G.R. No.

134209

January 24, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent. DECISION GARCIA, J.: Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision1 dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 which affirmed an earlier decision2 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69 in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1. The decision under review recites the factual backdrop, as follows: This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, more particularly described in the amended application filed by Celestina Naguiat on 29 December 1989 with the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, Branch 69. Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof. On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . . filed an opposition to the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicants claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of . . .; and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation. On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of general default as against the whole world, with the exception of the Office of the Solicitor General, and proceeded with the hearing of this registration case. After she had presented and formally offered her evidence . . . applicant rested her case. The Solicitor General, thru the Provincial Prosecutor, interposed no objection to the admission of the exhibits. Later . . . the Provincial Prosecutor manifest (sic) that the Government had no evidence to adduce. 3

In a decision4 dated September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment for herein respondent Celestina Naguiat, adjudicating unto her the parcels of land in question and decreeing the registration thereof in her name, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates the parcels of land situated in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, appearing on Plan AP-03-003447 containing an area of 3,131 square meters, appearing on Plan AP-03-003446 containing an area of 15,322 containing an area of 15,387 square meters to herein applicant Celestina T. Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Rommel Naguiat and a resident of Angeles City, Pampanga together with all the improvements existing thereon and orders and decrees registration in her name in accordance with Act No. 496, Commonwealth Act No. 14, [should be 141] as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1529. This adjudication, however, is subject to the various easements/reservations provided for under pertinent laws, presidential decrees and/or presidential letters of instructions which should be annotated/ projected on the title to be issued. And once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be immediately issued. (Words in bracket added) With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, petitioner Republic went on appeal to the CA inCA-G.R. CV No. 37001. As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed decision of May 29, 1998, affirmed that of the trial court, to wit: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Hence, the Republics present recourse on its basic submission that the CAs decision "is not in accordance with law, jurisprudence and the evidence, since respondent has not established with the required evidence her title in fee simple or imperfect title in respect of the subject lots which would warrant their registration under (P.D. 1529 or Public Land Act (C.A.) 141." In particular, petitioner Republic faults the appellate court on its finding respecting the length of respondents occupation of the property subject of her application for registration and for not considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property. Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act of the Government so that they may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of private appropriation.5 As to these assets, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.6 Given this postulate, the principal issue to be addressed turns on the question of whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain. Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act7 and the Constitution8 classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks," do not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded land or an expanse covered by dense growth of trees and underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of Amunategui 9-

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. xxx. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. xxx Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,10 which embodies the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.11 All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the State.12 Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.13Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive Branch of the government and not the court.14Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant.15 In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in question are already alienable and disposable. Wrote the appellate court: The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are lands of the public domain cannot be sustained as it is directly against the above doctrine. Said doctrine is a reaffirmation of the principle established in the earlier cases . . . that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property . (Word in bracket and underscoring added.) The principal reason for the appellate courts disposition, finding a registerable title for respondent, is her and her predecessor-in-interests open, continuous and exclusive occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years. Prescinding from its above assumption and finding, the appellate court went on to conclude, citing Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)16 and Herico vs. DAR,17 among other cases, that, upon the completion of the requisite period of possession, the lands in question cease to be public land and become private property. Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by the CA are not, however, winning cards for the respondent, for the simple reason that, in said cases, the disposable and alienable nature of the land sought to be registered was established, or, at least, not put in issue. And there lies the difference. Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.18 Aside from tax receipts, respondent submitted in evidence the survey map and technical descriptions of the

lands, which, needless to state, provided no information respecting the classification of the property. As the Court has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.19 It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands has been a notorious practice resorted to in land registration cases.20 For this reason, the Court has made it a point to stress, when appropriate, that declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the case may be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable lands need an express and positive act from the government.21 The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessor-ininterest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is now of little moment. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.22 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, respondents application for original registration of title in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, is DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 135527. October 19, 2000] Spouses GEMINIANO and AMPARO DE OCAMPO and Spouses PEDRO and CRISANTA SANTOS, petitioners, vs. FEDERICO ARLOS, MARY ARLOS, TEOFILO OJERIO and BELLA OJERIO, respondents. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Under the Public Land Act as amended, only titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain may be judicially confirmed. Unless a public land is reclassified and declared as such, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long ago, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. A suit for the reversion of such property to the State may be instituted only by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the August 28, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 52048, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:[2]

ACCORDINGLY, for want of merit, the appeal is DENIED and the challenged Decision dated 26 November 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Balanga, Bataan, is AFFIRMED. No costs. The affirmed Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled on the following: (1) Land Registration Case No. N-340, filed in 1977 for confirmation of respondents title to three parcels of land; and (2) Civil Case No. 4739, filed in 1981 for cancellation of petitioners Sales Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title covering two of the said lots. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:[4] ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered: I. In Civil Case No. 4739 1. Ordering the cancellation of Sales Patent Nos. 5387 and 5388 as well as Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-43298 and T-44205 in the names of [herein petitioner-]spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo and x x x Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos. 2. Taking judicial cognizance of the decision in Civil Case No. 3769, which ordered the cancellation of Free Patent Nos. 522697 and 502977 as well as Original Certificate of Title Nos. 296 and 297, which decision has already become final and executory; 3. Ordering [Petitioners] Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo and x x x Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs attorneys fees in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and the costs of suit. II. In Land Registration Case No. N-340 1. Confirming [herein respondents] title [to] the land subject of registration and ordering the registration thereof in the names of [Respondent] Teofilo D. Ojerio, of legal age, Filipino, married to Bella V. Ojerio and a resident of Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan - share; and Cecilia P. Arlos, Jose P. Arlos, Gloria P. Arlos, Luisito P. Arlos, all of legal age, Filipinos, single and residents of 500-A, Fifth Avenue corner Baltazar Street, Grace Park, Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and Alberto U. Arlos, minor, Filipino, and a resident of 500-A, Fifth Avenue corner Baltazar Street, Grace Park, Caloocan City, Metro Manila - share; and 2. As soon as this decision becomes final and executory, let an order for the issuance of the corresponding decrees be issued. SO ORDERED.
The Facts

The undisputed facts are quoted by the CA from the RTC judgment, as follows:[5] On 14 April 1977, Federico S. Arlos and Teofilo D. Ojerio filed an application for registration, docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-340, wherein they seek judicial confirmation of their titles [to] three parcels of land, namely: (1) a parcel of land covered by SGS 4140 [PLAN] with

