Understanding China's Energy Security

World Political Science Review
Volume 3, Issue 3 2007 Article 2

Understanding China’s Energy Security
Christian Constantin_
University of British Columbia, cconstan@interchange.ubc.ca

Originally published as Constantin Christian 2006. “Comprendre la sécurité énergétique en
Chine.” Politique et Sociétés. 25(2-3): 15-45. Reprinted with permission from Politique et
Societies.
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press.
1. Introduction
On June 30th 2004∗, following a year of intense discussions, a study group made
up of actors from the energy sector and headed by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao set
an energy policy stressing the importance of energy conservation, new
technologies, and the protection of the environment. One would have expected
that, in light of the rising prices of black gold, Beijing’s decision to revise its
dependence vis-à-vis hydrocarbons be met with acclaim and considered as a step
in the right direction. Yet, the Western press lashed out with critical articles on the
impact of the Chinese demand on crude price and the risks Chinese consumption
entail for the security of East Asia1.
This discrepancy between the decisions taken in Beijing and the perception
of China abroad may be explained by the reliance of some analysts of energy
geopolitics or Chinese energy policy on dangerously short-sighted theoretical
conceptions on energy security and decision-making processes. First of all, these
theoretical approaches often give oil supply a privileged position to the detriment
of other energy sources or demand-control measures. Second, these analyses
either attribute an overall unity to the Chinese regime, or see bureaucratic
bargaining as the only mechanism of political innovation. These approaches do
not do justice and cannot convincingly describe the evolution of debates on
energy policy within the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since the coming to
power of the Hu Jintao administration.
This paper seeks to offer a different perspective of China’s energy policy
and of the role played by security issues in its definition. Hence, it will impart
particular attention to conceptions and ideas held by the actors involved in the
energy policy decision-making process. It will demonstrate that the different
measures that make up Chinese energy policy are the result of a debate among
proponents of three frames 2 – a strategic vision, a market approach, and a
conception of “scientific development”– simultaneously exhibited within China’s
energy policy community. Each one of these frames sheds light in a unique
fashion on the objective conditions confronting Chinese decision-makers by
∗ A preliminary version of this text was presented at the CEPES’ symposium titled: The
Challenges of Governance in China, September 17 2004.
The author would like to thank the Center of International Relations at the University of British-
Columbia and the SSHRC (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada) for
their
financial support, as well as the Center for Strategic Studies (Zhanlüe yanjiusuo) of Qinghua
University for their warm welcome and their logistical support.
1 For example, Lam (2004) and Tanner (2004).
2 I will come back to this concept in greater details later in the text.
1
Constantin: Understanding China's Energy Security
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
identifying some of them as problematic while leaving others in the shadows, and,
at the same time, they offer solutions articulated in their own terms. If these
frames provide the substance of problem definition and solutions, it is also
important to note that certain structural factors, namely economic culture, political
institutions, and administrative procedures impose a selection among frames or
limit the possibility of them being converted into viable policies.
2. Approaches to China’s Policymaking
2.1 The Rationalist Approach
China’s central state is often viewed as a rational and unitary actor. This
perception is common because of theoretical reasons peculiar to the discipline of
international relations, but also because the workings of the central Chinese state
remain largely unknown. The conception of a monolithic central regime is also
conveyed by the literature concerned by center-region relations or by the
opposition between the regime and China’s civil society3.
This theoretical perspective stems from a long tradition of research which
postulates a rational process of public administration. This process begins with the
identification of problems to solve and objectives to achieve, then proceeds to the
identification of available solutions and the evaluation of their consequences and
leads, finally, to the adoption of the appropriate solution in light of a costsbenefits
assessment4. Although it is well known that very few actual public policy
processes come close to this ideal, it nevertheless remains widespread when it
comes to studying China. Its main advantage lies in its ability to provide plausible
hypotheses on the objectives and solutions that avail themselves to Chinese
leaders in a situation where the nature of the regime limits researchers’ access to
the decision-making process 5 . It goes without saying that this model seems
particularly well adapted to approximate the decisions of a regime with a high
degree of autonomy from social pressures and in which political leaders enjoy
considerable power over their subordinates.
A majority of analyses dealing with the international consequences of
China’s energy policy adopts this model. To authors of these analyses, the
growing dependence of this country on oil imports, forces Chinese leaders to
adopt a series of diplomatic and administrative measures to limit the negative
effects of this dependency. Thus, the Chinese strategy of investing in foreign oil
resources (Zouchuqu or Going Out), the development of diplomatic and
3 For a few examples, see Shambaugh (2000), Roy (1998) and White, and Xiaoyuan (1996).
4 This classic model was originally elaborated from the Weberian concept of ideal bureaucracy
and Taylor’s model of scientific administration (Gerth 1973; Taylor 2003).
5 Graham Allison mentioned this theoretical advantage of rationalistic models in the study of
Soviet foreign policy (Allison 1999).
2
World Political Science Review, Vol. 3 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://www.bepress.com/wpsr/vol3/iss3/art2
commercial ties with a variety of oil producing countries, the acceleration of the
exploitation of national energy resources as well as the creation of a strategic oil
reserve, to name a few, can be seen as part of a larger strategy of resource control.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would thus have adopted a shortage-equalsthreat-
to-security reasoning and applied a mercantilist approach that relies on
bilateral diplomatic contacts with oil producing countries to beef up its energy
security (Yergin, Eklof and Edwards 1998; Herberg 2003).
Conclusions about the international order that researchers derive from these
recent developments sometimes diverge though. Some see it as a new source of
rivalry between China and other oil importing countries (Lewis 2002; Kane and
Serewicz 2001; Salameh 1995-1996). Kent Calder, an eminent specialist of
energy in Asia, considers that “At the root of Asia’s energy security problem is
China -a rising, frustrated, revisionist power in which ideological communism is
yielding to nationalism- and its new status as an oil importer” (Calder, 1996: 56).
For others, however, China’s increased participation in international energy
markets can facilitate regional and international cooperation. Indeed, China and
the United States share a common interest in ensuring the stability of oil supply.
