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Anny amMnd ard Generdl Staff College i n partial fulfillment of the requir-ts for the
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JAMES J. m E P s u i ,
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Rxt L e a ,
Kansas
1995
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,.
2 Jun 95
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900
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. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
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During the World War I1 campaign to seize the island of Okinawa, Operation Iceberg, U.S. Tenth Army employed a significant U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps military police structure. However, the challenges posed to these units by military traffic, nearly 300,000 enemy civilians, and over 10,000 prisoners of war are issues largely neglected by historians. This study analyzes the overall effectiveness and value of the largest joint military police operation in the Pacific theater. It evaluates military police force structure and operations by assessing pre-campaign planning and results of operations with extant historical doctrine, operational setting, and historical information. Historical military police doctrine is discussed to identify standards which existed in 1945. Intelligence or other information about the operational environment is examined for relevance to doctrine. Finally, historical accounts or information about military police operations are contrasted with doctrine and operational setting. Historical information is assessed within five mission areas; traffic control operations, prisoner of war operations, civilian handling operations, security operations, and law and order operations. within these mission areas information is further organized by unit. time, and relation to the tactical situation. Detailed assessment and evaluation reveal Tenth Army military police overall effectiveness and value in Operation Iceberg.
15. NUMBER OF PAGES
. SUBIECT TERMS
World War 11, Joint Operations, Military Police Operations Amphibious Operations, Traffic Control, Prisoners of War, Civilian Handling, Security, Law and Order, Pacific Theater
I
124
16. PRICE CODE
20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRAC1
Unclassified 1 754001-280-5500
Unclassified
Unclassified
, Member
,
LTC Robert G. Mang&, Ph.D.
,
Philip J. '~rookes, Ph.D.
The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U. S. Army Camnand and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
MIIXrAw KILICE O
mjor J s
m i n g the World War I1 capaiw to seize the island of Okinawa, Operaticn Icekeg, U.S. ~ e n t h Army ' arplayed a significant U.S. Army and U.S. m i n e Ccaps military police structure. However, the &allposed to these units by military traffic, nearly 300,000 eraeny civilians, and over 10,000 prisoners of war are issues laqely neglected by historians. This s t * andlyzes the overall effectiveness and value of the largest h e Pacific theater. It evaluates joint military police operation in t military police force structure and operations by assessing pre-capaign planning and results of operations with e x t a n t historical doctrine, operatid setting, and historical infomation. Historical military police .&=trim is discussed to identify standards which existed in 1945. Intelligence or other informtion about the operatid euvirctment is Bgmined for relevance to doctrine. Fi~lly, n f t i o n about military police operations are historical acaxmts or i cantrasted with doctrine and o p e r a t i 1 setting. Historical i n f t i o n is assessed within five mission areas; traffic c a l t r d operations, priscner of w a r operations, civilian handling operations, security operations, and law and order operations. Within these mission areas information is further organized by unit, time, and s s e s and evaluaticn relation to the tactical situation. Detailed a reveal Tenth Army military police overall effectiveness and Value in @ention Iceberg.
To my wife, Sharyn, I cuuld r i o t have succeeded without enaauaganent, patience, support, and sacrifice. This thesis is yours
also.
'I\3
my son, J ,
Finally, to those b i b l i ,
accarplishnents in "Cperaticm Icebergn and your enthusiastic support for this thesis. This is your story; Setper Fi!
iii
TABLE OF C
APPROVAL
i ii iii vi
................. ............... ................. ............... ................. .................. Review of Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Significance of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY General Logic Evaluation Framework Assessment of Planning Assessment of Operations Doctrine Structural Evaluation Structural Planning Assessment Structural Operations-based Assessment Operational Evaluation Criteria Operational Planning Assessment Operational Results Assessment Summary Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. . . eli imitation .
. . . .
6 6 7 9
9
10 13 14
TWO.
.............. ........... .......... ......... ................. .......... .... ..... .... .... .................
THREE. MILITARY POLICE FORCE STRUCTURE EWLUATION General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Structural Planning Assessment . . . . . .
.... ....
28 28
Doctrinal Support Relationships U.S. Axmy Ground Combat Forces U.S. Marine Corps Ground Combat Forces Landing Operations . . . . . . . . . . Garrison Forces/Island Command Tactical Air Forces Functional Doctrine and Setting . . . . Traffic Control Operations Prisoner of War Operations Civilian Handling Operations Security Operations Law and Order Operations Operations-based Assessment of Structure . Traffic Control Operations Prisoner of War Operations . . . . . . Civilian Handling Operations . . . . . Security Operations Law and Order Operations . . . . . . . Summary Endnotes
FOUR.
........ ........
........ .............. .... .......... .......... ......... .............. ........... .... .......... .... .... .............. .... ..................... ..................... .....................
.... ....
28 29 31 33 33 35 36 37 39 41 44 45 47 47 50 51 53 55 56 57
.
"
MILITARY POLICE OPERATIONS E7JALUATION General Operational Planning Assessment . . . . . . . . . Traffic Control Operations Planning . . . . . . Prisoner of War Operations Planning . . . . . . Civilian Handling Operations Planning Security Operations Planning Law and Order Operations Planning Operational Results Assessment Traffic Control Operations . . . . . . . . . . Prisoner of War Operations Civilian Handling Operations . . . . . . . . . Security Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Law and Order Operations . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
61 61 61 63 65 66 67 68 68 76 80 87 89 92 93
FIVE.
. . . .
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure
1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . .
3
5
16
2.
. 4.
3
.................
. . . . . . . .
40
B a -
The last major World War I1 operation in the Pacific theater, the Ryukyus Oonpaign, focused on the island of Okinawa at the southern end of
the qrukyu chain between Fonmsa and Japan. The invasion of Okinawa,
Operation Iceberg, was one of the largest mphibious assaults of the w a r bringing the gnnmd forces of A&iral Chester A . N M t z and General Douglas Maarthur tcgether for the first time. U.S. ambat and logistical forces mmkered 172,000 and 115,000 respectively, slightly less than at Luzon. This force faced 100,000 Japanese defenders and a dense civilian population of 500.000.' The joint and d i n e d expeditionary force under the operational direction of the aarmander-in-Chief,Pacific Ocean Areas, was assigned the mission to capture, o c q , defend, and develop Okinawa island and establish ccoltrol of sea and air in the Nansei Shoto a r e a . The mission
Tenth Anny canpign concept was to seize the island of Okinawa, rapidly
inprove and develop airfields and port facilities, and exploit this
W i n e and two Psny divisions, and a large army garrison force or island
carmand.'
The qrukyus C a p i g n provides a unique and m t c h e d
vie of
joint and ccmbined integratian of senrices and forces at both the operational and tactical levels? The Carmander, Fifth Fleet was the werall carmander of the opemtim, the amrander, l l v r p l h i b i o u s Forces Pacific was the oarmander of the e t i o n a r y force, and the Carroanding General, Tenth ?my was the cormander of expditicmary troops. The Cmmder-in-Chief,Pacific Ocean Areas issued the initial p l directive an 10 Cctober 1944 to initiate preparatias for Operatian . I
for an operation of this size and scq?e previously on 16 August 1944. structure was ncdified by replac-
i n figure 1 :
The regirerent for base developnent and military govermnent operatias in the Pacific theater had highlighted the inadequate mmker of military police orgamic to the divisions and carps. The P m t mrshal,
Far East Carmand, realized that as operatians pushed further into the
theater, it would not bepractical to evacuate prisoners of war to Australia. As a result, this would require a dramatic increase in the
behind advancing ompaign fmts, the need for additimal military police
units to protect installatias in theater would also grow. Widering
Command
F i -
military police be prodded in theater. The War Department could not fully accamodate this request and f o m t i m of provisiaal military police units
hcam n e c e s s a r y . '
? @ r i m s t i were encountering increasing ~nmnbersof civiliansin their
military police planners to provide classic suppoa to a joint field q , handle an estimated 500,000 eneny civilians, support base developlaent for at least eight airfields, and support dwelopnent of a Navy operating base at White Beach on Nakagusuku Bay. ' Acardhqly, w i t k i n the Tenth Army task organization existed an
Army and I % & n e Corps military police farce structure canprised of
police, while the Marine Corps enp1Oyea one battalion and five separate canpanies of military police. The foregoing force structure is depicted in figure 2 . Finally, the Tenth Amy PrOwst mrshal also aaployed a joint staff canprised of both Anrry and Marine Corps representatives.'
U . S . Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, military police planners
ompaign. They
availability.'
ompaign in Novanber 1944. Planners originally police structure that nas larger than that described above.
The creation
of provisimal military police units was utilized to aqwwate for military police deficiencies identified by planners. Additicmally, there
are mmerms 1 e s
amalgamated phases I and I1 of the ompaign.'O Lieutenant Generdl Victor H . Krulak, U.S. I%&ne Corps, Retired, was the G-3 for 6th I % & n e Division &riq Operation Iceberg. General
camrents r
the Okinawa czqxiign: You must realize that this was our first real exprience w i t h civilians. Military police wereused in the classic sense as part of the shore party to help organize the beach area, and as sam as we began to encxnmter civilians t h e y were givencharge of the civilian
5.
There are
~.nnwaus t -
administrative details,
such as traffic, supply, and evacuation, when instructions are tco v 0 1 to be included in paragraph 4 of the field order, and at other
poaion of the beachhead which cxmtains all the canbat senrice support units and activities necessary to sustain the 1
Dmp.
f0rC?.13
civilian internees, refugees, displaced civilians or detained civilians." s Garrisan/&%md CCormudder. l%e garrisan or island carmander i
the officer ordered to canrand the units of all services assigned as the
M i l i t a r y Gave-t.
p e r because of war."
Friscoler
of War C o l l e c t i r g
mint
axmumications zane with facilities for the processhg and tenpolary detentian of p r i m of w a r .
Straggler.
organization without authority. A mtor vehicle that has fallen behind for
orders and usually following well-defined terrain features such as roads, railroads, or streams a l q or in rear of which military police patrol for
the purpose of a p p -
authority."
Straggler W t .
stragglers."
Limitations
the topic indirectly wfien speakhg of emirta~nentalfactors: enmy p r i m , enmy civilians, or trafficability of main supply routes. This type of infmtion is scattered through these texts rquirhg detailed and time conslanirag examination. Fortunately, the available primary source dacumentation p d d e s much better detail n q a d i q task organization, p l d enployment and results of operations. This infonmtion c a n b i d
w i t h the fonner may not provide a caplete picture of the results of
enployment, pmblans, and lessans learned. Military p~lice battalion after action reports & s t about for the units involved; however, infop~tion
Army
participants were located in spite of strenuous efforts. Even thotgh difficulty &st4
Review of Literature
There are a rnnnber of excellent extant works which address the
Okinawa Canpign.
Key works on this topic are mjor Charles S . Nichols,
Jr., W, and Henry I . Shaw, Jr.' s Okinawa: V i c t o z y in the P a c i f i c ; J a m H. and William M . Belote's
a f S t e e l : lk B a t t l e f o r Okinawa;
They spend
n the little, if any, time addressing the military police support imralved i
operation. There is saxe indirect reference through discussion of the envirornnent. The attention devoted to enerry prisaners, circumstances on
books are George Wt4illan; C . Peter Zurlinden, Jr.; Alvin M . Josephy, Jr. ;
navid Daqsey; Keyes Beech; and Heman Kogan's Mc~mnanVdor: mcine
Divisians
occasicmal reference to the military police directly and are also laced with of the indirect notes described i n the first category of
literature.
N e , Mere are works d e a l *
These are found primarily at the Service and division level. These works
include Benis M . Fmuk and Henry I . Shaw, Jr.'s V i c t o r y and O c c u p a t i a n :
History o f U. S. &dne C o r p s qperatians in W o r l d War II; Ray E .
States
Amy
in W o r l d War
1 1 , The War
Division in W o r l d War
II;
Richard
W.
Infantry D i v i s i o n in W o r l d War II; 77th Mantry Divisicol, mited States Amy's Ows to hbld it High: The History o f the 77th I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n in
W o r l d War II;
o f the
9 6 t h Infantry D i v i s i o n .
histories cansidering the canbat invwlvenent at the divisicm and reghatal levels. These authors spend very little the and text addressing their organic military police support or attached military police support in a
given operation.
. .
