Case: Valdes vs. RTC, G.R. No. 122749.

July 31, 1996Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married January 5, 1971. Begotten during themarriage were five children. In a petition, dated June 22, 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court granted the petition,thereby deClaring their marriage null and void on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity.Stella and Joaquin were placed in the custody of their mother and the older children chose whichparent they want to stay with. The petitioner and respondent are also directed to startproceedings in the liquidation of their property as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code andto comply to Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for theliquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the motion,the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father. Issue: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership. Arguments:Petitioner: Petitioner argues that:(1)"Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties arepsychological incapacitated. (2) "Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern thedisposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio ,including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of thespouses. (3)

"Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on theground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistentlywith Article 129.(4)"It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay." Respondent : Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decisiondirecting compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that theFamily Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in"unions without marriage." Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, theproperty relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership (Art 147 FamilyCode). Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtainedthrough their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shallbe considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the careand maintenance of the family

Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4s funeral. ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes. HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to

Carino V. Carino Article 40 In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee.

question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party this includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all. Mercado-Fehr vs. Fehr G.R. No. October 23, 2003

After due proceedings, the trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent void abinitio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of property. It appears from the facts, as found by the trial court, that in March 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, petitioner leftCebu City and moved in with respondent in the latters residence in Metro Manila. Their relations bore fruit and their first child, Michael Bruno Fehr, was born on December 3, 1983. The couple got married onMarch 14, 1985. In the meantime, they purchased on installment a condominium unit, Suite204, at LCG Condominium, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983executed by respondent as the buyer and J.V. Santos Commercial Corporation as the seller. Petitioner also signed the contract as witness, using the name Elna Mercado Fehr. Upon completion of payment, the title to the condominium unit was issued in the name of petitioner. In light of these facts, we give more credence to petitioners submission thatSuite 204 was acquired during the parties cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code, said property should be governed by the rules on co-ownership. The Family Code provides:Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to

have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly to the acquisition thereof if theformers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of their family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts intervivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the coownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar. This provision creates a co-ownership with respect to the properties they acquire during their cohabitation. We held in Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br.102, Quezon City: This peculiar kind of coownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term capacitated in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards

152716.

This case arose from a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code filed by petitioner ElnaMercadoFehr against respondent Bruno Fehrbefore the Regional Trial Court of Makati in March 1997.

not under any of the impediments mentioned in Article 37 and 38 of the Code. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima faciepresumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household. Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. It has not been shown that petitioner and respondent suffered any impediment to marry each other. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife when petitioner moved in with respondent in his residence and were later united in marriage. Their marriage, however, was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code because of respondents psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations. The disputed property, Suite204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installment basis on July 26, 1983, at the time when petitioner and respondent were already living together. Hence, it should be considered as common property of petitioner and respondent.

o p e r a t o r o f t h e passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight trainof the Philippine National Railways that took place on November 23, 1969which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its passengers. At the time of the accident, Eugenio Jose was legallym a r r i e d t o S o c o r r o R a m o s b u t h a d b e e n c o h a b i t i n g w i t h d e f e n d a n t - appellant, Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen (16) years in a relationship akin tothat of husband and wife.Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying thatthe decision be reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay damages jointly and severally with her co-defendant, but was denied.Issue:Whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code (now Article 148 of FC)i s a p p l i c a b l e in a case where one of t h e p a r t i e s i n a c o m m o n - l a w relationship is incapacitated to marry.Ruling:It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the co-ownershipcontemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and thewoman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contractmarriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there isan impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under theaforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and hislegal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damagesarising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengersof the jeepney which figured in the collision

