ilitary

VIew
III This Issue
+ Unified Command
+ US Global Strategy
+ Horsepower for Vietnam
May 69
UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL
STAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
COMMANDANT
Major General John H. Hay, Jr.
ACTING DEPUTY COMMANDANT
Colonel Benjamin D. Capshaw
The Military Review is published by the United States Army Command and General
Staff College in close association with the United States Army War College. It provides a
forum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy, national
security affairs, and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of command.
Military Review
Professional Journal of the US Army
Is the Unified Command Obsolete? LTC Sam L. Barth, USA 3
Military Assistance to Latin America . . James C. Haahr 12
Warnings Must Be Heeded . GEN J. A. Grat von Kielmansegg, FRG Army, Ret 22
Warsaw Treaty Organization LTC Paul R. Shirk, USA, Ret 28
Tukhachevsky: Dynamic Revolutionary LTC Hugo W. Matson, USA 38
The Collapse of US Global Strategy . Howard G. Kurtz 43
Harriet B. Kurtz
Japan: Eye on 1970 . . . . John K. Emmerson 53
Fortifications in Theater of Operations COL W. G. Stewart, USA 67
Fathers of the Blitzkrieg . . LTC Bruno J. Rolak, USA, Ret 73
Red Army at the Bavarian Border
Wilhelm MeyerDetring 77
Horsepower for Vietnam MAJ James L. McCoskey, USA 85
The Bayonet
CPT A. L. Thompson, British Army 93
Reader Forum
98
Military Notes
99
Military Books
109
library of Congress Catalog Card No 34-33760 Rev
The VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS' and not necessarily those of the
US Army or the Command and General Staff College.
Editor in Chief
COL Donald J. Delaney
Associate EdOor
COL John B. B. Trussell, Jr. '
Army War College
Assistant EdOor
LTC A. Leroy Covey
Features Editor
LTC Robert G. Main
Production Editor
Helen M. Hall
SpanishAmerican Editor
MAl Juan HortaMerly
Brazilian Editors
LTC Samuel T. T. Primo
LTC Romero Lepesqueur
Publication Officer
MAJ Donald E. Tuman
Art and Design
Charles A. Moore
MILITARY REVIEW-Published monthly by the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leav
enworth, Kansas, in English, Spanish, and Portuguese. Use of funds for printing of this publication has
been approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army, 25 July 1968.
Second-class postage Caid at Fort' Leavenworth, Kansas. Subscription rates: $4.00 !US currency) a
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jltlttnru itultw
.Awnrb .Antelt
The Military Review announces the selection of the following arti
cle from the March 1969 issue as a MILITARY REVIEW AWARD
ARTICLE:
"Mao's Thoughts: Still a Blueprint for Action"
Colonel John B. McKinney. United States Army
Colonel McKinney discusses some of Mao's basic philosophy and inter
prets some actions which may be taken by Communist China in the future.
Mao's published thoughts show that he takes the long view of history and
is willing to accept tactical losses to achieve strategic victories. His
strategy is timeless and the United States is the implacable foe. Mao's
grand design is to restore the boundaries and grandeur of the Middle
Kingdom with Peking once again as the center of the universe.
* *
*
COMING:
Stanley L. Harrison, in "NATO's Role After Czechoslovakia," discusses the
events which led to the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and the re
actions by the various members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
As a result of the invasion, he feels the alliance will alter, and he sees heart
ening signs in the efforts of President Richard M. Nixon to turn the United
States toward Europe in a positive manner. He suggests that NATO will
change internally, and he anticipates changes in the role to be played by each
member state.
Colonel Robert B. Rigg, United States Army, Retired, in "How Not to Report
a War," writes of the paradox concerning the Vietnam war which is the best
documented war in all history, yet is the least understood in terms of mili
tary and political progress. He discusses the credibility gap between press
and governmental reports and suggests that the surrender rate would be a much
better gauge than the popularized "body count' to determine who is winning.
1922 1969
Is
Lieutenant Colonel Sam L. Barth, United States Arm/l
The 'Views expressed in this ar
ticle are the author's and do not nec
essarily reflect those of the Depart
ment of Defense or its agencies.
-Editor.
T
HE United States, in playing a
major role in world affairs, has
continually sought to improve the
management of her participation. One
of the earliest post-World War II con
tributions toward improved coordina-
May 1969
tion of the elementa of national secu
rity was unification of the military
departments. Preceding this step, how
ever, was the establishment of uni
fied military commands for exercising
joint control over all of the military
services stationed within a designated
area.
Despite the national and regional
unification of command of the armed
services, integration of the other as
pects of national security with the
3
UNIFIED COMMAND
military element has not been as suc
cessful. Real coordination of the po
litical, psychological, and economic
facets of national power with the mil
itary factor often has been left to
chance. Although the National Secu
rity Act of 1947 established a Na
tional Security Council, it did not pro
vide a comprehensive mechanism for
insuring that all of the elements of
our strength would regularly be
brought to bear in achieving o ~ r goals
throughout the world.
US Embassy
The most extensive experience in
integrating all of these factors has
taken place at the point farthest re
moved from Washington-the US Em
bassy. There, the Ambassador presides
over a Country Team, adhering to a
concept which was codified by Presi
dent John F. Kennedy in his letter of
authority to each of the US Ambas
sadors. In it, he wrote that "1 shall
count on you to oversee and coordinate
all of the activities of the United
States government in ...." However,
as the President pointed out, the au
thority did not "include US military
forces operating in the field where
such forces are under the command of
Lieutenant Colonel Sam L. Barth is
on the faculty of the US Naval War
College. He holds a B.S. from Indiana
University, Bloomington;- an M.S. in
International Relations from the
American University, Washington;
and is a 1968 graduate of the US
Army War College. He has served with
the US Military Mission with the Ira
nian Army; the 81d Airborne Divi
sion; the 8th Infantry Division in
Germany; with the Office of the Dep
uty Chief of Staff for Personnel, De
partment of the Army; in Korea, with.
the fd Infantry Division; and with.
the Office of Personnel Operations in
Wash.ington.
a United States area military com
mander."
This line of authority, he empha
sized, ran from the area commander
through the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) and the Secretary of Defense
to the President. Nevertheless, the
Ambassador was charged with work
ing "closely with the appropriate area
military commander." In the event
that the Ambassador believed that "ac
tivities by the United States military
forces may adversely affect our overall
relations with the people or govern
ment of . . ." then the Ambassador
was to "promptly discuss the matter
with the militarycommander." If they
were unable to resolve the question,
the Ambassador was to "request a de
cision by higher authority." ,
New Concept
Later, in order to improve in Wash
ington the integrated direction of all
of the elements of national security,
approval was given for the creation
of something "analogous to the Am
bassador and his Country Team." Un
der this new concept, each "regional
Assistant Secretary of State would
head an interdepartmental committee
called the Interdepartmental Regional
Group (lRG)." Above it, and simi
larily organized, is the Senior Interde
partmental Group (SIG) headed by
the Under Secretary of State. As "ex
ecutive chairman," the Under Secre
tary and the Assistant Secretaries
have "not only the authority but also
the responsibility for settling any is
sue on the agenda.'"
Permanent membership in the SIG
1 Subcommittee on National Seeurity Staftlng
and Operations, Con:amittee on Government Op.
eratfons. United States Senate. "The Ambassador
and the Problem. of Coordination,'- US Govern
ment Printlpl' Ofllce. Washlnirlon. 1963. pp 166..
167.
Maxwell D. Taylor. nThe Development of
States Role In Coordinating Forefa'h Aft'alrs," De ..
PQrlment of State N61D8lettu. May 1966. p 4.
Military Review
4
and the IRG includes representation
from State, Defense, JCS, Agency for
International Development (AID),
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
and the US Information Agency (US
IA). Other agencies such as the Treas
ury Department and the Department
of Agriculture can participate when
UNIFIED COMMAND
relationships are shown in Figure 1.
Because the nonmilitary agencies do
not have regional organizations, the
IRG's must serve not only for policy
coordination. but hopefully as a means
for integrating US activities within
the area as well. While policy bearing
upon military forces may similarly
REGIONAL COORDINATION OF FOREIGN ACTIVITIES

STAlE
SENIOR
INlEROIPMITIIEMTAI.
GIIOIlI'
1NlEROIP_AI.
REGIOIW._
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OTHIR

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AGIIICYIOII
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IGNCY
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1
I I
1
1
.1
_ ______..1.
:
___
L. ___________
COUNTRY TEAM
---DIRECTlOH
---- COORDINATION
Figure 1.
"business affecting them is on the
agenda." An indication of the author
ity found in the SIG can be noted by
the requirement that the Deputy Sec
retary of Defense and the Chairman
of the JCS represent their respective
organizations. Presumably. the next
level of officialdom meets in the IRG.
Thus. there have been developments
at both ends of the spectrum which
are directed toward bringing the mil
itary elements and the nonmilitary
closer together. The remaining orga
nizational anomalies. however. need to
be emphasized. Current organizational
be coordinated. it is expected that op
erations will be directed by the uni
fied commanders. However, the unified
commander is forced to become in
volved in foreign policy matters when
ever the Ambassador of any of the
countries within the command brings
to his attention any "activities by the
United States military forces" which
"may adversely affect" US relations
with that particular country.'
The unified commander is also re
sponsible for providing guidance for
S Subeommfttee on National Security Staffine
and Operations, loe. cit.
May 1969
5
UNIFIED COMMAND
the Military Assistance Advisory
Groups and other military aid mis
sions in countries within his areas of
command. Again, policy coordination
between the unified military com
mander and the individual Ambassa
dors and their Country Teams is re
quired.
The unified commander has a polit
ical advisor (POLAD) on his staff to
"advise and consult with tile com
mander on political, politico-military
and economic matters" within the
command. However, the POLAD is not
considered to be an institutional repre
sentative of the Department of State
nor a liaison officer. Thus, he is not
in a position to coordinate many of
the nonmilitary problems arising
within the region.
Crises Management
Readily apparent, even from a cas
ual knowledge of the events since
1946, is the fact that the unified mil
itary commands have not conducted
regional military operations in the
manner of World War II. Not so ap
parent, though, is the role which the
unified commander has played in the
repeated international crises which
have faced the United States during
the same period.
One crisis, the Korean Conflict, was
confined to that peninsula. Responsi
bility for the conduct of the war fell
to the commander of a relatively small
regional organization-the Far East
Command. Its first commander, Gen
eral of the Army Douglas MacArthur,
was relieved by the President of the
United States for publicly advocating
an expansion of the war beyond the
limited area of his responsibility.
Similarly, in Vietnam, military op
erations are being conducted within
a rather closely defined area. There
has been considerable emphasis on
keeping the war restricted. However,
for the first time in our history, we
have a "fighting" Country Team on the
scene. There, under the Ambassador's
direction, is an integrated effort em
ploying all of the elements of our na
tional power, including a coordinated
military organization, in order to ac
complish our goals.
Although the US Military Assist
ance Command, Vietnam, is a nominal
subordinate unified component of the
Pacific Command, the Country Team
concept and the close Washington su
pervision place the Commander in
Chief, Pacific, in a supporting role. So,
just as occurred during the Korean
War, the Pacific Command has a sec
ondary function in the limited war
area.
Berlin Confrontation
An excellent example of the manner
in which Washington controls crisis
situations can be noted in the 1961
Berlin confrontation. At that time,
President Kennedy appointed General
Lucius D. Clay as his personal repre
sentative to Berlin. Although cau
tioned to remain "in close touch" with
both the US Berlin commander and
our Ambassador, there was no doubt
that General Clay had direct access to
the White House.' Because of Clay's
line of communications, the US Euro
pean Command commander and the
US Ambassador must have thought
themselves somewhat superfluous.
A year later, during the Cuban mis
sile crisis, the President watched the
tracking of each ship in the White
House Situation Room.' It would cer
tainly seem accurate, in view of this
.. "Clay Will Return to Berlin to Represent
President.'" The NetI! York Timel. 81 August
1$61. p 2.
A Theodore Sorensen, Ktmttedll. Harper" Row.
N. Y.. 1965, p 710.
Military Revi
6
UNIFIED COMMAND
high-level concern, to say that the
Commander in Chief, Atlantic, must
have felt that his freedom of action
was highly circumscribed.
More recently, during the Domin
ican Republic crisis, the President had
a direct line to our Ambassador there
-nor is there likely to be a significant
In the future, it is expected that our
forward deployed forces will be re
duced because of the contribution of
the C-5A and the fast deployment lo
gistics to an improved capability for
a rapid, substantial employment of our
general purpose reserve forces. The
significance of the present concept of
AREAS WHI!RE MILITARY
CONSIDERATIONS PREDOMINATE
REGIONAL TEAM AREAS
Figure 2.
change in the President's participation
in crises in the future. The issues are
too great for him to forego this re
sponsibility.
Contributing to the growth of cen
tralized control has been the contin
ued ill\Provement in more rapid means
of communication and transportation.
As the world grows smaller and the
opportunity for friction between the
great powers continues to increase,
there is little possibility that the au
tonomy of field commanders will be
restored.
May 1969
a unified military command is likely
to diminish under this development.
Yet the military services will continue
to have a significant role to play in
the regional overseas operations of the
United States.
Now, and in the future, the United
States must watch in all directions for
situations dangerous to our security
and to our national purposes. Can we
watch, coordinate, and act upon mul
tiple crises of the future in the same
manner as in the past? With more
than 130 sovereign countries in the
7
UNIFIED COMMAND
world, this is not possible. We need
to develop new mechanisms. It is time
that we remolded our out-of-date re
gional military organization into an
integrated area organization for "wag
ing both peace and war."
An organization which will provide
regional direction to aU of the US par
ticipants in world affairs must possess
should be able to employ military ele
ments in whatever manner the situa-,
tion dictates. These forces may come :
from those already deployed within the '
area, or they may come from our stra
tegic reserve, based in the United
States.
A regional team, utilizing the best
features of our Country Teams and
'US REGIONAL TEAM
Figure 3.
a number of capabilities. It must be
able to apply aU of the elements of US
national power toward accomplishing
our goals within a region. This re
quires a wide spectrum of means rang
ing from the psychological to military
forces.
A new area grouping must also be
able to monitor closely and to report
regional developments affecting the in
terests of the United States. When
crises occur, the organizational head
quarters must be able to respond
quickly and in precisely the manner
decided in Washington.
If required, the regional focal point
organized to meet an area mISSIon,
could fulfill these requirements. How
ever, organizational differences be
tween State and Defense Departments
regarding the countries which com
prise different regions must be over
come. For instance, it must be decided
if Greece and Turkey belong in Eu
rope, a part of the European Com
mand, or are more properly within the
sphere of the Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs.
Figure 2 is a map indicating a POS
sible alignment of regional responsi
bilities. Shading of the areas indicates
Military Reyiew
8
regions where military considerations
may dominate. Particularly influenc
ing this evaluation is the probability
that we would continue to have de
ployed forces within those areas. The
final determination as to the dominant
UNIFIED COMMAND
team would have an integrated staff
of military. political. economic. psycho
logical. and intelligence representa
tives. Whether headed by an Ambas
sador or a senior military officer. the
team chief would be referred to as the
PROPOSED REGIONAL COORDINATION OF FOREIGN ACTMTIES
d
us INfORIIAIION
~ "
STATE
; , ~
OTHER
AG!ItCY
"
I
,
"
SOIIOiI
H
AGIIfCYRill
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INlERDIPAII1IIIItTAl.G!IOII'
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DIRECTOR
REGIONAl TrAIl
us fIlRCS
I
I
I
I
L
---DIIiCIION AND POlICY
- - - - COORDINATJOM-AGENY ItIATTIRS
Figure 4.
influence would. undoubtedly. be left
to the President.
The reason for differentiating be
tween these two considerations is to
establish responsibility for control and
direction. Areas where military inter
ests predominate would have the re
gional team headed by a military offi
cer. The other regional teams would be
headed by US Ambassadors. The dep
uty would always come from the op
posite service.
Regardless of the designation. each
May 1969
US Regional Director. Figure 3 con
tains a proposed organization chart.
On the military oriented team. one
of the major components might be a
smaller version of our present unified
commands. In that case. the Assistant
Director for Military Affairs would
also serve as commander of the mili
tary component of the team.
Regional team directors would re
port to the appropriate IRG executive
chairman for policy direction. A pro
posed chain of command is shown in
9
UNIFIED COMMAND
Figure 4. There would be no change
in the present work of either the SIG
or the IRG in establishing policy, but
they would be restrained from getting
into operational details. However, just
as the military departments are au
thorized direction of their respective
components of the unified commands
on uniservice matters, so the agencies
would have access to their representa
tives on either the regional or Country
Teams. Policy would continue to flow
from the IRG's to the regional di
rectors.
The relationship of the regional
team directors with the US Ambassa
dors in their area would be a delicate
one. It is expected that much of the
routine diplomatic business pertain
ing to the individual activities of the
countries would continue to take place
directly between the foreign capitals
and Washington. The regional direc
tor must be kept informed of signifi
cant developments if he is to exercise
his responsibilities.
A Working Concept
It can be seen from Figure 2 that
the proposed number of regional teams
outnumbers our present six geo
graphic unified commands. It is ex
pected that a smaller, more compact
area of responsibility would permit the
regional director to supervise his area
more closely. In order to assist con
trol further, it is expected that the
regional headquarters would be located
within this area. From this point, it
is believed that all of the US repre
sentatives would tend to devolop a
common "feel" for developments.
The opportunity to coordinate the
economic and Military Assistance Pro
grams regionally would be particularly
valuable. Possession of this coordina
tion authority would contribute to the
authority of the regional director and
facilitate the accomplishment of the
team's mission. It would also assist the
United States in furthering her na
tionbuilding tasks in the newly emerg
ing areas.
Nonmilitary Missions
The operations of the nonmilitary
regional teams have great promise.
The South Asian Regional Team, for
example, would probably have as its
prime mission the stabilization of the
area. Through an integration of eco
nomic, political, and psychological
teams, they could well contribute to
ward the reduction of the historical
tensions between India and Pakistan.
It is possible to visualize the Middle
Eastern Regional Team taking the
initiative in developing joint func
tional projects for the purpose of sta
bilizing that area. It is only through
a regional team concept that we can
approach the area as a strategic whole.
Where would individuals be found
to staff the regional teams? The di
rector should be a highly qualified
military or foreign service officer with
experience in two or more of the coun
tries within his area of responsibility.
The nonmilitary staff might come
from within the ranks of the State
Department, the AID, and the USIA.
Hopefully, those organizations will be
able to reduce the amount of their de
tailed operational work because of the
capabilities of the regional teams.
However, it might fall upon the mili
tary services, with their years of ex
perience in regional operations, to pro
vide much of the staff initially.
The regional team concept presents
the United States with a realistic op
portunity to accomplish many regional
strategic goals without resort to war.
A US organization on the spot can en-
Military Rniaw
10
courage other nations to cooperate in
the interests of peace.
If, in spite of our best efforts,
threats to our national interests do
arise, we must be capable of coping
with them immediately and within a
structure incorporating all of the ele
ments of national power. If we must
resort to military force, the integrated
regional national security headquar
ters, located close by, can direct the
entire US effort In support of military
operations.
UNIFIED COMMAND
Through the regional team concept
we can overcome the present organi
zational inconsistencies between mili
tary and nonmilitary agencies. The
nonmilitary agencies are also offered
an opportunity to reduce their present
overwhelming span of operational con
trol.
In turn, this wiJI permit the Senior
Interdepartmental Group and the In
terdepartmental Regional Group to de
vote more time to the vital matter of
US strategic policy.
MILITARY REVIEW BINDERS
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becoming dog-eared? Bind them in a sturdy,
hard-covered binder.
Holds 12 issues and the index.
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Please include name, address, and Zip code.
May 1969
11
MILITARY ASSISTANCE
TO LATIN AMERICA
James C. Baahr
U
NITED States military commitments to, and interest
in, the principle of inter-American military coopera
tion have been in existence for a number of decades. Debate
during the past few years on what US military assistance
policies toward Latin America should be contains many of
the same elements of indecision and uncertainty that have
characterized past debate and discullsion with respect to
those policies. The problem, therefore, is not new even
though new dimensions have been added.
Military Review
12
The modern beghmings of those
policies took place in 1946 when Presi
dent Harry S Truman made his initial
proposal for a program of inter
American military cooperation. How
ever, it was not until the passage of
the Mutual Secui"ity Act of 1951 that
an effort was made to put into policy
form those elements of wartime co
operation that the United States
wished to see continued in Latin
America. Standardization of equip
ment was one of thesll elements.
Objectives Stated
. Authorization for such a program
was contained in the 1951 act, and the
program's objectives were stated as
follows:
to maintain the security and to
promote the foreign policy of the
United States by authorizing military,
economic, and technical assistance to
friendly countries to strengthen the
mutual security and individual and col
lective defenses of the free world, to
develop their resources in the interest
of their security and independence and
the national interest of the United
States and to facilitate the effective
James C. Haahr, a Foreign Service
OfJicer, is Supervisor of the Political
OfJice of the American Embassy in
Santo Domingo., Dominican Republic.
He served as Vice Consul to the Amer
ican Consul General in Frankfurt
and in Hamburg, Germany, with the
American Consulate in Martinique,
French West Indies, and in MedeUin,
Colombia. He was with the American
Embassy in The Hague, Netherlands,
and was Special Assistant to the
Under Secretary of State, Washington,
D. C. He was assigned to the American
Embassy in Lima, Peru, as Consul and
as Political Military Affairs Advisor.
He holds a B.A. from George Washing
ton University and is a 1968 graduate
of the US Army War College.
MI,I989
LATIN AMERICA
participation of tltose countries in the
United Nations system for coUective
security.
The act stated that:
military assistance may be
furnished to the other American Re
publics only in accordance with de
fense plans which require the re
cipient nations to participate in mis
sions important to the defense of the
Western Hemisphere.
1
Resolution Recommended
At the consultative meeting of
American Foreign Ministers in Wash
ington in March and April 1951, a res
olution was adopted recommending
that the American Republics:
orient their military prepara
tion in such a way that through self
help and mutual aid . . they can with
out prejudice to their individual self
defense and their internal security:
(a) increase those of their resources
and strengthen those of their armed
forces best adapted to the coUective
defense, and maintain those armed
forces in such status that they can be
promptly available for the defense of
the Continent; and (b) cooperate with
each other, in military matters, in
order to develop the coUective strength
of the Continent necessary to combat
aggression against any of them.
The adoption of the resolution was
largely the result of the United States
seeking support for the war effort in
Korea and for the adoption of a com
mon program to resist the Commu
nist threat. Following these develop
ments, Congress appropriated 38
million dollars for Latin-American
military aid in 1951, and negotiations
began for the purpose of concluding
mutual defense agreements. The first
1 Section 105. Mutual Security Act of 1961.
:: The Department of State Bulletin. 9 April
1951. pp 566-567.
13
LATIN AMERICA
such agreement was concluded with
Ecuador in January 1952. The United
States agreed:
. to make available . . equipment,
materials, services, and other military
assistance designed to promote the de
fense and maintain the peace of the
Western Hemisphere.'
Similar agreen\mts were signed
with Chile, Colombia, Cuba, and feru
in 1952; with Brazil, the Domin'ican
Republic, and Uruguay in 1953; with
LatinAmerican Military Assistance
Program away from the concept of
hemispheric defense toward an em
phasis on meeting the internal sub
versive threat.
There have been many twists and
turns in US military assistance policy
toward Latin America, and the United
States herself has given a new direc
tion to the purpose of military as
sistance for Latin America. However,
the principle of hemispheric solidar
Nicaragua and Honduras in 1954 ;('-' ity and defense remains in the exist
with Haiti and Guatemala in 1955;\
and with Bolivia in 1958. r:
l
Policy Assumptions l
Thus, in this period, US secu'rity
policy assumed that the:
Hemisphere was threatened by
Communist aggression both from
within and without.
Security of strategic areas in the
hemisphere and of inter.American
lines of communication was vital to
the security of every American Re.
public.
Protection of these strategic
areas and communications was a com
mon responsibility.'
It is these policy assumptions that
were questioned and challenged begin.
ning in the late 1950's and which have
produced many of the problems now
connected with US Military Assist
ance Programs to Latin Ameriea.
Many hearings, study committees, and
reports were required to bring US
political and military action into line
with the change in doCtrine. As a reo
suit, it was not until 1964 that the De
partment of State, in an informal
memorandum, stated that the admin
istration was seeking to orient the
of State BuUetjn, 8 March
f The Department 0/ Stats BuUetin. SO March
1954. pp 463..,64.
ing mutual defense assistance agree
ments and continues to haunt US pol
icy toward that area.
Present Problem
The entire question of military as
sistance to Latin America has been
debated with considerable heat in Con.
gress. The issue is also a source of
controversy not only among various
interested agencies of the US Govern
ment, but also within the separate
agencies-notably the Departments of
State and Defense. Congressional pro.
posals to prevent the sale of sophis
ticated military hardware to Latin.
Ameriean countries or to deduct from
economic assistance programs those
amounts spent on such equipment by
LatinAmerican armed forces are
symptomatic of the new mood.
The present climate in Washington
is a great change from that existing
in the early 1950's, a climate which
insisted that the objective was com
mon for all American nations and
which led to the significant amounts
of military assistance extended to
LatinAmerican nations up to the
present time.
The major problem now facing US
policymakers is to attempt to ration
alize military assistance to Latin
Ameriea at a time when the threat
Military Review
14
has changed significantly, when the
hemispheric defense concept is no
longer valid and has not been for a
number of years, and when the eco
nomic development needs of the Latin
American countries have assumed far
more significance and priority than
their defense requirements.
The entire Military Assistance Pro-
LATIN AMERICA
The Military Assistance Program
has been charged variously with fur
nishing aid to dictators, with encour
aging large military forces where they
are not needed, with discouraging eco
nomic development, with providing
equipment that cannot be utilized,
with discouraging the growth of dem
ocratic elements and perpetuating
US Armll'
Demands for economic and social progress make it necessary to apply maximum
resources toward those ends
gram, including the sales program,
has come under sharp attack at home
because of the existence of an alleged
arms race in Latin America and be
cause many of the Latin-American na
tions maintain and support armed
forces at levels considered by certain
quarters in the United States to be
far beyond their requirements. Such
criticism, of course, is not new.
MIY 1989
"militarism" in Latin America, and
with leading to military coups against
legitimate governments.'
The history of social, economic, and
political development and change in
Latin America is so complex and em
braces such a variety of factors alien
to development in the United States
~ HaroJd A Hovey, United Statu Militaf1l Auist
4nce. Frederick A. praeger. N. Y.. 1966. pp
219228.
15
LATIN AMERICA
during the same period that it seems
impossible to justify the charges di
rected against US Military Assistance
Programs in Latin America.
The role of the military forces in
Latin America is equally complex and
difficult for the average American to
understand in the context of his own
America during the past few decades,
and the pronounced change in the
character of the armed forces of that
region, it is equally possible to argue
that the situation now prevailing in
the region could have been consider
ably more unstable and dangerous for
US security interests had it not been
Peru ultimately turned to France to modernize her air force through purchase of the
Miragf! VP. The fuselage of one of the craft is shown here about to be loaded into a
TransoU C160 for delivery to Peru.
environment. It is, perhaps, safe to
say that the image which still prevails
in the United States today of the
Latin-American military leader in
cludes those characteristics which
were, in fact, operative up to the early
1900's and, in some cases, even later.
However, that image fails to take
into account the change from mili
tarism to professionalism in the Latin
American military services, the trend
toward acceptance and support of dem
ocratic administrations, and the de
velopment of professional armed
forces led, for the most part, by dedi
cated and sincere patriots.
Given the nature of political, social,
and economic developments in Latin
for the existence of politicaJly strong
and cohesive armed forces.
The question of the nature and ex
tent of Latin America's military re
quirements has assumed new impor
tance for both United States and
Latin-American policymakers in re
cent years. The trend of present pol
icy formulation is considerably differ
ent from the statements made in the
late 1940's and early 1950's to jus
tify military assistance to Latin
America. Preoccupation with Latin
American military expenditures has
been expressed both in the United
Ststes and in Latin America although
the bulk of the criticism has been
voiced in this country.
