Philosophical Antecedents of the Sphere of Exchange [Cf also M.Friedman, Kant,Kuhn&Ration.

of Science about the rules of the game:

And there is then no doubt at all, Kuhn further suggests, that science, throughout its development, has become an increasingly efcient instrument for achieving this end. In this sense, therefore, there is also no doubt at all that science as a whole is a rational enterprise. This Kuhnian defense of the rationality of scientic knowledge from the threat of conceptual relativism misses the point, I believe, of the real challenge to such rationality arising from Kuhns own historiographical work. For it is surely uncontroversial that the scienti c enterprise as a whole has in fact become an ever more efcient instrument for puzzle-solving in Kuhns sensefor maximizing quantitative accuracy, precision, simplicity, and so on in adjusting theoretical predictions to phenomenological results of measurement. What is controversial, rather, is the further idea that the scientic enterprise thereby counts as a privileged model or exemplar of rational knowledge ofrational inquiry intonature. And the reasons for this have nothing to do with doubts about the incontrovertible predictive success of the scienti c enterprisethey do not call into question, that is, the instrumental rationality of this enterprise. What has been called into question, rather, is what Jurgen Habermas calls communicative rationality.12Communicative rationality, unlike instrumental rationality, is concerned not so much with choosing efcient means to a given end, but rather with securing mutually agreed upon principles of reasoning whereby a given community of speakers can rationally adjudicate their differences of opinion. 184 11. Kuhn, Afterwords (note 10 above), pp. 338339. 12. See Habermas,Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981), vol. 1, chapter 1; translated as The Theory of Communicative Action (Boston: Beacon, 1984).]

Empiricism and Machism Influence on Neoclassical Theory. Schop. to Mach In light of the influence on Mach attributed to Berkeley, it is important to stress the instructive and paramount differences between the positions of British empiricism (to which Berkeley belongs despite the subjective idealist sobriquet) and Schop.s critique of Kant in paving the road to Machism. Neoclassical Theory is unthinkable without both Schopenhauers ethical metaphysics and Machs philosophy of science. And Machs philosophy of science is unthinkable without the filter of Schopenhauers empiricism and pessimism. Empiricism is a form of positivism and this is how it will be handed down to Mach. But not without the allimportant mediation of Kants critique of Hume and Schopenhauers critique of Kant, after which it will become not just a Weltanschauung but rather a Lebensphilosophie.

A World separates the truth of the British empiricists and Classical Political Economy from the truth of the negatives Denken contemplative the former (a stable, immutable adaequatio mentis et rei that does not challenge the Newtonian mechanistic vision of reality [Berkeley, Hume] and even of self-identity [Hume]) and the activist notion of truth canvassed by the latter (cf. the Cassirer-Heidegger diatribe over precisely this aspect, with the Neo-Kantians taking the extreme formalist and contemplative version of Kants meta-physics; see also Heidegger on Das Wesen der Wahrheit and Simmels scathing review of Schopenhauers Metaphysik des Willens, ch.3 of Sch. und N.), where truth becomes an Entwicklungsprozess in the historial being of Dasein. The distinction lies in the fact that British empiricism from Hobbes to Hume involves a subjectivism of both experience and values (also based on experience) that does not theorise the relationship of Subject to Object in its practical ethical and political dimension. The empiricist perspective is entirely within the world of human perception; it does not seek to pose the problem of the thing in itself even when, as in Berkeley, it denies its content as matter. British empiricism is profoundly subjective, its world view is cinematic or imagistic or pictographic and delivers a passive, inert, contemplative Subject more interested in the theory of knowledge (how we learn things) than in the theory of reality (what things are, in themselves [an sich] and fur uns). Schopenhauer could rightly claim that Kants grosste Verdienst (greatest service) was to distinguish between Erscheinungen (appearances) and Dinge an sich (things-in-themselves) because the British empiricists never inquired into or enquired about the thing in itself and the active or practical role of the Subject in the world. By separating Erscheinungen and Dinge an sich, Kant opened up the entire question of how truth is more than the simple correspondence or adaequatio of the intuition (Anschauung) with the thing (res) by means of the understanding or intellect (intellectus), which we call here instrumental reason or Verstand. For Kant as well as for Schopenhauer, the world will no longer be something to be interpreted, to be contemplated or observed from without; rather it will be a Wirklichkeit (activity, worklikeness, actuality) that encompasses the Subject and its cogito (the I think) as being also an I will whether in its formalistic Kantian or in its negative Schopenhauerian or in its dialectical Hegelian or in its historico-materialist Marxian, or indeed in the evolutionary dimension favoured by Schumpeter and Hayek. Nietzsche himself will emend Descartess cogito ergo sum to vivo ergo cogito (I live therefore I think) to indicate the precedence of existence and experience over thought and reason. The Subject is no longer a receptive or reflective or regulative entity: it now yields,

whether in its formal or dialectic or in its negative (anti-)dialectic guise, a Will that is either free or from which the intellect or understanding (the Verstand/Vernunft of classical philosophy) has to be freed to serve a purely instrumental or operational function. The Will displaces Reason from the pre-eminent position that it had occupied since Plato. Whereas Western metaphysics since Plato had sought to account for the totality of the World, so that the freedom of the will became freedom from the will, philosophy after Kant, and especially in the negatives Denken from Schopenhauer to Hayek, will seek out the freedom of the will a free will that is either a freedom to will or a will to freedom, and then a power to will (Pouvoir-Vouloir) or a will to power (Vouloir-Pouvoir). This is the apotheosis of Vichian historicism according to which verum ipsum factum what is true is not some abstract objective reality but rather the very doing (factum) on the part of human beings -, but this time in negative guise, that is to say, the doings of human beings do not constitute a rational sequence, a Progress toward a common humanistic goal, an inter esse; rather, they are the record of meaningless strife and irresoluble conflict. Machism lies at the crossroads of the discovery of this processuality, of not moving beyond the instrumentality of reason (as equal to Verstand in its mechanical character) whereby not only the perception of the world (Weltanschauung) becomes subjective, but also its entire unfolding, its entire actuality or action or Wirklichkeit, seen in opposition to a static Realitat. The whole notion of reality as a given and immutable world gives way to the notion that there is no such thing as reality but rather a becoming. The empiricists had a subjective perspective on what they still believed and considered to be objective truth, even in the skeptical Humean version. But Machism replaces this truth with sheer functionality through Schopenhauers critique of Kant and Kants critique of Hume although this fact will be made explicit by Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, not by Schopenhauer or even Mach himself. (Cf. Simmel on Relativitat and Traum, pp24-36.) In other words, British empiricism confined its subjectivism to epistemology, to how we know, whilst it still posited the existence of an objective reality whether of things (Hume, Kant) or ideas (Berkeley). But the German epigones of empiricism and of classical German Idealism, from Schopenhauer to Mach, extended this subjectivism to reality itself by eliminating meta-physics as a relevant or legitimate field of human enquiry, either because of its impenetrability (Kants thing-in-itself and Schopenhauers qualitas occulta) or else because of its pragmatic irrelevance (Mach, Peirce and the American pragmatists).

Schopenhauers empiricism becomes more than materialistic or mechanical: it becomes instrumental, neutral from a metaphysical viewpoint indeed, it becomes anti-metaphysical and scientific in its instrumentality (the body is objectified Will). That is why, for Schopenhauer, Berkeleys insight that the world is my idea cannot be carried deeper than its vague universal tone to the particulars of Kants analysis (WWV, p.xxv and p.4). Similarly, Humes skepticism is derived from the inability of experience understood uncritically as evident to yield the principle of causation or sufficient reason, whereas Schopenhauer makes this principle the very foundation of experience (On the Four-fold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason). Humes insistence on the need for such necessary causal link between cause and effect betrays the very rationalist bias that his skepticism was aiming to explode! Even for Hume, the world exists independently of the idea (Vorstellung) and refers us back to those objects that the subject cannot com-prehend. His ontology is not idealist; his enquiry is limited to human understanding, to epistemology, and does not nullify meta-physics. Hence, realism and idealism face dogmatism and skepticism in an endless squabble over the nature of reality and knowledge (WWV, pp15-6). Hobbes and Hume, just as much as Berkeley and Kant, remain in a realistic world where objects (Gegenstande) may well be unknowable or things in themselves, and yet they still make impressions or images on minds. Even in Berkeleys idealism, ideas need to be objectified in God. This is still, albeit in a pictographic form, a Newtonian world in which even subjective utilities are commensurable through a commonality of experience as in Benthams utilitarian worldview. This is where Machism and Schopenhauer e-liminate this obscure veil (Nietzsche) that separates human experience from the world (the world as Will and Representation [Vorstellung]) with its obscurantist dichotomy of formalistic transcendental Pure Reason on one side and inscrutable things-in-themselves that we intuit or perceive as phenomena and order in accordance with reason, on the other side. The stated aim of the negative thought (negatives Denken) with its new empiricism and positivism was to abolish this meta-physics, this dichotomy or dualism of Subject and Object (noumenon/phenomenon) and with it to abolish the notion of causality with its Newtonian attributes of space (external intuition) and time (even in Kants version as internal intuition) now made redundant by Kants noumena themselves (!) and to reinstate (Berkeleyan) empiricism: esse est percipi.

Before Schopenhauer, ontology is still rationalist/deistic, even though epistemology is already empiricist. It was Kants attempt to reconcile epistemological empiricism with rationalist ontology that prompted Nietzsches baleful sarcasm (Kant is an astute theologian). Even as he resisted the heteronomy of instrumental reason, Kant still believed in a transcendental Reason (Vernunft) that regulates the intellect to the thing. Kant sees the technical/instrumental property of logicomathematical identities, but these are then subordinated to, indeed they form the apodictic foundation of, a Reason a transcendental autonomous entity that is a causa noumenon (Iii of KPV) - because it cannot be itself a heteronomous phenomenon or appearance - that is transcendent and that orders the world teleologically, has causal truth value, with its ethical-practical judgement. This is the foundation of Kants Dialectic of Pure Reason that leads to the notion of Practical Reason. Kant mistakenly extends the apodicticity of logicomathematical categories (as being synthetic a priori) to the physical category of causation! By so doing, he turns physical causation into a property of pure reason, independent of noumena in its reasoning or form and yet originating with and prompted by them in the sense that pure reason without noumena is empty form:- Thoughts without sense are empty; sense without concepts is blind. Only thus can Pure Reason (Vernunft) conceptualise and connect the various mere phenomena (bloss Erscheinungen) it perceives through its intuition (Anschauung) and orders through its intellect or understanding (Verstand) and link these phenomena into synthetic a priori judgements or causal laws. All phenomena have now scientific status; what science does is to link them together in as simple and economical (and elegant) a manner as is possible for the description to be useful: simplex sigillum veri (simplicity is the seal of truth). The problem then becomes how to erect or construct a scientific method or language that banishes metaphysics and instead links the human observation of physical events with scientific logico-mathematical propositions that record reliably/truthfully the regularity of those events. So even in the Machian conception of science and experience, logical propositions and scientific statements are intimately connected. The question was to establish the precise nature of such connection the Scholastic adaequatio mentis et rei. Wittgenstein and the Wiener Kreis on one side and Husserl on the other. The ultimate foundation of social life is the system of needs and wants. The ultimate aim and purpose of society is to satisfy these needs and wants that are ineluctably individual. Not only is the individual and its self-interest the foundation of human society, not only is the satisfaction of needs and wants their provision the essential aim of social life. But also the efficient satisfaction of these

needs and wants depends on the rational and systematic organization of free labor. And this free labor is understood as operari, as mere, sheer labor power or force a homogeneous and measurable quantity that does not itself create anything, pro-duce any goods, but rather consumes and utilizes the external world so as to satisfy and provide for its wants wants that are deemed to be as insatiable as the Schopenhauerian Will. In Schopenhauer, the Ding an sich is still present in the entity of the Will whose objectification is the body. Therefore the external world exists as well, though only as representation that can be comprehendedscientifically by the Understanding (Verstand) in accordance with the Principle of Sufficient Reason. In the Schopenhauerian version of the negatives Denken the world is still a Wirk-lichkeit, a work-likeness, an actu-ality in which the human operari is conditioned by scientific logico-mathematical laws just as it was in Kant, whose greatest merit for Schopenhauer consisted precisely in this separation of thing-in-itself and phenomena. Except that Schopenhauer effects a re-versal (Um-kehrung) of Kants metaphysics: the external world therefore is not an inscrutable Object, an unknowable reality of noumena op-posed (Gegen-stand, ob-ject) to the Will, of which we can only register phenomena. But because it is now the subjective side that is the thing-in-itself from which the phenomena, the objectifications originate, the scientificity of experimental observations, of phenomena, is guaranteed by the unity of their re-presentation (Vorstellung) as subject-object a unity that overcomes the infamous Kantian antinomies of thought: esse est percipi what you see is what you get. In this sense, Lukacss critique of Kants formalism is fully comprehensible only through the screen of Schopenhauers reversal of Kant.

Sichtbar machen and simplex sigillum veri. The separation of noumenon and phenomenon also disappears in Machism and merges in the Schopenhauerian fusion of subject-object in the representation effected by instrumental reason. This time it is the thing-in-itself that is entirely eliminated in favour of the simple mathematical connection between phenomena or sensations (Empfindungen) in an experimental relationship that is predictable and regular (Jevons). Like Neo-Kantism, Machs phenomenology, the Empfindungen, effectively instrumentalise science reducing it to the state of a mere tool, to its success or, in the phrase of one of the founders of the marginalist revolution, Stanley Jevons, to a set of predictions and regularities. There is here a virulent and total rejection of any reality or substance that may lie behind

phenomena, of any metaphysics. Science is sheer certainty achieved in the simplest relations capable of being described and calculated with mathematical precision.

For Weber as for Nietzsche, there cannot be any separation (Trennung) in the Marxian sense between labor and the means of production because there was never any union between them! The human operari is entirely instrumental to its goal the provision of want. There is and there can be no Gattungswesen, no speciesconscious being, no original union of workers with tools because, if anything and quite to the contrary, the nature of human wants and the scarcity of their provision ensure that there is conflict between and among workers, let alone between workers and capitalists! Human beings are irreducibly and ontologically things-in-themselves; they are Wills or, as Nietzsche describes them, instincts for freedom that can co-operate or col-laborate to the extent that their needs, their iron necessities and their wants are provided for and satisfied.

But this instrumental operari, this labor itself does not have utility. Only consumption goods have utility: utility alone ultimately provides the measure or value or price of the means of production not in an objective or substantive sense, but merely from the viewpoint (Gesichtspunkt), from the per-spective of the individual choice. Utility is an entirely subjective and inscrutable entity that can be measured as Value, not in absolute terms but only relative to the utilities of other individuals with respect to consumption. Only thus can utility be given social significance or a social Form can it be reified only through the social osmosis of the market pricing mechanism where individual Wills clash or com-pete for the same scarce consumer goods. And this Value can be calculated not just in an instantaneous or timeless analytical dimension but even in a temporal one, in terms of time preference (Bohm-Bawerks roundaboutness), even as a projection toward the future!

In this view (Anschauung), in this perspective (Welt-anschauung), labor can have no utility because it has no intrinsic value on its own, if separated from the means of production. Instead, labor is effort, it is the objectification of the Will, it is the operari, it is

Pain (Leid) without Pleasure (Lust): labor is dis-utility! And the marginal utility of the consumption goods produced to provide for the workers wants the wage - must be equivalent to the marginal dis-utility of labor if the production of consumption goods is to be optimal!

