (a) The full monthly income benefit shall be paid for all compensable months of disability. (b) After the benefit under Employees' Compensation shall have ceased as provided under the preceding paragraph, and if the employee is otherwise qualified for benefit for the same disability under another law administered by the System, he shall be paid a benefit in accordance with the provisions of that law. This paragraph applies to contingencies which occurred prior to May 1, 1978. (c) Except as otherwise provided for in other laws, decrees, orders, or letters of instructions, the monthly income benefit shall be guaranteed for five (5) years and shall be suspended under any of the following conditions: (1) Failure to present himself for examination at least once a year upon notice by the System (2) Failure to submit a quarterly medical report certified by his attending physician as required under Sec. 5 of Rule IV hereof; (3) Complete or full recovery from his permanent disability; or (4) Upon being gainfully employed. Sec. 3. Amount of Benefit (a) In the case of the SSS:

(1) Any employee entitled to permanent total disability benefit shall be paid by the System a monthly income benefit as defined in Sec. 8 (a), [sic] Rule VI of these Rules. (b) The number of months of paid coverage shall be the number of monthly contributions remitted to the System including contributions other than for Employees' Compensation if paid before March 31, 1975. The full monthly income benefit shall be paid for all compensable months of disability. (c) The first day preceding the semester of temporary total disability shall be considered for purposes of computing the monthly income benefit for permanent total disability. Sec. 4. Amount of Benefit for Dependent Children. (a) Each dependent child, but not exceeding five, counted from the youngest and without substitution, shall be entitled to ten (10%) percent of the monthly income benefit of the employee. These Rules shall not apply to causes of action which accrued before May 1, 1978. Sec. 5. Entitlement to the New Income Benefit Under PD 1641 (a) The new amount of the monthly income benefit computed under these amended Rules shall be applicable to all contingencies occurring on or after January 1, 1980. However, for contingencies which occurred before May 1, 1978, the limitation of P12,000 or 5 years, whichever comes first, shall be enforced. In the case of the SSS, the present monthly income benefit of current pensioners shall be increased by twenty percent (20%) effective January 1, 1980. In the case of the GSIS, the monthly income benefit of current pensioners shall be adjusted and recomputed to reflect the twenty percent (20%) increase over the benefit under PD 1146 effective January 1, 1980. Sec. 6. Aggregate Monthly Benefit Payable Except the benefit to dependent children under Section 4 of this Rule, the aggregate monthly benefit payable, in the case of the GSIS, shall in no case exceed the monthly wage or salary actually received by the employee as of the date of his permanent total disability. (ECC Resolution No. 2819, August 9, 1984). RULE XII Permanent Partial Disability Sec. 1. Conditions to Entitlement (a) An employee shall be entitled to an income benefit of permanent partial disability if all of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) He has been duly reported to the System; (2) He sustains the permanent partial disability as a result of the injury or sickness; and (3) The System has been duly notified of the injury or sickness which caused his disability. His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such injury or sickness occurred before the employee is duly reported for coverage to the System. (b) For purposes of entitlement to income benefits for permanent partial disability, a covered employee shall continue to receive the benefits provided thereunder even if he is gainfully employed and receiving his wages or salary. Sec. 2. Period of Entitlement (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first month of such disability, but not longer than the designated number of months in the following schedule:

Complete and permanent No. of loss of the use of Months One thumb One index finger One middle finger One ring finger One little finger One big toe Any toe One arm bra 50 Complete and permanent No. of loss of the use of Months One hand 39 One foot 31 One leg bra 46 One ear bra 10 Both ears b 20 Hearing of one ear 10 Hearing of both ears 50 Sight of one eye 25 (b) A loss of a wrist shall be considered a loss of the hand, and a loss of an elbow shall be considered a loss of the arm; a loss of an ankle shall be considered a loss of the foot, and a loss of a knee shall be considered a loss of the leg; a loss of more than one joint shall be considered a loss of the whole finger or toe, and a loss of only the first joint shall be considered a loss of one-half of the whole finger or toe. Other permanent partial disabilities shall be determined by the Medical Officer of the System. (c) The degree of permanent disability shall be equivalent to the ratio that the designated number of compensability bears to 75. Sec. 3. Amount of Benefit (a) Any employee entitled to permanent partial disability benefit shall be paid by the System a monthly income benefit for the number of months indicated in Section 2 hereof. If the indicated number of months exceeds twelve, the income benefit shall be paid in monthly pension; otherwise, the System may pay income benefit in lump sum or in monthly pension. (b) In case of permanent partial disability less than the total loss of the member, the same monthly income shall be paid for a portion of the period established for the total loss of the member in accordance with the proportion that the partial loss bears to the total loss. If the result is a decimal fraction, the same shall be rounded off to the next higher integer. (c) In case of simultaneous loss of more than one member or a part thereof, the same monthly income shall be paid for a period equivalent to the sum of the periods established for the loss of the member or part thereof but not exceeding 75. If the result is a decimal fraction, the same shall be rounded off to the higher integer. (d) The new amount of the monthly income benefit computed under these amended Rules shall be applicable to all contingencies occurring on or after January 1, 1980. However, for contingencies which occurred before May 1, 1978, the limitation of P12,000 or 5 years, whichever comes first, shall be enforced. In the case of the SSS, the present monthly income benefit of current pensioners shall be increased by twenty percent (20%) effective January 1, 1980. In the case of the GSIS, the monthly income benefit of current pensioners shall be adjusted and recomputed to reflect the twenty 10 8 6 5 3 6 3

percent (20%) increase over the benefit under P.D. 1146 effective January 1, 1980. Sec. 4. Unlisted Injuries and Illnesses (a) In cases of injuries or illnesses not listed in the schedule under Section 2 hereof, the benefit shall be an income benefit equivalent to the percentage of the permanent loss of the capacity for work. (Non-Scheduled Disabilities). RULE XIII Death Sec. 1. Conditions to Entitlement (a) The beneficiaries of a deceased employee shall be entitled to an income benefit if all of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) The employee had been duly reported to the System; (2) He died as a result of an injury or sickness; and (3) The System has been duly notified of his death, as well as the injury or sickness which caused his death. His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such death occurred before the employee is duly reported for coverage to the System. (b) If the employee has been receiving monthly income benefit for permanent total disability at the time of his death, the surviving spouse must show that the marriage has been validly subsisting at the time of his disability. Sec. 2. Period of Entitlement A. For primary beneficiaries: (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning at the month of death and shall continue to be paid for as long as the beneficiaries are entitled thereto. (b) The monthly income benefit shall be guaranteed for five years which in no case shall be less than fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00). Thereafter, the beneficiaries shall be paid the monthly income benefit for as long as they are entitled thereto. (ECC Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984). B. For Secondary beneficiaries: (a) The income benefit shall be sixty (60) times the monthly income benefit of a primary beneficiary which in no case [shall] be less than P15,000.00, which shall likewise be paid in monthly pension (ECC Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984). Sec. 3. Amount of Benefit (a) In the case of primary beneficiaries, the monthly income benefit shall be equivalent to the monthly income benefit for permanent total disability, which shall be guaranteed for five years, increased by ten percent (10%) for each dependent child but not exceeding five (5), beginning with the youngest and without substitution: provided that, the aggregate monthly benefit payable in the case of the GSIS shall in no case exceed the monthly wage or salary actually received by the employee at the time of his death; and provided further, that the minimum income benefit shall not be less than fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00). The death benefit shall be paid during the entire period for which they are entitled thereto. If the employee has been receiving income benefits for permanent total disability at the time of his death, the primary beneficiaries shall be paid the monthly income benefit equivalent to eighty percent (80%) plus the dependent's pension equivalent to ten percent (10%) thereof for every dependent child but not exceeding five (5) counted from the youngest and without substitution.

