"Philosophical Rhetoric" Reconsidered

67

c'PhilosophicalRhetoric" Reconsidered

This chapter reconsiders the remaining claims identified as part of the standard account of the beginning of Greek rhetorical theory:
13. The rhetorical teachings of the Sophists were amoral. 14. The Sophists were relativists who eschewed any positive notion of "truth" in favor of subjectivisrn.This clairn is closely related to the next. 15. The Sophists were more concerned with teaching political success than

pursuing truth, per se. 16. Plato's philosophical rhetorical theory was forrnu rimarily in response to fifth-century Sophisticrhetorical theory. 17. Plato's philosophical rhetorical theory can be distinguished from sophistic rhetorical theory by its commitmentto truth-even when such a commitment conflicts with successful persuasion.

George A. Kennedy describes the Sophists as "self-appointed professors of how to succeed in the civic life of the Greek states." Though a few of the "leading" Sophists can "rightly be thought of as philosophers," most were "little more than teachers of devices of argument or emphasis" (1980, 2 5 ) . Kennedy's treatment of the Older Sophists, like many other standard accounts, is based upon the assumption that the teaching of Rhetoric is the most fundamental defining characteristic of being a Sophist: "Sophistry was in large part a product of rhetoric, which was by far the older and in the end the more

[art]" (1963, 26). All too often, Platonic or other pejorative senses of oric are assumed, rather than proven, to describe apdy what the Sophists re al1 about. Once the Sophists are equated with Rhetoric, it is difficult to the centuries-old tradition of defining them as distinct from and opposed ilosophy-as the quotations cited in chapter I illustrate. My argument in chapter is that the absence of a clear concept of rhetwike or even logon n in the fifth century B.C.E. requires a careful reconsideration of what is rted in statements deining or describing the Sophists with the term Rhet.Such a reconsideration, 1 believe, will cast doubt on the remaining claims e standard account cited above. begin by contending that theoretical treatises written before and after the ance of the word rhetorike differ substantially.Since the deinitions and s of classification of Rhetoric and Philosophy in Plato's and Aristotle's are well known,' this section surveys a s e n a of passages from earlier ks to provide an iliusu-ativecontrast. Explicit and implicit textual evidence orts the claim that teaching discourse was conceptualized in very different n the fifth and fourth centuries. Specifically, in the texts of the fifth cene does not ind an explicit sense of a delunited art of th#~tor that is ed to political contexts or that is somehow distinct from the skills inwith being a philosophical thinker. There is no clear evidence of what 1 called the disciplinary sense of Rhetoric. Furthennore, no necessary conemerges in the most signiicant texts of the fifth century between the goals king successful persuasion and seeking "the truth." This is important se most scholars share Jacqueline de Romilly's belief that for the Soph"rhetorical" education, "success mattered more than the truth" ( ~ g g z a , r all, "unlike the philosophers, the new teachers were not disintereorists in quest of metaphysical mths" ( ~ g g z a33). , The basic point 1 make, both here and in the succeeding chapters, is that the Rhetoricl sophy binary is an inappropriate framework within which to make sense platonic texts, and thus the notion that "Philosophical Rhetoric" develm response to a distinct fifth-century Sophistic Rhetoric is problematc. arch for key terms provides evidence that no precise equivalent to the entury term rhetorik appears in the vocabulary of fifth-century texts. tertextual comparison suggests a substantial difference between the expredisciplinary terminology of the fifth century and the technical v m b that emerged in the fourth. Obviously 1cannot discuss every potentially nt preplatonic text for comments about discourse, art, and persuasion.

.%e, e.g., Hunt (1925~3-60); Baldwin (1924); Erickcon (1974,1979); and Kennedy
1963~74-113; 198441-8s).

68

The Origins of Rhetorical Theoy

"Philosophical Rhetoric" Reconsidered 69 atise known as the Anonymus lamblichi makes a passing reference to how one could learn "the techn concerning arguments," but the syntax is t from the stock phrase log6n techn, perhaps because it was unmiliar or not yet known8The sane is true of Gorgias' reference, in his Helen, speech "written with skill" (technZig~apheis).~ The sophistic tract Dissoi oi or Dialexeis (hereafter Dialexeis) explicitly refers to logn techn, but in context the skill is described as distinct from the abilities "to plead one's urtcases correctly" and "to make popular speeches."lO Thornas M. Robinptly translates logn techn in this passage as "argument-skilIs."'f Acmgly, if logn techn in Dialexeis is the art that is the object of Plato's crie, it is clearly much broader than what would later be defined as Rhetoric. erhaps the most interesting early instance of logn tecbin appears in XenoMemorabilia from the early fourth century.12 Xenophon clairns that the Tyrant, who bore a gmdge against Socrates, issued an edict outlawthe teaching of logon techne: "It was a calculated insult to Socrates, whom as saw no means of attacking except by imputing to him the practice tantly attributed to the philosophers" (~emorabilia%#.3 1).13 A few senes later Xenophon equates logn techn with the Socratic practice of thai-"holding discussion" (Memorabilia 1.2.33-34). Regardless of th of the story about Critias' edict, clearly the scope of activities deby logn techn was, even in the early fourth century, considerably r than the art of political speechmaking. Logn techn was sufficiently ive with philosophical argumentation and discussion for Xenophon eve that the phrase could be credibly linked to, and even spoken by, his ocrates. The usage of logn techn in Dialexek and by Xenophon both be an art of discourse that show the early signs of professionalization disciplinization-insofar as the skills described are specialized and not