China and its neighbors could also team up to develop hydrocarbon resources in
Central Asia and Russia. Furthermore, the cooperation between China and the
countries of the OECD is reinforced by the mere fact that there are programs tying
Beijing to the International Energy Agency (IEA) (Harrison 2002; Yoshihara and
Sokolsky 2002; Anonymous 1999; Christoffersen 1992; Ögütçü 1998).
The application of the rationalist model of decision-making to the China’s
energy security policy suffers from the well-known ailments of this model. First,
this model suggests that Chinese leaders enjoy complete knowledge of alternative
solutions and a capacity to calculate the costs and benefits of each option’s
consequences. This particular premise was abandoned some time ago in most
research on administrative decision-making processes (March 1978).
Furthermore, these studies presuppose a unity of view within the Chinese state or,
at least, leaders with sufficient power to impose their views over the whole state
apparatus. However, these two premises seem difficult to maintain, even in the
context of China’s political regime (Jianrong, 1999). One last problem occurs
when this model is used to study Chinese energy security policies: the objectives
pursued by China are mostly seen in terms of access to oil resources. This
tendency introduces an important bias: problems related to the energy sector but
not directly related to oil are systematically dealt with in a residual manner.
3. Fragmented Authoritarianism
The limits of the rationalist model have led to the development of new,
more realistic, models of public administration. On the one hand, researchers
could no longer ignore the fact that public policies represent less the result of a
3
decisive choice among clear alternatives than the consequences of an incremental
process of transformation in preexisting policies in a context of incertitude with
regard to their likely consequences6. On the other hand, the discrepancy between
the optimal policies identified by the rationalist model and the policies
implemented was explained in two ways: it was either the impact of socioeconomic
interest groups exerting pressure on their political representatives, or it
is seen as the fruit of internal conflicts among bureaucratic agencies in search of
more resources or locked in standard operating procedures restraining their
capacity to innovate (Niskanen 1994).
In China, this theoretical current paved the way to the “fragmented
authoritarianism” model developed at the end of the 1980s by Lieberthal and
Oksenberg. These authors explain the decisions taken by the Chinese government
in terms of power and struggle among bureaucratic units of the Chinese state
(Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988). In a similar fashion, other authors explain these
decisions as a result of conflicts among leaders and their network of clients
spanning the state apparatus and the provinces (Shirk, 1993).
This type of approach appears particularly appropriate to describe energy
politics in China since the context in which decision-making takes place is
characterized by a decentralized administrative structure, unclear hierarchy
among the different administrative units involved, close and under-regulated
relationships between state enterprises and administrative structures, as well as
the fact that coordination among actors in energy politics is held only at the end of
their respective decision-making process, in other words, each actor has already
prepared detailed projects and is set on implementing them before they meet. This
strong decentralization is responsible for the involvement of numerous actors with
various and often conflicting interests in the decision-making process. New
policies are often the result of a long bargaining process between participating
agencies. Thus, more often than not, adopted policies lack in cohesion, since from
one political measure to another, bureaucratic participants tend to be different.
Finally, these policies are never definitive; bargaining can begin anew in an
ulterior phase in the implementation process (Lampton 1992; Junhua 2003).
Numerous authors, Chinese as well as Westerners, have noticed that one of
the major problems facing China in its quest for energy security can be traced
back to a lack in coherence between measures (Fengying 2003; International
6 For Lindblom, incrementalism in public policies is characterized by: (1) decision-making
through small or incremental moves on particular problems rather than through a comprehensive
reform program, (2) it takes the form of an indefinite sequence of political moves, 3) it is
exploratory, as the goals of policy-making continue to change as new experience with policies
throws new light on what is possible and desirable, and (4) it is moving away from known social
ills rather than moving toward a known and relatively stable goal Braybrooke and Lindblom
(1963).
4
Energy Agency, 2000: 8). Philip Andrews-Speed is probably the most
representative author of this school of thought. According to him, the lack of clear
authority in an already decentralized sector, the direct involvement of state owned
oil enterprises (SOOE) in policy formulation coupled with the weakness of the
legislative branch and the absence of strong regulation hinder the emergence of an
integrated and coherent energy policy. Furthermore, the competition among
bureaucratic agencies seems also to be condoned by Chinese leaders expecting
that representatives from different ministries will defend the interests of their own
organization (Andrews-Speed, 2004: 32,53).
These bureaucratic disputes have hindered the liberalization of the energy
sector and led to the adoption of a “strategic” approach to energy security. This
strategic approach is aimed at limiting the Chinese dependence on international
markets by promoting self-sufficiency, the use of national resources, state-owned
enterprises investments in overseas hydrocarbon assets and tight control over
exports and imports of energy products. According to Andrews-Speed, this
approach to energy security is counterproductive as it may engender problems
such as domestic price instability and the waste of financial resources in
investments with dubious returns. Furthermore, it could lead China to get
involved in bilateral agreements entailing potentially explosive political and
military compensations (Andrews-Speed, Xuanli and Dannreuther 2002).
The bureaucratic competition model brings increased realism to the study of
decision-making processes, but carries certain weaknesses as well (Lieberthal,
1992). First, if the model can accurately explain gradual changes taking place in
established policies, it has more trouble to deal with quick shifts in orientations
that can also take place in public policy (Scot Tanner, 1999: 27; Schulman, 1975).
Indeed, confronted with sudden shifts in policies, the authors who rely on this
model must often invoke the actions of Chinese political leaders, who acting as
deus ex machina save the state from the bureaucratic drama. Second, more often
than not, this model takes the problems of the rationalist model of decisionmaking
to a lower level of analysis. Indeed, instead of picturing states as unitary
and rational actors with predefined interests and objectives, this model depicts
bureaucratic or faction actors who pursue their objectives rationally by weighing
in the pros and cons of such or such measure. Another problem emerges when we
realize that this grid of analysis can only take into account those who enjoy
resources —material or bureaucratic— which are readily exchanged. It is thus
unable to capture the important role played by think tanks and university research
centers in the identification of problems and the elaboration of solutions (Li 2002;
Naughton 2002). Finally, except ex post facto this model teaches us little about
the substance of policies because a multitude of political measures can be in line
with the objective interests of the actors involved. To state after the fact that a
policy is favorable to the interests of the strongest coalition of actors is arbitrary if
5
we don’t take into account the ideas held by political actors prior to the decision
and which give a political meaning to their interests.