(b) In the case of secondary beneficiaries, the income benefit is payable in monthly pension which shall not exceed the period of sixty (60) months and the aggregate income benefit shall not be less than P15,000.00 If the employee has been receiving monthly income benefit for permanent total disability at the time of his death, the secondary beneficiaries shall be paid the monthly pension, excluding the dependent's pension of the remaining balance of the five-year guaranteed period. (ECC Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984). Sec. 4. Entitlement to the New Income Benefit Under PD 1641 The new amount of the monthly income benefit computed under these amended Rules shall be applicable to all contingencies occurring on or after January 1, 1980. However, for contingencies which occurred before May 1, 1978, the limitation of P12,000 or five (5) yeas, whichever comes first, shall be enforced. In the case of the SSS, the present monthly income benefit of current pensioners shall be increased by twenty percent (20%) effective January 1, 1980. In the case of the GSIS, the monthly income benefit of current pensioners shall be adjusted and recomputed to reflect the twenty percent (20%) increase over the benefit under PD 1146 effective January 1, 1980. Sec. 5. The new amount of lump sum benefit computed under these Amended Rules shall be applicable to all contingencies occurring on or after May 1, 1980, otherwise entitlement thereto shall be governed by the immediately preceding Section. RULE XIV Funeral Benefit Sec. 1. Entitlement to Funeral Benefit A funeral benefit of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) shall be paid upon the death of a covered employee or permanently totally disabled pensioner to one of the following: (a) the surviving spouse; or (b) the legitimate child who spent for the funeral services; or (c) any other person who can show incontrovertible proof of his having borne the funeral expenses. (ECC Resolution No. 3682, July 21, 1987). RULE XV Beneficiaries Sec. 1. Definition (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined at the time of employee's death. (b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary: (1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employee's death until he remarries; and (2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are unmarried not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is [sic] incapacitated and incapable of self-support due to physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged natural children, they shall be counted from

the youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding five. (ECC Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984). (c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary: (1) The legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the employee for regular support; (2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is [sic] incapacitated and incapable of self-support due to physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority. Sec. 2. Priority (a) Primary beneficiaries shall have priority claim to death benefit over secondary beneficiaries. Whenever there are primary beneficiaries, no death benefit shall be paid to secondary beneficiaries. (b) If the deceased employee has no primary beneficiaries at the time of his death, the death benefit shall be paid to his secondary beneficiaries. (c) If the deceased employee has no beneficiaries at the time of his death, the death benefit shall accrue to the Employees' Compensation Fund. Sec. 3. Primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a monthly income benefit. In their absence, the secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a monthly income benefit not to exceed sixty (60) months and the death benefit shall not be less than P15,000.00. (ECC Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984). RULE XVI Employers' Records And Notices Sec. 1. Notice by Employee The notice of sickness, injury or death shall be given to the employer by the employee, his dependents or anybody on his behalf, within five (5) days from the occurrence of the contingency. Said notice is not necessary where the employer or his representative already had knowledge thereof, or the contingency occurred during working hours at the work place. Sec. 2. Employer's Logbook Every employer shall keep a logbook to record chronologically the sickness, injury, or death of his employees, within five (5) days from due notice thereof. Sec. 3. Notice by Employer The notice of sickness, injury, or death for cases which the employer deems to be work-connected shall be submitted to the System by the employer within five (5) days from due entry thereof in his logbook in a form prescribed by the System. Sec. 4. Visitorial Power The employer's logbook prescribed in these Rules shall be made available for inspection to any duly authorized representative of the System during working hours. Sec. 5. Penalty Any employer who fails to record in his logbook the sickness, injury, or death of any of his employees within five (5) days from knowledge or receipt of due notice thereof as prescribed herein, gives false information or withholds material information already in his possession, shall be liable to fifty percent (50%) of the lump sum equivalent of the income benefit to which the employee may be found to be entitled and/or a fine of not less than P500 nor more than P5,000 and imprisonment for not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year, at the discretion of the Court. The sum paid by the employer under this Section shall accrue to the Employees' Compensation Fund of the System.

RULE XVII Accreditation Sec. 1. Minimum Requirements for Accreditation (a) A physician may be accredited for purposes of the Employees' Compensation Program upon his application if he is a doctor of medicine duly licensed to practice in the Philippines and an active member in good standing of the Philippine Medical Association. (b) A Hospital may likewise be accredited upon application if: (1) it is an institution primarily engaged in providing to inpatients, by or under the supervision of physicians, diagnostic and therapeutic services of their medical diagnosis, treatment and care; (2) it is adequately equipped with facilities for physicians to treat injured or sick persons; (3) it maintains clinical records on all patients; (4) it has by-laws concerning its medical staff; (5) it provides 24-hour nursing services by itself or is supervised by a registered professional nurse; and has a licensed practical nurse or registered professional nurse on duty at all times; (6) it requires that every patient must be under the care of a physician; (7) it is licensed by the Bureau of Medical Services of the Ministry of Health; (8) it meets the health and safety requirements of the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Labor; (9) it maintains a Utilization Review Committee as provided for in Section 3 of this Rule; and (10) it is a member in good standing of the Philippine Hospital Association. (c) A rehabilitation facility may be accredited upon application if: (1) it is an institution engaged in providing to in-patients, by or under the supervision of physicians (specialized in rehabilitation medicine, in neurology, or in neuro-surgery, or in internal medicine, or in orthopedic surgery), diagnostic or therapeutic services in rehabilitation practice; (2) it is adequately equipped with facilities for physical medicine rehabilitation (PMR); (3) it maintains clinical records on all patients; (4) it has by-laws concerning its medical staff; (5) it requires that every patient must be under the care of a physician; (6) it is licensed by the Bureau of Medical Services of the Ministry of Health; (7) it meets the health and safety requirements of the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Labor and Employment; and (8) it maintains a Utilization Review Committee as provided for in Section 3 of this Rule. Sec. 2. Conditions on Accredited Hospitals or Rehabilitation Facilities and Physicians or Rehabilitation Specialists (a) An accredited hospital or rehabilitation facility binds itself: (1) not to collect from the patient any amount for ward services; (2) to provide adequate services on a non-discriminating basis; (3) to limit charges for ward rates approved by the Commission, including, but not limited to, laboratory ward rates, laboratory facilities, x rays, stools, drugs, medical attendance and the Relative Value Scale (RVS) for surgical procedures, etc.; (4) to abide by these rules on accreditation;

