NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE LITTORAL

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

WILLIE LOVELACE, JR., LCDR, USN B.A., University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1997

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6 June 1597

IMaaer's Thesis 4 August 19%-6 June 1997

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~ a v a Operations l in the Littoral.

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Lieutenant Commander Willie Lovelace, Jr., U. S. Navy

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U.S. Army Commandand General StaffCollege ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fon Leavenwonh, Kansas 66027-1352
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A s the United States Navy shifrs iu hrndamental war fightingaway fmm blue-waler to brown-wateropedons.,il will be oresented with a fluid and a dvnamic , banlefield unlike anv it has faced since the &v 1950s. This battlefield will demandthecreation of innovative ideas and war fi hting principl& for the successful employinentof Naval Expeditionary Forces and the maintenance of critical sea lines o communicationsin support of our national military nraregy.
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The Navy white paper, "...Fmmthe Sea," the Marine Corpsconcept paper. "Sea Dragon,'and the pmposedNavy white paper "2020Vision for the 2lst Century" attempt to exploit the inherent advanrages derived hum combiningopedonal m w v e r s fmm the sea and superior U.S. technology in achieving success withln the battlefields of the littorals. Howeve~ this visualization of the battlespace may be too limited and should be bmadened to include all facets ofoperations includir sustainment issues in a joint sewice environment.

This study investigates the scope of naval operations as a sustaining force for the initial insertion of gmunduniu in the ne; co:stal envimnment. Specifically, it examines the feasibility and acceptablity of explanding naval operations into the rear-area sustaimnt envimnmentof Army ground troops.

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Naval operations in the littorals, sunainment issues, joint logistics.

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MAS'I'EK OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE TIIESIS APPKOVAI. PAGE

Nrune or Czuididalc: LCDR Willic Lovclncc, Jr.; U.S. Navy Thesis Title: Naval Operations in Lhc Liltoral

Approvcd by:

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Thcsis Committee Chairman

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. Mcmber, Consulling Faculty

! : Accepted thls 6th day or June 1997 b

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.D~rcctor.Gradualc Dcgree Programs

Philip J . Brookcs. Ph.D.

l'hc opin~ons and conclusions cxprcssed hcrcin arc h x c ofthe sludcnl author mid do not necessarily reprcscm thc vicws of the U.S. Army Command and General Sta[TCollcgc or any other govemnicnlal agency. (Rcrercnccs L o lhis stud! should include thc roregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

NAVAL OI'ERATIONS IN THE LITTOKAL by I.CDR Willie I.ovelace, Jr., USN, 73 pages As the Unitcd States Navy shifls its fundamental war fighting strategy away from blue-water (open ocean) to brown-water (coastal littoral) operations, it will be prcscnted with a fluid and a dynamic battlcficld unlike any it has faced since the early 1950s. This battlefield will demand and dictate the creation of innovative ideas and war fighting principles for the successful cmploymcnt ofNaval Expeditionary Forces and the maintenance of critical sea lines of communications to achieve our national sccurily stratcgy and military objectives. ~l'he Navy white papcr, "Forward ...From the Sea," the Marine Corps concept paper. " Sca Dragon," and the proposed Navy whitc paper "2020 Vision: A Navy for the 21st Century" attempt to exploit the inherent advantages derived from combining operational maneuvers from the sea and superior U.S. technology in achieving success within thc battlefields ofthe littorals. I-lowevcr, this visualization ofthe hattlc space may bc too limited and should hc broadened to includc all facets of operations including sustainrncnt issues i n a joint service cnvironmcnt. This study investigatcs the scope and limitation of naval operations in a supporting role and as a sustaining forcc for the initial insertion of ground units in the near coastal environment. Specifically, it examincs the feasibility and acceptability of expanding naval operations into the rcar-area sustainment environment of Army ground troops.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank a11 ol'the contributors for participating in this study. I am deeply
indchted to hlAJ Mark l.una, LCDR Richard Anderson, MAJ Michacl R. I'aync, and M,4J Kenneth Dyer for thcir ndvicc. assistancc, and cncouragerncnt. Without the compctcnt and patient support of thc individuals who assisted with thc typing of all drafts and tinal versions of the chapters of this thesis. this work would not havc bccn possible. I am thus indebted to A n n Chapman. Finally, I am grateful to my wife: Rrcnda, and my family for thcir undcrstnnding and support.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

AI'PROVAL I'AGE ABS'I'KACT................................................................................................................................. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .......................................................................................................... LIS'I' OF TARI, ES ..................................................................................................................... CHAPTER ONE. TWO. INTKODUCTION................................................................................................ REVIEW OF 1 . ITEKATURE .............................................................................

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TIIREE. RESEARCH M!XHODOl.OCiY ..................................................................... FOUR . ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................... FIVE. CONCLIJSIOIU'S AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..............................................

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APPENDIXES A . 1~IEI.ICOPTER1.IFT CAI'ARILI'~ILS ........................................................................... 64 65 67 69 73

..................................... B . CAIXULKI'ION 0 1 : 'IL'AC LIIyf (:APAUII.ITY ............. .

C. UNIT DOIIIC SlJMMARY FOR ARMD CAV REG'I' .............................................. I\IBLIOGRAPI-IY...................................................................................................................

. . ........................................................................ INITIAI, L~ISTRIDU'I'ION LISI'...............

LIST 01: TABI-ES

Table

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..l .eam Composition............................................................................. I. 12andlng
.. .. . . learn . 2 . Land~ng Compos~t~on ............................................................................... ... 3 . Amphibious force Capabllltles: 2010-2015 .................................................
27 44 45 46 47 47 48 49 51 51

..................................................... 4 . Amphibious Ship Characteristic~lCa~ab~l~t~es

. . . . 5 . Aviation Character~st~cs of Mk.F .................................................................... .. 6 . Maximum Over-thc-l lorizon Transport Capac~t~es .............................................
7. Over-the-Horizon Total Daily Transport Capacities ..........................................

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8 . Task I'orcc Daily Sustainment Kcquirenlent........

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9. Estimated Bulk POI Consumption ...................................................................

10. Iistimatcd Ammunition C:onsumption ............................................................... I I. Total Weapon Systems (ACR) ..............

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12. [.anding Team Landing Requirement............................................................... 13 . [.anding Team r)aily Sustainment Kcquirement ................................................ 14. Total Ir ~ p s per Day...........................................................................................

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CHAlYfER ONE' NI'RODIJC'I'ION

I be a successful commandcr at any c c h ?Ion, ~ you havc better think about logistics and you had better make sure that when you are rcady to go you have enough fiel, beans, bullcts and bandages-all o f the ihings to sustain your forcc.'

-General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., N D P - I

To~ic. k ~ c k ~ r o u nand d. Sco~c l'hc above maxim, attributcd to Gencral Carl E. Mundy, .lr., IJSMC, Commandant o f the IJnited States Marine Corps. i s perhaps more applicable today than any other period in U.S. military history. With largc reductions i n the number o f troops forwardly deployed outside o f the United Statcs and the corresponding loss o f their support networks, the military can no longer dcpend upon having large quantities o f prcstaged war material in theater to meet I J . 5 wartinlc needs. The world i s changing at a rapid pace. Thc collapsc o f t h e Rcrlin Wall in 1989, continuing democratic reforms in thc former Soviet Union, and thc dissolution o f thc Warsaw Pact arc all examples o f rcccnt events which havc virtually changed the way t l ~ c United States military preparcs and trains for operations. Campaigns i n which largc conscript armics deploy to regions around the world to tight the nation's wars arc not the combat opcrations o f the futurc. With more nations leaning or shifting toward dclnocratic tendencies, the increasing cost o f maintaining largc militaries and the support mechanisms which drive thcm, demand greater responsibility and accoontabilit) on the part o f military planncrs in the cmploymcnt o f thcsc forces. Successful military leaders must learn to economize their forces to mcet the uncertaintics

o f a post-cold war era. Simply stated, the 1J.S. military must learn to do morc with lcss by rcdetining tlic size and composition o f folrcs elected to deploy around thc world to safeguard

US. national security interests.

T o influence world evcnts overseas and to maintain its current position in a new world order, America needs a credible, forwardly deployable, power projection capability. The ilnited Slates Navy has historically provided this capability. However, the battlefield o f the futurc w i l l demand a mixturc o f forces from other services, tailor-made to combat a particular threat. The answcr is a powcr projection force-contingency forces from all services. I n carrying out thcse missions. these forces w i l l most likely conduct joint operations under the framework o f a unilied commandcr or his dcsignated reprcsentativc Commander, Joint Task Force. I t w i l l be the commandcr's responsibility, and rightly so, to ensurc that tlic appropriatc support organization i s in placc to sustain this i'orce. I n order to achievc maximum initial combat power and rapid deployment wit11 littlc or no advance noticc, contingency forces most likely w i l l dcploy to "hot spots" around tlic globe with minimal logistics asscts. Compounding this problem, it is equally likely that these forces w i l l deploy to areas without the henefit o f preestablished support bases with prepositioned material and w i l l receive minimal host nation support. Kegartlless o f tlic circumstances, U.S. military forccs must bc capable o f responding to any and all contingencics despite the political situation surrounding the rcgion and the support mechanisms i n place to support it. Once deployed, thc U.S. forcc must bc capable o f sustaining combat power throughout thc full term o f the deployment. U.S. military forces must be able to achieve economy o f force and mass by sharing critical resources and support mechanisms among all branchcs orsenriccs. I n effect. the military must crcatc a continuous and scamless joint logistical support hasc to meet the demands o f a l l o f U.S. forccs.

The IJnited States Naval Scrvices have developed a versatile new concept for projecting power ashorc. As prescntcd. this ncw concept would meet thc needs of policy makers whcn

deploying contingcncy forccs and still rcspcci the international rights of a particular region.
'l'his concept, at lcast on the surfacc. appears to be easily moditiablc and capable of accomlnodating a brigade-sizcd or larger ground force similar to that o f a Marine Air Ground Task Force. This ncn concept is known as "Operational Maneuvcr From the Sc3 (OMFTS)."' OMITS is about the projection of maritime po\vcr ashore. It ofrers the ultimntc marriage bctween economy of force, cffort, and mass.' Howcvcr, contrary to traditional naval expeditionary campaigns, OMITS is not simply putting \vavcs ofmarincs and sailors ashorc in the traditional linear amphibious landing followed by the establisliment of beachheads for the Sollow-on assault. Separately controlled movements, supporting operations, landings, and maneuvcr ashore arc rcplaced with a decisivc capability to quickly maneuver from ship to ob.jectivc bringing to hcar all fscets of naval power. 1,ogistics sites will bc sea hascd on naval ships. 'l'l~cintroduction of ibllo\v-on ground troops through the seized landing sitcs will follow the initial assault phasc.'While thc sca protects the Navy front lines and flanks, thc maritimc force can projcct all of its combat power at the timc and place of its choosing. The Navy will deploy its forccs along broad fronts (up to 600 to 700 nautical rnilcs), thinning the encmy's
capabilities to defend the landing while massing operating systcms at thc decisivc point to sccure

thc military objective.' 'This concept depends highly on thc U.S. abilih to sustain the contingcncy force from sea based logistical sitcs similar to those traditionally employed by the Army's Division Support C:ommand (1)ISC:OM). I'hc Navy and the Marine Corps havc cmbraced "Forward ...From the Sca" as its guidance for achieving battlc space dominance; to include logistical functions, ihrough the

concepts o f OMFTS and power projection. As the prime mover o f fonvardly deployed contingency forces operating in the joint arena of the littorals, Naval Expeditionary Forces most be willing and prepared to seek opportunities to cxploit its traditional strengtlis and the inherent advantages achicvcd through power projection and the Navy's dominance o f the sea. 'fhe U.S. military must be capable o f expanding its influence into areas not normally associated with Navy or Marinc Corps operations. Recent operations, such as Operation Desert Storm: Grenada and Hosnia. provided U.S. forces a baseline for assessing its prcparcdness and ability to adequalely support land operations in the joint warfare cnvironmcnt. But, as stated earlier. fiturc littoral operations w i l l most likely introduce maneuvering forces and their equipment onto hostile shores without the benefit o f secured pons or support bases. Given this i b c the ~ logistical successes in Dcsert Shield and Desert Storm, by virtually
1 1 1 1 assessments.

were tlie esceptions rather than thc rule. A more

detailed analysis o f littoral warfare uncovers the real danger o f mines, coastal navies, coastal batteries and air-to-surface and air-to-air missiles. Additionally, future adversaries w i l l not give tlie [J.S. six months to stockpile a logistical base prior to the commencement o f offensive

operations. 1\11 o f these dangers present a rcal threat to maintaining critical sca lines o f support.
1.!.S. forces w i l l face a myriad o f problems during the initial insertion and cnsuing battle. These
forces should not have to worry about how they are going to sustain themselves. Ry expanding the Navy's area o f responsibility inland, overlapping coverage potentially provides protection and logistical support o f ground units during h i s critical phase. lmprovcd sensors and enhanced mobility should enahle the Navy to dominatc and control the battle spacc o f t l i e littorals more than ever before. Naval Doctrine I'ublication 1, Naval Warhre, defines the littorals as "those regions relating to or existing on a shore or coastal region, within direct control o f and vulnerable to the

striking power o f naval expeditionary forccs."TThe hattle spacc includes thc air, surfacc, subsurface. spacc clcctronic spectrum. and the land in thc objective arca. b'hile tlic threats in thc open ocean have diminished, U.S. naval forces w i l l he cl~allcnged in the confined and congested watcrs o f the littoral areas. 'l'hc f i r s t task o f tlic naval expeditionary forces is to isolate the

objective area; protcct U.S. fnrces; and limit and shapc cncmy actions by projecting power to
rstablish air, sea, and information dorninancc. Landing forccs then establish land hattlc spacc dorninancc and pro,ject their powcr against ohjectivcs ashorc.' Opcrations in the battlc spacc o f the littoral w i l l have four intcrlcavcd componcnts-approaching tlic littoral. operations in and on ihe littoral, arid leaving the littoral.' components arc further defined below: These

1. .4pproaching thc littoral--where thc maritime force can dctcr or strike the cncmy, but

IIC has difficulty reaching U.S. naval hrces.