Neoclassical theory from Gossen onwards begins with the notion that human living activity is toil, it is effort, it is want (Bedarf) and pain (Leid) in search of provision (Deckung). It follows from this perspective that human living activity is conceptually separated from its object, from its environment which supplies it with the means of production. And consequently human living labour is seen from the outset as pure and utter destitution, as poverty, as want. Accordingly, all means of production cannot serve as means for the expression or objectification of human living labour but rather as labour-saving devices! For the Neoclassics, then, labour and workers are by definition the factor of production that is in want or need, that suffers toil and pain and dis-utility and that needs capital (the means of production as labour-saving tools) in order to satisfy its wants that are made immediate, urgent in contrast with the capitalist owner who can defer consumption by the very fact that it does not now have provisions for its subsistence and reproduction and survival!

What this means is that human living labour itself is already considered, for one, as a tool, as an instrument whose productivity can be measured in terms of units of output per unit of time. And for another, it is seen as an activity or a labour power that is purely abstract, mere potentiality, utter possibility, sheer project not bound to a particular, specific mode of expression or activity. In practice, it is the latter view of living labor that serves as the premise that leads inexorably to the former conclusion! Weber's entire understanding of "free labour", discussed here earlier, is the sociological equivalent of this decadence and nihilism not, pace Lukacs, a destruction of Reason, because Reason itself is the summum bonum that culminates in nihilism - of European thought. In this perspective, this abstract labour is sheer, naked, destitute poverty, barren misery potential that can only become actual if, and only to the extent and manner that, it is allowed by the laws of supply and demand to come into contact as a tool with the means of production that are the endowment and possession of the capitalist.

Webers inexorable separation (inexorable because for him there is no existential basis whatsoever for conceiving of a union of the worker with the means of production except on the basis of individual ownership of the latter) - the inescapability of bureaucratic rule over modern industrial work anticipates fatidically the philosophical synthesis operated by Heidegger only eight years later in 1927 with the publication of his epoch-making Sein und Zeit. Heideggers ontology of human Da-sein, of human being as possibility, is a philosophical reflection of the politically-enforced separation (Trennung) that Weber deems inescapable and that Heidegger will misconstrue philosophisch for phenomenological inauthenticity (Uneigentlichkeit) and existential estrangement (Verfall). Pathetic(like Schopenhauers sym-pathy derided by Nietzsche, like Romain Rollands oceanic feeling refuted by Freud in Die Unbehagen der Kultur) will be Lukacss plaintive longing for the enchantment of totality, his late-romantic vision of the proletariat as the individual subject-object of history just as equally pathetic will remain Heideggers appeals to authenticity in the face of the Vorhandenheit(instrumentality) of Technik. (The proximity of the two thinkers is reviewed by L. Goldmann in Lukacs et Heidegger.)

For the Nietzschean Weber, these literati with their romantic fantasies fail to grasp the irreducible and overriding irreconcilability of human individual needs and wants, the total absence of any social syn-thesis, the complete lack of any inter esse in human Da-sein. Life is conflict; it is struggle; it is Will to Power. This much Weber has learned from Schopenhauer and Nietzsche combined. But this ineluctable, physio-logical human conflict can and does allow for human co-operation in a purelyinstrumental sense, to achieve practical purposes that satisfy individual needs and wants. Social institutions, both symbolic and political, can lead to the socialization of the instincts through compromises that channel human instincts of freedom toward the construction of an ontogeny of thought that stretches from the notions of consciousness and ego-ity (Ich-heit), to those of logic and mathematics, and then to science, individuality, society and the State. This ontogeny of thought is what allows Weber to reconcile Nietzsches true perspectivism and phenomenalism with Neo-Kantian epistemology and Machian philosophy of science. Kants transcendental idealism remained fundamentally subjective. The universality of Pure Reason is questioned in the Critique of Judgement and made to retreat to the sphere of intuition and

aesthetics, as Heidegger would argue later in the Kantbuch. NeoKantism is the avowal of this retreat of Reason, of the definitive abandonment of the summum bonum of German Idealism of unifying metaphysics with epistemology a surrender presaged already by Kant in the Opus Postumum and the subject of the dramatic clash at Davos between Heidegger and Cassirer. The Natur-wissenschaften and theGeistes-wissenschaften will never be united again: the irretrievable separation of the Subject from the Object is finally conceded. The social sciences must turn to the Unicum of the Soul which can ex-press and externalize its spirit through symbolic and social forms. This is the essence of socialization that mani-fests itself in all areas of human life even to such an extent that these Forms acquire a life of their own, until they become a crystallized Spirit (geronnener Geist) that dominates the lives of individual souls. The intellectual path of Lukacs from Die Seele und die Formen (adopting Simmels schema of Soul and Forms from the Philosophische Kultur) to the elaboration of the concept of reification out of the Marxian fetishism of commodities in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein describes faithfully and fatefully this flirtation of Marxism with theVollendung of German Idealism: At the time, then, it was Marx the sociologist that attracted me and I saw him through spectacles tinged by Simmel and Max Weber. I resumed my studies of Marx during World War I, but this time I was led to do so by my general philosophical interests and under the influence of Hegel rather than any contemporary thinkers. (from 1967 Preface, p.ix) Indeed, it was Marx who first acknowledged this flirtation with Hegel (in the Preface to Kapital) and then coined the phrase crystallized labor-time [blosse Gerinnung von Arbeitszeit, Vol.1, Kapital] to indicate the socially necessary labor time that is embodied in the means of production used by living labor to valorize commodities in the process of production. Marx sought thereby to circumvent the obvious inconsistency that it is impossible for market prices, which are subjectively allocated according to demand, to determine what is socially necessary labor-time. It is something with which the most discerning Marxists have struggled since the publication of Volume Three of Das Kapital. The finest among them have sought to reconcile the inconsistency by appealing precisely to this crystallization of labor-time through the reification of human living labor that the fetishism of commodities engenders through the market mechanism. (See especially Lukacss chapter on Reification in Geschichte and the final chapter on Marxismo: Scienza o Rivoluzione? in L. Collettis Ideologia e Societa.) The

insuperable objection to this version of Marxs critique is that if value is sheer mystification and fetishism, then it is absolutely impossible for it to determine the quantitative allocation of social resources for production! Nor is it possible for us to discern a way to evade this fetishism! Lukacs himself confesses to the overriding subjectivism of this framework (p.xviii) and indeed to its affinity with Webers own brand of Neo-Kantian rationalization (as we will see later) and Heideggers phenomenological account of inauthenticity and totality in Sein und Zeit(p.xxii).

It is not an accident then if Karl Lowith focused on the convergence of the concepts of rationalization in Weber and of alienation in Marx in his appositely titled early work on Max Weber and Karl Marx. This complex web of sociological forms characterizes also Webers entire methodology from the ideal type (Simmels Form) as a sociological form to the hermeneutic Verstehen of social phenomena (clearly drawn from Dilthey) that allows the liberation of social science from its normative content (wert-frei, value-free science). Indeed, we will argue that Webers entire sociology and Wissenschaftslehre is founded on these Simmelian sociological Forms that allow him as they do Schumpeter in the Theorie and the Austrian School generally, especially von Mises who had links with Weber to conceive of the Rationalisierung in terms of its instrumental purpose (Zweck-rationalitat what we may call mathesis) and therefore scientificity that can be distinguished from its Norm or Value (Wert-rationalitat). Once more, we are back full circle to Simmels Neo-Kantian dualism of Soul (value, norm) and Forms (instrumental purpose). But in pursuing this schema, Weber moves very far from Nietzsches much more consistent and sophisticated philosophical Entwurf and his own original version of the Rationalisierung. Weber is more ecumenical than Nietzsche in highlighting the irrational elements of Kultur in which Ratio and iron cage are crystallizations or Forms of the Spirit or Soul. Such a neat Kantian distinction would have seemed absurd to Nietzsche part of that moral theology of German Idealism that he vehemently denounced. And indeed part of the emanationism that Weber himself had rebuffed when reviewing the old German Historical School in his Roscher und Knies. Utility, Labour and Wealth from Smith to Schopenhauer to Neoclassics The Will and its instrumental reason (Verstand), as understood by Schopenhauer, work reality/actuality, they labour the World, the subject/object of representations, to satisfy a

motivation that is a need. This is the operari, the consumption of the World on the part of the Will. In this operari there is no telos, no qualitas occulta (hidden quality or ultimate cause, Sch., WWR, p.106), no causa finalis in the endless chain of causation (samsara, the cycle of life) that is the veil of Maya (illusion). The Will is the objectification of the Ding an sich: but Work is the motioning of the Body, which is the objectification of the Will: it is meaningless motion (the Wirklichkeit of Vorstellungen), effort and toil dis-utility or pain (cf. Hagenberg on Gossen!). Work is consumption of the World, and in this consuming it does not have utility. Utility is to be found in the things as they relate to the Will as operari, in the product of work, but work itself is only operari, consumption of the means of work, of the means of production. (This logical sequence may well be why Gossens early Fundamental Law that still privileged labour was untenable for Jevons and his epigones) Although it pro-duces wealth mechanically, the worker or labourer uses the means of production as well as his own body. But whereas the means of production have utility to the extent that they help pro-duce new objects of utility, work itself is an effort to the labourer and is therefore a dis-utility. Thus, work is neither the measure nor the substance of wealth, but rather an expense, a consumption, an erogation of Leid/Kraft (pain/effort). The source of wealth must then be negative: wealth is not pro-duced but conserved, though it can be accumulated; wealth is consumption a-voided or postponed/delayed: wealth is saving, it is ab-negation, ab-stinence, the refraining from or delaying of consumption. It is impossible to understand Bohm-Bawerk and the Austrian School, starting with Menger, without understanding Schopenhauer. But even in Smith we have the beginnings of this empiricist philosophy that can be traced back to Hobbes. In Hobbess mechanicism, the living activity of human beings is already described as a Power that can be used and appropriated mechanically. Wealth is not pro-duced by labour, because wealth too is a Power that can subjugate and appropriate the labour of others by means of possessions that are another form of Power. Wealth or possessions (from Latin potestas, power over things) allow their possessors to exercise power or influence on those who do not possess them. Thus, labour is the price (the dis-utility!) that must be paid for the utility of consumption, which is the wealth represented by the Lebensmitteln/Viktualien (food) and the means of pro-duction: these are what give life, the means of life (Lebensmitteln). It is the employer, the owner of wealth/capital who employs, who gives work (he is the Arbeit-geber or employ-er of) the worker; and it is the worker who takes work (Arbeit-nehmer, employ-ee) from the employer. It is not the worker who gives labour in the sense of wealth-creating force to the employer. Furthermore, utility represents analogously the principium individuationis of Schop.s will and its shapeless, protean subjectivity, its fungibility or malleability, hence its exchangeable (Simmel, wechselseitig) character because of its manifestation or objectification in any object or reality or representation (Vorstellung). Not to mention, of course, the insatiable nature of the Will, again analogous to that of accumulation. The attempt to avoid this bottomlessness is what moved Hayek to distinguish the notion of individual from that of in-dividuum (in CRS). Hence, the notion of utility already

constitutes the in-dividual in its unbridgeable, impenetrable subjectivity, whereas labour contains immediately the concept of inter-action, of social labour. Consequently, economic science must start with the concept of utility if it wants to present social life as market exchange between atomized in-dividuals. Any economic theory that begins with labour will eventually encounter the problem that there is no such thing as individual labour and that indeed all labour is necessarily social labour. Thus, prices do not require a search into utilities. Indeed, the very subjectiveness of utility is consistent with the usurpation of the world by the Subject for whom alone the Object is now posed (not exists, for this question is inconceivable given the relation/unity of the Object with the Subject in the Vorstellung, representation). The relationship between Subject and Object is now entirely internalized, introspected away into mere mechanically ordered phenomena because this is the status of Vorstellungen. Reality is now indistinguishable from dream; it is replaced by sheer action or movement or displacement, by Wirklichkeit where the nexus with work/conatus is evident. Ultimately, exchange value or value must be re-translated into command over living labour, into a specific employment of living labour. But the brutally crude fact is that command over living labour (value) is dependent on the political control of use values (including material resources!); and this opens the way to a total re-formulation of the nature and causes of value in terms of the market, that is, in terms of the ability of goods to satisfy individual incommensurable wants. The proto-neoclassics (from Roscher and Knies to Dupuit to Gossen) therefore invert the Classical and Marxist analytical perspective: they easily take the existing relations of property for granted and proceed to calculate empirically the role of the market in satisfying wants given the existing structure of property (endowments). Given this existing structure of property, of endowments, it follows that labour power is a dis-utility in that the worker needs to consume the means of pro-duction, including its body, in order to pro-duce goods that allow its reproduction. The utility of these goods lies in the satisfaction of the workers wants, one of which is survival. The meaning of wealth then is stored resources, delayed consumption: wealth is no longer embodied labour power because this would mean that only labour power can pro-duce wealth. Rather, wealth is renunciation of the immediate satisfaction of wants; wealth is sacrifice or Vernichtung, annihilation/suppression of the Wille zur Leben something that is not done in contemplation but in the active, effective renunciation of the will to life. Nirvana is not a terminus ad quem, a summit, an apex to be reached at the end, that involves the renunciation of action. On the contrary, Nirvana is the active satisfaction or extinction of wants through their renunciation, through the accumulation of wealth, of resources! Not renunciation of this or that want: as Robbins insightfully put it, Nirvana is the satisfaction of all wants that is to say, the total extinction of want. Roscher and Knies still attribute exchange value in terms of the ability to satisfy wants to goods, the object, to the thing-in-itself. (This is part of the emanationism [Parsonss translation] that Weber criticized as a Hegelian residuum in Roscher-Knies.)