an area of 226,105 square meters; (2) a parcel of land identified as Lot 1, SGS 41241 [PLAN] with an area of 111,333 square meters; and (3) a parcel of land identified as Lot 2, SGS 4141 [PLAN] with an area of 63,811 square meters, all located at Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan, and having a total area of 401,159 square meters or 40.1159 hectares. Spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo De Ocampo and spouses Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos opposed the application for registration, alleging that they are the co-owners of Lots 1 and 2 of Plan SGS 3062, situated at Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan, and their ownership is evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-43298 and T-44205, and that they became owners of said lots by purchase from the government through sales patents. The Republic of the Philippines also opposed the application, contending that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interests have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the parcels of land applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation. Spouses Placido Manalo and Rufina Enriquez and spouses Armando Manalo and Jovita Baron also opposed the application for registration. Almost four years after the filing of the land registration case or, to be exact, on 20 February 1981, applicant Arlos and his spouse, Mary Alcantara Arlos, and applicant Ojerio and his spouse Bella V. Ojerio, filed Civil Case No. 4739, seeking to cancel; (1) the free patent title of defendants-spouses Placido Manalo and Rufina Enriquez, that is, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 296-Bataan, covering Lot, 1, Plan F-(III-4) 508-D with an area of 155,772 square meters, and Lot 2, same plan, containing an area of 43,089 square meters, or a total area of 198,861 square meters or 19.8861 hectares; (2) the free patent title of defendants Armando Manalo and Jovito Baron, that is, OCT No. 297-Bataan, covering Lot, 1, F-(III-4) 510-D with an area of 72,065 square meters or 7.2065 hectares; and (3) the sales patent title of defendantsspouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo and defendants-spouses Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos, that is, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-44205-Bataan with an area of 225,011 square meters or 22.5011 hectares, and T-43298-Bataan with an area of 111,333 square meters or 11.1333 hectares. In the Order dated 31 July 1991 of the RTC, Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan, Civil Case No. 4739 which was then assigned to said Branch was ordered consolidated with the land registration cases assigned to Branch 2. Of relevance to this case on appeal is the Decision of the Supreme Court dated 26 April 1989 in G.R. 64753 involving Civil Case No. 3769 entitled Spouses de Ocampo et al. v. Manalo, et al. which annulled the free patent titles of the spouses Manalo and declared as valid the sales patent title issued in favor of the spouses De Ocampo and spouses Santos involving the same properties subject of this appeal.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Affirming the factual findings of the trial court, the CA ruled that petitioners had failed to comply with the Public Land Act, which required sales patent applicants to be the actual occupants and cultivators of the land. It held that the testimonies of petitioners, which were incongruous with reality, bolstered the finding that [they had] never occupied, cultivated or made improvements on the property. It explained: On the basis of its own findings, the trial court, after evaluating the evidence presented, concluded that [herein respondents] and their predecessors-in-interest were in actual possession of the subject lands in 1947 and continuously up to the present. In contrast, the checkered testimonies of [petitioners] reveal that they have never been in possession of the lands. And because of the absence of the actual occupancy on their part, the sales patents and titles issued in their favor are null and void citing therein the ruling in Republic v. Mina (114 SCRA 946) that the alleged misrepresentation of the applicant that he had been occupying and cultivating the land are sufficient grounds to nullify the patent and title under Section 9 of the Public Land Laws. On this particular note, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. x x x.[6] Debunking petitioners reliance on Manalo v. IAC and de Ocampo,[7] the CA ratiocinated as follows: [Herein respondents] do not challenge the Decision of the High Court dated 26 April 1989 in GR No. 64753 which annulled the free patent titles of defendants-appellants Manalos and granted the issuance of sales patent titles of [Petitioners] De Ocampos and Santoses. What is being disputed is that the issuance of the sales patents of the subject property in favor of the Santoses and the De Ocampos was allegedly tainted by fraud and misrepresentation on their part by misrepresenting themselves to be actual occupants of the subject properties when in fact the subject properties were being actually occupied by the [respondents] since 1947 way back when the land still formed part of the military reservation and further on when it was declared to be public agricultural land. x x x.[8] Hence, this Petition.[9]
The Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:[10] I Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in disregarding the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 64753 entitled, Placido Manalo, et al. vs. Spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo, et al., wherein the validity and legality of petitioners TCT No. T-44205 and TCT No. T-43298 [pertaining to] the land in dispute were upheld. II

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ordering the cancellation of petitioners Sales Patent as well as TCT Nos. T-43298 and T-44205 considering that private respondents are not the proper party to institute the action for annulment of petitioners titles [to] the lots. III Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ruling that petitioners committed an act of misrepresentation in their Application for Sales Patent. IV Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ordering petitioners to pay private respondents the amount of P50,000.00 representing attorneys fees. In short, petitioners ask this Court to determine the propriety of (1) the registration of respondents title under the Public Land Act and (2) the cancellation of petitioners Sales Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs).
The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:Registration of Respondents Title

Respondents application for registration of title to the three parcels of land that were once part of the public domain is governed by the Public Land Act,[11] the pertinent portion of which reads: SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxxxxxxxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. x x x x x x x x x Respondents claim that they purchased the subject lots in 1967 from Bernardo and Arsenio Obdin,[12] who in turn had been in possession of the property since 1947. Hence, when the former filed their application for registration in 1977, they and their predecessors-in-interest

had been occupying and cultivating, in the concept of owners, the said parcels of land for at least 30 years, as required by the Public Land Act. We are not convinced. First, a title may be judicially confirmed under Section 48 of the Public Land Act only if it pertains to alienable lands of the public domain.[13] Unless such assets are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 1073[14] clarified Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by specifically declaring that the latter applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.[15] In the present case, the disputed land which was formerly a part of a US military reservation that had been turned over to the Philippine government in 1965, was declared disposable and alienable only in 1971. In Manalo v. IAC and de Ocampo,[16] a suit involving the same parcel of land and instituted by herein petitioners against other claimants, the Court held: As correctly pointed out by the appellate court in its questioned decision: x x x. It is not correct to say that when the U.S. Military Reservation in Bataan, of which the land in question forms part, was turned over to the Philippine government, the same automatically became a disposable land of the public domain. The ownership and control over said reservation was transferred to the Philippine government, but its nature as a military reservation remained unchanged. Said parcels of land became a disposable land of public domain only on May 19, 1971, per certification of the Bureau of Forestry (Project No. 4-A, C-C. Map No 2640). Its disposition only by sale was duly authorized pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 274. If the land in question became immediately disposable upon its turn over to the Philippine government in 1965, then why, it may be asked, was it certified disposable only in 1971. This Court is of the conclusion that this land above referred to continued to be a military reservation land while in the custody of the Philippine government until it was certified alienable in 1971. (Emphasis supplied.) Second, respondents and their predecessors-in-interest could not have occupied the subject property from 1947 until 1971 when the land was declared alienable and disposable, because it was a military reservation at the time. Hence, it was not subject to occupation, entry or settlement. This is clear from Sections 83 and 88 of the Public Land Act, which provide as follows: SEC. 83. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, the President may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in accordance with regulations prescribed for this purpose, or for quasipublic uses or purposes when the public interest requires it, including reservations for highways, rights of way for railroads, hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communal pastures or leguas comunales, public parks, public quarries, public fishponds, working-men's village and other improvements for the public benefit.

SEC. 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of section eighty-three shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared under the provision of this Act or by proclamation of the President. (Emphasis supplied.) Verily, in Manalo, the Court debunked therein petitioners similar argument that they had been occupying the property since 1944. It ruled in this wise: The big tract of land in Mariveles, Bataan to which the parcels of land involved in the case belong was formerly a portion of the US Military Reservation in Mariveles, Bataan which was turned over to the Philippine Government only on December 22, 1965 (Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals et al., No. L-39473, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 648). Under the situation, the Court seriously doubts whether Placido Mapa and their predecessors-in-interest could have been in possession of the land since 1944 as they claimed: Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired (Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., No. 14912, September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 146). We reiterate that the land was declared alienable only in 1971; hence, respondents have not satisfied the thirty-year requirement under the Public Land Act. Moreover, they could not have occupied the property for thirty years, because it formed part of a military reservation. Clearly then, their application for the registration of their titles was erroneously granted by the appellate and the trial courts.
Second Issue: Cancellation of Petitioners Titles

Petitioners claim that their titles can no longer be challenged, because it is a rule that the Torrens Title issued on the basis of a free patent becomes indefeasible as one which was judicially secured upon registration upon expiration of one year from date of issuance of patent.[17] Petitioners further contend that the action for the cancellation of their Sales Patents and TCTs should have been initiated by the solicitor general, not by herein respondents, pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act, which we quote: SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondents argue, however, that the present proceedings are not for reversion, but for reconveyance. Hence, they have the personality to file the present suit. We are not persuaded by respondents argument. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in

another persons name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. That is what reconveyance is all about.[18] Reconveyance, however, is not available to respondents, because they have not shown a title better than that of petitioners. As earlier shown, the former have not proven any title that may be judicially confirmed. Moreover, respondents invocation of Heirs of Nagano v. CA[19] must be rejected. In that case, the Court noted that the allegations in the Complaint, which were deemed admitted for the purpose of resolving the Motion to Dismiss, were an assertion that the lot is private land, or that even assuming it was part of the public domain, private respondents had already acquiredimperfect title thereto under Section 48 (b) of CA No. 141 x x x. Hence, the Court ruled that respondents, not the OSG, were the proper parties to file the suit. In the present case, we reiterate that respondents failed to show entitlement to the land. They have not established that they are the rightful owners of the property; or at least, that they, not petitioners, have a better right thereto. Respondents vigorously contend that the Sales Patents were fraudulently obtained by petitioners, who have allegedly failed to prove the requisite actual occupation of the land in question. The former cite several portions of the transcript of stenographic notes, showing that the latter have not actually occupied or cultivated the property. The Court, however, finds that a ruling on the veracity of these factual averments would be improper in this Decision. If petitioners Sales Patents and TCTs were in fact fraudulently obtained, the suit to recover the disputed property should be filed by the State through the Office of the Solicitor General. Since petitioners titles originated from a grant by the government, their cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.[20] At the risk of being repetitive, we stress that respondents have no personality to recover the property, because they have not shown that they are the rightful owners thereof. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court are REVERSED. No pronouncement as to costs. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General for a possible review, in its sound discretion, of the issuance of the Sales Patents and Certificates of Titles in the name of herein petitioners. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989

THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner vs. RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent. The Solicitor General for petitioner. Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena & Marcos for respondents.