Division provides a tm-page history of its organic Military Police Platoon's imrolvemnt i n the Pacific, There are no references made about
the canpanies of the 519th Military Police Battalion which were attached to
the 7th, 77th, and 96th Infantry Divisias &ring the early phases of the Okinawa Gqaign. Similarly, there are no references made to the canpanies
c were h attached to
the I11 2nphibious Corps, First l 4 d z i . m Division, and Sixth l4dzine Divisim
during the early phases of the Okinawa Canpaign.'* Detailed exmination
of both of the foregoing categories-oflitezatme ensured discovery of 1 1 references to military police support spread thraughout larger
i n the
p r -
field orders, daily staff reports, actim reports, and special action repoas f m n theater level down to battalias. Reports frcm units, wen separate units belm the battalion level were incorporated i n the reports of the next higher level amnands, if at all. This creates an obstacle in dealwith military police units due to the tendency to attach carpMnies
and p l a t -
reporting priorities of the supported unit, since separate capany and platoon reports thraugh parent mrmands appear to have been rare.
Nevertheless, there is a amsiderable antnmt of infmtion available in these documents for detailed review. Finally, mmenms relevant articles fran periodicals such as the c e s muine Ca2ps G3zette and Military Review, are available. These -
qerations, civil affairs, and military police handlw of enmy civilians. These articles serve to support discussion of military police handling of civilians. Collation of the many mall shreds of evidence available increased the u l t i r r a t e d u e of this literature.
'Dan, Van der Vat, ! R E P a c i f i c CiolpMign: !l%e U .S. -J s e War 1941-1945 (New York, NY: S i m and S b t e r , 1992) , 382.
Naval
9enth pnml, Action Report Rydqus, 26 m c h to 30 June 1945 (Okinawa: n.p., 3 sep 4 5 ) , 1-0-1.
G. Fix, Tenth A m y in the Okinawa CanpMign: An AnaZysis f a n the O p e r a t i d Pa-spective W A S Thesis, U. S . Army Caumnd and General Staff College, 1992), 1-2.
%nth
Army,
Action Report
Ry&us,
' ~ r m yForces, ~ a East r Cormand, ~eneal Headquarters,!l%e havost J&mhal'sHistozy, Cznpaigns of the Pacific, 1941-1947 (Australia: n.p., 23
61stLt Lewis Meyers, m, ftJapanese Civilians in Canbat Zanes" mine coqs ~ e t t e (February 1.945), 1-3.
' J a m e s H . and William M . Mote, 7&2mm of Steel: ! T h e B a t t l e for Okinawa (New Yak: IEarper and Raw, 1970). 196-197. "Tenth Army, Action Report Rydqus, 1 1 - M I - 1 , 11-=I-2.
'Army
Operation,
Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, Participation in the Okinawa ( [ ? I : n.p., 15 m r 46). 99.
Rydqus, 11-MI-I,
11-MI-2.
"LtGen Victor H . Krulak, m, (Ret) , interview by author, 19 C c t tape reandhg and transcript, telephmic interview at LtGen Krulak's hane i n San Diego.
"FM 19-5, M l i t a z y Folice [Obsolete1 (War Department: Govenmrent Printing Mfice, 14 Jun 441, 221.
' % n t h
Amy,
"Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Staff O f f i c e r s ' Field mnual for dqkibious Operations [Obsolete] (Hawaii: n.p., 10 Sep 44) , 55.
" k yE . m l e m n , James M. Burns, Russell A. Weler, and John Stevens, Okinawa: Ihe Last Battle, Ihe War in the P a c i f i c , Lhlited States Army in World War II (Center o f Military History, United States Army,
Washiragtan, DC), 1993, 473-482.
General Lqic
The challerge in studying military police support in Opeation
Iceberg is meamrhg its effectiveness. In order to gaugenilitary police
effectiveness in this campaign, structural and operaticma1 evaluations are presented u s a symnetrical framework (fig. 3 ) .
Figure 3.
Ebaluation Framwork
this chapter describes the framework for both evaluations and the mechanics of both processes within that framework. Finally, the military police doctrine and plaxmirq infonmtion available in 1945 is presented. While this chapter provides an overview of doctrine and infomation, detailed discussion by topic is found in chapters three and four. Evaluation Frammrk
Structural and operatianal evaluatims are d i n e d to create me
logical framework. This architecture fonns the basis for chapters three
chapter four, military police operations are assessed to determine if effective i n actual execution. Amlysis of military police operations
This research design does not attenpt to masure other areas, such as logistics, due to a lack of pertinent military police infonmtion. logistical cansiderations h a m a significant inpact on strudure or operations are discussed under each topic. Assessment of P l a r r n i n g
of preoperation military police planning. The goal of is to determine phmirq adequacy. Dxtrinal standards and plans to
force structure enployed and the effectiveness of the operations cmducted based q c m the results of military police operations. This operations-based assessnent process differs fran the operatid evaluation. whereas, the operatid evaluation measures effectiveness,
the operations-baseda s s e s -
Dodrine
our
a s s e s t prccess.
of the accuracy of the military police force structure planning First, Field Mmual 19-5,Military Aolice,' provided the primary
& m y military police doctrine t h o . @ 1945.
source of
This field d
primarily addressed operatid tapics. There were, howwer, several sections dedicated to standard military police organizatias and doctrinal
Field 1
far Anplhibia~sqperaticms; pruvided detailed m i n e Corps p l guidance for anprhibious operatias in the Pacific Ocean Area. This field manual mmtained a structural cmprisun of a Marine Divisicm and an Anny Wantry Division. Other infomtion regardirrg military police support* relationships w i t h canbat, and canbat support, and canbat service
operatianal infoxxmticm in this source, however, infrequent references are m d e z q a d i q military police roles in anphibious operatias. Third, a series of trainkg docments, published by m i n e Corps Schools titled, Arpbibicus Gpratiom, included Mphibious (Phib) 19,
1 t of Militazy Aolice:
Iceberg
planners, it does represent the collective Marine Corps military police eqerieuce available to planners fran after action reports of previous operations. It can masaably be assured to represent m i n e Corps military police operatid standards in ~anuary1945.
Fourth, Field mnual 27-10, W e s o f Larad Warfare , provided very
the
of occupatianal forces,
these t o p i c s . ' p e r s c o l n e l ~rmcemirq Several periodicals exist which addressed military police lessans of & s
necessary, U.S.
?umy
theater?
2.
s s e s t is amsidered relative to the tactical and operatid setting. A of military police planning and operations as they relate to force structure provides a gmd ruler for me%mxkg overall military police structural appropriateness for this v i g n . evaluation is contained in chapter three. Structural Planning Assesauent
. Anny Forces, Pacific Ocean Ewmination of Tenth Anny and U.S
established in dodrine. Did Tenth Anny anploy the dnhnn military police structure prescribed by doctrine ? Military police dodrine traditional r e l a t i & p s
between supporting and supported units based upm exprience at the service level. While these traditional relationships fail to account for specific mission-based requirements, they do infer minirmnn generic levels of support at various canmnd levels. Dob2:ine also provides a basis for deducing
basis for calculating m i d n u n force structure required for specific types of missi-. Whilemission-based requiranents f a i l t o account for the
the e n ,
indigenous civilians, the euvircwnent, and the situation are cansidered due
Exh factor is
discussed in chapter three as it affects a particular facet of missim planning. Doctrinal criteria teqered w i t h infomatian pruvided the most military police support in 1945.
Today this
p 1 -
s t r u c t d planning a c y .
Operations-based assesanent of the Tenth Amy military police force structure m i d e r s specific m i t s , specific o p e r a t i d results, and the relative tacticdl and o p e r a t i d setting i n w h i c h military police operations occurred. This process seeks t o assess the adequacy of military Did the Tenth Amy have
sufficient military police assets to handle thecirclnustances they encountered? This question is anmered by analysis of military police operatias they relate to structure. Assessnent depends
upcgl
results
frun after action reports, special action reprts, recollecticms of participants, or well-ckumnted seandaq saurcematerials. Major abjectives expressed in p l a n n i r i g are canpared to the results of operatims. Operation plans define the required structure that planners identified for this caugnign. Operatid results damstrate
there is
the rapid sweep of northern Okinawa by 6th M x c h Divisica6 Third, there is the shifting of I11 Marine ~ i o u Oorps s to southem Okinawa.'
Faurth, there is the perid of omstant msnsoons and diminished
trafficability in May and June, 1 9 4 5 . 8 Finally, there is the mssive i o n of p r i m and civilian internee pcqxrlaticms as the southemmxt Tkse five junctures are not -istent with
part of Okinawa is s e d ?
military police units. Inefficiency is captured and separated run inadequate structure.
W a s operational p l -
aconplished?
operations. The framewcok for evaluation is near-identical to that used for structure. Evidence is again organized by unit, function, and chnxmlcgical sequence. As in the structural evaluation, the factors of
ecanany of force and mtual support are discuss& where applicable. A
operatiaal plambq effective? This question is answered again by c a n p a r i r a g dcctrinal criteria and operational s e t t i r a g with the historical plamliq conducted.
Even t b g h issessnent of operations planuixg relies qxm the same
dcctrjnal sources, chapter four examhes cmly operational catent.
It is
cansidered here again. Each area is defined in sufficient detail to evaluate the effectiveness of both planning andoperations ccoldubed.
External factors and circ~anstances abviously affected each unit's
ability to adhere to doctrinal standards Thus, the setting is urther defined f m n that base provided in chapter three. The expanded doctrinal criteria canbined with a redefined setting together provide a yardstick to measure operational plans. Planning is assessed for every unit possible; however, lack of infonmticm for scme units precludes q l e t e assessrent. Thus, the assesanent of planning in this operation focuses at the T e n t h Amy, X C J Corps, and 111 Aqhibious Corps levels due to availability of historical infonmtian. Unit plannhq at lmer levels is inwrporated into the Amy and Corps discussions. The planning assessrent d e w s the planning prcduct not the process. Operational Results Assesanent Assessrent of operational results represents the realsubstance of
analyzes all aspeds of both successful and unsuccessful results achieved. Plans identify operational objectives. These objectives indicate what capabilities were desired by planners Military police plans, analyzed in the operational planning assessrent, provide a basis for analysis of operations actually executed. Discussion of doctrinal
of operations plarmiq
' E M 19-5, M l i t a z y mlice [Obsolete] (War Department, Washington, DC: Govenrment Print* Office, 14 Jun 44),1-250. 'Fleet m i n e Force, Pacific, S t a f f O f f i c e m f Field Nmud f o r Aphibicxzs Operations [Obsolete] (Hawaii: n.p., 10 Sep 44), 1-74.
' p m 19, Ehplopsnt o f M l i t a z y &lice [Obsolete] ( m i n e Corps Schools, NC: n.p., 1945), Series on Arrpjlibious Operations, 33vols, 1-48.
' E M 27-10, Rules o f Land W a z f m [Obsolete] (War Department, Washjlagton, DC: C m e m w n t F r i n t * Office, 19401, 18-21, 74-77, 82-85.
=TenthA q r , Action Repart Ryukyus, 26 Mrch t o 30 June 1945, 3 w l s . (Okinawa: n.p., 3 Sep 4 5 ) . P7-111-2, PII-IV-8/29, PII-=1-1/5; PTOVOGt B k x s b l , 1st Rgineer Special Brigade, M i l i t a z y mlice Activities Okinawa Beach *Nice m a (Okinawa: n.p., 17 ~ u l y 1945). 1-3
' 6 t h BBrhe Divisicm, Special Action Report, Okinawa Gperation, 2 wls., Phases I & 11, 30 A p r 45, Phase III (Okinawa: n.p., 30 Jun 45), VII-11/48. ' 1 1 1 BBrine Zqhibious Corps, Action Repart Ryukyus -ration, Phases I and I1 (Okinawa: n.p., 1 Jul 451, 44.
%XIV Corps, Action Report Ryukyus, 1 Apr-30 Jun 45(0kinawa: n.p., n.d.), 67-69, 87-90; I11 K&ne Zqhibious Corps, Action Report, 110-128.
Generdl
farce structure, effective task organizaticm, and econany of force were u i crucial principles g
identified.
S t r u c t dP
A s s e s t
First, dcctrine
established traditimal support relatiaships for military police units and supported carmands. S d , dactrine created specificamditians for mission perommce based qxm service l e v e l e n c e
and lessons
l e a d . These ccmditians served to expand or diminish traditimal levels a i l of prescribed support t it for a given situaticm. Raditional
struchve
provide
Field Mmml (EM) 19-5,Military Police, provided planners with a general description of the doctrinal levels of military police support for a U.S. Army division, corps, field army, and theater headquarters. Specific organization of these units was found in their respective tables of organization or tables of organization and equipnent. Additicmally, this reference provided description of military police prisoner of w a r processirag canpanies, military police escort guard canpanies, and specially fonned criminal investigation units for use at critical points within a theater. Finally, FM 19-5 describes a military police canpany, aviatim for use in support of air forces and associated installations.'