2. Operating i n the littoral--\vilere the fricndly and enemy maritimc forces can mutually
engage.

3. Operating on tlic littoral--the maritimc cxpeditionary forcc put people ashorc and
support their operations (primarily from the sca).

4. Leaving the littoral--operations ibllowing mission acco~nplishrncnt.''

Levels of' I.ocristics Support Naval Doctrinc Publication 4, Naval Lonistics, defines logistics as the scicncc o f planning and carrying out the movemcnt and maintenance o f forccs.'"n its most

comprehensive scnsc, it includes those aspccts o f military operations which dcal with:
1 . Dcsign and developrncnt. acquisition, storagc. movement, distribution, maintenance,
cvacuation, and disposition ol'materiel;

2. Movcmcnt, evacuation, and hospitalization o f pcrsonnel:

3. Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation. and disposition o f facilities; and
4. ./\cquisition or furnishing o f services."
Logistic support is provided at thc strategic, operational, and tactical Ic\& and involves

interrelated and often ovcrlapping functions and capabilities. Strategic logistics encompasses the
nation's ability to deploy and sustain its opcrating forcc in executing the national military strategy." I t is conccrned with dctcrmining rcquirements, personnel and material acquisition,

mnnagcment o f air and sealift For stratcgic mobility, and support o f forces in distant thcaters o f opcration." I t also includes the rolc o f prepositioncd equipment and material. hoth afloat and

sshorc, and the nation's ability to maintain the rcquired support levels for operations o f any duration. Long-term sustainment is ticd directly to thc national industrial bases, which includc the nation's manufacturing, agricultural. transportation, and health scrvices sectors.'" Such organizations as thc Defense National Stockpile Center play a strategic rolc in maintaining raw materials that would he nccdcd to support a signilicnnt huildup o f t h e industrial hasc. A particular conccrn at the stratcgic level is that U.S. industrial bases maintain the capability, capacity. and tccl\noloyy to support timely production ofnlodcrn weapon systcms, suppon equipment. health services, munitions, stores ant1 command and control systcms to mcct wartime requirements o f a power projection Force.15

Operational logistics involves coordinating and providing intratheater logistics resources

to operating forccs and primarily concerns thc unilied comhatiult commanders and thc service component c o r n m a n d c r s . ' ~ t includes support activities rcquircd to sustain campaigns and ~ i i a j ooperations r ~ i t l ~ai theatcr n and i s the lcvcl at which joint logistics rcsponsihilitics and
arrangements are coordi~iatctl.Operational logistics c~~compasses thcater support bases and

lscilities and the theater surhce, air and scalili requircd to transport thc personnel and matcricl

to the supported forces--as well as managing and protecting thosc assets aftcr they have

delivered their materiel and services.'' Operational logistics provides linkagc to the strategic
level and enables the military to succeed at the tactical level. Tactical logistics focuses on planning and support within and among operating units o f the task force or battle group." The tactical commander at this level draws upon resources made

available at the operational lcvel. Navy tactical logistics encompasses the logistic support o f forces wilhin a battle group. amphibious readiness group and Navy elcments ashore. from both afloat platforms including the Combat 1,ogistics Force and shore-bascd logistic support facilities.'"The tactical-level support fimctions includc maintenance. battle damage repair,

engineering, cargo handling. f i d i n g . a r m i ~ ~ moving. g. sustaining: materiel transhipmcnt, personnel, and health scrvicrs. Marine Corps tactical logistics, combat service support, i s provided by a combat service support element organized to provide maintenance, supply. motor transport, rncdical, dental, engineering and landing support which complements the organic logistic capabilities o f the aviation and ground combat clement^.'^ The proper m i x o f logistics support is provided by organizations that hegin with thc mauufacturer, training facilities. and dcpots and end with delivcring the nccded product to thc user. This spans thc strategic. opcrational. and tactical levels o f logistics, consisting o f support organizations h a t are rnanned with high-quality, well-trained personnel from active and reserve forces and the civilian sector. Continuity o f logistics support in providing an uninterrupted flow o f supplies: maintenan'ce, transportation, health scrvice. combat engineering, and pcrsonnelrclated scn.icc is paramount to I J S . success in thc littorals. Much o f the operational and logistic planning involves full integration and participation

illjoint and multinational operations. Similarly. military planning must consider i)cpartment o f
Ucfcnse interservice agreemcnts. For example, tlic Navy providcs outfitting and logistic support

to Coast Guard ships, aircraft, and facilities to ensure that thc Coast Guard is preparcd to carry out assigncd naval warfarc tasks while opcrating with the Navy.?' Special aspects involving ,joint and multinational participation includc:

1 . The capability to support or reccivc support from joint or multinational forccs.

2. Assignment o f logistics responsibilities and servicing arrangcments by the Joir~t Force

Commander.

3. 7he tactical and physical limitations o f participating units from thcir serviccs and
nations to receive and provide logistics support using naval systcms.

4. Early contracting For forcign logistics support (including contractual and finance

personnel) and o t l ~ chost r nation support, to ensurc access to thc required host nalion
capabilities.2' The emphasis on joint logistical integration demands coordination b c t w e n divcrsc functions and organizations. I'rocurement: transportation, supply, personnel, maintenance, health-services systcms, and information must bc compatihle to find, acquirc. store, movc, and track resourccs from one scrvice to anothcr. For exarnplc, organizations. such as thc Defense Logistics Agency and (.icncral Serviccs Administration, support all scrvices arid coordinatc t l ~ c i r activities. Transportation Component Commands o f the U S . Transportation Command (Military Sealift Command, Military Traffic Management Command, and A i r Mobility Command) provide and coordinate transponation nccds for all serviccs. The currcnt magnitude and co~nplexity o f ma.jor force dcploymmt and rcsupply stretch each distribution elemcnt t o its limit. Without interagency coordination, forces and logistics support w i l l not arrivc at their destination in adequatc quantities or on schedule. The Army's Ficld Manual 100-5, Onerations, describes force projection as "the demonstrated ability to rapidly alcrt, mobili7c. dcploy and opcrate anywhcrc in the ~ o r l d . " ~ '

Iiowcvcr. to sustain contingency forces in war and opcrations other than war requires major changes i n US.doctrine, operating procedures, and support organizations. Morc important, it w i l l rcquire changes in the way thc military train. Operating proccdures wliich were successfi~l in the past cannot be relied upon to achieve the same success in the future. Holding onto old paradigms i s the singlc most important factor that the 1J.S. military must overcome. Military commanders must bc willing to venture "outside o f their comfort 7oncs." The old, preconceived way o f training and doing husincss in the military. Iiowever, reniains difficult to chnnye. 'l'hc situation niust he lookcd at squarcly as it exists: the world has changed. Military comrnandcrs and logisticians must rccognize this changc and a?just their thinking and suhscqucnt planning cfl'orts. Forcc prqjection derived from contingency forces does not constitute rapid reinforccment.'" Having one docs not neccssarily means having the other. Rapid reinforccment

was appropriatc in scenarios in which forccs were projected into theaters with at least some degrcc o f viable logistics infrastructure and an existing force structure. The enemy could be simply overwhelmed \\it11 superior logistics synchronized throughout thc strategic-opcr;ition,?Itactical spectrum. I n today's cnvironment, a force-prqjection army can no longer rely on ;~ssumptionsmade from past operations and old models dcveloped in a rapid reinforcement

F M 100-5. O~erations.also provides the link between the National Military Stratcgy and the remainder orthe Army's doctrinc for force s ~ s t a i n m e n t . The ~ ~ supporting spectrum o f doctrine, both Army and joint doctrine, must bc studied to determine its continued rclcvancy i n light o f the evolution o f a force projection arliiy. On the surfacc. this appears to be a fairly standard doctrinal review proccss: howcvcr, i t is one which is still ongoing in all services.

A r m y and Navy support org;lnizations, particularly today's post-cold war era combat support and combat service support elements. must bc assessed for relevancy in tlie ncw strategic cnvironnient. Organizations that were dcsigned to provide support as part o f multiplc-corps armies should become particular targets for scrutiny. As cliccks are madc for relevancy, support functionality, capability. and capacity for a downsized, rapid response army should be studied. The requircnicnts to alert, transport, dcploy, and sustain n forcc ranging from company to corps size prcscnt unique challcnges to joint logisticians. Modifying existing logistics organizations is an approach that probably w i l l not work. A design o f modular logistics units will, most likely, bc required. allowing for a building-black approach where just enough fi~nctional capabilit: can he dcployed to support the contingency conibat force.'" When thc force is cxpandrd, modular logistics units can he addcd accordingly and fonvardly deploycd with l!.S. contingency forces. While the tr;insition to contingency-oric~iled,Porcc-pro,jection Army continucs, mechanisms ibr the rcvision ol'cornbat service support to thesc units must bc continuously rcvicwed. The focus must shift from the brutc force. item pile methodology o f past campaigns to one taking full advantage o f state-of-the-art management and communication capabilities. Elliciencics must be gaincd without sacrilices in combat effcctivcncss. 'l'hc logistics trains must bc delivered all the way to 1J.S. frontlinc troops fighting the closc battles in support o f tlic national military strategy. Throughout its history. tlie Ammy's logistics systcm has maintained a sustained commitment to provide the right support. on time: in thc right condition and quantity to frontline troops i n war and operations othcr than war. While the logistics system has assumcd many forms and has continually adapted to the requirements o f 1I.S. military strategy, its fnndamcntnl values h a w transceridcd time. Today. as the Army i s aggressively undertaking a major 10

reorganization due to downsizing, the biggest clialleoge to the logistics leadership remains: acknowledging change and crcating a vision for sustaining smaller, lighter forccs deploying with minimum organic support. This study w i l l attempt to answer thc questior~ as to whether or not naval operations encompass operations i n an immature rear-area sustainment environment o f Army ground forces.

Do naval operations provide overlapping logistical and service support to ground troops similar
to those provided to an Marine Air-Ground Task Force? Can naval operations provide adequate and timely push-packages to contingency forccs ashore? How do the maritime force provide for reliahle communications Tor real-time monitoring and tracking o f logistics lines in this shared environment? Can the Navy provide the necessary air superiority to protect thesc critical lincs o f communications inland? How do logistical commanders configure service support systems to tactically integrate with the amphibious force'? The wide-ranging maneuver o f the landing force and absc~lce o f bencl~hcads v . ill preclude establishing large amounts o f combat service support ashorc. Maintaining 1ogistic;d support o f the landing force w i l l require the ability o f the force to rapidly and reliably communicatc its real-time logistic status to its sea base. N o real rcsc;~rclior study has been adequately devoted to asscss the full extent in which naval forces can protcct and support the Army's sustainment operations in the hattlclield o f the littorals. The study w i l l atlempt to explore this area: focusing on combined naval and land operations in the near coastal environment. I t w i l l review the objectives o f the Army, Navy, and joint logistical systems in the

1J.S. military effort to achieve a seamless logistics system for thc twenty first century and
hcyond. The conclusion o f this study hopes to reveal a t\vcnty lirst century military endowed with a well-thought-out vision for future operations in the littorals which extends combat service support seamlessly from the current strategic lcvcl through the operational and tactical levels. Accomplishing this vision w i l l he standardired operating practices and supporting automation

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and communications architectures w l ~ i c lare i hot11 cost-effrctivc and transparent to the user. The particular service (Army, Navy, Marines, or A i r Forcc) providing thc support to tlie end user would bc immaterial. If a truly scaniless logistical system can be crcatcd. in a modified version

of itself or in some luturistic form, naval operations in the littorals would cncompass operations
in an immaturc rcar-area sustainment environment o f tlie Army unit. I-lowcvcr, ;~dditional rescarcti is requircd to support or disprovc this theory.

Tlie Kcscarch Oucstion Do littoral operations cnconipass operations in an immature rear-arca sustaintilent cnvironment o f Army ground forces?

Tlie Subordinate Oucstions

Do naval operations provide overlapping logistical and service support to ground troops
similar to those providcd to a Marine A i r - G r o ~ ~ n Task d Forcc? Can support teams providc pushpackages to contingency forccs asliorc in the right amount and at tlie right time? How do tlic Navy provide for rcliable communications for rcal-time monitoring and tracking o f logisticill lincs'! Do naval logistical asscts possess the necessary lift capacity to sustain operations fiom over the horizon?

IJndcrlvina Assum~tions l'herc arc several assumptions upon wliicll thc p r e m i x o f this thesis has heen based. 'l'hcy include: 1. Absent a signiticant threat at sea; future naval operations w i l l focus on near-shore operations and see to influcncr [lie outcome o f cvcnts aslinrc.

2. Smaller, lighter contingency forces with limited logistical support w i l l be deploycd to

tight the battles o f the future.

3. Continency forces w i l l most likely deploy to regions with limited or no host-nation

support, forward support bases or prcpositioned material.

4. Naval forces that tight in the littoral w i l l be pan o f a j o i n t or multinational task force.

Limitations

I. Logistical assessment w i l l focus o ~those i specific requirements to support the initial

assault phasc only.

2. A sample force is limited to three landing teams (arrnorcd cavalry squadron)

deployed inland, up to one hundred nautical miles from the amphibious task force.