CRUZ, J.: The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares, as they are commonly known. If they are part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under the Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural lands, they may be acquired under private ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in question must be judged by these criteria. The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First Instance. of Capiz. 1 The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2 The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review oncertiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed. It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the land is mangrove land. There is no dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the parties is the legal nature of mangrove swamps ormanglares. The petitioner claims, it is forestal and therefore not disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The issue before us is legal, not factual. For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the earlier American organic acts in the country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and timber or forest lands. This classification was maintained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, promulgated in 1935, until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That new charter expanded the classification of public lands to include industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, and grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to provide for other categories. 3 This provision has been reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in the present Constitution. 4 Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when this case arose, only agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. 5 Their disposition was provided for under

C.A. No. 141. Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private ownership unless they were first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation. In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government, 6 promulgated in 1909, mangrove swamps or manglares were defined by the Court as: ... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various kindred plants which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there. These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also, to some extent cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that they cannot be so regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases cited or in general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available for purpose of navigation, and they may be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains. xxx Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law, the custom had grown of converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which became a common feature of settlement along the coast and at the same time of the change of sovereignty constituted one of the most productive industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and prove a public disaster. Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so susceptible of private ownership. Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the above-cited case, that mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative Code of 1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year, thus: Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character. It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court maintained the doctrine in the Montano case when two years later it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry: 7 ...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act (Act of Congress) as terrenos forestales. We think there is an error in this translation and that a better translation would be 'terrenos madereros.' Lumber land in English means land with trees growing on it. The mangler plant would never be called a tree in English but a bush, and land which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it cannot be called 'timber land. xxx xxx xxx

The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa swamps does not change the general character of the land from manglare to timber land. More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section 1820, the Court declared: 'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said that the phrase agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July 1st 1902, classifies the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands. The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment. These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should have considered them agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands, then the rights of appellants are fully established by Act No. 926. The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera v. Obias, 8 promulgated on March 4, 1933, more than fifteen years after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917. Justice Ostrand declared for a unanimous Court: The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land covered by the application there are mangrove lands as shown in his opponent's Exh. 1, but we think this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress. No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the cases of Montano and Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of Forestry, 9 with Justice Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in nature. The decision even quoted with approval the statement of the trial court that: ... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees are small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of commercial value as lumber do not convert the land into public land. Such lands are not forest in character. They do not form part of the public domain. Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10 the Court, citing Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 11 reiterated the ruling in the Mapa case that "all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands. But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of decisions holding the contrary view.

In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 12 promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled "that the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest lands. Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, when it held, again through Justice Gutierrez:
13

the Court was more positive

The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.' Although conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of the said Code as first, second and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private persons for many years, and therefore, said land was already 'private land' better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification. The petition is without merit. A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands' do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-theway places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classsified as 'forest' is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply.' The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 14 where this Court agreed with the Solicitor General's submission that the land in dispute, which he described as "swamp mangrove or forestal land," were not private properties and so not registerable. This case was decided only twelve days after the De Porkan case. Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need for a categorical pronouncement that should resolve once and for all the question of whether mangrove swamps are agricultural lands or forest lands. The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the legislature, which has the authority to implement the constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain (and is now even permitted to provide for more categories of public lands). The legislature having made such implementation, the executive officials may then, in the discharge of their own role, administer our public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed' and in accordance with the policy prescribed. For their part, the

courts will step into the picture if the rules laid down by the legislature are challenged or, assuming they are valid, it is claimed that they are not being correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the three departments, coordinating with each other, pursue and achieve the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and utilization of our natural resources. In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the Philippines the function of making periodic classifications of public lands, thus: Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into: (a) Alienable or disposable, (b) Lumber, and (c) Mineral lands, and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition. Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act. With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law provides: For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows: (a) Agricultural; (b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and (d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses. The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time make the classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another. As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as follows: Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of same. - Upon there commendation of the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the Department Head, the President of the Philippines may set apart forest reserves from the public lands and he shall by proclamation declare the establishment of such reserves and the boundaries thereof, and

thereafter such forest reserves shall not be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall remain as such for forest uses, and shall be administered in the same manner as public forest. The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter or modify the boundaries of any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke any such proclamation, and upon such revocation such forest reserve shall be and become part of the public lands as though such proclamation had never been made. Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. - Lands in public forest, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands. With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion: Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected. We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That determination having been made and no cogent argument having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so we shall. Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural lands should be understood as covering only those lands over which ownership had already vested before the Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively legislated as forest lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property right protected by the due process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 15 where the possession of the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909, before it was much later classified as timberland. It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could therefore not be the subject of the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private respondent in support of his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be released as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code.

The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the Director of Lands, 16 to prove that the land is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere existence of such a plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in officious. The Director of Lands was not authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for private ownership. Thus we held in the Yngson case: It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of utilization. The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or timber land and not released for fishery or other purposes. The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus: It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registerable. The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence until after the forest land has been declared alienable and disposable. Possession of forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it into private property.' We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in nature, the proof the private respondent offers of prescriptive possession thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of the existence of the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the original transferor of the property, let alone the fact that the conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it been shown that theinformacion posesoria has been inscribed or registered in the registry of property and that the land has been under the actual and adverse possession of the private respondent for twenty years as required by the Spanish Mortgage Law. 17These matters are not presumed but must be established with definite proof, which is lacking in this case. Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were practically the only basis used by the appellate court in sustaining his claim of possession over the land in question. Tax declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and much less vest ownership in favor of the declarant, as we have held in countless cases. 18 We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right to the registration of the subject land in his name. Accordingly, the petition must be granted.

It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now, mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for registration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-39473 April 30, 1979 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LASTIMADO, respondents. Eduardo G. Makalintal for private respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: This is a Petition for Review (Appeal) by certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines from the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on September 30, 1974 in CA-G.R. No. Sp01504 denying the State's Petition for certiorari and Mandamus. Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows: Private respondent, Isabel Lastimado, filed on September 11, 1967, in the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch I, a Petition for the reopening of cadastral proceedings over a portion of Lot No. 626 of the Mariveles Cadastre, consisting of 971.0569 hectares, pursuant to Republic Act No. 931, as amended by Republic Act No. 2061, docketed as Cad. Case No. 19, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 1097. In the absence of any opposition, whether from the Government or from private individuals, private respondent was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte. On October 14, 1967, the trial Court rendered a Decision granting the Petition and adjudicating the land in favor of private respondent. The trial Court issued an order for the issuance of a decree of registration on November 20, 1967, and on November 21, 1967, the Land Registration Commission issued Decree No. N-117573 in favor of private respondent. Eventually, Original Certificate of Title No. N-144 was also issued in her favor. Private respondent thereafter