Therefore, it still makes sense to ask how the goods are pro-duced, and to regress to labour-power or Arbeitskraft. Gossens initial Fundamental Theorem starts from this Ptolemaic perspective because it measures the utility of goods against the marginal utility of the labour-power applied to their production. Later, however, he will invert this perspective to sever once and for all the link between goods as a pro-duct and goods as endowments that are judged/valued according to their ability to satisfy individual wants, and therefore in terms of these subjective individual wants which are inscrutable except through the willingness of people to pay money for them (Dupuit and JB Clark, as well as Gossen). Now labour is no longer the nature and origin of wealth but simply another negative good to be exchanged for goods with the ability to satisfy the workers wants. Labour becomes, not the source of value, but rather the consumption of value, of the world, of resources (wage funds), and therefore immediate consumption, non-Entsagung, enslavement to the world (mundanity), not deliverance from the world! We note that the economy of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, its bland and ruthless reliance on the irrefutability of the phenomenon (Erscheinung) as the basis of human scientific causal explanation of events through the action of the intellect (Verstand) understood as purely instrumental reason, as against teleological or divine Reason, - quite simply, an empirical tool that orders our Vorstellungen or re-presentations of reality this economy in representing the relativity or subjectivity of market prices, in denoting objectively/socially values that are entirely subjective this economy is also the economy involved in the principium individuationis that allows Schopenhauer to isolate the selfishness of the Will to Life in its irrepressible striving for its own interest, without having to give it any self-identity or self-awareness or selfconsciousness that would then engender the dialectical notion of inter-esse or intersubjectivity or inter-action on which Hegelian and Marxist philosophies are based. In both cases it is the empirical/perceptive/intuitive im-mediacy of these notions (reminiscent of Hegels hic et nunc or Bertrand Russells sense-data) that allows Schopenhauer to regress to the jejune concept of human nature in the Grundprobleme der Ethik. (Note, incidentally, on the theme of instrumental reason, Joan Robinsons definition of Economics as a box of tools, reprised by Schumpeter in the History, but now attributed to Pigou by Geoff Harcourt in J. Robinsons Early Views on Method.) [Discussion of Sraffa and Wittgenstein in Sen.] Similarly, utility exists only in the relationship of individuals to things and can only be defined materially or objectively in relative prices. The resultant relativism is unlike that of Einsteins theory, but rather more like Schopenhauers Principle of Sufficient Reason according to which causation is an endless chain given to perception immediately, without necessity or contingency. (Cf. Cacciari, Krisis, p.24: Al di fuori di questa analisi [neoclassica di Bohm-Bawerk] non poteva darsi nulla: nessuna misura teorica o legge del valore. I rapporti di valore erano immanenti e relativi alla struttura del ciclo. See also Simmel regarding the Funktionen,

d.h. in Relativitaten auf und verdanken sich wechselseitig alle ihre Bestimmtheiten, p27 in Schop. u. Nietzsche. For distinction with Kants absolutism, see p24.) The very subjectivity and ineffability of the notion of utility the utilities of individuals can neither be compared nor measured, they are heterogeneous - gives much greater scope and weight to the market mechanism as a tool of social and not strictly economic regulation. It is the self-regulation of the market, its ability to reflect the individual choices of members of civil society that determines not just its Economic rationality but also its Political desirability, its osmotic function as co-ordination of the free choices of individuals. (Cf. Hayek on one side and Walras on the other. It is obvious that the subjectivist notion of utility ultimately clashes with the determinist straitjacket of general equilibrium, especially at a microeconomic level cf. Roschers reservations against the idealist method in favour of the historical one, in Principles of PolEcon.) This may be the place to emphasize that utility is a singularly subjective metaphysical (the euphemism used is psychological) notion that can have no meaning outside of its empirical manifestations relative prices. But Smiths notion of wealth is entirely different from utility when he privileges the labour theory of value, which is not dependent on the notion of equilibrium except in the Marxian sense of simple reproduction. The reference to nations gives Smiths notion of wealth a far more sociological and objective flavour than utility. This is a feature shared by the Old and Young German Historical Schools, whose notion of a Volksgeist was the real source of the Methodenstreit. (Roscher, for instance, in dismissing Gossen, notes the impossibility of measuring individual utilities for the economy as a whole [pp103-4] revealing again his objective understanding of the notion and dismisses also the idealist method, its algebraic formulae and caeteris paribus calculations which display a harmful scientistic reductionism against the spontaneity of peoples [see up to p110].) Note Hagendorf on Gossen: Bourgeois economists since Jevons always speak of marginal productivity of labour instead, as labour value is considered a dangerous concept. But note also the following in Papadopoulos, Karl Knies:
In the quest to find Karl Kniess contribution to the emergence of marginal utility theory, one can find a reliable source in the writings of Carl Menger himself, the founder of the Austrian branch of neoclassical economics. In Appendix C of his first and most famous publication, Principles of Economics13, Menger makes direct reference to Kniess aforementioned richly suggestive essay on value, criticizing, nonetheless, several parts of his theory, which he evaluates as leading to doubtful conclusions. First, he alludes to Kniess definition of value as the degree of suitability of a good for serving human ends , to which he objects because he says that it confuses the nature of value with the measurement of value: the measurement of value belongs as little to the nature of value as the measure of space or time to the nature of space or time (Menger 1950, p.293). Thus, Menger understands Knies to attribute inherent value to goods, which obviously cannot correspond to the psychology of the newly born (Austrian) neoclassical methodology14. (pp14-5)

After Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, through to Machism and the neoclassics, the individual becomes a Unicum, echoed in Stirners The Ego and Its Own, a bottomless pit or black hole of utility/will in which truth is only an instrument and no common-ality or inter-esse is epistemologically possible. As Cacciari puts it, I neoclassici definiscono un sistema generale dequilibrio [di mercato] che parte dalla individualita economica concreta e ne segue lo sviluppo fino alla costituzione di un sistema che non e se non lincontro, empirico, impotente a operare qualsiasi metamorfosi, tra gli interessi specifici di ogni individualita (Cacciari, p29) These are interests that will remain inscrutable and insubstantial except as empirically observable relative prices. How to reconcile or co-ordinate these interests through relative market prices will become the principal problem of economics either providentially (Smiths invisible hand) or abstractly (Walrasian General Equilibrium) or a priori (Misesian praxeology and its neo-Kantian concept of homo agens, game theory, rational expectations) or technically-empirically in relation to a General Equilibrium framework (Hayeks and Robbinss science of choice with its homo quaerens) or through evolutionary institutional factors (immanent, in Hayek and the New Institutional Economics, or transcendental, in Schumpeters innovation). In this regard, the neoclassical notion of the market has an uncannily democratic structure in that it excludes theoretically accumulation for its own sake and concentration as its monopolistic aberration (contra Webers protestant work ethic where individual accumulation and anti-competitive behaviour are seemingly unrestrained, even ethically see below) by allowing the social synthesis/osmosis or the reconciliation of subjective interests or utilities through the self-regulating price mechanism. The equal exchange that the market pricing mechanism serves to establish allows a coordination of individual activities in the sphere of material reproduction of society that can preserve the private ethical beliefs and customs of individuals whose material selfinterest can be given rational-scientific free rein in the market whilst the Political sphere is kept well out of the ambit of individual beliefs. The market therefore achieves a double equilibrium: - by ensuring equal exchange and optimal satisfaction of individual utility in the material sphere, it preserves individual freedom of expression in the cultural sphere. It is the scientific rationality of the market, its ability to maximize the wealth/utility of the nation that permits the neutrality of the Political with regard to other spheres of social life. The bourgeois can co-exist with the citizen in light of this rationality of what can then be called appropriately Political Economy an oxymoron for Antiquity, as Arendt reminds us (in The Human Condition) in that the Political is reduced to privatistic Volkswirtschaft and the latter is erected to the only appropriate real sphere of individual choice! Similarly, Webers Protestant ethic is marginalized in the wider, now irretrievably secular, neoclassical market equilibrium (see discussion below). Contrast with Smith and Classical Political Economy

Compare Smith: - without disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, every man must have procured to himself every necessary and convenience of life which he wanted, ibid., p. 29 (discussed in M. Rothbard, The Present State of Austrian Economics, p.26, fn.46) It seems explicable therefore why Smith saw wealth as arising from exchange. He had to start with exchange because this made it easier to disguise the division of social labour into separate, atomised individual labours. It is easier to assume exchange between in-dividuals first (that is, individual labours), and then to proceed to the specialization or parcelisation of social labour as a means to greater productivity and thence utility. Had Smith started with specialization (as Rothbard demands), he would have had to concede (as with Hobbes and Rousseau) that originally the division of labour is really the division of social labour. And then he would have had to explain how this social labour became an aggregate of individual labours without the collapse of the human community that was so reliant on social labour originally! Had Smith assumed the original primordial existence of social labour, he could never have come up with an explanation of individual labours through exchange! Rather, he would have had to interpose between social labour and individual labour the Trennung (the forced separation of social labour) that is brought about by the invention of private property! Even Rousseau and Proudhon, who famously labeled private property as theft, started with individual labours and thus condemned their critique of capitalism to the realm of good intentions or, as Marx labeled it, primitive communism. Instead, by starting with and assuming the natural existence of private property (that is, private ownership of the means of production and alienability of the workers living labour in exchange for dead labour), Smith could easily demonstrate how exchange facilitated specialization and therefore the further division of (presupposed/assumed) individual labours. Labour pro-duces the value that is in part use value but in part exchange value depending on the exchangeability of its pro-duct in the market because some produced use values find no real demand in the market, in exchange. The market determines through competition what is socially necessary labour time and what is not. But the real nature and origin of the value of commodities, what allows them finally to constitute wealth, is related politically to the labour force or power (Arbeitskraft, Roscher again) that it can command for fresh pro-duction, not their ability to satisfy individual wants or utility, so that the value pro-duced is actually independent of subjective needs and wants or utility in that it constitutes itself as social wealth, as a political power independent of the subjective demand of individuals, of consumers. The fact that the social synthesis or osmosis is operated through the division of labour made up of individual labours that are in turn mediated by the market mechanism of exchange this fact means that labour is the substance, the matter that is the foundation, the nature of wealth, its fons et origo. That this wealth then goes to serve the utility sought by self-interested individuals is a secondary factor that leads to the determination of individual market prices. But these market prices in aggregate denote the amount of labour that goes materially into the pro-duction (bringing forth, for Roscher) of the goods that, in turn but only at last (!), satisfy wants.

By reifying value into a quantity, Smith can easily switch from the sphere of production to the sphere of exchange so that value becomes, not an independent political category of command over living labour, but rather a market price entirely dependent on the exchange of subjective utilities. The difference here is vital: the Marxian theory of value allows for the expanded reproduction of capitalist society, whereas both the labour theory of value and neoclassical theory must eschew any notion of value outside of market prices set by market competition in a state of equilibrium, of equivalent exchange! Therefore, as Schumpeter showed conclusively, the entire notion of economic growth or development or evolution [Entwicklung] is entirely missing from exchangebased equilibrium theories of capitalism both Classical and neoclassical. Smith never poses himself this question of the incommensurability of utility for the simple reason that the brand of empiricism and utilitarianism that pervades British philosophy from Hobbes to JS Mill and Bentham has a Newtonian scientific paradigm as its framework in which utility is commensurable! Hobbess Newtonian, mechanistic notion of Power says it all. The analogy between the labour-power of the labour force in the production of exchange value, and the force and power that was so visible in the rapidly mechanized industrial world in Newtons time must have provided a powerful theoretical incentive for Smith to place labour as the prime mover of value. Exchange value and prices are only relative notions: they are the value-inexchange of commodities: they lack therefore the absolute magnitude of Newtons universal concepts on which natural science was founded. Even for the empiricist Smith, prices were clearly too variable to explain value: demand and supply are forces analogous to action and reaction, but these can only equilibrate or cancel out one another: but they fail to determine the quantum of value contained or embodied in a commodity. And yet his absorption in the Sphere of Exchange meant that Smith was inveigled into a reified definition of labour as the cost of reproduction of the labour force, which failed to distinguish between labour power as a commodity for exchange on the market and living labour as the source of value which itself is not a quantity. [Even in Smith, the physical body already constitutes a separate will, a Hobbesian Power opposed like an ob-ject, a standing against, an op-position, to all other powers and in conflict with them. It is this civil war that forces all individual powers to exchange for their survival (the equivalent of the Hobbesian social contract: alienation of ones product to the market). (Recall that Schopenhauers account of the State is very similar to Hobbess, it is salus publica, mere Police.) But exchange presupposes private property which presupposes an indivisible subject (Kant, Conclusion to KPV). Loasby adds that exchange is a matter of life and death just as the exit from the state of nature into the status civilis was in Hobbes. So exchange is necessary because of the division of labour. But it is exchange that was supposed initially to make possible the division of labour! Thus it is clear that not the division of labour but the separation of social labour into individual labours makes exchange a matter of life and death. Obviously, this cannot result in co-ordination because there is no alienation of endowments to a sovereign,

as there is in Hobbes for individual freedom. And therein resides a great difficulty with Smiths own use of the two notions of wealth and utility, and his oscillation between labour value and market prices, - which was not resolved as a specifically bourgeois economic ethics (to paraphrase Weber) until the psychological neoclassical theory of marginal utility was developed to replace Smiths absolutist/rationalist or objective notion of value and wealth.] [Matters of interest: Hobbes finds the volitional source of the contractual or conventional basis of the status civilis in the ultima ratio of the self-preservation of self-interested individuals: the fear of death leads to the agreement to alienate individual independence which never existed in the status naturae. The state of nature is a state of civil war by definition so it is only a hypothetical state that justifies or rationalizes the civil state. Loasby offers the same self-preservation arising from the division of labour as a founding principle for co-ordination. But the two notions are very different. Exchange is a dira necessitas only if one presupposes individual labours, instead of social labour, which is historically and anthropologically the reality. In that case there is no exchange in the sense intended by Smith. So we are still in need for a reason for co-ordination. Moreover, even if one allows the dira necessitas of exchange, it still does not lead to co-ordination because there is no alienation of individual freedom to a sovereign central market authority. This point becomes overwhelmingly evident in Schop.s own theory of the state with its Hobbesian-Kierkegaardian Pessimismus.]

It was the leading feature of Classical Political Economy that it gave wealth (as value) a spatial or quantitative definition, in absolute, even monetary, terms like purchasing power. This positive or substantial vision of wealth is to be contrasted with its dreamlike negative character in Schopenhauer (see Simmel, pp29-30), the empiricist aspect of which Smith finally apotheosises in the invisible hand that sanctions providentially the co-ordination of phenomenal market prices at equilibrium. Schopenhauer and, through him, Mach preserve the validity of Newtons mechanics but from a radically different epistemological perspective that removes the dualism of mind and matter co-ordinated by a universal truth (however hard to detect, as in Hume), and resolves it in the phenomenology of Will an extreme subjectivism that, unlike British utilitarianism, does not preserve any simulacra of egoism and utility as commensurable/sympathetic entities (pace Schopenhauers sympathy), as an interesse of sorts, an enlightened self-interest like Smiths that lies accanto allaffermazione del sistema newtoniano (Cacciari, Krisis, p.31, see pp.29ff). The contrast with Schopenhauer in this regard is extremely significant and it is this that will set neoclassical theory so far apart from Classical Political Economy. The allimportant point is that the social synthesis now can no longer be found in the measurement of labour as the nature and cause of wealth, of exchange value, for the simple reason that from the perspective of the negatives Denken neither labour powers nor utility are commensurable, politically or quantitatively, as they were for Classical Political Economy, including its major critic, Marx! What is commensurable is

the fact of the exchange of goods to satisfy wants. Here there is truly a Copernican revolution in process (Gossen). What all the proto-neoclassics (Roscher and Knies above all) reproach Ricardo and Marx for is their fundamentalist rejection of use value as an independent source of exchange value on the grounds that natural or external resources (Roscher) do not seem to have any exchange value in that they are freely available. But Roscher and Knies understand the fact that use values can have a scarcity value given to them by prior ownership so that in fact exchange value, in their perspective, becomes a far more political concept than it was for Ricardo and Marx because exchange value now can be calculated not just by the amount of labour contained in commodities but rather by the ownership of commodities with strategic political value, with strategic use values! Classical Political Economy was founded inevitably on the labour theory of value that even Smith (the father of GE, Arrow-Hahn) could not avoid as the matter/substance, the substratum or Kantian ether of economic enquiry. Classical Political Economy, even in its Marxist critique, had completely overlooked the fact that resources are not a given and that use values are subject to ownership. Even if we agree with Marx that it is socially necessary labour time that determines market prices, the fact remains that it is the market that determines what is socially necessary labour time through market demand! But this market demand is neither necessary (say, for society to reproduce itself) nor is it independently fixed or exogenous to the capitalist mode of production itself because it is the mode of production, the existing ownership of social resources, that conditions politically the mode of reproduction! Marx, of course, will determine ultimately that living labour is the ultimate political use value, the one that alone can valourise constant capital, that is, the means of production. Yet this re-opens and reiforces the reality of how value is a political notion that determines exchange values in terms of the political ownership of use values, - which once again raises the question of the Trennung, the separation of the means of production from living labour, not merely in terms of ownership but also in terms of what means of production are used to produce what commodities. It is the great tragedy of Marxism that too many Marxists sought to turn Marxs critique into an objective pseudo-science by placing the political violence of the Trennung in the background and privileging instead the objective production of value through socially necessary labour time, almost as if value were a tangible physical property embodied in commodities themselves! The unfortunate result was the reductionist emphasis on the inequality of distribution of product, with which exploitation was entirely identified, rather than on the political command over living labour in the process of production and on the political use of the means of production both in terms of the political choice of the technologies to be adopted and of the pro-ducts to be made. By so doing, Marxists opened themselves to the charge of metaphysical mythology coming from Bohm-Bawerk and the neoclassics, whilst enabling the latter to conceal their own metaphysics, that of utility, by expanding the source of exchange value to use values as well, by turning both into indistinct goods, and letting their value be determined by the empirically observable behaviour of market participants without questioning the prior political ownership of the use values constituted by the means of