Military Review 16
The most recent attempt to face the
problem was at Punta del Este, Uru
guay, in April 1967, but the agreed
position expressed in Chapter VI of
the "Declaration of the Presidents of
the Americas" 'left much to be desired.
That position, in essence, recognized
that the demands of economic and so
cial progress made it necessary to ap
ply the maximum resources to those
ends, and that, consequently, military
expenditures should be limited.
Requirements Differ
However. the statement added that
such expenditures would be limited in
proportion to the actual demands of
national security, in accordance with
each country's constitutional provi
sions, and would avoid those expendi
tures not indispensable for the per
formance of the specific duties of the
armed forces. This means that the de
cision to limit military expenditures
or not is left to each country to decide
based on what it sees as its own se
curity requirements. Those require
ments will inevitably be viewed dif
ferently in Peru than they will be in
Ecuador and Chile on the one hand,
and in Argentina as opposed to Brazil
and Chile on the other.
Subsequently, on 31 October 1967,
Chile's President Eduardo Frei Mon
talva stated that, while his govern
ment neither supported nor sponsored
the disarmamllnt of Latin America, it
believed it necessary to limit the ac
quisition of arms and wished to sig
nify its willingness to participate in
any high-level meeting that I!light be
called to consider the general prob
lem. It is likely, though, that Presi
dent Frei's statement was' prompted,
in part, by Peruvian press and con
gressional reports attempting to jus
tify feru's possible acquisition of
May 1969
LATIN AMERICA
French Mirage fighter aircraft on the
basis of alleged Chilean arms pur
chases from Great Britain and sources
other than the United States.
Replacement Cycle
Is there, in fact, a new arms race
in Latin America? It does not appear
that much basis exists for this charge.
When he was commander in chief of
the US Southern' Command, General
Robert W. Porter testified before the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
that he had no evidence to suggest
that any Latin-American country was
involved in a genuine arms race. He
added that what was involved was a
replacement of obsolete and antiquated
equipment, and that most military
purchases had been within normal
budgetary levels.
On the other hand, Peru has been
portrayed in the US press as embark
ing on an extensive rearmament pro
gram. However, Peru is, perhaps, a
typical case of a Latin-American na
tion which for the past decade or so
has traditionally devoted some 85 to
90 percent of its annual military budg
ets to administrative support, force
maintenance, and nonmilitary proj
ects. Few funds were left over for the
replacement of equipment deemed to
be obsolete.
What has happened, then, is that a
normal replacement cycle arrived, and
the US press and other quarters used
the occasion to represent Peru as in
spiring a new arms race in Latin
America. As a result of Peru's re
quirements, she unsuccessfully sought
to replace her aging F-80 and F-86
fighter aircraft with the US-built F-5,
having in mind a phasing out of the
F-80 and F-86 squadrons. Following
the initial US decision that the F-5
would not be available for Latin
17
LATIN AMERICA
America for several years, Peru then
turned to Great Britain and ultimately
to France for what she saw as her
moderliization needs.
In one sense, however, US policies
may be at fault in that they can lead
to unilateral restrictions on materiel
acquisitions. Such restrictions on
policy that would take into account a
gradual phasing out and replacement
of obsolete equipment in the inven
tories of Latin-American armed serv
ices.
There is little argument in favor
of an unlimited military assistance
policy toward Latin America. Eco-
US AnnJl
The United States has a great stake in Latin America and should participate in the
area's future
types of equipment, unfortunately,
were not adopted multilaterally at
Punta del Este in April 1967. The
subsequent US decision to offer the
F-5 to Peru on a commercial sales
basis tended to alienate the Peruvian
military leaders further following the
initial decision not to provide the air
craft until about 1970. It also appeared
to indicate the lack of a long-range
18
nomic and social development require
ments should have first call on the
limited financial resources available.
Logic, therefore, points necessarily to
the need to limit arms acquisitions by
Latin America.
However, the case-by-case basis that
has characterized recent US policy has
not improved our stance in Latin
America, and it is sometimes forgot-
MilitarJ Review
ten that the United States is dealing
with sovereign and independent coun
tries whose own view of their best in
terests often conflicts with that of the
United States.' What is required is a
common understanding of the nature
of the problem and the development
of a clearly defined policy.
Present Pollcr
The nature of present US military
assistance policy seems to be that:
Each program should relate di
rectly to important US security and
foreign policy interests.
The program should reduce
chances that assistance might support
regional conflicts or undemocratic re
gimes.
Grant aid should be terminated,
and essential military equipment pro
vided on a sales basis, when a recip
ient country has aeveloped the ability
to bear its own defense burden.
With particular regard to Latin
America, the United States desires to
insure that available limited resources
are devoted to economic and social ob
jectives and a regional arms race
avoided. Intentions have been that mil
itary assistance to Latin America en
courage realistic policies in such di
yerse areas as modernization require
ments, lower force levels, decreased
defense expenditures, internal secu
rity needs, and economic development
support. The Fiscal Year 1968 pro
gram was planned at a level of 45.5
million dollars in grant aid, of which
18 million dollars was for training.
The cash-and-credit sales plan totaled
52.5 million dollars.
This description of the nature and
intent of the program is far different
from that presented in the early 1950's
and serves to indicate how far the
United States has moved away from
May 1969
LATIN AMERICA
the concept or myth of hemispheric
defense. However. it is difficult to see
how a program which envisages the
termination of grant aid and tight
ceilings on military sales can at one
and the same time necessarily serve to
reduce force levels and defense ex
penditures.
Political Interests
It should be stated with all frank
ness that the primary purpose of past
and present military assistance to
Latin America has been political. It
is the United States who will have to
assume the burden of the defense of
the Western Hemisphete in case of
need. The Latin-American countries
simply do not have the capability or
the equipment to participate but mar
ginally in hemispheric defense, nor
have they been overly concerned about
Communist encroachments in areas
viewed by them as having little or no
importance to their national interest
or security. Perhaps Korea and Viet
nam are the best examples of Latin
American disinterest in matters that
do not affect them directly.
The concern of the United States,
on the other hand, has been with in
ternal security in the countries to the
south, with securing actual or poten
tial base rights, with influencing mil
itary counterparts, and with gaining
Latin America's collaboration in mil
itary and political matters of impor
tance to the United States. All in all,
if this has, in fact, been the primary
objective of military assistance, the
policies pursued have been reasonably
successful up to now.
More recently, however, with grant
aid to be terminated and with increas
ingly stringent restrictions being
placed on military sales, politico-mili
tary relations between the United
19
LATIN AMERICA
States and Latin America may be in
for a changed and somewhat bleak fu
ture in terms of US interests.
Will the termination of grant aid
lead to a vacuum that could be ex
ploited by European nations and pos
sibly the Soviet Union? Will restric
tions on sales, both in terms of types
of equipment and funds, automatically
tend to drive Latin America to. Euro
pean ~ r m s suppliers? If both questions
are answered in the affirmative, a new
look should be taken at the future of
United States-Latin-American rela
tions in this field.
Future Recommendations
Now that the myth of hemispheric
defense has been removed from policy
formulation, if not completely in pol
icy execution, an agreed statement of
the purpose of inter-American mili
tary collaboration appears to be re
quired. Over the short and long run,
the following steps could serve as the
basis for a new type of collaboration
among the countries of the hemisphere'
and one which would better serve the
interests of the United States:
At the highest military level,
representatives of the United States
and the Latin-American nations
should meet for the purpose of ar
riving at an agreed position on the
nature of the threat facing Latin
America and the hemisphere as a
whole. The present threat would ap
pear to be essentially internal, aided
and abetted from abroad.
Once the nature of the threat has
been determined, attention should be
directed to the type of equipment and
force structures that the Latin-Amer
ican armed forces will require to meet
the threat.
The United States should then
indicate her willingness to assist in
the establishment of realistic force
levels and equipment requirements un
der a new and modified military as
sistance policy to include grant, train
ing, and sales assistance.
The United States, in consulta
tion with Latin-American armed
forces, should establish a long-range
plan for the provision of certain types
of equipment for Latin-American
armed services. Stress would be placed
on internal security and civic action
requirements, but there also should be
provision for gradual replacement of
other types of equipment which the
United States now views as unsuita
ble for the inventories of the Latin
American armed forces. This would
include more modern destroyer-type
vessels to replace the cruisers now in
service in certain naval forces and an
offer to supply a more modern fighter
aircraft provided older models were
phased out and no increase in force
levels resulted from the change.
The United States, with the
agreement of the Latin-American
armed forces, should substantially re
duce the size of her military groups
in Latin America, eliminating posi
tions once required under the hemis
pheric defense concept, but no longer
needed.
The countries should proceed at
the diplomatic level to confirm agree
ments reached and to take whatever
initial steps that might be possible to
reach agreement on a nonreceipt type
of arms limitation agreement relating
to the acquisition of certain types of
hardware by the armed forces of
Latin America.
As a result of these actions, force
levels could be reduced, defense ex
penditures cut, and equipment mod-
Military Reylew 20
ernized. At the same time, each nation
would maintain adequate, well-trained
armed forces capable of meeting in
ternal threats, but with some equip
ment necessary to satisfy Latin-Amer
ican requirements for professional
forces as viewed by them.
This program, utopian as it may
seem and which does not meet the
problem of securing the support of the
US Congress for a long-range Military
Assistance Program, has been pur
sued, in part, by the United States.
Perhaps the time has come to take the
Latin Americans into our confidence
and discuss frankly with them the mu
tual problems relating to inter-Amer
ican military cooperation.
It probably is not in the best inter
ests of the United States to eliminate
the grant aid program for Latin
America or to place so many restric
tions on the sales program that the
LATIN AMERICA
United States ultimately will lose the
influence, prestige, and investment es
tablished over so many years of her
military presence in Latin America.
It seems much more preferable to fur
nish certain arms than to leave a
vacuum. It seems equally desirable to
recognize that the Latin-American
nations will retain certain types of
equipment in their: inventories and will
maintain force structures sometimes
ill-suited to their actual needs.
However, the United States has a
great stake in Latin America and
should participate in that area's fu
ture, shaping it as opportunities per
mit rather than abdicate interest and
responsibility. The suggested program
might contribute at least a beginning
toward that mutual understanding and
collaboration that have not been too
evident recently in US military rela
tions with Latin America.
Latin America has so far avoided an arms race with great success, not
only in comparison to other regions but in absolute terms. Despite certain
outstanding exceptions, Latin America as a whole has also been notably
successful in controJling military expenditures over a period of many years.
There is, moreover, no evidence that any level of military expenditure is re
lated to political ambitions: in point of faet, cheap weapons tend to be more
useful for coups d'etat than jet planes and aircraft carriers.
Covey T. Oliver
US Executive Director, World Bank
May 1969
21
A . ~ l r t ) ~
From Die Welt (Federal Republic of Germany)
WARNINGS
MUST BE
HEEDED
General Johann A. Graf von Kielmansegg, West German Army, Retired
U
NINFORMED, unprepared, com
pletely surprised, stunned, help
less-those were the words used by
journalists in all Western capitals to
desctibe government reactions to the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Was
there no recognizable warning? Or
was it once again a failure to under
stand what had been happening? Had
analysis been based on wishful think
ing?
Ten months before the invasion,
there were the first signs of the be
ginnings of considerable change in
Czechoslovakia. In January 1968, the
so-called "spring of Prague" started.
During the four months preceding the
invasion, continuous military maneu
vers took place at a time of year not
generally chosen by the Warsaw Pact
for major exercises.
First, there were the "staff exer
cises" of the Warsaw Pact countries
-with the exception of Romania
which took place on Czech territory.
At the start of the exercises, it took
MiliWy Revie. 22
the Soviet troops three days to move
into their positions, but it took five
weeks for the same movement in the
opposite direction.
During the same period, frequent
"air defense" 'exercises took place in
the territory of East Germany, Po
land, and the Soviet Union bordering
on Czechoslovakia. In addition, so
called supply and logistic exercises
were underway which were described
by Red Star as the biggest since 1945,
a description that was no doubt cor
rect. A Soviet declaration issued at
the end of July stated publicly that
the troops "were in a high degree of
readiness for military action."
New Exercises Continued
This series of military maneuvers
was declared at an end on 10 August,
but new exercises continued in the
same areas from '11 August onward;
they did not receive special names,
however, and were hardly reported. On
the night of 20-21 August, they turned
into the invasion mounted from five
directions on land and by air.
For the military observer, even
This article was trans14ted and
condensed trom the original, pub
lished in DIE WELT (Federal Re
public of Germany) 2 ~ Auguat
1968, under the title, "Warnun
gen Milssen Auch Genutzt Wer
den."
General Grof von Kielmansegg,
now retired, re8ide8 in Bad Krot
zingen. His active duty as8ign
mentB included two tour8 with the
Defense Ministry and as the mili
tary repre8entative oj the Ger
man Federal Republic to the Su
preme Headquarter8, Allied Pow
er8, Europe, in Paris, 1955-58,
and as Commander in Chief, Al
lied Force8, Central Europe,
1966-68.
May 1889
WARNINGS
without access to classified informa
tion, the picture. of an almost classical
deployment of troops, in logical se
quence, became clear no later than the
beginning of July. Staff prepsrations
and exercises-eoupled to an extent
probably never enjoyed before with
reconnaissance on the spot-eamou
flaged partial mobilization, installation
and activation of air defense, logistic
deployment, and troop deployment. It
can safely be assumed that the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Com
mand had a clesr and detailed picture
of the potential of all this. The mili
tary intention to invade Czechoslova
kia became more and more apparent.
Passivity ExhlbHed
But Moscow's political intention, the
intention behind the troop deployment,
became apparent only insofar as the
escalation from normal maneuvers to
a maneuver of blackmail could not go
unnoticed. The ''hot line," installed to
permit a dialogue in times of crisis,
was, it seems, not employed. Moscow,
not surprisingly, did not reveal its in
tentions over the "hot line," but there
were no questions either from Wash
ington, Instead, passivity was ex
hibited in various forms.
There is no doubt that Moscow has,
in the last few months, given a demon
stration to the world which is of ex
treme interest. For a preliminary anal
ysis of the question of warning time,
it should be remembered that the
strategy officially agreed on by the
NATO powers in the spring of 1967,
the strategy of a flexible response to
any military preparations and actions
by the Warsaw Pact countries directed
against the West, depends for its suc
cess, both in theory and in practice,
on the assumption of warning time
being given and acted upon.
23
From left to right: Czeehoslovak Marshal Ivan I.
Yakubovsky, Czechoslovak Party Secretary Alexander D u ~ e k , and Czeehoslovak Pre
mier OIdrieh Cernfk reviewing Warsaw Pact maneuvers at Miloviee, Bohemia, 2 July
1968
fits certain preconceived views. This would lack both sense and caution if
-and, indeed, the whole notion of he revealed his aggressive intention.
warning time-was not accepted with On the contrary. he would try by all
out objections from some of the NATO possible means to deceive the rest of
allies, among them the Federal Repub
the world, his own country, and his
lic of Germany, but the fact remains allies included-as we have just wit
that it was accepted. nessed.
To the concept of strategic and mil The concept of military, as opposed
itary warning time, always considered to political, warning time is based on
a first essential in assessing the situa the observation of military and civil
tion, another concept was added, some movement and actions which point to
say invented-that of political warn deployment, to suppressive measures
ing time. This was based on the thesis or preparation for attack; political in
that, in the world of today, the inten dications have, of course, to be con
tion, possible or probable, of any sidered as well. While the concept of
WARNINGS
This is stated expressly in the 9
May 1967 Ministerial Guidance which
is the political guidance to NATO mil
itary commanders. The experience of
Czechoslovakia not only warrants, but
I\rgently requires, a sound assessment
of the actual implications of this no
tion of warning time.
First, two concepts of warning time
this
power or group of powers to use force
for political ends can be recognized
weeks, or even months, in advance
that is,' within a period of time that
can be used to prepare the necessary
countermeasures.
Of course, a correct assessment of
political intentions cannot be dis
counted, but it is highly improbable
Military Review 24
political warning time is not suscepti
ble of precise calculation, this is not
so with military warning time. Mili
tary action and movement can, to a
certain extent, be analyzed and calcu
lated by a trained observer and make
it possible, therefore, at least to as
sess the minimum and the maximum
period available for countermeasures.
Length of Period
The length of this period is, of
course, subject to differing assess
ments as there are bound to be many
uncertainties and confused pictures,
not to mention differences of opinion
on the value to be put on incidents.
But there is certainly a minimum pe
riod which can be arrived at although
here and there analysis may, perhaps,
be manipulated to support a particular
policy.
However, it should be understood
that military warning is not based on
speculation about intentions, but on
the analysis of facts that there is, on
the other side of the border, prepara
tion for a military attack. Whatever
the nature of warning time, it can only
serve its purpose, which is to allow
for timely and adequate countermeas
ures, if it is not only heeded, but acted
upon. The experience of the summer
of 1968-and, indeed, of the last 35
years-gives little ground for opti
mism.
The first, and minimum, require
ment for action to be taken by NATO
in the event of a warning in central
Europe would be to bring back those
ground and air units that have been
withdrawn since 1967, and those that
probably will be withdrawn from cen
tral Europe in the future. As was in
dicated during the negotiations con
cerning the first slice of troop with
drawals some time ago, the United
MIY 1969
WARNINGS
States requires 30 days for Army, and
15 days for air units to get them back
over the ocean. Similar movement by
Britain would also take more than a
few days.
There is no doubt that these figures
are correct. They will only surprise
those who are unaware that, while the
time required for mere transportation
may be short, and even shorter in the
future, a lot of time is needed before
and afterward, particularly for the de
cision to return troops.
Lessons to Be Learned
Let us, as a hypothesis, look at the
30-day timescale against the back
ground of the events of the Czechoslo
vakian invasion. We would find that
the return of the US forces previously
withdrawn would have had to have
been started by 22 July, the day when
Moscow agreed to hold talks in Cierna.
Let us imagine this to have been,
instead, a conference in Geneva. From
the beginning of such a conference un
til 16 August, a Big Lift operation
could only have had an escalatory e f ~
fect, and, in all probability, there
fore, Washington would have decided
against it. Only on 18 August, just
three days before the invasion, were
there new political warning siguals.
The parallel with a genuine period of
East-West tension should be obvious,
and so is the conclusion.
For all those who are willing to
learn, the "maneuvers" taught at least
four very important lessons for West
ern security and defense planning:
The Soviets have proved-not for
the first time, but most convincingly
-that they are able to launch maneu
vers and get a major deployment of
their own and allied ground and air
units underway without any visible
signs of preparation and, even more
25
WARNINGS
important, within a very short time.
While it was part of the purpose of
these maneuvers to attract attention
by the use of carefully phased an
nouncements, it is easy to imagine
that, without such announcements, the
surprise effect in other circumstances
would be even greater. This is the les
son to be drawn from the first phase
of the Warsaw Pact maneuvers of
June-July 1968.
July when combat readiness was said
to have been achieved, an announce
ment that obviously escaped attention
in the Western chancelleries. That mil
itary readiness can be continuously in
creased without revealing the true po
litical intention behind it is the lesson
to be drawn from the August phase
of the maneuvers.
The military and strategic warn
ing time started, at least, with the
The Soviet beirinnilllg of the mobilization
Eut E1UOJ)fJ Photo.
Leaders of live Soviet-bloc parties meet with Czechoslovak leaders in Bratislava on 3
August 1968. Soviet party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev is on extreme right.
hiding her real intentions until the
very last moment. This remains true,
even if the decision to invade was not
finally taken until the talks between
Walter llibricht and Alexander Dub
~ e k at Karlovy Vary on 12 August as
many indications would suggest. The
decision to provide the necessary mil
itary capability was, however, possibly
made at the conference of the five
Warsaw Pact members in Moscow on
8 May.
This military capability had prob
ably been provided not later than 31
and the escalation of the maneuvers
in mid-July. Yet it seems that the
same political importance was not at
tached to this as it wss to the peace
ful intentions exhibited in Cierna and
Bratislava. If these maneuvers had
been intended as a deployment directed
against Western Europe, NATO would
not have had 80 or even 15 days left
to bring its defenses up to full readi
ness by the return of the troops with
drawn and by mobilization.
One lesson seems clear enough:
Whatever the strategy, it cannot be
Military Review
28
based on the concept of political warn
ing time that rests on speculations
about possible political intentions. The
concept of military warning time, for
military countermeasures, has to be
based on the assumption that it may
be the shortest period conceivable. It
canm.\t exclude total surprise. Hesita
tion in taking political and military
decisions can be fatal in a crisis.
As far as action on warnings gen
erally is concerned, I quote from the
Daily Telegraph of 20 August 1968:
The present situation demonstrates
the weakness of the NATO system.
Whenever tension arises the NATO
authorities, far from taking any pre
cautionary steps-for fear of worsen
ing the situation-shy away from any
move.
This is, in general, correct as is the
fact that apprehension about one's
own courage breeds weakness. But the
British paper reproaches the wrong
people. The NATO commanders lack
the authority to take steps on their
own in a period of tension. They can
not turn on NATO's useful and effec
tive alert system. All they can do is
order, to a certain degree, a state of
higher readiness in the garrisons, but
decisions on further steps to meet a
crisis, or even any military move
ments, are beyond their authority.
These can only be taken by tbe po
litical authority, the NATO Council,
but even the council cannot by itself
decide on the necessary action. It rep
resents the sovereign countries of the
WARNINGS
Atlantic alliance and depends, there
fore, on their instructions. It can act
only if every single government ap
proves of joint action in the council.
It is the governments, therefore,
that should be prompted by the lessons
of the maneuvers around and in Czech
oslovakia to examine very carefully,
and very quickly, the main premises of
the strategy of flexible response to see
if they are still valid. This requires
objective rethinking, free from the
emotion caused by the crisis. Wishful
thinking and self-deception must not
be part of it. Above all, it must start
from the fact that Moscow's political
logic, and its political thinking, are
not the same as Western political logic
and thinking. No amount of brains or
computers will reach correct results
if they work on Western logic alone.
This has nothing whatsoever to do
with a cold war mentality, nor does
it imply that the aim of reasonable
and true detente should be given up.
Security based on a sufficient degree
of power and detente are not antag
onistic but complementary components
of a goal to be achieved. But on the
long road toward this goal, it should
be kept in mind that the policy of
detente will only be successful if the
Atlantic alliance as a whole, and the
Federal Republic of Germany as one
of its members, is assured that not
only can any crisis be met effectively,
with adequate and timely preparation,
but that they are also visibly resolved
to meet it.
May 1969
27
Lieutenant Colonel Paul R. Shirk, United States Army, Retired
T
HE Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the Council of
-Mutual Economic Aid are the two institutional structures bind
ing the countries of Eastern Europe to one another and to the Soviet
Union.
The creation of the WTO, however, was not the beginning of em
pire building in the military sphere by the Soviets in Eastern Europe,
but was viewed by them as the capstone of their effort to Sovietize the
armed forces of the Eastern European nations. One analyst has ex
pressed the significance of the Warsaw Pact as the "culmination of
the military integration of Eastern Europe under Supreme Soviet
Command which had been in process over the preceding decade.'"
The signing of the pact and the creation of the WTO may be viewed,
therefore, as one step in the development of the armed forces of the
Eastern European countries.
This development proceeded through four identifiable phases. The
1 Hanns von Krannhals. "Command Integration Within the Warsaw Pact," MUita11l Re
view, May 1961. p 40.
Military RevIew 28
WARSAW TREATY
phases were not necessarily concurrent
for each country although each coun
try did pass through each one. The
first phase can be termed the period
of preparation during which Soviet
policy was to minimize the role of the
armies of Eastern Europe to remove a
potential obstacle to the eventual
formation of Communist Govern
ments.
Origin of Groups
The period actually started during
World War II with the formation of
national armies in the Soviet Union.
Not all countries provided cadres for
a Moscow-oriented formation, but
members of the armies of Poland,
Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Ger
many were recruited into Soviet-spon
sored national formations.
The Czech group had its origins in
the group which had traveled to Kra
kow in April 1939 to aid in the defense
of Poland against Germany. With the
advent of the war, these Czechs, un
der the leadership of then Lieutenant
Colonel Ludvik Svoboda, became refu
gees in the USSR. During 1941, the
Czech-London government-in-exile and
the Soviet Union signed an agreement
to provide for the formation and train
ing of Czech units in the USSR.
Lieutenant Colonel Paul R. Shirk,
US Army, Retired, is on a FeUow8hip
at The American Univer8ity, Waah
ington, where he is currently instruct
ing in the School of GO'IIemment while
completing work on his Ph. D. degree.
A graduate of the US Army Command
and General Staff CoUege, his aasign
ments have included duty in Germany,
Thaimnd, and with the Military AB
sistance Command, Vietnam. Prior to
his retirement in August 1968, he waa
with the US Army Combat Develop
ments Command Institute of Land
Combat.
May 1969
Approximately 350 Czech enlisted
men were trained as officer candidates
in Soviet military schools and commis
sioned as Czech officers. A battalion
was committed in action under Soviet
command for the first time in January
1943. Svoboda was promoted to the
rank of general and given command of
what eventually evolved into the 1st
Czechoslovak Corps. By the end of the
war, this force was about 80,000
strong and destined to become the
nucleus of the postwar Czechoslo
vakian Army.
In a similar fashion, two Romanian
divisions were formed in the Soviet
Union from among the 180,000 pris
oners of war who were susceptible to
Soviet indoctrination. These two divi
sions became the nucleus for the Ro
manian 1st and 4th Armies. In 1946,
an additional 500 Romanian officers
were returned from Soviet prisoner
of-war camps after their indoctrina
tion and integrated into the army.
Polish Formation
Poland presents the most striking
example of a national Communist
army formed during the war in the
USSR. The first Polish formation or
ganized and trained by the Soviets
the Kosciusko Division-was formed
in May 1943 and became the nucleus
of the postwar Polish Army. By the
end of World War II, the Soviet-spon
sored forces totaled almost one-half
million men divided into three armies.
Although not organized in the So
viet Union as a "national army," the
present East German Army has a sim
ilar foundation insofar as the back
grounds of its personnel are concerned.
Because of the delay in creating an
army in East Germany, there is no di
rect relationship either to the German
Army of World War II or to the pris
29
WARSAW TREATY
oner-of-war groups formerly in the
Soviet Union. However, when about
7,500 police were transferred into the
embryonic army in 1948, indications
were that a great majority of them
had been prisoners of war and had
Lif.
Marshal of the Soviet' Union Ivan S.
Konev
undergone the familiar Soviet indoc
trination program.
The formation of the "national ar
mies" under Soviet sponsorship and
tutelage was but one measure in the
sanitization of the Eastern European
armed forces. The forces were exten
sively purged. Thousands of Bulgarian
officers were tried as collaborators and
executed or imprisoned. Polish officers
auffered mass arrests and deporta
tions. The Hungarian Army was vir
tually nonexistent by the war's end.
Nevertheless, the few officers who had
survived the war were rapidly purged.
In Czechoslovakia, the potentially
anti-Communist underground was vir
tually eliminated by the Germans dur
ing August and September 1944, after
Soviet promises of aid did not mate
rialize although the Red Army was on
the border of eastern Slovakia. Since
the political climate did not permit ac
tual purging until after 1948, the Com
munist Party accomplished the same
result by shunting officers not sympa
thetic to their cause into unimportant
positions. For example, General Ser
gey Ingr, leader of the Czech "London
Army," was sent off as Ambassador
to the Netherlands although President
Eduard Benel! planned to appoint him
Minister of Defense. General Svoboda
got the post instead.
MilitalJ Alliance System
The period of preparation drew to
a conclusion with the construction of
an elaborate military alliance system
during 1947 and 1948. All similar in
wording, the treaties were designed to
"prevent any attack on the part of
Germany, or any other nation which
would ally itself with Germany." The
treaties committed the cosignatories to
mutual defense against aggression,
particularly aggression by a rearmed
Geiman state. In this regard, the trea
ties concluded with East Germany
were called only friendship treaties.