4. Ideational Approach
By taking as granted that public policies are nothing more than mirrors of
actors’ interests – of the state or of socio-economic groups, traditional approaches
tend to reject any independent role that ideas may have in the Chinese
administrative process (Yu 2004; Reardon 2002; Halpern 1989). However, many
recent researches attribute a greater role to ideas in the elaboration of policies in
other nations7. The political debate does not limit itself to a struggle around
unambiguous material conditions, but rather deals with strategic representations
of what is legitimate, of what ought to be done. By manipulating these
representations, political actors can create conditions propitious to the formation
of coalitions that transcend cleavages due to conflicting material interests. It is
through this process of strategic representation that actors come to shape their
perceived interests with regard to a given political issue. The social construction
of problems and of the available solutions provide the raw material that allows the
concrete expression of socio-economic or bureaucratic interests, what actors
desire or are actually able to desire. An analysis which puts the emphasis on
political ideas may reduce the researcher’s “disposition effect” by refocusing the
analysis on actors’ intentions8.
I will follow a two-pronged analytical strategy in order to better highlight
the role of ideas in the elaboration of energy security measures. First, it seems
important to put energy security questions back in the broader context of China’s
energy policy. Indeed, one of the most common problems of current studies of
this particular issue is caused by the adoption of a narrow version of energy
security and which restrict analyses to measures related to oil supply. As I will
demonstrate, the debate on energy security in China is located within a much
larger debate that deals with the future structure of the country’s energy needs and
of the national energy production.
7 For recent reviews of this literature, see Béland (2005), and Lieberman (2002).
8 These “disposition effects” are on display in Erika Strecker-Downs’ analysis of the debates
surrounding energy security in China. Indeed, this author takes as granted that the notion of
energy
security is grounded in stable oil supplies and thus limits her analysis to the presentation of
bureaucratic discussions related to the implementation of diverse measures aimed at enhancing
oil
security. She thus brackets out the internal debates in China about the larger issue of defining
energy security and the priorities that this definition entails (Strecker-Downs, 2004). On the
importance of taking into account actors’ intentions to avoid these “disposition effects”, see:
Dobbin (1994) and Boudon (1986).
6
Second, I intend to analyze the elaboration of China’s energy policy as the
result of political games revolving around three frames: a strategic vision, a
market approach and a conception based on “scientific development”. A frame is
a “perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined, problematic situation can be
made sense of and acted on” (Rein and Schön 1993). It provides a way to select,
organize, and interpret a complex reality and provides the references needed for
knowledge, analysis, persuasion and action. The use of frames allows participants
in the decision-making process to identify problems and priorities, to specify their
interests and objectives, to back their empirical and normative judgments on a
solid theoretical basis, and hence lends them moral or scientific credibility in
political debates (Bleich, 2003).
The importance of frames is not limited to their role in interpreting the
world. They also endow political entrepreneurs with tools for persuasion, which
are crucial in decision-making processes, and this, even in a closed political
system like that of China9. By calling on the shared values of the polity or on
scientific or moral superiority, frames provide the necessary arguments for the
promotion of a policy or the rejection of an antagonist point of view. By
reframing wider questions on the basis of their own conception of what should be
done, participants to the political game can also call upon broader cultural or
historical referents to buttress their own point of view, and build “causality
stories” to attribute responsibility for a political problem to another actor or to a
given structural condition (Schmidt 2002; Blyth 2002; Campbell 1998; Stone
1989).
Three types of energy security representations are available for states to
choose from: a strategic conception, a market approach and vision inspired by
environmental considerations 10 . The first two representations entail the
preservation of the development model based on hydrocarbons adopted
worldwide, but differ on the role the state and the market should play to ensure
the security of supplies. The third one suggest the possibility of moving to a new
mode of energy production and consumption which would help to reduce both
environmental risks and concerns over supplies and the security of energy
infrastructures.
Each one of these frames is present in China. The 1990s were primarily
characterized by a debate between the strategic conception of energy security and
the neoliberal grid of analysis. However, the coming of a new leadership team in
2003 and the development of a new rhetoric of “scientific development” (kexue
9 Nina P. Halpern (1992) uses the concept of “competitive persuasion” as the cornerstone of her
analysis of Chinese bureaucratic processes.
10 In a similar fashion, Måns Nilsson (2005) identifies three basic frames in Swedish energy
policy: « energy as infrastructure », « energy as market » and « energy as risk ».
7
fazhan) have introduced a new environmental dimension to the debate on energy
policy.
In order to identify frames and their influence over policy, I will follow a
model of policy formulation based on three relatively independent “streams”: the
“problem stream”, the “policy stream” and the “political stream” (Kingdon 1995).
The direct impact of frames is more likely to be visible in the discursive
enterprises which take place at the level of problems definition and policy
formulation. In conclusion, I will focus on political opportunities, which puts into
play political institutions and cultural variables such as the national mood, to
demonstrate how the mechanisms of reframing, combining, and rhetorical
construction, explain the emergence of a window of opportunity which allows
innovation in policies pertaining to Chinese energy security.
5. Frames
5.1 The Strategic Point of View
Originally intimately related to the military performance of nations at war,
energy security was first viewed in terms of access to oil resources, then as the oil
weapon wielded by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) in the 1970s. According to this approach, energy security is achieved
when: (1) adequate supply is sufficient to support a healthy national economy; (2)
allies also have access to these supplies; (3) the concerned nation and its allies
have the means to protect their vital energy supplies if threatened (Ahearne 1985).
For consumers, price and availability are the two most important aspects of
energy security; but for governments it is rather a question of supply
diversification, which allows the reduction of vulnerability, and fuel
diversification which seeks to lower dependence on oil (Ebel 2003). It would thus
be dangerous to let the energy mix of a country be dictated by the market alone,
since consumers and firms would presumably turn to the cheapest fuel and thus
increase the level of vulnerability and dependency of the country (Belgrave,
Ebinger and Okino 1987).