(5) to have its house rules conform to the requirements of the Commission; (6) to subject its facilities to inspection at any time by duly authorized representatives of the Commission or the System. (b) An accredited physician binds himself: (1) not to collect from the patient any amount for ward services; (2) to provide adequate services on a non-discriminating basis; and (3) to abide by these rules on accreditation. Sec. 3. Utilization Review (a) Every hospital or rehabilitation facility shall have a Utilization Review Committee, composed of at least two physicians or rehabilitation specialists, to help assure the most effective use of rehabilitation facilities, hospitals, and services by reviewing admissions each day on a sample basis and all long-stay cases. (b) The Committee shall decide in every specific case being reviewed, whether or not care in a hospital is medically necessary. In every case, the Committee shall discuss its findings with the patient's doctor before making a decision. (c) The Committee shall advise in writing the patient, his doctor and the hospital of its decision only if it has been decided that care in a hospital is not medically necessary, in which case no payment for room and board shall be made by the System. Sec. 4. Coverage of Services (a) Payment for services shall ordinarily be made only to an accredited rehabilitation facility or hospitals and accredited physicians. (b) Non-accredited rehabilitation facilities or hospitals and nonaccredited physicians shall be paid only for emergency services. No payment can be made to them for services rendered after the emergency has ended. Sec. 5. Emergency Services (a) Those services which are necessary to prevent the death or serious impairment of the health of the individual, and which necessitate the use of the most accessible hospital available and equipped to furnish such services. (b) An emergency no longer exists when it becomes safe from a medical standpoint to move the patient to an accredited hospital, or to discharge him, whichever occurs first. (c) The determination that the patient's condition requires emergency services or that an emergency has ended shall be based on the physician's evaluation and, when appropriate, on the patient's medical record and other additional data furnished by the hospital. (d) Claims filed by non-accredited hospitals and non-accredited physicians for payment of emergency services shall be accompanied by a physician's statement. (e) The physician's statement shall describe the nature of the emergency, furnish relevant clinical information about the condition of the patient, and state that the services rendered were necessary to prevent the death of the individual or the serious impairment of the health. A bare statement that an emergency existed is not sufficient. (f) In addition, when in-patient services are involved, the statement shall include the date when, it the physician's judgment, the emergency ceased. Sec. 6. Referral Immediately upon knowledge by the employer of his employee's injury or sickness at the work place, he shall, in addition to the medical and dental facilities which the pertinent provisions of the Code and these Rules on Accreditation

may require him to furnish, cause the employee to be brought by the fastest available means of transportation to the duly accredited physician or hospital nearest or most accessible to the employee's place of work. Sec. 7. Violation of Conditions and Requirements, Penalties (a) An accredited hospital or physician shall be disaccredited for violation of any of the conditions and requirements under Section 1 and 2 hereof without prejudice to the imposition of penalties under Rule XIX if applicable or to any other penalty which the Commission may impose. (b) The cancellation or invalidation of accreditation of a physician or hospital shall be effective on the date of notice of the disaccreditation. (c) In case of disaccreditation, the physician or the hospital shall carry the disqualification wherever its physical identity is found. Mere change of legal personality shall not defeat the disqualification imposed. (d) Disaccreditation shall be lifted only on application and upon showing of good cause and effective upon approval by the Commission. As soon as accreditation is duly restored, the hospital or physician concerned shall be allowed to participate in the Employee's Compensation Program. RULE XVIII Settlement of Claims Sec. 1. Services (a) The claim for medical benefits shall be filed in a prescribed form by the accredited physician or accredited hospital directly with the System. (b) The claim for emergency services shall be filed in a prescribed form by any physician or hospital. Sec. 2. Income Benefit The claim for income benefit shall be filed in a prescribed form by the employee, his dependents or his employer, on his behalf, directly with the System. Failure to file the claim within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued, shall forever bar the right to benefits granted under these Rules. (ECC Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984). Sec. 3. Adjudication Upon receipt of the claim, the System shall process the same and determine whether or not the injury, sickness, disability, or death is compensable. Sec. 4. Additional Requirements If the supporting papers of the claim are insufficient to make proper determination, the System shall require the submission of additional proofs from the employee or his dependents, or from any office, entity, or agency, public or private, or from any person, having knowledge of the contingency. Sec. 5. Appeal Within ten (10) days from receipt of the letter of denial or the affirmation of the denial, as the case may be, the claimant shall inform the System in writing of his desire to appeal the decision of the System. Upon receipt of such appeal, the System shall within five (5) days forward the entire record of the case to the Commission for review.

RULE XIX Review by the Commission Sec. 1. Decision En Banc Within thirty (30) working days from receipt of an appeal case, the Commission shall review and decide said case. Four affirmative votes shall decide the case. However, if only a quorum of four members are present, 3 affirmative votes shall decide the case. No motion for reconsideration of the decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall be entertained. Sec. 2. Payment of Awards Decisions, orders, or resolutions of the Commission en banc awarding compensation shall be complied with by the System within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Sec. 3. Other Decisions In all other cases involving payments to be made by the employer, decisions, orders, and resolutions of the Commission en banc which have become final and executory shall be enforced and executed in the same manner as decisions of the Court of First Instance, and the Commission shall have the power to issue to the City or Provincial Sheriff or to the Sheriff it may appoint, such writs of execution as may be necessary for the enforcement of such decisions, orders, or resolutions. Sec. 4. Failure to Comply Any person or persons who fail or refuse to comply with the writ of execution issued by the Commission shall be punished for contempt by the proper court. In the case of a corporation, trust, firm, partnership, association, or any other entity, the manager or officer-in-charge when the offense was committed, shall be responsible. RULE XX Penalties Sec. 1. Penalty for Failure to Install and Maintain Safety Devices, etc. The System shall determine for purposes of imposing the penalty provided in Art. 200 of the Code, whether the employer's sickness, injury or death was due to the failure of the employer to comply with any health and safety law, or failure to install and maintain safety devices in accordance with standards set by the Commission, or take other precautions for the prevention of the sickness, injury, or death. The requisite standards shall be set by the Commission within six (6) months after the effectivity of these Rules. Sec. 2. Penal Provisions (a) The penal provisions of R.A. 1161, as amended, and C.A. 186, as amended, with regard to the funds as are thereunder being paid to, collected, or disbursed by the System shall be applicable to the collection, administration, and disbursement of Employees' Compensation Fund of the System. The penal provisions on coverage shall also be applicable. (b) Any person who, for the purposes of securing entitlement to any benefit or payment under these Rules or the issuance of any certificate or document for any purpose whether for him or for some other persons, commits fraud, collusion, falsification, misrepresentation of facts, or any other kind of anomaly shall be punished with a fine of not less than P5,000 and imprisonment for not less than 6 months nor more than one year, at the discretion of the court. (c) If the act penalized is committed by any person who has been or is employed by the Commission or System or a recidivist, the

imprisonment shall not be less than one year; if committed by a lawyer, physician, or other professional, he shall in addition to the penalty prescribed herein be disqualified from the practice of his profession; and if committed by an official, employee or personnel of the Commission, System, or any government agency, he shall in addition to the penalty prescribed herein, be dismissed with prejudice to re-employment in the government service. RULE XXI Implementing Provision Sec. 1. Effectivity These amended Rules and Regulations shall take effect June 1, 1987.

GSIS v. MONTESCLAROS FACTS: Milagros assail unconstitutionality of section 18 PD 1146 being violative of due process and equal protection clause. When her husband died, she filed in GSIS for claim for survivorship pension. GSIS denied claim, it said surviving spouse has no right of survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. HELD: There is denial of due process when it out rightly denies the claim for survivorship. There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving her an opportunity to be heard. There is also violation of equal protection. A proviso requiring certain number of years of togetherness in marriage before the employees death is valid to prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary gains. Here, it is 3 years before pensioner qualified for the pension. Under this, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than 3 years before the pensioners death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within 3 years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose intended. The surviving spouse of a government employee is entitled to receive survivors benefits under a pension system. However, statutes sometimes require that the spouse should have married the employee for a certain period before the employees death to prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary gain. One example is the Illinois Pension Code which restricts survivors annuity benefits to a surviving spouse who was married to a state employee for at least one year before the employees death. The Illinois pension system classifies spouses into those married less than one year before a members death and those married one year or more. The classification seeks to prevent conscious adverse risk selection of deathbed marriages where a terminally ill member of the pension system marries another so that person becomes eligible for benefits. In Sneddon v. The State Employees Retirement System of Illinois, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that such classification was based on difference in situation and circumstance, bore a rational relation to the purpose of the statute, and was therefore not in violation of constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another. The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminates against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the pensioners death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to prevent deathbed marriages " then we do not see why the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the pensioner died. The classification does not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension benefits. Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the reason Congress deleted the proviso in Republic Act No. 8291 (RA 8291), otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance Act of 1997, the law revising the old charter of GSIS (PD1146). Under the implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving spouse

who married the member immediately before the members death is still qualified to receive survivorship pension unless the GSIS proves that the surviving spouse contracted the marriage solely to receive the benefit. Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted within three years before retirement or death of a member are sham marriages contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. The present GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the survivorship pension of the surviving spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within three years before the members retirement or death. The law acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer prescribes a sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for want of merit. We declare VOID for being violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the law the proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146, which proviso states that the dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. The Government Service Insurance System cannot deny the claim of Milagros O. Montesclaros for survivorship benefits based on this invalid proviso.