subdivided the land into ten lots, and the corresponding titles. Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 18905 to 18914 inclusive, were issued by the Register of Deeds. On June 3, 1968, or within one year from the entry of the decree of registration, petitioner filed a Petition for Review pursuant to Sec. 38, Act No. 496, on the ground of fraud alleging that during the period of alleged adverse possession by private respondent, said parcel of land was part of the U.S. Military Reservation in Bataan. which was formally turned over to the Republic of the Philippines only on December 22, 1965, and that the same is inside the public forest of Mariveles, Bataan and, therefore, not subject to disposition or acquisition under the Public Land Law. Respondent field an Opposition thereto, which was considered by the trial Court, as a Motion to Dismiss, and on December 20,1968, said Court (Judge Tito V. Tizon, presiding) issued an Order dismissing the Petition for Review mainly on the ground that the Solicitor General had failed to file opposition to the original Petition for reopening of the cadastral proceedings and was, therefore, estopped from questioning the decree of registration ordered issued therein. On January 28, 1969, petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the trial Court in its Order dated May 20, 1969, for lack of merit. Petitioner seasonably filed a Notice of Appeal and a Record on Appeal, which was objected to by private respondent. On July 15, 1972, or three years later, * the trial Court (Judge Abraham P. Vera, presiding) refused to give due course to the appeal. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the trial Court denied it in its Order of October 14, 1972 on the ground that the proper remedy of petitioner was a certiorari petition, not an ordinary appeal, and that the Order sought to be appealed from had long become final and executory as petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was pro-forma and did not suspend the running of the reglementary period of appeal. On November 9, 1972, petitioner filed a Petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals claiming that the trial Court gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction when, without the benefit of hearing, it summarily dismissed the Petition for Review; and since said Petition raised certain issues of fact which cannot be decided except in a trial on the merits, the dismissal of the Petition on the basis of private respondent's Opposition, considered as a Motion to Dismiss, constituted a denial of due process of law. Petitioner then prayed that the Order of the trial Court, dated December 20, 1968 dismissing the Petition for Review, be declared null and void, and that said trial Court be directed to give due course to the Petition for Review; or, in the alternative, to give due course to petitioner's appeal. On September 30, 1974, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial Court's dismissal of the Petition for Review stating: ... We cannot find any allegation in the petition for review which shows that private respondent had committed fraud against petitioner. Its representations and officials were duly notified of private respondent's petition for reopening and registration of title in her name. In said petition, the technical descriptions of the portion of Lot No. 626 of the Mariveles (Bataan) Cadastre, subject-matter of the petition were expressly stated, the boundaries, specifically delineated. The alleged ground that the land forms part of a forest land exists at the time petitioner was duly notified of said petition. Failure to file opposition is in effect, an admission that the petition is

actually not part of a forest land. Indubitably, therefore, no justifiable reason exists for the annulment of the Order, dated December 20, 1968 (Annex D-Petition) of the lower court dismissing herein petitioner's petition for review of the decree issued in favor of private respondent Lastimado. 1 The Court of Appeals then disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, finding that the respondent Judge has not committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in the issuance of an Order, dated December 20, 1968 (Annex D-Petition) dismissing herein petitioner's petition for review, the present petition for review is hereby denied. The issuance of the writ of mandamus as prayed for in the petition is no longer necessary as this Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and authority to supervise orderly administration of justice, has already resolved on the merits the question whether or not the dismissal of the petition for review had been done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 2 From this Decision, petitioner filed the present Petition for Review (Appeal) by certiorari assigning the following errors to the Court of Appeals and to the trial Court: 1. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in finding that there can be possession, even for the purpose of claiming title, of land which at the time of possession is subject to a military reservation. 2. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in finding that such land which is subject to a government reservation, may appropriately be the subject of cadastral proceedings, and hence. also of a petition to reopen cadastral proceedings. 3. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in finding that a parcel of land which is part of the public forest is susceptible of occupation and registration in favor of private individual. 4. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Republic of the Philippines is not estopped from questioning the decree of registration and the title issued pursuant thereto in favor of respondent Lastimado over the parcel of land in question. 5. The Lower Court erred in dismissing the petition for review of the Republic of the Philippines. 6. The Court of Appeals erred in denying Petitioner's petition for certiorari and mandamus. Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) provides: Section 38. Decree of registration, and remedies after entry of decree. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto. subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon

and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice of citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern". Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affect thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. ... 3 The essential elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree are: a) that the petitioner has a real and dominical right; b) that he has been deprived thereof; c) through fraud; d) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and e) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser. 4 However, for fraud to justify the review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. 5 The following ruling spells out the difference between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud: Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant "outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case." But intrinsic fraud takes the form of "acts of a party in a litigation during the trial such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did not affect the present action of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case. 6 The fraud is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the Court. 7 In its Petition for Review filed before the trial Court, petitioner alleged that fraud was committed by private respondent when she misrepresented that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land publicly, peacefully, exclusively and adversely against the whole world as owner for more than forty years when, in fact, the subject land was in. side the former U.S. Military Reservation, which was formally turned over to the Republic of the Philippines only on December 22, 1965, and that she likewise contended that her rights, as derived from the original and primitive occupants of the land in question, are capable of judicial confirmation under existing laws, when the truth is, said parcel of land is within the public forest of Mariveles, Bataan, and is not subject to disposition or acquisition by private persons under the Public Land Law. The trial Court ruled, and was upheld by the Court of Appeals, that no fraud was committed by private respondent, which deprived petitioner of its day in Court as there was no showing that she was aware of the facts alleged by the Government, so that she could not have suppressed them with intent to deceive. The trial Court also noted that petitioner had failed to file an opposition to the reopening of the cadastral proceedings despite notices sent not only to the Solicitor General as required by Republic Act No. 931. but to the Bureau of Lands and the

Bureau of Forestry as well. It then concluded that "the remedy granted by section 38 of the Land Registration Act is designed to give relief to victims of fraud, not to those who are victims of their own neglect, inaction or carelessness, especially when no attempt is ever made to excuse or justify the neglect." With the foregoing as the essential basis, the trial Court dismissed the Petition for Review. We find reversible error. Although there was an agreement by the parties to submit for resolution the Opposition to the Petition for Review, which was treated as a motion to dismiss, the trial Court, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, should not have dismissed the Petition outright but should have afforded petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of the facts alleged to constitute actual and extrinsic fraud committed by private respondent. Thus, in the case of Republic vs. Sioson, et al., 8 it was held that "the action of the lower Court in denying the petition for review of a decree of registration filed within one year from entry of the d without hearing the evidence in support of the allegation and claim that actual and extrinsic fraud upon which the petition is predicated, is held to be in error, because the lower Court should have afforded the petitioner an opportunity to prove it." If the allegation of petitioner that the land in question was inside the military reservation at the time it was claimed is true, then, it cannot be the object of any cadastral p nor can it be the object of reopening under Republic Act No. 931. 9 Similarly, if the land in question, indeed forms part of the public forest, then, possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private property as it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to register under the Torrens System. 10 Even assuming that the government agencies can be faulted for inaction and neglect (although the Solicitor General claims that it received no notice), yet, the same cannot operate to bar action by the State as it cannot be estopped by the mistake or error of its officials or agents. 11 Further, we cannot lose sight of the cardinal consideration that "the State as persona in law is the juridical entity, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land" under basic Constitutional Precepts, and that it is moreover charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 12 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 30, 1974, dismissing the Petition for certiorari and mandamus filed before it, as well as the Order of the Court of First Instance of Bataan (Branch I) dated December 20, 1968, dismissing the Petition for Review, are hereby set aside and the records of this case hereby ed to the latter Court for further proceedings to enable petitioner to present evidence in support of its Petition for Review. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-52518 August 13, 1991 INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitionerappellee, vs. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., respondents-appellants. Taada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner-appellee.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p From an adverse decision of the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) Laguna dated 3 June 1968 in a special civil action for declaratory relief with injunction, Civil Case No. SC-650 entitled International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines vs. University of the Philippines and Jose Campos, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of petitioner and against the respondents: (a) Declaring that Rep. Act No. 3990 does not empower the University of the Philippines, in lieu of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry, to scale, measure and seal the timber cut by the petitioner within the tract of land referred to in said Act, and collect the corresponding forest charges prescribed by the National Internal Revenue Code therefor; and (b) Dismissing the respondents' counterclaim. respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 49409-R. After the parties filed their respective Briefs in 1971, the Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) promulgated on 28 December 1979 a resolution elevating the case to this Court as the "entire case hinges on the interpretation and construction of Republic Act 3990 as it applies to a set of facts which are not disputed by the parties and therefore, is a legal question. 1 Civil Case No. SC-650 was filed by petitioner Hardwood before the trial court on 28 June 1966. 2 Petitioner seeks therein a declaration that respondent University of the Philippines (hereafter referred to as UP) does not have the right to supervise and regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other forest products, to scale, measure and seal the timber cut and/or to collect forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties from petitioner and/or impose any other duty or burden upon the latter in that portion of its concession, covered by License Agreement No. 27-A issued on 1 February 1963, ceded in full ownership to the UP by Republic Act No. 3990; asks that respondents be enjoined from committing the acts complained of and prays that respondents be required to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as damages and costs of the suit.