U.S. Amy Gxxm3 aanbat Porces
properly defined. A division military police platcon organized under Table of Organization 19-7 was authorized apprcodrrately 90 soldiers in the unit.
By
and 150 soldiers dependirag upon the table of organization that the unit was
organized under. Fomd w i t h i n the division headquarters anpry, division military police p l a t were carmanded by thedivision p m t rcarshal?
29
ccmpany expand&
. of cme
platoon per division. The 19-37 canpany had the same support relationship
with a corps as a military police battalion had with a field anny.
both the canbat zme and the annumication z m . This battalion was
organized under Table of Organization and Fquipnent 19-35. This battalion ccmsisted of a headquarters and headquaaers detachvat, four military
Each ccmpany within the police ccmpanies, and a medicdl detaclm~~L
battalion m i s t e d of ccmpany headquarters, scout car section, and three military police platcons.
Ebr an anny of mxe than three corps, a military
police ccmpany, Table of Organization and Equipent 19-37, attached to the battalion for each additicaal c o r p s . '
A s s i g n i r a g the 519th Military Police Battalion to the XXnr Corps vice Tenth
Amy, deviated ran doctrinal support relationshipsi n EM 19-5 to push
military police support forward to XXnr Corps. The Tenth Amy Headquarters had a platoon fran the 519th Military Police Battalion p r o v i d i r i g security
and military police support at the canmnd post. Additionally, the Corps
attached ccmpanies fran the 519th to their two assault divisicms, 7th Infantry Division and 96th Infantry Division. Ccmpany B, 724th Military Police Battalion attached to the 77th Mantry Division i nT e n t h Amy
r e s e r v e . '
Amiy
dadrinal support
doctrine. Tenth Amiy did not lMintain centralized ccmtrol of the 519th
Military Police Battalian in order to provide additiaal support to X X N Corps for shore p a r t y operations. M d n u n military police support was task organized at the lowest possible levels. U.S. &Brine Corps G
d Canbat Forces
planners with the sane service level experience and traditicmal support relatimships as FM19-5. Phib 19 provided a descriptian of two basic m i n e Corps military police organizations; the fleet Marine Force military police battalion and the m i n e division military police canpany.'
battalions was activated 27 October 1944. These new battalions saw varying mmirq levels between 350 to 500
t4xi.m~.
these battalicms was t a s k organized into a force abnre the division lever.
helm
to
Battalion, Fleet l 4 I ? 5 I E Force, Pacific also attached to and supported the 111 Marine Anqhibious Gzwqs. Additionally, the Tenth Army attached three military police cmpanies run the 1st Pravisid Military Police Battalion, Island amMnd to this corps. The I11 Marine Anqhibious Corps kept one of these mnpanies attached to the Corps Military Secticm, and attached the other two cmpanies to the 1st and 6th W i n e t t a t Divisicms. Tenth Army planned this joint a of military police to
assist I11 Marine Aqhibious Corps with cantrol of civilians and allow more
n assault shipping. The military police mits to flow into the target i
7th Field Depot possessed a guard ccmparry. Altlmgh not organized under a
military police table of organization, this canpany perfonaed nummus military police support functions. Finally, the 2d Marine Division also in
~enth ~rmy reserve had a canpany of military police organized under Table
address two of the military police organizations enploy&d to support an military police canpany and the field depot AqXbious Corps: the m~ps
guard mnpany.
police canpanies gave the corps an apprcadmate 30% increase t o its military police structure. Ultimately, I 1 1 Marine Anphibious C o r p s possessed over
Landing Operatiom
In the 1 -
As
the next higher headquarters flowed ashore and established ccmtrol; these
units ~ m ~ l consolidated l y again either re~ining cm the beach or pushiq forward w i t h the divisicm. These units required no a d d i t i d structure t o
provide this shore party aqprt. Division military police w s+ly detached plat-
and plat-
Capst and Army l w e l shore parties drew military police support ran
and
FM 19-5 prescribed a s
assist in maintaining security a t the service carmand, defense carmand, ports of embarkation, overseas department, or within a theater of operatiom. This type of unit, organized under Table of Organization and
W l e of perfomirg a full range of military police functias, it represented a versatile organization well suitedfor support to garrison forces and island canrands. Emever, available doctrinal publications failed to specifically address a m p p r t relatimship for this type of
military police battalions were formed ran the 102d Mantry Regiment
under Table of Organization 19-55. The 1st Provisid Military Police
battalion attached to the Island Trcops, Island Carmand, and the 2d Provisid Military Police battalion attached to the Military Govenmrent, Island Carmand.
respectively. ' l In addition to military police battalions, FM 19-5 lccsely desaibed crhinal investigation units. These were special organizations formed w i t h i n a theater of operations to amduct Q^iminalinvestigations for a field a m y , w i t h i n a cammications zone, or other carmands wfiich required this type support.
quantitative s u p p r t relaticmship. It also fails to establish the general size of these units. U . S . Anny Forces, Pacific &em Provost s identified a r e q u i t
ALW
sections, organized under Table of Organization 19-5005J. Subsequently, cmly one kcam? available: the 36th Criminal Investigation Detachent
w i t h apprcodmately eleven members.=
n the Pacific. They mall special units operated at the platm level i
pravided a&.ninistration and record keepkg functions for the Prisoner of
Island amnand. The successhl eqerience of these unitsin the Pacific, forecasted the adequacy of this p l d ~tructure.~
FM 19-5 identified cme organizatian that had a prescribed support
carmand, a defense carmand, a field amy, or a separate corps. This canpany operated a prisoner o f w a r inclamre, or a canp, and ccmducted
evacuation of prismem. The Tenth Army did not request any of these canpanies for operation of the Island Connmd central priscmer of w a r i n c l e . Historical records provide no evidence of why this type
organization failed to participate in the campaign." Tactical Air Forces P 1 a n n h g for support of tactical air forces and installations presented issues similar to those faced in p1anrh-g for military police support for garrison forces. Develcpent of airfields an Okinawa
projected a cannensurate increase in the military police m q p r t for these installations. The base developnent plan depicted a total of eighteen airfields. EM 19-5presmibed use of a military police canparry, aviation for airfield support. It provided traffic amtrul and security with five
o p e r a t i r a g sections and a canpany headqw.rters according to Table of Organization 19-217. This oqanization eqanded as necessary to meet the
*
Aviation within the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadrcm, 92d The plan to utilize cmly tvJo military police canpanies,
replacmts and service units, the hwost Marshal, U . S . Amy Forces, Pacific Ocean Area received disappmval of a request for a fifth military police battalion This m y account indirectly for this and other
structural shortfall^.'^ Functional Dxtrine and S e t t i r a g Functicmal doctrine merely prescribed the characteristics of
p2oper perfonnmce of a prticular mission or function. This cnnbined with
*
support relationships applied here also. Fmctional areas included traffic control operations, p r i m of viar apeations, enarry civilian ccmtml apeatians, security apeations, and law and order operations. These fmctional areas are andlyzed and anpared to the structure and capabilities of the various military police units. haffic Cmtrol Operations *doctrine in
E 'M
pHIB
1 9
placed a large prenim on the kpxtmce of traffic contm1,avoidance of anqestion, and nobility for canbat effectiveness andoperatid success. Doctrinal respcasibility for traffic plaxming resided with the G-4. Doctrinal reqcasibility for road reamnaissance, input to the G-4, and route signkg fell q c m the
execution of traffic plans resided with the military police under the supenrision of the p m t marshdl.'6 Specific prescribed duties fall into
cme-way defiles; and operate infonmtion booths, furnish infonmtion, report rmvenents, report required mintenance, and recannend iuprovanents. (Required fixed posts)
2 . Esoort colunms, patrol routes, handle accidents, and clear
jams. (Required foot and vehicle patrols) '" Intelligence available for the target emrirorrment provided fairly detailed infonmtion on beaches, inland terrain, and road networks The
Hagushi beaches backed up to a seawall and other obstacles, but, each
assault beach had rmerow exits leadkg tavard a mastal road nmnirq
37
between the beach and Kadena and Yontan airfields. The c e n M part of the island psessed a ccmplex inland mad network. Okinawan mads omtinued south via three principle routes. Substantial lateral routes existed
around mjor towns and villages, however, decreased in the open expnses in
between.
TO the north, only o m principle routeran north and south.
Occasionally, lateral access rcads ranbetween the primary route and local
towns or villages. Undweloped and restrictive routes characterized the road network in the north
Apprmcimately 225 and 450 miles of primary and
seccwdary roads respectively would require a canplex systen of traffic omtrol posts and patrols. This is depicted in Figure
4.
The m t
significant deficiency of the Qkinana road network centered on the poor qyality of surface and subsurface road mterials. Ctmsideriq the
anticipated volume of military traffic and pcDr weather, roads pranised to deteriorate quickly requiriq traffic omtrol in areas requiring mhtenance. Tqether, these factors indicated that traffic omtrol would h a n1 require a rrmch greater t f of mqzmsr.''
for and requested an additiaal military police battalion which was disapproved. There is no evidence that corps or divisicm provost l r r a r s h a l s anticipated difficulty acanplisking this mission with the available support. Military police p l at the anny and theater levels reflected
varied amrmg the nmtamw G-4 sections. Not all major subordinate carmands prduced traffic circulation plans prior to landirg. mis deprived military police units of theability to plan traffic related force reqwiranents in d e t a i l . ' 9 Priscmer of Xar Cpemticms
policy
The primary
handling prisoners at all levels. There existed three sub-fundions of these operations w h i c h directly affected military police force structure requirements:
1 . Operation of division collecting pints. (Division level
i n t i o n
Figure 4 .
40
discussians of p l -
U . S . Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas states that the enemy prisoner of war
island c a n & -
were studied
in plarming for Operation Iceberg. These records further indicate that large mxnb=rs of prisaners were anticipated in planning.
Plans placed
respansibility for prisoner of war operations with military police units o m c to canbat units and considered this structure adequate. Corps military police units were initially tasked with establishent and operation of i n c l e s . Operation plans provided detailed and consistent
suppoa at the corps level, and ultimately shifted the burden to garrison
'' forces.
Civilian &mcXLingOperatians
Both Army and Marine Corps doctrine pointed out the relatiaship
between military police in occupied territory and the aWstration of military gwenment. EM 27-10,Rules of Lmd Warfare, was at the heart of military police operatias in support of military w t . The basic
goals for this missicn area included enforcerent of military govenmtent ordinances, protection of lives and property, and restoration of law and
order.
and hostile attacks, and seize and secure civil records, property, and
facilities.
2.
and pilferage,
Doctrinal i n f t i o n
tenus, and presented canplex prablems to military police planners. Colrnterintelligence planws assessed the pmbable reaction of these
o Tenth Amy forces. Japanese propaganda would prabably result civilians t
am i n i n n r m , this would
require duplication of the military police support to ccmbat units cansidered adequate for handling priscmers of war. This mission area also required an estimate of the m m h r of civilians that would be interned in order to judge the inp.ct on structure.
In this case, military govennnent planners prepared a detailed estimate of
civilians to be interned, respective geogaphic lccatias, and relative time in the c~npaign. The plan envisioned a symnetricaluncwerirag of the
civilian population i n the north and south. The total population anticipated counted appKodmately three hundred thousand Okinaumn~.~~ Military gwensnent teams were attached to cantat units at t h e lowest levels; however, the 2d Provisicnal Military Police Battalion attached to the Military Governnent Secticn, Island OcmMnd was not scheduled to arrive at the target until seventeen days after the initial landing. Three anpanies f m the 1st Provisicnal Military Police Battalion were attached to the I11 l&rbe Zqhibious Carps: Ccmpany A attached to the Military Goverrnnent Section, I11 Mw5.m Zqhibious Corps,
t h l&rbe D i v i s i & o and aanpanies B and C attached to the, 1st and 6
work
cover the shortfall created by the shippiq flow of the garrison forces,
and mved m e military police support forward to handle civilian^.'^ This mission area deMnded a m t a t i o n of military police structure based p the density of the civilian population on Okinawa.
battalias of army level and garrison force military police support to canbat units early in the campaign. The plan later shifted garrim force units back under Island Carmand. Ttxxwgh plamiq by military govenment sectias allowed military police planners to be flexible in the gnplayment of a limited structure."
Security Operations Security operations doctrindlly overlapped the four other mission areas. In traffic operations, military police s e d
min supply routes,
In p r i m of w a r operations, military
collecting points, i n c l e s ,
populations, and facilities. Military police also cxmducted tactical security operations in
areas against
enslry
1 units or guerrillas.
facilities such as supply W s , airfields, carmarad posts, or amstruction units generally required dedicated forces with this as their primary focus.