This conception guides an important number of Chinese analyses dealing
with the geopolitics of oil, the necessary strategic measures to ensure China’s
access to oil resources —investments abroad, the construction of pipelines, the
creation of military and merchants fleets to protect supplies, etc.— and the risks
of too much dependence on the Middle East, a very unstable region controlled by
the United States11.
11 For a few examples, see Jianhua (2003), Yuncheng, Zhugui, Chunqiang, Yujun, Junhong and
Wei (2003), Yishan (2002) , and Zhongqiang (2001).
8
From this point of view, the most important problem in the China’s energy
sector can be traced back to the country’s transition in 1993 from the status of
exporter to that of net importer. From that day on, its dependence on oil imports
grew dramatically (see figure 1). From 1993 to 2003, the national oil production
remained stagnant –it grew by an average of 1.7% during these years– whereas
the major, but quickly maturing, oil fields of Daqing and Shengli12 were slowly
declining and exploration, offshore as well as in the Tarim Basin, remained
disappointing. Meanwhile, oil consumption has grown an average of 7% per year
during the same period. This increase follows, of course, the economic growth of
the country, but is also the result of recent reforms in the transportation sector and
the conversion of China to the automobile civilization –the production of that
industry increased by about 50% per year since the turn of the millennium
boosted by a 256% increase in car loans since their debut, in 1998, and the end of
200313.
Figure 1: China’s oil production, consumption and importations, in million
of barrels per day, 1980-2003.
12 These fields are responsible for more than 50% of China’s national production.
13 These loans made up only 20% of the car market in 2003, compared to 70% in more advanced
economies (Mc Gregor 2003).
Importations
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Consommation Production
9
Even though Chinese consumers have not yet encountered problems in oil
supply from the international markets, the growth of the dependence vis-à-vis
imports has been portrayed as a major crisis by promoters of the strategic frame.
Many rhetorical tropes were used to underline the acuity of this crisis. First, some
called on national values and harked back to the self-sufficiency ideal exalted
during the Maoist era in order to campaign in favor of the development of
domestic energy resources. At the same time, to discourage increased reliance on
international markets, analogies of the painful experiences of the Sino-Soviet rift,
which eventually led to the end of the Russian oil supply, and of the embargo
imposed by Western nations on China during the Cold War were summoned and
supplemented by the evocation of the two international oil crises and of the
blockade imposed by the United States on Imperial Japan. Finally, the question of
energy dependence has also been linked to maintaining social stability due to the
importance of fossil fuels production and transformation in China’s employment.
The significance of this issue is even more obvious when we take into account
that the traditional regional base of the Chinese oil industry has suffered the most
from economic reforms over the past twenty-five years and does not benefit from
increased energy imports.
These arguments were sufficiently convincing to provide the main thrust to
the elaboration of China’s energy policy throughout the last decade. In 1993, Li
Peng set the twin objectives of guaranteeing a stable oil supply to China and
making sure that it does not become vulnerable to an external embargo in the
future as the top priorities (Chang 2001). In a similar fashion, the 10th Five-Year
Plan, presented in 2001, puts the preservation of supply security at the top of its
energy strategy. In order to reach that goal, the plan puts the emphasis on
innovation in production technologies and expects the accelerated development of
national energy resources, on the pursuit of the Zouchuqu policy which
encourages investments in foreign assets, on the creation of a strategic reserve, on
the diversification of supply sources, and on the development of alternative
fuels14.
5.2 The Market Approach
The second school of thought on energy security was developed in parallel
to the comeback of neo-classical economic ideas in a context of global oil glut.
Here, security is essentially seen in terms of economic costs related to sudden
changes in supply or energy prices (Bohi and Toman 1996). According to this
14 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia fazhan he gaige weiyuanhui [National Development and
Reform Commission], 2001, Guomin jingji he shehui fazhan dishige wunian jihua. Nengyuan
fazhan zhongdian zhuanding guihua [Tenth Five-Year Plan of Social and Economic
Development.
Special Section on the Energy Development Program.], [www.ndrc.gov.cn].
10
approach, government interference should be limited to cases of market failure15.
One of the most important observations of this approach deals with the
“fungibility” of oil, a characteristic that renders useless any policy based on the
diversification of sources, since, in the global oil market, all consumers are
affected by price variations due to a disruption of supply even if it is localized
(Hogan 1985). Accordingly, the path to security goes through enhanced
integration of national and international markets, the development of hedging
tools such as the oil futures market, and the establishment of an international
juridical framework which would guarantee investments and multilateral
cooperation. Ideally, state intervention would be limited to the diffusion of
information in a multilateral context, the support of innovation, and, for some, the
management of a strategic oil reserve which would be used in case of momentary
supply disruption (Andrews-Speed and Vinogradov 2000; May 1998; Fesharaki
1999). These precepts apply to the whole energy sector as well since deregulation
is often seen as a cure to all the ailments that afflict a sector which tends to be
naturally dominated by monopolies.
The liberal conception of energy security is much less frequent in Chinese
debates. Nevertheless, many authors and specialists point out that international
markets can answer to the international and Chinese demand and that China needs
only to improve its international cooperation to reduce the impact of sudden
changes in oil prices and to counter the influence of the OPEC (Zekun 2004; Lei
2003). Others adopt the pro-deregulation arguments and advocate improved
competition in China’s energy markets as well as innovation as means to foster
the development of new resources16. Finally, some proponents of the creation of a
strategic reserve in China believe that this measure can only make sense in a
wider, regional or international, context of cooperation (Lei 2003).