3. This study cxcludes all non-U.S. logistical s i ~ p p oassets. ~t

Vcfinitions Area o f Influence. A geographical arm in which n commander is directly capable o f influencing opcrntions by niallcuver or tire support. Area o f lntcrcst. That area o f concern to the commander. including thc area o f influence, arras adjacent, and arcas extending into cnemy watcrs or territory to the objectives o f currcnt or planned operations. This also includcs areas occupicd by enemy forces that could jeopardize the mission. I3attle Sonce. A l l aspccts o f air. surfacc. and suhsurfacc, land: space, and the clcctromagnetic spectrum that encompass thc arcn o f intluencc and area or intcrcst. Combat Service Sunnort. The csscntial capabilities, finctions. ac~ivities. and tasks necessary to sustain all elemcnls ofoperating forces in thcatcr at all levels o f \wr. Within. the national and thcater logistic systems, it includcs but is not limited lo that support rendered by

servicc forces in ensuring tlic aspects ofsupply, maintenance, transportation: licalth serviccs. and other serviccs rcquircd by i~viation and ground comhat troops to permit tliosc units to accomplisl~ their missions in combat. Comhat servicc support encompasses those activitics at all levels o f war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battletield. Crisis Kcs~onse.The ability to maintain the forces and the agility to rcspond quickly and decisively to regional crises with a rangc o f options. Force Sustaintncnt. Capabilities. equipment, and operations that cnsure continuity, freedom o f action, logistic support, and command and control. Forward I'rcscncc. Forward-deploycd forces o f forces ovcrscas to demonstrate national rcsolvc. strengthen alliances. dissuade potential advcrsi~ries.and enhancc the ahility to respond quickly to contingencies. Industrial Prenaredncss. The state o f prcparcdness o f industry to produce essential material l o support tlie national military objectives. Infrastructurc. A tcrm generally applicable to all fixed and pcrmanent installations, fibrications, or facilities for tlic supporl and control o f military ibrces. Intewated Locristics Sunnort. A coinposik of all tlie support considerations necessary t o assure tlic cffcctiw and economical support o f a system for its life cycle. I t i s an integral part o f all other aspects o f system acquisition and operation. Interaecncv Coordination. Coordination within the context ol' Department o f D e f e n x

involvement, tlic coordination that occurs between elcrncnts o f Department o f Defense and
engagcd U.S. government agcncics, nongovernmental organizations. private voluntary organizations, and international organizations for tlic purpose o f accomplishing IJ.S. objcctivcs.

Joint. Connotes activities. operations, organizations. etc.,

than one scrvice o f the sarnc nation participate.

in which elements o f more

I h i c s ofCommunications. A l l the routes. land. water. and air which connect an operating military Lbrcc with a base o f opcrations and along w l ~ i c h supplies and military forces IllOVC.

I,iltoral. Those rcgions rclating to or existing on n shore or coastal rcgion, within dircct
control o f and vulnerable to tlic striking power o f naval cxpcditionary forccs. 1.oristics. Thc scicnce o f planning and carrying out the movcmcnt and maintcnancc o f Ibrces. I n its most co~nprchcnsive sense: thosc aspccts o f military opcrations which dcal with: ( I ) dcsign and development: acquisition, storage, movcrncnt, distribution. maintenance. evacuation, and disposition o f material: (2) itmvcment. evacuation. and hospitalization o f

personnel; (3) acquisition or construction. maintenancc, operation and disposition or lhcilitics

and; (4) acquisition o f li~rnishing o f scrviccs. Maritime Prenosition Forcc. Civilian-crewed. Military Scalill Command-chartered ships which arc organired into threc squadrons and are usually fornard deployed. Thcse ships are loaded with propositioned equipment and 30 days o f supplies to support three marine cxpcditionary brigades. Marine Air-Ground I'ask Force. A task organization ofhlarine forccs (ground comhat. air, and combat service support clcmcnts) under a singlc command and structured to accomplish
a specitic mission. Thc MAGTI: w i l l also include Navy support elemcnts.

Multination;ll. An alliance, coalitioi~.or other international arrangement. Multi-Servicc. Two or more services in coordination. National Command Aothorities(NCAl. thcir cluly deputized ' I Iternatcs or successors. Naval SurVace Fire Sun~ort.Fire provide by Navy surface gun, missilc, and electronicwarfarc systcms in support o f a unit or units o n land. The President and thc Secretary o f Dcfcnsc or

Power Proiection. The application ofoffensive military force against an enemy at a chosen time and place. Mariti~ne powcr pro,jcction may he accomplished by mnphihious assault operations. attack of targets ashore, or support of sea control operations. Starter Stocks. War rcscrvc material stocks prepositioncd in or near a theater of operations and intendcd to last until resupply at rates is established.

Swinr Stocks. War reserve material stocks positioned ashore or afloat for meeting war reserve requirements of morc than one contingency in rnorc than one theater of opcrations. War Reserve Material. Mission esscntial secondary items. major end itcrns and munitions required to attain operational objcctivcs in the scenarios authorized for sustainahility planning in the Secretary of Defense planning guidance. This tlicsis will be based on an assessment of the Unitcd States Navy's ability to support and sustain an Army Armored Cavalry Regiment operating in the joint environment ofthe

l ittoral.

'Department of thc Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 4. Naval Locistics (Washington. DC: Government Printing Ofticc: .lanuary 1995)- p. I I . 'Deparlment of the Navy. "Operational Maneuver From the Sca: A Concept for the Projection of Naval Powcr Ashorc" (Washington: DC: tiovcrnmcnt Printing Oftice), 1 .

"lbid. 'Ihid. "Deparlment of thc Navy, Naval Doctrine I'ublication I, Naval Warfare (Washington DC: tiovcrnment Printing ORice. March 1094), p. 73. 'Onerational Mmcuvcr From the Sea, p. 3. 'Kobcrt .I. Murray, "Focus 96: Littoral Oncrations (Wnshington: 1)C: Government Printing Press. August 1996), 8.

"'Naval Doctrine I'uhlication 4, Naval Lonistics. 77 "Department ofthe Army. FM 100-5. Oncrations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 14 Junc 1993). G-5. "Naval Doctrine Publication 4, Naval Loclistics, 7. %id. "lbid. %id. "lbid.

and General Staff C:ollegc, 1,oristics: "'Department of the Army. U.S. Army Co~nniand Descrt Storm and lnto the 21st Centurv (1% Lcavcnwonh, KS: IJSACGSC, August 1996), 65. "Field Manual 100-5. p. 1-3.

'"1,oeistics:

Desert Storm and lnto llic 2lst Centurv, 66

CIiAPTER TWO LITEKA'IUKE KEVIEW

I-listorically, the Navy and Marine Corps have functioned as a tcam to project firepower and maneuvers from the sea into coastal regions of the world. Several studies and concept papers have been written detailing U.S. leaders' visualization for the conduct of these opcrations and for maximizing the inhcrcnt advantages thcy prcsent when properly synchronized. In an effort to assess whether or not naval operations encompass operations in an Army brigade's rearnrca sustainmcnt cnvironmcnt, this study will rcvicw current and past Navy and Marine Corps strategies for their historical value and insight for future operational planning and strategic clevelopmcnt. Iiistorical publications mark rhc starting point for the literature review. These publications arc uscful in that thcy providc suhjcct-mattcr cxpcrtisc in thc successful employment of naval forces in the battlefields of the littoral. The following is a summation of current literature devoted to the study of this subject: 'l'hcsis: '' Will '1:onvard . . . From thc Sca' Support Sca Dragon." W. E. Hardy's rnastcr's thcsis cxamincs the joint NavyIMarinc Corps relationship in some details. I-lis work qucstions whcthcr or not naval opcrations support the deployment o f a Marine expeditionary force. During his examination. he reviews
"

. . . From the Sea" and "Sea Ilragon" (thc Marinc

Corps concepts papcr for future opcrations). "Forward

. . . from thc Sca" shiftcd the primary

focus from blue water operations to the brinvn watcr of thc littorals. It providcs thc framework for the creation ofh'aval Expeditionary I'orccs to mass combat p o w r at dccisivc points on the battlelield. The Marine's strategy, S(xi Dragon, seeks a halance hetween the inhcrcnt advantages
1X

o f mancuvcring lbrces liom the sca and the high-technological precision-strike capability o f t h e U S . Navy. The mastcr's thcsis, "lnlluencing thc Land Campaign from the Sea: Thc Interaction of Armics and Navies in thc Amcrican Revolutionary War," written hy H. P. Bolich, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California attempts to unvcil the causal relationship betwccn dcvclopments at sea and thc shaping o f land campaigns. The author suggests that command o f the sea offers distinct advantages to co~nmnnders o f land forccs ashore. 7'hcsc advantages include: mobility o f troops and logistics, opcrntional initiative. improved geographic access and surprise. Kcaders are warned that naval superiority alone is not enough to goarantcc an advantage. Naval forces must scck and win command o f the sea bcforc that command can be fully cxcrciscd. The work furthcr analyzes the interaction between land forces and naval opcrations during the Amcrican Ilevolutionary War. A n attempt is matlc to link land campaigns with changes in naval dcvclopments at sea. ].inkage is estahlishcd and the author concludes that the development o f land campaigns can he influenced by naval opcrations at sea. 'fhc government report lnchon-Seoul Oocration: A Lesson in the 1)csivn o f Oocrationnl Mancuvcr from the Sea, writtcn by W. R. Mitchell, Naval War College, Ncwport, Rhodc Island, includcs a case study which cxamines the lnchon-Scoul campaign in an attcmpt to derive lessons learncd l i o m the successful application o f "Opcra~ionalManeuvers From the Sea." Thc author suggcsts that the conccptual "Operational Mancuver From the Sca" used in this campaign i s timeless. I t is as applicable today as i t was to sea and land commanders during this campaign. Thc author concludcs that this conccpt o f maritime stratcgy can enahle thc Navy to prevail in battlc o f littoral warfarc today and in the future.

In Overation CHROMITC: I'owcr I'roicction . . . From the Sea, P. E. Rucklcy, Naval War Collcgc, Ncwport, Khodc Island analyzcs aspects of Operation CHROMITE for the lessons applicablc to land and sca component commanders in meeting the challcngcs U S . forces will facc in futurc regional contingencies. The author suggests that favorable resolution of threats to

U S . security will necessarily mandate the projection of powcr and maneuvers from the sea. This
study concludes that increasingly limitcd military resources and reductions in forward basing of

U S . forccs dictate changes in U.S. strategy in the littorals.

Denartment of lhe h'avv 1995 Posture Statement--The Navy-Marinc Corvs Team. produced by Department ofthe Navy. Washington. D.C. contains a posturc statcmcnt that outlincs the programs, policies, and organizational changes designed to keep thc Navy and Marine Corps in step with rapidly changing national security challenges. The conference proceeding "Annual Admiral Charlcs M. Cooke Conference (5th) for Naval Strategists and Planners." held at Newport, Rhode Island. on 15-17 March 1994.

summarizes the prcscntations and discussio~~s provided at the Cooke Conference. 'l'hc thcmc of
the conference was Naval lixpcditionary Warlhrc. Thc govcrnmcnt rcport Svnchronization of Littoral Overations, written hy I). Whccland, Naval War Collcgc, Ncwport. RI cxamines scveral major historical littoral operations to dctcrminc the synchronization factors that might be applied to future operations. Naval operational maneuvers (amphibious landings) are emphasized. The author supgcsts that historically synchroni7ation has constituted a major factor in littoral operations and despite advancemcnts in technology: thc Navy will still havc to synchronize mancuvers with lirepower, intelligence, and logistical support. The study implies that successful land operations cannot bc

sustained ror long pcriods of time uitliout adequate resupply and service support.

W. F. 1:ostcr's study From the Sca: Refinin11an Old Idea examincs three caws where

U.S. military forces conducted joint operations in a littoral environment, Opcration CHKOMITE,
in Korea (1950). Opcration BLI:I33AT in Lebanon (1958), and Operation POWER PACK in the Dominican Rcpublic (I 965). The author suggests that cacli operation was successful i n acliicving its operational goal and provides lcssons concerning joint force employment for usc i n fi~ture operations. Arcas cxamined include opcrational planning. command structurcs and relationships, force employment, logistics, and intcroperabilit? Issues. '.. Thc government report Possiblc Lonistical lmnlications of '...l:roni tlic Sca.' by C. G. L)citchman, Naval War Collcgc, Newport, Rhodc Island, utilizes the Navy white paper "...From the Sea" as the basis Tor examining the difficulties in carrying out joint littoral warfare from a logistical point o f view. The study cxamines the Navy 1.ogistics and the Joint l..ogistics over thc Sea Systcm to highlight logistical difficulties in areas whcrc port accessibility were unavailable. I.'inally, this study ofl'ers suggestions to minimize potential problems in wstaining forces without the use o f port facilities. 1-1. J. Krauss' From tlic Sca in 1950: I.cssons for the 21st Centunr From Operation Chromitc providcs a historical study o f the ilnited Statcs' last major amphibious operation, with joint and combined forccs during a major rcgional conflict. This study suggests that current U.S. naval forces may bc plagued by a similar dcniobilization trend which mirrors tlic stratcgic culture o f thc 1940s. The study highlights perccivcd wcaknessrs the naval service w i l l bring into Ihe twenty first cenlury for a littoral Navy: insufficicnt gunfire and amphibious l i f t resourccs.

"Operations in the l.ittoral" by Karl Semmlcr, Naval Doctrine C:ommand, Norfolk,

Virgina: devclops and examines new opcrational conccpts that w i l l maximizc the potential o f future naval forccs whilc cnhancing tlic capabilities o f the currcnt force. I t draws up the expertisc o f a wide range o f activities within tlic naval community inclnding input from the fleet.

'fhc purpose of'tliis study attempts to identify an ovcrarching concept for naval operations as part of, or tlic \vliolc of, a joint or multinatio~lal campaign in the early years o f t l i e twcnty first ccntury. The author analyzes tlic future battlefield o f thc littorals and identifics supporting f h c t i o n a l pro.jccts which further detine conceptual details to littoral opcration. The monograph "Operational Sustainmcnt i n an Immature Thcatcr," by Yves J. Fontaine, Unitcd Statcs Army Command and (icneral StaffCollcgc, identifies critical sustainment issucs for the deployment o f contingency forces to an immature tlieatcr and analyzes the doctrinc's adcquacy as it provides guidancc to an analysis o f four contingency opcrations; the 1964 U.S.-Belgian hostagc rcscue in the Congo, the 1965 U.S. intewcntion in the Dominican Republic, and tlic 1982 British campaign i n the Falklands. The study identifies repetitive sustainment problems with each opcration. comparcd with tlic following sustainmcnt considerations: planning; deployment; comrnand. control and communication: synchronization logistics intelligence; forward basing: air superiority fi~turc sustainment; and medical evacuation. The analysis reaftirnis thc doctrinc's adequacy in addressing tlic issues. The monograph
"

Sustainmenl ofTlieatcr Army Forces: The Esscncc and the Art," by

Michacl E. Ivy, U. S. Army Command and ticneral Staff Collegc, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. examincs hvo o f the assumptions which undcrlie the Joint C l ~ i c f s o f Staff support planning model as thcy rclatc to sustainment o f Arniy forces in a unitied command's wartime campaign. One i s tliat lincs o f communication are securc. The second assumption is that an intratlieatcr m a n s o f distribution exists: which is normally associatc with ports, airtields, roads and railroads, and tlicir operating units. Tliesc tow assumptions are annlyzcd using theoretical, doctrinal, and historical criteria. The analysis concludes that secure I A X s and infrastructure capabilitics are absolute requirements to sustain Army forces in a unified command's wartimc

campaign. The analysis further indicates that inhstructural requirements will vary greatly between theaters. The article "U.S. Navy Chief offers his vision to Congress," in Jane's Defense Weekly, international edition, by Admiral Jay Johnson: recently sworn in as Chief of Naval Operations, provides his vision of a Naval Expeditionary Task Force as the maritime component oftlie future. Hc sugsests this concept could form the basis for moving naval operations landward
fiom the littoral region.