employed as the vice presidentin a private corporation. The Imus Rural Bank, Inc. executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina Castillo Francisco, married to EduardoFrancisco, covering two parcels of residential land with a house. TheRegister of Deeds made of record at the dorsal portion of the said titles. Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila Cando for a loan. Itappears that Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed.Eduardo, who was then the General Manager and President of Reach Out Trading International, bought 7,500 bags of cement fromMIWCC but failed to pay for the same. MIWCC filed a complaint against himin the RTC of Makati City for the return of the said commodities, or thevalue thereof. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of MIWCC and against Eduardo. Josefina filed the said Affidavit of Third Party Claim in thetrial court and served a copy thereof to the sheriff. MIWCC then submittedan indemnity bond issued by the Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. The sale at public auction proceeded. MIWCC made a bid for the property. Josefina filed a Complaint against MIWCC and Sheriff Alejo in theRTC of Paraaque for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminaryinjunction or temporary restraining order. She alleged then that she wasthe sole owner of the property levied on execution by Sheriff Alejo. Hence,the levy on execution of the property was null and void.Issue:Whether or not the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina Castillo and Eduardo Francisco. Ruling: The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property withher personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she isthe sole owner of the property. The evidence on record shows that theImus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the property

Juaniza vs. Jose89 SCRA 306 Facts:E u g e n i o J o s e w a s t h e registered owner and

Francisco vs. Master Iron Works Construction Corp.G.R. No. 151967 February 16, 2005 Facts: Josefina Castillo was only 23 years old when she and Eduardo G.Francisco were married. Eduardo was then

to thepetitioner and titles over the property were, thereafter, issued to the latteras vendee after her marriage to Eduardo.It is to be noted that plaintiffappellee got married at the age of 23.At that age, it is doubtful if she had enough funds of her own to purchasethe subject properties as she claimed in her Affidavit of Third Party Claim.Confronted with this reality, she later claimed that the funds were providedby her mother and sister, clearly an afterthought in a desperate effort toshield the subject properties from appellant Master Iron as judgmentcreditor.

Mallilin vs. CastilloG.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000 Facts:Petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint for "Partitionand/or Payment of CoOwnership Share, Accounting and Damages" againstrespondent Ma. Elvira Castillo. The complaint alleged that petitioner andrespondent, both married and with children, but separated from theirrespective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship while their respectivemarriages still subsisted. During their union, they set up the SuperfreightCustoms Brokerage Corporation, with petitioner as president and chairmanof the board of directors, and respondent as vice-president and treasurer. The business flourished and petitioner and respondent acquired real andpersonal properties which were registered solely in respondent's name.D u e to irreconcilable differences, the couple s eparated. Petitionerdemanded from respon dent his share in the subject properties, b u t respondent refused alleging that said properties had been registered solelyin her name.Respondent admitted that she engaged in the customs brokerageb u s i n e s s w i t h p e t i t i o n e r b u t a l l e g e d t h a t t h e S u p e r f r e i g h t C u s t o m s Brokerage Corporation was organized

with other individuals and dulyr e g i s t e r e d w i t h the SEC. She d e n i e d t h a t s h e a n d p e t i t i o n e r l i v e d a s husba nd and wife because the fact was that they were still legally marriedto their respective spouses. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of allreal personal properties involved in petitioner's action for partition on theg r o u n d that they were acquired entirely out of her o w n m o n e y a n d registered solely in her name.Issue:Whether or not the parties are considered as co-owners of theproperties.Ruling:A c o - o w n e r s h i p exists between a man and a woman w h o l i v e together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewisep r o v i d e s t h a t , i f t h e p a r t i e s a r e i n c a p a c i t a t e d t o m a r r y e a c h o t h e r , properties ac quired by them through their joint contribution of money,property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion tot h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s w h i c h , i n t h e a b s e n c e o f p r o o f t o t h e c o n t r a r y , i s presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership eventhough the coupleare not capacitated to marry each other.