Fortunately, computer searches through the texts of the Thesaurus Linguue Graecae include al1 extant writings from the classical era. Personal inspection of the rnost relevant texts, complemented by Thesaurtrs Linguae Graecae searches for key terms in al1preplatonic texts, allows us to generalize about the status of predisciplinary theory with some confidence, The two specific concepts that combine to form rhetorik are techn, as art or skill, and rhtr. Signicantly, one does not ind the two terms explicitly linked in ifth-century texts, nor does one ind an explicit reference to an art of pers~asion.~ The word rhtr was a legal term denoting a specific class of people: those who often put fonvard motions in the law-courts and the as~embly.~ Rhtr was not a very old term-the earliest extant use is from 445 B . c . E . ; it appears far less in the fdth century than it does in the f ~ u r t h . ~ Herodotus, for example, never used the word rhtr (Powell 1977)~ and Thucydides refers to orators (rhtores) only three times.s And no surviving preplatonic text refers to a Sophist as a rh~tr.One cannot, then, explain the absence of rhtorik in the fifrh century by claiming that two words were used to delineate what Plato denoted with one word. The available evidence strongiy suggests that the explicit notion of a specific art of the rhtr was not yet h e d in ~ r e e k consciousness. That both Plato and Aristotle use the expression logn techn as an equivalent to rhtorik to refer to the "art of speechW6 has led scholars such as W. K. C. Guthrie to project the sarne usage back to the fifth century: "The rhetorical art was also known [among the Sophists] as 'the art of the logoi' " (1971, 177). However, the expression logn techn appears very rarely in the fifth century, and when it does, it has a broader meaning than Rhetoric.' The reconstructed
2. According to a search with Pandora 2.1 for techn- near rhe-, and peith- near techn- in al1 preplatonic texts in Thesaums Linguae Graecae Cornpact Disc version C. That the phrase xei0oGc 6qptmpyq originates with Plato has been established by Hermann Mutschmann (1918,440-43). 3. See Hansen (1981, 345-70); Ober (1989, 104-27); Sinclair (1988, 136-37). See also Hansen (r983a, 33-55; 1983b, 151-80). 4. See Wilcox (1942,127); Tod (1985,88-90); Meiggs and Lewls (1969,128-33). 5.See 3.40.3,6.29.3,and 8.1.1 inH.S. Jonesand J.E.Powell(1g42). 6. See, e.g., Plato, Phaedrus 2604, z61b4-6,26jd5, +66c3,266d6,267b4, z67d7-8, 27oa7, 271~2,27zb1-4, 273d7, 273e3; Aristotle, Rhetoric 13 54a1z, cf. 13 56a1 I, 1356a17. The standard edition of Plato's Phaedms is Burnet (1939), but cf. the text and cornrnentary by Rowe (19 86).For Aristotle's Rhetoric, see Kassel(1976)and Kennedy's translation (1991). 7. Investigated with a search using Pandora 2.1 forwXv- proximate to hoy-or h y in al1 preplatonic texts in Thesaurns Linguae Graecae CD-ROM version C.

.~ a i 7 p q v
&OLTO

&V ZYGV KUT& ~ dhiyoi ~ p v w r (89 52.7).

m KUI p 00b v oi) xepov 705 ~ S d o~ ~ov-

For the Greek text see seaion 89 in DK, or teiner (1949).For an English translation see section 8pin Sprague (1972).On the age in question see also Kerferd (1981b, 126-27). .For the Greek text see DK or Untersteiner (fasc.11),sec. 82 B 11.13; for an English slation see the comesponding seaion in Sprague (197z),or Kennedy's updated transon in Matsen, Rollinson,and Sousa (1990,34-46). . For the Greek text see DK or Untersteiner (fasc. III), sec. 90.8.1; for an English lation see the correspondingsection in Sprague (1974, or Robinson (1979). .Robinson (1979,227)correaly suggeststhat Sprague's translation of log6n techne z ,291-92) as "art of oratory" is overly restrictive. 12. For the dating of Xenophon's Memorabitia see Marchant (1923, xi). 13. Translation adapted from that by Marchant (1923).
kv