Its motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue having been unfavorably acted upon, and pursuant to the order of the trial court of 26 August 1967, respondents filed their Answer on 13 September 1987, 3 wherein they interpose the affirmative defenses of, among others, improper venue and that the petition states no cause of action; they further set up a counterclaim for the payment of it by petitioner of forest charges on the forest products cut and felled within the area ceded to UP under R.A. No. 3990 from 18 June 1964, with surcharges and interests as provided in the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioner filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim. 4 On 18 October 1967, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Joint Submission of the Case for Judgment, 5which reads as follows: COME NOW the parties in the above entitled case by the undersigned counsel, and respectfully submit the following JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS AND JOINT SUBMISSION OF THE CASE FOR JUDGMENT, without prejudice to the presentation of evidence by either party: xxx xxx xxx 2. Plaintiff is, among others, engaged in the manufacture, processing and exportation of plywood and was, for said purpose, granted by the Government an exclusive license for a period of 25 years expiring on February 1, 1985, to cut, collect and remove timber from that portion of timber land located in the Municipalities of Infanta, Mauban and Sampaloc Province of Quezon and in the Municipalities of Siniloan, Pangil, Paete, Cavite and Calauan, Province of Laguna under License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) issued and promulgated by the Government through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on January 11, 1960. ... ; 3. That aforementioned Timber License No. 27-A (Amendment) is a renewal of the Timber License Agreement No. 27-A previously granted by the Government to the plaintiff on June 4, 1953 to February 1, 1963. ... ; 4. Plaintiff, since June 4, 1953, continuously up to the present, has been in peaceful possession of said timber concession and had been felling cutting and removing timber therefrom pursuant to the aforementioned Timber License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960; 5. Plaintiff, on the strength of the License Agreement executed by the Government on June 4,1953 (License Agreement No. 27-A) and of the License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960, has constructed roads and other improvements and installations of the aforementioned area subject to the grant and purchased equipment in implementation of the conditions contained in the aforementioned License Agreement and has in connection therewith spent more than P7,000,000.00 as follows: ... ; 6. Sometime on September 25, 1961, during the effectivity of License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960, the President of the Philippines issued Executive Proclamation No. 791 which reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx RESERVING FOR THE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS EXPERIMENT STATION FOR THE PROPOSED DAIRY RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE AND FOR AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION STUDIES OF THIS COLLEGE A CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, SITUATED PARTLY IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF PAETE AND PAKIL ,PROVINCE OF LAGUNA, AND PARTLY IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF INFANTA, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, ISLAND OF LUZON. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, Carlos P. Garcia, President of the Philippines, do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for the College of Agriculture, University of the Philippines, as experiment station for the proposed Dairy Research and production studies of this College, a certain parcel of land of the Public domain situated partly in the municipalities of Paete and Pakil province of Laguna, and partly in the municipality of Infants, Province of Quezon, Island of Luzon, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to the condition that the disposition of timber and other forest products found therein shall be subject to the forestry laws and regulations, which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows, to wit: xxx xxx xxx IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed. Done in the City of Manila this 25th day of September, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and sixty-one, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the sixteenth. (SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA President of the Philippines xxx xxx xxx 7. That on or about June 18, 1964, during the effectivity of the aforementioned License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of July 11, 1960, Republic Act No. 3990 was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines and approved by the President of the Philippines, which Republic Act provides as follows: AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A CENTRAL EXPERIMENT STATION FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES. Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled: SECTION 1. There is hereby established a central experiment station for the use of the University of the Philippines in connection with its research and extension functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences. SEC. 2. For this purpose, the parcel of the public domain consisting of three thousand hectares, more or less, located in the Municipality of Paete, Province of Laguna, the precise boundaries of

which are stated in Executive Proclamation 791, Series of 1961, is hereby ceded and transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines, subject to any existing concessions, if any. SEC. 3. All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment station shall be exempt from taxation, local or general, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines. SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved, June 18, 1964. 8. That on the strength of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990, and prior to the institution of the present suit, defendants have demanded, verbally as well as in writing to plaintiff-. (a) That the forest charges due and payable by plaintiff under the License Agreement 27-A (Amendment) referred to in paragraph 2 hereof be paid to the University of the Philippines, instead of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and (b) That the selling of any timber felled or cut by plaintiff within the boundaries of the Central Experiment Station as defined in Republic Act No. 3990 be performed by personnel of the University of the Philippines. 9. That the position of the plaintiff oil the demand of the defendants was fully discussed in the letter dated April 29, 1966 of plaintiffs lawyer addressed to the President of the University of the Philippines, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A" hereof. 10. That in line with its position as stated in paragraph thereof, plaintiff has refused to allow entry to personnel of the University of the Philippines to the Central Experiment Station area assigned thereto for the purpose of supervising the felling cutting and removal of timber therein and scaling any such timber cut and felled prior to removal 11. That in view of the stand taken by plaintiff and in Relation to the implemetation of Republic Act No. 3990 the defendant Business Executive sent the letter quoted below to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue: xxx xxx xxx February 8, 1966 Commissioner of Internal Revenue Manila Re: Forest Charges of U.P. Paete Land Grant Dear Sir: Under Republic Act 3990 approved in June, 1964 a parcel of forest land approximately 3,500 hectares in area was ceded in full ownership by the government to the University of the

Philippines. This area is known as Paete Land Grant, the title to which is presently issued in the name of the University of the Philippines. The law transferring the ownership to the University of the Philippines gives the university full rights of dominion and ownership, subject to the existing concession of International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines. Under the terms of this law all forest charges due from the concessionaire should now be paid to the University of the Philippines. The purpose of giving this land grant to the University is to enable us to generate income out of the land grant and establish a research and experimental station for the Colleges of Agriculture, Forestry, Arts and Sciences and Veterinary Medicine. I would like, therefore, to inform you and to secure your approval of the following matters: 1. All forest charges paid by Interwood to the District Forester of Laguna from June, 1964 up to the present should be remitted in favor of the University of the Philippines pines; 2. All forest charges presently due from Interwood shall hereafter be paid to the University of the Philippines and lastly 3. Hereafter the University of the Philippines shall receive all forest charges and royalties due from any logging concession at the land grant. May we request that proper instructions be issued by the district Forester of Laguna about this matter. Thank you. Very truly yours, Sgd.) JOSE C. CAMPOS JR. Business Executive 12. That in reply to the above letter of defendant Business Executive dated February 8, 1966, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the following letter-ruling dated March 11, 1966: xxx xxx xxx March 11, 1966 U.P. Paete Land Grant University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City Attn: Jose C. Campos, Jr. Business Executive Gentlemen: This has reference to your letter dated February 8, 1966 stating as follows:

xxx xxx xxx In reply thereto, I have the honor to inform you as follows: In accordance with Section 266 of the Tax Code as amplified by Section 15(a) of Revenue Regulations No. 85, the Forest Products Regulations, forest products, cut, gathered and removed from registered private woodlands are not subject to forest charges, but they must be invoiced when removed to another municipality or for commercial purposes in the manner prescribed by the regulations. As the Paete Land Grant was ceded by law to the U.P. in full private ownership and as the grant is manifestly to be considered registered, no forest charges are actually due and payable on the timber cut and removed therefrom. The forest charges purportedly to be paid by any concessionaire under any licensing agreement entered or to be entered into by the U.P. are, therefore, to be considered not as the charges contemplated by the National Internal Revenue Code but as part of the royalties payable by the concessionaires for the exploitation of the timber resources of the land grant. Accordingly, you queries are answered viz: 1. The University may directly collect the supposed forest charges payable by concessionaires of the land grant. 2. The forest charges paid by International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines may be refunded provided that a formal claim for the refund thereof is made within two years from the date of payment. The proper claimant shall be International Hardwood and not the University. Very truly yours, (Sgd.) MISAEL P. VERA Commissioner of Internal Revenue 13. That subsequently, defendant Business Executive sent the letter quoted below to the District Forester of the province of Laguna una dated April 18, 1 966: April 18, 1966 The District Forester Bureau of Forestry Sta. Cruz, Laguna Dear Sir: Enclosed is a copy of a letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue concerning the right of the University of the Philippines to collect forest charges from the existing logging concessionaire at the Laguna Land Grant (formerly Paete Land Grant). This tract of forest land containing some 3,500 hectares was ceded to the University of the Philippines in full ownership