deedexecuted in 1959.4. Alayo died March 1967. In 1970 Josefa andJosephi ne executed a document of extra-judicialpartition and sale of the lot, which was described as conjugal property. Josefas share went to Josephine for P10,000, so Josephine Belcodero had fullownership. Notice was published.5. In October 1980 Juliana (real widow) and 3 ch ildrenfiled for reconveyance of property. Trial Curt andCourt of Appeals ruled in favor of Juliana.ISSUES:1. The husband acquired ownership while li ving with aparamour, after deserting his wife. Property boughtprior to effectivity of 1950 Civil Code but the final deedwas ensued after. And the Family Code took effect1988.a. Whether the property was acquired in 1949 when he first started paying installment or in1959 when the deed was finalized, result isthe same. Property belongs to conjugalpartnership of Alayo and legal wife Juliana. Under old and new Civil Code all property is presumed to belong to conjugal partnership 3 unless it is provided that it is exclusive to either spouse b. Property acquired by Alayo, he merely had the title transferred to Josefas name. Sheimplicitly recognized Alayos ownership when she and Josephine filed extrajudicial partitionof the said property the partition wouldhave conformed with partition in intestancyhad they been sole and legitimate heirs ofAlayo.2. Common law spousesa. In Art 144 and in Maxey v. CA the co-ownership rule had been repudiated wheneither of the spouses had impediments tomarryb. Art 147 and 148 of Family Code did notdeviate from old rules. Art 148 says that:when one of the parties is

Belcodero v Court of Appeals FACTS:1. Alayo Bosing married Juliana Oday in 1927 and th eyhad 3 children. In 1946 he abandoned them and livedwith Josefa Rivera (whom he acknowledged ascommon law wife Josefa Bosing). They had one child,Josephine Bosing, now Josephine Belcodero.2. He married Josefa Bosing in 1958, while still marriedto Juliana.3. Alayo purchased parcel of land on installment ba sis in1949 and his deed he named Josefina Bosing as hiswife and transferred lot in her name. Final

validly married toanother, his or her share of the coownershipshall accrue to the conjugal property of thevalid marria ge. But the provisions cant apply to this case without interdicting prior vested rights, so the provisions dont apply. 3. Constructive trusta. Acc to Art 1456: If property is acquired bymistake the person obtaining it is trustee forimplied trustb. The applicable reconveyance period is tenyears. Under the Torrens System theprescriptive period starts when transaction isregistered and a Certificate of Title is issued.Josephine Belocdero got the Certificate in1974 and Juliana filed the case in 1980.4. New evidencea. Juliana married again, but no legal separation was brought to Alayo during hislifetime si this holds no relevanceDECISION:Affirmed, property goes to Juliana. Villanueva v. CA (April, 2004) J. Carpio Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the coownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding

Article.The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. (144a) Facts:1. Eusebia Napisa Retuya (ENR) is legal wife of NicolasRetuya (NR), married Oct 1926; 5 children. Duringmarriage, they acquired real properties and allimprovements in Mandaue City and Consolacion,Cebu (Case enumerated 20 parcels of land).a. One of those parcels of land was in thename of Pacita Villanueva (PV).b. Also, NR is co-owner of a parcel of land inMandaue wc he inherited from parents.c. Some of abovementioned properties earnincom e from coconuts and the otherlands/houses are leased to a number ofindividuals and corporations.2. In 1945, NR no longer lived with legit family andcohabited with PV with whom he had an illegitimateson, Procopio Villanueva (PRV).a. Nicolas then was the only person whoreceived income of abovementionedproperties.b. Pacita from time of concubi nage with NR, nooccupation, no properties.3. In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke, could not talk norwalk. From time NR suffered stroke until present,PRV has been receiving income of said properties.a. Daughter Natividad Retuya (DNR) askedPRV that they talk things over but PRV saidit was not yet time to talk about the matter.

23 b. No settlement was reached betweenlegitimate family and the illegitimate family.4. Oct 1988, ENR filed complaint before RTC against NR, PV and PRV, seeking reconveyance from NRand PV of several properties as such were herconprops with NR. She also prayed for accounting,damages and delivery of rent