70

The Origins of Rhetwicul Theory

1
1

"P~ophicaE Rhebric'*Recmsidered

71

accessible to all- yet are not as specificaliy delimited as the art of Rhetoric would be in the texts of Plato and Aristotle. Fifth-century language use did not clearly delineate an expiicit art of the rhEt6r. Possibly, of course, such a notion could be pointed to within a given text even without a distinct lexical marker.14 Implicit, intratextual evidence concerning such a conclusion is largely a matter of interpretation. Nevertheless, if one brackets the fourth-century notion of rhEtorik2 when reading several key fifth-century predisciplinary texts, it is apparent that the art of discourse is conceptualized in terms broader and less differentiated than that found in fourth-centurytexts. The three texts discussed here are Aristophanes' play Clouds, Gorgias' Helen, and the sophistic tract Dialexeis. These three texts are arguably the best extant sources for evidence about the language used to describe sophistic teaching in the fifth century. Because the point of Aristophanes' Clouds was to parody the Sophists, and because Aristophanes has a documented penchant for borrowing and making fun of new technical jargon (Denniston 1927,113-21; Chantraine 1956'98-99; 0'Sullivan 1992,7), Clouds is a very valuable source for evidence about sophistic theorizing-as long as it is kept in mind that Aristophanes was writing a comedy, not a history.15 Gorgias' Helen is the most theoretical discussion of persuasive speech found in the fifth century. Kerferd clairns that it provides "our best insight" into sophistic rhetorical theory (1981b, 78). And, though it has been largely overlooked by historians of rhetoric, Dialexeis is an important sophistic text that includes an enumeration of specific verbal activities and skills. Particularly in light of the fact that al1 three texts date from very late in the fifth century, they are our most useful guides to the preplatonic, predisciplinary vocabulary concerning discourse.

to explain how he wili avaid

1 the moon, for without the y payments; use a "burningbt f r o m a distante; or, if a l l h n g hlmseif so rhat no one can bring suit to coiect (Clouds 737eidippides, Srrepsiadeshon, shows hs ability to win a suit after g the Thnkery through the use of &ver reasuning, not through forhmakng. Pheidippiiles argues that crsditors cannot force payment traditional collectioi &y, cailed "Old-and-New Day," since it is as ible for a day t o be both old and new as it is for a woman tu be old and (Clouds 1178-12ao).~~ ThPOUghout the play, Aristophanes pomays a natural consequence of mes absurd) reasoniag. ond noteworthy aspea of C l o d s is the surprisingvariety of subjects are now called astron-

sciplinary jargon one might expect to be assocated with sophistic r k Neither t e c w (in thesense of arc or skill) nor mentioned -eren when the Clotouds promise Strepsiadesthat no one assembly h i h e (Clouds 43 I - 3 ~ Although ) ~ ~ ~ persuasion is implicit and a specific art of &e rhZt6r cleady did not reduce ali sophistic teaching LO trainore, he pormys sophistic training as involve wmld new cai critical reason and a scientific outlook. In mmy

Aristophanes' Clouds
Three aspects of Aristophanes' Clouds are particularly noteworthy. First, as noted in the previous chapter, the play posits a close relationship between thinking and speaking, and between acquiring wisdom and the abil14.See, for example, the relatively late (340 B.C.E. at the earliest) treatise known as the Rhetoric to Alexander that, while not using the word rhztorik, clearly belongs to the "disciplined"writings of the fourth century rather than the predisciplinary writings of the 6fth. For Greek text and an English translation, see Rackham (1937). 15. The best critical edition of the Clouds is that by Dover (1968a);see also Reckford a . 418 B.C.E. (see (1987, 388-402). The surviving version of Clouds has been dated to c Storey's 1993 reply to Kopff 1990).
a, 19r-96; Starkie 1911,172-81. a, q 5 9 7 ; Starke 1911,256-61. evidence supportingrhe notion rhattheSophists investigated a. broad

te&?&appears at 88s and 13~3, bur as Dowr (1968,2~8, cf. 249)

