RULE 130 SECTION 48 OPINION RULE 1. Lim vs.

CA 214 S 273 (supra)-Bisnar

Facts: Nelly Lim (Petitioner) and Juan Sim (Private respondent) were married. On Nov. 25, 1987, Sim filed a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground that Lim was allegedly suffering from schizophrenia. Sim announced that he would present Dr, Lydia Acampado, Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital and a Doctor of Psychiatry, as his next witness. Lim opposed it on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from Dr. Acampado is privileged since she had examined Lim in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia that she was barred from testifying under the rule on confidentiality of a physicianpatient relationship. Sim however argued that Dr. Acampado would be presented as an expert witness and would not testify on any information acquired while attending to Lim in a professional capacity. Court allowed Dr. Acampado to testify. Dr. Acampado was asked hypothetical questions related to her field of expertise. She neither revealed the illness she examined and treated Lim nor disclosed the results of her examination and the medicines prescribed. Lim now claims that the court erred in believing that Dr. Acampado was summoned as an expert witness and not as an attending physician of Lim. Issue: Did the court err in allowing Dr. Acampado to testify? Ruling: No. Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. She did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of Lim; moreover, the facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while attending the patient. There is as well no showing that Dr. Acampados answers to the questions propounded to her relating to the hypothetical problem were influenced by the information obtained from Lim. Her expert opinion excluded whatever information or knowledge she had about Lim which was acquired by reason of the physician-patient relationship existing between them. As the expert witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot be excluded.

The statutory physician-patient privilege, though duly claimed is not violated by permitting a physician to give expert opinion testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the physical mental condition of a patient whom he has attended professionally, where his opinion is based strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated, excluding and disregarding any personal professional knowledge he may have concerning such patient. But in order to avoid the bar of the physician-patient privilege where it is asserted in such a case, the physician must base his opinion solely upon the facts hypothesized in the question, excluding from consideration his personal knowledge of the patient acquired through the physician and patient relationship. If he cannot or does not exclude from consideration his personal

professional knowledge of the patients condition he should not be permitted to testify as to his expert opinion. 2. People vs. Galleno 291 S 762-Fernandez Parties: Evelyn Garganera - 5 yrs old, was the victim Rosita Garganera- mother of the victim Galleno accused Emetrio- uncle of the victim Penicola-aunt of the victim Facts: Rosita left her daughter Evelyn with Emetrio. Evelyn was living with Emetrio and Penicola, her uncle and aunt. One day, Emetrio and Penicolo left the house. The only person left was niece evelyn and nephew Eleazar. Accused, Gelleno went to the house of Emetrio and inserted a blunt instrument in Evelyns vagina, which made her cry and she told Emetrio. Then they went to the hospital. Trial Court: guilty Accused-appellant contends that the testimony of the three expert witnesses presented by the prosecution, namely, Dr. Alfonso Orosco, Dr. Ma. Lourdes Laada, and Dr. Machael Toledo, which convinced the trial court that rape was committed against the offended party was not binding. Issue: W/N contention was correct? Yes Held: As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give opinions. It is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts proved. However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are received in many cases, and are not confined to expert testimony, based on the principle that either because of the special skill or expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the subject matter under observation, of for other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in reaching a judgment. In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the expert testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim's laceration, but also the testimony of the other prosecution witness, especially the victim herself. In other words, the trial court did not rely solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated various possible causes of the victim's laceration does not mean the trial court's interference is wrong. SC: affirmed lower court RULE 130 SECTION 49 OPINION OF EXPERT WITNESS

1. Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. vs. William Lines, Inc. 306 S 762-Kung Facts: Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. repaired marine vessels while the Prudential is in the non-life insurance business. William Lines, Inc., the owner of M/V Manila City, a luxury passenger-cargo vessel, which caught fire and sank. At the time of the incident, subject vessel was insured with Prudential for P45M for hull and machinery. CSEW was insured for only Php 10 million for the shiprepairers liability policy. They entered into a contract where negligence was the only factor that could make CSEW liable for damages. Moreover, liability of CSEW was limited to only Php 1million for damages. The Hull Policy included an Additional Perils (INCHMAREE) Clause covering loss of or damage to the vessel through the negligence of, among others, ship repairmen. William brought Manila City to the dry dock of CSEW for repairs. The officers and cabin crew stayed at the ship while it was being repaired. After the vessel was transferred to the docking quay, it caught fire and sank, resulting to its total loss. William brought suit against CSEW alleging that it was through the latters negligence that the ship caught fire and sank. Prudential was impleaded as co-plaintiff after it had paid the value of insured items. It was subrogated to 45 million, or the value it claimed to indemnify. The trial court brought judgment against CSEW 45 million for the ship indemnity, 65 million for loss of income, and more than 13 million in other damages. The CA affirmed the TC decision. CSEW contended that the cause of the fire was due to Williams hotworks on the said portion of the ship which they didnt ask CSEW permission for. Prudential, on the other hand, blamed the negligence of the CSEW workers in the instance when they didnt mind rubber insulation wire coming out of the air-conditioning unit that was already burning. Hence this MFR. The trial court found direct evidence to prove that the workers and/or employees of CSEW were remiss in their duty of exercising due diligence in the care of subject vessel.
On appeal to SC, one of the assignments of error raised by CSEW is that THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING CSEWS EXPERT EVIDENCE AS INADMISSIBLE OR OF NO PROBATIVE VALUE. HELD:

The direct evidence substantiates the conclusion that CSEW was really negligent. Thus, even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, in light of the direct evidence on record, the ineluctable conclusion is that the petitioner, Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc., was negligent and consequently liable for damages to the respondent, William Lines, Inc. Neither is there tenability in the contention of petitioner that the Court of Appeals erroneously ruled on the inadmissibility of the expert testimonies it (petitioner) introduced on the probable cause and origin of the fire. Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the testimonies of the fire experts, Messrs. David Grey and Gregory Michael Southeard, who testified on the probable origin of the fire in M/V Manila City. Petitioner avers that since the said fire experts were one in their opinion that the fire did not originate in the area of Tank Top No. 12 where the JNB workers were doing hotworks but on the crew accommodation cabins on the portside No. 2 deck, the trial court and the Court of Appeals should have given weight to such finding based on the testimonies of fire experts; petitioner argues. But courts are not bound by the testimonies of expert witnesses. Although they may have probative value, reception in evidence of expert testimonies is within the discretion of the court. Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides: SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness. - The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.

The word may signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness as evidence is a prerogative of the courts. It is never mandatory for judges to give substantial weight to expert testimonies. If from the facts and evidence on record, a conclusion is readily ascertainable, there is no need for the judge to resort to expert opinion evidence. In the case under consideration, the testimonies of the fire experts were not the only available evidence on the probable cause and origin of the fire. There were witnesses who were actually on board the vessel when the fire occurred. Between the testimonies of the fire experts who merely based their findings and opinions on interviews and the testimonies of those present during the fire, the latter are of more probative value. Verily, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving more weight to said testimonies.

RULE 131 SECTION 1 BURDEN OF PROOF Jimenez v. NLRC Pedro and Fredelito Juanatas, father and son, filed a claim for unpaid wages/commissions, separation pay and damages against JJs Trucking and/or Dr. Bernardo Jimenez. They alleged that they were hired by Bernardo Jimenez as driver/mechanic and helper, respectively, in his trucking firm, JJs Trucking. They were assigned to a ten-wheeler truck to haul soft drinks of Coca- Cola Bottling Company and paid on commission basis. That for the years 1988 and 1989 they received only a partial commission of P84,000.00 from JJs Truckings total gross income of almost P1,000,000.00 for the said two years. Consequently, with their commission for that period being computed at 20% of said income, there was an unpaid balance to them of P106,211.86; that until March 1990 when their services were illegally terminated, they were further entitled to P15,050.309 which, excluding the partial payment of P7,000.00, added up to a grand total of P114,261.86 due and payable to them;