According to this frame, oil dependency is not necessarily the most
important problem facing China since international markets are now sufficiently
developed to absorb short-term shocks and since global resources are seen as
sufficient to accommodate demand over the medium term (Xing, Xiaolin, Jialin
and Li 2003). The most important problem in oil security is rather related to the
state’s control over prices and the monopoly of state firms in refining and
distribution. The fact that crude oil prices are fixed monthly by the state in light of
international markets has, for example, allowed distributors to hoard oil during
15 It is interesting to note that, according to this vision, the costs generated by the deployment of
troops to ensure the stability of oil production regions, the environment externalities, and the
issue
of oil-induced commercial deficits are not taken into consideration in the calculation of the
adequate price of energy (Bohi 1993).
16 For a review of these arguments, see Yanrui (2003).
11
the weeks of rising prices prior to the American invasion of Iraq, a behavior
which in turn led to localized shortages (Jun 2003; Teo, 2003).
From this point of view on energy security, the most pressing problem is
rather to be found in the incomplete reform of the power sector. This situation is
responsible for a pendulum movement between surpluses and deficits of
production. The last manifestation of this phenomenon began in the summer of
2003. That year’s exceptional growth in electricity demand —up 15.3% over the
previous year, a dry and hot summer coupled with a failure in planning led to
brownouts and blackouts in half of China’s provinces. This crisis was due for the
most part to a freeze in the construction of new plants imposed in 1999 as a
response to power surpluses caused by low demand during the Asian crisis of
1997-1998. Yet, although this moratorium ended in 2002, its long-term effects
were deeply felt in the mid-2000s as delays of three to four years, even more for
nuclear plants, are necessary in order to put a new plant online.
To this serious bureaucratic blunder, we can add droughts responsible for
empty hydroelectric reservoirs, quick growth of energy-intensive industries like
those of aluminum, steel and cement, problems related to the half-baked
liberalization of coal prices, and a population increasingly able to afford modern
household appliances. These phenomena converged in 2003-2004 and led to the
worst electric supply crisis since the beginning of the reforms17. However, the
administrative measures undertaken to slow demand growth and to encourage the
construction of new power plants risk to reverse shortages and create a new
situation power glut in 2006 or 2007.
The discursive ammunition available to promoters of the market point of
view on energy security is also much diversified. First, they can rely on the
abundant Western theoretical corpus expounding the virtues of deregulation as the
best way to ensure an efficient energy supply, a theoretical corpus which draws its
authority from the different technical and scientific canons of economic sciences
and on the recommendations of international economic organizations. Second, the
international experience is also used as an analogy to stress the potential gains
that China could secure by increasing competition in its energy sector. The
causality discourse produced within this framework further indicates that the
sources of the instability in China’s energy supply are to be found in the actions
of state monopolies and in the control of prices which both introduce irrationality
in the market.
17 Ore prices are determined by the market whereas electricity prices are still controlled by the
state. Coal prices have escalated during the last few years in response to the closing down of
many
dangerous and polluting mines, the competition from the steel sector, and the closure of oil-flared
plants. Because of that, many thermal plants have been operating at sub-regime rather than
sustaining important losses (Anonymous 2003e; Anonymous 2003a).
12
Of course, in the background of this discourse lays the privileged solution
for all these problems: to leave more freedom to market mechanisms while
ensuring minimal regulation to prevent the rise of monopolies. The action of the
state should thus be limited to a few roles like improving international
cooperation, either within the framework of global or regional institutions, or
facilitating foreign investments in China’s energy industry. Another important
task would be the development of institutions which would help regulating the
market or would allow China to improve its action in international markets, like
the development of an oil futures market and the creation of a strategic oil reserve
(Daojiong 2004; Zhun 2003; Zhonglang 2003; Anonymous 2002). A report by the
State Council Development Research Center (SC-DRC, Guowuyuan fazhan
yanjiu zhongxin) made public in 2002, thus emphasized a set of measures
influenced by the market frame: (1) the development of a better administrative
and juridical system in the oil sector, (2) accelerated exploitation and
development of national resources, (3) development of natural gas resources, (4)
cooperation with international oil producing states, (5) the creation of a strategic
reserve, and (6) increased oil consumption efficiency (Runsheng, Yan and
Shenyuan 2000).
5.3 The Environmental Grid
A third conception of energy security stems from the identification of two
important elements missing from traditional definitions (Stares 2000): the risks
due to polluting emissions and those entailed by centralized systems of energy
production and distribution vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Often environmental
issues are seen as going against the grain of energy security. Increased attention to
the former is seen as leading to important sacrifices in terms of security. For
instance, the use of coal as a substitute to oil can limit dependence on imports but
is also linked to serious environmental degradation (Yergin 1991: 779; Stanislaw
2004). The third current on energy security thus tries to highlight how new energy
sources can both serve environmental security purposes and ensure supplies
(Flavin and Dunn 1999)18. In order to do that, it is not only necessary to see oil
security within a larger picture encompassing all types of energy, but also to adopt
a concept of security that applies to all stages of the energy cycle: extraction,
transport, transformation/consumption and elimination of wastes produced by this
cycle. Since they can be produced in situ and do not involve a dangerous and
vulnerable industrial structure and because they are less polluting, renewable
energies would contribute more to national security than nuclear energy or fossil
18 It may be argued that this new approach is trying to “flatten” the “Maslow Pyramid” of energy
security so that supply needs, viewed as the priority, are not be satisfied at the expense of the
environmental needs, seen traditionally as secondary. See Frei (2004).
13
fuels which necessitate the transportation of dangerous products over long
distances and often from unstable regions, their transformation in polluting and
hard to protect infrastructures, their distribution on highly vulnerable domestic
networks while at the same time being responsible for the production of
environment-damaging wastes (Stoett and Pretti 2003).
This perspective on energy security is embodied in China’s concept of
“conservation society” (jieyuexing shehui) which has been diffused in the country
after the rise to power of the leadership team led by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao.