and other income fromsubject properties.a. At the court, DNR testified that land in nameof PV was property bought by NR from oneAdriano Marababol for at time of purchase,PV had no means of livelihood.b. RTC decided in favor of Eusebia.c. The petitio ners appealed to CA. Eusebiadied and so heirs substituted her pursuant toCA resolution. CA upheld RTC decision.d. Petitioners filed for MR but it was denied.5 . Petitioners went to SC.a. RTC and CA were one in saying PV failed torebut presumed conjugality of propertiesunder A116/FC.b. Petitioners sought reversal and raisedamong others (as conjugality and bar byprescription on action for reconveyance overlot under PV name. They are offtangent totopic though) whether CA erred in notapplying instead presumption underA148/FC in favor of coownership bet NRand PV.Issue: Did CA err in not applying instead presumption underA148/FC in favor of coownership bet NR and PV?Decision: NO. CA was correct in not applying insteadpresumption under A148/FC in favor of co-ownership bet NRand PV.Rationale:1. Petitioners relian ce on A148 of FC is misplaced. Areading of said provision shows there must be proof of actual joint contribution by both live -in partnersbefore the property becomes co-owned by them inproportion to their contribution.2. The presumption of equality of contributio n inA148/FC arises only in the absence of proof of theirproportionate contributions, subject to condition thatactual joint contribution is proven first. Petitionersfailed to provide such proof of actual joint contributionin the acquisition of land in PV name. Hence, no co-ownership and no presumption of equal sharing. DOMINGO v CA DATE: September 17, 1993PONENTE: Justice RomeroPARTIES: Roberto Domingo

v CA and Delia Soledad AveraACTION: PETITION for review of the decision of the CA (that dismissed Domingos petition to dismiss Delia Averas petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation ofProperty).FACTS:1. Delia filed a petition before RTC of Pasig against RobertoDomingo.2. They were married November 29, 1976 but unknown toher, Roberto already had a previous marriage withErmelina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which was still validand existing. She only found out when in 1983 Ermelinasued them for bigamy.3. Since 1979, Delia has been working in Saudi Arabia andshe used to come to the Philippines only when she wouldavail of the onemonth annual vacation shes given. 4. Since 1983 up to the present, Domingo has beenunemployed and completely dependent upon her forsupport and subsistence; out of her personal earnings,she purchased real and personal properties which areunder the possession and administration of Roberto5. In June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, shediscovered that he was cohabiting with another womanand she further discovered that he had been disposing ofsome of her properties without her knowledge or consent6. Thereafter she appointed her brother Moises R. Avera asher attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties7. Domingo failed and refused to turn over the possessionand administration of said properties to herbrother/attorney-in-fact.8. The petition in the Pasig RTC

and of no forceand effect- and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusiveowner of all properties acquired at the time of their voidmarriage and such properties be placed under the propermanagement and administration of her attorney-in-fact. Domingo:- filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the petitionstated no cause of action.- The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for thedeclaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous andunnecessary.- He added that Delia has no property which is in hispossession.9. RTC Ruling: Denied Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.Judge Maria Austria says:On Domingo arguing that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage : Indeed, underYap v CA there is no dispute that the second marriagecontracted by respondent with herein petitioner after a firstmarriage with another woman is illegal and void. However, the issue in the Yap case wasnt whether or not the second marriage should first be judicially declared anullity. The case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, is moreapplicable when the Supreme Court ruled in explicit termsthat there is need for judicial declaration of its nullity.- Finally, the contention of respondent that petitioner hasno property in his possession is an issue that may bedetermined only after trial on the merits.10. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Domingostressing the erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra v.GSIS and the absence of justiciable controversy as to thenullity of the marriage.11. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motionfor reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days fromreceipt within which to file his answer.

Petitioner of that case (respondent in this one), Delia wanted- temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminaryinjunction be issued enjoining Domingo from exercisingany act of administration and ownership over saidproperties- their marriage be declared null and void

27 12. Instead of filing the required answer, Domingo filed aspecial civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the groundthat the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion todismiss.13. On February 7, 1992, the CA dismissed the petition.- It explained that the case of Yap v. CA cited by petitioner(Domingo) and that of Consuegra v. GSIS cited by the lowercourt do not have relevance in the case at bar, because thesecases dealt with the successional rights of the second wifewhile this case prays for separation of property corollary withthe declaration of nullity of marriage.- It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution ofthe properties acquired during the union can be had only uponproper determination of the status of the marital relationshipbetween said parties.Furthermore, the declaration of nullity of marriage may beinvoked in this proceeding together with the partition anddistribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and52 of the Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayerfor declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may beraised together with other incidents of their marriage such asthe separation of their properties.- Lastly, it noted that since the Court has jurisdiction, thealleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss ismerely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would havebeen to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of anadverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion

forreconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit.14. Case filed at the SC