[A.M. No. P-95-1167. December 21, 1998] CARMELITA L. LLEDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. CESAR V. LLEDO, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City, respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: Court personnel, from the judge to the lowest clerk, are invested with the sacred duty to maintain the good name and standing of the institution they serve. A court employee abdicates that duty when he abandons his family and openly cohabits with his mistress. He aggravates his culpability by falsely representing his paramour to be his lawful wife. This principle is applied by the Court in resolving the present Administrative Complaint for immorality, abandonment and conduct unbecoming a public official. Filed on February 4, 1994 by Mrs. Carmelita Lledo against her husband, Atty Cesar V. Lledo, branch clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, said Complaint presented the facts as follows: "That sometime last year (1993) I received some information that he is keeping a paramour, which information I verified, as a result of which, I personally came to know that my husband is living with another woman named Katrina Narvaez with whom he has children[. A] certified true copy of the Birth Certificate of his son named Ryan Narvaez Lledo, is hereto attached marked as 'Annex B'; "That the other children's birth certificates named Don and Kathleen are still for release by the National Statistics Office; "That when I was able to secure a copy of the Birth Certificate of Ryan, I immediately went to see the specified address at 240 Rd. I Pag-asa, Quezon City, only to be informed by Mrs. Songco, their landlady that they transferred to another apartment in Burol I Sta Cruz Village, Balagtas Bulacan because they had a serious altercation which resulted in the filing of three (3) cases namely: IS No. 92-15883, Oral Defamation and Grave Threats, IS No. 9216957, Grave Threats, Malicious Mischiefs and Physical Injuries and IS No. 92-15650 for Slight Physical Injuries, xerox copies of which are hereto attached and marked as Annex 'C', 'D' and 'E' respectively; "That on November 12, 1992, Atty. Cesar Lledo executed an affidavit subscribed and sworn to on [the] same date by the Assistant City Prosecutor, Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo, Fiscal['s] Office, Quezon City, attesting to the truth that Katrina is his wife and that they are tenants or lessees of one of the rooms of the house of Mrs. Dolores Songco, xerox copy of which is hereto attached as Annex 'G'; "That they lived as husband and wife at 240 Rd. I, Pag-asa as evidenced by a contract entered into by his paramour K.N. Lledo, xerox copy of which is attached and marked as Annex 'F' and that Katrina and Atty. Lledo are known in the community as husband and wife; "That upon knowledge of my husband's infidelity which caused irreparable psychological and emotional damage to the children and gross humiliation I suffered as the lawful wife, I immediately wrote a formal letter (xerox copy of which is hereto attached as Annex 'H') to Judge Pedro Santiago, Executive Judge of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, copy furnished Atty. Lledo's immediate superior, Judge Romeo Zamora, Regional Trial Court Branch 94, requesting xxx a dialogue which never transpire[d] because my husband refused to see me; "That Atty. Lledo with his paramour Katrin had been transferring their residence from 240 Rd. I Pagasa, Quezon City, to Burol I Sta. Cruz Village, Balagtas, Bulacan and at present at Santol Burol 5, Balagtas, Bulacan, maintaining their illicit relationship up to the present;

"That such, actuations of Atty. Lledo [constitute] disgraceful and immoral conduct violative of the provisions of Administrative Code of 1987 (PD 807) and RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); and, "That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truthfulness of the foregoing statements and as basis for my complaint against my husband for immorality, abandonment and for conduct unbecoming xxx a public official." [1] In his Comment, respondent denied all the material allegations of the complainant and stated: "That since the birth of all their children, respondent has not been remiss in his obligation to provide for their support as he is still paying the matriculation fees of their youngest daughter who is taking up [the] Degree of Bachelor of Psychology in an amount of not less than P9,000.00 per semester, more or less. Additionally, he (respondent) caused the employment of his two (2) sons, both married namely Eric - employed at the sala of Judge Lucas Bersamin, and Cesar, Jr., - employed at the National Power Corporation. "Additionally, the amount obtained on the maturity of his GSIS Policy was all utilized for the payment of all the debts incurred due to advances made to pay the needs of his children especially for payment of tuition fees and other miscellaneous needs of the children. "The filing of the case was triggered on the unfounded ground or claim that the petitioner [would] not [get] her alleged one-half share of the respondent's pension. The said ground is untrue and bias[ed]. The truth of the matter is respondent will be paying the amortized house and lot and will give the complainant her onehalf share of the pension."[2] On August 28, 1996, the Court referred the Complaint and the Comment to then Executive Judge Pedro T. Santiago, RTC, Quezon City, for investigation, report and recommendation. Finding that the Report of Judge Santiago was not responsive, in fact totally irrelevant, to the issue in the case, the Court on September 30, 1997 asked the new executive judge, Hon. Estrella Trias-Estrada, to reinvestigate the matter. After a thorough investigation, wherein both the complainant and the respondent were accorded the opportunity to present their respective causes and to cross-examine each other's witnesses, Judge Trias-Estrada submitted her Report, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder: "From the evidence on record, the undersigned has reason to believe the claim of complainant Carmelita Lledo that respondent ha[s] indeed abandoned her and their children sometime in 1987 without giving adequate support to their four legitimate children and [that] he had established a second family with one Katrina Narvaez and their own set of children. In the affidavit-complaint dated November 12, 1992 which respondent Cesar Lledo filed before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office executed under oath (Exhibit 'J"), respondent Lledo gave the name [of] Katrina as his wife and [of] xxx Don as his child. The complaint-affidavit was filed in connection with a serious altercation he had with one Dolores Songco, the landlady/administrator of the house at No. 240, Road I, Pag-asa, Quezon City where he and Katrina lived together as husband and wife with their children. The cases filed by him were oral defamation through malicious mischief and slight physical injuries. These cases, however, were dismissed by Judge Tolentino of the MTC. The affidavit-complaint of respondent is in effect an admission that he considered Katrina Narvaez as his wife and Don as his child. Complainant was also able to secure a birth certificate of one Ryan Narvaez Lledo whose father's name is Czar Diaz Lledo with address at No. 240 Rd. I, Pag-asa, Quezon City. Although the name of the purported father appears to be different, Czar Diaz Lledo, it is obvious that it is a typographical error or perhaps, it was intentionally misspelled that way because it was Katrina Narvaez who