"Philosophical Rhetoric"' Reconsidered playvxigllds hostility, the ~$~c+xsof Mstophw y s I @en diseountiag tcr &s&gukh fram those who w-oddsoon be m'Tlmkery are c a k d pbslasoj&e~s. This ,poirtttisnox~swpishg ii we x d rhat &e Athenian p&lii -&e Pkta -" m & no m m p t o diffwmbate s o & s ~from philmophers;" (Oawalcb 1986, 259). TI& h b s i g h t m can interpret specific portions of + C ! d an atta& on R k o r i c Ybut amcshe historieal reading mggests that &e w s an amek on &e n d d d q h r g h e r education" in genemi. Rtra~ac-&~~@ it maM late^ beame a & & & subjm- was still a brgeLy ~mdiife~atiad p ~ ski d 31inslagos' _

Alth.mgh s c h o r s &agm about tthe precise p q m e of 6mgias' Helen, mastl&e~&t thespeech contabs Gorgias' m t ~xplicit m l p i s o20gos.~l Ch&Sb & d d be mdersooA-SS brmd in s a p e and IroLstic in funct i a , &e m w l t b e ' i a~relsrtionship. b e c m 56PK5t and logos m d i k e that #omdIn Mst&p"hme~.~To under.otarrd th~ perbmsive &kts of bgos, Gorgias ou&eswfT$t one mmt d y ?Qmif~, &e arguments &&e astronomers {tck +n&eo4.dag& 10@) w b , wbstituthg o p h fmr opinim (doxa), remo~& onie ai3-dh t i l h g mo&&+ d e w h a ti s incredikieand mclea~ appear trrie t ah e : q e s of opi&on; second, &e forcC&nzmms af mg~mentation,2~ where &e side of rbe aqrmenq mieerr with sili h ~ aspdten t with truth, please~ a large au&ence md persiiacfes; thizd, the d e ' k s d r h l philosophers 4 pI;riT'oso:ph:n log& had&&),:m ~hich &w oftBt~&ris &so exhibited, making M e f in an opW& mdy chafiged" (H&w 131. The breadth of acfi.t*iries k ~ c i a t e d wish p e r s u h by means af bgos demonstrates that, for Gorgias, the skills of logos were auch broader in scope than &ose of the discipline rhetonka as expliqted by Plato and Arisrotle.24 Gorgias' description 'ofbgm as 'Uap&erkul lord" is weil kuown, F& Gorgias, logos is "an iBdependent externa1 p q e r w k h fosca th;e bet~ do its will" (Segal 1962,121)P Since his /*os ks a psychqhysical force&at acts directly on the
TransLtiom oOorgias' Helar are based on K m d y (19~2133 1991,284-88). For (19%)a d DK 8%BII 22. @'onefnidsa %bxy ~ ~ o in-&r&s? n "dm Eanguage, it would be h e case that aildiscoursei s "dCaptive." As the H i d e n s b w s (131, pldosophers and rhetoritrirffi9' ifi their &orts to persuade. CfcianS am equaEIy dose to, or h n t from, V e d d u s (1981, I I 6-28). &&vas as "logi23. Kemedfs altemate fiaiislttion of "~dq dcYayic& 6ia .'. b-9: cally necessary.debates" tr972b543 j. 24. Oil the breadth of the Sophisac i c oflogos see Ker 25. See also Monrelatos (1985,607-3.8).
2 1 .

logy between the effect of drugs and that of logos is litc 4-7): "for just as different drugs dispel clifferent secreti tnd some bring an end to disease and othei-S to life, so alsc of logos -some bririg pain, others pleasure, some bring fear, others wage in the hearers, and some drug and bewitch the psyche with a . @ persuasion" (Helen 14). & S and Aristotle's writings, the psyche becomes the composite of discalized functions (such as in Plato's myth of the charioteer) wherein ktrasted to the emotions (Guthrie 1975,421-25; 1981,277-327). k&eory of logos culminates, according to Charles P . Segal, as a "fulldentific' theory in the Poetiw of Aristotle" (1962,134). Once con> Plato's and Aristotle's compartmentalizationof different verbal arts &tic, dialectic, rhetoric, etc.) and their corresponding forms of com$&, the holistic and largely undiflerentiated sense of Gorgias' logos %pparent:26 "The consequent division of the psyche, with a hierarchibg .of its parts, represents in a sense a narrowing in the attitude psyche and a relinquishing of the sense of the organic~e+ationship between rational and ernotional capabilities that chkracterized " (Segal 1962,134). It is appropriate, there:fore, to categoi rize :nt of logos as predisciplinary.