Petitioners Argument for SC case (Domingo): - That the Declaration of nullity must be dismissed for beingunnecessary (since marriage was void ab initio in the firstplace) AND- he interprets Art 40 of FC to mean that a declaration of nullityshould only be sought for the purpose of remarriage. And sincethere was no mention of an intention to remarry in the petition,petition should be dismissed. Respondent (Delia): Declaration is necessary notfor the purpose of remarriage but as basis for theseparation and distribution of properties.ISSUE:1. WON petition for judicial declaration of a voidmarriage is necessary and should it be filed only forthe purpose of remarriage.2. WON Declaration of Nullity and Separation o fProperty is the proper remedy for Delia to recover herproperties.RULING:1. WON declaration is necessary: YES! There is no question that the marriage of petitioner andrespondent is bigamous. Petitioner himself does not disputethe absolute nullity of their marriage. However, the rule is, it isnot for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void ornot. That judgment is reserved to the courts. After a lot ofconflicting jurisprudence, the Family Code finally ruled thateven if a marriage is void ab intio, it still needs a judicialdeclaration for nullity to be upheld. (See notes on themovement of requiring the declaration) Should it be filed only for the purpose of remarriage ? NO! Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is theposition in the provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, itshows that it is meant to qualify "final

judgment declaring suchprevious marriage void." The provision in question, as it finallyemerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previousmarriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . ..," in which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "forpurposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, theinterpretation of petitioner would have been correct that theabsolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solelyfor purposes of remarriage.The way Article 40 is formulated denotes that final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not beobtained only for purposes of remarriage.2. WON Declaration is proper remedy: YES!Wh en a marriage is declared void ab initio, law statesthat final judgment on the case shall provide for: theliquidation of properties, custody of common children anddelivery of presumptive legitimes. So since FC clearlyprovides for the effects of a declaration of nullity (as seen inArt 43 and 44), including jurisdiction to rule over propertyrelations, lower court committed no abuse of discretion.DISPOSITIVE:WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.Court of Appeals decision, AFFIRMED.NOTE: (Just in case it is important) MOVEMENT ON HOW JUDICIAL DECLARATION OFNULLITY WAS FINALLY AFFIRMED The cases of People v. Aragon and People v.Mendoza are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void,bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that JusticeAlex Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions statingthat: Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for thespouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. . . .

This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majorityposition in subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus,in Gomez v. Lipana, the Court abandoned its earlier ruling inthe Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court'sorder forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed propertyacquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "ifthe nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for theapplication of Article 1417, there is need for a judicialdeclaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action forthat purpose."Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently heldin Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service InsuranceSystem, that "although the second marriage can be presumedto be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriagewas still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration ofsuch nullity."In Tolentino v. Paras, however, the Court turnedaround and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling onceagain. In granting the prayer of the first wife asking for adeclaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction ofthe death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained that"(t)he second marriage that he contracted with privaterespondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null andvoid from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicialdecree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a voidmarriage."However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v.Sempio-Diy the Court reverted to the Consuegra case and held

28

that there was "no need of introducing evidence about theexisting prior marriage of her first husband at the time theymarried each other, for then such a marriage though void stillneeds according to this Court a judicial declaration of such factand for all legal intents and purposes she would still beregarded as a married woman at the time she contracted hermarriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."Came the Family Code which settled once and for allthe conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of theabsolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required eitheras a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where theabsolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invokedfor purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basisacceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legalinfirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriagevoid.The Family Law Revision Committee and the CivilCode Revision Committee which drafted what is now theFamily Code of the Philippines took the position that parties toa marriage should not be allowed to assume that theirmarriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before theycan be allowed to marry again. ILLUSTRATION:Aragon and Mendoza (no need) -- dissent by J.Reyes (there is) dissent adopted in Gomez v Lipana andabandoned Aragon and Mendoza (there is need) Consuerga v GSIS (applied Gomez v Lipana = there isneed) Tolentino v Paras (went back to Aragon andMendoza = no need) Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (appliedConsuerga = need) FC: there is need