furnished that dat[um] in said certificate of live birth. But despite the erroneous spelling, said certificate of live birth became the key to the discovery of the address of the respondent after he left their conjugal dwelling. "The complainant was able to get information through Dolores Songco, the landlady of respondent and Katrina Narvaez Lledo who gave a full account of the relationship of respondent and Katrina who[m] she personally observed to have conducted themselves as husband and wife; that Don was four years old when he was brought to said residence as their son and where the two other children Ryan and Kat[h]leen were conceived and born. Dolores Songco categorically stated that respondent and Katrina lived in the house where she is the administrator together with her from June, 1988 up to November 7, 1992. "Respondent Lledo did not make any [categorical] denial of the charges. His answers were only that he did not know said Katrina, that he did not also [know] Ryan, but the only reason that he left the conjugal dwelling [was] that his wife was a complete nagger and was not performing her duties as a responsible wife and mother, that it was he who performed the household chores and often he would bring to his office one of his children to take care of. He also denied that he was not giving financial support but his wife who never spent any single cent. He admitted that the signature appearing in the affidavit-complaint marked as Exhibit 'J' which was the basis of the criminal charges against Dolores Songco is his signature. "Between the oral and documentary evidence of the complainant and the oral denials and admissions made by the respondent, the inevitable conclusion is that the charges against respondent Lledo are true. The abandonment of complainant and their children apparently came about when respondent Lledo was already at the JDRC and had started to have drinking buddies and later on a sweetheart. And in 1987 he already completely left the conjugal dwelling to establish a second family and for the purpose, he and Katrina with their son Don, established their residence in a room in the house at No. 240, Road I, Pag-asa, Quezon City which was being administered by one Dolores Songco for and in behalf of her brother who is living in the United States. Such second family stayed in said residence for four (4) years, lived as a complete family without the benefit of marriage and therefore was living in an immoral status which is a ground for dismissal of a government official or employee. Considering that respondent is holding a high government position which requires him to be of good moral character and fit to perform his functions as Branch Clerk of Court, his actuations [are] not a good example to his subordinates. "IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended that the corresponding penalty of dismissal from the service be meted [out to] respondent Atty. Cesar V. Lledo." In its September 2, 1998 Memorandum addressed to the Office of the Chief Justice, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) agreed with the findings of Judge Estrada and recommended that Atty. Cesar Lledo be dismissed from the service for disgraceful and immoral conduct. The Court agrees with the recommendations of Judge Estrada and the OCA that respondent should be sanctioned. The Court has emphasized time and again that "the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the sheriff and to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility." [3] In a similar case, the Court has further held that "a court personnel, being a public servant, must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of his official duties but also his personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the court's good name and standing."[4] The Court has also admonished court personnel that their conduct "should be geared towards maintaining the prestige and integrity of the court, for the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and

lowest of its personnel; hence, it becomes the imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a temple of justice." [5] In the present case, sufficient proof, both oral and documentary, was presented to show that Respondent Lledo abandoned his conjugal dwelling without providing support for his legitimate children and subsequently cohabited with Katrina Narvaez with whom he had three children. It is beyond dispute that respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of marriage and his elementary obligation to provide for his legitimate children. Worse, he executed several Sworn Statements that he was lawfully wedded to his mistress. Clearly, the respondent in this case has failed to comply with the strict standards required of court employees. His conduct betrays an unscrupulous streak that has, in turn, tarnished the image of the judiciary. We impose on respondent the penalty of dismissal, in line with numerous similar cases. In Sicat v. Alcantara,[6] the Court dismissed a clerk of court and a judge for maintaining an illicit amorous relationship with each other. In Castillo v. Calanog[7] and in Dy Teban Hardware & Auto Supply v. Tapucar,[8] respondent judges were also dismissed from the service for moral obtuseness in maintaining mistresses and for immoral advances against the complainants. These cases demonstrate, as we do once again, that "exacting standards of morality and decency have been strictly adhered to and laid down by the highest Court of the land in regard to those in the service of the judiciary xxx."[9] "In fact, moral integrity is more than a virtue; it is a necessity in the judiciary." [10] Because respondent clerk of court has failed to perform his imperative duty to maintain the prestige and integrity of the judiciary, he has forfeited his privilege to partake in the administration of justice. Moreover, the conduct for which he is here penalized affects not only his qualifications as a court employee, but also as a member of the bar. For this reason, the Court hereby refers the case to the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.[11] WHEREFORE, Cesar V. Lledo, branch clerk of court of RTC, Branch 94, Quezon City, is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including any governmentowned or controlled corporation. This case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 98395-102449 June 19, 1995 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and DR. MANUEL BARADERO, respondents. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and MATILDE S. BELO, respondents In our decision dated October 28, 1994 we held that government service rendered on a per diem basis is not creditable in computing the length of service for retirement purposes. Thus, we reversed the questioned resolutions and orders of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) requiring the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to consider creditable the services of private respondents on a per diem basis. However, private respondent Matilde S. Belo in G.R. No 102449 filed a motion for reconsideration dated 17 November 1994, of this Court 's decision of October 28, 1994. She insists that the services rendered by her as Vice Governor of Capiz, between December 31, 1975 to January 1, 1979, be considered as creditable for purposes of retirement. The Government Service Insurance System likewise filed a motion for reconsideration on November 22, 1984 in behalf of both private respondents Belo and Dr. Manuel Baradero on essentially the same grounds. We shall deal with both motions together. While what respondents Belo and Baradero received were denominated as "per diem," the amounts received were actually in the nature of a compensation or pay. What should therefore be considered as controlling in both cases would be the nature of remuneration, not the label attached to it. Respondent Belo held the position of Vice-Governor of Capiz continuously between January 5, 1972 up to February 1, 1988. From January 25, 1972 up to December 31, 1979, she held office by virtue of an election and was paid a fixed salary. 1 From December 31, 1979 up to February 1, 1988, she held the position of Vice Governor of Capiz in a holdover capacity, broken down into two periods: 2 1. A period in which she was paid on a per diem basis from December 31, 1976 to December 31, 1979; and 2. A period in which she was paid a fixed salary from January 1, 1980 to February 1,1988. In its June 7, 1989 Resolution 3 on the matter, CSC held that the services rendered for the first holdover period between January 31, 1976 to January 1, 1979 was creditable for purposes of retirement. CSC noted that during the entire holdover period, respondent Belo actually served on a full time basis as Vice Governor and was on call 24 hours a day. Disagreeing with the CSC's insistence that the period in which respondent Belo was paid on a per diem basis should be credited in computing the number of years of creditable service to the government, GSIS subsequently filed a petition for certiorari before this court, questioning the orders of the CSC. Agreeing that per diems were not compensation within the meaning of Section 1(c) of R.A. 1573 which amended Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186 (Government Service Insurance Act), we granted the petitions in G.R. Nos. 98395 and 102449, 4 and reversed the CSC Orders and Resolutions in question. ISSUE Whether or not regular service in government on a per diem basis, without any other form of compensation or emolument, is compensation within the contemplation of the term "service with compensation" under the Government Service Insurance Act of 1987.