It was not until June 1964 that the
German Democratic Republic-Soviet
Union agreement was upgraded to the
level of a Treaty of Friendship, Coop
eration, and Mutual Assistance.
When the political goal of having
a Communist government in each
state had been achieved during 1948,
the second phase in the postwar de
velopment of the Eastern European
armies was initiated. Extensive So-
MUlti" RBYlew
30
viet military aiq was supplied to the
nations of the area, administered by
large Soviet missions in the country.
During this period, the armies even
began to look alike since insignia and
uniforms were widely copied from the
Soviet example. By the early 1960's,
the armies of the various countries
had achieved the goal of reorganiza-
WARSAW TREATY
alism rather than the strictly bilateral
method of doing business with the
Soviet Union. Thus, starting in the
general timeframe of 1960-61, the na
ture of the WTO began to shift. Sub
stitution of the concept of muItilater
alism for bilateralism in any alliance
system introduces a corollary concept
of greater autonomy for the individual
WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION STRuctURE
I'OlIl1C.II. CONSULTA1M COIIIIITTH
FIRSI SECIIEIAR1IS Of PARTIES
atIffS Of STAlE
I
RMIDGII IIIIOSlERS
0fDISE IIIIOSlERS
I
I
PRIIAIIEIIT
I
COMMISSION
JOINT ARMED RIRCES COIIIIMD
COIIMAIIIER III CHIEF
0fDISE IIIIIISTERS IDB'U1Y COMIIMOERS IN allEl)
CIIIEFOfSTm*
-1btDlalnnln of tilt Jairt SecrttIrIIt Ibo sems IS ChIef of SId oItIIo __faRn_
J
I
JOINT
SECRETARIAT'
I
tion along Soviet lines and under So
viet tutelage.
As the armies achieved a measure
of professionalism, they embarked
upon a third period which can be re
garded as one of further development.
This period started in the middle or
early 1960's. It was during this time
that the Warsaw Pact was signed
but it was a period still belonging to
the USSR and was characterized by
the ultimate of military dependency
of the Eastern European countries on
the USSR.
Nevertheless, the signing of the pact
carried with it a notion of muItilater
members. The culmination of this phe
nomena in the case of the WTO was
the expressed desire first of the Ro
manians and then of the Czechs for
a greater voice in the Joint Staff.
Czechoslovakia's geographic. loca
tion made autonomy an impossibility
from the point of view of Moscow. As
a result, when she attempted to set
her own course in relations with the
Federal Republic of Germany, the So
viets decided invasion was necessary.
The WTO was intended by the So
viets as a counterfoil to the North At
lantic Treaty Organization and, more
specifically, to the accession of the
MIJ 1969
31
Ivan Konev as Commander in
WARSAW TREATY
A tank is transported across the V1tava River during Warsaw Pad maneuvers in
Czechoslovakia
Federal Republic o ~ Germany to
NATO. The Bonn government joined
NATO on 5 May 1955-the Warsaw
Pact was signed on 14 May.
The preamble of the treaty is a re
flection of this motivation. It de
nounces the increased threat of war
the military sphere and speaks of a
desire for a system of collective Eu
ropean security. The key articles in
the treaty are the fourth, which pro
vides for immediate assistance by all
means if a member country is at
tacked in Europe; the fifth, which es
tablishes a joint command for the
armed forces of the several nations;
and the sixth, which deals with the
Political Consultative Committee.
That the WTO was intended to be
a creature of the Soviet Union was
indicated by the announcement on the
day the treaty was signed that the
Joint Command Headquarters would
be located in Moscow, and by the ap
pointment of Marshal of the Soviet
BCIfI E_Y'OP6
Chief of the Joint Command. Konev
continued to serve as Deputy Minister
of Defense in the Soviet Council of
Ministers-a duality of role perform
ance which continues today in the per
son of Marshal Ivan I. Yakubovsky.
The pact was clearly an instrument
of multilateral diplomacy, but this did
not mean that the countries who were
signatories to the pact, in fact, gained
a greater voice in the management of
Military Review
32
Eastern European military policy. No
joint maneuvers were .held during thi3
early period, and the much publicized
Joint Command remained largely a pa
per organization as a staff section
within the Soviet High Command.
The Political Consultative Commit
tee, obligated to meet not less than bi
annually by the pact provisions, met
only twice during the first five years
of the WTO's existence. The only sig
nificant military development during
this period was the extension of the
air defense and early warning system
of the USSR into Eastern Europe. The
Commander in Chief of Soviet Air De
fense served concurrently as Com
mander in Chief of WTO Air Defense.
Final Phase
The final phase in the development
of the armies of Eastern Europe was
the modernization and the transfor
mation of the WTO. It was the inter
vention by the Soviet Army in the fall
1956 uprising in Hungary which set
into motion a shift in philosophy vis
a-vis the WTO. The intervention was
justified on the basis of the pact by
both the Soviets and the Hungarians.
This interpretation, however, was not
universally accepted. Poland, in par
ticular, felt the provisions of the pact
had been severely misinterpreted. It
thus became apparent that tensions
existed concerning the role of Soviet
troops in the Eastern European coun
tries.
The immediate result was the ex
pressed willingness of the USSR to re
examine "the question of Soviet troops
stationed in the territory of WTO
countries." Accordingly, status-of
forces agreements were signed with
Poland, East Germany, Romania, and
Hungary-the only countries where
Soviet forces remained.
May 1969
I
}
WARSAW TREATY
By these agreements, the Eastern
European countries concerned gained
a large measure of control over the
Soviet troops stationed in their re
spective countries. The negotiations of
these agreements were a significant
step toward transforming the WTO.
They represented tacit recognition by
the Soviets that, if future incidents
similar to that in Hungary were to be
avoided, the Eastern European coun
tries must have some access to the
decision-making process within the in
stitutional framework of the WTO.
Political Motivation
It was not until 1960 that the overt
manifestations of the new trend be
came apparent. The international re
lations of the Soviet Union, in general,
may have accelerated the trend. The
U-S incident of May 1960; the sub
sequent breakoff of the scheduled
Paris Summit and worsening United
States-USSR relations; and a definite
worsening of Sino-Soviet relations
may all have provided political moti
vation for improving the force struc
ture of the Eastern European coun
tries.
Within' the Soviet Union, a debate
was being conducted between Nikita
S. Khrushchev, who favored a reduc
tion of Soviet ground forces and
greater reliance on technology, and
the more traditionalist marshals, who
urged that vast ground forces were
still necessary in the nuclear age. Up
grading the value of the collective
strength of the WTO forces was one
way to support the contention that
Soviet ground forces could be reduced.
An overt manifestation of this de
bate was the relief of Konev as Com
mander in Chief of the WTO, and
from his position as Deputy Minister
of Defense. Konev, who had been luke
33
WARSAW TREATY
warm to the idea of upgrading the
WTO forces, was replaced by Marshal
Andrei A. Grechko. Significantly,
Grechko had served in the Kiev Mili
tary District with Khrushchev during
World War II, had been Commander
of Soviet Forces, Germany, during the
1953 revolt, and had been created a
Following a meeting of the WTO
Defense Ministers in Moscow during
September 1961, the first joint ma
neuvers were conducted the following
month with the participation of So
viet, Polish, Czech, and East German
forces. The pattei'll for joint military
exercises was thus established. Great
Hero of the Union
these
Warsaw Pact tanks are refueled during Exerelse Neman In late July-August 1968
shchev in 1958. He was appointed to
his present position as Soviet Minister
of Defense on the death of Marshal
Rodion Y. Malinovsky in 1967.
The convening of the Political Con
sultative Committee on 4. February
1960, after an almost two-year period
of dormancy, was another indication
that new life was about to be breathed
into the organization.
An impressive program of modern
ization of the armed forces of the
Eastern European countries was un
dertaken, focusing on the long
neglected ground forces. The obsolete
Tal, tanks were largely replaced with
modern T51, and T55 models. MiG-f1
aircraft replaced older models. Sophis
ticated armaments such as antitank
missiles, self-propelled guns, and rock
ets capable of carrying nuclear war
heads were provided.
vers as signifying the development of
the WTO into a true coalition.
The device of joint maneuvers has
apparently reaped dividends in rais
ing the armies of Eastern Europe to
a high level of professionalism. Fol
lowing the September 1966 Exercise
Vltalla as the maneuvers were called,
"Western sources pointed out that the
40,000 troops . . . were well trained,
well deployed, and well equipped.'"
The official Czech news agency,
Ceteko. (CTK) , reported that mock
nuclear weapons were used in the
course of the exercise, a training ve
hicle also used in the October 1964
maneuvers. The deployment of highly
trained Polish parachute troops in So
viet aircraft haa also been a feature
of WTO maneuvers in recent years
another indicator of high profession
2 The New York Timu. 26 September 1966. p 2.
MllitarJ Re"e. 34
alism within the Eastern European
armed forces.
It is obvious that the WTO and the
armed forces of Eastern Europe have
undergone a dramatic transformation
I!ince the signhig of the pact in 1955.
Initially, the creation of the WTO had
but scant effect on the armed forces
of the area. Today, they are well
equipped and well trained.
Greater Role
As the Eastern European countries
have seen their forces achieve an un
precedented level of professionalism,
and hence the ability to assume a
larger share of the WTO military re
sponsibility, they have apparently
grown more determined to share in
the WTO decision-making process.
Maneuvers since October 1962 have
usually been at least nominally under
the command of a non-Soyiet officer.
This helps to create the impression of
a greater role for the Eastern Euro
pean countries at the level of joint
action, as should be the case in a true
coalition.
However, at the level of the high
command, control is little changed
from the 1955 arrangement. Soviets
continue to occupy the posts of Com
mander in Chief and Chief of Staff,
and central planning and coordination
are still conducted by a special branch
of the Soviet General Staff.
Although permanent representa
tives of the coalition members are
posted to Moscow, they retain their
national identity under their respec
tive Ministers of Defense who serve
concurrently as Deputy Commanders
in Chief, WTO, and retain command
of their own respective national
forces. Thus, the permanent represen
tatives are in Moscow more as liaison
officers than as members of a truly in-
MIJ 1989
WARSAW TREATY
tegrated combined staff. Such an ar
rangement is certain to create friction
and resentment.
This staff arrangement reflecta So
viet military doctrine which envisages
the incorporation of the various ar
mies into the strategic aims of the
USSR. The Communist Party of the
Soviet Union's First Secretary, Leonid
I. Brezhnev, has repeatedly called for
the further strengthening of the WTO
by welding the armies into a more
monolithic structure.
This desire has been resisted, par
ticularly by Romania. The 11th an
niversary of the WTO was pointedly
ignored in 1966 as a measure of her
disapproval of this policy. The Ro
manian leaders have expressed the de
sire for absolute control over their
own national forces while, at the same
time, advocating a larger voice in the
determination of coalition strategy
and a veto over the use of nuclear
weapons by Soviet forces in Eastern
Europe.
Nuclear Control
Romania's policy concerning nuclear
weapons was further indicated by her
refusal to sign the statement concern
ing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty
issued by the pact's Political Consul
tative Committee at the end of the
March 1968 meeting in Sofia. The Ro
manians insisted upon two provisions
quite unacceptable to the Soviets.
They wanted some system of interna
tional control over the nuclear pow
ers and guarantees written into the
treaty for protection from nuclear at
tack-a nuclear "umbrella."
Romania's position vis-a-vis the
WTO reflects the basic lack of homo
geneity of Eastern Europe. This prob
lem is recognized by the Soviets who
speak of "surviving nationalistic tend
35
WARSAW TREATY
encies from the past," but proclaim
that Western "splitting attempts" are
bound to failure.
First Strategic Echelon
The basic cleavage in Eastern Eu
rope is further reftected in the fact
that joint maneuvers generally have
combined either the Balkan group or
the northern tier of countries lying
abreast the northern European plain,
and that the latter group has
the emphasis. Poland, East Germany,
and Czechoslovakia have been referred
to publicly as the "first strategic ech
elon" of WTO. This regional differen
tiation is one of the principal prob
lems of WTO and is a modern mani
festation of the historic Problem of
the lack of unity of action and pur
pose among the countries of Eastern
Europe. This point has been empha
sized since the August 1968 invasion.
The concept of Czechoslovakia being
in the "first strategic echelon" has
both geographical and force value com
ponents. The former played a major
role in the decision to invade. The act
ing Foreign Minister of Poland em
phasized this point in September:
When Czechoslovakia showed signs
of leaving the Warsaw Pact, it endan
gered the balance of Europe. Czech
oslovakia is a long finger reaching 600
miles right into the heart of Europe,
pointed at the frontier of Russia. It
. . cuts the Socialist world in two.
We cannot permit the Socialist world
to be divided.
This theme was mentioned by CzeCh
oslovak Party Secretary Alexander
also in September, when he
acknowledged he had "underesti
mated" the strategic and military im
portance the WTO members placed on
his country. Thus, although Foreign
Minister Hajek and other Czech
oslovak leaders had repeatedly assured
the Soviets that the country would
stay in the pact, Prague's repeated
insistence for a free hand in her rela
tions with the Federal Republic of
Germany made those assurances in
credible in East Berlin, Moscow, and
Warsaw. The future force value of the
Czechoslovak Army must be of con
siderable concern to the Soviet Union.'
Uncertain Period
The WTO is passing through a pe
riod of uncertainty-even of crisis.
Alliance systems by their very nature
are dynamic. This dynamic quality can
assert itself by changes in member
ship, organization, and role. The role
of the WTO as originally conceived by
its creators is obviously no longer
viable.
Within the structure of the WTO,
the armies of Eastern Europe have
been developed to a level of profession
alism unparalleled in their histories.
This role, or function, of the WTO
has, therefore, been discharged. Sim
ilarly, the jurisdiction of WTO is no
longer appropriate. Poland and East
Germany are concerned with the "Ger
man threat" much more than Hun
gary, Bulgaria, and Romania.
Clearly, new roles must be sought
which are applicable to the entire or
ganization if the WTO is to remain
viable. This implies that WTO could
assume a greater political role as a
true coalition. Any situation whereby
the USSR would cease to be the major
and even dominant member of the al
liance is inconceivable, by virtue of
her predominant power. Nevertheless,
the power of the Eastern European
members is increasing in absolute
terms, as well as relative terms.
II The Waahinllton Post, 15 and 22 SeptemMr
1968.
Military Review
36
An alliance must reflect, in its de
cision-making apparatus, the relative
power of its members. If it does not,
the alliance will be in disequilibrium,
and tensions will grow. If the nations
of Eastern Europe are successful in
gaining a greater voice in the organs
of the WTO commensurate with their
increased national power, the over-aU
political autonomy of the individual
countries will be. enhanced, but not
necessarily at the expense of weaken
ing the WTO. Indeed, its evolution
into a true coalition, with a greater
cognizance of the compelling national
interests of the respective member
states, could strengthen Eastern Eu
ropean cooperation.
However, the WTO invasion of
Czechoslovakia makes it manifestly
clear that the Soviets regard the evo
lution into a true coalition inimical to
their own interests. The 3 August
Danube declaration provided for a
"strengthening" of the pact, but pro
vided no details of the means to ac
complish it. The Czechoslovak view of
"strengthening" the pact was in the
direction of a true coalition. Defense
Minister Colonel General Martin D ~ u r
had insisted that member nations
should share senior positions of the
Joint Staff-a proposition Moscow
consistently rejected when mentioned
by the Romanians, and likewise re
jected at Bratislava.
WARSAW TREATY
The Soviets had an excellent oppor
tunity for at least token integration
on the Joint Staff when the Chief of
Staff, General Mikhail I. Kasakov, re
tired in August. The appointment of
General of the Army Sergey M. Shte
menko, a Deputy Minister of Defense
in the last years of Joseph Stalin's
rule who was removed from his post
and demoted following the latter's
death, is about as far in the opposite
direction as the Soviet leaders could
go.
The invasion has, in fact, reduced
the possibility of evolution into a mu
tual partnership in the immediate fu
ture. The invasion led to the formal
withdrawal of Albania, long a nonac
tive member of WTO. This action drew
strong praise from Communist China
where both the Peking People's Daily
and the Liberation Army Daily an
nounced the USSR would suffer "a
thorough, ignominious and irrevocable
defeat" if the WTO attempted inter
vention in Albania.
A Pravda editorial on 20 September,
calling for "further strengthening" of
the WTO because of the "growing ag
gressiveness" of NATO, is probably
an indication that Marshal Yakubov
sky's trip to Sofia the preceding day
for a WTO conference on the subject
has probably resulted in, if anything,
even less autonomy for the member
nations.
May 1969
37
Dynamic Revolutionary
Lieutenant Colonel Hugo W. Matson, United StateB Armg
F
ROM 1937 until 1964, Marshal of
the Soviet Union, and early leader
of the Red Army, Mikhail N. Tukha
chevsky was an unperson. He was ex
ecuted by Joseph Stalin's order in the
purge of the army in 1937; his writ
ings disappeared from the shelves of
military libraries; and his name was
deleted from the encyclopedias. From
all outward evidence, he might never
have existed. But the force of his
thought was too great and his contri
butions to Soviet military doctrine too
important for his memory to be
erased. Following Stalin's death, he
was rehabilitated posthumously. In
1964, his writings were republished,
and he is again studied in the acade
mies.
What effect Tukhachevsky has on
this generation of Soviet leaders is
only conjecture. But his doctrine of
world revolution, with the Red Army
in its van, is no doubt still attractive
to international communism. It holds
small comfort for the West.
Tukhachevsky was born in 1898 in
the province of Smolensk, completed
MilitalJ Review
38
the Alexander Military Academy in
1914, and served as an officer in the
czar's army in World War I. He was
captured by the Germans, escaped
after several . attempts, and began
service with the Red Army in 1918.
Military Experience
During the Civil War, he com
manded the 1st and 5th Armies on the
Eastern Front. In 1920, he commanded
the Western Front. By September
1921, he was Chief of the Military
Academy (Workers' and Peasants'
Red Army). From 1921 until he was
purged by Stalin in 1937, he served
in such positions as Deputy Chief of
Staff and Chief of Staff of the Red
Army, member of the Revolutionary
Military Council of the USSR, and
later as its assistant chairman.
Tukhachevsky accepted as his moti
vation the classical Marxist-Leninist
view of a world rocked by the struggle
of opposing classes. This class strug
gle, fermenting within the bourgeois
world, was essentially a war of the
oppressed classes against the exploit
ers-a civil war without frontiers or
political boundaries.
As a result of the natural antago-
Lieutenant Colonel Hugo W. Mat
son commands the Md Battalion, 10th
Infantry, 5th Infantry Division
(Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado.
He has studied at the University of
Helsinki, Finland; received his B.A.
from Hobart College, Geneva, New
York; and his M.A. from Columbia
University. Colonel Matson studied
Russian at the US Army Language
School, Presidio of Monterey, Califor
nia; graduated from the US Army In
stitute of Advanced Russian Studies,
Germany; is a 1965 graduate of the
US Army Command and General Sfaff
College; and served in Moscow as US
Assistant Army Military Attachi.
MIY 1969
TUKHACHEVSKY
nism that existed between the bour
geoisie and the proletariat, world rev
olution was inevitable. Because the
USSR had established a dictatorship
of the proletariat, Tukhachevsky pre
dicted that the ''thunder and shafts"
of the Capitalist world would be di
rected against the USSR. '
From the moment the dictatorship
of the proletariat was established in
a country, the proletariat government
became an island amidst the sea of
the other bourgeois governments. A
socialist island in such a sea is not
possible. The bourgeoisie cannot allow
it. It must perish under the blows of
the bourgeoisie or it must spread the
revolution by way of civil war
throughout the whole world.
Logical Environment
Thus, Tukhachevsky justified the
right to carry the revolution abroad.
The Socialist revolution had a right
to expand and spread its influence to
neighboring countries. Revolutions, as
such, could materialize in two ways.
Power could be seized by a revolution
ary uprising within a country or it
could be seized for the proletariat by
the armed action of a neighboring
proletarian state. Such an approach,
therefore, would justify almost any
Soviet action.
For Tukhachevsky, war was the
most logical environment in which to
carry the revolution abroad. He did
not visualize carrying the revolution
by revolutionary zeal alone, for as he
said:
. of course, a warlike revolution
ary spirit and class consciousness are
decisive factors in a revolutionary
war, but revolutionary spirit alone
without the necessary technology in
contemporary warfare will not be vic
torious.
39
TUKHACHEVSKY
War was accepted as being the ex
tension of politics, not an abrogation
or substitute for it. Therefore, the pol
icy of the proletarian government
which determines the goals of war
must penetrate the war fronts and
unite the interests of the proletariat
reflect in its doctrine and tactics the
experiences derived from its own rev
olution against the exploiters. In or
der to express the revolutionary en
ergy of the army of the proletariat
in the best manner, the doctrine and
theoretical basis of the army had to
of
General Mikhail N. Tukhaehevsky
orient itself to the offensive. Only an
disorganize the rear of the enemy
tension of politics, the army conduct
ing this policy had to have interna
tional objectives and be offensive ori
ented. For Tukhachevsky, the army
of the Socialist state had to be both
the defender of the revolution and the
instrumentality for carrying the revo
lution forward.
Tukhachevsky attempted to unite
the political objectives of communism
with the doctrine of the Red Army.
The Red Army had to reflect not only
its Socialist background, but had to
offensive-oriented army could properly
carry the revolution.
As the prospects for an immediate
world revolution faded in the minds
of the Soviet leaders in the twenties,
Stalin adopted a policy that sought
only to preserve the revolution in the
USSR. He consolidated his own power
and control over such levers of power
as the secret police, the army. the
party. and the bureaucracy which
could threaten his position. The Com
munist Parties of other nations were
Military Review
40
now expected to w-ork to preserve the
gains made by the revolution in the
USSR.
During this period in which Stalin
actually militated against revolution
from without, Tukhachevsky contin
ued to develop a doctrine that would
be aggressive and best reflect the de
mands of a future war on a revolution
ary army. In his work, "New Ques
tions of War," 1 Tukhachevsky not
only poses some problems for com
manders on the future battlefield, but
also theorizes about war.
New Weapon Systems
He studied the new systems of
weapons that were being developed
prior to World War II and saw
that armor and aviation represented
new forms of combat p-ower rather
than simply serving as supp-orting
weapons on the battlefield. Each new
system had the capability of provid
ing decisive results in war. But a na
tion must develop them and be pre
pared to use them in a decisive direc
tion to paralyze the deployment and
mobilization of the enemy forces.
He saw a future war as being
fought on a broad front and in great
depth. The ability to fight such battles
in depth required aggressive com
bined-arms operations employing air
borne forces to disorganize the rear
of the enemy and masses of tanks sup
ported by artillery and accompanied
by infantry to defeat the enemy in
depth.
By deep penetrations, these forces
would establish a barrier against
which the enemy would be pressed and
his forces destroyed. Such battles in
depth would be characterized by great
mobility, but would have inherent
1 Mikhail N. TukhacheV8ky, "Novoye Voprosi
Voiny," Voenno Istorickukii Zhurnal. Number 2.
February, 1962.
May 1969
TUKHACHEYSKY
problems of supply, repair, and con
trol. In exploring these problems, Tu
khachevsky clearly defined the meas
ures that the army would have to take
to adapt itself to the requirements of
such a battlefield.
The importance of his "New Ques
tions of War" is that it predicted the
future battlefield and provided an
original approach to solving the prob
lems of the battlefield even though it
showed a restraint in defining the re
lationship of this future war to the
world revolution.
International General Staff
While the Red Army would be the
instrument for world revolution, Tu
khachevsky conceived the necessity for
developing an international general
staff under the direction of the Com
intern to coordinate the revolution
abroad. The reasons for such a staff
were made clear when he pointed out
that:
Revolution from without and revo
lution from within remain absolutely
equival6nt in the se1l8e of their sig
nificance for the liberation of the pro
letariat. Neverthekss they are distin
guished with respect to the manifes
tation towards them by the less
conscious masses.
Revolution from within is national,
overthrowing its own bourgeoisie.
Revolution from without under an in
sufficient preparation of the working
class of a given state, can be easily
used by the bourgeoisie for ezcite
ment of a, chauvinistic self-defense
against imperialistic invasion.'
The international general staff was
to direct the mood of the working
class within a given country toward
the goals of the Soviet Communist
~ Mikhail N. TukhaehevskY. VoinG Kl&301t. Mos
cow. Gosudaratvennoe hdateJ'Stbo, 1921.
41
TUKHACHEVSKY
Party. By being able to determine cor
rectly the attitude of the proletariat
in any given country, the general staff
could better coordinate the revolution
from without with the revolution from
within. The general staff would also
have a mission of judging the avail
able human and material resources
that would aid the revolution and the
requirements necessary for .the attack
by the Soviet Red Army.
The staff had to calculate the forces
and means of the opponents, develop a
mobilization plan for the proletariat,
train officers, and prepare senior com
bat commanders and staff members in
order that they could assume forma
tions in the regular Red Army. Tu
khachevsky recognized that the or
ganization of military control would
take time. He also realized that the
world civil war must not occur unex
pectedly, otherwise there would be
problems for the proletariat of secur
ing arms and gaining the initiative.
There had to be a close relationship
between the center of revolutionary
activity and the parties in the various
countries.
Revolution from without had inher
ent dangers if the proletariat had not
developed a class consciousness that
transcended both national differences
and ethnic prejudices. A consciousness
of the solidarity of the world proletar
iat was an essential requirement. The
attacking army of the proletariat
the Red Army-therefore, had to be
composed of ideologicaIly well-oriented
soldiers with a sense of the purpose
of their mission. Only a regular army
that was organized to conduct an of
fensive war could adequately defend
the proletariat of the world and dis
seminate the revolution.
The relevance of Tukhachevsky1s
theories to current Soviet military
thinking has to be considered on the
basis of its purely military, as well as
its politico-military content. While his
military theories do not reflect any
thing new today, they reflect an origi
nality of thought when judged in
terms of the period in which he wrote
them. More important, they are ex
pressed in terms which would allow
their universal consideration in any
type of war. For the Soviet theoreti
cian, a study of Tukhachevsky's writ
ings provides the basis for a more
original approach to the requirements
of the present-day battlefield.
The politico-military content of his
writings is probably more dangerous
from a Western point of view since
they advocate a more aggressive role
for the Red Army as the instrument
of world revolution. More than any
other Soviet military lesder, he was
able to define a relationship between
communism and military doctrine. He
saw an aggressive, offensive-minded
army as the best reflection of an ac
tion-oriented international Commu
nist movement. His writings could
provide a bridge for the Soviet theo
retician between the revolutionary ori
entation of the earlier Red Army and
the present-day requirements of pre
paring for war on a nuclear or con
ventional battlefield and the require
ment of keeping alive the spirit of the
revolution during a period of peaceful
coexistence.
MIl/tarJ Rul..
42
\
-"
~ ' 7 , . - - - ~
tI
The Collapse of US Global
Strategy
Howard G. Kurtz Harriet B. Kurtz
T
HE invasion of Czechoslovakia by armed forces of the SoViet Union,
Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and Bulgaria on 20 August 1968 ap
parently caught official Washington by surprise. Once again, the United States
and her allies were in the position of rescting to the initiative of the other side.
MIY 1969
43
GLOBAL STRATEGY
This was a further application of the
adage that a war is not lost on the
battlefield. It is lost many months or
years in advance, in neglect or in the
limited vision of the single human
mind in supreme command, or in the
immediate personal strategic staff.
No Supreme Council
The United States has no .supreme
strategic council, freed from the fires
of escalating operational crises and
grobal emergencies, working on the
more important and complex problem
of developing"a grand strategy for the
safety of future generations of US
citizens in the new era of exploding
total global danger.
For a decade or more, the members
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
National Security Council have been
so engrossed in fighting fires that they
have had no time to work on the long
range problem of how to create a fire
proof house or a warproof world in
which the United States might once
again find real national security.
In times of grave crisis, there is the
opportunity for a leader to emerge,
Howard G. Kurtz, a former lieuten
ant colonel in the US Air Force, grad,
'/U1.ted in Industrial Management from
Pen1l8ylvania State College in 1980.
He spent years in airline manage
ment positions, foUowed by 1B years
as the Senior Associate in a nationaUy
known management coneulting firm.