The document Loclistics: Desert Storm and into the 21st Ccnturv i.s a co~nposition of logistical support-related readings designed to providc students in attendance at the Army Command and General StalT ('oliege an enriched understanding o f a wide spcctrum of recent logistics issues and events. Articles are targeted on the logistics challenges of today's and future armies. The goal oftlris work is to provide examples and studies that will prompt creative logistical thinking. It is a collection of various authors' cxpcrience, concepts. and opinions, but provides signilicant insight on the implications of sustaining future armies ofthe tnerrty first century

CI I.APTER THREE RESEAKCH DESIGN

This study will usc thc opcrations rcscarch and rystcms analysis (OItSA) method as the primary techniquc for gathcring data to dctcrminc if naval opcrations in thc littoral provide adcquatc logistical support for an Army's brigade-sized organization utilizing sea-based naval assets. The Navy-Marinc Corps's vision for futurc operational niancuvcrs from thc sea suggests conducting amphibious assaults, by air and surface, from over the horizon (25 to 200 miles), possibly on a. w r y broad front, maneuvering directly to objectives well inland (50 to 200 milcs), and providing logistics support from thc sca. Such ambitions if applicd to an Army corps or division-sizcd formation (thc Army's Force XXI tactical formation) arc onrealistic--logistically unsupportable. I lowcvcr, logistical support of smaller, morc modular, task-organized rorccs arc well within the capabilities ofthe Navy. The question which this study will attempt to answer is. how large a forcc can naval opcrations rcasonably support'? Scenarios i n which contingency forccs arc most likely to be dcploycd will vary depending on thc situation. 'I hc specific mission, enemy, terrain, and other mitigating factors will determine the size, means of transporting : cquipmcnt, and composition ofthc deploying force. Given the scope of thcsc unccrtaintics. this study will utilizc a hypothctical saniplc forcc for notional planning purposes. Aditionally, the support effort will be limited only to those forces which constitutes the initial assault echelon. The balancc of thc forcc would be in the assault follow-on cchclon. and would be transported by cargo vessels operated by Military Scalift Command or by civil, and military aircraft from the Air Mobility Command (including

24

the Civil Reserve Air I'lcct). l)cploying ground forces will consist of a three armored cavalry squadrons. Supporting naval rorccs will inclode one carrier hattlc group (CVBC;), and onc amphibious readiness group (AKG). cach \vith their corresponding aiming. The research methodology will consist ol'a historical, and doctrinal analysis as wcll as a lechnical analysis in determining thc logistical implications of supporting Army units from scabascd assets. The historical analysis will focus on the logistical support of two rccellt campaigns (War i n thc Falklands and Grenada). In :tddition to thc historical analysis of these important cascs, and a review of doctrinal conccpts, and principles for providing suppotl in the joint environment will be undertaken. The technical analysis (upon which most of the conclusions from this thcsis will dcrivc) will assess the significancc of thc physical constraints placed upon Army and Navy logistical planners in meeting the logistical requirements for forccs in the year 2010.

Scenario The United States has deploycd an a~nphibious task force, consisting of a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) and an Amphibious Rcadincss Group (AKG), to the littoral watcrs o f a coastal hclligcrcnt nation. Thcsc forces, including ground forccs of an Armored Cavalry Kcgimcnt (Light), are deployed into the area without thc benefit of fixed port facilities. established infrastructure or host nation support. While still over the horizon, the task forcc deploys three landing t c a m (armored cavalry squadrons) to objcctivcs well inland, and widely disperscd, up to one hundred nautical milcs from thc amphibious task force. As an initial cntry hrce. the ACK would support the JTF operations with crcdihlc forcc as a demonstration of 1J.S. rcsolvc. They are landed and sustairicd by air and sea using LCACs, C H - S t s , and MV-22s. These landing tcams will serve lo place and monitor sensors, direct ship-to-shore lire and air strikes, block. and

confuse enemy actions, and oltirnately, attack to seize a limited objective. They w i l l operate at long distance from the ships, over the horizon for one to seven days. As postulated by the OMFTS concept, thc introduction o f land forces from the sea in this scenario w i l l most likely be unopposed. Nevcrtheless, absent direct enemy thrcats. the environment, and circumstanccs o f amphibious operations, may mitigate against efficiency in logistics support. Tough seas. I ~ i g lwinds. i mud or dust. and the confusion, and fast paces o f military activity w i l l probably take their toll over an extended period. Since cxplicit consideration o f all such fiictors is difficult at best, this scenario w i l l minimize the effects o f these factors as much as possible. Wcather conditions for this operation w i l l be light to moderate, having no adverse cffcct negligible. The corriposition o f tlic Armored Cavalr) Regiment (ACR) is outlined in tablc I . This particular organi~ation is selected due to its robustness and its organic logistical capability. The ACR (light) i s a sclf-containctl combinctl arms organization, but is capable o f being packaged mid rapidly deployed by air or sealirt as part o f a power projection forcc responding to worldwide contingencies. Bccause o f its unique command and control structure and support base within the rcgimcnt, i t is w r y modular and capable o f rapidly integrating its forces into task organizations. This li~ctor supports the scenario with a force that can be tailored for the situation and expanded once it is deployed ashore i f t h e situation dictates. T o assew the full logistical implications o f O M F f S , the ACR w i l l bc deployed u i t h i t s direct support artillery. although the conceptual notion o f O M I T S tasks naval forces with providing naval fire support.
011 U.S.

operations. Likewise, sea state conditions w i l l he

L A N D I N G T E A M COMI'OSITION Armorcd Cavalry Regimcnt (Light) HHT Armed Cav Sqdn, ACR (3) Rcgt Aviation Sqdn A D A Btry VulIStingcr Engr Co. MI Co. Chml Co. Spt Sqdn No. o f People

Sourcc: Department ofthe A m y , ST 101-6, G I G 4 Battle Book (Ft. Leavenworth. KS: U S . Army Command and Gcneral SvdtTColcgc, July 1996), 1-18.

Rcscarch Phasing Phase I: Develop tlic research material arid perform a detailed analysis of logistical

support issucs and current capabilitics. I'hase 11: Formulate the research rcsults, develop thc conclusions. and prepare thc final rcscarch paper. I'enincnt qucslions to be dcvcloped during thc tcchnic:d analysis include:

I. What are the notional daily suslainment rcquirernents to support an Armored Cavalry
Regiment (ACR) for sixty days o f opcralions? Functional areas o f scwicc suppon provided the samplc force to include: (1) ammo, (2) fucl. (3) water, (4) rations, and ( 5 ) ~naintenance

2. What are the currcnt service support capabilitiesllimitations o f the Amphibious Task
Force'? What is its current lift capability?

3. What sustainmcnt assctslcapabilities does the 1J.S. Army bring to this hypothetical
scenario? Can the Arniy provide heavy airlift support for material movcmcnt'?

4. What arc thc daily sustainment requirements for the sample task force? 5. What arc thc maximum over-the-horizon daily transport capacities o f our forcc (per
vchiclc)?

6. What are the I m d i n g rcquircmcnts For the landing force'?

Information sourccs for this thesis include reports available from the Governnicnt Printing Office (GPO). National 'l'cchnical Information Service (NTIS), arcliival documentation, professional journals. doctoral dissertations, and master's thescs (publisl~cd,and unpublished). and the Educational Kesourccs lnformation Ccnter (ERIC).

CI-IAPTEK 1:OUK ANALYSIS OF RESEARCII D A T A

This (:hapter i s divided into two major arcas o f conccnlration. Part 1 providcs a historical and doctrinal analysis o f two rcccntly conducted military operations involving contingency forces assembled from two or rnorc scrviccs. The lirst case study examines contingency operations conducted by U.S. forces during its invasion orGrenada in 1983. The sccond case involves contingency forces from Great ijritain dcploycd into thc South Atlantic to secure the Falkland Islands following thcir invasion by Argentina. Part I1 o f this chapter w i l l provide a detailed technical analysis o f the logistical scrvicc support and

lin capabilities organic to the

Naval Expeditionary Force earmarked to conduct "Operational Maneuvcrs from the Sea" in the ycar 2010. The case studies selected in this thesis (The War in tlic Fnlklands and Grenada) w i l l serve as tlic benchmark for assessing our hyothetical sample force with regards to sustainment issucs and possiblc implications which may hamper combat operations o f thc futurc.

I'art I : Historical and Doctrinal A n a l v s i ~ Grcnada Operation--0peratic)n Orpent Furv 1983 Located at the end o f ; I chain o f Carihhean Islands, known as the Lesser Antihes, Grenada sits astride the main shipping lanc for supcrtankcrs that bring U.S. imported o i l from tlic Midcast and Africa. Additionally, Grenada i s in easy striking range o f thc Venezuelan o i l tields, anothcr stratcgically significant sotlrce o f U.S. imported oil. I t is no wonder that thc U.S. bccamc conccrncd whcn Cuban engineers began construction o f an airficld capable o f receiving

long-range military aircraft.

'[lit

U.S. conccrns hcightcncd in I O X O when Grenadian leaders

signcd a trcaty with Moscow. giving thc Sovicts landing rights on Grcnada.' In October 1983, an U.S. task force was dispatched to Grenada to evacuatc U S . and foreign citizens and to reestablish a democratic rcgimc in the area.' The operation has been dcscribcd as a "comc as you arc" scenario: a pick-up game--typitied by critical time sensitive mission rcquircmcnts, minimal planning, employment ofjoint and comhined forccs, incomplete intelligcncc. logistical support. C3 intensity: and high political visibility. I'hc initial actions takcn in rcsponsc lo the unrest in Grenada included diverting tlic USS
lndepet~dence and Navy and Marinc amphibious groups from deploying to Lebanon and

preparing [lie 82nd Airborne Division for deployment to the theater of operation.Voncurrently, Admiral Wesley McDonald, Commander in Chiefof Atlantic Command, reccivcd thc mission to conduct operations to protcct and cvacuatc 1J.S. m t l dcsignatcd forcign nationals from Grenada. neutralize Grenadian forces, and stabilize thc internal situation. 'l'lic Atlantic Command immcdiatcly organized a largc task force headquarters to plan and coordinate the operation. JTF 120 was thus established and the commander designatcd as Vicc Admiral Joscph Mctcalf 111.5 A scvcntccn-man joint staff quickly assembled on thc ship
Guam to plan thc opcration. Howcvcr, most of tlic olTiccrs had ncver worked together, were

unknowledgeable or the other services' method of operation, and forced to work in isolation duc to opcrational security (OPSEC) rcquirements. Although a contingency plan existed in the I'cntagon for intcrvcntion in Grcnada. planners ignored it for a new concept. The concept changed the command and control structurc by eliminating the XVllI Airhorne Crops Hcadquartcrs' involvcnicnt in thc opcration. The planners, however, kept the 82nd Airborne Division involved in the operation: splitting an cstablishcd chain of command and altcring logistics relationships. The concept dividcd tlic

operation in three phases: Phase one called fbr the surprise seizure o f the island and the rcscuc o f the governor and medical students. Phase two called for the arrival o f Task Vorcc 121 o f the X2nd Airborne 1)ivision to establish order. I'hase thrcc involved pcacekecping duties. Throughout the operation, the naval bntlle group provided surface and air support.' Thc actual operation was plagued with many setbacks. Special operation forces

encountered numerous prohlems caused by poor intelligence on available landing zones.

insufticient quantities o f heavy ueapons. logistical support, equipment. and inaccurate maps! Thc special forccs failed to achieve surprise and to capture critical objectives. sucli as thc radio transmitting stations and thc prison. Ultimatcly, the Rangers and Marines capturcd Salinc and Pearls airlields allowing deployment o f the 82nd Airborne Division which defeated the Grcnadian and Cuban forces and rescued the I!.S. citizens. Ilowevcr, the confusion caused hy thc strong Grenadian defense resulted in requests o f unnecessary rcinforccmcnt. Although duc to security reasons, logistics planning was deliberately kept separate from opcrational planning. Imgisticians saw transportation and sustainment requirements, particularity the deployment capabilities o f thc 82nd Airhorne IXvision as requiring spccial attention becausc o f thc distance involvcd bctwecn the t\vo nations. Therefore. sustainment plarincrs tirst planned to use C130 aircraft with inflight refueling capability to deploy the force without stops to Grenada. Sccond. they established a fonvard-staging area in Barbados. capahle o f rccciving CSA aircraft which could not land in Grenada. The forward staging allowed the deployment o f large items. such as helicopters, for usc in thc thcatcr o f operation. Thc concept o f support called for air deployment o f rorces to Grenada.' Lines o f communication were established from Fort Dragg to Pope A i r Force Base to Grenada to supporl the deployment o f forccs and light cquipmcnt, and from Fort Bragg to Pope A i r Forcc Basc to 13arhados to Grenada to deploy heavy equipment. Airborne troops were to deploy \villi three

days o f supply to provide timc for the establishment o f logistic stockage at Saline Airport, Grenada. Once established, thc X2nd Airborne Division support command (DISCOM) would provide combat service support fomard using direct requisitioning procedures from Grenada to Fort Bragg through the tactical satellite system. A regular replenishment air tlow o f hvo aircraft per day would ensure daily resupply, and the extensive use o f captured cquiprncnt, particularly wheeled vehicles: would augment transportation shortage on site. Even though an'actual mcdical evacuation plan did not exist for this operation, the 82nd Airhorne Division deployed with minimal organic medical assets. countirlg on thc Navy to provide backup hospital s i ~ p p o n . ~

A review orthe actual support orthe operation identilied numerous logistical

discrepancies. Problems in plrmning, deployment. command rmd control, logistics intelligcncc and synchronization affected thc sostainment to combat soldiers. I'hc rapid planning and overuse o f security adversely affrcted the entirc opcration.' First. the Joint Task Force I-lcadquartcrs was cstablishcd rapidly, which meant the stalTmemher had no prior working expericncc bcforc the opcration. Sccond, as sccn in silnilar U.S. campaigns (e.g., the Dominican Republic opcration). Joint Task Forcc planners did not consider scarching for an already- developed contingency plan. The use o f an existing plan would have identitied a different but already established chain o f command and prevented some o f thc logistics problems which hampered this opcrr~tion.Third, under the guise o f operrttional

security. the commander orthc 82nd Airborne Division was kept in the dark until the last
Inomcnt, which forccd him to plan rapidly for the opcration. Finally. the minimum

involvement o f logistics planncrs in the ovcrall concept dircctly affected the operation resulting
in airflow h ~ c k u p s at Saline airlield and in emergency requests for replenishment that could havc bccn anticipated and planncd.