production. As Arendt and Habermas, among others, have observed, there is an undeniable tendency in Marx toward turning the political character of capitalist social relations of production, which they themselves fail to relate specifically to the Trennung of the wage relation, into an instrumental or mechanical scientific stage of human social evolution (now legendary is Marxs attempt to dedicate Das Kapital to Charles Darwin) - effectively into a Kapital-Geist or late Hegelian dialectical teleology. (See further comments below on Weber and Arendt.) Schopenhauers Ethics and Webers Protestant Ethic Webers Protestant Ethic still indirectly glorifies labour as at least one motor of wealthcreation in tracing the spirit of capitalism to the Christian notions of human expiation of the original sin ora et labora. Yet although puritanical parsimony is one means (saving) of accumulating wealth, it is by no means a method of creating or producing wealth. This is the side that Weber neglects but that is present in Schopenhauer and is insightfully theorized by Bohm-Bawerk. For Webers Calvinists and Puritans, wealth is a sign of Beruf, of blessedness and active divine calling. But the Beruf, even in the religious specification of Entsagung, of renunciation and Askesis, does not yet sever decisively the theoretical link between labour and accumulation which is absolutely vital to the development of a specifically capitalist ethic freed from the moral theology of an obsolete Judaeo-Christian eschatology. Labour is still consumption of the world in that it pro-duces greater wealth; it is not deliverance from the world and from wealth; it is not resignation. Labour is still intimately connected with wealth-creation, it is an end in itself (see Weber, PE, beginning of section on Asceticism). Only by severing the nexus between labour and utility or wealth-creation will an economic theory emerge that will relegate labour and the working class to their proper subordinate place in the market economy. Above all, only by severing the social/teleological osmotic link between labour and wealth will it be possible to replace the Judaeo-Christian Beruf, so burdened with religious tenets and moral theology (Schopenhauers critique of Kant and Hegel), with the amoral, effective Entsagung that leads to the entrepreneurial spirit,the Unternehmergeist! This is the specifically bourgeois economic ethic that Weber was seeking but incorrectly understood. The new link that needs to be theorized is that between saving as renunciation of consumption and thence as deliverance from the world (Schopenhauer), on one side, and utility and interest on the other. Again, these features are lacking in Weber. Webers Protestant ethic as an explanation of the rise of capitalism runs against the insuperable difficulty that if labour is the ultimate Askesis (renunciation of life and pleasure, or a penalty and expiation for their enjoyment, as in the Benedictine ora et labora), then labour is also necessarily or by implication the source of wealth, which is contrary to the specifically bourgeois economic ethic that Weber sought to discover by means of the Protestant ethic. Above all, the mundanity of wealth as created by labour, its evanescence as the fruit of labour, its Sisyphean futility, is left unexplained and is yet another inconsistency in the Protestant ethic as a rationale for accumulation as an end in itself in the spirit of capitalism. By contrast, the

evanescence of the efforts and striving (Leid/Kraft) of labour its poverty or misery (Elend) as against natural wealth - is the very centerpiece of Schopenhauers system, the Unwirklichkeit der Erscheinungswelt and of the will to life (Simmel, pp.29-30). Weber was unwittingly reprising Smiths theory: - division of labour as wealth-creation. Wealth is created through growing labour productivity enabled by exchange and therefore specialization, that is, through the pro-duction of more goods for exchange and the use of fewer goods for consumption. This growth of productivity through exchange is the source of wealth. Thus wealth is a saving of labour disutility and consequent greater command of utility-for-exchange. In this perspective, wealth is the squeezing out of greater output from existing means of production or resources. By consuming less for himself, the worker can exchange more. Otherwise, the worker can be more productive by specializing, producing more and consuming less in the exchange. Smith assumes constant/fixed and exogenous technology. Smiths theory does not allow for innovation or the role of wealth as delayed consumption. Thus, consuming less for oneself becomes producing wealth through exchange by producing more. Weber points this out as an aspect of Asceticism in PE, p161. It can be seen how this protestant work ethic rationale preserved entirely the link between labour and wealth that could no longer serve the bourgeoisie after the initial phase of accumulation. What for Smith and the Puritans and for Weber? - was wealth-creating division of labour, Hegel perceived in Smiths pin production as the antithesis of productivity that does not enrich the worker! This occasioned the diatribe between Mandeville and Smith where the former could see that the Publick that benefitted from Private Vices was not the working class. And Mandeville took delight both in the ferity of humans as well as in exposing the hypocrisy of enrichment and immiseration for a divine purpose. But Mandeville still shared the condemnation of laziness, of the charity halls, not for Deistic reasons related to the work ethic, but for the cynical realization that they invited work-shirking. In the negatives Denken, wealth stands against and is the ob-ject (the means of production; the German for object, Gegen-stand, also denotes op-position) and the objective of work, not its pro-duct, just as the Body and the World are the objectification of the Will, its variance or resistance or polarity or source of strife. Wealth (capital) employs labour; labour consumes wealth to earn its keep, to pro-duce more wealth. But the active part is wealth, which is stored consumption or utility, whereas labour is the passive (passio, suffering) part, the part that consumes wealth and in consuming affirms the world. Wealth is consumed by labour after it has been saved by the capitalist. Wealth is delayed consumption. Piercing the veil of Maya, seeing through the illusion of striving and labouring, the mortification of the body, the abnegation of the Will is the renunciation of consumption and the preservation of wealth. As we noted above, these features are lacking in Weber. Above all, the mundanity of wealth, its evanescence, is left unexplained and is yet another inconsistency in the Protestant ethic as a rationale for accumulation as an end in itself in the spirit of

capitalism. By contrast, this evanescence is the very centerpiece of Schopenhauers system, the Unwirklichkeit der Erscheinungswelt and of the will to live (Simmel, pp29-30). This, not Webers version, is the true A-skesis, the abnegation of the Indian philosophers and the Christian saints embraced by Schopenhauer at the end of Book I of WWV. Indeed, it is surprising that Weber could draw the connection between protestant work ethic and capitalism but failed to examine the inconsistency between the accumulation of wealth and ascetic ideals, for one, and the invidious link between labour and wealth for another (see esp. p172, 174-5 of PE) except to note that the link waned after the initial wave of religious fervor (pp176 ff). A specifically bourgeois economic ethic had grown up (p176) says Weber, that allowed capitalists to regard wealth as a sign of divine grace whilst favoring the discipline that low wages induced in workers (p177; also Mandevilles point). Weber rightly observes (p179 iron cage of accumulation, p181) that the convergence between Socialists and Neoclassics came precisely over opposition to monopolies and cartels, that is, disruptions in the Sphere of Exchange (Cacciari makes the point also, K at p29). Despite the reference to Entsagung and Goethe and the iron cage (p181), at the very end of PE, it seems that Weber failed later altogether to consider or even mention Schopenhauers fundamental role in the epochal (Schump, even Blaug) rise of neoclassical theory and in breaking the link labour/value, which had begun to weigh politically after June 1848. (Cacciari highlights this development and makes it pivotal to his analysis in PenNeg&Raz. He also cites Blaug, Econ.InRetrospect.) Weber does not broach these matters, he does not peer into the black box of the factory, in part because they are not directly relevant to his theme. Yet his purpose in researching the origins of the Protestant work ethic was to explore the rise of the spirit of capitalism in line with his sociological explanation of the rise of capitalist accumulation. Clearly for him capitalism is rather a stage or moment in the Rationalisierung whereby the saints cloak grows into the iron cage (stahlhartes Gehause) an immanent bureaucratic and technocratic structure which is inhabited by the leitender Geist. Another shortcoming in Webers account of the innerweltische Askese is its inability to account for the Catholic/totalitarian form of the Kapitalstaat traceable to Hobbes (see Tronti, Stato e Rivoluzione, p259) which is clearly in contrast with the Protestant notions of Individualitat and property rights that go back to the jusnaturalist and Lockean liberal tradition. What Weber fails to delineate is the incongruity of the individualist roots of Protestantism and the liberalist understanding of burgerliche Gesellschaft and its Offentlichkeit (Koselleck, Habermas, Arendt) as against the totalizing tendencies of the Hobbesian analysis which is far more coherent and congruous with the logico-historical Entwicklung of social capital a feature, this last, that finally engulfs not just Webers own Rationalisierung but also Schumpeters Entwicklung and indeed even the apparent extreme individualism of Neoclassical Theory when its Schopenhauerian foundations are properly examined. Once more, the Protestant work ethic is found deficient as an

interpretative key of capitalist development in terms of both individual motivation and the centrality of labour value and, even more important, the specific State-form functional to and compatible with the development of social capital. Ultimately, Schopenhauer does not simply lead to, is a precursor of, Nietzsche and Weber and Schumpeter as well as of Neoclassical Theory; but above all, Schopenhauer points straight back to Mandeville and Hobbes! Schopenhauer therefore assumes a pivotal role that is the keystone of our work.
There is an evident convergence between the Weberian verstehen and his understanding of the Protestant work ethic at the origins of capitalism, as the spirit that inspired accumulation, and the notion of work (Arbeit) that forms the basis of the labour theory of value (Myrdals Real Value) at first only to metamorphose into the Subjective Value of the neoclassical, not Benthamite, kind. It is the Benthamite notion of utility that still has the labour theory of value in mind, with Labour acting as the source of Value and therefore as the social synthesis, the dialectical substance that permits the standpoint of society and the utopian aim of working toward a common goal. Labour and Value are the inter-esse, the premise of Social Value, the foundation of the communistic society in Myrdal and Arendt, something they attribute to a technocratic closing of the sphere of action into behaviour or the collective housekeeping in the interests of society (Volkswirtschaft) (p16). They remonstrate against the notion that economic analysis is capable of yielding laws in the sense of norms, and not merely laws in the sense of demonstrable recurrences of actual and possible events (Myrdal, PEinET, p4). Thus, they both fundamentally misunderstand the entire climactic change wrought by the negatives Denken and neoclassical theory. Webers revulsion at Marxist historicism that Myrdal invokes (p12) wished to preserve for the Sozialwissenschaften the velleity of scientific neutrality that permeates hermeneutic historicism and that is evident in his reconstruction of Kapital-Geist (spirit of capitalism) as the manifestation of the Entseelung or disenchantment that leads from the saints cloak to the stahlhartes Gebaude. That labour is still central to asceticism and then to accumulation illustrates the proximity of verstehen to the German idealist tradition and indeed to the Newtonian scientific enlightenment understanding of British empiricism and utilitarianism. This is far more akin to the communistic society decried by Myrdal and Arendt than the radical subjectivism of neoclassical theory which is the virulent antithesis of the former. (According to Cacciari, M Blaug sees this epochal trans-formation of economic theory from labour value to utility but makes no mention of Schop. [PN&R, p31, fn 22].) The revolution that the negatives Denken operated consists precisely in this: - that all dialectical social syntheses are removed, beginning with Labour, and that now only the market mechanism can objectify the expression of subjective wills through the price system. No social synthesis, no inter-action, no inter-esse is possible against the background of conflicting, strife-torn, individual interests as described by Schopenhauer but ineffectually resolved by him in the moral sympathy of Nirvana, the apex of Entsagung. (Cf. Cacciari in PN&R.) Herein lies the specifically bourgeois economic ethic that Weber was looking for in vain to overcome the contradictions of the Protestant work ethic and that he mistakenly identified with Franklins brand of asceticism as a linear evolution of the Protestant ethic. The major point here is that this new ethic is provided by the negatives Denken and it really originates in Hobbes: it is more than just a bourgeois economic ethic; in fact it is a theory of the capitalist State-form consonant and conforming with the requirements of social capital.

Webers own political tragedy (and that of the GHS) may well have lain in his attempt to adapt Scholastic and idealist political categories in the form of Demokrat-, Parlamentar-isierung to the novel reality of social capital even with the advent of Nietzsche. (This is something we will have to research.)

[The Ethics Of Negatives Denken - Utility As Calculus of Pleasure and Pain] For Schop., Kant had correctly determined that the ultimate cause of our perceptions, the Dinge an sich, are absolutely inscrutable and inconceivable to us except as Erscheinungen that are given an intelligible order through our Verstand and then, at a higher level of conceptual order, by our Vernunft. But this Verstand/Vernunft is a merely mechanical or instrumental means of ordering phenomena into representations to enable us to make sense of the world immediately, that is, without the intervention of a metaphysical entity such as a Pure Reason that stands outside of the World of representations. The Verstand/Vernunft is a mechanical ability that stands within the World of causal Erscheinungen, and is itself a Vorstellung. Our ability to order Erscheinungen does not immediately give us the ability to deduce from or transcend the world of Vorstellungen to a higher entity or identity or self-consciousness that separates the Verstand/Vernunft from the world of representations. Indeed, all we can say is that the World is my representation in that my perception of the world is filtered and ordered mechanically and instrumentally by the Verstand/Vernunft and trans-formed into representations. Even the Body through which I perceive the Erscheinungen and through which, by virtue of the faculty of Verstand/Vernunft, I link them causally into Vorstellungen even this Body is my representation. It is mere utopia, sheer fantasy to leap from the awareness of my representations and the immediacy of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which gives me the certainty (Wirklichkeit) of my experience of this world, to another meta-physical world of Dinge an sich of which I have no experience whatsoever, either as an Object (noumenon) that causes the Erscheinungen (phenomena) ordered as a world of Vorstellungen by my Verstand, or else as Subject, a causa noumenon, dictated (as in Kant) by the unfounded, imaginary logical necessity for a free entity that stands outside of the totality of causal links. In reality, my Body and my Verstand/Vernunft are themselves Vorstellungen that are immediately subject to, not the totality of the causal chain, but rather to its infinite or indefinite extension, of which they remain necessarily a part, a link to which they remain subjected, to which they stand as member, not subject, as an intermediate cause and effect, not as ultimate cause. And yet, for all this, I still remain aware of a force, a volition that operates and motivates my Body, that commands it and causes it to act within this world of representations and that therefore presents itself to me as an actuality (Wirklichkeit). This is my operari, my living activity, my Arbeit. This force, this volition of which I can trace perhaps the Motivation (Motif) or sequence of motivations as an immediate cause or causes of which its movements, motions and manifestations are the

effects this force or volition or sequence of motivations I can only designate as my Will. Because volitions cannot be separated from the representations that my body perceives and that my body occasions, then the totality of these representations, both active and passive, that re-present the world to me go to constitute my will as the principium individuationis of the world. The world is made up of my representations that I perceive through my body. But my body is the ex-pression and objectification of my will. Therefore the world is made up of both my will and my representations. As the principium individuationis, my will is not a subject, nor is it a self of which I can be fully conscious: my will is not an identity or even an entity. But it is a unity as opposed to a multiplicity because I am conscious of its being a source of activity, a will, a force beyond which my awareness and my Verstand/Vernunft cannot reach: my will is a qualitas occulta, an ultimate cause it is therefore the Ding an sich, or rather, my will is the objectification of the Ding an sich given that the will acts or is prompted by motivations whose ultimate source I cannot know but that are objectified or manifested through my body. That is why the body is the objectification of my will. And through the body, through the fact that my will perceives by means of the body that in the pursuit of its volition its expression or mani-festation is contrasted or op-posed by its ob-ject, its op-position or Gegen-stand, which is the world, then the will perceives the world as a hostile will, as a source of pain to its irrepressible search for pleasure which is restrained only by the mechanical operation of the Verstand/Vernunft based on the attainability or feasibility of its wishes. The fulfillment of every wish held by the will, the gratification of its desire/conatus or satisfaction of its need is met with the immediate extinction of the pleasure and gratification and satisfaction that such success entails. Consequently, the will is endless source of dis-satisfaction, of needs, of desires and passions that cause anxiety and pain (Lt. patire, suffer). The operari is pain: Arbeit is pain. The height of satisfaction for the will is the extinction of Pain; it is the Vernichtung of desire, or passion, and need. Therefore, the awareness of the evanescence of the wills objective entails the instrumental deployment of the intellect to contain the will in its search for gratification. And this deployment of the intellect for the attainment of the wills needs is the real meaning of A-skesis and Entsagung. It is renunciation, it is awareness of the satisfaction of the need and sublimation of its evanescence, of its perishable-ness, of its fleeting-ness, of its transience. Entsagung is not a final goal, a nec plus ultra; it is still part of a process, but at each station in its progress it is at once satisfaction of a need through renunciation of the will, Vernichtung of its endless insatiable striving; it is a mirror to the world. Robbins could properly claim that Nirvana is the satisfaction of every desire in this negative sense in which renunciation ultimately equals ful-filment and satis-faction of every desire. For marginalism this equation of satis-faction as extinction of desire is the essential basis for its calculation of market prices.