They first introduced the concept of “scientific development” which seeks to
integrate economic development, reduction of social inequities, and the protection
of the environment. This concept has since been elevated to the status of official
doctrine by the national propaganda apparatus and has been relayed at all level of
the state apparatus (Fewsmith 2004). The concept of “conservation society” is
included in this broader doctrine and constitutes its application to the sectors of
energy and natural resources. It first appeared in the Tenth Five Year Plan (2001-
2006), but was only recently exposed in greater details by Ma Kai, the head of the
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). It has since been used
by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao on many occasions before being the object of indepth
media coverage in the spring of 2004. It aims at putting an end to the
bottlenecks hindering development and to support the transformation of the
current conception of economic development toward a more sustainable concept
of development (kechixu fazhan) (Kai 2003; Tiemao 2004). In other words, this
new development philosophy is geared at the conservation of resources —energy
having a priority status within the larger body of natural resources— and is to be
realized through technological innovation, through the reduction in energy
consumption generated by the transformation of China’s industrial structure and
the reduction in energy intensity (the amount of energy per unit of GDP), and
through popular education and state intervention.
If the advocates of this approach recognize the problems in supply and
inefficient regulations, they maintain that it is essential to link these difficulties to
the environmental issue and to the important social and economic costs it entails.
According to a World Bank study published in 1997, pollution costs China 8% of
its GDP, close to 20 billion dollars in health care, in addition to around 200,000
premature deaths every year (Johnson 1997). China’s energy choices weigh
heavily in the country’s future environment balance. In the first place, China is
dependent for almost two thirds of its energy on coal, available in large quantities
on its territory (Energy Information Agency 2004). Second, energy consumption
in the transportation sector, which generally accounts for the largest share of
fossil fuels consumption and polluting emissions, makes up a mere 15% of the
14
overall Chinese energy consumption and is thus bound to increase19. Finally,
China is already the world’s second most important source of greenhouse gases
with 13.5% of global emissions, yet these emissions represent little more than
10% of per capita emissions in the United States.
Proponents of this new approach shore up their discourse on the failure of
traditional frames to include considerations about the environmental impacts of
current modes of production and energy consumption. They thus suggest a new
language to evaluate the environmental impact of economic decisions: to calculate
a measure of “Green GDP” which subtracts environmental costs from the
traditional GDP equation. Promoters of this frame stress that China’s international
status will be affected if it proves unable to control transnational emissions.
Finally, the specter of social instability as a result of urban pollution is also used
to emphasize the urgency to revise thinking about energy policy.
The “Short and Long Term Strategy of Energy Development, 2004-2020”
made public on June 30th 2004 as the result of a large consultation headed by
Prime Minister Wen Jiabao offers a variety of solutions which concretely
articulate the environment frame: (1) to make reduction in energy consumption
the core of the energy policy, (2) to adjust and optimize the energy structure, (3)
to encourage the rationalization and the regional coordination of energy projects,
(4) to make use of both national and international resources, (5) to base energy
development on technological innovation, (6) to improve environment protection,
(7) to strengthen energy security by diversifying the sources of supply, (8) to
improve market mechanisms by speeding up reforms in the energy sector
(Anonymous 2004b). To execute this plan, NDRC calls for an improvement in the
diffusion of resource conservation techniques, for more technological innovation,
for stronger regulations and norms, for a transformation in the structure of
production, and for the creation of a “circular economy” (xunhuan jingji) (Kai
2004) 20.
The emphasis is thus put firstly on measures aimed at improving the
country’s energy efficiency, either by betting on the gradual modification of the
country’s economic structure —from the polluting and energy-intensive
manufacturing industry to the service industry— or by improving the energy
saving measures through the elevation of standards, the replacement of obsolete
equipment and the use of more efficient technologies (Anonymous 2003d;
Anonymous 2003c). Secondly, the modification of the energy production
structure will also attribute a greater role to “cleaner energy”: hydroelectricity,
19 The IEA estimates that this share will reach 23% by 2030. International Energy Agency
(2002).
20 The term “Circular Economy” is the official translation used in English-language Chinese
media,
yet the Chinese term would be closer to the idea of a “close circuit economy” or “full circuit
economy”. The expression “recycling economy” is also used, but may lead to some confusion.
15
renewable energy, natural gas, but also nuclear power. Thirdly, in order to
guarantee the concrete implementation of these measures, the proponents of this
approach suggest the adoption of a new mode of calculating GDP as mentioned
above.
6. Political Choice
The selection of one frame over another is, of course, not carried out only at
the level of ideas; ideas can stand at the margin for a long time before being
attached to a problem and then have a political echo. Institutional and cultural
variables, as well as the persuasive power of idea advocates, can play an
important role, if not a more important role, than the idea itself in its
transformation into concrete policy. To paraphrase Risse-Kappen, “ideas do not
float freely”(Risse-Kappen 1995). To have a political impact, a frame must be
supported, reformulated, softened, or adapted to the flavor of the day by political
entrepreneurs, individuals or organizations who are ready to invest time and
political capital to promote their pet policies21. Then, a favorable political window
must open to enable these entrepreneurs to link objective conditions viewed as
problematic and available solutions to the political context of the moment
(national mood, leaders’ priorities, the interplay of socio-economic groups, etc.)
(Kingdon 1995:19). I suggest first to identify the main political entrepreneurs of
the Chinese energy sector, then to describe the necessary conditions for the
opening of a window of opportunity.
The Western literature on Chinese energy policy identifies a certain number
of key actors in this process. In general, a typology of actors includes important
SOEs in the energy field (CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC), the NDRC, the different
ministries involved in energy issues (Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce,
Ministry of Finance, etc.) and, to a lesser extent, the major financial Chinese
holdings (China International Trust and Investment Corporation, CITIC), the
energy services firms, and the military(Strecker-Downs 2004; Cole 2003).
Notwithstanding the fact, underlined above, that the “manipulators of symbols”
are excluded, this list seems problematic for two reasons. First, it does not allow
21 For Rein and Schön (1993), "Frames are never self-interpreting", the interpretation of frames
has to be executed by advocates who set up the frame, explain its implications on public action
and develop the argumentation that must sustain that action. Recognizing that these political ideas
are carried by specific actors does not constitute a return to “fragmented authoritarianism”
though.
First, all political actors are not political entrepreneurs. Second, these actors' interests are not only
shaped by their material bases or their bureaucratic position, but are also formulated in terms of
the frames diffused by political entrepreneurs. Finally, the consensus that provides the substance
of concrete political measures is built through frame reinterpretation or frame synthesis rather
than
through a process of bargaining around material or bureaucratic resources. See (Hall 1997: 194).