'l'hc problem in planning forced the 82nd Airborne Division to deploy rapidly regardless o f loading plans. The small amount o f vehicles available (or deployment obliged soldiers to carry thrcc days o f supply (Classes 1 and V) on their backs accentuating fatigue. More important, it precluded thc units from using long-range communication capability and affected air defense Stingcr wcapon ammunition resupplies."' I.ogistically. the rapid planning and loading prevented thc timely dcploymcnt o f forklifts to tlic thcatcr o f opcration. I-lie lack o f forklifts drastically slowed the unloading process in Grenada and concurrently increased the waiting time for other aircraft to land. Some o f the aircraft were diverted to Barbados. Command, control, and co~nmunications procedures were problcmsome as seen in other

US. campaigns. First, Admiral Metcalf, located offshore, led the ground forces on shore."
l>cspite good reasons to designate a single ground forcc commander, Admiral Mctcalf

maintained a ccntralized C2 system which kept forces separated rather than working together.
The failure to designate a single ground forcc commander created problems in coordinating support between services. Particularly noteworthy arc thc conflicts to prioritize rcsupply shipmcnts and thc difficulty in coordinating medical evacua~ion. Second, the inability o f the scrviccs to communicate wit11 one another surfaced as onc o f the largest problems cncountcrcd in thc opcration. Joint Task Forcc 120 failcd to cstablish adequate communications for the forcc, and thc communication cquipnicnt was inco~npatiblc." Logistically, thc confusion in communications meant that all units developed their own systcms to request replenishment. Units used the operations net vcrsus logistics net to oblain support. I n frustration, they often bypassed the established system for rcplcnishmcnt which causcd duplication o f rcqucsts and loss o f control. Additionally, the lack o f a secure communications system limited the Military .Airlift Command's (MAC'S) ability to effectively command and control airlift assets." Again: this

rcsultcd in confusion and ultimately in additional airplanes scnt to f i l l duplicated rcqucsts jamming the already crowded airfield. 'l'hc problem was eventually solved by centralizing airfield control at ports of debarkation and ports of embarkation. Missing intelligence caused major problems for the forces as they prcpared to invade the isIand.l4 Logistically, the missing intelligence
011road

nchvorks. suitability of landing beaches,

and a gcncral layout of the arca prevented planning for propcr logistics support. For examplc, tlic failurc of logistics intelligence to identify potable water supplics in Grenada resulted in paratroopers carrying additional canteens ofwatcr to combat, thus additional weight. 'fhc Rarbados dcfcnsc forcc had tlic intelligence available; however, the JCS did not include them in thc planning. The lack of coordination hetween Joint Task Force planners duc to cxccssive OPSEC resulted in the rejection of an already-developed OI'LAN. and causcd loading problems, dcploymcnt problems, and requisitioning problems. Lxcessive OI'SIiC prohihitcd Joint Task Forcc planncrs from synchronizing thc plans ibr the operation with logisticians until tlic last rninutc. Additiol~ally,critical pcrsonncl in the R2nd Airborne Division were dcnicd acccss to lhc plans bccausc of operational security. Thc rcstrictio~~s resulted in rapid logistical planning and affected the type of support forwarded to co~nhat units in Grcnada as oflicers with n o knowlcdgc of tlic plan made decisions on replenishment needs to the theater. Similar to the Rritish's Falklands cxpcricncc, the mcdical support suffered liom lack of planning and synchronization. A plan did not exist nor was oric dcvclopcd to coordinate joint medical operations. As already identitied, combat scrvicc support planncrs did not assist in planning the operation. nor did they formulate an ovcrall mcdical command structure headed by and Trent017to providc medical ajoint task forcc surgcorl. 'l'hc conccpt callcd for the USS GUNNI and surgical support. Rased on this information, ground forces deployed with minimal organic

medical support counting on rapid cvacoation to the Naval fleet. Due to a lack o f synchronization, however, medical officers from the othcr scrviccs did not know o f the evacuation plans. Additionally, actual evacuation by air was impaired by tlic lack o f A r m y pilots traincd to land on ships. Nevcrthclcss, all thcsc problcms did not stop the 1J.S. medical forccs from accomplishing thcir mission through improvisation, tactical-level coordination and Ilexibility. 'I'he U.S. experience in Grenada den~onstratcd tl~c nccd for a good plan to sustain forces not only during tlic assault but after tlic battlc'was wcll. I'hc original plan anticipated stability operations which consisted o f internal security, psychological operations, and civil affair programs. Thc goal was to cstahlish an atmosphere o f well being and assist Grenada on its path toward dcmocracy. I n summary. the Grcnada operation was a success. Ilowever, the [J.S. forces

experienced signilicant logisticid problcnis causcd mainly by tlic rapidity in phnning and the
cxccssivc operational sccurity critcria which prcvcntcd ncccssary synchroni~ation to take place.'' 'l'hc costs o f thcsc problcms wcrc a risc in cmcrgcncy requisitions and a concurrent impact on the airflow into Grcnada. Ncvcrthclcss. U S . forccs dcmonstratcd thc llcxibility to adapt to the situation and achieved the mission.

The Falkland Islands Invasion Thc Falklands are a group o f islands undcr British rulc locatcd 8,000 miles south\vest o f tlic Unitcd Kingdom, more 1ha11 4,000 milcs from Ascension Islands and 400 miles froni the Argentine mainland. On 2 April 1982, an .Argentine Task Force composed o f one aircraft carricr, thrcc dcstroycrs, thrcc transportcrs. two corvcttcs. and onc landing ship invaded the I'alkland Islands.'"In response to the Argentine invasion o f l3ritish tcrritory. Uritain deployed

its contingency forccs with rapid spccd. Britain formed Task I'orce 3 17, consisting o f a carrier group and a landing task forcc group." This l i m e had a mission to conduct military operations to reestablish British control over the Falklands. There w r c two phascs to the campaign:'' Phasc one from 1 to 21 May consistcd

mainly o f naval and air engagcmcnts in which the Argentine suffered tremendous aircraft losses and the British lost six major ships. Phase two from 21 May to 14 June consisted o f an aggressivc British offensive aftcr a landing al San Carlos henchhead and includcd ground attacks which resultcd in the Argentine surrender. Thc logistics support to this operation and the dispatch o f a task force in such a short rime wcrc magnificent achievements. Thcy rcsulted fiom close cooperalion bctwccn services, the merchant navy, royal dock yard, com~nercial ports: transportation offices, and industry. I'irst, the task force had to hc stocked with provisions for at lcast three months at sca. Second, a system had to bc cstahlishcd for resupply without rcturn to Britain. Third. a plan had to bc conceived to support the concept o f operation.''' To achieve logistical support o f such a largc task rorcc. thc Rritish rcquisitioned civilian ships to augment thc Koyal Fleet Auxiliary (WA).'" 'l'hcy rnodilied thcsc ships to accept m i l i t q equipment, supplies, and soldiers. Additionally, in order to support lhc task force during the sea voyage, thc RITAstationed fucl tankers throughout the route to thc Falklands and a rcsupply ship in the vicinity ofGihraltar." Concurrently with the depioymcnt, lead elements o f the British h r c c s landed a1 Ascension Island, preparing thc island to opcratc as the intermcdiate staging arca for the task force. Thousands o f tons o f supplies were flown to the staging area to support thc amphibious task group." Later. anorhcr logistics staging arca was estahlishcd at sea closer to thc Falklands

which had thc capability to rcpair battle darnagc on vessels. 'nit tug, repair, and logistics area operated on the ~iortheast cdgc o f the theater undcr the protcction of the carrier hattlc group.

Command and control o f logistics operations fell on Commodore Michael Clapp."

Hc

was assisted in his task by an ad hoc multiservice logistics support ccll which becamc invaluable in coordinating resupply. Lieutenant Colonel lvar licllberg, commander o f thc commando logistics regiment developed the concept for providing support to the land forccs. Tlie plan ci~llcd for two landing ships to support one beaclilicad landing with rcplenishmcnt ships remaining furthcr at sea. A hospital ship also r e m a i ~ ~ at c dsea rcady to accept casualties cvacuatcd by air. Thc concept, naturally: callcd for air supcriority to allow a twenty four hours a day operation." Tlie following analysis o f thc sustainmcnt concept compared to the sustainment

criteria identifies thc strong Hritish coopcration and synchroni~ation hetween scrvice and industry, the choice o r staging area. command, control, conimunications, and the propcr use o f logistics intelligence as the causes behind a successful opcration. Ilowcver, the British encountcrcd problcn~s in loading procetlurcs and air supcriorily. The synchronization served tlic Rritisli wcll as they planned and identified resourccs needed for thc deploynent ol'a contingency force without contingency plans o n thc shelves." I:urthermore, sincc the Falkland Islands wcrc located far way from Britain, tllc dcployment o f t h e force to the arca o f opcration becanic o f crucial iniportancc. Primarily, thc l3ritish wanted to cnsure that adcquate combat power was provided up front to dcfeat tlie Argentine fbrce. T o solvc the problcm and cnsure the availability o f adcquate transportation, the Rrilish rcquisitioncd and transformed fifty merchant ships which were used during the campaign.'" Although tlie improvisation o f requisitioning the ships was brilliant, it was lcsscncd by rhc loading problcms encountered duc to the rush in dcploymcnt o f tlie forcc. I.oading occurred at a rapid pace to mcct starting time deadlincs and without rcgard to any loading plan." This ultimately rcsulted in a loss o f accountability. 'Slic Rritish artcrnpted to rclocatc loads on ships enroutc to the Falklands but could not complctcly corrcct the errors caused at tlie port o f

cmbarkation. Combat units would expcrience shortages during thc hattle hecausc supplies wcrc located too deep in thc ship's storage holds and hecausc accountability had been lost. For example, a shortage of helicopter heavy lift occurrcd during the operation hecausc all assets were loaded on a single ship and subscqucntly lost \vhcn the ship sunk. A key lesson to learn from this operation is thc importance of planning for loading and the priority given in loading asscts. The staging identificd at Asccnrion Island hccame one of thc major reasons behind the British success and demonstrated the nccd for staging when conducting operations in remote areas with limited or no support structure in place. The Ascension Island allowed the British to decrease thc distance bctween tlicir homeland and thc battlelicld by half and, by the same lokcn, allowcd the British to reduce ihc order-reccipt time for all supplies. A sound and synchroni~ed command. control, and conimunicarion system enlianccd the chance Tor success. At the strategic level, a small group of ministers managed the crisis on a daily basis with the I'rime Minister!' This group established clcar guidelines for the operations

commanders yci did not interfere with thcni X.000 milcs away. Satellite communications allowed clcar coordination without excessivc security prccautions. Conimantl and control for sostainment rcsted with Commodore Clapp and the planning for the operational sustainmcnt with Licutenant Colonel lvar Hcllhurg. Evcn though command and staff elenicnts had to separatc on

numerous occasions due to thc poor availability of ships, command and control rcmained intact.
The British applied a good intelligcncc analysis prior to dcploying their forcc to the Falklands and in choosing thc landing sitc.?" 'l'hey rcalizetl that the untr;~llicablcterrain would eliminate the need h r trucks in support of thc force. Thcy thus adjustcd the loadins of assets in Ikitain by rcducing thc amount of trucks whilc increasing helicopters deploying to tlic theater. Additionally, bascd on terrain analysis and the enemy situation, the 13ritisli itlcntitied San Carlos

38

as the landing site. San Carlos provided good heachcs for the landing and protcction from the enemy air and submarine attacks. l'he battlc of the Falklands eniphasizcd the importancc of air superiority in the dcployment of forces far from lio~ne.'~ 'l'hc British countcd on early air superiority as essential

i n allowing twenty-four hours logistics support. Their failurc to achieve this goal resulted in a
slow down of logistics support lo such an extent that it took nearly a week to build up cnough supplies ashorc to allow movc~iicnt out oftlic lodgement area. Had Argentine identified the corrcct decisivc point in thc Rritish Task Forcc, its logistics lifeline, and attacked logistics ships hy air, thc l3ritisli would haw found the campaign significantly more dillicult. l'he mcdical plan was an extension of the synchronization among the thrcc services. 'l'lie plan callcd for air evacuation of casualties, forward medical tcams augmenting comhat units, and a ticld surgical team with a surgeon placcd as far forward as possiblc for immediate support.