Lowith, Webers Rationalisierung and Marxs Accumulation

Karl Lowiths Max Weber und Karl Marx offers interesting points. Chapter Two on Weber, after discussing his critique of Roscher-Kniess emanationism (Parsons word, the translator strangely preferring emanantism), goes on to trace the Rationalisierung back to The Sociology of Religion and the rise of a Protestant-Puritan Ethic that on one hand preserves the Divinity as the summum bonum, but does so by substituting the scientific method and its disenchantment of the world in its approach to practical life. Until, that is, this rationalization does not become, from an effective means, an end in itself, and therefore irrational. Lowith compares this to Marxs formula of accumulation (from C-M-C to M-C-M). The iron cage is the result of rationalizing and secularizing living practice and, with it, the world. In its pursuit of truth, humanity lost sight of the meaning of truth, so that eventually, for Weber, the individual is thrown upon himself (and here is the link with Nietzsche and Heidegger) to throw light on the world (the Daseins Lichtung). Verstehen, then gives the social scientist almost a romantic patina, the frisson of the condottiere, of the pioneer who, to borrow from Cacciari, climbs the ladder and then throws it away the mystic. Politically, this is the path to the leitender Geist and the Grosse Politik. Lowith adds also the Unternehmergeist, but we know Cacciaris objection to this in his discussion of Schumpeter: - there is no Unternehmer in Webers famous tryptich (PaB, WaB, and PuR). This is instructive, as we have discussed, in that Weber could see that industry and commerce and capitalism itself are all subjected to the same process of Rationalisierung that requires political leadership, the ethic of responsibility, not of conviction. The scientist discovers the means through rational/secular methods. But it is the leitender Geist that has to navigate the ship of state through uncertain and fluctuating goals. Lowith emphasizes how Webers philosophical stance remains at once individualistic and nationalistic unsurprisingly, if one takes the combination of bureaucratization with secularisation and rationalization as the vehicle and leadership at the helm. But the question here surfaces and lingers stubbornly: how do we define this rationalization? It is the abstract, hypostatized quality of Webers concept that must be questioned here. And this is where Marx, if not Hegel, can provide some answers with their infinitely more historical approach that Verstehen and wertfreiheit simply lack. (Forget the Heideggerian bestialities of Vor- and Zu-handenheit peddled in the Preface to this English edition by Brian S. Turner.) But Lowith too is ever the incorrigible philosopher (what with his theological background to make matters worse, a la Heidegger) and his treatment of Marx refined, of course misses lots of points, perhaps the point. Is it self-alienation that Marx is fighting? Where does he say the he wants the division of labour and specialization abolished? Lowith is still lost in the Gelernte struggles, or in Lukacss discussion of totality and reification things that, if they stood as they are described by Lowith/Lukacs, humanity could never elude! (Just think: the reification of reification it reminds you of Heideggers ground of grounds.)

And where would that leave the Grundrisse, for one? Of course, Lowith could not have known them they were not published. He refers to the totality of being human (p94), but then fails to connect it to the real production of emancipation as the historical antagonism of relations of production. This is the spring of Marxs critique of Hegels idealism. Without this precise critique, Marx would be indistinguishable from the Hegel of the Phenomenologie, from its Selbst-Entfremdung. (Cf. Trontis remarks on Lowiths treatment of Marx in VHzN, in OeC, p139-40.) And this leads me to note that much of the work and study done in this direction, call it the finality or orientation of capitalism, have severed the link between the critique of capitalist social relations of production and focused almost exclusively on postHeideggerian notions of Technik and, from Castoriadis to Negri, constitutional change or even, to be kind, vague and thoroughly irrelevant notions of empire. What these people forget stuck as they are in university corridors and lecture-rooms is that change or trans-formation of capitalist society can only come lastingly from the sphere of production first, because this is what makes the trans-formation possible. So this is precisely the difference between Weber and Marx: - that Weber reifies rationalization, a process that can be com-prehended socially but not in itself as a notion standing alone hence his reliance on Individualitat; whereas Marx, with his materialist foundations in species-conscious being, sees rationalization as a method of domination, a strategy of control (cf. Gramsci on Americanism and Fordism) and can also see the emancipatory force of this (these are the most beautiful pages of the Grundrisse, perhaps of all literature) as a result of the antagonism it embodies, which totally eludes Weber! By subordinating the interpretation of capitalist social relations of production to the formalistic notion of rationalization which itself has no rational basis or finality, as Weber is the first to concede -, Weber completely misconstrues the real historico-political character of capitalism. (Cf. Collettis critique in I&S.) For all the above, see Lowiths ch2 on Weber. Kalyvas writes in a footnote:
4Karl Lowith in his brilliant, still unsurpassed comparative discussion of Marx and Weber has argued, wrongly I think, that the latter, while concerned with the alienating effects of modern, bureaucratized societies abstained, contrary to the former, from providing a political solution to the problem of bureaucratization. Thus, where Marx offered a therapy, Lowith maintains,

Weber offered only a diagnosis. Karl Lowith,Max Weber and Karl Marx, ed. Tom Bottomore and William Outhwaite, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982, p.22.

Yes, but a diagnosis that is not a therapy is necessarily incomplete. The theoretician is part of the cosmos that is theorized there is no Archimedean point (Habermas in EuI). And perhaps this is the limit of Lowiths analysis that it reduces Marxs critique to an ethical exhortation to the overcoming of self-alienation toward the totality of being human. This is Lukacsian/Heideggerian indeed. By insisting on his notion of Christian-bourgeois society, extended here to bourgeois-capitalist society, Lowith incorrectly describes Marxs notion of alienation as self-alienation (Selbst-Entfremdung is Hegels notion in PdG), and then as pertaining to the antithesis between bourgeois and citoyen forgetting

all the while that both bourgeois and citoyen (with their formal rights) are in reality the antagonistic antithesis of. the proletarian! What is clear, therefore, is that this division/antithesis of bourgeois/citoyen pertains only to the liberalist hypocrisy/ideology of the bourgeoisie that, on one side, seeks its own interests, whilst on the other preaches the sacrosanct national nature of its legal rights and duties. This is still Hegel no, its Aristotles zoon politikon (p102)! It is a misapprehension that places Lowith squarely with Arendt (HC) in the post-Heideggerian camp.
The human particularity which is attacked in these writings is not that of man as an owner of money and commodities, but human particularity as such, in contrast and opposition to the public universality of existence. What is distinctive about bourgeois man, what separates and removes him from the universality of public life, is that his human existence is primarily that of a private individual, and in this sense, bourgeois. (p103)

Lowith misses the specificity of the alienation in the sphere of production, and not in that of state/civil society or indeed religion (Feuerbach) which are only a secondary aspect of the primary antagonism. That explains why Lowith insists on specialization (to stress the continuity of Marxs thought with Webers) and the anthropological meaning (p95) to bring him in Feuerbachs left-Hegelian camp (cf. treatment of post-Hegelians in VomHzuN). Lowiths incomprehension of Marxs critique of capitalism (not bourgeois society) is at the end of p.95, when he states:
Marx traced this fundamental and universal self-alienation of man in modern political,
social and economic structuresthat is, in the same order that we encountered in Weber as the inescapable destiny of rationalisationin all its aspects: in its economic, political and directly social forms. The economic expression of this problematic is the world of commodities; its political expression, the contradiction between the bourgeois state and bourgeois society; its direct human-social expression, the existence of the proletariat. (My emphasis.)

Again, Lowith completely neglects the central point: - the labour process, the Trennung; and quite incorrectly stresses the philosophical aspects of alienation, fetishism, and reification. In the next section, he proceeds to describe Marxs description of the commodity; and then this:
How is it that within the involuntary transformation of personal interest into class
interest that personal behaviour of the individual must be reified and alienated, and at the same time emerges as an independent power beyond human control? Marx finds the answer in the division of labour, which is the basis of rationalisation. (p96).

Thus, he confuses Marx with Weber or with Arendt who similarly distinguishes between labour and work! Clearly, Lowith is light years away from Marxs meaning. A look at p.100 will show the Feuerbachian basis of Lowiths reading of Marx whereby the only difference between the two is that Marx found in the economic sphere the grounding of the formers humanism:
Marx accomplished the decisive break with Feuerbachs real humanism in The German Ideology.

Yet even Capital is not simply a critique of political economy, but a critique of man in bourgeois society in terms of its economy. The economic kernel of this economy is the commodity form of the product of labour. (p100)

No! It is the commodity form of (living) labour! And the rest of this section is a clear illustration of Lowiths inability to grasp the central concept of Marxs entire critique. The Lukacsian reading of Marx (Lowith acknowledges approvingly GuK in fn12) is evinced by what the Hungarian philosopher, himself adapting Schopenhauers critique of Kant, wrote on the subject (Antinomies in GuK, at fn28):
For, on the one hand, men are constantly smashing, replacing and leaving behind them the natural, irrational and actually existing bonds, while, on the other hand, they erect around themselves in the reality they have created and made, a kind of second nature which evolves with exactly the same inexorable necessity as was the case earlier on with irrational forces of nature (more exactly: the social relations which appear in this form). To them, their own social action, says Marx, takes the form of the action of objects, which rule the producers instead of being ruled by them.

When Lowith finally comes to this point the exclusion of the proletariat from bourgeois society -, he again is unable to go beyond political reality and the mundane problems of life (though here he cites Marx from GI) and into the sphere of production where alienation truly resides:
Because the wage-labourer is completely externalised through the mundane problems of life, because he is in no way a man, but simply one who valorises and sells his labour power, a personified commodity, his condition has a universal function. (p110)

It is symptomatic in all this that Lowith confines himself to Marxs most Hegelian writings, the ones that precede the scientific period with the Doppelcharakter of the commodity labour-power from 1849 (Tronti, OeC, p127). In this crucial passage it is possible to detect the reasons behind our critique of Lowith: Marx most certainly did not deal with the contradictions of bourgeois society as formulated by Hegel!
Rather, Marx analysed the coherent totality of our human world in terms of human self-alienation, which he saw as culminating in the proletariat. Self-alienation, in turn, is regarded from the aspect of its possible transcendence, which for Marx meant no more and no less than transcending the bourgeois contradictions (as Hegel had formulated them) of particularity and universality, the private and the public sphere, in a society which would be not only classless but de-rationalised in every respect, and in which man as such is a social species being. The fact that this self-alienation is determined by the mode and the stage of development of material production, and by the natural division of labouror in general by the sum of concrete life conditionsdoes not imply that it is nothing more than the product of a particular, purely economic distortion. (p111)

Note how Lowith is re-homogenising Weber and Marx as well as Hegel and Marx by insisting on de-rationalisation and on the Hegelian citoyen/bourgeois opposition (which Marx subsumes to his critique of Hegel) both absurd concepts for Marx, and products of their mystification of social reality. Cacciari, by contrast, in rescuing Hegel from Marxs Kritik der Rechtsphilosophie, stresses how he correctly formulated the conditions whereby the State could overcome dialectically (aufheben) the contradictions of burgerliche Gesellschaft, which do not include the proletariat, which is its negation as

in Marx [in DdP]. In doing so, argues Cacciari, Hegel did not decree the end of history, as Marx would have it, but preserved the antagonism of bourgeois society to be resolved in the higher stage of the Spirit whilst still leaving the proletariat out of the equation precisely because his formulation of the problem was so different from Marxs in that it sought to articulate the problem of the State conceptually. Again, Cacciari prefers Hegels unresolved/irresoluble formulation of the problem, to Marxs critical yet chiliastic resolution. Lachmann on Weber Lachmanns monograph, The Legacy of Max Weber, gives us the pretext to place our critique of Lowith another way. Lachmann describes the task of historiography as understanding (Verstehen) the purpose of human activity, using Webers term derived from the German Historical School but without its emanationism (see p58ff) and discounting Webers Idealtypus (ch1), but adopting instead the notion of plan (p29) the idea that human beings are unique for being able to plan their activities. Marx does the same, but from the premise of species-conscious being and of interaction/labour (Cacciaris operari), which Lachmann has to discount (being close to the Austrians) with the outcome that he is unable to overcome epistemological uncertainty (Knight, Shackle and Keynes are with him on this), particularly in the sphere of social or collective action, despite his empiricist championing of scientific models (Hayeks problem as well, given methodological subjectivism). Models can predict but cannot explain (Lawson confuses the two functions in denying explanatory reality to equilibrium analysis a language game that may well possess predictive merit). Conversely, Weber reproached Menger for the naturalistic fallacy of treating as explanatory what were only circumstantial, contingent predictions, camouflaged as laws (as in praxaeology, which is simply a language-game). [See discussion on pp25ff and then from p37; Lachmanns substitution of plan/orientation bounded rationality for Misesian a priori praxaeology would give the latter a paroxysm, as it did to Rothbard cf my Equil&MrktPrcss. The chapter on Institutions has an interesting discussion of transition from metallic standard to Hickss labour standard. The last chapter discusses Webers politics in the institutional context.] Now, Lowith takes into account the first Marxian element (species-conscious being) listed above, but not the second (labour/interaction), which is inseparable from the first if indeed it is the totality of being human that we wish to grasp and only the second can sublate the self-alienation that he privileges. With the result that self-alienation is not selfalienation at all the product of some phantomatic human essence or Hegelian objectification. Indeed, Marx used alienation (from the Paris Mauscripts) precisely to focus on the practical-historical and political-productive (rather than politicoeconomic) dimension of this process, evolving into generalized exchange-value production in capitalism. Lowith completely elides this reality.