Mr. and Mrs. Kurtz are the founders
of War Control Planners, Incorpo
rated, and colligators of the strategic
study War Safety Control Report.
Harriet B. Kurtz is an ordained
minister in the United Church of
Christ. She is a 1987 graduate of
Wellesley College, Massachusetts, and
received her Bachelor of Divinity de
gree from Union Theological Semi
nary in 196.
with vision of a way to resolve the
emergency and courage to provide the
leadership required. However, no one
has yet advanced an idea to break the
open-ended, self-generating global
arms confrontation and to begin to
regain eroding national security.
Makeshift US strategy has collapsed
time after time since World War II.
In the immediate postwar period, the
"strategy of weakness" collapsed. A
reappraisal became imperative, and
the policy of "containment" of Com
munist aggression emerged. Then, the
strategy of containment, narrowed
down to nuclear power alone, collapsed.
A reappraisal again became impera
tive. Then, the strategy of contain
ment by ftexible response across the
entire spectrum of nuclear and nonnu
clear weapons collapsed as the United
States moved deeper into the Vietnam
war.
Vietnam Conllict
The involvement in Vietnam came
at a time in history chosen by the en
emy, in a place chosen by the enemy,
and in terrain favorable to the enemy.
Each escalation of the Vietnam war
served as a rallying point for Commu
nist countries while separating us
from most of our European allies and
neutrals, at least on this issue.
The United States now has moved
into a deeper strategic trap of "nego
tiate and fight simultaneously"-a
well-established Communist maneuver
toward victory. Communist strategists
aim to keep US power caught in this
trap in the hope that the US crises
involving race, urban affairs, poverty,
youth, the economy, politics, and vio
lence all head toward simultaneous
eruption. As long as the Communists
are convinced that US prestige, power,
and moral stature continue to suffer,
Military Renew
44
GLOBAL STRATEGY
The Communists hope the various US crises will all lead toward simultaneous eruption
there is no need for the Communist
enemy to want peace.
Because the reflex reaction of US
policy is predictable, a weaker enemy
can focus US public, press, and gov
ernmental attention wherever he
wants it-in Berlin, Korea, the Middle
East, Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, and in
an endless future succession of cl'ises
at times and places of the enemy's
choosing.
The US objective in world disarma
ment is outlined in Section 2, Public
May 1968
Law 87-297, 26 September 1961:
An ultimate goal of the United
States is a world which is free from
the scourge of war and the dangers
and burdens of armaments; in which
the use of force has become subordi
nated to the rule of law; and in which
international adjustments to a chang
ing world are achieved peacefully.
No fault is found with this ultimate
objective. However, it is the strategy
for achieving this goal which has been
a deception and a failure.
45
GLOBAL STRATEGY
The United States declares that she
intends to move toward this goal with
"staged disarmament." In theory, the
nations will agree in stage I to a cer
tain level of disarmament and will cre
ate an international agency capable of
enforcing these agreements. Then, the
nations will agree to far larger steps
of disarmament in stage II and will
create a far larger en
forcement instrumentality. in
stage III, nations will agree to general
and complete. disarmament and the
creation of a global enforcement au
thority capable of making peace per
manent.
Fatal Flaw
The fatal flaw in this plan may be
seen by studying a map of the world
and imagining that the nations have
progressed wel1 into stage II, having
agreed to abolish al1 nuclear power, al1
space power, al1 airpower, al1 naval
power, and having created an enforce
ment agency capable of preventing
violations. At this point, history will
have been thrown back to the 13th cen
tury when the Mongols killed 18 mil
lion Chinese in 10 years using only
man-sized weapons.
When this point of enforced staged
disarmament is reached, what is there
to prevent the Chinese masses and the
Soviet masses from moving on land,
with modern land transport and indi
vidual weapons, across Europe, the
Middle East, Asia, and Africa? In
time, they could dominate the land
masses of the strategic continents and
the wealth and resources sufficient to
make their conquest permanent.
The United States, separated from
these areas by massive oeean distances
and polar regions, devoid of nuclear
power, space power, airpower, and na
val power, would be helpless to prevent
Communist world domination. The
United States would not last long as
an island of frustration and weakness.
Agenda OuUined
Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin of the
USSR was reported in The New York
Times of 2 July 1968 to have out
lined the agenda of the items the So:
viet Union would negotiate. The Krem
lin is willing to discuss publicly before
the world:
A ban on the use of nuclear
weapons.
I
Measures on ending the manu
facture of nuclear weapons and re
ducing and liquidating the stoekpiles.
Limitation and subsequent re
duction of means of delivery of stra
tegic weapons.
Ban on flights of bombers carry
ing nuclear weapons beyond national
frontiers, and limitation of zones of
voyages on submarines carrying nu
clear missiles.
Ban on underground tests of nu
clear weapons.
Liquidation of foreign mJitar
y
bases.
Since Communist strategic power
and position is built upon a base of
massive people power, natural re
sources, and ability to move on land
to al1 areas required for strategic mas
tery, they do not list for discussion any
subject which would limit their capa
bilities to support "wars of liberation"
and internal revolutions. They will not
discuss limitation of the ability of the
forces of the Soviet Union to move on
land into Czechoslovakia or any other
nation to be held or brought by force
under Communist domination.
There are many bold, safe initia
tives the United States can launch to
regain eroding national security.
Needed is leadership with the vision
MIlItIrJ 1,,1
48
Ii
PRESIDENT
I
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i. \ "'.,g4?,
A \ \ tilt
/\\,
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/ aL. POLITICAL
/ ~ MORAL
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~ - - - - - - - - - - ,
/. I
1 MODEL . I
/
1 GLOBAL I
1 SAFnY I
I AUTHORITY 1
1
7 i
c...... L,1_r--______
MILITARY
TECHNICAL
ECONOMIC
LEGAL
PUBLIC OPINION
GLOBAL STRATEGY
of lasting world peace and the courage
to mobilize the American people for
a generation of effort to assume world
leadership into a new era of global
war safety control systems capable of
preventing war between all nations.
First, the American people must un
tie indefensible, the entire feudal sys
tem collapsed. It made little difference
whether the lord of a castle was a
"dove" or a 4'hawk."
If he was a "dove" and chose weak
ness in the face of oncoming enemies,
he and his people tended to disappear
nature of the crisis from history. If he was a "hawk" and
A model Global Safety Authority Command and Control Center
the magnitude of the problem. Until
the problem is understood, all activity
tends to be random and counterproduc
tive.
Civilization today is caught in the
collapse of a historic era. A historic
era collapses when the basic military
protective system collapses. This is not
a political event. At the core, it is a
military disaster. There is a precedent
from history for today's crisis. When
advancing technology produced gun
powder and cannon, rendering the cas
sent forth his armies to fight to defend
the system, he shot more and more
holes in more and more castles until
the ruins of castles remain scattered
across the countryside as monuments
to the dead era of one-castle defense
force. This was not a "political sci
ence exercise." It was the collapse of
basic military protective systems.
Today, this has happened again.
Advancing technology Ilas produced
weapons and global delivery systems
capable of producing de-
Review 48
struction. As both the United States
and the USSR increase their ability to
inflict unacceptable damage on the
other, real national security for both
countries recedes further.
The self-generating dynamics of
power have built up today into con
frontations in space, in the airspace,
on the ocean, and in military, eco
nomic, and political frontlines across
the earth's surface. If either side
turns weak, the opposing powers will
move quickly to fill the vacuum. For
"preventive" reasons, the victor will
make certain that the opponent never
again will achieve military capability.
As a historic era collapses, civiliza
tion reaches a dead end street. A
breakthrough, or leap, or discontinu
ity is the only way out. There will be
some kind of global security system,
or there will be chaos and devastation.
In some way, there will be a reconsti
tuted United Nations, or a world pub
lic authority, or limited world govern
ment in the field of war and peace, or
a new world security organization-or
civilization will not move forward. It
will revert back to the jungle.
Alternatives
For the first time in history, it is
becoming possible to develop armed
forces management to full global di
mensions, to provide a single com
mand structure over all potentially
dangerous military materiel or activ
ity. It is only a matter of time until
such a world military protective sys
tem emerges. When this event trans
pires, all nations will be forced to re
duce their armaments down to limits
allowed for domestic law and order.
There will be no wars between nations
because the superior safety authority
will have the right and the strength
to prevent such wars.
May 1969
GLOBAL STRATEGY
The greatest portion of the present
200 billion dollars a year invested in
global arms races could be saved and
invested instead in food, clothing,
housing, health, education, and wel
fare for human beings in all nations.
The great unanswered question is
whether the global safety authority
will be dominated by one bloc or an
other or by unprecedented new checks
and balances and controls of a recon
stituted United Nations or new world
security organization?
This is, perhaps, not only the most
crucial question facing the American
people, but the subject of the future
safety of mankind.
Global Dimensions
For the first time in history, ad
vancing systems technologies and
management skills make it feasible to
expand armed forces management to
global dimensions for a future UN
Safety Authority. In 1945, when the
United Nations was chartered, this
seemed unattainable.
No new scientific breakthroughs
will be required. Rapidly advancing
systems of communications, air traffic
control, space traffic monitoring, un
dersea exploration, surveillance, intel
ligence gathering and evaluation, eco
nomic and meteorological forecasting,
and near-global military command and
control systems in the future can be
integrated into a global safety system.
Such a future public safety author
ity would maintain public inventory
of all potentially dangerous military
materiel and activity and would en
force war prevention discipline as a
city fire department enforces fire pre
vention discipline. It would have the
power required to put out any fires
of war which started.
There are no valid military reasons
49
GLOBAL STRATEGY
why the United States should not as
sume world leadership developing,
testing, and demonstrating prototype
all-nation defense systems, along with
unprecedented checks, balances, and
controls for a worldwide armed forces
management system. Many years of
satellites will be in
tions with safety command and control
centers in all nations
be required before public confidence in
such a war safety control system
would be warranted. No nation would
be asked to submit its national de
fense responsibilities to the projected
UN Safety Authority during the ex
perimental years.
This project would be in addition to
essential defense effort. Each stage of
development would increase national
defense posture, not weaken it as in
premature disarmament. A new US
strategic aim would be the national
security and political independence of
the United States in a multinational
safety system guarding the national
security and political independence of
all nations. The people of all nations
would respond to major power leader
ship toward the future global security
system which would give promise of
an eventual end to war.
There would be no need to negotiate
first with the enemy for the United
States to assume this leadership. All
nations would be invited to cooperate
in the prototype experiments, but pio
neering would go forward with US ini
tiatives no matter what nations held
back in the beginning.
A generation might be required to
pioneer global safety power as a gen
eration was required to pioneer nu
clear power or space exploration. A
first lO-year commitment could be
made now to take significant strides
toward global safety. Many large
scale, safe initiatives could be an
nounced to the world without delay.
Global Safety Council
The US Congress could authorize
the President to create a new Council
on Global Safety (COGS). While the
National Security Council would con
tinue its responsibilities for day-to
day and medium-range matters relat
ing to the national defense, the CQGS
would conduct and foster
development, and planning for the
United States to assume world lea er
ship toward the long-range goal of a
future United Nations, or new world
security organization, capable of mak
ing the world safe from war. The
council would bring together repre
sentatives of the military and civilian
sectors of the American society.
For the President, COGS woul!! di
rect US participation in multinational
war prevention garnes, war prevention
systems conferences, and experimental
global command and control centers.
Through techniques of computer
ized simulation and through system
atic testing of global safety systems,
the council would clarify the new dis-
Military Reylew
50
ciplines and regulations required for
future political checks, balances, and
controls for a remodeled United Na-
tions or a new world security organi
zation. Specific proposals would be pre
sented to the public such as:
Measures to assure that global
command and control of the world's
military power will not, itself, be
come a tyrant over governments of
independent nations.
Enforceable provisions that no
nation can possess a veto in the field
of the prevention of violence and ag
gression between nations, while, at
the same time, guaranteeing its free
dom to make and to change its domes
tic law on all other matters.
New legal instrumentalities re
quired to resolve internation conftict
in a new era in which violence has
been outlawed in internation affairs.
New restraints on international
relations which will permit each na
tion to change its domestic form of
government by any means, including
revolution, without the participation
or involvement of any foreigu force,
including the United Nations.
Provisions for flexibility in
global safety systems so that nations
may remain free to form voluntarily
into larger political and economic
structures without military force.
The character and magnitude of
restraints upon individual freedom
which would be the price of global
safety systems.
As a first step toward global safety,
the nations would be invited to de
velop surveillance systems for experi
mental installation in a continuing
series of orbiting laboratories. All na
tions would have free access to infor
mation outputs so that all national
defense establishments, all regional
May 1969
GLOBAL STRATEGY
defense establishments, and the UN
Military Staff Committee could gain
experience in this prototype of future
UN Safety Authority intelligence im
pability. The objective would be public
inventory of all potentially dangerous
military materiel or activity. Answers
would be sought to the question: Can
a future UN Safety Authority war
rant public confidence?
A second step would be an experi
mental UN command and control sys
tem using unclassified information.
Advanced global command and control
centers would be constructed near UN
Headquarters, in the capitals of coop
erating nations, and in the headquar
ters of regional defense organizations.
The centers would be open to the pub
lic of all nations. Large illuminated
display walls would be linked directly
to the national command centers of
all cooperating nations or regional or
ganizations. No nation would be ex
pected to divulge information detri
mental to its own national security.
All would gain experience in the inter
face problems of a future war safety
control system of world dimension.
A third step would be war preven
tion systems conferences. In a contin
uing series of multinational confer
ences, military and political leaders of
all cooperating nations could begin to
hammer out force structures and re
quirements for a future UN Safety
Authority. They could explore and ex
periment with new political controls
required to make certain that an all
nation military command and control
authority could not become a tyrant
over governments of independent na
tions and could not be captured by any
one political power clique for world
domination.
These continuing conferences would
51
GLOBAL STRATEGY
be held on many levels, inside and out
side UN channels. They would be held
with individual nations and with re
gional defense organizations. Free dis
cussion and exploration would be en
couraged in universities. professional
associations, and in the press.
A fourth step would be continuing
multinational war prevention games.
While war games are utilized to test
and improve proficiency in wllging
war, the purpose of this series of
war prevention games would be to
test and improve the proficiency of
the prototype UN Safety Authority.
All available techniques would be used
from computerized models of poten
tial war scenarios to large-scale exper
iments in subversive mobilization for
war between nations. Every means of
public communication would be em
ployed to inform and educate the pub
lic of the world on the successes and
failures of these war prevention
games.
The US Government should create
a new military command-the US
Global Safety Systems Command, re
porting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
It would be responsible for the mili
tary aspects of US development and
testing of future all-nation defense
systems, and for US participation
in the multinational war prevention
games. The mission would include:
Pioneering global intelligence ca
pabilities and requirements for a fu
ture UN Safety Authority.
Pioneering global war control de
tection, inspection, and prevention
systems, and testing of such capabil
ities.
Pioneering and establishing
global aerospace, land force, naval, in
telligence, and command requirements
for a future UN Safety Authority.
Maintaining and supporting ad
vanced scientific and engineering re
search and development centers in all
fields relating to global safety systems
to be cognizant of, and ahead of, fu
ture breakthroughs to new military
weapons concepts.
Maintaining and supporting ad
vance planning capabilities to assure
flexibility of future global safety sys
tems to meet changing needs for pro
tection of all nations from threats of
war from foreign powers.
Cooperating with higher strate
gic and political prototype develop
ment activities and maintaining au
thorized liaison with the military
branch of each cooperating nation, re
gional defense organization. or the
United Nations.
Developing additional capabili
ties of war prevention personnel so
that, when not engaged in active vio
lence prevention efforts, troops would
be available for disaster relief and to
help developing nations in the fields
of education, training, public works.
agriculture, transportation, comn\mi
cations, health, sanitation, mapving,
highway and bridge constructiol{, ir
rigation systems, and general devel
opment.
Sponsoring and encouraging
large-scale advance research, develop
ment, and planning in war prevention
weapons, tactics, and technologies;
into the maintenance of the integrity
of national borders; and into other
global military safety capabilities.
The search for a new world order,
secure from war, would require a
long-range US commitment. The path
would not be easy, but "a journey of
a thousand miles begins with a single
step." The first step should be a bold
one.
Military Review
52
A _ ~ l t z , ~
From Foreign Affair8
JAPAN ...
eye on 1910
T
HE United States and Japan ap
proach a changing relationship.
Japan wants the continued nuclear
guarantee of the United States, but is
restive at the protracted US control
of Okinawa and the irksome problems
arising from US military bases in Ja
pan. The natural desire of a leading
industrial nation for a more "inde
pendent" foreign policy, including
what is vaguely expressed as "autono
mous defense," appears to be steadily
growing.
At the same time, the United States,
under a new administration and in a
post-Vietnam period, can be expected
to reassess her responsibilities over
seas, particularly in Asia. The simul
taneous meeting in Japan of these
forces for change could, if the gears
mesh smoothly, produce a healthy
May 1989
transition toward a sounder, more mu
tually responsive Japanese-American
relationship. On the other hand, mis
understandings or misplaced expecta
tions on either or both sides could
block such a happy result and damage
the interests of both countries.
There is a timetable. In June 1970,
when the security treaty becomes sub
ject to notice of intent to terminate,
political action is threatened by the
left. A goal for the opposition and a
deadline for the government, 1970
symbolizes Japan's most important
and most discussed foreign policy is
sue today. In essence, it is the problem
of Japan's security. To understand it,
one should look at Japan's current
"mood," her effort in self-defense, the
security treaty itself, and the problem
of Okinawa.
53
JAPAN
The year 1968 marked the lOOth
anniversary of the accession to the
throne of Emperor Meiji. The Japa
nese take pride in the achievements
of the Meiji era, but in spirit seem
somewhat closer to the pleasures of
the long Tokugawa peace than to the
militancy of the Meiji Period which
followed. In fact, an all-pervading
"peace mood" is the strongest element
in the state of the Japanese 'mind
today.
The Japanese "peace constitution,"
which, in its Article 9, prohibits the
maintenance of "land, sea, and air
forces, as well as other war potential,"
is today supported almost unanimously
by the Japanese people (91 percent in
a recent poll). In fact, the Japanese
Socialists attribute Japan's' postwar
peace and prosperity to Article 9
rather than to the security treaty with
the United States.
"Nuclear Allergy"
The Japanese devotion to their peace
constitution is reinforced by a "nu
clear allergy," a psychological result
of the national experiences of Hiro
shima and Nagasaki. The government
recognizes this popular feeling and
seeks to influence it;, the left finds
endless opportunities to exploit it.
The Sato government has declared
its nuclear policy to be built on three
This article was reprinted by
special permission from FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, January 1969. Copy
right 1969 by the Council on
Foreign Relations, Inc., New
York.
Mr. Emmerson, a Foreign
Service officer from 1995 to 1968,
is now a Scholar in Residence at
Stanford University. From 1962
to 1967, he was a Minister in the
US Embassy in Tokyo.
principles-namely, that Japan shall
not possess, manufacture, or permit
the entry into the country of nuclear
weapons. This is one of the few gov
ernment policies approved by all po
litical parties. Still, the Prime Minis
ter has refused to go so far as to
support an opposition-sponsored Diet
resolution endorsing the three nuclear
principles. He explained that he would
feel uneasy to have the Diet thus "bind
the Japanese people forever."
Port Calls Discontinued
The left has made the most of the
"nuclear allergy," particularly in con
nection with the visits to Japanese
ports of US nuclear-powered naval
vessels. Demonstrations reached new
heights during the call at Sasebo of
the aircraft carrier Enterprise in Jan
uary 1968. A furor again erupted in
May when a slight degree of radio
activity was discovered in Sasebo wa
ters after the visit of a nuclear-pow
ered submarine. Although the United
States, after full investigation, an
nounced that the submarine coulct not
have been responSible, public conQern
was not allayed. As a result of tbese
incidents, all port calls of US nuclear
powered naval vessels were discon
tinued for the time being.
The inconsistencies between the
"nuclear allergy" and the facts that
Japan plans to build her own nuclear
powered ship and that nuclear energy
will undoubtedly become a chief source
of Japan's electriC power by the end
of the century, are stiIl lost on many
Japanese. To them, the presence in a
Japanese port of a nuclear-powered
warship conjures up the specter of
possible Japanese involvement in war.
This fear is a strong element in the
peace mood of the nation today.
Many Japanese have observed the
Military Revle.
54
war in Vietnam with a sense of fear
that the pressures of escalation and
Japan's close ties with the United
States might implicate their own coun
try, particularly-if Chinese-American
hostilities should result. Peace talks in
Paris brought a sense of relief to the
Japanese and, for many of them, Viet-
Prime Minister Eisaku Sato of Japan
nam became a faraway issue-a "fire
on the other side of the river."
Peace is not only a mood. The Japa
nese recognize that their advance to
the top ranks of the world's industrial
powers has been measurably assisted
by the fact that under one percent of
the gross national prodlict has been
spent on defense, a percentage less
than that of any other nation of con
sequence. . . . Twenty-three years of
peace and security have provided the
environment for the achievement of
Japan's "economic miracle."
The most popular "ism" in Japan
today is "my-home-ism" which, along
with "my-car," "my-room," and the
May 1969
JAPAN
many "my" words so prevalent in the
present-day Japanese language, sym
bolizes the feeling of cozy satisfaction
in achieving one's wants. "My-home
ism" is a kind of selfish concentration
on getting for oneself as many of the
good things of life as possible. . . .
Many Japanese critics deplore it as
selfish indifference unbefitting a coun
try assuming the rank and status of
a great power.
Prime Minister Eisaku Sato recog
nized the appeal of ''my-home-ism''
during the election campaign of last
summer. Inspired by Herman Kahn's
prediction that the 21st century will
belong to Japan, he painted a rosy fu
ture for the Japanese-peace and pros
perity ahead, with continuously rising
standards of living, surpassing Eu
rope and, by the end of the century,
even the United States.
New Nationalism
As a natural result of developing
confidence and as a kind of reaction
to ''my-home-ism,'' a new nationalism
is growing in Japan. Defeatism has
given way to pride in country, and
economic single-mindedness no longer
fully satisfies. This spirit is not the
property of any party or ideology.
While it contains no nostalgia for the
militarism of the past-although the
Socialists warn that it does-it envis
ages a country with the ability to de
fend itself, at least to a certsin degree.
"Autonomous defense" is a popular
phrase in Japan. No one has clearly
defined it, and its significance may
change in the future. Today, it seems
to mean: ''We ought to do more about
defense, but not too much, and of
course we still need the American se
curity guarantee."
The new nationalists will not be
satisfied with a purely economic role
55
JAPAN
for Japan, particularly in Asia. They
can be expected to urge greater diplo
matic activity to acquire international
inftuence more commensurate with
Japan's economic power.
Leadership of the new nationalism
has yet to emerge. Several younger
politicians belonging to the Liberal
Democratie Party and known as the
pan as a great power becomes a na
tional ideal.
The purpose and role of the Japa
nese Self-Defense Force (SDF) are
clearly set forth in the defense con
cept approved by the National De
fense Council on 29 November 1966:
The basis of our nationtU defense
is to prevent aggression before it
Japanese students claslt with police during a demonstration against tlte visit of tlte US
nuclearpowered aircraft carrier Enterprise at the port of SaBebo, Japan
"new right" would like to speed the
changes and break out in new direc
tions. Given the strength of tradition,
the rigidity of the political system,
and the present trend of voting pat
terns, there is little likelihood of sud
den change. One can surmise, however,
that, over the coming years, as the
postwar generation gains inftuence
and its members come into positions
of power, the peace mood and "my
home-ism" may lose some of their
pervasiveness while the concept of Ja
actually occurs by maintaining a se
curity structure with the United
States and by maintaining an effec
tive defense force by Japan herself.
Furthermore, Japan wiU, with her
own capability, cope with an indirect
aggression and a small scale direct ag
gression and any armed aggression on
a larger scale will be repelled with the
cooperation of the United States. In
this case, strategic defense operations
will be primarily conducted by Japan.
Thus, we see that Japan's SDF is
Military Review 56
organized to cope with conventional
threats of moderate scale while the
United States maintains the nuclear
deterrent.
Probably no. other country in the
world maintains armed forces whose
constitutional legality is open to chal
lenge. Japan's SDF exists in spite of
Article 9 of the Constitution. The
principal political parties opposing the
government consider the SDF uncon
stitutional, and Japan's Supreme
Court has never passed on the ques
tion.
General Douglas MacArthur stated
in 1946 that, in Article 9, Japan "sur
renders rights inherent in her own
sovereignty." However, successive Jap
anese Governments have taken the po
sition that the Constitution does not
and cannot take away from Japan the
inherent, sovereign right of self-de
fense. It is on this interpretation that
Japan's defense structure is built.
Revision
Revision of the Constitution was a
live issue a few years ago, but no Jap
anese Government would propose it to
day. Not only does the party in power,
the Liberal-Democratic Party, lack
the necessary two-thirds majority in
the Diet to amend the Constitution,
but popular support for changes, par
ticularly in Article 9, is totally lacking
in the country.
Many Liberal-Democratic Party
leaders personally favor revision, but
the hazards of saying so were proved
in February 1968 when the Minister
of Agriculture and Forestry in the
Sato government was forced to resign
after a casual remark to some journal
ists suggesting that Japan's constitu
tional restrictions on military power
hampered her diplomacy. Prime Min
ister Sato has publicly stated the po-
May 1989
JAPAN
sition of the government by describ
ing the "pacifism" of Article 9 as the
"flesh and blood of the Japanese pe0
ple today."
Interpretation rather than revision
has been the constitutional road fol
lowed by Japan, and, in this manner,
EftIb"'f 01 Japan
Nik" AJa>: missiles of the Japanese Self
Defense Force. Present plans are to
supplement their HAWK and Ajax air
defense system with the newer Nike
Hercule8 missiles, but without nuclear
capability.
most legal blocks to the development
of a competent defense force have been
circumvented or removed. Along the
way, it has been established that J a
pan will not engage in offensive war
fare nor possess offensive weapons.
Yet Japanese defense experts note that
technological developments are making
it more and more difficult to distin
guish between offensive and defensive
weapons.
57
JAPAN
Although it is accepted that Japa
nese forces are not to be dispatched
overseas to engage in combat, succes
sive government spokesmen have
agreed that Japanese bombers must
be allowed to attack enemy bases
should this prove the sole available
means of defense. Similarly, from the
time of Prime Minister Nobosuke
Kishi, Japanese Governments have as
serted the constitutionality of "defen
sive" nuclear weapons. However, these
would still face legal prohibition by
the Atomic Energy Law which pro
vides that nuclear power must be used
for peaceful purposes only.
PeaceKeeping Engagement
A live question is whether the SDF
may legaUy join in a United Nations
peace-keeping force. Engagement in
combat overseas in a Korean or Congo
type UN operation would be out of the
question. On the other hand, participa
tion in UN actions of a noncombat na
ture, such as supervising armistices
or inspecting elections, while not vio
lating the Constitution, might conflict
with laws establishing the Defense
Agency and the SDF. Still, it seems
likely that, should a UN presence be
established in Southeast Asia after
the Vietnam war, Japan's urge to co
operate would be strong enough to
overcome legal obstacles.
Japan ranks approximately 12th in
the world in defense expenditures.
Budgets have increased annually, but
have represented progressively smaller
percentages of the gross national
product and national income. Expendi
tures for 1967 were a little over one
billion dollars, or .91 percent of the
gross national product and 7.4 percent
of the national budget.
The Third Defense Buildup Plan be
gan in 1967 and runs through 197i.
The emphasis of the plan is on the
qualitative improvement of the SDF
through research and development, the
modernization of equipment, and the
production of equipment in Japan.
Primary attention will be given to
"coastal water defense capability, vital
area air defense capability, and mobile
capability by various means."
Equipment to be acquired under the
present plan includes destroyers, sub
marines, helicopters, Nike Hercules
missiles modified to carry only non
nuclear warheads, and fighter aircraft.