Persons: Property relations: Art. 148 Agapay v Palang 28 July 1997 Ponente: Justice Romero SUMMARY: Miguel Palang married Carlina, left for Hawaii,and then refused to return to her and their daughter, Herminia.Instead, he married Erlinda Agapay (the marriage was void,since he was still married to Carlina), bought some rice landand a house and lot, and had a son, Kristopher, with Erlinda.Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of the crime ofconcubinage. After he died, Carlina and Herminia demandedthat they get the properties Miguel bought while he was livingwith Erlinda. The RTC ruled that the properties would go toErlinda and Kristopher. The CA reversed the decision andga ve the properties to Carlina and Herminia. Kristopher wasntofficially recognized as Miguels illegitimate child. TheSupreme Court ruled that under Art. 148, Erlinda shouldhave made an actual contribution to the purchase of therice land if she wanted to have a share in it. Since she didnt, she and Kristopher werent entitled to any part of it. As for the house and lot, the sale was under Erlindas name,but the money was Miguels, making it a donation to her. Art. 87 prohibits donations made between people who are livingtogether as husband and wife. FACTS: Case is a petition for review of a decision of the Court ofAppeals -

Miguel Palang married respondent Carlina (or Cornelia)Vallesterol in 1949, then left to work in Hawaii. They hadone child in 1950: Herminia o Miguel tried to divorce Carlina as early as 1957, andwhen he returned for good in 1972, he refused to livewith Carlina and Herminia 15 July 1973: Miguel (63) married Erlinda Agapay (19,petitioner) o Two months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda jointlypurchased a parcel of rice land which was issued intheir names o 23 September 1975: Erlinda allegedly bought a houseand lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan. It was issued in hername o They had a son, Kristopher A. Palang, born on 6December 1977 30 October 1975: Miguel and Carlina Palang executed aDeed of Donation as a compromise agreement. They bothagreed to donate their conjugal property to HerminiaPalang. 1979: Upon Carlinas complaint, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage 15 February 1981: Miguel died 11 July 1981: Carlina Palang and Herminia Palang de laCruz instituted the case at bar o They wanted recovery of ownership and possessionwith damages against Erlinda

They wanted the rice land and the house and lotthat Miguel allegedly bought while he was livingwith Erlinda Lower Court: DISMISSED Carlinas complaint. There was little evidence to prove that the properties were Carlina and Miguels conjugal properties, and the Lower Court provided for the intestate shares of the parties o It confirmed the fact that Erlinda Agapay exclusivelyowned the house and lot in Binalonan and that sheowned half of the rice land in Binalonan o It adjudicated to Kristopher as his inheritance, half of therice land; as long as he executes a quit-claim within 15days, renouncing claims to annul or reduce Herminias donation from her parents Court of Appeals : REVERSED the trial courts decision o Declared that Carlina and Herminia were the owners ofthe properties o Ordered Erlinda to vacate the properties and deliverthem to Carlina and Herminia o Ordered the Pangasinan Registrar of Deeds to cancelthe Transfer Certificates of Title and issue another certificate of title in Carlinas and Herminias names 24

ISSUES o Erlinda claims that the Court of Appeals erred:1. In not sustaining the validity of the deeds covering theabsolute sale of the rice land and the house and lot2. In not finding that Kristopher should be considered party-defendant in the case before the trial court3. In not declaring Kristopher as Miguels illegitimate son and thus entitled to inherit from Miguels estate SUPREME COURT RULING Petition DENIED, challenged CA decision AFFIRMED HELD Petitioner Agapays claims have no merit 1. The deeds of sale of the properties should go to Carlinaand Herminia Deeds of conveyance were valid Applicable provision of law is Art. 148 of the FamilyCode: property regime for when a man and a woman who arent capacitated to marry cohabitate or live under a void marriage o Miguel and Erlinda married in 1973, but their unionwas void because Miguel was still married toCarlina. o Art. 148: only properties acquired by both throughactual joint contribution of money, property orindustry shall be owned by them in common, inproportion to their respective contributions. If a