&xeis

p;:

kzxt seeBzirhb&

k i r d fifth-centurytext examined here is the treatise Dialexeis, dated Attempts to identify the author have been inconclusive; (3ne lat the Dialexeis is a collection of notes, Iiever intended for ,gleaned from lectures by one or more Sophists (Robinson 1979, of the suviving text consists of illustrations of Protagoras' out every 'thing' there are two logoi, opposed to each other" ssion of the semantic implications of the t h e s i ~The . ~ ~remaining op the two-sided approach and directly address topics of popular -~tellectuals. Of the nine chapters, three are (3f special value for his chapter. Chapter two is entitled "On SI eemiy and Sharne&escribing a variety of "things" that are seemly to some but shame&S, the author interjects the notion of kairos- a concept often assoPlato's division of verbal arts see Kerferd (1981b);Nehamas (1990'3-16). the dating and translation of Dialexeis, see Robinson (1979, 34-41). Conley 5) doubts the standard dating, but the absence of fourth-centuryterminology port for the traditional date of around 400 B.C.E. survey of the literature and d~scussion of Protagoras' thesis, see Schiappa

a.

. 2

-2

A'.-

74

The Origins of Rhetorical Theory

"PJ3iosophical Rhetoric" Reconsidered 71

ciated with sophistic theories or "defbitions" of r h e t ~ r i c"To : ~ ~put the matter generally, al1 things are seemly when done at the right time, but shameful when done at the wrong time" (Dialexeis 2.20). Chapter nine concerns memorization. Before suggesting ways of improving one's memory, the author claims that the ability to memorize is an important discovery: "It is useful for au purposes, for both Inquiry and Wisdom" (es philosophian te kai sophian).30 What is noteworthy about both chapters is the complete lack of referente to political or public-speaking contexts. In light of the centrality of the topics of kairos and memory to (later) classical approaches to rhetoric, the absence of any rhetorical treatment of them in the Dialexeis implies that the disciplinary matrix comecting these concepts to persuasive speechmaking either had not emerged or was not yet fked in Greek language or t h o ~ g h t . ~ ~ The opening sentence of chapter eight of the Dialexeis depicts a single, allpurpose techn that the author commends to the audience: "1 beiieve it belongs to the same man and to the same skill to be able to hold dialogue succinaly, to understand the truth of things, to plead one's court-cases correctly, to be able to make popular speeches, to understand argument-skills, and to teach about the nature of al1things -how they are [their condition]and Besides ~ the audacious breadth of the how they came to be" (Dialexeis 8 . 1 ) . ~ abilities pictured by the author, the passage is noteworthy for the terminology (dialekit fails to use. Normally one would expect to find the word ccdialectic" tikg) to designate skill in dialogue, as well as rhgtorik and philosophia to refer to the other skiils explicated. The lack of these terms is good evidence for the preplatonic, predisciplinary character of the treatise. Once clearly conceptualized and disciplinized, Rhetoric and Philosophy were seen as in tension because the goals of the two subjects, political successand truth, were, according to Plato, incompatible. The significanceof chapter eight of Dialexeis is that no such incompatibility is evident. Far from it: success and m e understanding are presented as two sides of the same coin. Compare the phrase here with Socrates' words as portrayed by Plato decades later: "A man must know the truth about al1 the particular things of which he speaks or writes, and be able to define everything separately" (Phaedrus, 277b). Robinson characterizes the skill discussed in chapter eight of Dialexeis as omnicompetence: an ability to produce true and compelling discourse in a 29. See K e ~ e d (1963'66-68); y Race (1981,197-213); Poulakos (1983a, 27-42]. 30. Based on Robinson's and Untersteiner's (fasc.111) editions Dialexeis $ 9 . 1 (6. DK 2: 416). 3 I. On the notion of disciplinaty matrix see Kuhn (1970,182). 32. For the Greek see DK 90.8.1 or chapter 2, note 6, above.