The plan also calls for an increase of
8,500 men in the Ground Self-Defense
Force, bringing total authorized
ground strength to 180,000 by the last
year of the plan. SDF personnel at
present number about 275,000, includ
ing land, sea, and air forces.
Manpower
The SDF is competent and well
equipped; its problems lie more in
manpower than in materiel. No mili
tary conscription means no reservoir
of reserves. Entering vOluntlrs are
sometimes too few to meet quire
ments, and, after receiving aluable
technical training, many men resign
to take profitable jobs in private in
dustry. This turnover, highest among
ground forces, has the educative ad
vantage of spreading SDF experience
through the population, but is natu
rally detrimental to the efficiency of
the forces.
More important, the SDF, an orga
nization which cannot even call itself
"military," has developed no ideology
and little sense of purpose. For these
reasons, coupled with a lack of pres
tige and popular support in the past,
morale has suffered. In the words of
one commentator, "National support
is worth more than a hundred jets."
MilitIJy Revle.
58
JAPAN
Automobile assembly line typifies the economic advance of Japan to the top ranks of
the world's industrial powers
Fortunately for the SDF, its image
has improved markedly in recent
years. Public opinion pons now show
majority support for the continuation
of the SDF, but, it should be noted,
"at its present leveI."
In their communique issued 15 No
vember 1967 after meetings in Wash
ington, President Lyndon B. Johnson
and Prime Minister Sato declared:
it to be the fundamental policy
of both countrie8 to maintain firmly
the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security between the United States
and Japan in order to ensure the 8e
curitY'of Japan and the peace and 8e
curity of the Far East.
"Automatic extension" of the treaty,
or "automatic continuation" as the
Japanese Foreign Office prefers to call
it, would require no specific action by
either government. The treaty would
become subject at any time after 23
June 1970 to termination upon one
year's advance notice by either party.
While the Japanese Government would
thus become vulnerable to continuing
opposition proposals for abrogation, a
Diet confrontation like that in 196!)
would be avoided.
Another procedure-amendment of
the treaty to extend its validity for a
specific period of years-would not
only invite a Diet struggle possibly
more violent than that of 1960, but
might well inspire amendments when
submitted to the US Senate, in view
of US criticism that this stH:8lled
"mutual" treaty, in fact, imposes one
sided commitments on the United
States.
The Liberal-Democratic Party in
terpreted the successful retention of
a majority in the House of Councillors
May 1989 59
JAPAN
elections last July as popular endorse
ment of the security treaty. In fact,
the Japanese voters probably based
their choices at the polls less on their
judgment of the treaty than on their
concern over prices, housing, and
other problems of daily life, and in
response to the local appeals of indi
vidual candidates. Recent public opin
ion polls reveal fair support for con
tinuation of the treaty, b)lt the per
centages of "don't know" answers are
large.
There is obviously a considerable
body of opinion favoring a "weaken
ing" of tlie security relationship al
though "outright termination" re
ceives only small minority support in
most of the polls. Most Japanese prob
ably expect the treaty to continue in
effect although many do not under
stand its contents or significance.
Opposition Parties
The Socialist and Communist Par
ties propose an end to the treaty in
1970. The Socialists alone favor un
armed neutrality. The unpopularity of
this policy may have been one ele
ment in the resounding defeat which
they suffered in July. In fact, in a
poll of Tokyo Socialist Party mem
bers, 47.7 percent rejected unarmed
neutrality in favor of "self-defense
power" for Japan. Even the Commu
nists admit that, in certain future cir
cumstances, Japan might have to take
defense measures "in a military

The other two opposition parties
the Democratic Socialists and Komeito
-are prepared to accept a revised se
curity treaty for a limited period of
time. The former advocate an ar
rangement whereby US forces would
no longer be stationed in Japan, but
would return in cases of emergency;
the latter proposes "gradual dissolu
tion" of the treaty, with final termina
tion during the 1970's.
Three aspects of the treaty prob
lem deserve attention. First, it should
be noted that the basic effect of the
treaty is to guarantee the security of
Japan through US nuclear forces or,
in popular language, the "nuclear um
brella." At the same time, the parties
to the treaty both subscribe to "a
common concern in the maintenance
of international peace and security in
the Far East," and the treaty provides
that US bases in Japan are to be used
not only for the defense of Japan, but
also to defend "the peace and security
of the Far East."
"Far Easf' Clause
Furthermore, the Japanese Govern
ment has consistently maintained that
there is an inseparable relationship
between the defense of Japan and the
peace and security of other parts of
Asia. Yet it is doubtful that this con
cept is fully accepted by the general
public, and it is under consl:\lnt attack
from the opposition. In vein, on
9 August 1968, in the commit
tee of the House of Representatives,
a Socialist member argued that, be
cause application of the treaty to the
"Far East" brought apprehensions to
the Japanese people, the "Far East"
clause should be eliminated in 1970.
Foreign Minister Takeo Miki replied
that the government had no intention
of proposing such a change.
As the war in Vietnam has ex
panded, use of Japanese bases appears
to be less related to the defense of J a
pan than to events in Southeast Asia.
For example, visible increases in air
traffic, repair operations, and hospital
usage are widely publicized by the
Japanese 'information media.
Military Rewiew
60
Embauv 01 Japan.
F.I01 StarlighterB of the Japanese Air SelfDefense Force
At the same time, US use of the
bases for direct combat operations in
east Asia is limited by the agreement
which requires prior consultation with
the Japanese Government, not only
before major changes in the deploy
ment and equipment of US forces in
Japan can be made, but also before
JAPAN
Japanese Government recognizes that
the bases are a small price to pay for
the US security guarantee and are
themselves an essential element in Ja
pan's own defense.
Among left-inclined Japanese, how
ever, the bases are frequently seen as
an indemnity, first exacted from an
occupied Japan and instesd of
operations outside Japan. The phrase
"major changes in equipment" is un
derstood as r e ~ e r r i n g to the introduc
tion of nuclear weapons. The "prior
consultation formula" does not apply
to the bases in Okinawa.
A second aspect of the treaty is
that, for obvious Japanese constitu
tional reasons, it places no reciprocal
obligations on Japan to come to the
defense of the United States. Instead,
Japan provides bases and facilities for
the use of US military forces. The
May 1969
offering protection, act as a kind of
dangerous lightning rod to attract re
taliation from enemies of the United
States and to embroil Japan in un
wanted conflict.
Japan's rapid urbanization and the
mounting pressures of population have
intensified the problems of the bases,
a good number of which are unfor
tunately located in the densely popu
lated Kwanto Plain surrounding Tokyo
and Yokohama. US military installa
tions now number some 149, con
81
JAPAN
trasted to more than 2,500 in 1952.
Most of the facilities used at present
are inconspicuous and generate no
trouble, but the few large airbases
present problems of land use, noise,
incidents, and accidents. United States
and Japanese authorities cooperate
closely in seeking to prevent or ame
liorate these problems and have
achieved notable progress.
In continuing and speeding up the
process already underway, additional
bases can be eliminated, reloCated, or
transferred to the SDF, and US per
sonnel can be further reduced. In the
cases of reiocation and transfer to
Japanese control, heavy expenses are
involved, and the Japanese Govern
ment is not always ready and willing
::::t:!e
ploitable political issues, and the oppo
sition parties and Japan's hyperactive
mass media keep them vivid in the
public mind.
No External Threat
A third element in the treaty prob
lem is the fact that the Japanese, in
general, feel no immediate external
threat to the security of their coun
try. The government is reluctant to
specify such a threat or to designate
any country as a potential or hypo
thetical enemy of Japan.
Although Prime Minister Sato sub
scribed to language in the joint com
munique with President Johnson
which referred to the "present intran
sigent attitude" of Communist China,
the Prime Minister has stated before
a Diet committee that he would
"neither affirm nor deny" that China
had aggressive tendencies. He bas de
nied repeatedly that Japan looks upon
Peking as a "hypothetical enemy."
Although few would doubt that Ja
pan's defense strategy is directed
against mainland China and the So
viet Union, the Japanese do not now
fear attack from either of these na
tions. Peking's rapid progress in de
veloping nuclear weapons surprised
and sobered many Japanese and jarred
some of their genial assessments of
China. Japanese military analysts
predict the successful Chinese pro
duction of intercontinentsl ballistic
missiles in the early 1970's. Yet many
Japanese have accepted Peking's arms
program as largely defensive in char
acter and have believed Mao Tse-tung
when he promised never to be the first
to use a nuclear weapon.
Trade Increase
As for the USSR, the Japanese were
encouraged by the constructive steps
in Soviet-United States relations and
were themselves intrigued with the
possibility of trade and economic co
operation, particularly in Siberia. In
fac;t, Soviet-Japanese negotiations for
the development of Siberia have, so
far, made little concrete proyess al
though trade betwecn the twp coun
tries has increased. The Soviet Gov
ernment has continued to refuse dis
cussion of Japan's claims to the
"northern territories."
The invasion of Czechoslovakia pro
duced a profound reaction in Japan
and reawakened the decp suspicions
and mistrust of the USSR, tradition
ally strong among the Japanese. The
result was a heightened wariness to
ward the Soviet Union which has not,
however, translated itself into a sense
of direct threat.
US visitors to Japan are often sur
prised at the seeming complacency of
many Japanese toward an external
Communist threat. Especially one
would expect that the Japanese might
MilibJJ Revll.
62
worry about a possible attack in Ko
rea across the 38th Parallel. Although
recently increasing attention has been
directed toward Korea, serious con
cern is rarely. expressed.
A public opinion poll taken in Tokyo
in March 1968 attempted to discover
whether the Japanese felt any "sense
of crisis" and, if so, for what reasons.
Results showed that about half of
those polled did feel a sense of crisis.
However, only six percent of these be-
JAPAN
tion of Japanese life. If an election
should be held, the government would
consider a victory a mandate in sup
port of the treaty. Although the left
will stage demonstrations and may at
tempt a general strike in 1970, most
competent observers believe that, bar
ring an unforeseen resurgence of op
position strength, the antitreaty move
ment will not succeed.
However, if a solution is not soon
found for the problem of Okinawa,
lieved the danger came from a possi
ble attack on Japan by a Communist
nation, and 51 percent attributed their
uneasiness to the "possibility of be
coming embroiled in conflicts through
cooperation with America's Asian
policy."
If, as expected, the Liberal-Demo
cratic Party maintains its majority
into 1970-there is the possibility that
the House of Representatives may be
dissolved and an election held in 1969
-the automatic continuation of the
security treaty can be expected to take
place in 1970 without serious disrup-
May 1969
this issue could dominate all others,
stimulate the forces opposing the
treaty, and cause serious difficulties in
1970.
The problem of Okinawa is a prob
lem of when and how rather than of
what. All are agreed-Americans,
Japanese, and Okinawans-that the
Ryukyu Islands belong to Japan, are
part of the "homeland" of Japan, and
will be returned to Japan. The gov
ernments concerned have also agreed
that the military bases on the islands
will be retained by the United States
for a considerable time in the future.
83
JAPAN
EmbGUV 0/ J'apan
The M60, self-propelled, I06-millimeter recoilless gun of the Japanese Ground Self
Defense Force
Reduced to ita essentials, the problem
is when can the United States turn
over to Japan responsibility for ad
ministering the islands, and how, or
under what conditions, can the United
States maintain the bases.
At the time of Prime Minister Sa
to's visit to Washington in November
ter of the calendar. The United States
maintains that agreement on the use
of the bases must be an integral part
of the reversion process and cannot be
postponed until after the transfer of
administrative rights.
The use of the bases poses tough
political problems for Japan. If the
1967, both countries agreed to "keep
under joint and continuous review the
status of the Ryukyu Islands, guided
by the aim of returning administra
tive righta over these islands to Ja
pan...." Since then, Sato has ex
pressed his conviction that agree
ment on a date can be reached "within
two or three years." Undoubtedly, the
Prime Minister has had 1970 in mind,
but fixing a date is not a simple mat-
United States is permitted to main
tain the bases without restrictions, as
at present, while the "prior consulta
tion" formula continues to control
bases in Japan, Okinawans will charge
discrimination. Already they have
shown their sensitivity. When B-52'8
have taken off from bases in Okinawa
to bomb North Vietnam, the clamor
from Okinawans, as wellas from Jap
anese, has been loud and strong.
MilitJry Review 64
The use was legal, and the Japanese
Government could not protest; still,
the bases were on soil of the acknowl
edged "homeland," and national feel
ings were aroused. Needless to say,
the value of tlie Okinawan bases has
gone up as the war in Vietnam has
intensified, and, while the war con
tinues, the United States can scarl!ely
be expected to agree to restrictions.
Three Solutions
There are three ways in which the
base problem could be resolved at the
time Japan assumes administrative
rights. The first would continue the
status quo, according the United
States unrestricted use of the bases,
including the possible presence of nu
clear weapons. Presumably, this would
be most satisfactory to the United
States.
A second arrangement would place
the Okinawan bases under the same
restrictions that obtain for US bases
in Japan; the "prior consultation"
formula would be operative, and no
nuclear weapons would be allowed.
This would be supported by public
opinion in both Japan and Okinawa.
A third solution would be to ban
nuclear weapons from the islands, but
grant the United States "free use" of
the bases in all other ways. For ex
ample, military units could be sent di
rectly into combat without prior con
sultation with Japan. This would
probably be politically more accepta
ble in Japan than continuation of the
status quo, but would be open to the
charge that sending forces into com
bat without Japanese knowledge or
consent could involve Japan in US
conflicts. Thus far, Sato has been non
committal on the future of Okinawan
bases, taking a position he calls the
"clean slate." .
May 1969
JAPAN
The victory of the candidate sup
ported by all opposition parties in the
first direct election of the Chief Ex
ecutive of the Ryukyu Islands held
on 10 November has injected a trou
blesome note in the calculations of
both Japan and the United States. The
outcome was not only a defeat for the
Liberal-Democratic Party and its Oki
nawan counterpart; the victor's ob
ligations to his supporters, who in
clude Communists and Socialists, could
complicate the smooth exercise by the
United States of her administrative
authority over the islands. Certainly,
the vote indicated Okinawan impa
tience and added urgency to the search
for a solution of the Okinawa ptoblem.
Difficult Decisions
Resolution of the Okinawa problem
wilJ require hard decisions by both
sides. The Japanese Government must
evaluate for itself the contribution
tMt the Okinawan bases make to Jap
anese security, as well as to that of
South Korea and Formosa-neighbors
whose relations with Japan are of
critical importance to Tokyo. Japan
must, above all, calculate the effect
on Communist China of a weakening
of the US deterrent on Okinawa
through a change in the status of the
bases.
In the light of these judgments and
of political factors in both Okinawa
and Japan proper, the Japanese Gov
ernment must determine what ar
rangements for continued US use of
the bases are desirable and accepta
ble. At the same time, the US Gov
ernment, in reexamining its military
bases around the world, must strictly
evaluate the strategic importance of
Okinawa, considering the situation in
east Asia, technological developments,
and the fundamental US interest in
85
JAPAN
maintaining the solidarity of the Jap
anese-American relationship.
Given the urgency and the stakes
on both sides, it seems imperative that
Japan and the United States rapidly
achieve an agreement on the terms
of a return of the administrative
rights to Japan and the future status
of the bases. If an understanding on
the timing and conditions of a solu
tion is not reached before 1970, the
problem of Okinawa could serIously
corrode Japanese-American relations.
In a post-Vietnam Asia, a changing
relationship between Japan and the
United States must be based on a
realistic understanding of what each
country can and cannot do and on the
politicaj. determinants in both Tokyo
anllWashington. Regardless of the
kind of strategy the United States
chooses to pursue in east Asia, an ef
fective US military presence in either
Japan proper or Okinawa can be main
tained only with the full support and
cooperation of the Japanese Govern
ment.
Furthermore, the Japanese Govern
ment operates within a democratic
system and is subject, in spite of its
/'
Diet majority, to the pressures of
public opinion and the opposition par
ties. A national consensus on foreign
policy does not exist in Japan, and the
Sato government has thus far failed
to instill among the Japanese people
much feeling of concern or responsi
bility for the security of Asia. How
ever, the spirit of nationalism is
growing and national attitudes are
changing.
*
*
*
Japanese-American relations are at
a point when talk of partnership is
not enough and taking the other for
granted evades reality. Each nation
acts in its own self-interest, but, in
the modern world of entangling com
munications and relationships, no na
tion acts alone. Therefore, Japan and
the United States, although their
premises and perspectives may occa
sionally differ, must each be sensitive
to the urgencies of the other. To an
important degree, the stability and
prosperity of east Asia depend rpon
the compatibility and of
action of these two leading industrial
powers.
COMMENTS INVITED
The Military Review welcomes your comments on any mate
rial published. An opposite viewpoint or a new line of thought
may be published in our Reader Forum and stimulate the ex
change of ideas. If you are an authority on a subject, why not
write an article for our consideration? If you have only an idea,
query us; perhaps we can assist you in developing an acceptable
article.
&8
MilitarJ Rerie.
of Operations
Colonel William G. Stewart, United States Armll
T
HE conventional wisdom about
the strategic use of fortifica
tions includes two great misconcep
tions, One of these misconceptions con
cerns their general value, Some people
contend that such works are not use
ful. Others see them as actually det
rimental. These detractors invariably
refer to the French use of forts and to
the "Maginot Line Complex," They
never seem to quote German experi
ence or mention any "Siegfried Line
Complex," The point is that it is
always dangerous to bet the nation's
survival on any single weapon, work
of war, natural obstacle, or diplomatic
device. It was not the Maginot Line
May 1969
which failed France, but the minds
that depended on it too exclusively to
save the country.
The other misconception is that
fortifications aid only the defense.
Actually, they may help the offense
just as much, They let a commander
form a mobile force behind them
whether that force is to attack or
counterattack, With fortifications, he
can save on the men he must keep in
the battleline because the works will
slow the enemy and permit the mobile
reserve to react to any surprise move.
He then has a decisive means of in
fluencing the battle,
It is essential for us to understand
67
FORTIFICATIONS
FIRST BAntE OF THE MARNE, 1914
PARIS-SAINT MIHIEL
(144 MILES)
SAINT MIHIEl-SWITZERLAND
(120 MILES)
\
Figure 1.
LEGEND


GERIIAN FOIInFlED AREA
c::>F.ENCli ARMY L:::;rFRE1ICH FOIIIIFIED AREA
o
,
100
,
MIlES
not only how we, the probable de
fenders, can use fortifications, but
also how our potential enemies can
use them on the offense. A study of
Europe in the two World Wars shows
how fortifications can be used strate
gically.
In World War I, after their defeat
in the opening Battles of the Frontiers
in 1914, the French redistributed their
units. Taking advantage of their forts
in the east, General Joseph J. C. Joffre
took divisions from there to weight
his left flank against the German main
thrust. By the First Battle of the
Marne, the forces were distributed as
shown in Figure 1.
Joffre was able to place almost three
quarters of his force on about half
of his front to fight the battle which
he hoped would be decisive.
The Germans had started in 1906
with Schlieffen's plan which put the
maximum force in the decisive right
wing. By 1914, however, the plan had
been weakened by shifting weight
toward the left and to the Eastern
Front. Only two-thirds of the divi
sions in line were in the right wing
for the Battle of the Marne.
Military ReYiew 68
By 1940, the French should have
been able to do even better. The
Maginot Line, much superior to the
World War I forts, guarded the east
ern frontier. Part of France's border
with Germany then lay on the Rhine
-a stronger natural barrier than the
line of 1914. Yet the Allied disposi-
FORTIFICATIONS
the same frontage in the east as they
did in the north. Sir Winston S.
Churchill described a conference in
Paris after the German breakthrough
at Sedan, in which he learned of the
lack of a strategic reserve:
The General [Maurice G. Gamelin]
talked perhaps five minutes without
LIGIIl)
Figure 2.
tions in May 1940 were as shown in
Figure 2.
Of the combined French-British
forces, only half were prepared to
oppose a drive through Belgium. Thus,
they did not save on men in the
Maginot Line to be strong elsewhere
or to build a strategic reserve. The
French had placed divisions on about
May 1969
anyone saying a word. When. he
stopped there was considerable silence.
I then. asked: 'where is the strategic
reserve?' General Gamelin turned
to me and, with a shake of the head
and a shrug, said: 'Aucune.'
.. .. it
What was the Magi1Wt Line for?
It should have economized troops
69
FORTIFICATIONS
DISTRIBUTION OF DMSIONS ON WESTERN FRONT
(INCLUDING CAVALRy)
mrlAl"".
Main S-WII Pereent ill
7'otal Bottle Bottln Main Bottle
Marne. 1914
Allies 89 66 23 74
Germans 76% 50% 26 66
~
France. 1940
Allies 135 83 52 62
Germans 89* 72* 17 81
* Excludes strategic reserve of 47 divisions. 20 of which were positioned im
mediately behind the Army groups:
Figure 3.
upon a large 8ector of the frontier.
not only offering many sallY"'Ports for
local counter-strokes, but also enabling
large forces to be held in reserve:
and this is the only way these things
can be done. But now there was no
reserve. I admit this was one of the
Colonel William G. Stewart is Chief,
Engineer Section, Headquarters, US
Army, Vietnam. He was formerly in
Washington. D. C., with the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Systems Analysis) and with the Of
fice of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Military Operations. Other assign
ments include duty with the 1st Ar
mored Division in Germany, with the
Armed Forces Special Weapons Proj
ect in New Memo, with 8th Army in
Jatpan, and as Area Engineer in Green
land. He is a graduate of the US Mili
tary Academy. West Point; the US
Army Command and General Staff Col
lege; and the US Army War CoUege.
He holds an M.S. in Civil Engineering
from Harvard University and an M.A.
in International Affairs from George
Washington University.
greatest surprises I have had in my
life . . *
After the German attack began, the
22 Belgian and 10 Dutch divisions
were added to the Allied force, '{or a
total of 135. Even with these trjlOps.
the Allies had only 62 percent of \heir
force in the main battle compared to
74 percent at the Marne.
The German situation had also im
proved. In 1914. General Helmuth von
Moltke had only isolated forts to pro
tect his left flank from the French
while massing his own main attack
on the far right of his line. In 1940,
the Germans were considerably better
off in this respect. The Siegfried
Line and part of the Rhine Jet them
reduce the forces on the Jeft. They
took advantage of these changes and
put 81 percent of their committed
divisions into the main battle com
pared to 66 percent in 1914.
Thus. the Germans did much better
in 1 9 ~ than in 1914. They put an
.WSDIIWft 8. Churebm. Their FiftUt Bo.r.
Houghton Mlftlin Co.. Boston. JIau.. 1949, p 80.
MIl/tIrJ .eri.. 70
even smaller force in the south than
they had before, even though they had
more divisions available. At the same
time. the threat there was much
greater in terms of French divisions
-53 compared-to 23 in 1914.
The Siegfried Line not only made
such economy of force possible. but
it had already served Germany well
during the Polish campaign. Second
line divisions were sent to man the
fortifications at that time. permitting
the main army to be concentrated in
Poland. Even if the French and Brit
ish had attacked immediately in the
west, the works would have given time
to redeploy the first-line forces.
Dispositions of both sides in both
wars are summarized in Figure S.
Both times. the victor used his
works to save on forces in secondary
battles and to put more into the
decisive fight. He thus got a superior
force ratio in the main battle and ac
cepted inferiority on less critical
fronts. In one case. it was the defender
who won in this way. In the other, it
was the attacker.
COUNTRY BATTACKS
COUNTRY A COUNTRY B
Figure 4.
MIJ 1969
FORTIFICADONS
COUNTRY B
EfFECT Of F O I 1 R l ~ II fIIOIITASE AlII
SPEED OF CGUIITEIATTACII
Figure 5.
War-gaming factors. based on his
torical rates of advance and force
ratios. also can be used to show the
use of fortifications at theater level.
In a model. Country A and the ad
joining Country B each field a force
of 300,000. Each country puts 200.000
on their common border and holds a
reserve of 100.000.
Should Country B decide to attack,
she might do so as shown in Figure 4.
Country B has twice the strength
of Country A in the main attack zone.
The thrust should move at 1.8 miles
per day initially. Country A could
move her reserve to the north and
might get a stslemate. but the fight
would all be on her territory. and she
would probably lose some of it.
Country A has another alternative.
She can execute the same maneuver
as Country B. thus threatening the
enemy homeland. Country A. too.
would expect initially to move about
1.8 miles per day. However. she might
start later unless she had sufficient
warning of impending attack to
prepare her countermove. This capa
71
FORTIFICATIONS
bility of Country A to duplicate Coun
try B's move may deter the latter from
attacking.
Country B, however, can improve
her capability to attack by buildilig
fortifications. She might build them
only on the southern half of the front,
but this would reveal her plan. There
fore, Country B probably would for
tify the entire border, thus retaining
the option of attacking anywliere.
With Country B fortified, CQuntry
A has less capability for a counter
move. If both attacks were made on
the same front.as before, Country A
would be expected to move only 0.4
mile per day while Country B would
still gain 1.8 miles per day. For
Country A to get 1.8 miles per day
in her attack will now require four
times the strength of the fortified
troops compared to only twice the
strength of unfortified defenders. This
will require Country A to narrow her
attack to one-third the former front
age. Thus, the threat to Country B
has been cut to 22 percent of its
earlier value based on time or 33 per
cent based on frontage. (Figure 5).
The works give Country B another
option. She can reduce her strength
in the south and increase her force
ratio in the attack. If Country B
cuts her strength in half in the south,
Country A could have a force ratio
of four there, and could again at
tack at 1.8 miles per day. However,
Country B now has a force ratio of
2.5 in her attack in the north and
could be expected to move 2.4 miles
per day.
Country A may counter with her
own forts. This brings the strategic
balance back to its value before Coun
try B began construction. There is
one significant difference, however-
the entire action is slowed. The mutual
constl'uction will give an advantage
to the country which has the most to
gain from time such as a greater
mobilization potential or a greater
reinforcement by allies.
Of course, Country A, the defender,
might have been the first to fortify.
She would then have an obvious ad
vantage over an unfortified Country
B should the latter attack. Country A
could form a larger mass of msneuver
than could Country B. She could also
conduct limited attacks from her
works, preventing the enemy from
reducing his strength on secondary
fronts.
Country B would have to take some
action to restore the balance. One
such action could again be the con
struction of fortifications.
The experience of the two World
Wars and the analysis of war-gaming
factors lead us to the following con
clusions:
Fortifications give a cou,tr
y
a
strategic advantage over an u for
tified neighbor.
They can be used to reduce' the
number of troops on secondary fronts
and to form a larger mobile reserve.
Fortifications may also be used
to slow enemY attacks or counterat
tacks, thus gaining time for the for
tified country to execute the maneuver
it desires.
They are useful either on the
offense or on the defense. When a
potential enemy fortifies his frontier,
it should not be concluded, based on
that evidence alone, that he is defen
sively inclined.
When both opponents fortify,
the advantage goes to the country
which gains greater strength with
time.
MflitIrJ Revie. 72
Fathers of the Blitzkrieg
Lieutenant Colonel Bruno J. Rolak, United States Army, Retired
T
HE Israeli victory in the six-day war, among other events, re
vived memories of the World War II blitzkrieg. Differing ac
counts have identified General J. F. C. Fuller, B. H. Liddell Hart,
General Heinz Guderian, or General Charles A. de Gaulle as "Father
of the Blitzkrieg." These claims have one element in common: They
are incorrect. Noone man deserves such a title, for the blitzkrieg
concept was a product of numerous parents.
General Karl von Clausewitz was an early contributor to the
doctrine by saying that, "once it bas been decided to overthrow the
enemy," a nation should utilize all its resources to destroy and im
pose its will on the opposing army. Ideally, this should be accom
plished in a single battle of maximum violence.
While many theorists decided that the stalemate on the West
ern Front during World War I discredited Clausewitz, a few men
knew better. In November 1916, at a time when a majority of
May 1969 73
BLITZKRIEG
opinion held that offensive warfare
had become obsolete, Captain Giffard
Martel, a British engineer officer, pre
pared a paper in which he predicted
future battles between tank armies
operating like fleets at ses. This study
qualified him as the esrliest prophet
of a return to wars of maneuver.