HELD We are convinced that the "per diem" she received was actually paid for in the performance of her duties as Vice-Governor of Capiz in a holdover capacity not as the per diem referred to by section 1(c) of R.A. No 1573 which amended Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186 (Government Insurance Service Act). A closer look at the aforecited provision, moreover, reveals a legislative intent to make a clear distinction between salary, pay or compensation, on one hand, and other incidental allowances, including per diems on the other. Section 1(c) provides: (c) Salary, pay or compensation shall be construed as to exclude all bonuses, per diems, allowances and overtime pay, or salary, pay or compensation given to the base pay of the position or rank as fixed by law or regulations. 5 Since it is generally held that an allowance for expenses incident to the discharge of an office is not a salary of office, 6 it follows that if the remuneration received by a public official in the performance of his duties does not constitute a mere "allowance for expenses" but appears to be his actual base pay, then no amount of categorizing the salary as base pay, a "per diem" would take the allowances received by petitioner from the term service with compensation for the purpose of computing the number of years of service in government. Furthermore, it would grossly violate the law's intent to reward the public servant's years of dedicated service to government for us to gloss over the circumstances surrounding the payment of the said remunerations to the petitioner in taking a purely mechanical approach to the problem by accepting an attached label at face value. In the sense in which the phrase " per diem" is used under the Government Service Insurance Law, a per diem is a daily allowance given for each day an officer or employee of government is away from his home base. 8 This is its traditional meaning: its usual signification is as a reimbursement for extra expenses incurred by the public official in the performance of his duties. 9 Under this definition the per diem intended to cover the cost of lodging and subsistence of officers and employees when the latter are on duty outside of their permanent station. 10 The clear intent of the Government Insurance Law was to exclude those extra incidental expenses or incurred on a daily basis covered by the traditional definition of the term per diem. An important fact missed from our earlier decision was that, while respondent Belo was paid on a per diem basis during her first holdover period as Vice Governor she was subsequently paid a fixed salary, which apparently rectified an otherwise anomalous situation. The services rendered by respondent Belo having been continuous, the disputed period should be credited for purposes of retirement. The distinctions between salary and per diem made hereinabove were in fact adverted to in our original decision dated October 28, 1994. In explaining the allowance of service rendered on a per diem basis in the case of Inocencio vs. Ferrer of the Social Security System, we noted with approval the Government Service Insurance System's explanation that the per diem service which was credited for purposes of retirement was Commissioner Ferrer's full time service as Hearing Officer not his per diem service for attendance at Board Meetings. Even then, we indirectly noted the difference between per diem paid as compensation for services rendered on a full time basis and per diem as allowance for incidental expenses. Respondent Belo asserts, with reason, that the per diems paid to her, while reckoned on the basis of attendance in Board Meetings, were for her full time services as Vice Governor of the Province of Capiz. In fact, the same service, albeit still on a holdover basis, was eventually paid with a fixed salary.

Cena v CSC Facts: Gaudencio Cena worked for 7 years as a Legal Officer of the Law Dept of Caloocan City. He was then transferred to the Office of the Congressman where he worked as a Supervising Staff Officer for 3 months. He was then appointed as Registrar of the RD (Register of Deeds) in Malabon. In total, he has rendered govt service for 11 years, 9 months and 6 days. Before reaching his 65th bday, he requested the LRA Administrator that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the 15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with full benefits of old age pension. The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from the CSC. The CSC denied the extension but Cena filed a motion for reconsideration. This time around, CSC granted a 1-yr extension to him. Cena still filed a case against CSC for grave abuse of discretion when it granted an extension of only 1 yr. He contends that the law(Sec 11, PD 1146 also known as Revised Govt Insurance Act) does not limit or specify the maximum number of years the retiree may avail of to complete the 15-year service. Thus, the CSC has no authority to limit through a memorandum the number of years. In defense, CSC said that since it is the central personnel agency of the govt, it is vested with power to grant or allow extension of service beyond retirement age. Issue: Whether or not Cena is allowed to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement? Held: Yes. An administrative circular, such as a memorandum of the CSC cannot limit PD 1146, on extension of service of employees who reach 65. While it is true that CSC is given the authority to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service, it cannot extend to matters not covered. The CSCs authority is limited only to carrying into effect what PD 1146 says. It cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. The CSC Memorandum, being in the nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle that a regulation must be in harmony with the provisions of the law and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. CSC has no power to supply or add perceived omissions in PD 1146.

CSC denied Rabors request. Rabor asked for reconsidered of CSC ruling citing Cena case but was denied. Rabor reiterated his request to Mayor Duterte but was rebuffed. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON Rabor request for extension should be granted in view of Cena case Held: No. Cena doctrine overturned. In Cena v. CSC, the Court reached its conclusion primarily on the basis of the "plain and ordinary meaning" of Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms, there were (and still are) two (2) administrative issuances which prescribe limitations on the extension of service that may be granted to an employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age. These are CSC Circular No. 27, s. 1990 and OP M.C. No. 65. The Court resolved the challenges posed by the above two (2) administrative regulations by, firstly, considering as invalid Civil Service Memorandum No. 27 and, secondly, by interpreting the Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65 as inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T. Cena. Nevertheless, the Court now ruled that the SC in Cena made a narrow interpretation. It is incorrect to decide the issue on the basis only of PD 1146. Reading the pertinent provisions the Admin Code particularly the provisions governing the CSC, it is clear that both the Admin Code and PD 1146 are the governing laws relating to retirement of government officials and employees. It was on the basis of the above quoted provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code that the Civil Service Commission promulgated its Memorandum Circular No. 27. In doing so, the Commission was acting as "the central personnel agency of the government empowered to promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for efficient, responsive and effective personnel administration in the government." It was also discharging its function of "administering the retirement program for government officials and employees" and of "evaluat[ing] qualifications for retirement." It is also incorrect to say that limitation of permissible extensions of service after an employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not germane to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The physiological and psychological processes associated with ageing in human beings are in fact related to the efficiency and quality of the service that may be expected from individual persons. CSC Memo No. 27 is not invalid for having gone beyond the parameters set by PD 1146. In fact what the legislature intends is that the CSC should fill in the details in the implementation of PD 1146.

RABOR V. CSC Facts: Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City. He entered the government service as a Utility Worker on 10 April 1978 at the age of 55 years. Sometime in May 1991, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he had already more than 68 years old. Rabor responded by showing a GSIS certificate with a notation to the effect that his service is extended for him to complete the 15years requirement for retirement. The Davao City Government wrote to the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission, Region XI, Davao City informing the latter of the foregoing and requesting advice as to what action should be taken on Rabors case. Director Caward replied by saying that Rabors continued employment is contrary to OP M.C. No. 65 hence, it is nonextendible. Mayor Duterte furnished Rabor a copy of Cawads letter and order him not to work anymore. Rabor asked Director Cawad for extension of his job until he completed the 15-year requirement but was denied. Rabor then asked OP for an dextension. His request was referred by OP to CSC and thereafter

Case title: GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs COURT OF APPEALS and FELONILA ALEGRE GR NO: GR No. 128524 Date: April 20, 1999 Petitioner: GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) Respondent: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELONILA ALEGRE Ponente: ROMERO, J.; Facts: Felonila Alegre's deceased husband, SPO2 Florencio A. Alegre, was a police officer assigned to the Philippine National Police station in the town of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. On that fateful day of December 6, 1994, he was driving his tricycle and ferrying passengers within the vicinity of Imelda Commercial Complex when SPO4 Alejandro Tenorio, Jr., Team/Desk Officer of the Police Assistance Center located at said complex, confronted him regarding his tour of duty. SPO2 Alegre allegedly snubbed SPO4 Tenorio and even directed curse words upon the latter. A verbal tussle then ensued between the two which led to the fatal shooting of the deceased police officer. On account of her husband's death, private respondent seasonably filed a claim for death benefits with petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 626. In its decision on August 7, 1995, the GSIS, however, denied the claim on the ground that at the time of SPO2 Alegre's death, he was performing a personal activity which was not work-connected. Subsequent appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) proved futile as said body, in a decision dated May 9, 1996, merely affirmed the ruling of the GSIS. Private respondent finally obtained a favorable ruling in the Court of Appeals when on February 28, 1997, the appellate court reversed 2 the ECC's decision and ruled that SPO2 Alegre's death was work-connected and, therefore, compensable. Aggrieved, GSIS comes to us on petition for review on certiorari reiterating its position that SPO2 Alegre's death lacks the requisite element of compensability which is, that the activity being performed at the time of death must be work-connected. Issue: May a moonlighting policeman's death be considered compensable? Held: Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing his official functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer, it is not difficult to understand then why SPO2 Alegre's widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or permission of his superior officer. In the absence of such prior authority as in the cases of