and that Jimenez refusal to pay their aforestated commission was a ploy to unjustly terminate them. On his part, Jimenez contend that Fredelito Juanatas was not an employee of the firm but was merely a helper of his father Pedro; that all commissions for 1988 and 1989, as well as those up to March, 1990, were duly paid; and that the truck driven by Pedro Juanatas was sold in 1991 and, therefore, private respondents were not illegally dismissed. The labor arbiter ordered the payment of the P15,050 but dismissed the complaint of Fredelito. On appeal, the NLRC modified the labor arbiters ruling and declared Fredelito as an employee of JJs Trucking and ordered the latter to pay P84,387.05 in unpaid commissions. Jimenez argues that the NLRC erred in finding that the Juanatas were not paid their commissions in full. The Supreme Court, while affirming the award, modified the NLRC judgment by deleting the declaration that Fredelito is an employee. The Court said It finds no reason to disturb the findings of NLRC that the entire amount of commissions was not paid due to the evident failure of Jimenez to present evidence that full payment has been made. It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegations. Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an affirmative allegation, the plaintiff or complainant has to prove his affirmative allegation, in the complaint and the defendant or respondent has to prove the affirmative allegations in his affirmative defenses and counterclaim. Considering that Jimenez assert that the disputed commissions have been paid, they have the bounden duty to prove that fact. As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment. When the existence of a debt is fully established by the evidence contained in the record, the burden of proving that it has been extinguished by payment devolves upon the debtor who offers such a defense to the claim of the creditor. Where the debtor introduces some evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the evidence - as distinct from the general burden of proof shifts to the creditor, who is then under a duty of producing some evidence to show nonpayment. Although the Juanatas admit receipt of partial payment, Jimenez still has to present proof of full payment. Where the defendant sued for a debt admits that the debt was originally owed, and pleads payment in whole or in part, it is incumbent upon him to prove such payment . That a plaintiff admits that some payments have been made does not change the burden of proof. The defendant still has the burden of establishing payments beyond those admitted by plaintiff. The testimony of Jimenez which merely denied the claim of the Juanatas, unsupported by documentary evidence, is not sufficient to establish payment. The positive testimony of a creditor may be sufficient of itself to show non- payment, even when met by indefinite testimony of the debtor. Similarly, the testimony of the debtor may also be sufficient to show payment, but, where his testimony is contradicted by the other party or by a disinterested witness, the issue may be determined against the debtor since he has the burden of proof. The testimony of the debtor creating merely an inference of payment will not be regarded as conclusive on that issue. Hence, for failure to present evidence to prove payment, Jimenez defaulted in their defense and in effect admitted the allegations of the Juanatas.

LRTA vs NAVIDAD FACTS:

October 14, 1993, 7:30 p.m. : Drunk Nicanor Navidad (Nicanor) entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token. While Nicanor was standing at the platform near the LRT tracks, the guard Junelito Escartin approached him. Due to misunderstanding, they had a fist fight Nicanor fell on the tracks and killed instantaneously upon being hit by a moving train operated by Rodolfo Roman December 8, 1994: The widow of Nicanor, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, Roman, LRTA, Metro Transit Org. Inc. and Prudent (agency of security guards) for the death of her husband.

LRTA and Roman filed a counter-claim against Nicanor and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent: denied liability averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and surpervision of its security guards LRTA and Roman: presented evidence Prudent and Escartin: demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task RTC: In favour of widow and against Prudent and Escartin, complaint against LRT and Roman were dismissed for lack of merit CA: reversed by exonerating Prudent and held LRTA and Roman liable

ISSUE: W/N LRTA and Roman should be liable according to the contract of carriage HELD: NO. Affirmed with Modification: (a) nominal damages is DELETED (CANNOT co-exist w/ compensatory damages) (b) Roman is absolved.

Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty off exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers

Civil Code: Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances

Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless

they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755

Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the formers employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers

This liability of the common carriers does NOT cease upon proof that they Exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.

Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carriers employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.

Carriers presumed to be at fault or been negligent and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieaved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure

Where it hires its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task, the common carrier is NOT relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage

GR: Prudent can be liable only for tort under Art. 2176 and related provisions in conjunction with Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. (Tort may arise even under a contract, where tort [quasi-delict liability] is that which breaches the contract)

EX: if employers liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee, employer can be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees.

EX to the EX: Upon showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee Factual finding of the CA: NO link bet. Prudent and the death of Nicanor for the reason that the negligence of Escartin was NOT proven NO showing that Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability Contractual tie bet. LRT and Nicanor is NOT itself a juridical relation bet. Nicanor and Roman Roman can be liable only for his own fault or negligence