[ Henryk Grossman and Cacciari Contrast this below with the insuperable difficulties Classical Political Economy and Labour Value faced in their inability to explain, on the capitalist side, the source of profit and, on the workers side, the source of surplus value. For if labour value determines prices, then the market mechanism will reduce all labour value down to socially necessary labour time and eliminate surplus value (and profits) altogether so there is nothing left for workers to claim as theft of labour time. And if supply and demand determine prices, then there will be equivalent exchange that will eliminate profit. The solution the neoclassics introduce is to attribute profit to Entsagung delayed consumption so that production disappears behind consumption preferences. We must stress that whereas CPE looked at the economy from the angle of labour and production (individual labour leads to exchange leads to specialization leads to productivity leads to wealth), neoclassical theory looks at it from the angle of pure individual exchange and individual consumption (endowments lead to delayed consumption lead demand for immediate consumption lead to exchange lead to maximized individual utilities). Henryk Grossmans Marx, CPE and the Problem of Dynamics turns out to be surely Cacciaris inspiration for his approach to political economy, adopted by myself in this project. Grossman selects two lines of attack on CPE: - its focus on value creation, that is on the emergence of value from the sphere of exchange rather than from the labour process, despite Adam Smiths initial focus on the division of labour; and, as a result, the failure of CPE to explain profit and its tendency to degenerate into equilibrium analysis and, consequently, to become incompatible (despite efforts from JS Mill to JB Clark) with the Entwicklung/Krisis stressed by Schumpeter. Grossmans chapters are actually allocated to each stage of this analysis in turn, which makes it extremely useful, almost didactic. Particularly insightful and penetrating are the chapters on the transition from CPE to Neoclassical Theory, on which clearly Cacciaris work is modeled. The problem is that Grossman, after correctly stating the object of Marxs critique of CPE, finally reverts to Marxs schemes of reproduction and the organic composition of capital and that infamous law of falling rate of profit which, in our critique, inevitably present value as a quantity and therefore Grossman retrogresses conceptually to the very notion of equilibrium he is criticizing, merely noting that equilibrium can only be accidental and disequilibrium is the endemic condition of capitalism (!). And eventually, ineluctably, reverts to underconsumption or overaccumulation as the cause of crisis. Remarkable how a refined thinker like Grossman fails to see that equilibrium is not a matter of balance (overshooting and suchlike), but a matter of categories, because value is a social relation of production and therefore equilibrium is categorically inapplicable to capitalist production and to the Marxian critique! In contrast, Schumpeter could see that it was this trans-crescence, meta-morphosis (Cacciari) that trans-formed

capitalism from a reality analyzable in quantitative terms hence, Gleichgewicht/Statik into one that is truly socio-political, the Dynamik/Entwicklung.] As Cacciari shows, the Nietzschean supersession of Schopenhauer as Educator will lead far away from these toward Weber, toward Schumpeter and Heidegger. But Cacciari ably distinguishes between the initial phase of transformation of economic theory, from Gossen through Jevons and Bohm-Bawerk, when the inversion of value theory into the positive theory of capital takes place, when the will to power of the new theory is in full vehemence against the demands of the emerging working class, from the later equilibrium theory that constitutes both a socialist dream of a balanced economy (Walras) or of a consumerist heaven (Hayek/Mises/Robbins) that accomplishes the goals of Political Economy. Here the socialist utopia of the Law of Value meets the neoclassical liberal Nirvana of equilibrium in the foundation of anti-monopolistic free competition. (Cacciari, PNeR, pp29ff.

Myrdal and Arendt Politics and Value-free Economics; Public Sphere and Volkswirtschaft We can see here how inadequate Myrdals and Arendts notions of communistic society are when applied to economic theory (classical and neo-classical). Arendt and Myrdal mistake the real social needs and development of social capital as some kind of communistic principle or substratum in economics. In fact, it is nothing of the kind: both co-ordination and welfare are always understood strictly in individualistic terms, especially in theory. The welfare is that of a society of in-dividuals. Obviously, Arendt and Myrdal thoroughly misconstrue the basis of Marxs communism, which was not that of Pareto optimization of utility: the economics of individual utility maximization, however welfarist, can never have anything to do politically with communism, which has radically different theoretical and historical origins. Again, Arendt and Myrdal start from a notion of individual that goes back to Antiquity and, worse, understand economics and society uncritically as a distortion of vita activa (Arendt) its reduction to consumerism and Volkswirtschaft, or as a neutral wertfrei/verstehen domain to be sheltered from political, normative incursions (Myrdal), and not as specific historical products of capitalist social relations of production. Arendt and Myrdal seem to operate from a hermeneutical position (cf. Lawson) that neglects the historical specificity of this society as capitalist society and therefore amounts to a sterile sociology-of-knowledge, Mannheimstyle or Lukacsian analysis of reification or consumerism that does not penetrate and evaluate the strategic content of economic science in hiding the sphere of production. (Arendt quoted in our Eq.&SocRlty, sec. 4; for Myrdal see ch. 1 of Pol El in Dev of Ec Th, esp. p16-7.) Myrdal resuscitates Webers wertfrei formulation in W. als B. (p12) to distinguish the options that social science can give from the political choices that it must not pre-empt. But this is an evidently impossible task and a normative threshold that Myrdal has already unwittingly crossed with his Weberian incantation! Thus, he hopelessly confuses the utilitarianism of the Scottish enlightenment (it is really just an elaboration of Benthams hedonistic pleasure-pain calculus [p15]) with the utility of the neoclassics (which is worlds away from the former!) and presents the latter as a less objectionable form of psychological hedonism (p16), which it most certainly is not! Nor is it a tautology based on circular

definitions (p16) far from it! Nor are circular definitions purely formal, ie intrinsically meaningless (p18)[what does that mean?]: they are purpose-less, which is a totally different thing as we have seen in the analysis of language games. Myrdal is right to note that the meaning (purpose, in fact) is surreptitiously introduced in the tacit assumptions: but how does wert-frei social science speak its own assumptions? Again, Myrdal mistakes marginal utility with Social Value which has truly nothing to do with subjectivism (for instance) as enunciated by Hayek or with the theory of interest and capital formulated by Bohm-Bawerk. The misunderstanding is epitomized by Myrdals quotation of Jevons (p17): the mode of employment of their labour which will maximize the utility of their produce clearly does not refer to Mill-Bentham utility (working toward a common goal, from the standpoint of society) but to subjective utility, which is something completely different that eludes Myrdal totally. (See section on Utility as Calculus below re Jevonss opposition to labour value.) And Myrdals characterization of Real Value as derived through Hobbes and Locke from natural law through to Smith and Ricardo is a complete misconception of the realist/rationalist roots of the concept in Newtonian mechanics (Hobbess Power, see above on Smith). Natural law played a part in defining the legal right to property, but not in determining the meaning of value or of wealth which have nothing at all to do with the natural right to property, a perspective that Mandeville and Smith had already superseded. Indeed, Myrdal proceeds immediately to contradict himself when he describes how economic science is born with Adam Smith which raises the question of how the scientific notion of value in Classical Political Economy could owe its status to jurisprudential notions derived from jusnaturalism without the critical metaphysical influence of Newtonian science. For Smith and Ricardo value is value regardless of what claims economic agents might have to its distribution: it is the substance of production, it is wealth, it is a socially objective quantum (most vehemently so in Marx) and Myrdal has failed to see this even when he discounts with thinly-veiled disdain the notion that by recourse to logical operations it is possible to construct on the basis of empirical observations the concept of a kind of value which is somehow profounder than mere exchange value or price (p15). Smiths vacillation between empiricist supply and demand and essentialist value (but note Schumps Gravitationszentrum for equilibrium) was far removed from jusnaturalism, which played a more central role in the conception of civil society in Locke and Ferguson. Myrdals own empiricist Machian credentials are presented thus as is his shallow unawareness of their far more profound origin than in simple psychological hedonism. The same challenge, of course, can be mounted against the institutionalist school of North America that Myrdal also mentions: - that no amount of institutionalism or empirical observation can explain the social objectivity of value! Again, Myrdal is all at sea about the origins of these economic concepts. The problem at heart is that Myrdal can see economics only as the analysis of the distribution of income and wealth (p15) from a value-free perspective borrowed from Weber, because that is quite clearly what he conceives to be the domain of economic science.

A similar Heideggerian echo to Weber and Arendt and Myrdal is in Cacciari where technology and bureaucratization play the central role. How on earth the antagonism of the wage relation then becomes a surrogate for the Kapital-Geist is a mystery

indeed! It is not in Marx and not even in Hegel. But the perspective, or rather the interpretative trajectory (the Entwicklung), is the negatives Denken where the will is in turn the objectification of the Ding an sich, the destiny (Schicksal) within which the will is not a Subject or an id-entity, but a design/project (Zeichen) as well as the Verstand whose Vorstellungen are the objectification of the Will. Simmel catches this Doppelcharakter: wirZuschauer u. Akteure, Geschaffene u. Schaffende sind, p31, foreshadowing Nietzsches expression die geschaffene Menschen (in HATH1 rePoets). There are pantheisticand monistic and mystic tones (Simmel, p28, p38, p62-3) as well as Freudian ones (the fragmentation of the Subject/Self [p54], sublimation) and Darwinian/vitalist (adaptation of the will in its con-ditioned aspect, p57) that lead to insoluble antinomies (undifferentiated unity of will against its multiple manifestations, self-lessness of will against awareness both of its being and its mechanical aspect as Verstand, the volitional unity of will and polarity of the strife [Kampf] for Life pp58 ff; hence, the purpose-lessness of the Will [Zwecklos p68] which, on the other hand, supports the Wertlosigkeit of the world and the preponderance of Leid over Lust because the attainment of pleasure/wish nullifies its object and defeats the purpose). And Hannah Arendt echoes the analysis in the first part of HC with the notion of bureaucratization as a restriction of the sphere of action, of spontaneity, into behaviour on the part of the masses or mob engaged in work which comes uncomfortably close to the con-dition aspect of labor. In a way, work is the interface of the triad, the osmotic membrane between labor (immanent instrumentality) and action (transcendental consciousness). (Similar late-Romantic nuances are easily found in the Frankfurt School and the post-modernists from Lukacs to Foucault.) What is missing is the specific historical sequence that leads like a golden thread from the wage relation through social capital to the State-Plan. (Arendt does much better in Vol.2 of The Origins in this regard because she is guided by the Hobbesian logic of capitalism that we have examined in Civil Society.) Sombarts Socialism Between Equilibrium and Law of Value As Cacciari shows, the Nietzschean supersession of Schopenhauer as Educator will lead far away from these toward Weber, toward Schumpeter and Heidegger. But Cacciari ably distinguishes between the initial phase of transformation of economic theory, from Gossen through Jevons and Bohm-Bawerk, when the inversion of value theory into the positive theory of capital takes place, when the will to power of the new theory is in full vehemence against the demands of the emerging working class, from the later equilibrium theory that constitutes both a socialist dream of a balanced economy (Walras) or of a consumerist heaven (Hayek/Mises/Robbins) that accomplishes the goals of Political Economy. Here the socialist utopia of the Law of Value meets the neoclassical liberal Nirvana of equilibrium in the foundation of anti-monopolistic free competition. (Cacciari, PNeR, pp29ff. But see W.Sombarts Socialism, at p24, and perceptive emphasis on Utopia [unreachable] as the rationalisation or equality of Labour and the concentration of industry which Sombart also espouses at p83 as enabling equilibrium between supply and demand, and War [necessity of class struggle], whilst refuting both pauperization and the Zusammenbruchstheorie at pp87-8. These form the premises for

Sombarts review of Social Democracy the supersession of scientific socialism and its bureaucratization, c.p92. The chapter on Anarcho-Syndicalism is instructive for the Romantic opposition to concentration and bureaucratization which, as Sombart ably notes (c.p117), makes their views completely outdated and unrealistic in the face of the tremendous re-structuring of German capitalist industry, although he wrongly lists population increase and technical change as the reasons behind this anachronism. The role of the Gelernte is right there and the anti-parliamentarian chiliasm of a Sorel rightly derided. Here Sombart replicates Webers position of capitalism is here to stay at p123, particularly the lack of technical and scientific and managerial leadership that would be needed for trade unions to replace capitalist management. Sombart rightly contrasts the rise of capitalist entrepreneurs out of feudalism with the role of trade unionists in complex capitalist concerns, p126: production would have to be carried out on new lines, p128. [See also Cacciari on the Organisationsfrage.] The whole analysis then has to hinge precisely on the Organisationsfrage that is, on how to lead these developments and not be left out! Sombart establishes the non-proletarian composition of many revolutions and the travailliste philosophy behind the few proletarian uprisings (p137). At p145, Sombart argues that capitalism thrives where it embodies the needs of societies in material and political terms. The tendency for capitalist development to unify (also, internationalization, p180) what national cultures divide in socialism is noted at p177. Need for internationalism to replace national struggles, p210.

The Proto-Neoclassics
The reduction of human experience to human nature and the mechanistic interpretation of the Verstand/Vernunft go together with the reduction of science to sufficiency and therefore to the e-limination of adventitious or unnecessary aspects of ethical reflection in favour of observable behaviour (quod homines facere solent nec debeant) whence the focus on regularity of behaviour beyond the motivations, historical and moral, that Schop. equates with rationalizations behind the primal force of Egoism derived from the Will. Here is the mechanicism and utilitarianism of Hobbes applied to human society, but now no longer in terms of Power which is a throwback to labour and the division of social labour, but rather to the subjective perception of Lust und Leid which springs from the primordial (ursprungliche, Simmel) force or Energie (Simmel) of the Will. That is why Schump will admire the elegance of Bohm-Bawerk, itself a remnant of Karl Kniess statistical method. (Wolowski, intro. to Roscher, deplores JB Says neglect of history and praises A.Smiths tribute to Moral Sciences [c.p28]. The Intro seeks to counter the rationalism of scientific approaches to Political Economy. This is an illustration of the emanationism that Weber rejected in the GHS. Brief biography of Roscher who taught at an agricultural college, p30. R. wrote on Socialism and Communism. Mention of Knies [p31] forced to exile at Schaffhausen 1848 again; and Hildebrand [critic of Proudhon] and Rau. There follows argument contra Rossis mathematical approach in favour of unrestrained laissez faire and production against the interests of the polity. Defence of Smith, p42, against the charge of egotism, to which he joins communism, and in favour of sympathy contra Mandeville [this reminds us of Schop.s ethics] and particularly for

free labour [p43] with reference to Kniess defence of Smith, and social housekeeping [Volkswirtschaft, p45]. Pp47ff show how Wolowski equates progress with production which, in turn, is the free labour of Quesnay and Smith that leads to wealth. This is the equation that the protoneoclassics will begin to loosen in favour of a direct link between production and consumption that avoids labour value altogether [see above our comments on Weber].) Gossens theorems or laws, initially aimed at measuring the exchange between labour power (Kraft) and utility, soon dropped the link with effort or Kraft to focus on the utility derived from goods for consumption. Kraft becomes pain (Schmerz/Leid) and every exchange is therefore a calculus of pleasure and pain. Thus, Gossen moved from the Fundamental Theorem to the Two Laws, which place the emphasis on consumers, that is, the sphere of exchange, away from production (see Hagenberg below). Ekelund (Pre-History of Neocl Microecon) highlights the role of engineers and agrarians as well as statisticians in the evolution (Jaffes preferred word to Marginal Revolution, see Fontaine on Jaffe, fn2) of neoclassical microeconomics. So the analysis shifts from the value embodied in commodities in the process of production, to the subjective utility of goods in exchange which obviously refers to the individual. Engineers close to the political standpoint of the bourgeoisie would be keen to develop a theory that would present economic analysis from the point of view of the consumer and justify the universal social role of industry against the sectoral interests of workers, especially the Gelernt clashing with capitalist restructuration in mass production (the second industrial revolution). The Utilitarians still used utility as the foundation of a broad calculus of pleasure and pain that related to life experience in general. More important, consistently with labour value, they do not consider labour as dis-utility. This latter view is distinctly Gossenian and of clear Schopenhauerian derivation. So long as labour is seen as the creator of value as an objective measure, it is impossible to carry out the Copernican revolution claimed by Gossen. And this is an effect that Schop. may well have had on Roscher down to Knies in German university circles, perhaps in reaction to the Prussian bureaucracy after the failed 1848 uprising, given the intellectual proximity of exchange values or goods satisfying individual wants [Roscher] against the political demands of the Volks- oder Nationaloekonomie with particular regard to the labour market and the egotistic-communist Gelernt. See important section on piece-wages, p139 ff, where workers apparent control of their pro-duce yields higher productivity but Roscher does not notice that putting-out lowers wages. Here is a clear example of the opposition between Gelernt and Ungelernt: skilled workers wish to control output to maintain wages and standards; the unskilled fall prey to individualism that reduces their control over production and wages in exchange for apparent freedom. Wonowski will make a similar moral point. Austro-German Sozialdemokratie will struggle to deal with this dilemma championing the Gelernts artisanal leadership role (Vanguard) but unable to represent the interests of the new class composition - and therefore postponing the confrontation with capital until its final collapse (Zusammensbruck) whilst in the meantime managing reformistically the transition to socialism intended as economic planning. Roscher stresses the role of exchange in furthering the division of labour. Like Knies with Marx (see Papadopoulos, K.Knies), he upbraids Ricardo for neglecting use value which hinges on the utility of goods in satisfying wants. He also senses the danger in the Smithian antithesis between the Theory and the Wealth and opts for the historicist reliance on social