Hinoguin and Nitura, or peacekeeping nature of the act attended to by the policeman at the time he died even without the explicit permission or directive of a superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is no justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in the ECC guidelines. That he may be called upon at any time to render police work as he is considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will not change the conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed in a situation where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In fact, he was refusing to render one pointing out that he had already complied with the duty detail. At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police service in character. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42003 dated February 28, 1997, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 86020 August 5, 1994 RAMON CORPORAL, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents. QUIASON, J.: This is a petition for certiorari questioning the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission which denied petitioner's claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. I Norma Peralta Corporal was employed as a public school teacher with assignment in Juban, Sorsogon. On November 28 to November 30, 1977, she was confined at the Esteves Memorial Hospital for acute coronary insufficiency and premature ventricular contractions. On June 30, 1983, she was assigned to the Banadero Elementary School in Daraga, Albay. Norma had to walk three kilometers to and from said school as no transportation was available to ferry her and other teachers from the national highway to the school. During her fourth pregnancy, Norma suffered a complete abortion and was hospitalized for two days at the Albay Provincial Hospital. After her maternity leave, Norma reported back to work. In March of 1984, she again conceived. However, in September of the same year, she was transferred to the Kilicao Elementary School, where she had to walk more than one kilometer of rough road. On December 2, 1984, she gave birth to a baby boy with the help of a "hilot." An hour later, she was rushed to the Immaculate Conception Hospital due to profuse vaginal bleeding. She underwent a hysterectomy but unfortunately, she died on the same day due to "shock, severe hemorrhage" resulting from a "prolapse(d) uterus post partum." Norma was 40 years old when she died. Her husband, Ramon Corporal, petitioner herein, filed a claim for compensation benefit with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). The GSIS denied petitioner's claim thus: Please be advised that on the basis of the proofs and evidences (sic) submitted to the System, the cause of death of your wife, Shock secondary to Severe Hemorrhage, Uterine PROLAPSE is not considered an occupational disease as contemplated under the above-mentioned law (P.D. No. 626). Neither was there any showing that her position as Teacher, MECS, Albay had increased the risk of contracting her ailment (Rollo, p. 23). Petitioner filed several motions for the reconsideration of the denial of his claim to no avail, because a re-evaluation of the claim by the Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Group of the GSIS showed that there was "no basis to alter its previous action of denial for the same reason . . . that her cause of death is nonwork-connected as contemplated under the law" and neither did her job as a teacher increase the risk of contracting her ailment (Rollo, p. 25). Petitioner appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC). The ECC requested the GSIS to re-evaluate petitioner's claim and to finally determine compensability, with instruction that in case the claim is denied once more by the System, the entire record of the case be elevated to the ECC. The GSIS reiterated its denial of petitioner's claim. On September 7, 1988, the ECC rendered a decision also denying petitioner's claim. It said:

Medical studies show that Prolapsed Uterus may occur in infants and nulliparous women as well as multiparas. Defects in innervation and in the basic integrity of the supporting structures account(s) for prolapse(d) in the first two and childbirth trauma for the latter. The cervix usually elongates because the weight of the nagging vaginal tissues pulls it downward, whereas the attached but weak cardinal ligaments tend(s) to support it. In third degree or complete prolapse(d) both the cervix and the body of the uterus have passed through the introitus and the entire vaginal canal is inverted. (Obstetrics and Gynecology, Wilson, Beecham, Carrington, 3rd Edition, p. 585). On the other hand Acute Coronary Insufficiency are terms often used to describe a syndrome characterized by prolonged substernal pain, usually not relieved by vasodilators of a short period of rest due to a more severe inadequacy of coronary circulation. The symptoms in this condition are more intense and prolonged than in angina pectoris, but abnormal ECG and other laboratory findings associated with myocardial infarction are absent. The syndrome is covered by a temporary inability of one's coronary arteries to supply sufficient oxygenated blood to the heart muscle. (Merck, Manual of Diagnosis & Therapy, pp. 100-101). Based on the above medical discussion of the subject ailments, we believe that the development of the fatal illness has no relation whatsoever with the duties and working conditions of the late teacher. There is no showing that the nature of her duties caused the development of prolapse of the uterus. The ailment was a complication of childbirth causing profuse vaginal bleeding during the late stage. We also consider Acute Coronary Insufficiency as non-work-connected illness for the reason that it is caused by temporary inability of one coronary arteries (sic) to supply oxygenated blood to the heart muscle. There is no damage to heart muscle. In view thereof, we have no recourse but to sustain respondent's denial of the instant claim (Rollo, pp. 29-31). Hence, petitioner filed the instant compensability of the death of his wife. II Petitioner contends that although prolapsed uterus is not one of occupational diseases listed by the ECC, his claim should proper under the increased risk theory. He anchors such claim on the fact that as early as January 1984 or before Norma's fifth pregnancy, he had noticed a spherical tissue which appeared like a tomato protruding out of Norma's vagina and rectum. He avers that such condition was attributable to Norma's long walks to and from her place of teaching Banadero Elementary School, which is situated on the side of the Mayon Volcano. Moreover, the roads leading to the school are full of ruts and rocks, and, during the rainy season, are flooded and slippery. Petitioner asserts that inspite of these, Norma continued to discharge her duties as a public servant, notwithstanding her pregnancy and her prolapsed uterus. Petitioner also contends that the findings of the respondents contravene the constitutional provision on social justice. He alleges that since the workmen's compensation law is a social legislation, its provisions should be interpreted liberally in favor of the employees whose rights it intends to protect. petition, asserting

Under P.D. No. 626, as amended, for sickness and the resulting death of an employee to be compensable, the claimant must show either: (a) that it is a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation with the conditions set therein satisfied; or (b) that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions (Santos v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 221 SCRA 182 [1993]; Quizon v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 203 SCRA 426 [1991]). Clearly, then, the principle of aggravation and presumption of compensability under the old Workmen's Compensation Act no longer applies (Latagan v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 213 SCRA 715 [1992]). Since petitioner admits that his wife died of an ailment which is not listed as compensable by the ECC and he merely anchors his claim on the second rule, he must positively show that the risk of contracting Norma's illness was increased by her working conditions. Petitioner failed to satisfactorily discharge the onus imposed by law. The fact that Norma had to walk six kilometers everyday and thereafter, a shorter distance of more than one kilometer just to reach her place of work, was not sufficient to establish that such condition caused her to develop prolapse of the uterus. Petitioner did not even present medical findings on the veracity of his claim that Norma had a tomato-like spherical tissue protruding from her vagina and rectum. Norma developed prolapse of the uterus because she was multiparas, or one who had more than one child, and quite beyond the safe child-bearing age when she gave birth to her fifth child she was already forty years old.Novak's Textbook on Gynecology describes prolapse of the uterus (descensus uteri) as follows: An extremely common condition, being far more frequent in elderly than in young patients. This is explained by the increasing laxity and atony of the muscular and fascial structures in later life. The effects of childbirth injuries may thus make themselves evident, in the form of uterine prolapse, many years after the last pregnancy. Pregnancies in a prolapsed uterus may lead to numerous complications, as noted by Piver and Spezia. The important factor in the mechanism of the prolapse is undoubtedly injury or overstretching of the pelvic floor, and especially of the cardinal ligaments (Mackenrodt) in the bases of the broad ligaments. Combined with this there is usually extensive injury to the perineal structures, producing marked vaginal relaxation and also frequent injury to the fascia or the anterior or posterior vaginal walls, with the production of cystocele or rectocele. Usually, various combinations of these conditions are seen, although at times little or no cystocele or rectocele is associated with the prolapse.Occasional cases are seen for that matter, in women who have never borne children, and in these the prolapse apparently represents a hernia of the uterus through a defect in the pelvic fascial floor(Emphasis supplied). The 1986 Current Medical Diagnosis & Treatment also describes the condition as follows: Uterine prolapse most commonly occurs as a delayed result of childbirth injury to the pelvic floor (particularly the transverse cervical and uterosacral ligaments). Unrepaired obstetric lacerations of the levator musculature and perineal body augment the weakness. Attenuation of the pelvic structures with aging