Additionally, these references provided g u i d a n c e cmemkg shore party security cancerns. Security of supply 6uqs cca~stituted a major amsideration in the n o d & u s i o n area durirag an E m p l h i b i o u s. 1 that characterized the ha& Security of supplies precluded service
pilferage and protected them against eneny units and civilians. Intelligence estkmtes described c~unterlandings and erployment of paratrccps within the hchhead as likely eneny cwurses of actian. This potential threat required that structurdl plans acmmt for it. Military fran division assets attached to the first subordinate police detadxm~ts
shore parties to land, and canpany size detachents ran corps' military
police units ultimately supported the Anny Shore Party Group."
Next, cansideration of airfield security requirements was a
critical plamiq factor. The size of Kadena and Yontan airfields and the prosped of developing sixteen additional airfields created a major structurdl consideration. Doctrine asserted that military police canpanies, aviation provided a proper suppcart relationship for a single tactical air forces installation. However, no infomtion on security r e q u i r t s for either of these airfields or any of the planned airfields
on actual
size or structure was addressed in the doclaeents ewmined. The 1243d Military Police Capny,Aviation and the 1388th Military Police Capny, Aviation both existed under H e a w e r s and Headquarters S q a c k m , 92d Air Depot Group. These two units are menticoled in the action report of the
P ~ O ~O ,G ~
It is unclear why
additional aviation canpanies were not plarmd to suppcart the two other existing airfields or the fourteen planned airfields. Plans fail address
prisoner of w a r o p e r a t i ,
of civil Kqxllatians,
r e a . " mission a
Ttm other independent functians of law and order operations
prescribed by doctrine existed in plans. The m3st significant function involved control of stragglers. Stragglers cansisted of unauthorized
perscumel in a given zone of action. These stragglers routinely included
sanrenir hunters or curiosity seekers. Their mwenent fran rear areas and
presmce i n forward areas clogged m a i n mp~~l routes y and interfered with
of straggler lines,
coincided with other traffic, prisoner of war, civilian ccmtrol, or security posts; however, this was mt a l w a y ~the case. Given its relative priority by T e n t h Anny, this function required cansideration in f o 1 s structure. Stragyler were k p ~ l instituted l ~ imnediately to the
earlier, the corps military police assets kcam less eqaged with prisoners and civilians as garrisan forces became operatianal. The result
was that corps military police battalions planned to shift enphasis fmn
function of law and order operatians amern& First, military police attenpted to prevent of weapans, unauthorized possession of
general e n f 0 . t c t .
pilferage, praniscuous f i r *
sowenirs or ccmtraband, and desecration of tanbs. Violations were investigated, incidents reported, and restraint applied w i m ~ necessary.
reqcmsibility for law and order operatians with military police units at
the Hagushi beaches cm Lt2 and I11 Marine Amphibious Corps a s &
of the mrthem half cm Lt6.
control
mnpanies supporting the 7th and 96th Mantry Divisions. They remained on the beach as planned to support the XxIV Qxps Shore Party. Ccmpanies C and D of the 1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet m i n e Force, Pacific
were planned to support the I11 Marine Amphibious Corps Shore Farty.
These
leavirq the corps shore party without support for five days."
this period the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions left guides behind i n critical intersections to protect their lines of annumicatian to the beach.
cm 9 April 1945?5 Tenth Anny Shore Party Group or 1st Bigheer Special Brigade relied upcm military police elenents of both corps' shore parties.
respcmsibilities were divided north and south at yellow beach 3 at the mth of the Bisha Gavia.
The
6th Mxine Division assessed their military police organization for shore party support as adequate and efficient. Both corps reported no ccolgestion on their beaches; hawever, I11 Sm@i.bious Corps noted that the shore
party military police landed too late to perfom efficiently, and sane beaches used to 1and'TenthAnny service units had hadequate traffic control."
additid duty diverted p?mamel planned for use at traffic posts. The
military police required to handle civilians, guard supply dmps, and still afloat, insufficient military police were available for traffic amtrol posts. The initial traffic problems were axrected as mre units such as
the 1st Military Police Battalion flowed ashore and established traffic
posts as planned. The 6th Mxine Division Bqheer reported that engineers
handled traffic control at canstruction sites until military police became available."
At
two separate division nwes south into the Tenth Amy lines. Additionally,
the 27th Mantry Division nwved to the north to a s tactical
structure when division and corps mits supported each other." Traffic control became critical dur5.q the mmscxms between late
May and early June. U . S . Amy Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, Observer
reports indicated that there was a need for m e properly trained military police, especially in these later phases. It further inferred that
inadequate military police structure ampmded the problems i n the xxnr Corps z o n e created by weather. Subsequent to the loss of supply mutes 13
and Lt65.
Zqhibious Corps military police with ccmtrol of route 1 while route 13 was closed."
Corps traffic on
haffic control operatiam supportkg Tenth Amy, as it uncovered the southern end of Okinawa and encountered dense pockets of miniq civilians, were characterized at all echelons as excellent. Many traffic posts south of the Island OcmMnd forward bmdary were jointly mnned. The I11 mine 2nphibious Corps characterized these operations a s requiring strenuous effort ran available mits." Traffic control in the outlyiq island operations is evidenced by operatiam of 3d Platoan, 2d m i n e Divisicm Military Police aanpany on
Shkm.
The
S-4
insufficient for handling both traffic operations and civilian handling operations ~imultaneously.'~
police units, and was corrected as these units became available. Garrison f -
harever, the two corps ulthtely supported each other late in the
9 .
missica~swas a significant distraction frun traffic operations throughout the =w=&m. Friscmer of W a r Operations Planned priscmer of w a r operations sinply included collection,
4
assmed that military police structure assigned t o canbat units would be adequate t o accanplish this functicm. Additimally, garrism forces were
tasked t o take over operation of corps inclosures and conduct pemanat processing of prisoners.
They were unable t o accanplish this and had to
opt for a single central incl-ef' Historical records reflect that the intenment and processing of
Garrison
forces also proved inadequate t o run the central inclosure a t several points during the cmpaign.
The 1st Platcan, 162d Military Police capany,
periods.
fran review of t h e s e operatias points t o the adequacy of the military police structure within oanbat forces as well as the inadequacy of military police structure within garrism forces!' Civilian Hadling
qperatias
Civilian handlkg operations ran parallel to p r i m of war operations, but were thirty times the size and scope of the latter.
This
dedicated military police structure intended t o integrate into the Military &xenment Secticm of the Island Carmand. The 2d hwisicmal Military
Police Battalicm ultimately provided this support; hawever, the unit landed
51
into the target rendered this battalion unavailable until phase three of
g n the &
causirig other units to canpensate i n the interim period.
d to hold civilians, e of
mission area. The 1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet m i n e Force, Pacific as already mentimed landed eight days late. This factor also l deprived the I11 m i n e ?mpXbious Corps of p function during this initial phase. Civilian i n c l e s established by military teams in support for this
that military police tables of organization be expmdd to include e a d q u a r t e r s ! ' interpreters in each canpany and battalion h Ctnbt forces were required to ann%x=t civilian handlirig operatians beymd mere collection at least twice during the campaign. A shortage of military police bwdemd the ambat forces of
6th
Mxbe This
result, the decision was made to decline civilian operations where a potential adverse result to tactical operatimight occur. This pmblen in southern
Okinawa. However, this time the 15th Marines formed a provisional military police unit of two officers and seventy five enlisted Marines to handle
n civilians. I
Battalian to Island OcmMnd cantrol while 6th Marine Divisian was quickly
m c m e r i q large rnanbers of civilians, put this division at M a t e
stressed the military police structure. This o c m e d at a time whm military police were providirg a full range of services a s
the entire
island. N o other operational exanples indicating insufficient military police structure existed. All other planned civilian operations were accanplished, and a total of 284,669 civilians were successfully i n t e r n e d . ' 9 Security Operations Security of supply W s , airfields, carmand p t s , or other critical sites represented four areas which required independent military police structure. Little evidence of advance detailed p l a r n r i r a g or
airfields, canmnd posts, or other sites received no attention in plans. Plans included supply dunp security pruvisicols and strict prohibition of p i l f e r .
initially in the beach s d c e area resulted in amsiderable looting and pilferage of equipnent and supplies. As additional units landed this prublen came under amtrol. The equipnent of the 1st Military Police Battalion, fleet K d n e Force, Pacific landed on yellow beach three ahead of the Battalion.
was gcme.
W h e n
majority of its vehicles, and by six days for the quarteamster to replace essential ~upplies.'~ Plans failed to address security for airfields. Very little infopnation exists regardirag the actual security of KadeM or Y a t a n airfields. The 1st Prwisional Military Police Battali=, the 1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet M 3 r i . w Force, Pacific, and the 519th Military Police Battalion all aupented security at one or koth of these airfields on rumexus cccasiom during the canpign.
I n the absence of specific
plans, these additicnal missions pulled planned structure run other mission area^.^' Plans also failed to address security of canmnd posts. Dxtrine prescribed military police for the field amty canmnd post;
<
to
the Tenth & . m y C!anmnd post. This platcan provided security for the
Military Police Battalian provided this detail. Finally, sane division dtsa l s o used military police for security of the divisicm carmand p t .
iqdhent to structural adequacy for other mission areas. Jnproperly cansidered, these requimwnts lacked sufficient dedicated structure to ensure successful mission accanplishment and mn-interference with other mission areas.
Law
This responsibility rested primarily with the corps military police units,
-8
and
-60.
Conversely, the 519th Military Police Battalion apprehended cnly Fifty four stragglers in the
mlv
These
General e n f o r c t
the
seamd greatest amo~lntof military police effort. Few arrests were made, but mch of the missmaterial was recwered by military police. Here,
military police structure provided adequate support for a planned and duable service. EufoIcement of weapns discipline in rear areas and prevention of desecration of tanbs were the subject of limited historical discussion in unit reports. It is clear that these missions were planned for and amkcted indicatthat the minimum necessary support-
structure was a~ailable.~ These law and order operaticas pointed to the adequacy of military police structure for this function.
and
amtml of task organization at the target were sanetimes deficient. Chapter four discusses operations in detail.
Endnotes
'EM 19-5, M i l i t a z y Evlice [Obsoletel ( W a r Department, Washiragton, DC: Gavenrment P r i n t i n g Office, 14 Jun 44) ,204-220.
"Fleet Marine Force, P a c i f i c , S t a f f O f f i c e r s ' Field Mmual for duphibicus Operatiom [Obsoletel (Hawaii: n.p., 10 Sep 441, Chap. 1, 16; 6 t h Ma?5ne D i v i s i a n , Operation Plan hB 1-45 (Okinawa: n.p., 10 Feb 45), 3zmex Mike, 1-7; U. S. Imny Forces, P a c i f i c Ocean m s , P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the OkinarYa @eration, 2 vols. (n.p.: n.p., 15 46), 99-100.
'renth
4 9 , 1-10; n.p., n.d.1,
Operation Plan 1-45 (Okinawa: n.p., 6 Jan Iwv Corps, Action Reprt Qukyus, 1 Fpr-30 Jun 45 (Okinawa:
2-6.
~ n n y , '2Bntative
EM 27-10, M e s of Larad Warfare Dbsoletel ( W a r Department, washiragtan, DC: Goverrnnent Printing Office, 19401, 18-21, 74-77, 82-85.
' P H I B 19, ~ l of Military ~ E w l i at [Obsolete] (Marine Corps Schcols, NC: n.p., 1945) , Series m rrmphibiaus Operations, 33vols. 1-48.
"w. Victor Bdej, U . S. Atmy and Muirae Corps h e r of B a t t l e , P a c i f i c TBeater of G p r a t i o m , 1941-45 (Allentown, PA: Game Publishing Co,
1984). 170.
' 1 s t Military P o l i c e B a t t a l i a n , fleet Marine Force, P a c i f i c , Action R e p r t of F i r s t M i l i t a r y Evlice Battalion, Fleet W 3 n e Farce, P a c i f i c f a r Phases 1 and 2 of Okinawa Gperation (Okinawa: n.p., n.d. ) , 2; m d e j , 161-165; Phib 19, Part 1, Section 1, 2.