16
us to distinguish at which point in the political process, stakeholders exert their
influence. Yet, it seems crucial to distinguish political actors whose actions
influence policies through the definition of problems and solutions, and those who
have a role downstream from this process. Second, Chinese leaders tend to be
excluded from these typologies as they are seen as last moment brokers in the
decision-making process. Yet, it is clear that the role of Chinese leaders does not
stop at settling bureaucratic quarrels, but is much more pro-active.
Indeed, Chinese leaders play an important role, not only in the shaping of
political windows and in the identification of problems, but also in the process of
formulating solutions. This hands-on approach seems to be relatively different
from that of their Western counterparts22. Their influence over policy formulation
is not, in general, felt in the elaboration of concrete policy measures, but rather in
the promotion of general theories which set the main directions which will later
influence the development of concrete policies23. The need to formulate these new
theories can probably be explained by tradition – the theoretical work of Mao,
Deng, and later Jiang Zemin have all been enshrined in the Chinese Constitution;
but it may also be explained by the expectation that new leaders will create their
own theoretical legacy to put some distance between them and the previous
generation of leaders (Fewsmith 2004; Tanner 2004: 212). Thus, the notion of
“conservation society” is often associated to the concepts of “scientific
development”, “circular economy”, and “sustainable development”. These
different terms have all been used to criticize the style of short-term, wasteful and
polluting extensive development which came to symbolize the rapidly growing
Chinese economy during the 1990s (Quanquan and Juhua 2004).
The state apparatus’ think tanks also play a central role in the identification
of problems as much as in the elaboration of solutions. Two organizations seem
particularly important in this regard. First, the SC-DRC which provides the Prime
Minister’s office with studies and evaluations. Ever since its creation in 1981, this
center has articulated the preferences of the Prime Minister’s office by
emphasizing economic reforms and liberalization under Zhu Rongji, then by
focusing on environmental and social measures since the nomination of Wen
Jiabao. However, this center also has its own measures of predilection. Thus, due
in part to the hierarchic affiliation of its energy section to its industrial economics
division, the improvement of energy efficiency and conservation have always
22 In general, the latter are viewed as too preoccupied by the political game and the evolution of
public opinion to take part directly in the theoretical elaboration of solutions.
23 In this sense, Chinese leaders can play the role of « path-shapers ». See Cox (2001).
17
been part of the measures recommended by the center24. The DRC has thus played
a major role in the translation of the “scientific development” frame.
The second source of interpretation of energy problems and formulation of
solutions is the Energy Research Institute (ERI, Nengyuan yanjiusuo) of the
NDRC. The NDRC plays a double role since it formulates the final version of
policies and is in charge of implementing them, but it is also engaged in frame
promotion through its Energy Research Center. In contradistinction to the DRC,
the ERI has pushed forward, in a regular manner, a strategic vision of China’s
energy problems by emphasizing the development of national resources, price
control and the Zouchuqu policy 25 . The bureaucratic culture of NDRC can
probably be partly held accountable for this tendency since, as the direct heir to
the State Planning Commission, this institution is imbued with an interventionist
tradition and still maintains intimate ties with state firms.
Other research centers also have a role in framing energy issues. Thus,
researchers at the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) and from
universities can directly voice their concerns to the different political leaders and
put forward recommendations ranging from the promotion of hydrogen as a
replacement fuel to the deregulation of the power sector26. Research centers on
international relations or strategic and military questions were also among the first
to attract attention to the strategic risk that dependence on imports can create.
Thus, if, like many have noted, the military hierarchy does not have a direct role
to play in the decision-making on energy policy27, research centers affiliated with
the military play a central role in the formulation of policy programs.
It appears that major state-owned firms in the energy field are rarely present
at the stages of problem identification or in the elaboration of political
alternatives. Their role seems rather located downstream in the process: they react
to actual policies, by supporting some and opposing others, without necessarily
following a coherent political frame28. Thus, the wavering that has characterized
the creation of the strategic oil reserve has more to do with the sharing of
respective financial burden between the state and its firms than with the lack of
24 Interview at DRC, Beijing, May 2004. See also DRC, 2003, “Guojia nengyuan zhanlüe de
jiben
gouxiang” [A Few Basic Concepts on the National Energy Strategy], Renmin wang, November
16.
25 Interview at the ERI, Beijing, May 2004. The ERI has nonetheless adopted certain aspects of
the
sustainable development program since one of its main suggestions is the reduction of the
country’s dependency on coal in favor of cleaner energy sources.
26 Interviews at CASS, Beijing, March 2005.
27 Strecker-Downs, “The Chinese Energy Security Debate”, p. 26-27.
28 This finding is consistent with Heclo’s (1974: 298) observation that interests groups are in
general reacting to policies adopted by the state and will sometime veto measures that are going
against there perceived interests rather than being pro-active at the policy-formulation level.
18
consensus in the identification of problems and the elaboration of solutions
(Anonymous 2003b).
6.1 Windows of Opportunity and Entrepreneurs’ Success
According to Kingdon, certain crucial moments create windows of
opportunity conducive to political innovation, for instance, when a problem
becomes so overwhelming that it can no longer be ignored and forces the search
for an appropriate solution or when transformations in the political environment
encourage political entrepreneurs to act (Kingdon 1995). The turn of the century
appears to offer such a favorable conjuncture for innovation in China’s energy
policy.
First, the coming to power of a new team with an apparent strong will to
reorient the economic development path of China makes the political conjuncture
more favorable to the revision of the country’s energy policy.
Second, traditional conceptions of energy security were plagued by many
problems which seemed insurmountable without a radical change of frame. First,
the shortcomings of the diplomatic approach, privileged under the leadership of
Jiang Zemin, were illustrated by the dead end reached in Sino-Russian energy
cooperation (Xuzheng 2003), by the reluctance of SOOEs to pay for national
energy security, by the growing problem of pollution, and by the difficulties of
the power sector. These shortcomings have all worn down the persuasion power
of the strategic approach followed during most of the 1990s. Second, the fiasco of
California’s power sector deregulation, the rapid rise of crude rates on
international markets, and the lack of success in the liberalization of the coal
sector in China have greatly shaken the credibility of the market option.