by Republic Act No. 3990, approved in June, 1964. In view thereof, the University of the Philippines requested that its authority over said land be recognized and that the existing concessionaire, International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines, in turn pay its forest charges directly to the University instead of to the national government. Please take note of page "2" of the enclosed letter of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the official ruling of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to the following points raised by the University: 1. That the University of the Philippines may now directly collect forest charges from INTERWOOD, the existing logging concessionaire. 2. That forest charges paid by INTERWOOD to the Bureau of Forestry from June, 1964 up to April, 1966 shall be refunded to the University of the Philippines. In this manner, INTERWOOD is requested to file a claim for the refund in the amount heretofore paid by it to be remitted to the University of the Philippines. On the basis of this letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it is understood that forest charges on timber cut from the Laguna Land Grant as scaled by scalers of the University of the Philippines shall now be paid directly to the University of the Philippines. In another ruling by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the University, particularly the Laguna Land Grant, is exempted from all kinds of Internal Revenue taxes. Very truly yours, (Sgd.) Jose C. Campos, Jr. Business Executive 14. That the above quoted letter of defendant Business Executive dated April 18, 1966 was duly endorsed by the District Forester of the province of Laguna to the Director of Forestry. 15. That on or about June 7, 19667 the Assistant Director of Forestry addressed to plaintiff the letter dated June 7, 1966, which states as follows: Sirs: This is in connection with your request for this Office to comment on your reply to the letter of Mr. Jose C. Campos, Jr. of the University of the Philippines. In your reply to the letter of Mr. Campos, it is stated that the University of the Philippines is claiming the right: (a) To scale, measure and seal the timber cut inside the area covered by the U.P. Land Grant at Paete, Laguna; (b) To collect the corresponding forest charges; (c) To collect royalties aside from the forest charges; and

(d) To exercise in effect all the authority vested by law upon the Bureau of Forestry in the cutting, removal and disposition of the timber from said area, and the authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue respecting the measurement and scaling of the logs and the collection of the corresponding forest charges and other fees in connection therewith. This office is in full accord with your arguments against the claim of the University of the Philippines to have acquired the above rights. We believe that the right vested the INTERWOOD by virtue of number License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) to utilize the timber inside subject area is still binding and should therefore, be respected. It is on the basis of this acknowledgment that we sent your client our letter of November 4,1965 requesting him to comment on the application of the State University for a Special Timber License over the said area. 16. That acting on the endorsement referred to in paragraph l4, the Director of Bureau of Forestry issued the letter ruling quoted below, dated June 30,1966: xxx xxx xxx June 30, 1966 District Forester Sta. Cruz, Laguna (Thru the Regional Director of Forestry, Manila) Sir: This concerns your inquiry contained in the 3rd paragraph of your letter dated April 26, 1966, designated as above, as to whether or not you shall turn over the scaling work for logs cut from the area of the International Hardwood & Veneer Company of the Philippines in the Pacto Land Grant to Scalers of the University of the Philippines. In view of the ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the Paete Land Grant, which embraces the area of the International Hardwood & Veneer Company of the Philippines, is considered a registered private woodland of the University of the Philippines and therefore no forest charges are actually due and payable on the timber cut and removed therefrom, and in view further of the ruling of said Commissioner that the forest charges purportedly to be paid by any concessionaire under any licensing agreement entered or to be entered into by the U.P. are to be considered not as the charged contemplated by the National Internal Revenue Code but as part of the royalties payable by the concessionaires for the exploitation of the timber resources of the land grant, you may turn over the scaling work therein to the scalers of the U.P. However, you should guard against the use of such licensing agreements entered or to be entered into by the U.P. as a means of smuggling forest products from the neighboring public forests. Very truly yours,

(SGD.) ANTONIO A. QUEJADA xxx xxx xxx On the basis of the above JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS, the pleadings filed in the case, and whatever additional evidence may be presented by the parties, the parties hereto, through counsel, jointly move and pray of this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered granting full and appropriate relief, on the following issues: 1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should pay forest charges due and payable under its timber License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2 hereof', to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, or to the University of the Philippines; and 2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said forest charges are to be paid to the University of the Philippines, whether or not the University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, telling and removal of timber within the Central Experiment Station area as described in Republic Act No. 3990, and to scale the timber thus felled and cut. Manila for Laguna, September 29,1967. Upon the foregoing Stipulation of Facts, the trial court rendered its judgment on 3 June 1968 in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which is quoted at the beginning of this decision. In deciding the case against UP, it held: ... the court finds that the respondents' demand on the petitioner has no legal basis. In the first place, the cession in full ownership of the tract of land referred to in the Act was expressly made 'subject to any existing concessions.' Inasmuch as at the time of the enactment of the Act, the petitioner's timber concession over the tract of land was existing and would continue to exist until February 1, 1985, the University of the Philippines will acquire full ownership' and exclusive jurisdiction to control and administer the property only after February 1, 1985. The cession of the property to the University of the Philippines is akin to the donation of a parcel of land, subject to usufruct. The donee acquires full ownership thereof only upon the termination of the usufruct. At the time of the donation, all what the donee acquires is the 'naked' ownership of the property donated. In the second place, the respondents' demand cannot be valid unless the provisions of Sees. 262 to 276 of the National Internal Revenue Code regarding the measuring of timber cut from the forest and the collection of the prescribed forest charges by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry are first amended. In their arguments, the respondents tried to stretch the scope of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990 in order to include therein such amendment of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code and Revised Administrative Code, but they failed to convince the Court, not only because of the first reason above stated, but also because it clearly appears that such amendment is not intended in Republic Act No. 3990, which does not contain even a remote allusion thereto in its title or a general amendatory provision at the end. In the third place, under Republic Act No. 3990, the University of the Philippines cannot legally use the tract of land ceded to it for purposes other than those therein expressly provided, namely, 'for the use of the University of the Philippines in

connection with its research and extension functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences.' Hence, upon the expiration of the petitioner's timber concession, the University of the Philippines cannot even legally renew it or grant timber concession over the whole tract of land or over portions thereof to other private individuals and exercise the functions of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry by scaling and measuring the timber cut within the area and collecting from them the forest charges prescribed by the National Internal Revenue Code. Respondents claim in their Brief that the trial court erred: I ... WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF WITH INJUNCTION INSPITE OF ITS INHERENT JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS THAT SHOULD WARRANT A DISMISSAL. II ... WHEN IT DECLARED THAT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3990 DOES NOT EMPOWER THE RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, IN LIEU OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF FORESTRY, TO SCALE, MEASURE AND SEAL THE TIMBER CUT BY THE PETITIONER WITHIN THE TRACT OF LAND REFERRED TO IN SAID ACT, AND COLLECT THE CORRESPONDING FOREST CHARGES PRESCRIBED BY THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE. 1. The first assigned error is without merit. In the Joint Stipulation of Facts, the parties jointly move and pray that the trial court render judgment granting full and appropriate remedy on the following issues: l. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should pay forest charges due and payable under its Timber License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2 hereof, to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, or to the University of the Philippines; and 2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said forest charges are to be paid to the University of the Philippines, whether or not the University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within the Central Experiment Station area as described in Republic Act No. 3990, and to scale the timber thus felled These issues bring the matter within the scope of an action for declaratory relief under Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and render meaningless the appeal to the rule laid down in Sarmiento, et al. vs. Caparas, et al. 6 that declaratory relief cannot be joined by injunction, because herein petitioner, for all legal intents and purposes, abandoned it by its failure to raise it in the Stipulation of Facts. Thus, what attains is an amendment to both pleadings (the complaint and the answer), which is authorized by Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Said section pertinently provides:

SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respect, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect the result of the trial by these issues. ... The stipulation of facts and the agreement as to the issues unquestionably satisfy the requisites for declaratory relief. (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ape for judicial determination. 7 There is a justiciable controversy where there is an actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of one exists between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and that the declaration sought will help in ending the controversy. A doubt becomes a justiciable controversy when it is translated into a claim of right which is actually contested. 8 2. On the second assigned error, respondents assert that: (a) Under R.A. No. 3990, the Republic of the Philippines may effect collection of forest charges through the University of the Philippines because the License Agreement does not expressly provide that the forest charges shall be paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue; in the absence of a specific contractual provision limiting it to a particular agency in collecting forest charges owing to it, the Republic may effect such collection through another agency. (b) Having been vested with administrative jurisdiction over and being the owner of the tract of land in question, the UP acquired full control and benefit of the timber and other resources within the area. Timber areas within the ceded property but outside the concession of petitioner can be fully exploited by UP. However, in respect to timber areas within the ceded property but covered by the concession of petitioner, only forest charges (or more appropriately, royalties) may be enjoyed by UP until the expiration of petitioner's license. To deny it such charges would render its "full ownership" empty and futile. (c) The UP is clearly entitled to the income derived from the tract of land ceded to it, for Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 expressly provides: All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment station shall be exempt from taxation, local or general, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines. (emphasis supplied for emphasis). (d) As provided by R.A. No. 3990, the UP is duty bound to operate and maintain a central experiment station; since this law does not provide for appropriations for such purpose, it is clearly the legislative intention that the establishment and maintenance thereof must be financed by the earnings or income from the area, which can only come from the timber and the royalties or charges payable therefrom. This is in accordance with the general principle that a grant of authority or jurisdiction extends to all incidents that may arise in connection with the matter over which jurisdiction is exercised. (e) Supervision of the License Agreement in favor of petitioner by UP was intended by R.A. No. 3990. (f) Finally, the two government agencies

affected by R.A. No. 3990 have issued specific rulings recognizing the authority of UP to collect royalties or charges and to supervise petitioner's logging operations. Petitioner refutes the foregoing arguments of respondents by asserting that: (a) The UP has not been granted by R.A. No. 3990 the authority to collect forest charges or the authority to supervise the operation by the petitioner of the timber concession affected by said Act. The rule is well-settled that legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of the public and most strongly against the grantee, and nothing will be included in the grant except that which is granted expressly or by clear implication. Under Section 262 of the Tax Code, as amended, the duties incident to the measuring of forest products and the collection of the charges thereon shall be discharged by the Bureau of Internal Revenue under the regulations of the Department of Finance. The reforestation fee shall be collected by the Bureau of Forestry. 9 The supervision and regulation of the use of forest products and of the cutting and removal of forest products are vested upon the Bureau of Forestry. 10 R.A. No. 3990 does not expressly, or even impliedly, grant the UP any authority to collect from the holders of timber concessions on the area ceded to it forest charges due and payable to the Government under the Tax Code, or to enforce its provisions relating to charges on forest products or to supervise the operations of the concessions by the holders thereof; (b) The cession in full ownership of the land in question was expressly made "subject to any concession, if any", and that petitioner's concession would continue until 1 February 1985; the UP then would acquire full ownership and exclusive jurisdiction to control and administer the property only after 1 February 1985. The position of UP is akin to that of a donee of a parcel of land subject to usufruct. (c) The rulings of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Acting Director of the Bureau of Forestry are patently incorrect; moreover, said agencies do not have the power to interpret the law, which is primarily a function of the judiciary. (d) Finally, it has acquired a vested right to operate the timber concession under the supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry. There is merit in the second assigned error. Under Proclamation No. 791, dated 25 September 1961, a parcel of land of the public domain described therein, with an area of 3,500 hectares, which is the very parcel of land subject of R.A. No. 3990, was withdrawn from sale or settlement and was reserved for the College of Agriculture of the UP as experiment station for the proposed Dairy Research and Training Institute and for research and production studies of said college, subject however to private rights, if any, and to the condition that the disposition of timber and other forest products found thereon shall be subject to forestry laws and regulations. The above reservation is within the area covered by petitioner's timber license. Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central experiment station for the use of the UP in connection with its research and extension functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences, the above "reserved" area was "ceded and transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines subject to any existing concessions, if any."

When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the Philippines completely removed it from the public domain and, more specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the timber license of petitioner, removed and segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto and relinquished and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the latter the absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing concession. That the law intended a transfer of the absolute ownership is unequivocally evidenced by its use of the word "full" to describe it. Full means entire, complete, or possessing all particulars, or not wanting in any essential quality. 11 The proviso regarding existing concessions refers to the timber license of petitioner. All that it means, however, is that the right of petitioner as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired or diminished; it must be respected. But, insofar as the Republic of the Philippines is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP as a consequence of the above transfer of full ownership. This is further home out by Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 which provides, inter alia, that "any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines. Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a registered private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it were likewise terminated. This is obvious from the fact that the condition in Proclamation No. 971 to the effect that the disposition of timber shall be subject to forestry laws and regulations is not reproduced iii R.A. No. 3990. The latter does not likewise provide that it is subject to the conditions set forth in the proclamation. An owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law. 12 The right to enjoy includes the jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing what it produces, and the jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by its use. 13 As provided for in Article 441 of the Civil Code, to the owner belongs the natural fruits, the industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There are, however, exceptions to this rules, as where the property is subject to a usufruct, in which case the usufructuary gets the fruits. 14 In the instant case, that exception is made for the petitioner as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to UP until I February 1985. However, it has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges, or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the same rate as provided for in the Agreement. The charges should not be paid anymore to the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Internal Revenue because of the very nature of the transfer as aforestated. Consequently, even the Bureau of Internal Revenue automatically lost its authority and jurisdiction to measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges and other fees due thereon. The foregoing disposes of the contention of petitioner that R.A. No. 3990 does not grant the UP the authority to collect forest charges and to supervise the operations of its concession insofar as the property of the UP within it is concerned. Its argument that it has acquired vested rights to operate its concession under the supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry is preposterous. The grantor, Republic of the Philippines, was by no means bound under the License to perpetuate the Bureau as its agent. Neither is there force to its contention that legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of the public and most strongly against the grantee. The grant under R.A. No. 3990 is transfer of absolute, full and entire ownership which leaves no room for a strict interpretation against the grantee, the UP. The reservation therein

made is in favor of the private party pursuant to the license, which is nevertheless protected. It is the concession in favor of the petitioner which should, on the contrary, be bound by the rule. It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within the area covered by R.A. No. 3990. IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. C-650, rendered on 3 June 1968; DECLARING that forest charges due from and payable by petitioner for timber cut pursuant to its License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) within the area ceded and transferred to the University of the Philippine pursuant to R.A. No. 3990 shall be paid to the University of the Philippines; DECLARING that the University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within the aforesaid area covered by R.A. No. 3990. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170308