' I I I Auphibiaus Corps, Action Reprt Qukyus Gperation, Phase I & 1 1 ( O k h a w a : n.p, 1 Jul 45). 3.8; Island Oarmand, U . S. Anny Forces, P a c i f i c Ocean Area, Gperation Plan m. 1, Legdims (n-p.: n.p., 1 5 Feb 1945), 13; Ora N t z , Former manber Guard aanpany, 7 t h F i e l d Depot, during Operation Iceberg, interview by author, 13 IXmnker 1994, tape recording and t r a n s c r i p t , telephonic intenriew at Ora N t z ' hate i n W e s t Lafayette, ; 2d Ma?5ne Divisim, Operation Plan AD 10 (Saipan: n.p., 15 Feb 45) , 1-2.
lo
Tenth Anny,
"FM 19-5, 204-212; USAFEOA, 689-700; LTC J. K. Daly, USA, *Thirty Zhasaud Prisoners of W a r Over the Beachn M l i t a r y Review (April 1945).
e n t h Army, Action Report 2 "FM 19-5, 202-203; T 30 June 1945 3 vols., (Okinawa: n.p., 3 S q 451, PII-XXI-1.
m,
6 to
'5USAFEOA. 77-80, 99-100; FM 19-5, 219-220; 51st Military Police Battalian, Action Report, 10 Jan 1945-30 June 1945 (Okhawa: n.p., 30 June 1945), 1-8; 1st MPBn, EMFPac, Action Repmt, Phases I & II, l-8.
99-100, 708;
"-. "
T e n t h Army, Tentative
"FM 19-5, 66-68, 155-160; Phib 19, Part 2, Sectian 4, 34-38; FM 27-10, 74-85. 13-23, 99-100; Tenth Army, Tentative Operations Plan 1-45, Annex 4, 8-9; 6 t h ES?5ne Divisian, Special Action Report, Okinawa @ration, 2 vols., Phases I & 11, 30 Apr 45, Phase I11 (Okinawa: n.p., 30 Jrn 45), VII44-VII47.
' % n t h Army,
, '
Action R e +
220; 51st MPBn, 1-7; 52d Military Police Battalian, (Okhawa: n . p . , 18 Oct 1945). 1-2.
"1st Special Brigade, 2; 51st MPBn, 1-7; 52d MPBn, 1-2; 1 , 1-8. 1st MPBn, FMFPac, Action Report, Phases I & 1
" ' E M 19-5, 146-155, 157, 189, 216, 219-220; Phib 19, Part 2, 13-26, figure 1 & 2.
3, 11; "'Tenth my, Tentative G p e r a t i m plan, ~ n n e x 188-191.
EM 19-5,
% 19-5. 219-220; Tenth ?Amy, Tentative Gperatians Plan 1-45, AQnex 13. "FM 19-5, 32-41, 128-133, 155-159, 168-178; Phib 19, Fart 2, 13-26, 31-38. =FM 19-5, 33-38, 157; Phib 19, 27-30; Tenth ?Amy, Tentative operations Plan 1-45, 17-19, Annex 13, Pgpendix I, 3; 51st MPBn, 1-7.
31
13, Pgpendix
Amy, Action Report, Pll-XI-3,8; 6th m i n e Divisicm, Specid Action Report, VII-11.12; X X I V Corps, Action Report, 34; I11 1 , 125, 216. Mzine m i o w Corps, Action Report, Phases I & 1
'%nth Army, Action Report, Pll-XI-3,4; 1st Karine Divisicm, Special Action Report, E Z g h e e r E n g i n e e r e x , 6; 6th Mzine Divisicm, Special Action Report, VII-33.
. Frank and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Victory and Occupation: '%enis M Xistory o f U. S. Corps Gperatians i n Warld War 1 1 (Washingtan, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, H e a u e r s , U. S. m i n e Corps, 1968),
197-222.
'?Yenth Amy, Action Report, P11-XXII-4.
'~IJSAF~A,708-709; Tenth Amy, Action Report, P11-XI-9; X X N Corps, Action Report, 67-69.
I 1 1 Wine Z4tphibious
Report, P l l - X I - 6 , 7 .
Pll-XI-6,7. 218-220.
';
1 , 1st mgheer Special Brigade, Military Fwlict? "Provost Activities Okinawa Beach Service Area (okinawa: n-p., 17 J u l y 1945) , 1-3;
USAFEOA, 708.
"6th Marine Division, S p e c i a l and Phase 1 1 1 , I 1 1 51.
Action
50-51;
"6th &Brine D i v i s i o n , S p e c i a l Action Report, Phase 1 1 1 , VII 47-48, Tenth Army, Action Repart, P11-XXVII-4.
Special Brigade, 2-3; & 1 1 , 5.
1st MPW,
5151st MPW, 1-7; 1st MPBn, FMFPac, Action Repart, Phases I & II, 1-8; 519th M i l i t a r y P o l i c e B a t t a l i a , Action Report (Okinawa: n.p., 1 J u l y 1945). 1 1 1 .
=EM 19-5, 216; Tenth Army, Action Report, P l l - X I - 2 - 7 ; 51st MPW, 1-7; a p t Edma7d G. ~ove, T h e 27th Infantzy D i v i s i o n in World War 1 1 (Washhgton, LC: Washington Infantry Journal Press: 19491, 551; 1st M i l i t a r y Police Battalion, F l e e t l&rhe Force, Pacific, S Q p p l e r w 2 t d Action Report o f F i r s t Military Fwlict? B a t t a l i o n , F l e e t l&dne Force, P a c i f i c f a r A3ricxi 22 April 1945 to 30 June 1945, Okinana @eration (Okinawa: n.p., 1 J u l y 1945), 2.
"hwost Mwx&al, 1st
Special Brigade, 2;
519th MPW,
1 1 1 .
"Crenth Army, Action Report, P 1 1 - X I - 5 ; 1st MPBn, FMFPac, Action m e s I & 11, 1-8; SQpplanental Action Report, 1-4; Provost Marshal, 1st Ecgineer Special Brigade, 1-3.
Report,
General The military police operations amducted during the Okinawa capaign proved
~llrmerous
considem five functional or mission areas: Traffic control operations, prisoner of w a r operations, civilian handling operations, security operations, and law and order operations. Doctrinal criteria for these five mission areas which was presented in chapter three and will not be reiterated. However, additional functional criteria is discussed. Planing amducted and operational results are assessed within the frammrk of these five mission areas. Operatid Planning Assessment ! c m t r o l Operations Planning Traffic C Field B&nual (EM) 19-5, Military Police, and IImphibious Operations (Phib) Volume 19, Brploymnt o f Military Police, both provided military police planners with detailed guidance for the planning of traffic control operations. These sources both pint out the dependent relatiaship of the military police traffic control plan upcm the approved traffic circulation plan prepared by the
G-4.
The i
m t . r o l s to canpliment the placenent and ccadhation of traffic e circulation plan and consider contiqencies.'
Review of available operation plans and adninistrative plans revealed significant dwelopnent of traffic policy. System for mmkerhg and letterkg routes, posting of signs, area respmsibilities, and functid respmsibilities were presented in these d o c r m i e n t s . At each level a traffic circulation plan was discussed, however, only the 2d Marine Division Order included a traffic circulation diagram. U . S . Anny Forces, Pacific Ocean Azea Selected Wervers noted that numeraus traffic circulation plans were
not
available for M a t e i . n p l e n e n t a t i o n . 2 The inference exists that detailed amtrol planning was delayed by the absence of t i r c s e l y circulation plans. Hcmever, the Tenth Anny
G-4
reported that the Anny traffic circulation map required very few changes, indicating a plan existed at the start of the carrp3aign. Prmrost Nwshal spoke further to this issue n o t The Tenth ~ n n y
n their possession which had been police ashore on Lcl had strip maps i
prepared akcmd ship frcm aerial photcgraphs.
I n ccmtrast, the 1st
Military Police Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific put together their traffic amtrol plans subsequent to a r r i v 4 . q carmand post at G m a Point. This o c e d at the I11 Mphibious Corps for two reasaus. First, the the
6 t h Marine Division had made quick and sizable gains e x p a d k g the Corps
Orrna
actually
occur.
doctrinal standards. The Provost Marshal, U.S . Amy Forces, Pacific Ocean
Areas,
traffic control requirements frun previous Pacific Ocean Areas operations. Finally, untimely traffic circulation planning by sane units failed to achieve doctrinal objectives: caplimentary traffic ccmtxol and circulation platming. Ultimately, these two processes occurred independent of each other or in reverse order at sane levels w i t h i n the Tenth Army? Prisaner of War Operatiom Plannirg noctrinal prisoner of w a r operations plannirg required amsideration of several basic clanponents: handling, collecting points, evacuation, and inclosures. EM 19-5 and Phib 1 9 both addressed each of these areas.
DependinEI q c m the given stage of an anphibious operation,
respansibilities for each of these areas varied. Within the beachhead the
r i s c o l e r s platccm or a n p n y , the unit also respnsible for evacuation of p to inclosures.6 I n c l e s were doctrinally established by a corps or army in a Laxye i n c l e s , temed central
Priscmera were p s s e d
inclosure in accordance with War &parimat requirenents. The tenu, priscmer of w a r stockade, finds its way into the action reports of this
m g n .
facility. It generally refers to sanething between the collecting pint and the inclosure described here. This facility is used at the divisicm and corps level in addition to colleding pints. perm~ent processing described above."
As discussed in chapter three,the Tenth Anny plan did not provide
Corps. Subsequently, the 51st Military Police Battalion, Island amrand, planned to a s ccmtrol of the three corps i n c l e s . '
'Ihese plans provided detailed guidance for handling of priscmera, aperation of collecting pints, arhhistration of id-es, and
evacuation of priscmers within both the beachhead and the various zcmes of
e n t h Anny txacept for action. The 1st Military Police Battalion used the T
handling priscmera in both training and plamiq. The former &mradhg officer of Clnpany A, Colonel Kenneth J. Becker, indicated that both the aawpt and the tminiq were proper for what t h e y m t a e d . These o c t r i n e . ' priscmer of war plans were all consistent with basic d
divisicm's first real experience with civilians. They realized that the
Okinavians were not treated well by the Japanese. Even though they obeyed
the Japanese, under American amtml t h e y would be canpliant, helpless, and require care. The Tenth Anny planned to be ccmpassiomte, provide fccd,
three."
Mnneraus articles on civil affairs, military gwenmnent, emmy
provided additicmal l e s -
leamed in
military police with military government relieving military police of all but security considerations. As such, military police planners primarily cansidered nmkers of civilians and their attitudes.l3 Finally, military police anticipation of r e q u i r t s for
Classes and
civilians. 'l
inferred
that they were the largest anticipated challenge. Plamiq satisfied most dactrinal standards incorporating significant detail. Hawever, there was m specific policy for the use of force w i t h civilians. Neither doclanentaticm or the recollection of veterans revealed any explanation. While not addressed in Phib 19, FM 1 9-5
addresses a pmhibition on n w v i q or holdkg priscolers or civilians w i t h i n sight or hearing of any carmand post.
reports and recollectims of veterans indicate security operatians to protect carmand posts ran the Army level da;vn occurred. Specific detacinnents were f d in accordance w i t hE M 19-5 for protection of the
?tvo
plannkg as evidenced by respedive action reports. There is no evidence that the doctrinal standards identified in chapter three were m e t . ' '
chapter three; straggler ccmtrol and general enforcement. Plans addressed each of these areas r q a d k q policy and pmhibiticms. Military police rxmtrols and schenes for e n f o r c t were also generally addressed. There
patrols prior to landing. Nor is there any indication of specific plans for law e n f 0 2 c t patrols or posts. Neither of these functions were
expected to require significant attention until later in the canpaign. This m y account for the absence of this specific p1amiq.l' Operatid Results Assessment Traffic Ccmtrol Operations
The first point of focus for traffic operatias was the beachhead.
FM 19-5 clearly listed the first duty of military police i n the beachhead
traffic control on the beaches to guide debarking units to assably areas. It is noted that the T e n t h Army Headquarters cam ashore on Lc17. IMIV Corps reported no caqesticm on their beaches early in the operation. The 111 m i o u s Corps action report indicated no caqestian on their
beaches on -2;
ball on the beach since we landed late. If we were to p r c n r i d e any real ccmtrol, we shaild have landed mch earlier."" ampanies A and B of the 1st Military Police Battalion established traffic posts, infomntion booths, and radio jeep patrols of
the roads.
conditions, reported on civilian cancentraticms, and enforced traffic regulations. Colanel Becker stated,
"My Ccmpany
68
battalion was iwolved primarily in traffic m t r o l . operations w e r e very effective. kept supply lines open."
W e
''
Oanpany D
performed the same funbions in a zone parallel t o C Conpany a l q the west coast mmiq north t o the road junction of Routes 1 and 6.
1 ,
The Provost
function w e M.
Other than 1 -
late
"
damstrated by their ability t o expand their military police support ran the beachhead as they turned north?