partys contribution isnt proven, there will be no co -ownership and no presumption of equal shares Rice Land: o CA correctly ruled that it would revert to Miguel and Carlinas conjugal partnership o Purchase was made when Erlinda was only 20; she couldnt have been able to have c ontributed thePhP3750 that she claims was her share in the purchaseprice. Also, Miguel was already 64 and a pensioner ofthe US Government House and Lot: o Erlinda allegedly bought it for PhP20,000, but the notarypublic testified that Miguel provided the money andsimply asked that Erlinda alone be placed as vendee. This makes it a donation, which is void under Art.739 of the Civil Code since it was made by personsguilty of concubinage Art. 87 also expressly provides that donationsbetween spouses now also applies to donationsbetween those who cohabitate as spouses The fact that Miguel and Carlina agreed to donate their conjugal property to Herminia is immaterial. It doesnt count as a judicial confirmation of separation of property since it wasnt spec ifically and expressly for separation ofproperty.2. Kristophers claim as illegitimate son and heir to Miguels estate should have been ventilated in the proper probatecourt or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose.An unrecognized child has no rights from his

parents or totheir estate3. Kristopher had not been impleaded before the trial courtand therefore was not involved in the case at bar Property relations: Art 121 Family Code Ayala Investment and Development Corp v. CA (1998) Private respondents: spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching FACTS :1. Respondent Alfredo , as executive VP of Philippine Blooming Mills, made himself answerable with PBMs indebtedness to Ayala when he executed securityagreements . PBM failed to pay the P50M loan.2. Ayala filed a case for sum of money with CFI Pasig,which in turn ordered PBM and Alfredo to pay Ayala.While appeal of the judgment was pending, the lowercourt issued a writ of execution. There, a sheriff salewas conducted on 3 of the respondents conjugal properties . An auction sale of the properties wasscheduled.3. The spouses sought to enjoin the auction sale. Lowercourt favored the spouses. Ayala filed with CA, whichin turn, enjoined the lower court from enforcing itsorder (to suspend auction sale). So, the auction saletook place. Ayala was the only bidder (as usual), andwas issued a Certificate of Sale and later, Final Deedof Sale .4. A different legal situation arose because 2 of theproperties are in the name of Encarnacion Ching, anonparty to the case before CFI Pasig.5. So CFI Pasig proceeded with the trial. It decided thatthe sale on execution was null and void.

The Courtof Appeals affirmed the decision. Art 121 FC: The conjugal partnership shall be liable for all debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by thedesignated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains . (Art 161 CC is similarly worded.) Ayalas main contention: The conjugal partnership of thespouses is liable for Alfredos obligation. Theres no need to prove that actual benefit redounded to the benefit of thepartnership. The transaction Alfredo entered into was for thebenefit of the conjugal partnership. ISSUE : Is the agreement that Alfredo entered into considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership which is chargeable against the conjugal partnership? RULING:NO. Alfredo acted only as a surety or guarantor , i.e., he didnot directly receive the money and services to be used for his own business or profession unless Ayala can pr ove that theconjugal partnership actually benefited from the contract. Ayalafailed to do so.Ayala merely cited as benefits the prospects of longeremployment and probable increase in the value of stocks ofthe family in PBM. The Court said these were indirect andremote, incidental and speculative not the benefits referred toby Art 121 FC and Art 161 CC. The contract of loan is clearly for the benefit of theprincipal debtor (PBM), and not for his family. PBM has a personality distinct from Alfredos f amily, even if the familyowns stocks in PBM. It was a corporate debt.

And Ayalas right of recourse against Alfredo as surety is only to the extent of his corporate

25 stockholdings. It does not extend to the conjugal partnership of gains of Alfredos family . Why does the contract have to be those that redounded to the benefit of the family and that the measure of the partnerships liability is to the extent that the family is benefited? Because the laws concern is for the conservation of the conjugal partne rship, for the husbands duty to protect and safeguard, if not augment. Not to dissipate it.