Formal speeches

Success

Palitical and

Truth Philosopher scientific

Nmpoliacal

9t :Success-Seeking Rhemric ::Philosopher :Truth-Seekiag Philosophy

ake clear in chapter 10, ISOCT~FE~S bad a quite drent discipiinay sense of

76

The Origins of Rhetorical Theory

"Philosophical Rhetoric" Reconsidered 77

Space does not permit a comprehensiveredescription of the dominant view af the Older Sophists, so for the purposes of this chapar 1 will simply assert the existente of a counterview that portrays the Sophists as quite different from what Plato described (see Kerferd 198 I b; de Romilly 19 88). According to the revised view, the Sophists were not fundamentally different from the people now referred to as Philosophers. From the standpoint of method of inquiq, subject matters pursued, and even specihc doctrines espoused, what the socalled presocratic philosophers, Socrates, the Sophists, and Plato had in common "was of greater importance than what separated them" (Havelock 1963, 290). Al1 represented an "intellectualist movement" that broke from traditional modes of discourse and thinking. "If they were called 'philosophers,' it was not for their d m i n e s as such, but for the kind of vocabulary and syntax which they used and tke unfamiliar psychic energies that they represented. Sophists, pre-Socratics, and Socrates had one fatal characteristic in common; they were trying to discover and to practise abstract thinkhg" (Havelock 1963,285-86). m e most sipificant difference between hose the ancient sources call Sophists and Philosophers seems to be the economic and social class with which each group is identiied. As Ostwald has documented in detail, most writers from the fifth and early fourth centuria B.C.E, were conservative members of the upper classes. Their writings display a remarkably consistent bias against Athenian democracy in general, and the middle class from which most dernocratic leaders came (after Pericles) in particular (Ostwald 19 86, 21 3-29 ). Accordingly, since the Saphists were often from the middle classes (or, worse yet, from an Athenian standpoint, were foreigners), they are seldom treated kindly in the literature of their time. Regardless of the reasons for traditional biases against the Sophists, &e important points are that the standard view of the Sophists is being radically revised, and that part of that revision must include a reconsideration of what is meant by Sophistic Rhetoric. In what follows, 1 provide a brief account of two of the most important Sophists, Protagoras and Gorgias, in order to illustrate further the point that the standard view of the origins of rhetorical theory has oversimplified their contributions to Greek thou&t.

11the area of language and linguistic formulaription, statement, arguments (as expressed e area of thought and mental processes, ,reasoning, accounting for, explanation (cf. orthos logos), etc.; area of the world, that aboast which we are able to speak and to rmulae, natural laws and so on, provided S actually present in and exhibited in the
S of sixth- and fifth-century thinkers is best understood as a rarival to traditional mythos- the religious worldview preserved in per arose as a comrnentary upon and correction ic imagery of Homer and the cosmic architecture of Hesiod's Thevelock 1983,80). The epic poets in general and Homer in particua sort of institutional status in Greek society. The poetry of the time &e functions now assigned to a variety of educational practices: training, history texts, and reference manuals 1963, 29). Because the vast majority of the populatio-ndid not read poeay was preserved communication that served as &ek culture's atored memory. Accordingly, poetry enjoyed a monopoly over edual and "citizenship training" in particular (Havelock 1963,43). k has documented in detail the role of those we now call presocratic rs in advancing abstract analysis over the mythic-poetic tradition 1982, ch. 11; 1983). The evidence is clear that the Older Sophists &e same role in the fifth century B.c.E., as did Plato in the fourth. In Protagoras, Socrates and Protagoras engage in an analysis of a e poet Simonides (338e-348a). Commentatorshave viewed Socgeous (mis-)interpretation of the passage as evidence of Plato's poetry and poetic interpretation (Guthrie 1975,227; Taylor 1976, r notes, the section also provides clues about :"'It seems likely that he saw the importance of literary criticism eloping the critical faculty and the exact use of language than in preciation of poetry as an end in itself" out a contradiction in Simonides' poem and it is important to be able to evaluate poetry and give a logos when (339a). Even allowing for some degree of distortion by Plato, it is a crucial analytical leap: from mere repetition to its critical analysis. His analysis was poetry had become an object of study rather the medium through which the world was understood (as it was for

Protagoras and Gorgias

The term logos was one of the most overworked words of ancient Greek and is difficult to translate into English. Summarizing the predominant senses of logos found in the fifth century B.c.E., Kerferd has written: "mhere are three main areas of its application or use, al1 related by an underlying coa-

78

The Origins of Rhetorical Theory

ccPhilosophical Rhetoric" Reconsidered 79 emocracy. Although the precise relationship between Pericles and Prois far from certain, it is clearly the case that both Parmenides' and ras' "philosophical" positions had strong ideological implication~.~~ ngly, it is accurate to say that Protagoras' particular rationalization of thos is in keeping with the trends of Athenian democracy. agoras' "two-Jogoi" fragment states that two opposing logoi are uue rning every experience. The thesis is an extension of contemporary theabout the nature of "things." By the iifth century, the predominant alistic (non-myhcal) schemata for understanding nature were various es of "opposites" (Kahn 1960,119-65). Human health was understood ny Mth-century physicians as being an appropriate balance of opposites, dry and wet, hot and cold (seeJones 1923,2:229). During the sixth centuria B . C . E . theories of opposites grew more sophisticated as the le analytical vocabulary and syntax evolved, and Protagoras' two-logoi nt contributed to that evolution. The two-logoi statement has proven to interpret because the meanng of logoi mentioned is unclear. Did ras simply mean diat two competing speeches are posible about every '' or did he rnean that each "thing" could be experien&@in contrary such that two opposingaccounts could both be true? The answer must The pMological evidence from the fifth century B.C.E. suggests that vered equally the nation of objective states, courses of action, or ways ,as well as speeches about the states and actions (Cole 1972). Accordrotagoras' statement must be interpreted as a claim about the world as a claim about discourse. gorean fragment most conducive to interpretation as an incipient etoric is his alleged "promise" recorded by Aristotle to "make the argurnent stronger" (Rhetoric 1402az3). Traditionally the statement n interpreted as representing "sophistry" at its worst, as reflected in oper's translation "m&ng the worse appear the better cause" (1932, dingly; hose who reduce Sophistic teaching to "mere" rhetoric refer to Protagoras' promise as evidence of the unethical nature of their uch an interpretation o f the fragment does much violence to the reek and ignores much of what is known about the historical ProAs mentioned earlier in this chapter, the superior interpretation is to "promise" in tandem with the two-logoi fragment. What Protagoras by making one logos stronger than its opposite was the substitution of a rred (but weaker) logos for a less preferable (but temporarily dominant)