In June 1917, General Fuller pre
pared his first paper forecasting re
turn of mobility to the battll!field
through development of motorization
and mechanization. These papers were
given limited distribution and were
not made public at the time.
First Published Prediction
The first person to publish his pre
diction of a return to a war of move
ment was the German General Hugo
von Freytsg-Loringhoven. In late
1917, he published his Folgerungen
aus dem Weltkriege (Deductions From
tlte World War) in which he charac
terized the trench warfare of that time
as a temporary condition. He predicted
that mobility and maneuver would re
turn to battlefields of the future.
Next, General Fuller, in May 1918,
prepared a detailed plan for a major
offensive on the Western Front em
ploying fast-moving tanks supported
by aircraft. Tanks would make the
initial penetration; infantry and cav
alry would then follow. This plan was
submitted to Marshal Ferdinand Foch,
but the war ended without putting it
into effect.
Lieutenant Colonel Bruno J. Rolak,
United States Army, Retired, is As
sistant Professor in the Department
of History at the University of Teros
at El Paso. Before his retirement in
1965, he graduated from the US Army
Command and General Staff CoUege.
He holds a Ph. D. from Indiana Uni
versity where he also taught Military
History.
While theorists were busy with
plans, other men were active. Begin
ning in esrly 1915 and continuing
through 1917, the armies on the West
ern Front had employed a standard
form of the offensive. Attacks opened
with an artillery bombardment last
ing several days. These were designed
to silence the opposing artillery and
machinegun defenses, blow a gap
through the barbed wire entangle
ments, and destroy the morale of the
entrenched enemy. This bombardment,
of course, disclosed the location of the
attack, sacrificed any chance of sur
prise, and permitted defenders to shift
their reserves to the threstened sector.
When attacking infantry climbed
out of their trenches and advanced to
ward enemy lines, they were either cut
down by the artillery and machine
guns which had survived the shelling
or were halted by enemy reserves in
position. Attacking troops did not dare
bypass enemy centers of for
fesr that such groups
daggers pointed at their backs. (
"Reinforce Failure"
As a result, commanders would "re
inforce failure" by committing their
reserves to assist those units which
were unable to progress against cen
ters of resistance. Reliance on these
tactics made a strategic breskthrough
impossible. This was the pattern on
the Western Front, and its frequent
repetition contributed to the belief
that all the senior commanders lacked
imagination.
The pattern was broken by the Ger
mans nesr the end of the war. On 3
September 1917, General Oskar von
Hutier crossed the Dvina River, first
encircled and then captured Riga and
9,000 Russians in a swift-moving cam
paign.
MIlItarJ .mew
74
More significant than the victory
itself was the success of the new
"Hutier tactics." Instead of the cus
tomary days-long artillery prepara
tion, Hutier employed an intense bom
hardment for five hours without pre
vious registration, thereby achieving
surprise. He also moved at night and
bypassed centers of resistance. This
was "reinforcing success" instead of
failure by committing his reserves to
support those units making the most
progress.
At that time, only a few officers rec
ognized the importance of the new
tactics. General John J. Pershing was
one; General Erich F. Ludendorff an
other. Hutier's example strengthened
Pershing'S conviction that movement
and offensive operations were possible
Mar 1969
BUTZKRIEII
under conditions of trench warfare.
Ludendorff transferred Hutier to the
Western Front.
The Hutier tactics were used suc
cessfully by the Central Powers
against the Italians at Caporetto in
October 1917, and again in the 1918
German spring offensives on the West
ern Front. In the West, the new tac
tics achieved advanccs in excess of 30
miles-the greatest gains on this front
since the early months of 1914. How
ever, these were tactical and not stra
tegic breakthroughs. The blitzkrieg
was in sight, but had not yet arrived.
Hutier demonstrated that an imagi
native commander could still take ad
vantage of surprise and maneuver in
the face of the overwhelming firepower
of modem defensive weapons. These,
plus the tactics of bypassing resist
ance and reinforcing success instead
of failure, would become essential fea
tures of the blitzkrieg.
"Expanding Torrenf'
Thus, by the end of World War I,
most of the elements of the blitzkrieg
had been discovered. General Fuller
and Liddell Hart now attempted to
convince the British Army that a fu
ture war would be one of movement
dominated by mechanized units. Lid
dell Hart coined the phrase "expand
ing torrent" to describe the method by
which mechanized units would spear
head an assault and exploitation.
In fact, this was a fitting term for
the Hutier tactics which reinforced
success instead of failure. The sole
important difference between the two
techniques was that Hutier used in
fantry and cavalry to exploit success
while Liddell Hart had adopted the
views of the tank enthusiasts and pre
dicted that mechsnized units would
lead the exploitation.
75
BLITZKRIEG
The most detailed description of
armored warfare was published by
Fuller in 1932 in Lectures on F. S. R.
III, reprinted in the United States in
1943 as Armored Warfare. It was a
remarkable forecast of future war
fare, but it fell short of describing the
corning blitzkrieg.
The gaps were filled by German the
orists. It is often stated, even today,
that the Germans succeeded. in the
early stages of World War II because
they had adopted the ideas of ,.Fuller,
Liddell Hart, and De Gaulle. This is
far from the truth. In the first place,
no army could possibly have adopted
the ideas of these three men because,
by the late 1930's, they themselves
were recommending doctrines which
conflicted in vital respects.
German officers were stimulated by
the ideas of Fuller and Liddell Hart,
and readily admitted this. General de
Gaulle had no influence on German
armored warfare, and this myth
should be laid to rest. German armored
doctrine had been established by 1933
when the general staff began work on
their Truppenfiihrung manual. De
Gaulle's book, Vers l'Armee de Metier,
was not published until 1934-too late
to influence the Germans. Further,
General de Gaulle offered nothing not
already proposed by Fuller, Liddell
Hart, and General Hans von Seeckt.
General Guderian went furthest in
developing the combined-arms princi
ple which helped make the blitzkrieg
possible. Where Fuller relegated in
fantry to an auxiliary role for fear
they would slow down tanks, Guderian
provided the foot soldiers with trucks
to keep up with the tanks. He went
even further and added mobile artil
lery, communications units, and engi
neers to the combined-arms team.
Engineers had long participated in
combat, but, in the years between the
World Wars, most nations looked upon
them as bridgebuilders and road main
tenance crews. The German Army used
them effectively as assault troops in
addition. The German Air Force also
contributed ita units to assist the ad
vance of the armor-led combat teams.
One final element was necessary to
complete the blitzkrieg, and this was
the contribution of General Erich von
Manstein. All previous theorists, in
cluding Guderian, had visualized the
blitzkrieg as a single, powerful spear
head assisted by one or more second
ary efforts. For the 1940 campaign in
France, Manstein proposed multiple
spearheads. The difference was sig
nificant. An alert enemy soon identi
fies a main effort and concentrates
against it. But what does a defender
do against tbree or four main efforts?
The German force assigned to in
vade the Netherlands had one panzer
division; the German 6th ArIIIY which
struck northern Belgium i n c l u ~ d one
panzer corps; the German 4th AnI\y
which came through southern B Igium
had one panzer corps; and the German
12th Arnty which drove through the
Ardennes included two panzer corps.
The Western Allies found it impossi
ble to defend against these powerful,
mUltiple thrusts.
The blitzkrieg had many fathers. It
is inappropriate and erroneous to des
ignate a single man or a single nation
as the creator of this type warfare.
It is clear, however, that British and
German theorists were the pioneers,
and that German theoretical contribu
tions to the blitzkrieg doctrine were
as significant and essential as their
practical demonstration of its effec
tiveness.
Military Reyiew 16
All Ir1)"JUt
From Wehrkunde (Federal Republic of Germany)
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\ '. .
Bavarian Border
Wilhelm Meyer-Detring
I
T IS difficult to understand com
pletely the reasons behind the So
viet Union's decision to invade Czech
oslovakia. The. recognition that even
in their own sphere of influence a
modified desire for freedom refused
to be suppressed with Marxist argu
ments, political pressure, and thinly
veiled threats must have, indeed, been
a frightening experience for the So
viet leaders.
There can be no doubt that before
their intervention they gave careful
consideration to the risks that would
attend strong action against Prague.
May 1969
They obviously felt no need for taking
the United Nations into account. Their
experiences with the 104 occasions of
veto left little room for worry in this
respect. And from what they had
learned in the case of the Berlin Wall
and the Hungarian uprising, they
could count with equal certainty on
a hands-off attitude on the part of
the United States.
As for the Red Chinese, there was
nothing more to lose with them ex
cept a new propaganda advantage. The
dissenting Romanians also offered lit
tle problem, for their dependent geo
77
THE BAVARIAN BORDER
graphical situation permitted effective
pressures without the necessity of a
punitive expedition.
A more serious problem to be con
sidered in taking action against Czech
oslovakia was the unfavorable effect
on the Communist Parties of the neu
tral and foreign countries. The deci
sion was apparently made to ignore
this disadvantage. Dialectical leaps be
long to the very nature of Marxism,
and, with their help, much can, be re
paired. For the Soviets, the securing
of their own sphere of influence was
a more pressing requirement than was
bracing up the outposts of world rev
olution. Account also had to be taken
of the shock which the Soviets, with
their action, would unavoidably pro
duce in all the Slavic countries.
Czech Reaction
But the most distressing thing for
the Soviets-and, indeed. the worst
mistake in their calculations-was the
reaction of the Czechoslovakian peo
ple. Persons well acquainted with
Czechoslovakia report how dramati
cally the former feeling of fellowship
toward the Soviets has, since the in
vasion, turned to hatred of them. With
a people who for centuries have lived
under foreign domination, this mis
take can hardly-at least not for a
long time-be forgotten.
And last but not least, the Soviets
must also have recognized the fact
that their decision would impart new
vigor to the North Atlantic Treaty
This article was translated and
condensed from the original, pub
lished in WEHRKUNDE (Federal
Republic of Germany) November
1968, under the title, "Die Rote
Armee am Bayerischen Wald."
Translation by Mr. LaVergne
Dale, Leavenworth, Kansas.
Organization. With their actions, all
basis for the agitation for dissolving
NATO disappeared.
Crude attempts were made by the
Soviets to mask their intentions and
justify their actions. When they con
ducted their invasion on 21 August,
the Soviets first attempted to create
the belief that they had been called
by the Czechoslovakian Communist
Party. When this lie quickly collapsed,
they claimed in early September that
their action had become necessary be
cause of the "imperialistic attitude"
of the West.
"Fatherland of Class"
On 3 October, the dialectical argu
ment of the subordination of the sov
ereignty of the states to the Socialist
unit was carefully explained before
the United Nations after it had been
published in Pravda by the ideologist
Andrei E. Kovalev. This is the con
cept where states of the Pact
as a whole are declared to be) sort
of unit, a kind of "fatherland of
in which any independent development
on the part of one of the members be
comes an act of treason toward the
unit as a whole.
But there was no success in disguis
ing, through the participation of other
Warsaw Pact nations, the fact that
imperialistic enforcement of the status
quo was the only aim of Soviet policy.
There is no point in again going
over the different stages of the occupa
tion which have been given extensive
coverage. It is certain that the Soviet
armed forces west of the Vistula were
strengthened by some 15 or 16 divi
sions, 20 of the total of 42 in this
region actually occupied Czechoslo
vakia and eight or 10 have remained
on occupation duty. This stationing
must primarily be regarded as di-
Military Review
18
rected inwardly in order to hold down
the "revisionists," and any index for
increased aggressiveness cannot be de
duced from this alone. But to Soviet
.strategists it is certainly proper to
consider a change of plans based on
the new situation.
Any effects of this change in the
distribution of the Soviet forces must
THE BAVARIAN BORDER
increased activity in Scandinavia, the
imperialistic nucleus of the Soviet pol
icy is more clearly seen.
The moral condemnation of the So
viet action by the independent states
was just as unanimous as that of the
Western World. Yugoslavia could not
help but apply many of the strong
threats directed against Czechoslo-
NATO I...IM
Soviet forees have left the eapital, but several divisions remain in Czechoslovakia
be measured against a reduction of
the Soviet potential due to the crip
pling of the Czechoslovakian Army
which can no longer be regarded as
a reinforcement.
The proximity of forces to the
southern portion of West Germany
and along with it the shortened initial
assembly time, however, have en
hanced the Soviets' position to carry
out an attack on portions of Europe's
NATO middle sector. If one takes into
account the simultaneous naval deploy
ment of the Soviets in the Mediter
ranean, their fractional orbital bom
bardment missile strategy with which
they are able to threaten the United
States from the south, as well as their
May 1969
vakia to her own position as an inde
pendent Socialist state. Soviet troop
concentrations in Bulgaria, as well as
the Soviet activity in the Mediter
ranean, must arouse apprehension in
Yugoslavia.
Austria is also a ticklish situation.
The nucleus of Austrian defense pol
icy is to make clearly known her will
to protect her neutrality. During the
first days of the invasion, there was
danger of border violations occurring
due to the flight of refugees or a pos
sible crossing by portions of the Czech
armed forces. Austrian airspace was
violated at least 19 times during the
first three weeks of the occupation.
The Austrian Government gave
79
THE BAVARIAN BORDER
clear expression to its determination
to remain neutral although, according
to official statements, it saw no danger
of an invasion. The incident, however,
prompted the Austrians to strengthen
their defense establishment which had
previously Buffered lack of
Soldat una Tech-nik
Former West German President Heinrich
Lubke with Defense Minister Gerhard
ShrOder inspect German forces participat
ing in the Black Lion maneuvers in
Bavaria last September
funds. Any eventual sharpening of the
Soviet attitude toward Yugoslavia
would again present difficult problems
to Austria.
The world watched with great tense
ness the reaction of the United Ststes
as the leading Western Power. To
many, it was of a disillusioning luke
warmness which appeared to demon
strate the political weakness of the
United States due to her upcoming
elections and the enervating war in
Vietnam. The efforts of President
Lyndon B. Johnson immediately after
the crisis, to still insist on a meeting
with Aleksei N. Kosygin, and the ini
tiaIly weak protests, provided doubt
of the interest of the United States
in European affairs.
Only after 11 September did the
United States become conscious that
such restraint might cause the So
viets to make false calculations. Wash
ington began to express itself more
clearly, announced the return of two
brigades and of one reconnaissance
squadron for the beginning of 1969,
and, on 9 and 10 October, issued un
equivocable declarations bearing on
the security of the Federal Republic
of Germany and on the Berlin ques
tion. FinaIly, it also became clear that,
after the events in Prague, opposi
tion to the nuclear nonproliferation
treaty was growing.
forewarning Period \
For NATO, the concepts o ~ the
strategy of flexible response, which re
garded a political and a military fore
warning period as calculable magni
tudes, had suddenly entered into
eclipse. There had been a military
forewarning period with sufficient in
telligence. At the end of April 1968,
the situation in Czechoslovakia was
systematicaIly evaluated and judged.
From 13 May on, the steady watch
over the situation by the intelligence
service began. The result was that Su
preme Headquarters, Allied Powers.
Europe (SHAPE), from the end of
July on, counted on a Soviet occupa
tion of Czechoslovakia at any time.
On 2 August, General Lyman L.
Lemnitzer requested a political assess
ment of the situation from the NATO
Permanent Council. The Political
Committee of the Permanent Council
Military Reyiew
80
THE BAVARIAN BORDER
judged on 7 August that there were
no indications of ady aggression by
the Warsaw Pact against West Eu
rope, nor could it conclude that the
initial Soviet assembly veiled an at
tack on central Europe. On 19 August,
SHAPE again confirmed this view.
Neither the Military Committee nor
General Lemnitzer to General Johann
A. Graf von Kielmansegg to General
Sir John Winthrop Hackett, to look
upon the Soviet potential as the only
reliable basis for an estimate of the
situation had, outside of the German
Ministry of Defense, been ignored.
Generally speaking, the politician
the it regards reaction to knowledge gained
Ann.U News F ~ t " r e 8
A convoy of the US 24th Infantry Division, part of Retarger I exercise in January that
demonstrated reinforcement of NATO forces from the continental United States
necessary to institute any special prep
arations. The result was that not un
til 24 hours after the beginning of
the Soviet invasion was the Permanent
Council able to deliberate over meas
ures to be taken.
A political forewarning period from
which conclusions could be drawn rel
ative to Soviet intentions proved to
be a deceptive concept. In the capitals
of the world, there was talk only of
surprise and consternation. The ad
vice of the military commanders, from
May 1989
during forewarning periods as escala
tion and does not risk the drawing of
any conclusion which defeats the pur
pose of the forewarning period. This
reluctance to act applies to rotation of
forces, to NATO's stages of prepared
ness, and to national measures.
Granting that the United States is
properly urging the stepping up of
defense ellorts on the part of her
European partners, the latter should,
for their part, insist on clarity with
regard to the rotation concept. We
81
THE BAVARIAH BORDER
know that, at the present time, ground
forces require around 30 days and air
forces around 15 days for deployment
from the United States. Projected onto
the C%ech crisis, the first rotation
would have had to begin on 21 July.
At this time, intelligence already
existed of the initial concentration
for a Soviet "maneuver." Its magni
tude clearly departed from thl! cus
tomary norm with possibilities which
could no longer be dismissed by Wish
ful thinking. That the Soviet inten
tions did not cO!lcern the NATO ter
ritory changed the situation but little.
Every future aggression could also
conceal itself with the same initial ap
pearance, with the additional circum
stance that now the military fc;>rewarn
ing period is shortened.
Reaction lacking
Either the will or the ability to re
act in a timely manner to every pos
sibility, not just to the possibility
wished for, was lacking. This assess
ment is not made with reference to
the NATO commanders. and only par
t i I ~ l I y to the directing body politiC over
them. the NATO Council. It is more
specifically an assessment of the gov
ernments of the NATO'states as sov
ereign. order-giving establishments.
What was declared to be prudence
looked more like alarm. like an excuse
for passivity in the face of a Soviet
line of action which. in "prudence"
of this sort. finds only the incentive
for new psychological pressure.
A protest was never arrived at on
the part of the three Western signers
of the Potsdam agreement against the
participation of East German troops
in the intervention in Czechoslovakia.
It must be noted that some coun
tries reacted with an attitude which
meant more than oral indignation. On
18 September 1968, the Netherlands
announced the augmentation of their
defense budget by 70 million dollars
and declared in October that they were
ready for a strengthening of NATO
if the NATO Council should decide
on this action. Belgium reported that
the planned withdrawal of two bri-
Main Operations Room of the NATO Air
Defense Center at Glons, Belgium. The
warning time has been reduced.
gades would be suspended while Great
Britain announced her readiness to
transfer one more brigade to the Ger
man Federal Republic.
Wholly disillusioning was the atti
tude of France. In the eyes of French
leaders. the Prague invasion was only
a "traffic accident." Charles A. de
Gaulle. with the prospect of the total
collapse of his self-centered Eastern
policy. was not ready to yield in the
least to West European solidarity. He
again withdrew from the rest of Eu
rope the bit of hope it had of yet
finding. between the millstones of the
great powers, security through the
joint efforts of their own forces.
MJlitJIy Review
82
The Federal Republic of Germany
showed political fiexibility in the shift
ing of the Black Lion maneuvers to
Bavaria. In the situation that existed
at that time, thJs was certainly a cor
rect decision, but there was little hope
by this action of slowing the Soviet
drive.
The temporary augmentation of
readiness forces was a minimum of
reaction-the checking of local defense
preparations, a thing to be taken for
granted. For the German Federal Re
pUblic, all the actions bearing on
NATO are, by several degrees, "hot
ter" than for her allies. Therefore, in
an actual crisis, she has to exercise
more farsightedness. The agreement
of military and civil intelligence on
methods of action, which is so impor
tant in periods of political tension, was
evident throughout although obviously
sufficient organizational forces did not
always exist. The frontier guard force
must have been especially painfully
conscious of the gaps in its personnel
during the crisis.
Future Policies
What are the conclusions of the So
viet action toward Czechoslovakia with
reference to future policies of the
German Federal Republic?
The detente or peacetime policy
of the West was in principle correct
and also will continue to be so in spite
of the shocks that it has sustained.
It would be to misestimate completely
the political capabilities of the Ger
man Federal Republic if Germans
turned away from it. A "pause for
thinking" will be necessary, it is true,
in matters of troop withdrawals, arms
control, and the nuclear nonprolifera
. tion treaty.
The work toward the unification
of Europe must not cease, for, looked
M., 1969
THE BAYARIAN BORDER
at with a long-range view, its effect on
security is undeniable. A blocking of
this policy by France cannot be met
with passiveness alone. The "biea]!:
through" and the "unconventional
means" of which Chancellor Kurt G.
Kiesinger spoke must continue to be
sought with great diligence in realiz
ing this goal. We shall probably not
be able to accept the
French foreign policy and count on a
continuing presence of the United
States in Europe.
We know, from the most recent
history, that NATO continues to exist
more from the pressure of the situa
tion than from its own initiative. The
pressure has just becom& active again.
The first result of this will be that,
in the year of 1969, presumably, no
partner will make use of his warning
right.
Hew Evaluations
The exit of Fr4nce has led to a con
siderable tightening of the adminis
trative organization. We may, tbere
fore, be sure that, even now, matters
which have been dubious-such as
presences, forewarning periods, alarm
system, an!! rotation--are being sub
jected to a thorough study together
with conclusions being drawn from
them.
The NATO Command is faced with
a changed disposition of the Soviet
forces which, although not decisive,
calls for new evaluations. This is in
progress. The formation of a NATO
naval command for maintaining a
close watch over the Soviet Fleet in
the Mediterranean is one of the first
results. The demand for a greater
presence of NATO troops has again
come into the foreground. This was
precisely what had been believed could
be left undone since adequate fore
83
THE BAVARIAN BORDER
warning time was counted on. Where
reduced presence is unavoidable, an in
conspicuously operating system of mo
bilization by stages will have to be
devised.
Many observers see the strengthen
ing of NATO as the wrong response
to the most recent events. Certainly,
a conspicuous increase in personnel
and equipment which could only be ac
complished over several years is' not
required. However, not bringing ',the
effectiveness of existing forces up to
the highest point possible could be
called a careless 'endangering of our
military security which, for the time
being, is more dependent on NATO
than on East-West agreements. Mili
tary power is still a decisive factor
in world policy. It operates through
threat or action. It is the firm founda
tion of a long-lasting policy of peace.
It is clear that the German Fed
eral Republic will be obliged to ex
pend considerably more means for her
defense. We cannot overlook the infer
ences of our geographic location. It is
apparent that the attitude of the
United States toward Europe will de
pend on this additional, expenditure.
To be sure, these means will probably,
first of all, be demanded for in
creased collective security arrange
ments. Where freedom of action exists,
however, they should be used solely
to close the gaps in our existing de
fense potential. We must finally be
come what we declare ourselves to be
-a sovereign state.
However the future world situation
may be judged, the Soviet Union has
at her disposal the potential for expan
sion. The most recent past does not
strengthen the assumption that she
will refrain from the application of
this expansion potential.
On the other hand, we may also say
that the element of freedom of our
mode of life clearly exerts a greater
attractive power than the skeptics in
our ranks are willing to admit. Based
on the firm foundation of security, it
will continue to operate further. That
this foundation also rests on military
power has not always been recognized.
It can, perhaps, even be said-varying
slightly a statement by Georges Cle
menceau-that security policy is too
serious a matter to be left to the poli
ticians alone.
We must now look to the future; having learned from the lessons of the
recent months we should put that knowledge to good use. We must take the
necessary steps to ensure that we are always properly prepared; that we
search for peace knowing that we are militsrily secure; that we face the prob
lems of the future squarely, honestly, and with confidence. For I firmly believe
that the strength and mutual confidence of the Atlantic Allies remain the sin
gle most important safeguard of peace, with freedom, in the Western World.
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Military Review
84
Horsepower for Vietnam
Major James L. McCoskey, United States Army
The views expressed in this ar
ticle are the author' 8 and do not nec
essarily reflect those of the Depart
ment of Defense or its agencies.
Editor.
N
OTABLE successes have been
scored in South Vietnam by
United States, Army Republic of Viet
nam, and other Free World forces
against regular North Vietnamese and
May 1969
Viet Cong units. Not so well publi
cized, but no less vital in the over-all
sense, is the war against ever-present
Viet Cong irregulars.
These guerrillas are continuing un
abated their mortar and demolition at
t a c k ~ on key base and logistic installa
tions. Aside from the tangible results
in terms of friendly casualties and ma
teriel damage, this type enemy activity
serves to lend a calculated air of ere
85
HORSEPOWER
US Army
Horse cavalry successfully conducted security patrolling in the past and might do the
same today with a high degree of effectiveness and economy
dence to Communist propaganda tout
ing Viet Cong "invincibility" with
which the local citizenry is incessantly
bombarded.
Finding workable solutions to the
local security problem i ~ a fertile field
for innovation. To fight as guerrillas
is infinitely simpler than to devise ef
fective methods with which to fight
against them. It is generally agreed
Major James L. McCoskey is a
student at the US Army Command
and General Staff College. He received
his Bachelor's degree from the Uni
versity of Omaha in Nebraska. He has
served three years in the Republic of
Vietnam as a battalion advisor; as
corps assistant Gs advisor with the
Military Assistance Command, Viet
nam; with the 1st Infantry Division,
and with the JS Combat Operations
Center.
that eventual defeat of the guerrillas
can only come from a combination of
military, police, and political counter
measures. For the present, however,
security of our base areas can be en
hanced by intensified patrolling of the
populated areas which commonly sur
round these installations.
The need for saturation patrolling
is recognized and is certainly not new.
In essence, the problem is one of es
tablishing tight control over the sur
rounding countryside out to a radius
exceeding 60-millimeter and 82-miIli
meter mortar range. However, because
of the relatively large areas to be cov
ered, an acceptable degree of satura
tion is most difficult to achieve.
Infantry, in sufficient strength, can
not be spared for such employment on
a permanent basis. Periodic large-scale
Military Review
86
search-and-destroy operations in the
peripheral areas do not contribute to
security in any permanent way since
local guerrillas simply hide and then
resume their activities after the troops
pull out.
Continuous patrolling with armored
vehicles is, in many cases, not feasi
ble. Such vehicles were designed for
combat and reconnaissance against a
similarly equipped foe-not to chase
lightly armed individuals through rice
fields owned and worked by civilians
whom the friendly government wishes
to irritate as little as possible. Aerial
surveillance, when used as a substitute
for ground patrolling, is not a satis
factory solution because of the ease
with which guerrillas ordinarily con
ceal themselves from such observation.
CombinedArms Team
It appears that an extension of pres
ent reconnaissance capabilities would
enable us to conduct local security pa
trolling with a much higher degree of
effectiveness and economy. Horse cav
alry which fulfilled similar require
ments in the past might well do so
today. Mounted patrols would comple
ment the other methods while techno
logical advances such as the helicopter
would measurably enhance the effec
tiveness of cavalry. In fact, latter-day
cavalry doctrine envisioned employ
ment of horse units as a part of the
combined-arms team in a way which
seems logical when considered in light
of the Vietnam environment.
Mounted reconnaissance units are
employed when armored 'Vehicles are
not a'Vailable, when the terrain is un
suitable for such 'Vehicles, when 'Vehi
cles are too few in number to co'Ver
the 'necessary areas adequately, or
10hen the progress of 'Vehicles is
blocked by hostile resistance. lnforma-
May 1969
HORSEPOWER
tion obtained from air and armored
car reconnaissance usuaUy is the basis
for the organization and emp/.oyment
of mounted reconnaissance elements.'
Alter Routes
The ease with which cavalry can al
ter routes of movement would make
enemy countermeasures such as mines
and boobytraps considerably more dif
ficult to employ effectively. Freedom of
movement, 80 vital to successful guer
rilla operations, would be restricted
by mounted patrols moving at ran
dom. Additionally, omnipresent pa
trols would impress the civilians with
evidence of government strength by
providing them security from Viet
Cong tax collection and other depreda
tions.
This concept of area control by
small, mounted detachments was
proved effective years ago by the US
Philippine Constabulary. This method
consisted of assigning specific areas
of responsibility to patrols composed
of six to 10 native constables com
manded by a US officer or noncommis
sioned officer. These small units kept
on the move-never setting a predict
able pattern. They came to know all
inhabitants on their "beats" by sight
and quickly detected any attempt to
organize guerrilla activity so that im
mediate action could be taken to pre
vent it.