institutions (family, church, state) as the convergent forces in society (in which presumably the economy plays a balancing role, being confined to the sphere of satisfying individual wants). With the proto-neoclassicals the emphasis shifts to the individual and to goods for exchange. Already, Roscher raises the problem of legal rights to use values and the relativity of wealth when labour is not freely available [everyone would have to be their own tailor or baker thus annulling the division of labour]. He defines wealth as goods in excess of ones personal needs hence, wealth becomes renunciation. For nations, wealth becomes resources. Weber wrote an important methodological piece on Roscher and Knies. Note that Roscher never understands wealth as accumulation as Weber already did (but retrospectively with regard to the work ethic) and seems to think that an excess of wealth beyond personal needs or wants is simply a resource similar to a nations. Wealth has a leveling effect and leads to independence, perhaps a reduction in the division of labour through rising living standards (reference to Smith). Roschers factors of production include external natural elements capable of exchange (where ownership is essential) and Arbeitskraft. The latter retains a moral character in Roscher: production can be its own goal (p130). He is ready to dismiss the ideological method for privileging reductive personal interests and seeking to describe them in algebraic form, and to dismiss Jevonss theories as curious (p103, fn4). Dupuit, in particular, says that the only utility worth considering is that for which people are prepared to pay (Ekelund)! So rarete or scarcity needs to be taken into account as well given that people would not pay for goods that are freely available which is what differentiates use values from exchange values since Smith. But at that stage we already have the circularity of equilibrium analysis whereby legal ownership rights have to be a component of the analysis against Mengers and Jevonss purely subjective stance -, whereupon we end up with Blaugs total equilibrium (in Caldwell, Mengers Legacy). Contra Myrdal, it must be said that the analysis is meaningful but purpose-less because at equilibrium we have non-action and before equilibrium we have indeterminacy given that we cannot exchange anything if prices can be fixed only at equilibrium! Equilibrium analysis is therefore meaningful as a language game, but abulic like one as well! The most interesting and essential point of this line of reasoning, however, is that by necessarily regressing the problematic of use values and exchange values back to endowments and scarcity, which are blatantly legal categories, the whole question of the effectiveness of the market and price mechanism shifts onto the political sphere, although not solely on the sphere of production. (See discussion above in Smith Weber Schop.) And this opens the way to the various branches of new institutional economics (quem vides).

From Hagendorf, Critique of Gossens Fund. Theorem:

5 The general neglect of Gossens 'Entwickelung' in Germany is part of a well cultivated saga promulgated by the counter-revolutionaries of the 1870ies and later. However, Pantaleoni has accused Carl Menger of plagiarism of Gossen. Jevonss claim not to have had any knowledge of Gossen's book is doubtful as the Library of the British Museum holds a copy since 1865 (Hayek, 1927, XII). In my research I found striking similarities in John Bates Clark's writings with those in Gossen. And this offers me the opportunity to add a further hypothesis to the explanation of the mystery surrounding Gossen's work. Robert Anderson, who apparently established the link between Gossen and Jevons, as

well as John Bates Clark had studied at Heidelberg University in the 1870ies. This university is wellknown for its hospitality and was certainly one of those places where students could practice Gossen's Theory of Pleasure. This not only because this university holds a copy of the first edition of Gossen but also the style of his theorems invited them to be published as decorations in the famous wine bars of the town. When Clark honours Karl Knies for having led him to seek to discover a unit of measurement of Wealth in 'Festgaben zu Karl Knies' (Clark, 1896, p. 3) this is only of secondary importance. Incidentally another one of the 'Festgaben zu Karl Knies' is Boehm-Bawerk's The Close of the Marxian System. Clark defines his unit of wealth as: this commodity will promote me by one degree in the scale of happiness. It is worth one unit of my collective labor.(ibid.) and more explicitly he demands taking marginal labor as the test of cost(ibid. p. 6) . The first author who has quoted the Fundamental Theorem in the context of the discussion on the labour theory of value was Tugan-Baranovsky in his (Tugan-Baranowsky, 1905, p. 158): This relationship between the labour effort for the production of a good and its value was very clear to the founder of the marginal utility school, Hermann Gossen: 'In order to maximize his life pleasure, man must distribute his time and energy among the preparation of various pleasures in such a way that the value of the last atom yielding each pleasure shall be equal to the magnitude of discomfort experienced by him if this atom had been created in the very last moment of the employment of force.' (Gossen, 1983, p. 53, translated by the editor)10 . In Gossen this theorem is introduced with the following phrase: If we take into account that the means of enjoyment must be produced by labour, the fundamental theorem of the theory of pleasure is that ...(ibid, translated and emphasized by the editor).11 This shows clearly that we have here the core of the Theory of Pleasure. It is then very curious that the followers, in particular Hayek in his introduction to the 3 rd edition (Hayek, 1927), but also Recktenwald and Krelle (1987; 1988), don't mention this theorem at all and refer only to the so called 2 Laws of Gossen, terms created by the Austrian economist von Wieser 12. One must add that the so called Second Law of Gossen (Gossen, 1854, p. 93, 94, see below) is not even emphasized in Gossen13. The reason for the banning of the Fundamental Theorem is clear: The bourgeois economists have done everything to keep the concept of marginal labour secret as it is the pendant to the concept of marginal cost and therefore it is the key to the correct understanding of the labour theory of value.14 Bourgeois economists since Jevons always speak of marginal productivity of labour instead as labour value is considered a dangerous concept. This point has also escaped Georgescu-Roegen when he wonders about the banning of the Fundamental Theorem 10 The translation differs from (Gossen, 1983) to emphasize the labour theoretical meaning. 11 The original German text: Mit Rcksicht auf die Nothwendigkeit der Beschaffung der verschiedenen Gensse durch Arbeit lautet daher der oben gefundene Hauptgrundsatz der Genulehre: Um ein Grtes von Lebensgenu zu erhalten, hat der Mensch seine Zeit und Krfte auf die Bereitung der verschiedenen Gensse der Art zu vertheilen, da der Werth des letzten bei jedem Genu geschaffenen Atoms der Gre der Beschwerde gleich kommt, die es ihm verursachen wrde, wenn er dieses Atom in dem letzten Moment der Kraftentwicklun schaffte. (Gossen, 1854, p. 45) 12 It is particularly humiliating for Gossen how the bourgeois economists, beginning with Wieser (1893, p. 8), over Hayek (1927) and Krelle (1988) express their admiration towards Gossen and at the same time suppress Gossen's labour theory of value and his basic goal: To Each According to His Work (Pain).

13 Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen's remark in his very stimulating but controversial introduction to the English translation of Gossen's work on the non-italicizing of the Fundamental Theorem (Gossen, 1983, p. xcvii) is not correct. Apparently he was confusing it with the non-italicizing of Gossen's Second Law. 14 An exception from this rule is John Bates Clark (for example (Clark, 1896) but his reasoning is not formulated in mathematical terms and somewhat contradictory .(Georgescu-Roegen, 1983, p. xcvii). In order to easily equalize marginal utility and marginal pain, Gossen redefines pain as negative utility and so the marginal pain functions become upward sloping as we have defined them above, (p15). [Its funny how Hagenberg and Tugan-Baranovski totally and blithely fail to see the lethal

importance of the transformation of labour into Kraft and then into pain (Leid)! Worthy of true Stakhanovites!] From Maneschi:
GeorgescuRoegen hailed Gossen as the first individual who broke with the concept of value in terms of embodied labor espoused by the classical economists, including Karl Marx. The revolutionary alternative that Gossen presented had been adumbrated by Turgot and by writers of the Italian Enlightenment such as Galiani. It postulated that value is measured by the amount of pleasure an object or service provides. As GeorgescuRoegen stated, Gossen was the insurgent who achieved the fundamental rupture with the physicalist conception of economic value held by the reigning classical school. [He] completed the mutation to the 10 psychological basis of economic value not because he elucidated the new concept (which he well did), but because he built the first extensive analytical system on it (1983, p. lxvi). Besides Galiani and Turgot, other anticipators of the marginal utility principle include William Lloyd and Jules Dupuit, whom George Stigler ([1950] 1965) once described as the unsuccessful discoverers of the principle of diminishing marginal utility. In the preface to the Entwickelung, as GeorgescuRoegen referred to The Laws of Human Relations, Gossen claimed: I believe I have accomplished for the explanation of the relations among humans what a Copernicus was able to accomplish for the explanation of the relations of heavenly bodies. Moreover, my discoveries enable me to point out to man with unfailing certainty the path that he must follow in order to accomplish the purpose of his life (1983, p. cxlvii). As regards his self-comparison to Copernicus, GeorgescuRoegen drily remarked that because of that self-glorification, we have often smiled at Gossen and even ridiculed him, but, given the exceptional value of his contribution, the persiflage should turn against the ridiculers (1983, p. lxv). Gossens mission was to indicate the paths 11 that humans ought to follow to improve their lives. If they only took his advice, then there is nothing further wanting in the world to make it a perfect paradise (Gossen, 1983, p. 298; bold in the original). GeorgescuRoegen aptly noted that the Entwickelung is dominated by an unlimited optimism, highly surprising in view of how tormented Gossens life was. Moreover, his optimism about the future of humanity is matched only by the present dogma of the cornucopian economists: Nature has an unlimited power to generate wealth: hence the human species will never cease to progress through art and science (1983, p. lxiv). Part I of the Entwickelung contains the outline of consumer theory for which Gossen has now become justly famous. GeorgescuRoegen points out that in the history of economic

thought Gossen stands alone in many respects, but, strangely, one view that sets him apart has been overlooked completely .... While all [economists] have identified scarcity with some material shortage of some sort or another, Gossen alone saw that what is ultimately scarce is time alone. It was on that scarcity as a foundation that he erected the first pillar of his system: Enjoyment must be so arranged that the total pleasure during ones entire life should be a maximum (pp. lxvlxvi). In his book Gossen enunciated many other theorems and showed mathematical acumen (p. lxx) by providing algebraic derivations of his consumer theory and illustrating his analytical findings with twenty-four diagrams. He argued that time is needed not only to produce commodities but to enjoy their consumption. In producing them, discomfort is incurred that Gossen set against the enjoyment derived 12 from the commodities themselves. Gossens consideration of time allowed to him to formulate, and illustrate graphically, what is sometimes denoted as the law of the recurrence of wants. This was labeled the second law by GeorgescuRoegen, who claims that there can hardly be any doubt that Gossen was the true discoverer of this law (p. lxxxiv). It implies that after an interval of time the desire to repeat a past enjoyment occurs again. The enjoyment of this repetition is lower than before, unless a sufficient time interval has elapsed. GeorgescuRoegens admiration for Gossen derives in part from the fact that Gossens treatment of time in consumer welfare maximization is reminiscent of the importance of the time dimension in GeorgescuRoegens own theories. Foster has argued that Mirowski (1988) was wrong in claiming that GeorgescuRoegens utility theory was essentially neoclassical: in fact, GeorgescuRoegens [concept of utility] subscribes to a Gossenian, not a Jevonian, view of utility maximisation. The latter neglects time, the former incorporates time and can deal, explicitly, with time irreversibility and evolutionary change (Foster, 1993, p. 984).7 The term Gossens second law has been used in the literature to denote the theorem for which he has received the greatest praise, namely that money should be allocated between the various pleasures ... in such a manner that the last atom of money spent for each pleasure offers the same amount of pleasure (Gossen, 1983, pp. 108109; theorem [7.11]; emphasis in the original). GeorgescuRoegen chooses instead to refer to the optimum allocation of money as Gossens first fundamental theorem(1983, pp. xcxciv), while the second 13 fundamental theorem (pp. xcvcv) outlines the optimum allocation of time. He wonders why both [Gossens] theorem about the optimal allocation of time and his ingenious diagram [Figure 2.4] have been ignored, although that theorem represents a far more profound finding than his other theorem [theorem 7.11], about the optimal budget (p. cv). In one of the imaginative diagrams (Figure 3, p. xcvii) with which he complemented Gossens own diagrams, each day is divided into three parts, the time of production of commodities, that taken to enjoy their consumption, and that for pure leisure. GeorgescuRoegen remarks that, in his previous work on utility (1968), I ignored the consumption time, a serious error of which I have become aware while preparing the present essay (pp. cxxxviiicxxxix). Gossens dream to become a mathematician was thwarted by his fathers desire to turn him into a bureaucrat in spite of himself. Thanks to his nephew Kortum, we know that Gossen would have not otherwise become interested in economics; it was his hatred of the bureaucratic environment that led him to fight its economic philosophy by formulating in opposition to it a new economic outlook (ibid.).(p15)

Nistico on Gossens Time Element in Consumer Theory:

A.1. The magnitude [intensity] of pleasure decreases continuously if we continue to satisfy one and the same enjoyment without interruption until satiety is ultimately reached. A.2. A similar decrease of the magnitude [intensity] takes place if we repeat a

previously experienced pleasure. Not only does the initial magnitude [intensity] of the pleasure become smaller, but also the duration of the pleasure shortens, so that satiety is reached sooner. Moreover, the sooner the repetition, the smaller the initial magnitude [intensity] and the shorter the duration (Gossen 1983 [1854], p.6).11 Gossens axioms on consumers behaviour, in that they emphasise the negative effects of reiterating the same enjoyment through time, express the idea that the main objective of mankind is not so much to enact defensive actions against needs but rather to enforce pro-active choices intended to fill up life with pleasures. This is attested to first of all by Gossens didactic choice to start his explanation of the laws of pleasure with reference to artistic and intellectual enjoyments: Who does not remember the pleasure he has derived from the discovery, real or fancied, of a new truth! Subsequently, some pleasure is derived from dwelling on the subject for a while; but this diminishes more and more until in the end any further contemplation of the topic results in boredom (Gossen 1983 [1854], p.7, emphasis added). Moreover, when extending his argument to the more typical case of material goods, Gossen does not even mention the physical satiation induced by an increase in consumption. He rather emphasizes the mental satiation induced by repetition through time of the same enjoyment and hence the risk of being overwhelmed with boredom when satisfying a recurrent need: To the man who allays his hunger with one single dish, the first mouthful tastes best; the second does not taste quite as good; the third, even less; and so on until, when he has nearly reached satiety, he is almost indifferent as to whether he takes the last bite. Experience confirms beyond doubt that repeated satiation with the same fare causes a decrease of pleasure and a reduction in the quantity of the enjoyable consumption similar to the contraction of the period of the intellectual pleasure (ibidem, pp. 7-8, emphasis added). If one accepts that the total pleasure accruing to the consumer within a given time span can be measured by the sum of the areas (or parts of them) below the curves falling within that time period,12 then the two diagrams show that the total pleasure enjoyed with a delayed repetition of consumption can be greater than that enjoyed with a frequent repetition. Together with his second law, Gossens connected principle of optimal frequency of consumption has also gone into oblivion. According to Gossens principle: With each specific pleasure, there is one definite manner of enjoying it, determined chiefly by the frequency of the repetition of that enjoyment, that will lead to a maximum of pleasure. Once this maximum is attained, the total pleasure decreases with either more or less frequent repetition (Gossen 1983 [1854], p.13).13