The 519th Military Police Battalion was largely split up anrmg
their divisions.
aanpany
1st Plat-
ccoltrol in nmemw areas; 1st Platcxm a t the Tenth Atmy Carmand Post, 2d
Platam in the vicinity of K u e and Chatan, and 3d Platam in the XXIV Corps
area east of mgushi beaches. ampany C also had 1st Platthe corps Shore Party until relieved on -18.
attached to
Additionally, on W14, 2d
Platcon, ampany A and the 3d Platam, Canpany C were attached to the Island Oamrand Slmre Farty for traffic control.
The 519th Military Police Battalion was fully engaged in traffic
As
XXIV
Corps
and yellow reported no traffic problems on its beaches. Distinctive G~een infmtion bcoths were established by the 519th Military Police Battalion early i n the operation. These were inneased to cover inprtant traffic
military police were initially sufficient in the beach maintenance area. All who were available were assigned to traffic ccmtrol and e~cuatim of civilians f m the rcads in this
-.
requires m a &
sugply roads were still posts and patrols to collect these civilians. &kin
behg developed throughout this period.
circle aided greatly with the speed, flow, and handling of traffic. After construction of the circle, bottlenecks d y occurred on Route 1 crossiq . In spite of the late the Bishagawa and at other briaes along Route 1 arrival of the 1st Military Police Battalion and the 51st Military Police
I n spite
of this, traffic ccmtml at all levels was excellent. &Bst difficulties were due to rmd ccmditias. The origindl T e n t h Anny plans pmved 1 ' s satisfactory, as evidenced by the Prwost Lcl.
Well informed Military Police armed with maps were on duty on the
heaches andaloqthemainroads."
for the 6th Marine Division drive came ran Oanpanies A and B, 1st Military Police Battalion as discussed above. As the operation progressed rapidly, and traffic ccmtml was b e d . mre of the island was u~lcovered
The
guards, and significant elements of the military police force were still
afloat, precluded establishing all of the desired traffic posts. This prablen was corrected as m e military police becaw a v a i l a b l e . ' "
Corps ProMst
Marshal Secticms.
The Tenth Army, hwost IBzxhal's report indicates the m s were a l l canpleted without any difficulty. The 6 t h m i n e Division used their
and specific instructions to military police was rates of d, inoJrporated in Opeation Order m d x r 49-45 on L+29."
On -35,
on W39.
had pcor bttans, and heavy traffic grwnd rcads into clouds of dust and
Qleck points were established w i t h i n corps' boundaries then seas of d .
Qn L+59 I 1 1
&phibious Corps
no wnnection w i t h &t
mid-June.30
In the south, the 1 1 1 Aqhibious C B q s rear
area
was divided
m e mere vvas c
traffic except around Naha. This system was not trouble free.
Becker
stated, "Scme perxnmel were insistent that they cane back the same way
t h e y went.
control, and rigid traffic screening maintained the flow of annumition and e q u i m t to the f m t line troops. mjor General
Ray
S . Geiger,
Military Police Battalion's successful effort' The 519th Military Police Battalion shared traffic posts
Corps Staff J m e P r h r o c a t e
established mbile traffic courts operated with military police patrols. One c m p n y was focused on traffic control for the Corps at any time.
Qnpny A was relieved on L A 5
by Canpany B.
corps
June.
XXIV
It suggested
that if traffic amtml had been prcnptly established, saw roads in the
XXIV Q r p s zcme
The Tenth A
reprted that subsequent to the loss of sqply Routes 13 and 5, Route 1 was only kept open between -51 and 6 5 t b m g h rigid traffic control and twenty four hour a day eqineer ~perations.'~ Traffic control d w 5 . q the final part of the ca&?aign was hmpered
by dense pockets of
civilians. The effects of lost w l y routes m l y operations anployed air and water
The I11 Marine
Wphibious Corps evaluated traffic c c o l t r o l as satisfactory, but mcrvetwt of t s and sqplies required strenuous effort. It was noted that cxmtrol
could have been better?' The 51st Military Police Battalion also provided traffic cxmtrol at mmemus times in the campaign. W h e n
Canpany
A reverted to battalion
n the vicinity mtro1, it provided traffic posts and patrols annmd Hiza i
Canpany A
aanpany B also
Canpany C continued to
The 51st Military
ampensated for by flexible military police run the Marine Divisions, and
the 1st Military Police Battalion's ability to quickly gain control once
.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, Selected Qbsenrers ashore. Seccold, U
reported that better preventative traffic amtrols could have precluded the loss of m t e s 13 and 5 in the X X I V Corps zone. I n contrast the I11 ?4qEbious Corps inwrporated a rigid one-way traffic circuit prior to the
rains, and dedicated two ccmpanies to traffic control in the Corps a r e a .
stockades were established initially: one by XMV Corps and t v i u by I 1 1 Aqhibious Corps.
Qn
The Island
A
Platcm, 162d Military Police acmpany a t the central inclosure in the vicinity of Kadena airfield. el-ts Later, these prismers were handled by
speaking prisoners
n one instance, tansmitted orders to the others, but pmblans did occur. I
a p r i m on a w m k i q party cut American phone lines. In another instance, six prisoners escaped f m the central inclosure. All of them
were recaptured or accounted for in several days. were
were Korean or Okinawau labor troops. The first Japanese were mostly
vmded, a factor limiting resistance.
Counterintelligence Corps teams screened prisoners daily. Sane banefide civilians were found a n w q priscmers and turned over to military grrvernment. Those prisoners with established prisoner of war status were pennmently processed by the 1st Platoon of the 162d Military Police
Ccmpany.
and efficiently. on
others c c o l t i n u e d to be captured
after the island was secured, many were found h i d i r g in caves, and there
was a sizable guerrilla force in north Okinawa."
June.
Ccmpany A
and
Canparry B
prisoners of w a r had been processed. The p m a n m t Island Cnrmand inclosure was opened on 8 3 at Yaka with a capacity to hold 15,000 prisoners. The temporary inclosure at Kadena transferred to the military govenrment for use as a civilian i n c l e . ' 5
hwost 1 -
intenqation center for the G-2 where reliable sources were inte?zqated.
The FYOICS~ Wshal utilized military police assigned to the Anny aarmand
post fzun the 519th Military police
for its divisions, the I11 w i o u s Corps did not maintain a regular p r i of w a r stockade. The 2 initial stockades referred to were
established and operated b y both of the Ku-ine Divisions. These 3 stockades were necessary prior to establishment of the Island aarmand central inclosure. 1st Marine Division noted that the prisoner evacuation process was satisfactory. Cm b43, the 1st Military Police Battalion
i n c l e s
78
By
Platoon, 162d Military Police C ! c n p n y had processed 250 prisoners in addition to initially qerating the inclosure. 141ey mtinued until late
forced to stop processing at least f a u times during the v i g n in order to a m t s e c u r i t y . " Within the lMnr Corps zcme of action, the problen of handlizg civilians urns also larger than prisoner of war considerations. As a
result, sane prisoner of w a r functicms were cmsolidated with civilian handling functicms. The Provisional Canpany, 519th Military Police Battalion established collecting points for the 27th Mantry Division. Ute in the operation, C h p n y A intensified prisoner of war operations
mgusuku.
operation. These opeations provided viable evacuation of prisaners, positive amtml of prisoners, support for intelligence and ~terintelligence operaticms, protection of prisoners, care of prisoners, and p e m m a t processizg of priscmers. Evidence that insufficient military police were available to cope with p r i s m of w a r operations simultaneously with other missicms clearly exists. In spite of that deduction, these operations achieved their desired results without any negative h p c t on the mnpaign
Civilian Handlhg Operations These operations canstituted the largest and mxt canplex mission
clearly recognized this challerge, as three battalions of military police plus corps and division organic assets were landed in the assault echelon to handle civilians. This mission area, like traffic mtrol, pranised to inpact the tacticdl situation directly if inproperly handled."
However,
it was necessary to use military police assets organic to canbat units to handle civilians at mmerous times during the cmpdign. kept natives inside inclosures at night and guarded gathering fccd durhg the day. The Okinaguarded
mthmally attempted to
evade their guards to return to their fonner hanes for clotbiq or other 1 affects. Gthers sinply wanted to be free of the restraint
prevented civilians ran being mistakenly killed. Military police attempted to keep guerrillas away frun civilians.
where raidiq Japanese killed civilians w
Sane
instances existed
. .
."
Due to lqistical design, the 52d Military Police Battalian did not land early enotigh to handle civilians in the initial stages of the operatian. Military Folice assigned to the military government should have landed w i t h than. As a result, the 3 ccnpnies fmn the 51st Military Police Battalian which landed in the assault echelan w i t h the I11 Zqhibious Corps played a critical role as 6 t h M&ne Divisicm began to
Wckly push north. Additionally, divisicm military police were actively engaged w i t h significant lnanbers of civilians wen before military govennnent teams came ashore. This requirement imposed these units to perionn other planned missions.u
Mrmeraus civilians were encountered m v i q i n the beach
the ability of
maintenance area. A civilian inclosure was amstructed but went mmmmed initially. Civilians would leave the inclosure and return to their villages. Military police were ultimately w i t h d r a w n ran traffic posts to collect and control civilians. The Tenth Azmy Military Govenrment actian
gxnqs of civilians with limited lnanbers of military police. points were operated as far forward as possible by and mmterintelligence. 5'
Civilian collect*
The Okinawans were generally cooperative and docile. A large percentage were
ufimen,
was m e n c e d a m q those civilians successfully taken into American custcdy. No concrete cases of civilian espicnage or sahtage occurred.
The Okinawans did not fear the Americans as nu& as t h e y feared the ravages
of w a r .
Hawever,
units toak o v e r .
L+77, 2 & e s
handle large rnanbers of civilians and p r i m collected in the final days of Daily ccanrays run the I11 2nphibious Corps of
a p p r c a c i r r a t e l y 50 trucks peddled civilians to whatever Island Carmand caps would accept them. These cawoys had to travel l c o l g distances run the
south requiring precious transportation and limited military police escorts. Late in June, the Corps evacuated 21,967 civilians frun the ~sland Carmand area because Island Carmand did not have sufficient resources available. This was a 75 hour operation tyirq up trucks and troops."
LIX~ZSassisted
an
overburdened garrison force ensuring mission accanplishmnt. The 1st Military Police Battalion worked closely with the I11 Aphibious Corps C-1, C-4, the Corps Military Police Cmpny, and the Military Gavennnent Section. The battalion evacuated 1602 civilians in the first 8 d a y s . They also provided guards at inclosures and chasers for civilian working parties.
73~0p l a t -
attached to 1st
the Corps
perfolmed the same scope missions satisfactorily. Dwing Phase I11 of the
platam was attached to 6th m i n e Division to handle civilians. The 1st Military Police Battalion pruvided substantial support to the m i n e Divisims, I11 m i o u s Corps, and Island aarmand."' Becker mrmnarized
the battalion's experience with civilians: S r r a l l grarps of military police run the ccmparry not invulved in traffic control would be sent out to pichq civilians ran collection points or find than. A dozen or so would ame aut of a cave, get on the narrow roads, interfere with traffic, and slow the advance of sup~1ie~.=~
Becker further recalled:
The use of force was applied at face value. There was no policy per se. W a n e n and children were no tmuble, and the mles were largely coaperative in the presence of w a n m and children. You just pointed which way that you wanted than to go and they waild go. The i r a l e s by themselves were always treated with sane caution.59
Periodically, these mines would experience significant quantities of civilians, but they were all extremely coopeative. Howwer, the first task of collectkg civilians was sanetimes difficult. Military Police would look into a cave and observe mwenent, but due to the language barrier receive no response to caoPands. B S r i n e s would m t i m e s open fire into the cave. Becker recalled, "Gne Sergeant he had killed two Okina-; to me once s a * that
I n June, the
Canparry
handled civilians at
Canparry B
handled
civilians in the XXIV Corps area at Chatan and l%amkoru between early in
the operation.
Canparry
provisional acmpanY to attach to and support the 27th Infantry Division. This Ctnpny ran the civilian inclosure at l&nnbru, forward collectirq points, an intermediate inclosure, and a rear inclosure. This support
control aperaticols d u x -
w.
and Ishikawa.
Ctnpny B
raanbers of civilians were pushed out on the Katchin Peninsula and fenced
off f m friendly forces as an imnediate tenporary control. This c a p n y established outposts to pickup civilians and amducted foot patrols w i t h military governnent teams forward of friendly lines to locate, capture, and protect civilians, records, and property. B Chpmy guarded Island CcmMnd civilian inclormres at , Koza, Takabaru, and M d i h r u .