Aristotle also provides evidence of Protagoras' critical approach to poetry. In Sophistic Refutations (173b) and in the Rhetoric (1407b6-7) Aristotle reports that Protagoras was concerned with the proper gender of words, and in the Poetics claims that Protagoras criticized the opening of Homer's Iliad for using the mode of "command" rather than "request" (146sb1~).Ammonius quotes Protagoras critically analyzing another passage in the Iliad (DK 8oA3o). The Gnomologium Vaticanum records the foliowing anecdote: "When a maker of verses cursed Protagoras because he would not approve of his poems, his answer was 'My good sir, 1 am better off enduring your abuse than enduring your poems' " (DK 80A25 trans. in Sprague 1972,16). In short, there is some evidence that Protagoras broke from the poetic tradition by making poetry a subject of critical analysis. Other presocratics had criticized Homer nd Hesiod, but Protagoras' method of analysis was different and original. When Heraclitus criticized the poets for failing to rqcognize that day and night are One, it was a matter of his opinion (doxa) versus theirs (DK 22, B57; see Kahn 1979). After Parmenides describes the nature of "what-is," it is defended as being the result of divine revelation. In both instances logos is understood as rationalized mythos, and is set against a tpditional mytbos. With Protagoras mythos became an object of analysis, a text or logos that can be analyzed, criticized, and altered. Plato's accouit of Protagoras analyzing epic poetry is the earliest recorded instance of "textual criticism" and it apparently started a practice that was continued by other sophists at least through Iswates' time (see Panathenaictrs 18). The extant fragments of Protagoras, when viewed as a whole, form a coherent view of humanity, discourse, and the world (Schiappa 1991). A summary of his more important fragments can demonstrate, albeit in cursory fashion, how his theorizing represented an advancement over mythic explanations of the world and contributed to the further development of rhetorical theory and practice. His most famous aphorism is "Of al1 things the measure is Humaniw Of that which is, that it is the case, of that which is not, that it is not ~ ~ aphorism was allegedly the opening line of a book the case" (DK 80 A I ) . The that was motivated, in part, as a critique of Eleatic monism as espoused by Parmenides (see Gagarin 1968, 122; Austin 1986, 120; Guthrie 1971, 47; Kerferd 1981 b, 92). Protagoras' point seems to have been that humans are the judge of what is or is not the case, not the gods or heroes of epic poetry, and not the divinely inspired philosophical poets like Parmenides. It is commonly accepted that Protagoras helped provide the theoretical justiication for Per) ,,

34. For thoughtful treatments of the Human-as-Measurefraeent, see Guthrie (1971, 188-92); Untersteiner (1954~77-91); Versenyi (1962,178-84).

*.

5. For Protagoras see Morrison ( I ~ ~ I , I - 1 6for ) ; Parmenides see Minar (1949'41-

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"Philosophical Rhetoric" Reconsidered