On Karl Knies: (Papadopoulos)

But if the facts of his life are straightforward, his ideas are rich and complex. On the one hand, Knies was one of the founders of the Older German Historical School. He was immensely influential upon Max Weber, and also educated some of the leading nineteenth century figures in both Austrian and American economics: Friedrich von Wieser, Eugen von Bhm-Bawerk, E.R.A. Seligman, RichardT. Ely, and John Bates Clark. He was highly influential on the work of Carl Menger and was also one of the only German economists who treated Marxs work seriously (he was deeply critical of Marxs theory of value for ignoring value in use). (p6-7) In his elaborate explanation of marginalist thought in German economics, Streissler presents three significant citations of Die nationaloekonomische Lehre vom Werth, where Knies uses the concepts of subjective utility and diminishing marginal utility. He demonstrates how subjective utility plays a central role for Knies analysis by citing Knies precondition for exchange that exchange takes place not because two quantities of two kinds of goods are equal, but because they are on both sides in opposite ways esteemed unequal

(Streissler, pp. 43-44/Knies, p.467). Secondly, he locates Kniess use of diminishing marginal utility in the notion that Knies shared with Hildebrand about the process of production, namely that the further increase of a quantity of a good will result in the decrease of the individuals marginal utility for the additional units produced (Streissler, p.44). Finally, Streissler mentions Kniess work with regard to how German economists combined supply and demand when discussing utility and prices, as in the case where Knies argued that value and price moved in the same direction, value being identified by all Germans since Rau with utility (Streissler, p.49). (pp8-9 In the quest to find Karl Kniess contribution to the emergence of marginal utility theory, one can find a reliable source in the writings of Carl Menger himself, the founder of the Austrian branch of neoclassical economics. In Appendix C of his first and most famous publication, Principles of Economics13, Menger makes direct reference to Kniess aforementioned richly suggestive essay on value, criticizing, nonetheless, several parts of his theory, which he evaluates as leading to doubtful conclusions. First, he alludes to Kniess definition of value as the degree of suitability of a good for serving human ends , to which he objects because he says that it confuses the nature of value with the measurement of value: the measurement of value belongs as little to the nature of value as the measure of space or time to the nature of space or time (Menger 1950, p.293). Thus, Menger understands Knies to attribute inherent value to goods, which obviously cannot correspond to the psychology of the newly born (Austrian) neoclassical methodology14. (pp14-5) The founder of the Austrian School does, however, give credit to Knies for mak[ing] a penetrating attempt to solve the problem [of the measurement of value] (ibid, p.299). He praises Kniess efforts to formulate a principle for the estimation of value based on the fundamental concepts of value itself, but he considers some of the assumptions arising from this analysis mistaken, since they derive from Kniess confused original definition of value. Menger specifically states his disagreement with Kniess concept of a classification and scale of human needs to which corresponds a classification and scale of species of goods, since Kniess concept cannot account for public goods such as water or air, which satisfy some of the most essential needs of mankind, but yet have no actual price-value in the market (ibid, p.299-300). Menger, however, acknowledges the fact that Knies later differentiates between abstract value and concrete value, but he still does not seem satisfied with Kniess treatment of the measurement of value because of the latters [failure] in formulating a principle for determining the magnitude of use value in its concrete form, although he comes close to it at one point (ibid, p.300 italics in original, referring to Knies at p. 441). Thus, we see that Menger notices several unresolved ambiguities in Kniess essay, especially regarding the definition of the measurement of value, which he perceives as unclear. His major problem with Kniess theory, hence, deals with the fact that it lacks a precise way of calculating utility; a task, which the Austrian author himself undertakes in the main part of his work (ibid, p.127).) (pp15-6) It appears that Knies put a lot of emphasis on subjective utility for the purpose of his analysis, as he focused on the individual consumer to draw more general inferences about economic behavior. Early in his analysis, in order to closely examine the several features of use-value, he marks a transition [] from human needs in general to the needs of a certain individual (ibid, p.429). This view of value from the perspective of the individual with regard to the satisfaction of his own human needs allowed Knies to reach great insights regarding utility theory that were later to become part of the foundations of neoclassical economics. At several instances in the essay, Knies denies use-value as an inherent quality of goods, since only the property of usefulness for human ends is inherent to objects (ibid, p.453)17. Hence, contrary to Mengers criticism, the German economist viewed use-value as a result of peoples individual preferences for the satisfaction of human desires. This notion of use-value as a subjective conception reaches to the crux of neoclassical economics and Mengers theory, and even relates to the most fundamental concept of subjective scarcity. The term subjective scarcity describes the condition according to which the value of goods depends neither on their costliness to produce, nor on their mere rarity, but on their availability relative to peoples desire for them that is, relative to the demand in the market. Knies made extensive use of the concept in his attempt to describe the determination of concrete use-value and concrete exchange-value in the national economy. He explicitly states that the concrete use-value of goods [] is not based [] on the quantity in circulation, but rather on the relation of this quantity to the quantum of the need that it must satisfy (ibid, p.455). Furthermore, as Streissler (1990) has demonstrated, Knies understands that the value that goods gain in

exchange depends on the variability of utility estimations that the exchanging parties make (Knies, p.467); thus, exchange will take place only if the good that A tries to sell has a greater use-value for B than the good that the latter is selling to A. In addition, Knies also mentions water as an ownerless good once it exists in great abundance (ibid, p.472) which answers Menger's questioning of Knies's definition of value. Hence, one can say that Knies had made a decisive step towards the clarification of the meaning of value and perhaps unwittingly - towards the establishment of neoclassical economics, when he perceived of use-value and exchange-value of goods as dependent on the relationship between the available amount of those goods to the "quantum of the needs" which they satisfy. (pp20-1)

From Gordon, Ph Or of Aust Sch

The Historical School's view of economics differed not only from the Austrian school but from classical economics as well. The members of the group rejected laws of economics, even such basic principles as the law of supply and demand. They regarded economics as a historical and practical discipline. Somewhat in the manner of Aristotle, who characterized economics as the study of household management, they thought of economics as the science of state management. Here they continued the tradition of the German mercantilists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the so-called Cameralists. They were less interested in economic theory than in the advancement of the power of the state, particularly the Prussian state, or, after 1871, the German Empire of which Prussia was the principal constituent. P1 Hegel saw the state as the director of the economy. "Civil society," though not a part of the state, fell under its authority. To allow unrestricted scope to the supposed laws of classical economics was to subordinate a higher entity, the state, to a lower, the economy. Instead, the economy should be manipulated to enhance the state's power. It is no accident, I suggest, that the Historical School favored precisely the same views. Mises in Omnipotent Government has described in detail the way in which German economists before World War I advocated the use of the economy as a means to advance the power of the state. Trade should not be free but controlled by the state for its own purposes. [6] The Austrian School stood diametrically opposed to the German Historical School. [7] In view of the vast divergence of the two schools in economics, one might expect substantial differences in philosophical background. This is indeed what one does find. The leading philosopher who influenced Carl Menger was Franz Brentano. He resolutely rejected the doctrine of internal relations, along with the remainder of the Hegelian system. (p4) In view of the importance of intentionality, let us risk laboring the point. An intention is a mental going out or grasping an object: it can be diagrammed as an arrow going from mind to object. In speaking of "object," I have been guilty of an ambiguity. An object of an intention can be either a mental object, e.g., the ideas of the empiricists, or a physical object. Does the intentional act extend "out of" the mind to make direct contact with the actual world? This is a difficult issue to answer, as Brentano's system is rather murky on the point. [8] Menger applied the concept of intentionality to economic value. He did not take value to be a feeling of pleasure or pain that comes into one's mind automatically when one perceives an object. Quite the contrary, a preference in Menger's system is a judgment: I like X (or I dislike X). The judgment in question is an act of preference: as the intentionality of thought grasps an object, so does a judgment of preference "move" toward an end. In slightly different terms, to prefer something is to evaluate it: to rank it on one's scale of values. By contrast, William Stanley Jevons had an entirely different notion of value. He equated value with utility or pleasure, measurable in units. He thought that an object created a certain number of units of pleasure in a person's mind when he came into the appropriate form of contact with it. The person as such really has little to do in regard to evaluation. Whatever created more units of pleasure, a strictly objective matter, was ipso facto the more valuable. (p5)

From Keynes Essays in Biography on WS Jevons Keynes traces the biography of an engineer who avidly sought regularities or econometric patterns as causal links in everything from trade cycles and sun spots to Malthusian coal-production indices of production to the effect of gold production on prices. Most of his economic ideas were conceived in long periods of solitude in Australia. Recall Keyness slingshot at Jevonss passion for steam engines jumping in joy like a child, whereas Marshall sat down and wrote a plan. (Keynes later reminds us, p343 on Mary Marshall) that the Marshalls spent time is Sudtirol with the VonWiesers and Bohm-Bawerk, with whom Marshall had corresponded on the theory of interest.) Again, this reminds us of the engineering circles that first promoted marginal utility and the personal ties that went into its spread. He had already written in his diary in 1852 about not believing in moral sense separate from animal feelings, and postulating the origin of species from one prototypical organism (p255). He approached economic statistics and fluctuations from the perspective of a meteorologist (p267). Jevons always organized his material in such a fashion to ensure the discovery of regularities and tendencies (p268). Price-indexing was his specialty (p269). He sought to locate the incidence of investment cycles with the turnover of large fixed capital assets (p272). Then came the theory of solar valuations (p274). Jevonss idea was to explain prices by a series of mathematical axioms. He obviously worked backwards from the Law of Supply and Demand (pp280-1). A hedonistic calculus [obviously based on Benthams utilitarian notions] allows us to balance the utility of consumption against the disutility of labour (p282). This would seem to be a special case because it still posits the centrality of labour, but in negative form in terms of dis-utility which then requires non-produced goods to have utility as well! This is where Walras came to the rescue! (See Keyness spiffy summary on pp284-5.) Because labour is not exchanged with particular goods but rather with money wages, it follows that not labour but prices must provide the subjective index of exchange values. Taking prices as given, Jevons could then move to the substance that market agents were exchanging. Its quite obvious that if we seek to compare the utilities derived from the consumption of disparate goods, this will be quantitatively impossible. But if we consider their prices, then we can isolate (illicitly, of course, because this is a petitio principii see Stiglers first article) the market price in terms of money from the exchange that it enables. The price is prima facie evidence of the fact that two goods are equivalent at the time of their exchange. So the utility of the purchased good must be equal to the utility of the quantity of money exchanged for it. But the reason why we do not exchange all of our money for one particular type of good is that we compare or select the goods we need to satisfy all of our utilities. It follows therefore that a point must be reached, theoretically, at which the utility to be derived from each purchased good must be calculated not absolutely but in terms of the effect of the purchase of one more unit on the corresponding change in the utility of one more unit of the other goods until these marginal utilities are equalized: until an increment will be more painful (p282). So here we have Arbeitskraft als Leid, as with Gossen!! But you cannot equalize even marginal utilities unless these are represented by prices. But at that stage marginal utility will become a metaphysical notion relying on the unobservable preferences of market agents observable only in terms of prices which defeats the purpose! Thus Jevonss system still relies on the wage fund notion, a throwback to Ricardo-Mill (Robbins). Something that Walras cured by eliminating money and nominating a numeraire. (Again, Stigler.) From 1861, date of Jevonss first draft, to 1871, the delay in publication severely hurt Jevonss claims to priority (see Hagendorf about possibility he took notes from Gossen!). (P.284)

Keynes then examines the differences that emerged between Marshall and Jevons over their dissimilarities of attitude toward Ricardo-Mill with the latter cited in two loci about his opposition to the labour theory of value (pp290-1) violence pursued to the point of morbidity against Mill. Then Keynes refers briefly to Jevonss work in Logic. Finally, he turns to his most negative views on charity reminiscent of Mandevilles (pp300-1). These are important because they help understand Jevonss individualist frame of mind not much Schopenhauerian Mitleid there! But he redeemed himself with more balanced views in The State in relation to Labour where he is cautious about state intervention in the economy (p303).

(b) The Austrian School and Machism

Purpose-lessness or aimlessness or a-bulia (Kant would call it heteronomy as against autonomy of transcendent system that explains trans-crescence) of equilibrium as Kreislauf or end-state or stagnation or non-action. Meaninglessness of co-ordination or efficient allocation of resources because either achieved teleologically ex ante (ratio abscondita, invisible hand) or tautologously a posteriori (hindsight, petitio principii of intertemporal equilibrium). Hayek-Robbins is empiricist because it sees growth as immanent and reducible to information because it is heteronomous/empiricdata, a given that can be determined or calculated or discovered (homo quaerens) ex ante. The science of choice is a technique that needs to be applied to heteronomous processes (means-ends) that preserve autonomy (choice and transcendence) only in their evolutionary/processual/empirical spontaneity (hence antinomic with transcendence and autonomy as an immanent/empirical order and with equilibrium as the rational/transcendent goal, wherein its spontaneity is eclipsed in the attainment, as Mises warned.). Worse, if the science of choice is a technique applied to allocation of resources, it then needs to define resources and ends which it is not possible to do in purely technical terms because both the inputs (resources including technologies) and the outputs or ends cannot be so defined without first making explicit the choices that apply to the determination of inputs. Robbins mistakenly thought that equilibrium analysis did provide the basis for the science of choice by permitting the value-neutral, hence scientific, pricing of resources which could then be applied (scientifically) to achieving chosen ends (see revealing footnote in ch.2 of Essay). But given that equilibrium analysis itself can only price resources in a politically charged manner (through its assumptions), then the science of choice must forsake its claim to scientificity and return to the status of being itself an arbitrary or political choice of technique against its wishes! Hayek makes this same point against the Socialists! See our Eq&MkPr. In both cases, Hayeks lucid analytical mind could see that ultimately the economic choice involved in pricing of resources can be defined satisfactorily only as transcendent or political choice that cannot be determined by instrumental means such as the market mechanism of equilibrium analysis on which Robbinss science of choice must be founded in order to avoid having to specify the ends to which its supposedly scientific application of means to ends pertains. Mises seeks to establish an autonomous/rational transcrescence by applying a praxeology(or practical logic, a contradictio in adjecto!) that is only logico-mathematical and therefore apodictic-technical or applied to a separate reality and can never be practical because devoid of choice or action in itself (Kant,KPV,I,I,4, p32 fn.1), thereby undermining the transcendent autonomy of homo agens reducing him to the heteronomy of equilibrium

(Kant, ibid,I,7,8, p39ff) or to a decisionism/voluntarism without any economic foundation. Hence Misess need to retain equilibrium as a technical foundation for his logic, which reduces his praxeology to empty technique devoid of practice. Schumpeter instead elegantly and perceptively distinguishes between an immanent transformation mechanism that is technical and an exogenous transcendental entrepreneurial spirit that is evidently autonomous and thereby over-comes or sur-passes or sup-plants Machism, despite his atavistic reliance on equilibrium as a crutch. We can conclude that equilibrium analysis was an antinomic necessity for Mises to found his logic, an antinomic ideal end-state to Hayek-Robbins to found spontaneity, and totally superfluous for Schumpeter who was careful to avoid equilibrium entirely.