They were
military government team. This canpany established civilian collectirq points at W, Tbya,
QI~M,
and property. C
Canpany
attached two p l a t -
to the Island
m i n e Division, Lieutenant General Victor H . Krulak, U. S . m i n e Corps, Retired, cannented: These operaticms took the load of handling civilians away run canbat units. The principal problems were those of magnitude. Our military police had never done this before. I believe they were quite well trained. We benefited early ran the Okinawan willingness to cooperate."
As noted by Krulak, the first significant problem was based upm
north, the 6th m i n e Division uncovered civilians much mre quickly than
anticipated. The late arrival of the 1st Military Police Battalion, the 52d Military Police Battalion, and e l t s of the 51st Military Police
Battalion canplicated this. In addition, the three canpanies of the 51st Military Police Battalion attached to I11 Aqhibious Corps returned to
Island Carmand cantrol while the 6th W i n e Divisicm was still wrestling with sizable groups of civilians i n the north."
Again, i n the south, the volume of civilians encountered
reascol.
handling operations were effective overall. Three thousand military police amtrolled three hund~edthousand civiliansP6
Secmd, it appeared that the use of force in these operatias was
mtter are t v e d by the recollections of former Private First Class Salvatore Cavallaro, of the 1st Military Folice Battalian. He stated,
Force in handling civilians was discussed, because we were going to take care of than. We had to clear caves and tunnels of the Japanese h e y tcok for cover. Accidents without killing the civilians that t happened sanetimes when Japanese soldiers hid in a crcwd of civilians and used a weapm or grenade on the troops. Sanetimes, t q s d d get trigger happy and open fire on the crowd. We would have to stop
this if we d d P 7
I n spite of the lack of plamed policy, use of force was covered i n
. t
Okina-.
Military police understccd that their job was to protect the This served to regulate the use o f force.6s Regardless of
deficiencies, these operations achieved overall success in the face of a large and canplex challage.
?
deal of military police time and effort. Airfields, carmand posts, and
other critical sites were secured by military police. The XXIV Corps G-2 credited military police security w i t h denial of eneny tactical success in
and neutralized d
inspected and closed. During the last eight days of phases 11, 1,290 tanbs were inspected. heny e n t e r s
were custa~lry: snipers, infiltrators in
military police to intercept two coral trucks reported as driven by Japanese soldiers. Canpany D provided scout cars to Y m t a airfield and
The anpny guarded sites at Kadem and provided security patrols in the
Island Carmand area. acmparry B encwntered a d infiltrators at , l Japanese unit of Early
in m y , the anpny guarded supply duqs at Kadena airfield and respzmded to Ycmtan airfield when eneny aircraft aash landed. Canpany C while attached to 6th Marine Division, helped suppress a Banzai attack at Tancha.
They supported the 521st Quartemaster Group by g u a z d i q supplies and ran a patrol at Kadena airfield to protect persannel against sniper fire.
Finally, this anpny provided security for the 693d Ordnance Battalion duqs.
its 1st Platcon providirig security for the shore party in the South Shore Paay Area. ! C h i s security included area and duq guards.
In m y the
Canpany
also
the 394 H a l d i r i g Canpany, and the 7lst Me3ical Battalion. The capany
Canpany C,
attached to 9 6 t h Mantry
Division, had its 1st Platm provide security to the shore party in the
Sxth S h o r e Party Area.
This security included area and drrmp guards.n 1st JBigineer Special Brigade
reported that the physical presence of sufficient Military Police hraught a significant looting and pilferage prablan on the beach under control through the use of walking patrols throughout the area." Military Police units of the Tenth Anny appear to have achieved pitive results w i t h these security operations. As the G-2 for xxlv Corps pointed out, military police security operations denied the Japanese tactical opportunity or advantage in the Tenth Anny rear area. Despite the lack of plannkg for these operations, effective and measured application of this mission area helped provide force protection for the Tenth Antry.
relative value or importance of gmrdhq nurses quarters or a rest canp could not be canpared to the need for additicmal traffic control or civilian handling capability. This is neither cansidered i n relation to other mission areas or the criticd military police junctures in the vign.
operations at specific times could have possibly been used to better overall advantage.
Iaw and O r d e r qWations
Neither of the t w basic unctions of this mission area presented prablens w h a canpared to other missims. Stragglers and pilfering, while
the
end of the day they were returned to their units with a message for their
ammdbg officer.
stragglers. Passes did not authorize travel forward of the corps rear
hnmdary.
Pilfering in supply c h n r p J s ,c m beaches, vehicle theft, and unauthorized access to civilian canpolnads represented the next msat frequent offenses. Very few arrests were made for pilfering, but mch stolen property was recovered. Unattended vehicles were frequently taken
inproperly marked, repainted, or the losing uuit was unable to identify the vehicle in detail. These factors greatly canplicated the recovery process. Despite this obstacle, a cansiderable rnrmber of vehicles were recovered
thrmgh the effective use of check pints.
Another area of general law and order was p m t i c m and response to crimes against the civilian population. There were a large rnrmber of native ,
civilian inclosures. I n spite of this there were a few cases of rape that were ultimately investigated. Additidly, military police investigated
stragglers. Violators were cmfined in the Island Carmand stockade, and on Lt90 there were 95 soldiers, 2 sailors, and 3 m i n e s in the Island Carmand stockade.75
thgn
to their
between 25-30 June for delivery to the Island Carmand Provost mmhal.
Stragglers were detained at the Battalion Wig until an officer ran the individuals unit called for him. This was quite effective in cutting dawn
the rnrmber of sowenir hunters each day." The 51st Military Police Battalion had ane canparry primarily
ccmducting these operatiam. Canparry D provided detailed straggler amtrol
in the South Shore Party Area of the Hagushi beaches, and ran patrols a l c o l g
the south side of the Bishagawa. Additicmally, these military police enforced Tenth ?mny regulations rqardhg the praniscuaus firing of
weapans.
identified. B y mid-Kay the canparry had issued a totdl of four hundred and sixty two r e p o r t s . "
The Provost 1 ,
519th
Military Police
in the beach maintenance area. The largest problem was vehicle theft.
Pspreheusicm of stragglers rivaled the scope of the vehicle theft problem. mrcodrrately seven hundred and ninety stragglers were
appmhadd i n the beach maintenance
area between
motor
This was
Law and order operations achieved notable results amsiderpart time focus and priority that they received. Tenth ? m n y military
the
Military Police operations achieved p l d abjectives and were generally effective. Operaticma1 deficiencies resulted p r i l y ran
structurdl inadequacy and late force arrival, however, rnrmerous operational p l five. oversights occurred. Detailed conclusions are provided in chapter
%M 19-5, M i l i t a r y Fulice [Obsoletel (War Department, Washington, DC: Govermnent Print* Office, 14 J m 44),48-65; PHIB 19, h l p l o y n w t of M l i t a r y Police [Obsolete] (Marine Corps Schools, NC: n.p., 1945), Series on zmpbibious Opeaticas, 33~01s.13-20. ?&nth Amy, W t a t i v e G p r a t i o n Plan 1-45 (Okinawa: n.p., 6 Jan 45), Annex 13, AppendixH, l,ff, Pppendix I, 1; XXnrCcorps, AchMstrative Order 10 ( m e : n.p., 10 Feb 45), Annex K, 1-4; lMIV Corps, Action Repart RyukyUs, 1 Apr-30 Jun 45 (Okinawa: n.p., n.d.1, 67-69, 87-90; 111 &@ibious Corps, Operation Plan No 1-45 (Okinawa: n.p., 23 Feb 45), Annex IbJw, 1,ff; U . S. Amy Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, participation i n the Okinawa Gpration, 2 vols. (n.p.: n.p., 15 Mar 46). 708-709. * t h Plmy, Action Repart Ryukyus, 26 6 to 30 June 1945, 3 wls. (Okinawa: n . p . , 3 Sep 451, PII-IV-27-29,PII-XXII-1-5.
%S?GPX, 13-23, 99-100, 218-220, 547,548; Tenth Amy, W t a t i v e Operations Plan 1-45, Amex 3, 1,ff; Tenth Amy,Actbn R e p r t ,
PII-1-40-41; 519th Military Police Battalion, Action Report n . p . , 1 July 1945). 1-11.
(Okinawa:
%AEFWi, 13-23, 99-100, 218-220, 547,548; Tenth Amy, m t a t i v e . Becker, qperatians Plan 1-45, Amex 3, 1,ff; Colonel Keflleth J (Ret), Interview by author, 28 Oct 1994, tape recording, telephonic interview at Colonel Becker's hane in L a Altos, Qlifomia; Provost Marshal, 1st Engineer Special Brigade, M i l i t a r y Police Activities Okinawa Bead Service Area (Okinawa: n.p., 17 July 1945). 1-3.
lo Lieutenant General Victor H . Krulak, n 3 C (Ret) , Interview by author, 19 Oct 1994, tape recordkg and transcript, telephonic interview at Lieutenant General Krulaktshane in San Diego.
"FM 19-5, 66-68, 155-160; Phib 19, Part 2, Section 4, 34-38; Basic Field Mama1 (FM 27-10),Rules o f Lurd W a r f m (War Department, Washington, DC.: &ted States Rwemmnt hrintirq Mfice, 1940), 74-85.
Lieutenant Colonel Lewis N. Civilians" M3rine Coqs Gazette (April 1945) ; Captain H. C. Prudthamre,U5.Z?lZ, "Civil Affairs" mine Corps Gazette (my 1944) ; S t a f f Sergeant B i l l Miller, USMC, ffBeachhead Gavezinmztm mvine CoIps Gazette (Nwauber 1944); First Lieutenant Lewis m , m, 57apanese Civilians in C & t Zanes" mine Coqs Gazette
(February 1945). 1, f f . "Sarrmelsen, 1-4; Tenth Amy, Action Report, 1 - 1 - 5 ; USAFPQA, 99-100. PII-XXII-8/9,
"1st M i l i t a r y P o l i c e Battalion, F l e e t Marine Force, P a c i f i c , Action Repart of First Military FDliae Battdim, Fleet Xzine Force, Pacific far Phases 1 and 2 of Okinawa Gpxatim ( O k b a w a : n.p., n.d.1, 1-8 and Stpplemental Actim Report of First Military FDlice Battalion, Fleet xwine Force, Pacific far Period 22 qpril 1945 to 30 June 1945, Okinawa Operation ( O h m : n.p., 1 July 1945). 1-6; 5 1 s t M i l i t a r y P o l i c e B a t t a l i a n , Acticm Report, 10 Jan 1945-30 June 1945 (Okinawa: n.p., 30 June 19451, 1-8; 52d M i l i t a r y P o l i c e Battalion, Actim Report (Okinawa: n-p., 1 1 ; Becker, Interview; 18 Oct 19451, 1-2; 519th MPBn, Action Report, 1 Colonel James H. McCrocklin, USXR (Ret), Interview by author, 23 Oct 1994, tape reaxdbq, telephonic interview at C o l d MXxccklin1s hane in Wimberly, Texas; Fonner PriMte First Class Hans H. Wer, U S E , Interview by author, 12 Nwauber 1994, t r a n s c r i p t , telephconic interview at o F i r s t Lieutenant John P. Mr. W e r ' s hane i n Philadelphia, PA; F Sawyer 1 1 , USICR, Interview by author, 22 October 1994, telephcmic interview a t Mr. Sawyer's hane i n Vero Beach, FL; Fozmx Private F i r s t Class Salvatore Cavallam, uSW2, Interview by author, tape recording, telephconic interview at Mr. Cavallaro' s hdme i n -stead NY.
"EM, 1st Dqineer Special Brigade, 2; 5 1 s t MPBn, 1-7; 52d MPBn, 1st MPBn, FMFPac,Action Repart, Phases I & 1 1 , 1-8; Tenth Army, mtative qperaticm Plan 1-45, 15-19; Becker, Interview. 1-2;
Becker, Interview;
Tenth Amy, Tentative Operation Plan 1-45, Tenth Amy,Action Repart, PII-XXII-1/9; 51st MPBn, 1-7; 52d MPBn, 1-2; 1st MPBn, FMFPac,Action Report, Phases I & 1 1 , 1-8; 519th MPBn, 1 1 1 ; Becker, Interview; McCrocklin, Interview.
Annex 13, Pppendix I, 1-3;
%SAFFG4,
l?USnrrOn, 99-100;
99-100;
PII-XXII-1/9.
'*EM 19-5, 11-19, 20-28, 31, 139-141; Tenth Amy, 'Bntative qperatians Plan 1-45, 5-19 andAnnex 13, Pppendix H , 1 and~nnex 13,
Apped-k I, 1-3.