Guerrilla dread of such mounted pa
trol operations is mentioned by Roger
Hilsman who was a former member
of the Office of Strategic Services De
tachment 101 which wrought havoc
behind Japanese lines in Burma with
tactics rather similar to those of the
Viet Congo He wrote:
We felt that our own existence was
1 Tadieal Employment of Caval,.", The C o m ~
mand and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth,
Kans., 1938. p 85.
87
HORSEPOWER
lIJell justified IlJhen the Japanese had
to take regular forces from front-line
fighting to chase a guerrilla unit. At
one state, my outfit, consisting of four
Americans and about 200 Burmese,
kept a luhole Japanese l'egiment of
3,000 men marching and counter
mal'ching over the mountains far away
from the front lines. What we would
have feared far more were smaller
groups patl'olling steadily, especially
cavalry.' .
Also, in Burma. British horse cav
alry detachments from the Indian
Frontier Force were used to secure
information on Japanese troop move
ments for General Joseph W. Stilwell's
Chinese divisions. Those reconnais
sance detachments were composed of
approximately 100 men each-large
enough to cope with strong Japanese
patrols yet small enough to retain
maximum mobility.
Superior Mobility
The primary advantage of horse
cavalry, in a general sense, is its
proved capability to maneuver effec
tively under virtually any natural con
dition. The arm has been successfully
employed over a full spectrum of en
vironments ranging from the subarc
tic to Southeast Asian jungles. As
compared to infantry on foot, the mo
bility of horse cavalry is greatly supe
rior in terms of range, rapidity, and
endurance. US cavalry manuals state
that cavalry can cover 25 to 30 miles
per day with troops and animals in
good condition, and can maintain
march rates of 50 miles per day for
several days without excessive fatigue.
For purposes of maneuver, cavalry
can move for short distances at speeds
up to 20 miles per hour. Of course,
:J Roger HiJsman. "Internal War: The New
Communist 'tactic," Manlle Corpa G4Zette, J'anu..
at)' 1962.
extremely adverse terrain conditions
will reduce those capabilities. but, in
any given situation, the endurance and
mobile capacity of mounted troops far
exceed that of men on foot. When op
posed to an enemy on foot. which is
normal in counterinsurgency. greater
tactical mobility would permit cavalry
to maneuver freely and withdraw
quickly in event of contact with a su
perior force. Stream obstacles can be
readily crossed when necessary with
out time-consuming engineer support.
Greater Dispersion
Horse patrols operate effectively
with far greater dispersion than com
parable size infantry units due to the
speed with which they can move.
Horse reconnaissance elements of
troop size were considered capable of
covering frontages of up to 10 miles,
depending on the nature of the ter
rain. Although conditions might not
generally permit such wide dispersion
in South Vietnam. cavalry can cover
effectively a far larger area than any
infantry unit of comparable size. Its
uses against an elusive enemy who
makes maximum use of space are
readily apparent from the economy of
force standpoint alone.
Attempting to use modern armored
vehicles to find small guerrilla bands
operating strictly on {oot is oddly
analogous to the disastrous Polish
horse cavalry charges against German
armor in early World War II. A deci.
sive role in selection of methods best
suited to fight him is played by the
nature of the enemy himself.
Horse cavalry was largely inappro
priate to the World War II environ
ment which was characterized by all
out battles between major units where
terrain and other factors favored
mechanized forces. In Vietnam, the
Military RevIew
88
guerrilla offsets his own lack of ar
mor and mechanized vehicles by avoid
ing the roads to which our armor is
largely confined. While armor can and
is being used off the roads in some
areas in "jungle-crashing" missions,
such operations are of little signifi
cance against guerrillas other than
mashing down potential concealment.
Present Usage
In the South American countries,
where counterinsurgency operations
are common, sizable horse cavalry
forces are still maintained. Latin
American nations employing large
horse cavalry forces include Mexico,
Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, Para
guay, and Colombia: Venezuela re
cently has employed cavalry quite suc
cessfully against Castro-backed insur
gents and was reactivating,a battalion
of mule-pack artillery which had pre
viously been considered obsolete. Thai
land has several regiments of horse
cavalry which are currently deployed
in northeastern Thailand, adjacent to
the Laotian border, where Communist
guerrilla activity is a significant
threat. Thai officers attest to the ef
fectiveness of their cavalry in recon
naissance and patrolling.
When employed in accordance with
its capabilities, liorse cavalry is no
more susceptible to destruction by an
opponent with superior firepower than
any other arm and can be employed
effectively against the weaponry and
equipment of modern warfare. The
26th Cavalry Regiment, Philippine
Scouts, successfullY covered with
drawal of General Douglas MacAr
thur's forces into Bataan during the
first few days of World War II. Dur
ing this delaying action, the cavalry
-maximizing its cross-country mo
bility-struck repeatedly at the Japa-
May 1969
HORSEPOWER
nese advance, causing disorganization
and loss of momentum thus affording
added time to General Jonathan M.
Wainwright's retreating forces.
In the European theater, a number
of ranking commanders felt the need
for, and requested, horse cavalry sup-
Ann.. NewlJ Features
As compared to infantry on toot, the
mobility of horse cavalry is greatly
superior
port. Even General George S. Patton
-an advocate of armored vehicles
spoke out as follows:
It is the clIBidered opinion, not only
of myself, but of 1mtny other general
officers who took their origin from the
infantry and artillery, that had we
possessed an American Cavalry Divi
sion with pack artillery in Tunisia; and
Sicily not a GeT1mtn would have es
caped.'
In their Indochina operations of
1946-54, the French Army employed
some horse cavalry, but were handi-
S Major General John K. Herr and Edwanl S.
WallacE', The Sto'P'1J of tM U. S. CGt1alf"'JI, Little,
Brown &; Co., BostoD, Mass 1953. P 251.
89
HORSEPOWER
capped by a shortage of suitable
horses. In addition, they effectively
used some horse cavalry in Algeria as
recently as 1958.
Logistic problems formerly associ
ated with employment of cavalry pale
into insignificance when compared
with the support requirements of mod
ern mechanized and airmobile units.
It is also quite feasible to airlift
cavalry by helicopter. Current US
Army cargo helicopters such as the
CH-9'l Mojave, C H - ~ ' l Chinook, and
the CH.s-'A Flying Crane are entirely
capable of lifting cavalry units as are
the fixed-wing cargo aircraft of the
Air Fdrce.
An important consideration in cav-
US Arm"
In World War II, Merrill's Marauders' Burma campaign revealed that such common
Asian vegetation as elephant and kunai grasses and bamboo shoots were a good bulk
ration for horses and mules
A UH-IB helicopter, which can carry
eight combat-equipped soldiers, re
quires over 4,000 pounds of fuel for
eight hours of operation. Yet eight
horses would require only 200 pounds
of hay and grain for the same period
-far less if subsisting on native for
age supplemented by grain. Up-to-date
concepts in delivery of supplies to com
bat units by airdrop and helicopter
are entirely applicable to support of
horse cavalry.
aIry logistic support is the fact that
unavoidable delays in resupply can be
taken in stride for short periods of
time because horses can continue to
operate for several days without food.
Like men, horses may not be happy
about a shortage of food, but also like
men, they will continue to operate to
the limit of physical endurance when
required. The British cavalry proved
in the Middle East that horses could
even go seveFal days without water.
Military RlYle.
90
Moreover, the ability of horses to live
off the land has been proved.
It was found that US Army domes
tic horses of the 4th Cavalry and other
units deployed during the Philippine
insurrection adapted well to the South
east Asian environment, were not es
pecially bothered by heat, and even
thrived on rice and native grasses. US
Army Veterinary Service studies un
dertaken during World War II in plan
ning for Merrill's Marauders' Burma
campaign revealed that such common
Asian vegetation as elephant and
kunai grasses along with bamboo
shoots will serve as satisfactory bulk
ration for horses and mules. The 590
pack horses and mules which accom
panied Merrill's Marauders subsisted
on native forage supplemented by oc
casional airdrops of grain.
Veterinary Services
Great strides have been made in
veterinary services during the past
two decades. With current antibiotics,
injuries and diseases which formerly
plagued the cavalry would cause small
inconvenience. Modern sanitation and
vector control would largely preclude
such diseases as glanders and surra
which were so dreaded in the past.
A further medical aspect of horses
is their longevity. According to US
Army statistics of the late 1930's, the
average US Cavalry horses were from
10 to 12 years of age. It was found
that older horses had the greatest en
durance and were far less subject to
disease. Many were used up to age 17.
The useful lifespan of an average cav
alry horse far outstrips that of the
motor vehicle.
Cavalry horse remount require
menta during the Civil War offer fur
ther evidence of equine hardihood.
General Philip H. Sheridan's cavalry
MIY 1969
HORSEPOWER
corps reaclled a strength in excess of
200,000 during the final campaigns in
the east yet required remounts at a
rate of only 150 horses per day. Dur
ing that period, Union cavalry was
extensively employed; the horses were
ridden hard and afforded little or no
shelter. Medical attention was rudi
mentary in those days, but, in spite of
that, and the rigors ,of combat, official
records show a rather high survival
rate on horse battle casualties.
"Fringe Benefits"
Many an old Indian fighter has cred
ited his horse with saving him from
ambush. This ability to aense trouble
is a legendary "fringe benefit" which
any experienced horseman will verify.
This phenomenon is easily explained
by the fact that horses are basically
timid animals, ever alert for anything
that might threaten their safety. Their
actions readily communicate the pos
sibility to their riders that something
is amiss.
Armament is another area wherein
the potentialities of horse cavalry have
been greatly enhanced by modern tech
nology. Individual light weapons such
as the M16 ritle seem perfect cavalry
weapons. The compact M79 grenade
launcher is another weapon made to
order for mounted troops. As for ma
chineguns, weight and bulk of the old
Browning series necessitated the serv
ices of pack horses to transport them.
The M60 could be carried in a saddle
boot similarly to a ritle. The 81-milli
meter mortars and ammunition can
be readily transported on pack horses
as they were in the early 1940's.
New light weapons, coupled with
horses' weight-carrying capability
would afford cavalry units unprece
dented firepower. Technology has also
solved the command and control prob
91
HORSEPOWER
lem with a family of small radios
which range in excess of 25 miles and
can easily be carried.
Procurement of animals for cavalry
use would present no particular prob
lem. A recent survey conducted by a
veterinary research organization as
sessed the present US horse population
at approximately six million and grow
ing. An interesting comparison Is that,
at the start of the ciVil War, the US
horse population also totaled approxi
mately six million, and the Union
eventually fielded over 200,000 cavalry
men. The present US horse population
is composed largely of well-bred saddle
horses.
Since the US Cavalry was deacti
vated in 1942, only a few senior officers
and noncommissioned officers with
cavalry experience remain on active
duty. Younger officers and noncom
missioned officers with which to staff
a new cavalry organization would have
to be trained. However, the adapta
bility, initiative, and versatility of US
officers and enlisted men is an estab
lished fact.
Fortunately, several friendly for
eign governments still maintain siz
able cavalry organizations, and ar
rangements to secure advisors should
be no real problem. Both Argentina
and Chile have cavalry schools of high
repute. A further possibility is that
of bringing back on active duty or
hiring in civilian status some of our
retired cavalry officers and nl)ncom
missioned officers to serve as instruc
tors. Early World War II experience
showed that total time required to
train basic US cavalrymen in wartime
did not exceed that required for train
ing soldiers of other branches.
Often, complex problems suggest
simple solutions. It would, however,
be a gross oversimplification to con
tend that horse cavalry is the panacea
for solVing the military problems of
counterguerrilla warfare, but neither
are the helicopter, the infantry, the
artillery, nor the Special Forces. Each
arm has a particular function which
it is best suited to perform. All are
only tools which must be employed by
commanders in combinations to fit spe
cific situations posed by the mission,
enemy, and terrain.
However, due to the fluidity of com
bat and absence of well-defined objec
tives in counterguerrilla warfare, the
requirements for continuous wide
ranging reconnaissance and security
are magnified. A means with which to
perform these missions effectively
must possess a significant ground mo
bility advantage over the enemy. A
combat vehicle which could adequately
perform these missions in the Viet
nam environment should possess these
characteristics: be inexpensive, able to
swim, step over logs and other obsta
cles, operate noiselessly without lights,
require no spare parts, little fuel, little
maintenance, be air transportable, and
have a flexible body to wend its way
between trees.
Unfortunately. modern science has
yet to produce such a vehicle while
nature has embodied all those charac
teristics in the horse. Nothing is really
obsolete unless something has come
along which can do a better job under
the same conditions. Nothing better
than the horse has yet appeared to
assume the cavalry role in security
patrolling. Horse cavalry may not be
the total answer to the guerrilla fight
ing problem, but a wealth of historical
evidence supporting its effectiveness
under similar conditions argues in fa
vor of at least a reasonable trial.
Military Reyiew
92
The
Bayonet
Captain A. L. Thompson, BritiBh ArmTl
You maTI do anTlthing with bal/onets, except sit on them.
-Napoleon Bonaparte
I
N THIS era of nuclear weapons
and intercontinental missiles, it
might be considered realistic to as
sume that the bayonet is now obsolete
and should be discarded. However, de
spite proliferation of nuclear weap
ons, all wars since World War II have
been fought with conventional weap
ons. Furthermore, in such campaigns
as Malaya, Borneo, and South Viet
nam, the outcome of numerous small
actions has been decided solely by the
ability of the infantryman to handle
his personal weapons effiCiently. The
bayonet, being one of these, is thus
obviously still of some significance.
The bayonet was invented in France
about 1640. Early patterns possessed
straight, two-sided blocks approxi
mately 12 inches long with tapering
hilts of wood, bone, or ivory which
could be inserted into a musket muzzle.
Because of this attachment method,
early designs became known as plug
May 1969
THE BAYONET
bayonets. All models ,resembled con
temporary daggers or hunting knives.
The general adoptilm of the new
weapon by continental armies caused
an important military change. Pike
men became obsolete. Previously, they
The US trowel IIayonet of 1873
had been employed as a means of pro
tecting the musketeer while he under
took his protracted and tedious reload
ing task. The possession of a bayonet,
however, enabled the musketeer to pro-
Captain A. L. Thompson, British
Army, is with the Royal Military Po
lice Training Center in Chichester,
Busse:x:. His service includes duty in
Germany with the 1st British Corps
Pro'/lost Company and with the Pro
'/lost Companies in London and Hong
Kong. He has served with the 99th
Gurkha Infantry Brigade Provost Unit
in Borneo and with a Territorial Army
unit in England.
tect himself, even when his firearm
was unloaded.
Unfortunately, plug bayonets had a
serious drawback. When fixed to a
musket, the weapon could not be dis
charged. However, if unfixed, the un
loaded musket .could not instantly be
employed as a close-i}uarter weapon.
These limitations were clearly demon
strated in 1689 when a regular British
force was defeated by a highland army
at KiIIiecrankie in Scotland. The high
land clansmen, who employed the sim
ple tactics of a rapid frontal charge,
achieved victory because they reached
the British ranks relatively unscathed
by musketry before the regular sol
diers had time to fix bayonets.
Improved Versions
This surprising defeat caused the
rapid adoption of the new, improved
ring bayonet which had been in con
tinental service for 10 years. The new
bayonet was attached to the musket
by two metal rings and could be re
tained in the fixed position during fir
ing. This enhanced the efficiency and
flexibility of infantry formations.
Troops could now fire a voIley and be
immediately capable of repelling en
emy cavalry or infantry charges.
About 1700, the ring bayonet was
replaced by the socket bayonet-a
plain, strong, all-steel model with a
triangular-shaped blade, deeply ful
lered on two sides and tapered to a
point. A short, cylindrical metal tube,
or socket, was joined to the blade by
means of a curved shoulder. In order
to fix the bayonet, the socket was fitted
over the mUZ7lle and held in position
by a stud located on the barrel. The
stud locked into an L-shaped slot in
the socket. The new weapon could be
used only to thrust, and not to slash
or cut an opponent.
Military Revle.
94
THE BAYONET
The socket bayonet was a most im
portant weapon in all battles between
1700 and 1830. During this period,
opposing armies confronted each other
in lines or squares separated by only
short distances. The essential battle
winning factors were good fire disci
pline and determination and steadiness
ance in European armies about 1830.
It was designed for the dual purpose
of being used either as a sword or
a bayonet. All patterns had a double
or a single-edged blade, tapering to a
point, enabling them to be used as a
cutting or thrusting weapon. The hilt
was fashioned as a handgrip and fitted
The BrOUlft BelllJ musket bayonet of 1756
with the bayonet. The latter continued
to be the means of repelling cavalry
charges and infantry attacks, or fin
ishing off an enemy after sustained
musket volleys.
British soldiers' abilities with the
bayonet contributed much to the Duke
of Marlborough's victories at Blen
with a cross guard. Some patterns
possessed a knuckle bow to afford ex
tra hand protection. Attachment to
the rifle was by means of a spring
catch mechanism housed in the hilt.
The blades of sword bayonets var
ied considerably in design and length.
They were generally extremely long,
The sword bayonet for the BruMUlick rifle of 1837
heim in 1704, Ramillies in 1706, and
Malplaquet in 1709. The same charac
teristics of courage, determination,
and steadiness were later to assist the
Duke of Wellington in achieving vic
tories in the peninsula and against
Napoleon Bonaparte at Waterloo in
1815.
The sword bayonet made its appear-
however, often measuring 22 inches
in order to compensate for the shorter
length of the new rifles and carbines.
It was considered important to main
tain the over-all length of the rifle
and bayonet to prevent soldiers from
being overreached by their opponents
in close-quarter fighting. The theory
was thus formulated that the shorter
MIJ 1969 95
THE BAYONET
the rifle or carbine, the longer the
bayonet.
Numerous sword bayonets were pro
duced with a sawback-a double row
of sharp teeth on the upper edge of
the blade. These were usually designed
for pioneers, but were also employed
by infantry since their fearsome as
pect was considered to be an effective
means of reducing enemy morale. The
British employed several of this type
such as the Elcho and Artillery Car
bine bayonet.
firepower Increase
The wideSpread adoption of the rifle
during the 19th century caused a tre
mendous increase in military fire
power. Opposing armies now fought
separated by greater distances than
hitherto. Consequently, bayonet effec
tiveness declined. The British, in
volved in colonial wars, still found the
bayonet useful against native armies.
In addition, the sword bayonet was an
ideal implement for bush clearance.
The continued value of the bayonet
was amply illustrated at Rorke's Drift
in 1879 during the Zulu War when a
detachment of 105 men of the 24th
Regiment, under two lieutenants, was
surrounded and cut off by an army of
between 4,000 and 5,000 Zulus. Dur
ing this engagement, the tiny British
force managed to beat off repeated at
tacks and hold their position. Their
success was due not only to excellent
fire discipline, but to the vigor with
which they wielded the bayonet.
Toward the end of the 19th century,
the invention of the machinegun fur
ther increased infantry firepower. The
attainment of such massive firepower
did not bring with it obsolescence of
the bayonet as might have been ex
pected. Instead, with the stslemate of
trench warfare of World War I,
9&
massed bayonet charges preceded by
artillery bombardment became contem
porary tactics. The bayonet thus en
joyed a final, brief period of impor
tance.
The British retained the bayonet,
with little change, until World War
II. In 1941, the old SMLE (Short
Model Lee-Enfield) pattern was re
placed by a short, rod-like bayonet
an indication of its reduced impor
tance. Since that war, the bayonet has
been retained, even on the modern au
tomatic rifle. It is now a short-bladed,
sheath knife type.
Relevant factors
In determining whether the bayo
net should be retained by modern ar
mies, there are four relevant factors
which need to be examined:
Combat effectiveness. The wide
spread use of automatic weapons has
increased firepower to such an extent
that the bayonet is most unlikely to
be employed as a combat weapon. Since
World War I, with the exception of
the Korean Conflict, the bayonet has
been responsible for negligible casu
alties.
To fire many modern rifles, with the
bayonet attached, necessitates a reze
roing if accuracy is to be maintained.
This occurs because, when the bayo
net is fixed, the point of balance of the
rifle is altered, and shots tend to fall
low. Loss of accuracy is further ag
gravated by the change of airflow
pressure at the muzzle due to the bay
onet. Thus, to insure maximum accu
racy, the infantryman must either zero
his rifle with the bayonet attached, or
be prepared to alter his aim automat
ically after fixing the weapon.
The bayonet can still be used to ad
vantage in close combat fighting, espe
cially in the jungle or street battles. It
Military Review
THE BAYONET
can be of use as a last resort weapon
when ammunition is exhausted and no
withdrawal or resupply is immediately
possible. A multipurpose bayonet could
be produced, with a wide blade, to un
dertake the functions of both bayonet
and entrenching tool. Attempts in this
direction have been made in the past,
notably by the US Army, with the
trowel or shovel bayonet. A bayonet
fashioned with a handgrip hilt and
double-sided cutting blade could also
be employed as a trench dagger.
Morale. The possession of a bay
onet gives the soldier a psychological
feeling of greater confidence and fos
ters the killing instinct. During in
ternal security operations, the actual
act of fixing bayonets can have a so
bering effect upon an unruly popula:
tion. The British forces in Aden found
this to be true. The glitter of a fixed
bayonet undoubtedly gives the impres
sion that a soldier is ready for any
mission.
Weight. The modern bayonet and
scabbard weigh about 18 ounces. Dis
pensing with them would reduce the
soldier's load. If other items were also
withdrawn from a soldier's equipment,
the total weight saving could be ap
preciable. To remove only the bayonet
would make very little difference in
saving the individual soldier from fa
tigue.
General duty functions. The bay
onet has always been used to accom
plish numerous although often unoffi
cial functions such, as cooking and
woodchopping. At present, it provides
the soldier with a handy, all-purpose
knife. To withdraw the bayonet from
issue would deprive the soldier of a
useful item, even for such mundane
tasks as can opening. Therefore, its
general duty function should be of
some consideration in determining
whether it should be retained.
Although the bayonet has been rele
gated to a distinctly minor position as
a weapon in most modem armies, there
appears to be little actual sentiment
to discard it. It is still an important
weapon in civil disorder. It undoubt
edly retains some value as a weapon
in close terrain and as a psychological
factor in training and combat. Since
its cost and weight are minor consid
erations, the bayonet will probably be
with us for some time to come.
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May 19B9
87
Mao's Thoughts
Colonel McKinney's "Mao's
Thoughts" in the March issue is an
incisive analysis of Red Chinese doc
trine and of geopolitics in east Asia.
However, he completely ignores any
role to be played by a resurgent Ja
pan. Surely, Japan as the area's dom
inant econ,?mic power will redound to
some form of her "Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere" philosophy.
The Japanese cannot and will not re
main indefinitely content to play the
subservient part. I suggest that it is
in our long-term interest to recognize
this now and to guide her in resuming
her place of leadership and responsi
bility in east Asia.
COL H. Martin Hays, USAR
Military Review Anthology
One of the most prized books in my
military library is the Infantry Jour
nal Reader. Between its covers is a
superb collection of some of the finest
informative and critical articles pub
lished in the Infantry Jou'NlDl. The
table of contents reads like an inter
national military Who's Who . Pat
ton, Fuller, Guderian, Burns, Liddell
Hart, Spaulding-to name only a few.
READER
FORUM
I feel that a similar work contain
ing selections from Milit4ry Review
is long overdue. Further, I believe that
such an anthology would be very en
thusiastically received, and can think
of no better way of commemorating
Military Review's 50th anniversary in
1972 than the publication of a book
that might well be entitled, A HaJf
Century of Milit4ry Review. The an
thology would make available, in a
single volume, those writings that will
always be of more than cursory inter
est to both the soldier and the scholar,
and will provide the student of ad
vanced military studies with a handy,
authoritative reference work. It could
also serve as a source of inspiration
for potential Milit4ry Review contrib
utors, encouraging their personal par
ticipation in the ''forum for the ex
pression of military thought ....n The
Milit4ry Review consolidated index re
veals a large and distinguished inven
tory of contributors who have dealt
with many diverse subjects of interest.
It would be interesting to learn if
there are others who may share my
views concerning the publication of a
Military Review anthology.
ISG Duane E. Miller, USAR, Ret
A vrlaaaQ' PDI'PO" of the MILITARY REVIEW It to pronde a Ion. for the exthallP of 'deu
and .lIformeci aplnton connmlq .Ultary .lIain. WII.. conironnlal tten are presen," In the
RBVlEW, ruden ........n. with the tlteorla or eoadlllloJU. p.....Jlted: are Invited to write brief
~ co.....Ola of d'"l'&'ent Ylewa. Cone". dIacaaIlolU Oil aD,. topia of pneal .rutaJ7 lAterat .....bo
weJeomed lor ......... pahlkatlon.
BeeaIlH of U.ited apace,. tile editor reser...,. the ri.l1I' to HIed: than eo....U alul dlJe'uafoDS of
.....tMt Nader bderat lor pallllcatiob and to edit or eu.tnate , ....... for II.....",. IWitiq wUl Dot
Intentlo_aIIT aodify eoatiflnltor-.....bll' or eontext.
ContrillatloJUI to dI. Header Pora .. _hoaJd be .tUreue4 to: Editor'" Chief, JI11Jtar;r Renew, us
Ana,. eo...and aIld Goerel Staff CoIl..., Port l.ea.,en:W'orth, Kaaau "'11.
MUItlIJ a,,,.. 98
MILITARY
NOTES
UNITED STATES
Helicopter or Jet PlaneSpeed FIIJllt
A new tilt-stop.fold rotor configuration is displayed on a model. The new
design would permit both helicopter.type flight and jet airplane transonic speeds.
At upper left, the aircraft would utilize its rotors in helicopter fashion for
vertical takeoff and landings; at upper right, the rotors would tilt forward to
serve as propellers capable of speeds up to 240 to 260 knots. For flight above
this speed, the aircraft would fold its blades (at lower left the blades begin the
folding process) and lock them (lower right) to enter conventional aircraft
cruise speeds of 390 knots or more.-BeU Helicopter News.
MIJ 1969 96
MILITARY NOTES
Marginal Terrain Vehicle Tested
Terrain normally impassable to
wheeled and heavy tracked vehicles
soon may be traversed by the XM759
Army LoDisUcilln
New XM159 marginal terrain vehicle op
erates in water, swamp, or dry land
marginal terrain vehicle (MTV). Test
evaluations indicate that the new MTV
could prove most effective in Vietnam
where tidal mudflats, heavily vege
tated waters, and swampy areas with
underwater obstructions abound. Pilot
models are amphibious and employ the
air-roll principle for both land and
water locomotion. They can accommo
date 14 fully equipped combat troops
or 1 %-ton rated payload.
Operated by a two-man crew, the
prototype weighs about 11,500 pounds.
It has a top speed of seven miles per
hour over inland water and a maxi
mum land speed of about 35 miles per
hour.-Army Logistician.
Portable Bridge Developed
The US Army has developed a man
portable footbridge for use in areas
such as the Mekong Delta of Vietnam
where the abundance of canals,
streams, and rivers greatly hampers
the mobility of troops.
It is a flexible, buoyant, plastic
blanket that floats on water. Modular
units 11 feet long by seven feet wide
can be joined together to form a
bridge 100 feet long.
The bridge is deployed by throwing
an anchor attached to a rope to the
other side of the stream and, then, by
Ann.1I' Lolli"ticifm
Troops demonstrate a new man-portable
footbridge
pulling the rope through an eye in the
anchor, the bridge is pulled across the
stream.
A bridge of 50 feet can be assem
bled and deployed in 15 minutes.
Army Logistician.
Military Review 100
MILITARY NOTES
Portable field shelter which will proted soldiers against chemical and biological agents
The Army is developing a portable field shelter that will protect at least
10 soldiers against chemical and biological agents.
The quonset hut-shaped shelter carries the formal name of XM51 Collec
tive Protective Shelter System (CB Pressurized Pod).