and congenital weakness can accelerate the development of prolapse. The determination of whether the prolapse of Norma's uterus developed before or after her fifth pregnancy is therefore immaterial since this illness is the result of the physiological structure and changes in the body on pregnancy and childbirth. With the evidence presented in support of the claim, petitioner's prayer cannot be granted. While as a rule labor and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant, (Tria v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 208 SCRA 834 [1992]), there is also the rule that such liberal construction and interpretation of labor laws may not be applied where the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and P.D. No. 626, as amended, are clear and leave no room for interpretation. The Court commiserates with the petitioner and his children for the loss of a loved one. We also recognize the importance of the services rendered by public elementary school teachers inspite of their meager salaries which are not proportionate to their immense responsibility in molding the values and character of the youth in this country (De Vera v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 133 SCRA 685 [1984]). But under the legal milieu of the case, we can only suggest, not mandate, that respondents grant ex gratia some form of relief to their members similarly situated as petitioner's wife. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 90267 December 21, 1993 PERLITA LOPEZ, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents. QUIASON, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Article 181 of the Labor Code and Section 16 of the Interim Rules of 1983 of the decision of respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) dated June 28, 1989 in ECC Case No. 4331 entitled "Perlita Lopez v. Government Service Insurance System," which affirmed the denial by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) of the claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, to claimant-petitioner, Perlita Lopez. Petitioner's late husband, Pedro Lopez, was employed as a public school teacher at the Urdaneta National High School, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, from July 1, 1973 until his untimely demise on May 27, 1987. On April 27, 1987, a memorandum was issued to Pedro Lopez by the head of the school's Science Department and noted by Lino A. Caringal, Sr. the principal, which reads: In view of your long and competent teaching experience as a PHYSICS Teacher and in anticipation with (sic) the forthcoming Division Search for Outstanding Improvised Secondary Science Equipment for Teachers to be held at the TAP Bldg. in Lingayen, Pangasinan on October 8 and 9, 1987, you are hereby designated to prepare the MODEL DAM, UNHS official entry to said contest. In this connection, you are further advised to complete this MODEL DAM on or before scheduled date of the contest (Rollo, p. 54; emphasis supplied). Lopez complied with his superior's instruction and constructed an improvised electric micro-dam, which he took home to enable him to finish it before the deadline. On May 27, 1987, at around 6:30 A.M., while he was engrossed in his project, he in contact with a live wire was electrocuted. He was immediately brought to a clinic for emergency treatment but was pronounced dead on arrival. The death certificate showed that he died of cardiac arrest due to accidental electrocution. Petitioner then filed a claim for death benefits with the GSIS, which was denied on the ground that her husband's death did not arise out and in the course of employment. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. She then elevated the case to the ECC for review, which affirmed the decision rendered by the GSIS and dismissed the same. The sole issue for us to resolve is whether or not respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the cause of death of petitioner's husband is not work connected and therefore it is not compensable under P.D. No. 626. Respondent ECC argued that based on the certification issued by the school principal, Lopez at the time of the accident was supposed to report for duty to help in the enrollment of the 4th year class, but he opted to remain at his house to finish the project. Hence, respondent ECC contends, that the claim for death benefits failed to satisfy the conditions set forth under Sec. 1 (a), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. Said rule states:

For an injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident, satisfying all the following conditions: 1 The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; 2. The employee must have been performing his official functions; and 3. If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order from its superior. The Employees Compensation Act is a social legislation whose primordial purpose is to provide amelioration of the working class of our society. As held in the case of Nitura v. Employees Compensation Commission, 201 SCRA 278 (1991): As an official agent charged by law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by the Constitution, the ECC should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection with the incident. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations should be resolved in favor of labor. In the case of Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. v. Quiroz, 16 SCRA 784 (1966), we held: xxx xxx xxx An injury or accident befalls a man "in the course of" his employment, if it occurs while he is doing what a man may reasonably do within a time during which he is employed, and at a place where he may reasonably be during the time, 13 NACCA LAW JOURNAL 28-29, And it "arises out of" the work of the employer, when it results from a risk or reasonably inherent in or incidental to the conduct of such work or business. "In the course of" points to the place and circumstances under which the accident takes place and the time when it occurs. Of the two phrases on work connection, "in the course of" is deemed broader than "arising out of" (Fernandez and Quiason, Labor Standards and Welfare Legislation, 1964 ed., pp. 563-564). While the death of Pedro Lopez took place in his house and not in his official work station, which is the school, he was still discharging his function as the one in-charge of the project. He was constrained to finish the project within a specific period of time and he could only do so if he worked overtime in his house. The death of petitioner's husband is service-connected even if it happened during the summer vacation. He was still under the employ of the government and there still existed an employeremployee relationship although teachers do not report for duty during that period (Pepito v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 78 SCRA 35 [1977] ). It can even be said that the conditions set forth under sec. 1, par. (a), Rule III of the amended Rules on Employees Compensation, have been complied with.

The said rule requires that the injury must have been sustained by the employee at "the place where his work requires him to be" and if the injury is sustained elsewhere the employees "must have been executing an order from his superior." Inasmuch as Lopez had to finish the project on the time for the contest scheduled on October 5 and 9, 1987, it can be implied that Lopez was given permission, if not direction, to perform his work at his house. Respondent ECC cannot rely on the fact that Lopez had been ordered by the school principal to report for duty to assist in the enrollment of the fourth-year students on the day of the accident. Lopez was electrocuted at 6:30 A.M. while he was working on the model he was asked to build. To claim that he should have been in school at the time he died in order to entitle his widow any compensation benefits, is to strain good sense and logic. For an injury to be compensable it is not important that the cause therefor shall have taken place within the purview of his employment, performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental thereto, the injury sustained by reason thereof falls within the protection of the law regardless of the place of injury (ECC Implementing Rules and Regulations, Rule III, Sec. 1; ECC Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984; Enao v. Employees Compensation Commission, 135 SCRA 660 [1985]). The thrust of social justice is compassion for the poor. By denying under the peculiar circumstances the claim of the petitioner for benefits arising from the death of her husband, public respondents ignored this public policy and committed a grave abuse of discretion. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the decision of respondent Employees Compensation Commission is REVERSED. The Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to pay the death benefits to petitioner, with legal rate of interest from the filing of the claim until it is fully paid, attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the award and costs of suit. SO ORDERED.