81

logos of the same "e~perience."~~ Again, logos carries a dual reference: to the end-condition a speaker seeks to change (from the weaker to the stronger) and to the means of producing such a change. Over time the sense of logos as an end-condition would fade as increasing attention was given to logos as a means of effecting change. Nevertheless, it can be stated with confidente that Protagoras' theorizing about logos heralds an important beginning of the development of what would later be ~ailed rhetorical theory. Based strictly on his methods and doctrines it is difficult to distinguish between Protagoras and his predecessors. Both broke from the poetic-mythc tradition, and both sought a rationalistic account of the world and how to change it. "Philosophicaln and "Sophisticn rhetoric have more in common than the traditional account acknowledges. Protagoras' doctrines by no means exhaust fifth-century theorizing about logos. A second example of an incipient rhetorical theory of the ifthcentury B . C . E . is that o f Gorgias' approach to logos. A brief summary is offered to iiiustrate further the need for individualistic studies that provide an alternative to the standard account of early Greek rhaorical theory. The prevailing opinion concerning Gorgias is that he was no$ a particularly serious thinker, that his rhetorical style was excessively ornate, and that the portrayal found in Plato's dialogue of the same name is generally accurate. In the past thirty years, an alternative picture of Gorgias has begun to emerge i m as a serious thinker with legitimately "philosophical" interests. that treats h The difference between the two views can be attributed, in large measure, to the relationship one assumes between Gorgias and Rhetoric. Kennedy, reflecting the attitude that "rhetoricai" interests logically precede the content of the Sophists' teachings, suggests that the new "philosophical approach to Gorgias . probably exaggerates his intellectual sophistication and credits him with an uncharacteristic power of conceptualization" (1980,3 1). This book sides with the position that Gorgias, like Protagoras, was a serious thinker who shared an interest in advancing logos over mythos. Plato and Theophrastus mport that Gorgias subscribed to Empedoclean theoris concerning the sun, optics, and color (DK 82 Bq, 5 , cf. A17, B31). Such interests clearly identdy Gorgias with the new rationalism considered characteristic of the "philosophers" of his time. Charles H. Kahn has written seminal works concerning the Greek verb cid, "to be" (1966,1973). ~ a h n ' s extensive survey of the ancient Greek literature revealed that there were ter-

cal constructions of the verb "to be" that occurred very rarely in c writings. According to Kahn, at least one of the technical uses, the rm of einai, was employed exclusively by "philosophers" (1973, Significantly, both Protagoras' and Gorgias' extant fragments ema negative form of einai. Protagoras uses the negative construction ice in his "man-measure" statement, and Gorgias authored an entire the subject of "On Not Being." ument advanced in Gorgias' On Not Being has long been the subject even if it ersy. Gorgias' argument was threefold: "(1)nothing is, (2) t be known to human beings, (3) even if it is and is knowable, it indicated and made meaningful to another person" (Kerferd 198 ~ b , on DK 82, B3). Most commentators agree that the argument was by the extreme monism embodied in Parmenides work "On Being," gias was attempting to refute Parmenides' position by reducing it However, there is little agreement whether the argument should ed "phil~so~hical" or merely "rhetorical." As has been suggested !&e dichotomy is anachronistic-a point that will be g lored furer eight. As has been amply documented by ~erferd,! e address with theoretical controversies that were at the heart of the fifthaual movement (1981b, 93-99). Gorgias raised issues that e referred to as having to do with predication, meaning, and ues that later became of vital importance to Plato. Accordingly, le sense to dismiss the seriousness of Gorgias' addresses on the t a "mere" rhetorician would not have held serious theoretical

..

36. See O'Brien's transiation of the weakerlstronger logoi fragment in Sprague (1972' 13); Coie (1972); Kerferd (1967,506).

goras, Gorgias held an implicit theory of logos that can be useood as an incipient rhetorical theory. Gorgias' theory of logos has analyzed by SegaI (1962) and is discussed in more detail in . According to Segal, the key to Gorgias' theory is a literal analn dmgs and logoi. As a doctor's dmgs affect the diseases and the life y, logoi alter the psyche and the emotions: "The processes of the thus treated as having a quasi-physical reality and, perhaps more as being susceptible to the same kind of control and manipulation agent as the body by the drugs of the doctor" (1962,104). The s works directly on the psyche, having a n immediate ability to from one state to another. Gorgias' conception of logos and the as more in common with the materialism of Democritus than the expressed in Plato's philosophy. For that reason, it, like other fifthwritings concerning logos, rarely has been understood or appreciated.

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Viewed in its historical context, Gorgias' writings can be respected as an early effort towards theorizing about subjects that remain difficult over two thou. sand years later. The point of this chapter has been to cal1 into question the traditional ways of differentiating between Philosophical and Sophistic Rhetorical Theory. 1am certainly not claiming that there are no salient differences among the figures known as Sophists, Plato, and Aristotle. 1merely want to problematize those parts of the standard account of the beginnings of Greek rhetorical theory that have been based on what 1believe are misreadings of key fifth-century texts. At this point, al1of the claims 1have associated with the standard account have been challenged. In the chapters that follow, 1do not seek to provide a full and complete counternarrative. While it posible to reconstruct the history of ancient rhetorical theory as "the growth of a single, great, traditional theory" (Kennedy 1963, g), 1strongly suspect that any such effort would sirnilarly fa11 victim to oversimplifying the key figures involved and overgeneralizing from the available texts. Instead, my goal is to attempt to illustrate the utility of a different approach to the texts in question-an approach that focuses on petits rcits rather than a grand narrative, and an approach that explores the process of theorizing and disciplining itself, rather than examining the texts of the time as end-products of a process already coi

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