I lowcvcr, the lack of air supcriority adversely affected mcdical support." Delays in medical

evaluation occurred as thc logistics ships seeking protcction from air attacks ncrc forced farther
to sea. Thc increase in helicopter rcquiremenls to transfer supplics from ship to ship and ship to

sliorc drcw assets away from casualty cvacuation~ as dedicaled lilt liad not hecn idcntitied for casualty evacuation. This problcm. added to tlic tcrrihle terrain, prevented soldicrs from carrying a bvounded man to a pickup point, resulted in the unnecessary severity of casualties. Finally, the British recognized the criticality of sustaining forces. prisoners of war, and civilian populace ancr the campaign. Tllerelbrc. tlic l3ritisli captured I'ort Stanlcy not only as an operational oh,jectivc hut also for logistics purposes. They cxpanded the Port Stanley airlield to acccpt air resupply from Asccnsion Island.'' 'l'he expansion called for 6,000 tons ofmatcrial, 5,000 tons of emergency storcs: and 1.000 cnginccr troops. l'hc Hritisli also rcalized that thc port needcd upgrading to accept civilian shipping. In order to augmcnt Port Slanlcy discharge

capacity, the task force carried all organic port facilities in tcrms o f mooring lightcrs and other

requirements.
111summary, thc British succccded in supporting the opcration by properly synchronizing the logistics support o f a multiservice force, ensuring that the command and control rcmaincd intact and clear throughout the opcration, and establishing staging operations and rapid resupply proccdures to support combat units. I-lowcvcr, the British also experienccd significant logistical dificultics. First, similar to tlic operation in thcir Ilominicatl Republic campaign, they cxpcricnced problcms with loading proccdurcs. The cost o f rushed loading ultimately rcsulted in

n delay i n combat operations. Second. they enperienccd logistical drawbacks duc to the lack of
protection against encmy air attacks. The nccd for air supcriority to protcct logistics functions
(an insignificant problcni during the U.S. invasion o f Grenada) surfaced i n this operation

because o f the higher level o f technology uscd by both parties to wagc mar. The British tlcmonstrated that planners most anlicipatc the air threat and protcct logistics lifelines accordingly. Ovcrall, the results o f this logistics effort w r c astronomical. I n sewn wccks. the task lixcc assembled 28:000 men and 1.000 ships, sailed 8.000 miles: and provided support to 10,000 mcn ashore.

.I he opcrations delincatcd in the abovc case sludics cxemplib logistical prowcss and
improvisation. However, thc operational battlefields o f the future in which speedcd-up acquisition, processing, and rapid sharing o f information would rwolutionize thc conduct and tcmpo of battlc dictate changcs in logistical doctrine for maintaining the tbrces. I n an attempt to mcct these changcs, Army publication, Forcc X X I O~erntions,spells out tive characteristics for future land opcrations. Thcy are: doctrinal tlexibility to meet the divcrsity ahead; strategic mobility with emphasis on anticipation. repositioning, early entry, lightness. Icthality, survivability, and investment in strategic lili; tailorability and modularity liuing the particulars

of contingency forces; joint. multinational ;md interagcncy connectivity; and linally, versatility-resting on qualitative edge and dccisivc powcr in way and in operations othcr t1ia11war."

JCS l'ublication 4-0, Doctrinc for Lonistics Suooort o f Joint O~crations, identilied seven
principles o f logistics wliicli complcmcnt principlcs o f war: rcsponsivcncss, simplicily, flexibility, economy, attainability. sustainability and survivabilily. For logistical purposes, responsiveness is providing thc '' right support in the right placc at thc right time."" I n opposed

amphibious operations today. a landing tcam nould crcatc a bcachhcad and establish a support basc ashorc as quickly as possible, then push out from that base to other objectives. Within rninutcs, shorc party and lieli60pter support teams nould move ashore to organize and establish heach and landing zone support areas. When fully developed. the combat service support area may spread over a thirty to forty square mile area, hold thousands o f tons ofammunition, thousands oTcontaincrs o f supplics, millions o f gallons o f pctrolcum and witcr, and housc such support services as equiprncnt maintcnancc. mcdical carc, and holding cncmy prisoners o f war.'" Amphibious operations as cnvisioncd by tlic conceptual Wperational Maneuver From thc Sca" call for the deployment o f landing fbrces direc~ly from the ships to thcir objcctivcs, \villi most o f their logistical support sca bascd. This proccss. at least initially, would eliminatc thc stockpiling o f tons o f material on the heacli--greatly reducing the expeditionary forcc's footprint while maintaining a high optcmpo. To be successful. logistics planners must be capable o f providing matcrial and sopplics. in thc right amount arid at thc right timc to U.S. forccs on thc ground. 1,ogistical suppon must he simple and tlexihle. As identified hy JCS I'ub 4-0. logistical planners must avoid conqdexity.'" Mission-type orders and standardized procedures should

contribute to this simplicity. T o s i n ~ p l i tthc l opcration, logistics planners must be able to clcarly

articulate support prioritics and rcallocatc supplics and services by the wpponed units.
Commandcrs must ~naintain positivc control ovcr subordinate organizations to maintain

flexibility." Logistics planncrs must he able to adapt logistics structures and procedures to changing situations, missions, and concepts of opcration. Attainability is thc ability to provide the minimum essential supplies and services required to hegin combat operations." It is the responsibility of the commander's staff to develop the concept of logistics support and the logistic estimate to match the support commander's requirements, priorities, and apportionment. And, thcy must providc this support at the least cost. In futurc contingcnc) operations, rcsourccs will be scarce. Military leaders must lcarn to do morc with less. Once the minimum level of support is on hand to support the initial phasc of tlic opcration, thc joint logistic staff must bc capahlc of sustaining tlic opcration. The concept of split-bascd logistics is currently rccciving a lot of attention with thc Army structure. A concept relying on assured communications systems that allowed much of the logistics base to remain in

o n information and sent necessary supplies d the Unitcd Statcs; those elcmcnts rcccivcd a ~ actcd
forward. Versatilit!. not only operational and tactical, but strategic is sccn as ccntral to the

Army vision of its responsibility for thc outcomc as wcll as tlic conduct of sustainnlent operations." Sustainability focuses the supporting commander's attention on long-tcrni objectives and capabilities of the supported forces. And finally, the concept of support must providc for provisions in the face ofdesrruction. Logistical support over the horizon will require activc measures to safeguard logistics bases at sea as well as those units deployed ashore. combat ~ forces and From a doctrinal standpoint, thcrc most cxist a balancc h c t w c c ~ logistic forccs. l&li campaign will demand it o\vn analysis of the proper balancc bctwccn supported and supporting forces: supported forces vcrsus combat forccs. and supporting forccs and capabilities.'" The vcrsus logistics forcc rations arc ways of assessing rcquirc~ncnts requisite strength of combat support/combat service support elements depend on many factors

such as tlic gross rcquircmcnts for logistic resources and where and when they arc nccded. the adequacy o f available transportation nchvorks and assets, the length o f t h e I . O C and the types o f opcrations bcing supportcd." Logistics planners must recognize these limitations and include thcni i n thcir logistical planning.

Part ll: Technical Analvsis I n chapter 3. the thesis outlined the composition o f thc hypothetical sample force and

postulated sccnario as a hasclinc for assessing the logistics requirements and sustainrncnt issucs
arising from the deployment o f Army ground units ashorc from Navy vcssels at sea. Lacking the comprehensive data and analytic tools to conipletc a rigorous quantitative analysis. this study

i s a "worst case " assessment utilizing a hypothetical force. Although dclineatcd in an earlier
chapter o f t h i s thesis, the postulated scenario is rcpcatcd hcrc for casc o f rcfcrcncc.

Scenario The llnited States has deployed an an~pliihious task force: consisting o f a Carricr Battlc Group and an Amphibious Kcadincss Group to tlic littoral watcrs o f a coastal helligerent nation. 'l'hcse forccs. including ground forccs o f an Armorcd Cavalry Kcgimcnt (Light) are deployed into thc arca without tlic bcnclit o f fixctl port facilities, establishcd infrastructure, or host-nation support. While still over the horizon, the task force deploys three landing tcams (armorcd cavalry squadrons) to objectives well inland and widely dispcrscd. up to onc hundrcd nautical miles from tlic aniphibious task force. As an initial entry force. the ACR (light) would support the Joint Task Forcc opcrations with credible forcc as a dcmonstration o f U.S. rcsolvc. They are landed and sustained by air and sea using LCACs, CI-I-53Es and MV-22s. These landing teams w i l l serve to place and monitor sensors, direct ship-lo-shore fire and air strikes, block and confuse enemy actions and ultimately attack to achieve a limited oh.jcctivc. 'l'hcy w i l l opcratc at a long

distancc from thc ships, ovcr the horizon: for onc to scvcn days. Weathcr conditions ror this

operation will bc light to moderate, having no advcrsc cffcct on maritime opcrations. Likewise,
sea state conditions will hc ncgligiblc.

TABLE 2 LANDING TEAM COMPOSITION Armorcd Cavalry Kegimcnt (Light) HHT Armcd Cav Sqdn, Kegt Aviation Sqdn ADA Btry VulIStingcr Enyr C:o. MI Co. Chml Co. Total Spt Sqdn ACK (3) No. of People 150 2492 489 172 200 1.59 73 4463 728

Source: Department o f the Army, ST101-6, (il/G4 Battle Book (Ft. Leavenworth. KS: L!SACGSC, July 1996). 1-1 8.

TABLE 3 AMPI IIBIOIJS FORCE CAPARII~ITIES: 20 10-20 1 5 Ship Type No. Troops Vehicle (sqrt) 25.4 20.1 25.0 l?.5 13.1 728 606 Cargo (tun) 106 125 25 5 40 1,905 1,614
1 Ielos

LCACs I* 3 2 4 2 90 74

LHA I.HD
I.lW- I 7

5 7 12 8 4 36

1,713 1,892 720 454 454 35.897 29,944

42 45 6 0 0 597 498

L S D 4I LSD-49 Total Flcct

Available Fleet 30

n ft thc Navy, Forcc 2001: A Pronram Goidc to thc U.S. Navy (Wasl~ington. Source: ~ e ~ a r t m ' eo DC: Government Printing Oflice, 1005). 35.

* LI I A can carry 1 LCAC and 2 LCIJ-1600 or 4 LCIJ-1600 **CFI-46 equivalent is a common unit o f measurement for describing the helicopter carrying capacity o f a ship. For cxa~nplc.a CH-53F. is cquivalcnt to 1.9 CH-46s on an LHD; and MV-22 is equivalent to 1.45.

AMPI-IIBIOIJS SHIP CHAKACI'ERISTICSICAPAUILITIES I.HA Tarawa Class LHD I WASP Class I.SW4 1149 Whidby Island Harpers Ferry L.PD 17

Length Ream Displacement Dran Speedlprop Capabilities Crew Staff Troops Cargo Vehicles

820 l i 106 ft 3 9 J M tons 27 ft 24 ktslstcam

844 TI 106 ft 40,530 tons 26.5in 24 kls!steam

609 ft 84 ft 17,745 tons 20.5 ft 20 ktsldiesel

-----------

none 700 28.700 sqft 141.200 cuft 25,500 sqft 166.600 cuft lh. I00 sqft 39 AAV veh deck and 31.CAC or Yl46 CtI-46 equilv. 12,500 sqft* 20:200 sqft 3924 cuftl* 67600 cufi 22.000 sqft 4I.C:AC/2I.CAC or 31,C:LJlI LCU or 4AAVIna N 25,000 sqft 25.000 cufi

Welldeck Sample dcck load load

19,000 sqft 394AV vch dcck and 2LC.lJ!I LCAC or 41.CU Y14.3 CH-46 cquav.

2LCAC

I-langer Capacity Deck spots Medical facilities

Y16 C11-46 equav. 2

300 bed 3 operating rms.

600 bed 6 operating rms.

limited

limited

05 Source: Department of thc Navy. Force 2001: A Pronrarn h i d e to thc U.S. Navv (Washington: DC: Government Printing ofticc. 1995). 69-70. Notes: ( I ) Typical I.HA aircraft mix includes 4 CH-5311. 14 CI-1-46,4 AI-1-1. two UH-I and six AV-8B. LHDs have additional room for 21 slightly larger aircraft mix.

AVIATION CI IAKACTERISTICS OF MEF k'ixcd Wing Aircrali FIA - 18 AV - 8B Rotary Wing Aircraft MV - 22 CII - 53E UH- I Al-I - I

0 60

144 64 24 224

Source: Calculations providcd by Dcploymenl and Logistics Working Group participating in tlic Naval Studies Board's study of tlic Ikpartmcnt of h e Navy's future capabilitics (Joly 1995). 4.

TARLE 6 MAXlMliM OVER-THE HORIZON DAILY TRANSPORT CAPACITIES (pcr vchiclc) Vchiclc Distance Max l.oad Capacity (Stons) 60Itrip Trips I'cr Day Max. Daily Capacity Capability (Stons) 300

LCAC

25nm

Source: Calculations providctl bq Dcploqment and 1.ogistics working Group participating in the Naval Studies ijoard's study of thc Dcpartmcnl ofthe Navy's fi~turc capabilitics (July 1995). 5.

TA13LE 7 OVER-'IHI'-HOlZI%Oh' 'fOI'Al. DAILY TKANSI'ORT CAPACITIES Vehicle

.

Nr.

Degraded capacity Per vchiclc (Ston)

'I'otal Daily Capacity

MV-22(Extcrnal)

144

I 1.25

1377

Source: Calculations provided by Deployment and Logistics Working Ciroop participating in tlic Naval Studics Roard's study ofthc Dcpartmcnt oftlie Navy's future capabililies (July 1995): 6. Notc: Maximum daily capacity dcgradcd to account for craft opcrational availability (85%) and average load (75% maximum).

Amphibious Forcc Ship-to-Shorc Transport Capacitics. Thc primary ship-to-shore assets for ovcr-tlic-hori7on transport in 2015 \\.ill he tlic I.CAC, CH-53E and MV-22. 'l'hcir daily transport capacities are summarized in Tables 5 and 6: calculations are in Appendices A and B. Thc capacities assumc thc ships arc 25 milcs from tlic shore and thc land fbrccs 75 miles inland; Ioi~ds are 75% of the maximum capacity. We assume the I.C;ACs will operate only bctwccn thc sliips and tlic shorclinc: transport inland is by aircraft and trocks.