It can be used for a command post, communications center, medical aid
station, or air operations center. It hss 210 square feet of interior space. In
addition, the shelter will provide a toxic-free area where combat troops who
have been weax:ing protective masks or clothing for extended periods can eat,
shave, relax, or perform assigned duties.
The 2,400-pound shelter system can be unpacked, assembled, and put into
operation by four men in about 20 minutes. It is made of a flexible synthetic
material and has dual walls of tube-like ribs, lIi inches in diameter, which are
inflated with filtered air to make them rigid.
One end of the shelter has a collapSible, inflatable airlock to provide con
tamination-free entrance and exit. To prevent infiltration of contaminants. fil
tered and conditioned air inside the shelter and airlock is kept at a higher
pressure than the outside air.
Four prototype shelters already have been tested at various Army installa
tions in the United States. Fifteen additional units are being built for engi
neering and service tests.-Army News Features.
May 1969 101
MILITARY NOTES
Foliage Preservative
Army scientists are developing a
preservative that is to be used to pro
long the life of foliage for use in cam
ouflage. .
Studies and laboratory tests have
revealed that a composite mixture of
organics and metallic salts, dissolved
in long chain alcohols, will feed stems
and thereby prolong the useful life of
six species of cut foliage. \
Treated with the ml;lterial,ioliage
cut from hemlock, birch, oak, maple,
holly, and beech trees did not wilt or
lose color and optical properties for
up to six weeks. Efforts are now being
made to develop a small plastic tube
which will contain the material and
be self-sealing when attached to the
cut portion of the stem. The tube will
have to be in various lengths and di
ameters for field use by troops.-US
Army release.
Artist's concept of the Navy's prototype Deep Submergence Rescue Vehi
cle (DSRV). The submersible is presently under construction. It is designed
to rescue up to 24 men at a time from stricken submarines. When transferring
personnel, the DSRV mates with the escape hatch of the downed submarine.
The DSRV will be capable of operating to depths of 3,500 feet or greater.
DOD release.
MllitllJ Review
102
INDIA
First IndianMade Rocket
The first completely Indian-made
Centaure rocket was successfulIy
launched in February.
An Indian spokesman termed the
flight of the two-stage sounding rocket
as "very satisfactory," and stated In
dia is now on the path to development
of rockets capable of satellite launch
ing within five years.-Indian news
release.
AUSTRALIA
Forces to Remain in Southeast Asia
Australia and New Zealand have
announced that they will maintain
land, sea, and air forces in the Singa
pore-Malaysia area after the British
withdrawal in 1971.
Two squadrons of Australian Mi
rage aircraft would be stationed in
Malaysia, minus olle section of eight
aircraft to be stationed in Singapore.
Australia and New Zealand would each
keep one naval vessel in the area at
alI times. Australia would contribute
about 1,200 men to a combined Aus
tralian and New Zealand force of two
battalions. In addition, Australia
would provide personnel for head
quarters, communications, and the
jungle warfare training school in Ma
laysia.
The ground forces would be based
in Singapore. However, one company
would be detached in rotation for serv
ice in Malaysia, except when the whole
force was training at the jungle war
fare school or elsewhere in Malaysia.
The Australian forces would not be
used to maintain internal law and or
der, but they would be available, with
the Australian Government's consent,
against Communist infiltration and
subversion promoted from outaide.
Australian news release.
May 1989
MILITARY NOTES
ARGENTINA
Two-Carrier Navy
The Argentine Navy has purchased
the aircraft carrier Karel Doorman
from the Netherlands. The 16,OOO-ton
warship has been renamed the ARA
25 de Mayo.
Built by the British during World
War II, the aircraft carrier was trans
ferred to the Royal Netherlands Navy
The Netherland's aircraft carrier Karel
Doorman is now the Argentine Navy's
Z5 de M"lIo
in 1948. It was decommissioned last
year after a decision was made not
to repair damages from a fire.
The ship is now being repaired at
a Dutch shipyard and, when completed,
will make Argentina a two-aircraft
carrier Navy. They already have the
carrier Independencia, also a British
built ship.
Brazil is the only other Latin
American country with an aircraft
carrier. The Brazilian Navy's Minas
Gerais is also a former British air
craft carrier of the same vintage as
the 25 de Mayo and 11!dependencia.
Navy.,
103
MILITARY NOTES
GREAT BRITAIN
'Magic Eye' Navigator
British tactical vehicles will soon,be
provided with navigational equipment
that will continuously pinpoint their
position. Called the Magic Eye, the
navigator provides continuous position
fixing in the form of a running six or
eight-figure map reference unit which
can be fitted anywhere convenient such
as the glove compartment of a
Accuracy is better than one percent
of the distance traveled. The principle
is simple. The position is plotted from
The Magic Ege navigator mounted on a
British truck
speed-derived from the vehicle trans
mission-and a heading provided by a
magnetic compass system.
The system, which relieves a vehi
cle commander of constant map read
ing, is unaffected by normal storage of
rifles, radios, and other equipment.
Eighty of the navigators have been
bought by the Royal Swedish Army,
and the instrument is under evalua
tion in North Atlantic Treaty Organi
zation and other countries as well.
British Army Soldier, 1969.
Defense Estimates 1969-70
The new British defense estimates
for Fiscal Year 1970 reflect the polit
ical and economic realities of concen
trating Britain's military capacity in
Europe and continuing the withdrawal
of British forces from Southeast Asia
and the Middle East.
For the first time in 11 years, the
defense budget has not risen. At 5.4
billion dollars, it is 12 million dollars
lower than the Fiscal Year 1969 es
timates, and amounts to just under
six percent of the gross national prod
uct. This is still a higher proportion of
the gross national product than the
defense budget of any North Atlantic
Treaty Organization country except
the United States and Portugal.
The new budget provides for the in
creased support to NATO announced
by Britain since the invasion of Czech
oslovakia. A 20,OOO-strong force from
the strategic reserve had already been
earmarked for NATO.
Additional decisions include the al
location of a 6,500-man amphibious
force (two helicopter carriers and two
assault ships) whose flexibility is es
pecially valuable on the flanks of
NATO; the stationing of a third
squadron of Harrier aircraft in Ger
many; reinforcement of MARAIR
MED (Maritime Air Forces, Mediter
ranean) during 1969 by a squadron
of reconnaissance ai rcraft based in
Malta; and deployment of the Royal
Navy so that there will be a major
fleet unit-aircraft carrier, helicopter
carrier, or assault ship-almost con
tinuously in the Mediterranean.
The British Army of the Rhine now
numbers 53,000, but could be rapidly
reinforced to about 120,000 in an
emergency.-News release.
MffitJry Review 104
'Martel' Production Set
Martel, the air-to-surface tactical
strike missile that recently experi
enced a highly successful series of fir
ing trials, is set for quantity produc
tion. The Martel (missile, anti radar,
and television) is actually two versions
designed and developed as part of a
group of projects undertaken jOintly
by the British and the French.
The television variant, primarily the
responsibility of the United Kingdom,
is designed to transmit to a launching
aircraft a picture from a television
Air Fare8 end Space Digest
The Martel missile being launched
camera mounted in the missile's nose.
This picture is monitored on a console
by a weapons operator who guides the
missile to its target with a joy stick.
During trials, the television version
hit targets only 10 feet in diameter
while controlled by an aircraft head
ing away from a target at high speed.
The antiradar version of Mariel, for
which France has prime responsibil
ity, is an all-weather missile that can
operate in the presence of multiple
targets, homing on enemy radar trans
missians. The antiradar version has
scored many direct hits on test radar
installations during the trial firings.
Both missiles can operate in the face
of electronic countermeasures.
May 1969
MILITARY NOTES
Martel missiles initially will equip
the British Navy's Buccaneer low-level
strike aircraft, the Royal Air Force's
Nimrod and French Atlantic maritime
reconnaissance aircraft, the Mirage
III strike fighter, and the jointly de
veloped Jaguar.-Air Force and Space
Digest, 1969.
THE NETHERLANDS
'Leopard' Chosen
The Netherlands Government has
decided to purchase 415 German Leop
ard tanks as replacements for the ob
solescent Centurion tanks. The order
was placed with West German in
dustry in October. At the same time,
an option w a ~ taken on 135 more tanks
of this type which will be purchased
if Dutch North Atlantic Treaty Or
ganization commitments make this
necessary. The order now placed repre
sents a value of 135 million dollars.
The deciSion to order the Leopard
was made after an evaluation of the
United States-West German MBT70,
the British Chieftain, and the German
Leopard. The MBT70 proved to be
most attractive, according to the Sec
retary of State for Defense (Army),
but it would not become available for
another four or five years, and such a
delay is unacceptable. Moreover, the
MBT70 is more expensive, with 400
of these tanks costing twice as much
as 550 LeopardB. The Chieftain and
the Leopard were considered almost
equal, but the German tank proved to
comply better with the military and
tactical views of the Dutch Army staff.
In addition, the Germans offered bet
ter economic conditions.
The amount of 135 million dollars
will be increased by 2.7 million dollars
for ammunition. Tank delivery will be
completed by 1971. While the Nether
165
MILITARY NOTES
lands will not take part in the produc
tion, Germany will place compensation
orders with the Dutch industry for
about 75 percent of the amount in
volved in the Leopard order.-Armed
Fm'ces Management, 1968.
JAPAN
Submarine Oil Tank
Japan has completed a model sub
marine oil tank, and started experi
ments on underwater storage. ,
With the expansion of her economy,
Japan's petroleum needs have been
steadily on the rise, and, because of
the lack of domestic oil resources, Ja
pan has relied upon crude oil imports
from the Middle East and elsewhere.
The research on the development of
submarine oil tanks was initiated to
insure a stable supply of petroleum.
Additional surface storage tanks
were excluded from this research be
cause of the acute shortage of avail
able land in major industrial centers
and the fear of possible accidents in
densely populated areas.
The recent experiments were con
ducted in the Port of Chiba adjacent
to Tokyo with a model one-tenth the
size of the projected tank. Shaped like
a flying saucer, the lower half of the
tank is made of steel and the upper
half of oil-proof synthetic rubber.
The rubber section distends like a
balloon when the tank is filled with
oil. Upon being emptied, the rubber
section deflates and collapses into the
bowl-like steel section.
Further tests are being planned re
garding water pressure, sea currents,
and paint. According to present plans,
a tank with a capacity of 26.4 million
gallons will be built this spring, and
it will be lowered to a depth of 262
feet to 328 feet and filled to its ca
pacity.- Japan Report.
10&
PAKISTAN
Ground Breaking for Dam
Ground-breaking ceremonies were
recently held at the remote viIIage of
Tarbela, on the site of what will be
the world's largest dam. The one bil
lion-dollar project, which wiII accel
erate the economic growth of south
Asia, is the centerpiece of Pakistan's
massive water and power development
program. It caps a chain of projects
designed to make Pakistan self-suffi
cient in food grains.
Tarbela lies astride the Indus River,
about 65 miles northwest of Rawal
pindi at the Himalayan foothills. The
Indus, unharnessed until now, rises in
Tibet and flows 1,800 miles to the Ara
bian Sea, draining a 375,OOO-square
mile area.
According to present estimates, it
will take seven years to complete and
will require around-the-clock effort by
500 engineers and 14,000 workers. The
Tarbela project will surpass Aswan in
size. It will store 11.1 million acre
feet of water in a reservoir 50 miles
long, 450 feet deep, and encompassing
an area of 60,000 acres. The dam will
also generate 2.1 million kilowatts of
energy.-News item.
BULGARIA
Direct Railway Line
Turkey and Bulgaria have report
edly worked out the details to begin
joint construction of a direct railway
line between the two countries. The
purpose of the project is to bypass a
small section of Greek territory
through which the present line runs.
Completion is envisaged by the end of
1970, according to Bulgarian reports.
The line will have a total length of
54 miles. It will be 11 miles shorter
than the present line connecting Sofia
with Istanbul.-Radio Free Europe.
Military Review
MILITARY NOTES
SWEDEN
Tightens Arms Export
The Swedish Trade Ministry plans
to make a careful evaluation of the
countries to which Swedish manufac
turers export military equipment. The
situation arose out of political contro
versy surrounding an export drive by
defense firms in Argentina and Brazil.
Sweden's policy is to prohibit weap
ons export to countries "engaged in
international conflicts or civil war or
where the international or internal
situation is such that war or other
conflicts are possible." The new policy
interpretation adds military-controlled
governments to the blacklist.-Armed
Forces Management, 1969.
BRAZIL
Army Supports Development
In a year and a half, Brazil's 5th
Engineer Battalion has slashed
through wild terrain in western Brazil
more than 1,100 miles of roadway. The
road will be called the Marshal Rondon
Highway after the Brazilian explorer
and anthropologist who prepared the
way for penetration of west Brazil.
The engineers still have to construct
about 750 miles from near Rio Branco
to the Peruvian border although the
route is surveyed and some prelimi
nary work done. When the road is fin
ished, it will be possible to go by car
from Rio or Sao Paulo to the Peruvian
border.-Brazilian news release.
CANADA
'BR7 Terraplane'
BR1 Terrap/ane
The BR7 Terraplane, a new French concept for carrying loads over muskeg
type terrain, has been undergoing tests and demonstrations in Ontario for pos
sible use by the army and other interested agencies in Canada. The vehicle rides
on air cushions and is propelled by both wheels and an aircraft propeller.
Canadian Forces Sentinel.
May 1969 107
MILITARY NOTES
COLOMBIA
'Hercules' Transports
The Colombian Air Force's Military
Air Transport Command is using its
C-180 Hercules in operations to air
lift cattle over the Andes Mountains,
haul oil rigs into jungle areas, and
otherwise contribute to the over-all
development program for remote areas
of this mountainous country. .
Largely without reliable year-round
transportation, the eastern and south
ern areas are benefiting from use of
these transports which, with their
large load-carrying capacity, have
drastically shortened the time re
quired to move cattle into fine graz
ing areas in the isolated, densely jun
gled section.
The rapid transport of oil explora
tion equipment into isolated. territory
promises to quicken the government's
efforts to develop its potential petro
leum resources.-Armed Forces Man
agement, 1968.
US Trainers Ordered
The Colombian Government has
signed a contract with a us firm for
10 T-37C'twin-jet trainers and 30 sin
gle-engine T-J.ID prop aircraft, The
contract, expected to exceed three mil
lion dollars, calis for delivery of the
jet aircraft to begin in September
1969. The first T-J.ID planes were de
livered in October 1968. The jets will
replace present propeller-driven air
craft in the Colombian Air Force.
The T-37C is similar to the T-37B
which is used in US Air Force jet pilot
training. Primary difference is that
the T-37C is equipped with wingtip
fuel tanks and may be fitted with pro
visions for armament. The T-J,lD is
powered with a 210-horsepower. fuel-
injection engine driving a constant
speed propeller. The extra power will
provide better performance for oper
ation out of high-altitude airports in
Colombia. The airplanes will be used
for primary training and transporta
tion.-AT1ned Forces Management.
1968.
WEST GERMANY
Better Equipped 'Bundeswehr'
The West German Defense Minister,
Dr. Gerhard SchrOder, has asked the
Bundestag that the projected defense
spending for the next four years be
increased by 625 million dollars and
outlined a series of current, continu
ing, and projected measures to im
prove strength, training, and equip
ment of the German armed forces.
Major steps to improve West Ger
many's defense posture include:
The planned realignment of the
ground forces and conversion of com
bat units into training units has been
abandoned.
Universal military service will be
retained, and selective service regula
tions and enforcement of draft oppo
nent prOVisions will be tightened.
Some 10,000 reservists will be called
to active duty for one month, and the
number of mobilization and alert exer
cises for reservists will be stepped up.
Reconnaissance capability will be
increased with the procqrement of 88
RF-J,E Phantom II aircraft approved
by the Bundestag budget committee
last November, and additional produc
tion of 50 F-I0J.G Starfighters will
augment current fighter squadrons.
Army mobility will be improved
with the procurement of 135 CH
53A medium transport helicopters.
Armed Forces Management, 1969.
Military Review
108
MILITARY
BOOKS
A DISSENTER'S GUIDE TO FOREIGN POLICY.
Edited by Irving Howe. Foreword by Lewis
Coser. 349 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger,
N. Y., 1968. $6.95.
By MAJ HARRY G. SUMMERS, JR., USA
The intellectuals of the Democratic
Socialist left have fallen upon hard
times. Their status as the "vanguard
of the proletariat" has been eroded by
the growing affluence and transforma
tion of the American "proletariat" into
middle-class bourgeoisie, leaving the
vanguard without an army. The head
lines, television publicity, and revolu
tionary fervor of the left have been
monopolized by the neo-Fascist, anti
intellectual militants of the new left
leaving the democratic left ignored
and forgotten.
This collection of essays gathered
by the editor of Dissent, the Socialist
quarterly, proves that the democratic
left still exists.
Each essay is a separate entity, and
several are purposely contradictory.
Many have raised the Marxian strug
gle between bourgeoisie and proletar
iat from the national scene, where it
no longer seems relevant, to the inter
national stage. The problems of the
third world of the developing nations
are discussed and analyzed in some
detail. The appeal of Maoism as the
ideology for the third world is evalu
ated in depth by two respected China
authorities.
Strange threads run through several
of the essays. Latent racism, unpopu
lar and unfashionable at home, is chan
nelized, rationalized, and projected
May 1969
abroad to defend bias against Asian
involvement. Neoisolationism, once
anathema to the left, seems now to ap
peal to many. A disturbing thesis is
advanced that the United States lacks
the courage for the transformation of
traditional societies of the third world,
and that this task should be left to the
Communists, the only ones ruthless
enough to carry out the "necessary"
bloody Great Leap revolutions.
This Machiavellian proposal is at
tacked in a later thesis, followed by a
rebuttal and a surrebuttal. Another
essay, on morality in war, advanced
the belief that, when faced with terror
tactics, one should give up rather than
resist-a belief once thought de
stroyed in the fires of Dachau and
Buchenwald.
A more hopeful essay is an exam
ination of the democratic reforms of
R6mulo Betancourt in Venezuela, with
its evidence of the possibilities for
peaceful and democratic change in the
third world.
The final essay, a thoughtful and
well-reasoned article extracted from
Partisan Review, sees the "rational"
world of Europe and its cultural satel
lites, the United States and the Soviet
Union, as the "Great White Hope" for
the future of mankind, eventually
westernizing and modernizing the "ir
rational" world of Asia and Africa.
Who would ever believe that "take up
the White Man's burden ..." would
be seriously advanced in a Socialist
publication? George Bernard Shaw
must be whirling like a dervish.
109
MILITARY BOOKS
POWER IN THE KREMLIN: From Khrushchev
to K05Ygin. By Michel Tatu. Translated by
Helen Katel. 570 Pages. The Viking Press,
Inc., N. Y., 1968. $10.00.
By COL LERoy STRONG, USA
The author, as a correspondent in
Moscow from 1957 to 1964, a member
of Columbia University's Research In
stitute on Communist Affairs from
1965 to 1966, and since thattime a
cOl'l'espondent in Eastern Europe, has
been in an excellent position to observe
and study the shifting balance of
power in the USSR.
In this book, he has reconstructed
in depth the principal events in the
internal politics of the USSR from
1960 through September 1967. Using
many sources, he analyzes the four
crises that appeared to lead to Nikita
S. Khrushchev's downfall: the U-2 af
fair in May 1960, the 21st Party Con
gress in 1961-62, the Cuban missile
crisis in October 1962, and the Octo
ber 1964 coup that resulted in his
ouster.
The interpretation of these crises
provides interesting insight into the
precarious balance of Kremlin leader
ship and the manner in which the
system attempts to preserve its inner
dynamism by means cif artificial revo
lutions-the purges. A postscript to
the book concerns the June 1967 Is
raeli-Arab contlict which is likely to
leave its mark on the Soviet collective
leadership just as the Cuban fiasco
ushered in Khrushchev's departure.
Of the alternatives of the Soviet
system moving toward parliamentar
ianism or reverting to a one-man dic
tatorship, the first appears more prob
able according to the author. Consider
able time may pass, however, before
this occurs. One matter he holds to be
certain, the power of the Stalinist gen
eration that has been in charge for
over a quarter of a century is drawing
to an end, and the changeover to its
successor will probably be chaotic.
The serious student of the USSR
should find the book informative and
thought provoking.
')
THE GEmSBURG CAMPAIGN. A Study in
Command. By Edwin B. Coddington. 866
Pages. Charles Scribner's Sons, N. Y., 1968.
$15.00.
By LTC DONALD A. CHAMPLIN, USA
No battle in American history has
elicited so much controversy as Get
tysburg. In sheer volume alone, his
torical writings on this event surpass
all others. It would seem highly un
likely that anything new remains to
be said concerning the battle. Yet
Professor Coddington has unearthed
new sources which provide fresh in
sights into the actions of the opposing
commanders, Robert E. Lee and
George G. Meade. The former stands
accused of failing to provide central
ized direction and control of his
forces; the latter is exonerated of the
charge that he allowed a defeated
enemy to escape.
The Gettysburg Campaign begins
by summarizing Lee's strategy in the
spring of 1863. The movement of
Rebel and Union forces into Pennsyl
vania, the plundering of the country
side, and the panic of the inhabitants
are dramatically recounted. The initial
contacts and decisive engagements of
the opposing forces are described as
extensions of command decisions.
The book is completely documented
and contains official rosters of the
major participating units and nearly
300 pages of notes and bibliography.
This work is not for the casual reader.
A general knowledge of Civil War
history is necessary for complete
understanding and appreciation of
the book.
Mllitlry Review 110
DEATH OF AN ARMY. By Anthony Farrar
Hockley: 195 Pages. William Morrow & Co.,
Inc., N. Y., 1968. $5.00.
By COL JOHN B. B. TRUSSELL, JR.,
USA
As a readable, perceptive, and pro
fessionally analytical account of the
First Battle of Ypres in the autumn
of 1914, this book is a valuable addi
tion to military history for the serious
military student.
While it focuses on the activities of
the British Expeditionary Force, it
does not do so in a vacuum. The Ger
man plans, and the difficulties encoun
tered in carrying them out, are dis
cussed in sufficient detail to give per
spective to the achievements and the
errors of judgment on the part of the
British.
Sufficient insight into the personali
ties of senior British, German, and
French commanders is also provided
to show how and why key decisions
were actually made.
In brief, Death of an Army is an
articulate, professional soldier's thor
oughly researched study of a signifi
cant campaign. Since it is written
chiefly from the viewpoint of corps
and division command, it is not what
its title seems to imply-an account
of the British Regular Army's human
achievement and sacrifice.
The author-whose extensive com
bat experience as a troQP commander
through the grades since early World
War II gives him impressive creden
tials as an interpreter of the ordeals
of the frontline infantryman-ac
knowledges the role of individual gal
lantry and endurance, but he does so
primarily in terms of casualty per
centages. The magnificence of human
achievement, while not ignored, is
somewhat obscured in statistics.
May 1969
MILITARY BOOKS
THE UN AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, 1967.
By Arthur Lall. 322 Pages. Columbia Univer
sity Press, N. Y., 1968. $10.00.
By MAJ DAVID W. LACY, USA
This book presents a comprehensive
documentary of the role played by the
United Nations in the Arab-Israeli
conflict of 1967. The author, through
his experiences as a former Ambassa
dor to the United Nations from India,
is able to explain the reasons behind
the positions taken by UN member
governments on many of the pertinent
issues involved during debates on the
Middle East crisis.
This volume provides substantial
support for those who question the
responsiveness of the United Nations
to cope effectively with critical world
situations. This doubt was reinforced
by the reluctance of the UN Security
Council to take action after a serious
clash between Israel and Syria in esrly
April 1967. Then, in esrly May, Secre
tary General U Thant directed the
UN members' attention to the dan
gerous potentials of the Middle East
situation, but again the Security
Council took no action. The author
credits the failure of the Security
Council to respond to these crises with
contributing to the resort to militant
action by Israel and the Arab States
during the second half of May and the
first half of June 1967.
The discussion of deliberations
within the Security Council and the
General Assembly after hostilities be
gan on 5 June provides an insight into
the obstacles that hamper the adoption
and enforcement of UN resolutions.
The reference value of the book is
enhanced by appendixes containing
draft and final resolutions pertaining
to the Middle East crisis adopted by
the United Nations from 24 May
through 22 November 1967.
111
MIlITARY BOOKS
NEW BOOKS RECEIVED,
A UNION SOLDIER IN THE LAND OF THE
VANQUISHED: Tlte Diary of Sergeant Mathew
Woodruf, June-December, 1865. Edited and
Annotated b, F. N. Bane,. 103 Pages. Uni
verslty of Alabama Press, UnlYersity, Ala.,
1969. $5.00.
GRANT TAKES COMMAND. By Bruce Catton.
With Maps b, Samuel H. Bryant 556 Pages.
Little, Brown & Ca., Boston, Mass:, 1969.
$10.00.
A NEW FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED
STATES. By Hans }. Morgenthau. 252 Pages.
Frederick A. Praeger, N. Y., 1969. $6.95
clothbound. $2.75 paperbound.
OBSOLETE COMMUNISM: The LeftWing AI
temative. By Oanlel CobnBendit and Gabriel
CohnBendit Translated by Arnold Pamer
ans. 255 Pages. McGrawHiII Book Co., N. Y.,
1968. $5.95.
PUAIN THE SOLDIER. By Stephen Ryan. 315
Pages. A. S. Barnes & Co., Inc., Cranbury,
N. I., 1969. $8.00.
PRAGUE'S 200 DAYS: Tlte Struggle for De
mocracy in Czechoslovakia. By Harry
Scbwartz. 274 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger,
N. Y., 1969. $5.95.
BRAXTON BRAGG AND CONFEDERATE DE
FEAT: Volume I. Field Command. By Grady
McWhine,. 421 Pages. Columbia University
Press, N. Y., 1969. $10.00.
CHURCHILL REVISED: A Critical Assess
ment A. J. P. Taylor, Robert Rhodes James,
J. H. Plumb, Basil Liddell Hart, Anthony
Starr. 274 Pages. Tlte Dial Press, Inc., N. Y.,
1969. $5.95.
DISARMAMENT AND SOVIET POLICY, 1964
1968. By Tltomas B. Larson. 280 Pages. Pren
tice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1969.
$6.95.
PIERRE LAVAL AND THE ECLIPSE OF FRANCE.
By Geoffre, Warner. 461 Pages. Tlte Macmil
Ian Co., Inc., N. Y., 1968. $8.95.
CONTEMPORARY CHINA: Papers Presented at
the UnlY'rsity of Guelph Conference, April
19&8. 138 Pages. Tlte Canadian Institute of
International Affairs, Toronto, Can., 19&8.
$4.00.
ISRAEL ~ N D THE ARABS. By Muime Radin
son. Translated From the French by Michael
Perl. 2391 Pages. Pantheon Books, Inc., N. Y.,
19&8. $5;95.
WEST POINT: Tlte Men and Times of the
United states Military Academy. By Tltomas
J. Fleming. 402 Pages. William Morrow &
Co., Inc., N. Y., 1969. $8.50.
THE POLITICS OF WAR: Tlte World and United
States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945. By Gabriel
Kolka. 685 Pages. Random House, Inc., N. Y.,
1968. $12.95.
LATIN AMERICAN RADICALISM: A Documen
tary Report on Left and Nationalist Move
ments. Edited by Irving Louis Horowitz, Josue
de Castro, and John Gerassi. 653 Pages.
Random House, Inc., N. Y., 1969. $10.00.
THE ORDEAL OF TOTAL WAR, 1939-1945. By
Gordon Wright 315 Pages. Harper & Row,
Int., H. Y., 1968. $1.95.
ZAPATA AND THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION. By
Jobn Womack, Jr. 452 Pages. Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc., N. Y., 1968. $10.00.
RETURN OF THE SWASTIKA? By Brigadier Tlte
Lord Russell of LiVerpool, C.B.E., M.C. 144
Pages. David McKay Co., Inc., N. Y., 1969.
$4.50.
THE FALL OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE: 1918
19&8. By Colin Cross. 3&8 Pages. Coward
McCann, Inc., N. Y., 1968. $8.95.
Military Review
112