Not only is there a political window opened by the perceived failure of
traditional frames but, thirdly, solutions to these problems are readily available.
Indeed, the “scientific development” frame offers solutions to more than one woe
of the Chinese energy sector. Energy conservation and the development of
alternative energies can kill three birds with one stone by reducing polluting
emissions, developing national resources, and reducing energy consumption. The
rhetorical force this frame enjoys is supplemented by the support of political
entrepreneurs with direct access to the country’s leaders, as well as by the entire
theoretical arsenal developed in the rest of the world around the concept of
sustainable development29.
Fourth, this frame receives support from major bureaucratic and socioeconomic
actors. The State Environment Protection Administration (SEPA) is
strongly in favor of this conception and of the development of a Green GDP
29 It is interesting to note that Greenpeace figures among the most enthusiastic supporters of the
new Chinese approach vis-à-vis energy (Anonymous 2004a).
19
measure, and can also rely on the support of foreign partners in favor of
sustainable development. The environment technologies industry, a rapidly
growing sector in China, is also strongly behind a transition to a new approach
regarding energy issues.
All these conditions seem to have aligned to open a window for in-depth
reforms of China’s energy policy. Nevertheless, as of today, the Chinese
government has not been able to fundamentally reorient the energy policy of the
country. In spite of innovations like the adoption of the Law on the Promotion of
Renewable Energies, the implementation of new measures aimed at energy
conservation and the constitution of a strategic reserve, the principal characteristic
of the policy in that sector remains status quo rather than change. If all these
conditions converged to be conducive to a major change, how can we explain this
inertia? I would like to suggest two hypotheses as a way of concluding.
7. Conclusion: Culture and Institutions
One possible line of explanation has to do with the economic culture or the
economic identity of the country. If Kingdon stressed the importance of the
“national mood” as a key factor of the “political stream”, he implied that it is
rather fickle and could vary depending on the government in power. However, it
is possible to think that certain, more perennial, elements of national identity or of
the economic tradition also have an impact on the persuasive power of these
frames (Crane 1996; Dobbin 1994: 2; Hall 1989): those that are very detached
from commonly shared references risk meeting difficulties.
In that sense, we can understand the attractiveness of the strategic approach
for Chinese elites: the Chinese cognitive background gives a primordial place to
self-sufficiency. Without even mentioning the millennium worth of autarchic
tradition, the birth of the Chinese energy industry was triggered by the withdrawal
of Soviet engineers and the end of Soviet exports of crude oil on which the PRC
was dependent for 50% of its needs. This bad experience has, since the discovery
of the giant oil field of Daqing which became a Maoist model of self-sufficiency
(zili gengsheng), led many Chinese to see foreign investments in the sector and
the dependence on international supplies as potentially dangerous. At the same
time, many also harbor doubts about new technologies and see them as less
reliable or technologically inaccessible for China (Strecker-Downs 2000). The
importance of this heritage is manifest in the efforts that advocates of
environmental solutions take to reframe in terms of security the benefits of their
preferred measures.
Beyond self-sufficiency which has become a constitutive element of
China’s economic identity, it is possible to treat the Chinese Communist Party as
a culture. As such, socialization in the CCP would encourage resorting to certain
repertoires of actions and to reject others (Campbell 1997: 22; Geertz 1964).
20
Indeed, the structures of recruitment of the CCP which emphasize ideological
uniformity can strongly play against political innovation (Yasheng, 1996: 101-
119). Thus, energy measures that could raise energy efficiency —a gas tax for
example— can also be construed as destabilizing might find scant support within
the Party even if some leaders would be in favor of them.
The structure of administrative and political institutions can also explain in
part this lack of process. First, even though institutions determine political
entrepreneurs’ access to decision-makers, in the case at hand, access does not
seem to have been a critical factor. It rather seems that the bureaucratic culture of
the NDRC —its rules, routines and standard operating procedures— led to the
formulation of measures inspired by past practices: popular campaigns inciting to
energy conservation and the exploitation of national resources by public firms, for
example. Only measures breaking new bureaucratic grounds have had a certain
success as in the case of the Law on the Promotion of Renewable Energies and
the creation of a strategic oil reserve. Finally, the administrative capacity of the
state could also have limited the echo of the “scientific development” frame on
concrete policies. Indeed, the need to develop a battery of new statistical tools
seems to have forced a reconsideration of the Green GDP program.
Maybe this inability to innovate, can simply be explained by the game of
socio-economic interest groups? The big state firms and provincial governments
could simply have been opposed to the more innovative measures. In the actual
state of the research, it is impossible to reject this hypothesis; yet an explanation
based only on interests seems insufficient to explain why certain measures have
been adopted whereas others were blocked. Why would the major SOOEs have
been able to check the most radical energy conservation measures when powerful
public power utilities have not been able to protect themselves from a law that
forces them to buy electricity produced from renewable sources at a higher price
than traditional fuels?
This paper aimed at offering a different point of view on the decisionmaking
process in China’s energy policy. I believe that an approach looking for
the independent role of ideas can yield superior results to one which takes for
granted the equivalence between material interests and ideas. An approach built
around political ideas organized in frames allows for a better understanding of the
substance of policies and gives a meaning to political games actors play by
unearthing the mechanisms of the social construction of their interests. I have
chosen to join two theoretical literatures which seem complementary but have
rarely been explicitly used together. The first approach was developed around the
concept of political framing and the second is the model of public administration
put forward by John Kingdon. These two analytical currents seems especially
complementary because the impact of frames is most clearly felt at the level of
problems definition and policy formulation, two relatively independent “streams”
21
in Kingdon’s work, while the third “stream” is more amenable to an analysis
sensitive to structural factors (culture, socio-economic interests, institutions)
which limit the possibilities of converting frames into concrete policies.
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