TAB1.E 8 TASK FORCE DAILY SI!SI'AINMENT REQUIREMENT 1Jnit: 17440L500 Aniiorcd Cav Kcginicnt Day One: Supply Class Class I - A Ration Units OEA 0EA OEA 13.3 17 EA Pounds 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.907.69 0.00 3,418.03 244.1 5 0.00 24, 569.97 9,281.95 2,263.89 17,756.00 19,975.50 15,092.60 2:485.84 81,678 Gal 680,374.41 5.948.32 777,748.32 Short tons 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.454 0.00 1.709 0.122 0.00 12.285 4.64 1 1.132 8.878 8.878 7.546 1.243 340. I87 2.974 388.874

- U Katiori - C Ration
-MKL -LKP (I) -HCPl -1iCP2 -RICW Class I Subtotal*' Class I 1 Class 111 Packaged <.'lass lV - Harricr Class IV - Construction Clrtss VI Class Vlll Watcr Mail ***lJnit Total***

Total Daily Sustainmcnt Rcqoircmcnt (conl.) Days 2-4: Short tons Class 1 .-A Ration
-B Raton

OEA 0 EA 8,878 EA 4,430 EA

0.00 0.00 11.430 3.385 0.00 1.709 0.122 0.000 16.746 4.641 1.132 8.878 9.988 7.546 1.243

-I-Ration
-MRE -LlW (I) -I-ICPI -HC1'2

- R/C W
Class I Class I1 Class I l l - Packaged Class IV - Barrier Class 1V - Construction Class VI Class Vlll Watcr Mail ***Unit Total*** 8 1,678 Gal
-

***SUBTOTAL***

340.187 2.974 393.335

Note: Requiremenls dcterminctl using CASCOWs OPLOGPLN 1.30 PROGRAM (January 1996).

TABLE 9

' 0 1 . CONSUMI'TION ESTIMATED BIJ1.K 1

~

Day One: JP8: DSI.: MOCi : **Total** Day 2-4: JP8: DSL: IMOC;: **Total**

Tank Capacity 19,285.00 201.733.00 962.00 221.980.00 Tank Capacity 19,285 210,733.00 962.00 22 1,980.00

Consumption 35.864.00 154,689.20 12.028.92 202,582.12 Consumption 35.864.00 154:689.00 12,028.00 202,582.12

Weight 235,375.43 1,081,586.89 74,615.39 1,391,577 Weight 235,375.43 1.08 1,586.89 74.61 5.39 1.391.577.71

Notc: Kcquircmcnts dctcrmincd using CASC:OM's OI'LOGI'LN 1.3 program (January 1996).

TABLE I0 ESTIMATED AMMIJNITION CONSljMI'1'ION

Day One:

Wcight: 986,105.72 Days 2-4: Weight: 746,262.66

Cube: 2 1.45 1.354

Stons: 493.05

LbslMan/l)ay: 222.15

Cube: 17,558.029

S t o w 373.13

Lbs/Man/l)ay:

168.12

Notc: Kcquirements delermined using CASCOM's OI'LOGPLN 1.3 program (January 1996).

'I'ABLE I I 'I'O'I'AI. WEAPON SYSTEMS (ACK) 108 HMMWVs (TOW) 180 HMMWVs (Scout)

24 Avengers Major I'icccs of Equipment: Supply and Transport Troop: 12 scmitrlr. flatbed. 22.5 ton 12 tank, fib, collap, 1.500-gal, wtr 35 trk: tractor, 5-1011 water pur, 600-gal 22 5,000-gal tankers

1 irk, FL, RT. 4000-lb

24 trk, cgo, 5-ton dropside 4 trk. I'L. 6.000-lb

Medical Troop:

Ordnance (Maint) Troop: 3 HETs Source: Department oftlie Army. ST 100-3, Battlc Book (Ft. I.ewcnworth, KS: USACGSC. June 1996): 2-77.

LANDING TEAM LANDING REQUIREMENT No. ICAC Trips MC-22 Trips CH-531: Trips

Howitzers Light Armored Velis

66 206

0
? .6

66

65*

Notc: Calculations based on deploying 80 percent of ACR and equipment. I'crsonncl will be tratlsported by LCACs and MV-22s. lieavy equipment by CI I-53s, other equipment and supplies split between LCACs and MV-22s.

LANDING T E A M DAI1.Y SUS'I'AINMENT REQU1RI:MENT ILAC Trips MV-22 7'rips CH-53E Trips

Stons

Rations (Including Wtr (gal)) Ammo Fuel

388 493 750

9 10 0

0 21 157**

0 0 42***

Note: Calcolations based on deploying 80 percent o f ACR and cquipmcnt. * LCAC can carry up to 4 I.AVs pcr trip. **Weight is not the limiting factor for transporling fuel. MV-22 can carry hvo 500-gallon pods cxtcrnally. ***CI{-53E can carry thrcc 500-gallon pods externally.

'IAHLE 14 TOTAI. 'IKII'S PER D A Y *

No. LCACs 74
3 141238

Note: *Maxilnum daily capacity dcgradcd l o account Sor craft operational availabilily (85%). Table summarizes lift requircmcnts (trips) for landing ACR, its equipmcnt and onc day's sustainmcnt.

Results
A n initial analysis o f tlie Marinc Corps' amphibious ship capahilities. i t s maximum overtlic-horizon transport capability. and the daily sustainmcnt requirements o f t h e hypothetical sample force appear to indicate that our concept o f support is probably neither fcasiblc nor advisable for operations extended over a sustained pcriod o f tirnc (greater than seven days). Providing for and sustaining nn organization as large as an Army's Arrnorcd Cavalry Regiment extends the force structure and logistical capahilities o f the Marine Corps to its w r y limits. Furthermore, committal o f the Corps' entire force capacity to a singlc major regional contlict (MIIC). more than likely, misses tlie aim for tlic modern-day military and was certainly not the intent o f this study. I n short: the initial findings o f this study indicate that sustaining sucli a force (an Army's ACK) would he a rnonumcntal, if not impossible. task. Nevertheless, it docs support the primary question o f this thcsis. Wliilc sustaining an ACR may not he executable, support o f a lesser-sixd forcc is ccrtainly fcasiblc and within tlic capabilities o f t l i e Maritime Expeditionary Force. The most limiting factors to supporting an organimtion thc s i x o f a 4,000-man-plus Arrnorcd Cavalry Rcgiment is tlic number o f amphibious ships avail;~hlr for the opcration and the total number o f heavy airlift assets available. Tlic amphibious forcc structure planned for

tlie out-years 2010-2015 prnject a maritime force with a total oftliirty-six amphibious ships. The exact makcup o f thcsc ships and their capabilities are outlined in table 4. rkspitc our most

nrnbitious cffoorts to cxtcnd this force, the C h p s w i l l probably have no morc than thirty ships availablc Tor deployment at any one time. Historically, thc Corps has maintained a force structure capable o f rcsponding to a twoM K C sccnario, in which thc proponents o f its force would be divided bchwcn the two regional conflicts. Accepting this policy. only fifteen to sixteen ships would bc available to support the

scenario. Currently: the suitability and acceptability o f maintaining a force structure capable o f responding to two MKCs is being dehated by U.S. political and military leaders with no clear-cut solution on the horizon. Nevertheless, Americans can assume that the i j . S . military w i l l always maintain a force structure capable o f responding to at lcast one M K C and one lesser regional conflict (LRC). Extending this line ofreasoning to the scenario presented in this thesis. the Corps w i l l probably not comrnit more than h n l r o f its fnrce capabilities to a MKC. 'l'hcrcforc. tlic total force capability uscd in tlic hypothetical sccnnrio o f this study can be rralistically reduced by half or fifteen ships. likewise, this thesis w i l l institute similar rcductions to the remainder o f the Corps assets and capabilities including heavy airlift. Thc corresponding loss o f heavy lift assets would be the most diflicult problem to overcome. The ability to move a largc volume o f fucl and othcr large amounts o f liquid bulk material over cxtcndcd distances is pcrhaps thc most constraining issuc for logistical planners. The issue is not one o f weight, but the number o F pods which can be transported cxtcrnally by organic airlift. The CH-53Es currently employed in the fleet can only tnovc tllrcc 500-gallon pods cxtcrnally at a tinic. tlic MV-22 can transport two pods externally. Working with a forcc rcduced by half, there would be only thirty-two CH-53Es, 72 MV-22s and 37 LCACs to move fucl shorc; thcrcforc. limiting the number o f troops \vhich could be reasonably sustain rrom over the horizon inland. I n short, naval operations from the sea do encompasses operations in the rear area sustainmerit environment o f Army ground units, but is limited to a force o f 2,000 to 2.500 troops \vithout the benefit o f logistical sitcs ashorc. As statcd carlicr in this study, this assessment is a worst case scenario with thc insertion o f landing tcams carrying n full complement of artillery and service support equipment. O M I T S , at lcast in conccpt. calls for thc deployment o f forces onto a beach without thc landing

o f artillery pieces. Fire support would be provided by naval air and combat ships operating within close proximity of the beach. Obviously, the logistically burden alleviated by the dccision not to deploy these assets ashore would dramatically reduce the burden on heavy liti However, the decision to deploy artillery with the landing teams is a decisiori o f the task ibrce cornmar~dcr and not one which should be left to logisticians. Nevertheless, this study included the addition burden o f deploying troops with a11 o f its comhat arms and equipment to tcst the full logistical implications--the breaking point--of the operation. Because o f this fact: the assessment derived from this study may bc too conservative, leaving room for the deployment o f a more flexible and lighter force.

'Peter M. Dunn and Bruce W. Watson, American Intervention in Grenada (I3oulder: CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1985), 131. 'Ibid., 161

blZeynoldA. Burro\ves, Revolution and Kescue in Grenada: An Account ofthe U.S. Caribbean invasion (Wcstport. CI-: Greenwood Press Inc., 1988). 80. 'Dunn and Watson. 163 'lbid.. 165. 'Ibid.. 76. "'lbid., 94. "lbid.. 120. "l3urromes: 82. "Dunn and Watson. O l

"lbid. IhLinda Washington, Tcn Years On: The British A r m in thc Falklands War (Great Britain: Jolly and I3arber i h i t e d , 1912). 103. "lbid. 'Xl'heSunday Times of London , War in the Falklands: The Full Storv (New York, NY: I-larper and Row, Publishcrs, Inc., 1982). 145. '"bid. '"lbid.: 103. "lhid. lilhid., 104. "lhid., 186. "lbid.. 157. "lhid., 145. "W~;lshington,6. "lbid., 107. '%e Sunday rimes of I.ondon, 177.

"lhid., 192. ""lhid., 206. ''Washington, 93. "lhid.. 84. "John I.. Komjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War (I'o~t Monroe, VA: Military House Officc. 1997). p. 140. "JCS, Join1 Publication 4-0, Doctrinc of Lopistics Suooort of Joint O~crations, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Oflice, 1992) p. 11-1.

j'lhid.. 11-1. ''lhid. '"American Arnmv Doctrinc for thc Post-Cold War, 120.
.I0

Ihid.: 11-5.

"lhid.

CHAPTER F I V E CONCI.IJSIONS A N D RECOMMENDATIONS

OMFTS is not a new concept. American military history provides many exccllcnt examples o f power projection launched from the sea. Onc such case is General MacArthur's hold operational strike at Inchon and the ensuring envelopment and dcfcat o f North Korean forces in Septemher 1950. Ilowever, significant advancements in technology, information systems, and mobility have rapidly changed h e way in which naval forces projcct power fonvard from the sea. Additionally, the ne\v world order and the corresponding realignment o f the

US. strategic dircction combined with

increasingly limited military resources and reductions

in forward basing o f \I. S. forces dictate changes in the strategic course o f military deployment decision making. This changc in strategy has rcsultcd in a greater emphasis on OMFI'S. A

medium which offers virtually unrestricted access and provides 1J.S. commanders a measure o f Ilcxibility in responding to contlicts in the littoral regions o f the world. The contingency h c c s deployed in futurc conflicts w i l l serve important U.S. political. security, and economic interests. 'They w i l l lend credibility to America's pledge to remain a global power and to meet i t s treaty conlmitment with its allics. I n addition, thcsc forwardly deployed forces w i l l also contribute to the maintenance o f regional balances o f power. particularly as many up-and-coming powers have increased significantly their military capabilities and arc becorning more adroit diplomatically. The Department o f thc Navy has enacted a broad range o f forward-looking programs, policies, and organizational changes designed to keep the Navy and Marine Corps in step with

60

rapidly changing national security challenges. T l ~ c Navy's ability to succcssfully conduct a wide range of demanding. real-world opcrations over the last year has validated this approach and will set the stagc for future operations. I'his study attempted to objcctivcly lay out a threefold analysis in historical, doctrinal, ilnd futuristic context while accuratcly assessing the myriad of complex issues that would hamper the projcction of naval operations ashore. Do maritimc forces have the lift capability to support such an opcration' Do thc Navy have the logistical support structurc in place to support it? What are the capabilitics/limitationsof the amphibious forcc'? I'hcse are 1111 credihlc issues. and ones which warranted critical rcvicw. Table 14 summarizes the lifi rcquircmcnls (trips) for landing thc Armored Calvary Regiment with its direct support artillery and combat scrvicc support elements. It also shows the numbcr of trips that the postulated amphibioos force of 74 LCACs, 144 MV-22s. and 64 CH53Ls c o ~ ~makc l d in a day. Initial calculations indicate that the force assembled could move and support the ACR for opcrations as detailed i n the hypothetical scenario. I-Iowever, the numbcr of trips required to m o w and sustain lhis s i ~ e hrce demand thc cmploymcnt of lhe entire forcc capability of the Marine Corps-an unrealistic plan. But. this does not climinatc tlic naval expeditionary forcc as a supporting effort in the insertion and sustainment of a rnorc limitcd sizcd force. Rough calculations indicate that a forcc of fifteen-lo-sixteen amphibious ships with corresponding air assets could support an Army organization up to approximately 2.500 troops for a period of five-to-sewn days. 'l'llc tactical-level support functions provided would includc maintcnancc. battle damage repair: engineering, cargo handling, fueling, arming, moving. matcrial iransliipment. personnel, and hcallli services. Most of thcsc scrviccs would, necessarily, be sea hascd allowing thc forces ashore freedorri of ~novcment, reduction of footprinl, and the abilily lo maintain a h s t optempo.