94
19 -5, 150; Tenth Army, Action Report, El-IV-8; Tenth ~ r m y , ActimReport, P6-0-2; XXnr Corps,ActionRepart, 34; I11 mine e i a u s Corps, Action ~epart, 125, 216; m e ,mterview.
'?EM
"1st MPBn, FMFPac, Action Report, Phases I and 1 1 , 1-8; Becker, Interview. =lst IGBn, EMFPac, Action l%Ckddin, Interview.
c i d Action Report, Okinawa Operation, 2 " ' 6 t h b5dne Divisian, * wls., Phases I & 11, 30 Apr 45, Phase I11 (Okinawa: n.p., 30 Jim 4 9 , WI-11.12; EM. 1st Ekgineer ~ p e c i a i Brigade, 1-3.
"519th MPBn, 1-11; XXIV Corps, Action Report, 89-90.
PII-XXII-4, PII-XXII-1/9,
PII-XXII-1/9.
"er,
Interview.
"1st MPBn, Supple2pntal Actian Report, Phase 1 1 1 , 1-6; I11 Anphihiom Corps, Actian Report, 128. "519th MPBn, Action Report, 1-11. 67-69.
' v e n t &
1-11. 95
VII 2, 1-7, x 1.
PII-1-40. PII-1-40; USAFPOA, 218-220, 530-532. PII-XXII-I/~;USAFpoA, 218-220,
a r i n e "111 m i Corps, Action Report, 141-143; 1st M Divisian, Specid Action Report,Okinawa, Namei-Shot0 (Okinawa: 10 Jul 4 9 , 2; lst m, FMFP~C, mppl-td Action ~eport, P III, 1-15.
,
USAFPOA, 708,ff.
89-96. 133-138.
&
"1st MPBn, FMFPac, Action Repart, Phases I Suppl-td Action Repart, Phase III, 1-6.
'BBecker, Interview.
6'519th
m, Action
Report,
1-11. 1-8.
"52d MPBn, Action Repart, 1-2; Island C Pacific Ocean Areas, Gpration Plan No. 1, 1945). 3, Annex I, Pppendiv A, 10.
W a k , Interview.
"Cavallaro,
Interview.
& II
'?kTlth
PII-=I-5/6.
"1st MPBn, FMFPac, Action Repart, Phases I & 11 and Phase 111, 1-8 and 1-6.
Si%ucturdl ?qprapriateness
Military police structure p l d to support the U . S . Tenth Imny quantitatively met or exceeded dcctrinal support relatiaships in all but
t w o areas: support for Tactical Air Forces and support for Garrison Forces.
Although structure provided military police assets for Kadena and Yontan
airfields, it made no provision for develqwnt and rehabilitation of additional airfields c m Okinawa. Additionally, doctrinal aplayment of a military police escort guard canparrywithin the Garriscm Force or Island
adequate, deviated significantly run traditional task oqanization to meet uncticoldl r e q u i r t s . Planners clearly denonstrated fldility and
insight as t h e y shifted oryanizatimal caphasis forward in support of ccmbat forces. Tenth Imny shifted the 519th Military Police Battalion dawn to the
XXIV
aorps.
51st Military mlice Battalion, Island amMnd to the I11 Anphibious Corps. Planners abvicusly appreciated the challaqe facing the assault echelon by
cc~lcertwith
civilian
Curiously, the I11 2nphibious Corps received a large and disproportimate share of the military police support. This was due to the
this mission area. hragile plans to shift task organization ciuriq initial stages of the campaign sought to provide adequate support until garrison forces were established ashore. Houwer, e d rapid gains in the
the 1st Military Police Battalion and the 51st Military Police Battalion.
large nunkers of civilians. The 1st Military Police Battalion ultimately supported the 6th m i n e Division; hwever, it was spread out providixg a full m e of support ran the Haguski Beaches to the m t c h peninsula
In this case the overall force ashore was inadequate for the volume of
a s k civilians and aolcurrent missions. The poorly timed shift of t
organization was caused prjmrily by the absence of the 52d Military Police Battalion. Whereas Island aarmand military gme?mwnt structure ashore was
growing, t h e i r dedicated military police support, the 52d Military Police
Corps
C-4
were required to support the Island amMnd in the handling of exceeded the capabilities of their
m t m l sinailtaneously. Addititma1 support for these ccmbat forces was l c o l g doctrinallines obviously required. These units apporticmed forces a and had no pool of additional suppcat as at the corps-level. Military police f r r n c t i t m a l doctrine was cansidered in 611 but two areas: support for Tactical Air ~orces and Island amMnd p r i m of w a r inclosures. m
Area plans,
e is no evidence in the U.S. Amy Forces, Pacific Ocean plans, or U .S . Tenth Amy Garrisan Forces or
4
Island aarmand plans that either of these issues was properly cansidered. 100
First, the requirement for Tacticdl Air Force andrespective airfield protection was obviously critical to the achievenent of operational abjectives stated in chapter one. Anticipated Japanese tactics discussed in chapter three should have further highlighted this requilrenent. Plarmers, as noted, prqmmm3 two aviation military police canpauies into the Tactical Air Force force structure. Havever, the absence of detailed airfield security plans, the mspxified size and strucXure of the two aviation military police ampanies enployed, and the failuxe to structure for further base developaent disregarded doctrine and provide3 substandard support for mission.
As a result, plarmers did notprcgram sufficient structure or
both Radena and Yontan airfields during the capign. This clearly pointed out the inadequacy of both security planning and the structure of the two aviation military police canpanies assigned to these installations.
GTI
reflected disparity between plans and dcctrinal prescripts. nS noted in s chapters three and four, the Island Carmand p l d to a
the three corps prisoner of war i n c l e s
aperation of
concept of Amy-level or Island Carmand support for this missicm area clearly inferred the doctrinal requirement for a military police escort
guard ccmpany. Havever, plarmers placed this responsibility with the
and four, was tasked to provide a full range of military police support to the Island Cormand. This left little assurance that prisoner of wa operations wauld not directly caupete with other missim assigned to this battalion. Even thngh planners anticipated large lnaobers of priscolers,
to one central inclosure w h i c h the 1st Platcon, 162d Military Police Canpany, Prisoner of War Processing, guarded exclusively in the initial stages of the operation. This unit a m t e d s i t y for this inclosure
twice m e durhg the onp3aign resulting each time in a tenporary halt to prisoner of wax processing.
of these,
~~npower. These
unplanned
requirements detracted fran the priority required for traffic and civilian operations; mission areas with dire3 k p c t on the tacticai situation. Accepting this discussicm, military police structural p l still genemlly t h o miwas
A
areas and special organizaticms. It is absolutely crucial to note again that these plarmers identified the need for m e additional battalion which
m s civilian
handling in the north, and mass civilian handling south. The first was attributable to the late arrival of d t s in the assault echelon. The
seam3 was due to the late arrival of garriscm forces and poorly timed
shifting of task organization within the assault echelon. Finally, the third was due to support requirements which exceedd military police capabilities at that point in the campaign. P l gaps failed to reveal
n p J a c t that security and prisoner of war operations wauld have on the the i overall structure, but especially the Tactical Air Forces and the Garrison
Forces. This last inadequacy points to the only real exmple where the
While credit-
these control plans did not anpliment t a f f i c circulatian plans produced later.
This issue was k e y a d the control of military police, but remined
a deficiency nevertheless. Traffic operatims were successful except durjunctwes in the d g n : run Lt3 t o -11
two critical
A
1 1 Aqb&ious Corps Shore Eaxty of the north half of the of control by the I
Hagushi beaches.
the Corps Service Group had not landed and traffic an the beach. Gnce ashore these Marines quickly gained
control of traffic and successNly expanded north run Hagushi a l l the w a y t o the t@tobu peninsula. Initially this problem was due t o the late
weather dur-
criticized reactive
i f not relentless joint traffic control was credited with the maintenance of Route 1 and the ccmtinued sustainnent of both corps.
It is clear that
their zone.
of Okinawan civilians. This unction also had significant hipact qmn tactical forces. Military police operations relieved canbat forces of the
issue.
The absence of a Tenth Amy policy for use of force with civilians
pmblan
bli
This issue provides the only real negative note for this mission
a r e a . It sfaouldnot wershadav the accanplishwnt of appmxkately 3,000
military police who successfully collected, mxred, i n t d , and cared for a p p r c o c j l n a t e l y 300,000 civilian Okinawans.
The s l e
Island amMnd proved inadquate. As a result, the Island Carmand central inclamre failed to carry o u t the T e n t h A m y policy for segregation of p r i m ; only officers were segregated. This was the only deficiency noted thm&xmt both operatianal assesawnts. These operations successfully collected, mnred, held, protected, and pmessed over 10,000 p r i m of war.
mirKr
missions created a plaminy void. m, security missions were not i t h other unctiaal ccmsideratians prior to the properly coordinated w
canp?aign. This parallels those same security related deficiencies
h these
.
A
missions were generally successful, their unplanned nature inpcted qxm the quality of overall mission accanplislnnent. It is impossible to &tennine what other problems might have been avoided had plaminy and
planning cccurred. It is clear that military police security operations were credited with deterring and neutralizhq Japanese atteupts to disrupt operations in the Anny and both Corps1 rear areas. This prablen was m e of poor p1anni.q and not of operatianal execution. Finally, detailed planning for law and order operationssuch as straggler control, was also neglected. Although general policies, prahibitions, responsibilities, and mrrective actionswere prescribed, military police did not plan for posts and patrols prior to lading. This n y significant need for p1anni.q may have been deliberately anitte3 since a general enforcenent was not anticipated until later in the operation. In contrast, pilferkg was clearly eqxxted to manifest itself in the keachhead, yet specific military police plans were not available. ?+gain, a planning failure did not render negative operatianal results. Law and order operations as with security operations were successNly executed and achieved successful results. This raises the question of haw detailed planning should be prior to arrival i n the area of operations.
inprtant mission
given t -
seemingly randan focus and reaction amn=g various units. Further, the
Tenth Amy never exercised operational control of these forces at the
Army-level i n order to focus the military police effort and achieve mutual
suppoa for critical mission areas. This would have provided a possible
solution for sane of the issues resultfrun inadequate or unavailable
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Samuelsen, Lewis N., "Handlicq hany Civilians."mrine Corps Gazette: April 1945.
&amelsen, Lewis N . , 'W1s on the Bea~h.~I@tine Corps Gazette: August 1945. Vernan, E. H . , "Civil Affairs and Military Garenrment."Military Review: June 1946. Chqxlblished Material
Fix, Robert, G., BT, USA, lX?nth Anny in the Okinawa c%Wiign: An AMly~is fm the O p e r a t i d -ive. m, Thesis, U . S. Plmy Carmand
James, H . , Col., U D C R (Ret), Former Executive Officer, C 1st Military Police Battalion, R4F Pacific, DurOperatian Iceberg. Interview by author, 22 October 1994, Wimberly, TX. Tape r e a d i n g and transcript held by author.
Canparry,
W e r , Hans, H., Former PFC, U S C , maker 1st Military Police Battalian, FMF Pacific, w i n g Operation Iceberg. Interview by author, 12 Novanber 1994, Philadelphia, PA. Transcript held by author.
Parks, Nelson, G., FoLmer PFC, USMC, manber 1st Military Police Battalian, FMF Pacific, Eurhg t i a n Iceberg. Interview by author, 23 October 1994, Sam City, FL. Tape recording and transcript held by author.
sawyer, J & ,
P . , 11, mnwr IstLt. U S C , PlatLeader, 1st P1atccm.C 1st Military Police ~attaliian,FMF Pacific, Durirq t i a n Iceberg. Interview by author, 22 October 1994, Vero Beach, F'L. Tape recording and transcript held by author.
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Combined Arms Research Library U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900 Marine Corps Staff College Breckenridge Library MCCDC Quantico, Vn 22134 Marine Corps Historical Center Personal Papers Section Building 58, Washington Navy Yard 9 0 1 Street ~ S.E. Washington, DC 20374-5040 Commandant of the Marine Corps Security Branch, (POS-101, Operations Division Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps 2 Navy ~ n n e x Washington, DC 20380-1775 U.S. Army Military Police Museum U.S. Army Military Police School Fort McClellan, AL 36205-5114 Colonel Anthony Wood Marine Section USACGSC Fort Leavenworth, KS
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Lieutenant Colonel Robert G. Mangnnn, Ph.D. 1724 Tulane Brownwood, TX 76801 Colonel K e ~ e t h J. Becker, USMCR (Ret) 1225 Monte Verde Court LOS Altos, CA 94024-6732
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10. Master Sergeant F. "Ace" Arciaga, Jr., U S (Ret) 9881 Kings Canyon Drive Huntington Beach, CA 92646