To be si~cccssful in an operation of this magnitude. the U.S. Army and Navy must be

prepared to erect cl~angcs in the way that thcy do business today. Modifying existing logistics organization is an approach that probably will not work. A design of modular logistics units will be required, allowing for a building-block approach whcre just enough functional capability can be dcploycd to support the contingency force. When the force or rcquircments of the force are expanded, modular logistics units can bc addcd accordingly and forwardly dcploycd to support operations. Ideally, overlapping responsibility and battle space will dcmand that the military build organizations whcre nlutual eflicicncics arc gained without sacriliccs in combat effectivcncss. The ruturc is now. While somc cffort must be devoted to configuring scrvicc support systcms to tactically integrate with forces ashore, the technology exists today. The changing evints of today (LC., the information agc, and rapid mobility) havc forccd overlapping coverage of battle spacc traditionally assigned to individual services. To be succcssrul in this new environment. the scnrices must continoc to standardize operating proccdurcs and support automation and communication architectures xhich \vould be benelicial to all. Developrncnt of a truly seamless logistical system is not far away in thc future. It can be donc today, on a limitcd scalc as outlined in this thesis. It will require a shin in strategic thinking and support from the highest levels to makc it fi~lly functional. Ncvcrthclcss: this study can conclude that naval operations do encompasses operations in thc rcar-area suslainment
environment ofarmy ground unit.

Disclaimer This study has, by no means. address all ofthc possible logistical support issucs and problems that will confront contingency forccs as thcy deploy around thc globc to dcfcnd U.S.

interests (i.e., logistical intclligcncc, command and control. and maintaining air superiority). Thcsc arc topics which warrants attention and can hc dcvclopcd fimhcr in other studies. I t was simply not the intent o f this paper to do so. I t was also not tlic intcnt ol'this study to justify tlic selection o f Army ground troops over tlic U.S. marine Corps in the assignment o f forccs in the traditional scnsc. Kathcr, this study assumed that the nation's military lcadcrs have selected the bcst lighting force for the mission and the current situation-to sccure and maintain the tactical advantage and initiative over a potential adversary. Thc ncxt fiftccn to twenty years o f military history w i l l be seen as a time o f transition hctwccn a ccntury o f persuasive contlict and a twcntylirst century information age. an unknown cra o f strategic revicw in which the Unitcd Statcs' sccurity challenges w o d d be diverse in type and technology and in which change would be constant. The military must be prepared doctrinally for all possihilitics. I t must be capable of creating innovative and imaginative combinations o f technology and forces in an effort to harness military cliangc. I n keeping with this line o f thinking. tlic cxact makcup o f future contingency forces deployed around the world to safeguard 1I.S. iritcrcsts w i l l bc. ncccssarily. situational depcndcnt utilizing the elements o f MITI'-'I' as tlic ruling factors at tlic tactical and operational levcls. Military planncrs must always consider the mission, enemy, terrain and wcathcr. and troops in

relations to the timc available \ h e n planning for operational missions. Therefore, the
assignment o f A m y ground forces in this study should not be t l ~ c primary issue. The focus o f
this thesis was simply to dctcrmine whether or not naval operations in thc littoral encompass operations in tlic immaturc rcar-arca sustainment environment oFArmy ground units. rcsults o f this study answer in the aftirmativc. The

HEI.ICOPTER L.IFT CAPABILITIES

Characteristics Load Passengers Spccd Combat radius wlo refuel Assumptions Distance from ship to unit Flight path distance Daily operating time External Internal External Intcrnal 16 Stons 6.5 Stons 53 80kts 150kts 200nn1 5 Stons 3 Stons 24 120kts 240kts I l Onm wlexternal load 200nm wlintcrnal load

l OOnm 120nm 8 hr.

Conlputations CH-531' Extcrnal

MV-22 I'xternal

MV-22 Internal

IJpload Time Outbou~nd Transit Time 1)ownload Time Return Transit Time Total Trip 'l'imc Cnlculatcd Trips pcr Day Complete Trips per Day

30 min 90 mi11 I5 n ~ i n 48 min 1 83 min 2.62 trips 2 trips

30 min 60 min 15 min 30 min 135 min 3.55 trips 3 lrips

30 rnin 30 min 15 min 30 min 105 mi11 4.57 trips 4 trips

APPENDIX R CALClJLATlON OF LCAC LIFT CAl'A1311.I'I'Y

Max. C

ABILITY

Refueling: Speed:

120ading/unloading time Sample loading

60Ston (overload to 75 Ston) 1809 sq ft 24 pcoplc Uses 100 gallhr. Rcfucl cvcry 4 hr. Takcs 15 minutes. (A fimction of' sea state) 40+ kt 0 to 1 2 35 3 30 4 25 30 minll 5 min for ROIRO I MI A I tank or 4 LAVs and 2 AAVs Trips Per Day (1 2 hours pcr day operations) For 25 nm

For 50 nm
30 min 86 min 15 min 86 niin 217 min 3.32 trips 3 trips

Upload Time Outbound Transit Time Download Time Return 'I'ransit Time Total Trip Timc Calculated Trips per Day Complete Trips per Day

-30 min 4.3 tnin 15 min 4 . 3 min 131 min 5.49 trips 5 trips

LCAC: the high-speed. fully amphibious landing crafi is capable of carrying a 60-ton payload (75 tons in overload) ;11 speeds in excess of 40 knots, up to ;I nominal range of200 nautical miles. Its ability to ride on a cushion of air allows it to operate directly form the wcll deck of LHD, LPD and LHA class ships. Carrying equipment, troops. and supplies. the LCAC launches form tlic shp's will deck and transits at high spccd ovcr thc waves. through thc s u r f ~ o n e and . across the beach to a suitable oftload site ashore whcre it quickly offloads and thc returns Tor

rcload and follow-on sorties. LCACs provide the commander, amphibious force (CATF) tremendous tlexihilil) in selecting landing sitcs as comparcd with convenlional landing craft, which could approach only 17 pcrcent ofihc world's potential bcach heads. Thc LCAC now pcrmits access to more than 75 percent o f thc world's heachcs, delivering its cargo onto dry land.

APPENDIX C UNIT DODlC SUMMARY FOR ARMD CAV REGT

DOIIIC Nomenclature
CTG 5.56MM B A I L M855 CTG 5.561MM TRCR M856 5.56MM LKD 4-1 CTG 5.56MM TRCR M 196 CTG 5.56MM BALL M 193 7.62MM 411 TRCR LKD 7.62MM 9/1 TRCR LKD C T C ; 9MM BA1.I. CTG CAL.38 M4 I CTG CAL .45 BALL CTCi .50 CAI. MI3 CTCi .50 CAL AP CTG 20MM HE1 M56 CTG 20MM HE1 M56 CTG 20MM HEI-f M246 25.44MM DECOY CTG 25MM APDS-T CT'G 25MM HEI-T Fr1792 25MM AI'IIS-I' 40MM GUST 40hlM RDST 40MM KIXM 40MM CiUSM 40MM LSM 40MM WI-IITE 40MM WHITE 40MM RIOT CON CTG 40MM I-IEDP M430 40MM IHEDP M433 CI'G 40MM I-IE M383 120MM HEIMO CTC; 120MM SlMK XM929 CTG 120MM ILLIJ XM930 CTG 120MM HE XM934 CTG 120MM AI'I:SDS-T

ROUNDS 338,148 77,004 38.178 506 2,222 285,486 229,080 4,170 320 74 68,977 930 33,250 0 0 1.232 10,750 17:375 0 247 247 494 494 494 247 247 1235 4212 2964 5796 0 234 36 1944 779

ClG 120MM IIEAR-MP-T 155MM DDARM XM898 155MM HE ADAM 155MM H E ADAM 155MM H E RAAMS 155MM II.I.UM 155MM HE KAAMS l551vlM COPPERHEAD 155MM RAAMS-S 1551MM RAAMS-L I55MM SMOKE WP I'R01' CHARGE M203 PROP CHARGE M 1 19A2 I'KOI' CHAKCiI: M3A I I'KOI' CHARGE h14.42 l 5 5 M M HE M I 0 7 155MM WPM110 155 HE ICM M483 165MM HEI'M123 155 IIE RAP M54OA1 155MM HASERRN GKIJN SMOKE K1' L8A3 GREN IR M76 KKT 2.75IN SMK M259 KKT 2.75 1IE R K T I I E I I Y D R A 70M151 KK'I' 2.75 11.1. M257 2.75 II.I.UM 2.75 SMK RKT IIE FYDRA TO M262 FLARE ACFT M206 DEMO K I T (MIC1.K) DTG lMP M796 FlJZE M T FUZE M T I.'lJZC I'D M739 FUZE PROX M7.32 PRIMER PERC M82 TOW STINGER MSLE CANISTER MINE XM87 CTCi I20MM SMK XM87 CTG 120MM I L L 0 XM930 CTCi 120MM HE XM934
UNIT TOTAL FOR ARMD CAV REGT WEIGHT: 986,105 ' Cl!BE: 21,451.354 STONS: 493.05

Uurrowes, Reynold A. Revolution and Rescue in Grenada: An Account of the iJ.S.-Caribbean Invasion. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988. Dunn, I'ctcr M., and Bruce W. Watson. American Intervention in Grenada: The Implications of Owration "(Jreent Fuw." Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1985. Dyer, George C. Naval Lonistics. Annapolis. MD: Unitcd States Naval Institutc, 1962. Ro~n,jue, J. L. American Armv Doctrinc For thc Post-Cold War. Fort Monroe: VA: Military I louse Officc, 1997. Shrader, Charles R. 1J.S. Militarv Lo~istics.1607-1991: A Rcscarch Guide. Wcstport, CT: Greenwood Press. 1992. The Sunday Times of London. War in thc Falklands. Ncw York, NY: Harper and Row I'uhlishers, l k . ; 1982. Edited and trnnslatcd by Michacl Howard and I'ctcr I'arct. von Clausewitz, Karl. OnWnr. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University I'rcss. 1976. Washington, Linda. Tcn Ycars On: Thc British Armv in the Falklands War. Great Dritain: Jolly and Barber Limited, 1992.

Pcriodicnls and Articlcs Boorda, Michael. "Tl~c Futurc of Scapowcr." Jancs' Navy International; I0 I ( 1 996): 32. Covaoll, C. "New Rolcs. Systcm Expand 1I.S. Carrier Flexibility." Aviation Week and Space Technolocv, 139 (1993): 48. Fryer, J. W. "Flying with the Bone (Joint l.ittoral Wartiare)." IJ. S. Naval Instilulc Proceedines 121 (1995): 49-52. Johnson, J. "1J.S. Navy Chicf Offcrs his Vision to Congress." Jane's Defense Weeklv, International Edition (JDW) 26 (1996): 19.

McGruther, K. R. "Naval Expeditionary Warlhre." Proceedings ofthc Annual Admiral Charlcs M. Cooke Confcrcnce (5th) for Naval Strategists and I'lanners Hcld at Newport, Rhodc Island (1 5-1 7 March 1994). Mundy, C. E. "Thunder and Lightning: Joint 1,ittoral Warfare." JFO: Joint Force Ouarterly 4 (1994): 65-73. Murphy, I : . J. "Littoral Warfare: Adapting to Brown-Watcr Operations." Marine Corns Gazcttc 77 (1993): 65-73. Myers, C. E. "Littoral Warfke: Back to thc Future." 0.S. Naval Institute I'rocccdinrs 1 16 (1990): 48-55. Starr, B. "Navy Focusing on Coastal Doctrine." Janc's Defense Weeklv. International Edition cJDw, 18 (1992): 13. Ya'ari, Y. "1,ittoral Arena: A Word o f Caution." Naval War Collere Review 48 (1995): 7-21.

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. .

Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrinc Tor Joint O~crations.Washington, DC: Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, Septemhcr 1993. Joint Publication 4-0: 1)octrine for Loeistics Suvoort o f Joint Oncrations. Washington, I)C: Ciovcrnment Printing Officc. September 1992.

US., Department o f the Air Force. Air Forcc Manual 1-10. Combat Sunnort 1)octrine. Washington. IX: Govcmment Printing Oftice. April 1987.

U.S., Department o f thc Army. U.S. Army Chnmand and General Staff College. S'I' 101-6, CiIlG4 Battle Book. I:t. Lcavcn\~orth,KS: USACOSC: July 1996.

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-. .
.

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Ivy, M. t:. "Sustainment of Theater Army forces: The Esscncc and the Art." Unpublished School of Advanced military Studies monograph, 1J.S. Army Command and General Stall'College, I:t. Leavcnwrth, KS, June 1990. Johnson, J. 1.. Forward ...From the Sea: 'fhe Navy Operational Concept." (Washington, DC: Departmcnt of the Navy, 1992)
"

Jordan: J. D. Operation CHKOMITE: Power Proiection . . . From the Sea. Ncwport, RI: Naval War Collcgc, 1995. (NTIS No. AD-A29380117lXA13) Krauss, 11. J. From the Sea in 1950: Lessons for the 21st Centun, From O~crntion Chromite. Ncwport, IU: Naval War College, 1993. (N'I'IS No. AD-A264 28411lXAB) Mitchell, W. R. "Inchon-Seoul Opcration." A I.esson in thc Dcsien of O~erational Maneuver From thc Sca. Newport. RI: Naval War College, 1995. (N'fIS No. AD-A2938991 1 IXAB) Murray. R. J. T o c o s 96': Littoral Operations." (Washington, DC: Departmcnt of the Navy, 1996) O'Keefe, Sean. Frank H.Kclso, 11, and Carl I:.Mundy, Jr. "...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for thc 2lst Century." (Wasllington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992) Semmler, K. "Opcrations in the 1.ittoral." (Washington. DC: Govenimcnt Printing Officc, 1996) [J.S.. Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Joint Vision 2010." (Wmhington, I)C: Ciovcrnment Printing Office, 1996)

US.,Department ofthc Navy. "Operational Mancuvcr From the Sea: A Conccpt for the
Projection of Naval I'owcr Ashore." (Washington. DC: Government I'rinting Office, 1992) Wheeland, D. Svnchronization of Littoral Opcrations. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1994. (NTIS No. ADA279 71 3/2/XAD)

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