March 7, 2008

GALO MONGE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. RESOLUTION TINGA, J.: This is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court whereby petitioner Galo Monge (petitioner) assails the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 28 June 2005 which affirmed his conviction as well as the discharge of accused Edgar Potencio (Potencio) as a state witness. The factual antecedents follow. On 20 July 1994, petitioner and Potencio were found by barangay tanods Serdan and Molina in possession of and transporting three (3) pieces of mahogany lumber in Barangay Santo Domingo, Iriga City. Right there and then, the tanods demanded that they be shown the requisite permit and/or authority from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) but neither petitioner nor Potencio was able to produce any.3 Petitioner fled the scene in that instant whereas Potencio was brought to the police station for interrogation, and thereafter, to the DENR-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO).4 The DENR-CENRO issued a seizure receipt for the

three pieces of lumber indicating that the items, totaling 77 board feet of mahogany valued at P1,925.00, had been seized from Potencio.5 Later on, petitioner was arrested, but Potencios whereabouts had been unknown since the time of the seizure6 until he surfaced on 3 January 1998.7 An information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 35 charging petitioner and Potencio with violation of Section 688 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705,9 as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, series of 1997. The inculpatory portion of the information reads: That on or about the 20th day of [July 1994], at about 9:30 oclock in the morning, in Barangay Sto. Domingo, Iriga City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating with each other, without any authority of law, nor armed with necessary permit/license or other documents, with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, transport and have in their possession three (3) pieces of Mahogany of assorted [dimension] with a[n] appropriate volume of seventy-seven (77) board feet or point eighteen (0.18) cubic meter with a total market value of P1,925.00, Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of the DENR in the aforesaid amount. CONTRARY TO LAW.10 At the 26 November 1996 arraignment, petitioner entered a negative plea.11 Trial ensued. On 17 June 1997, Serdan testified on the circumstances of the apprehension but for failing to appear in court for cross examination, his testimony was stricken out.12 On 16 January 1998, Potencio was discharged to be used as a state witness on motion of the prosecutor.13 Accordingly, he testified on the circumstances of the arrest but claimed that for a promised fee he was merely requested by petitioner, the owner of the log, to assist him in hauling the same down from the mountain. Potencios testimony was materially corroborated by Molina.14 Petitioner did not contest the allegations, except that it was not he but Potencio who owned the lumber. He lamented that contrary to what Potencio had stated in court, it was the latter who hired him to bring the log from the site to the sawmill where the same was to be sawn into pieces.15 The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner was imposed nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods and ordered to pay the costs.16 Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where he challenged the discharge of Potencio as a state witness on the ground that the latter was not the least guilty of the offense and that there was no absolute necessity for his testimony.17 The appellate court dismissed this challenge and affirmed the findings of the trial court. However, it modified the penalty to an indeterminate prison sentence of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor as maximum.18 His motion for reconsideration was denied, hence the present appeal whereby petitioner reiterates his challenge against the discharge of Potencio.

The petition is utterly unmeritorious. Petitioner and Potencio were caught in flagrante delicto transporting, and thus in possession of, processed mahogany lumber without proper authority from the DENR. Petitioner has never denied this fact. But in his attempt to exonerate himself from liability, he claims that it was Potencio, the owner of the lumber, who requested his assistance in hauling the log down from the mountain and in transporting the same to the sawmill for processing. The contention is unavailing. Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, criminalizes two distinct and separate offenses, namely: (a) the cutting, gathering, collecting and removing of timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and (b) the possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing laws and regulations.19 DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3 thereof materially requires that the transport of lumber be accompanied by a certificate of lumber origin duly issued by the DENR-CENRO. In the first offense, the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products may be proven by the authorization duly issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether or not the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of forest products are legal precisely because mere possession of forest products without the requisite documents consummates the crime.20 It is thus clear that the fact of possession by petitioner and Potencio of the subject mahogany lumber and their subsequent failure to produce the requisite legal documents, taken together, has already given rise to criminal liability under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, particularly the second act punished thereunder. The direct and affirmative testimony of Molina and Potencio as a state witness on the circumstances surrounding the apprehension well establishes petitioners liability. Petitioner cannot take refuge in his denial of ownership over the pieces of lumber found in his possession nor in his claim that his help was merely solicited by Potencio to provide the latter assistance in transporting the said lumber. P.D. No. 705 is a special penal statute that punishes acts essentially malum prohibitum. As such, in prosecutions under its provisions, claims of good faith are by no means reliable as defenses because the offense is complete and criminal liability attaches once the prohibited acts are committed.21 In other words, mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents, even absent malice or criminal intent, is illegal.22 It would therefore make no difference at all whether it was petitioner himself or Potencio who owned the subject pieces of lumber. Considering the overwhelming body of evidence pointing to nothing less than petitioners guilt of the offense charged, there is no cogent reason to reverse his conviction. Petitioners challenge against Potencios discharge as a state witness must also fail. Not a few cases established the doctrine that the discharge of an accused so he may turn state witness is left to the exercise of the trial courts sound discretion23 limited only by the requirements set forth in Section 17,24 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Thus, whether the accused offered to be discharged appears to be the least guilty and whether there is objectively an absolute necessity

for his testimony are questions that lie within the domain of the trial court, it being competent to resolve issues of fact. The discretionary judgment of the trial court with respect this highly factual issue is not to be interfered with by the appellate courts except in case of grave abuse of discretion.25 No such grave abuse is present in this case. Suffice it to say that issues relative to the discharge of an accused must be raised in the trial court as they cannot be addressed for the first time on appeal.26 Moreover and more importantly, an order discharging an accused from the information in order that he may testify for the prosecution has the effect of an acquittal.27 Once the discharge is ordered by the trial court, any future development showing that any or all of the conditions provided in Section 17, Rule 119 have not actually been fulfilled will not affect the legal consequence of an acquittal.28 Any witting or unwitting error of the prosecution, therefore, in moving for the discharge and of the court in granting the motionno question of jurisdiction being involvedwill not deprive the discharged accused of the benefit of acquittal and of his right against double jeopardy. A contrary rule would certainly be unfair to the discharged accused because he would then be faulted for a failure attributable to the prosecutor. It is inconceivable that the rule has adopted the abhorrent legal policy of placing the fate of the discharged accused at the mercy of anyone who may handle the prosecution.29 Indeed, the only instance where the testimony of a discharged accused may be disregarded is when he deliberately fails to testify truthfully in court in accordance with his commitment,30 as provided for in Section 18, Rule 119. Potencio lived up to his commitment and for that reason, petitioners challenge against his discharge must be dismissed. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184098

November 25, 2008

AMADO TAOPA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. RESOLUTION CORONA, J.: On April 2, 1996, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac, Catanduanes seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber and arrested its driver, Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection. On

investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the owners of the seized lumber. Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were thereafter charged with violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705,1 as amended, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes. The information against them read: That on or about the 2nd day of April 1996 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning at Barangay Capilihan, Municipality of Virac, Province of Catanduanes, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to possess, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally possess, transport in a truck bearing Plate No. EAS 839 and have in their control forest products, particularly one hundred thirteen (113) pieces of lumber of Philippine Mahogany Group and Apitong species with an aggregate net volume of One Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Four (1,684) board feet with an approximate value of Ninety-Nine Thousand One Hundred Twenty (Php99,120.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, without any authority and/or legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, prejudicial to the public interest. ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.2 Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on arraignment. After trial on the merits, the RTC found them guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt.3 Only Taopa and Cuison appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Cuison was acquitted but Taopa's conviction was affirmed.4 The dispositive portion of the CA decision read: WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED with respect to accused-appellant Placido Cuison, who is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on reasonable doubt, andMODIFIED with respect to accused-appellants Amado Taopa and Rufino Ogalesco by reducing the penalty imposed on them to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum. SO ORDERED.5 In this petition,6 Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges against him. He alleges that the prosecution failed to prove that he was one of the owners of the seized lumber as he was not in the truck when the lumber was seized. We deny the petition. Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopa's alibi because Cuison's testimony proved Taopa's active participation in the transport of the seized lumber. In particular, the RTC and the CA found that the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of Taopa's house and that Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanying the truck driven by Cuison up to where the truck and lumber were seized. These facts proved Taopa's (and Ogalesco's) exercise of dominion and control over the lumber loaded in the truck. The acts of Taopa (and of his co-accused Ogalesco)

constituted possession of timber or other forest products without the required legal documents. Moreover, the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at the mere sight of the police was likewise largely indicative of guilt. We are thus convinced that Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the seized lumber. However, we disagree with both the RTC and CA as to the penalty imposed on Taopa. Section 68 of PD 705, as amended,7 refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for the penalties to be imposed on violators. Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft.8 The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft. Articles 309 and 310 read: Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by: 1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. (emphasis supplied) 2. xxx Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher bytwo degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles xxx (emphasis supplied). The actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber was P67,630.9 Following Article 310 in relation to Article 309, the imposable penalty should be reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or a period ranging from 14 years, eight months and one day to 20 years plus an additional period of four years for the excess of P47,630. The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence10 imposable on Taopa shall be the penalty next lower to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case, the minimum term shall be anywhere between 10 years and one day to 14 years and eight months or prision mayor in its maximum period toreclusion temporal in its minimum period. The maximum term shall be the sum of the additional four years and the medium period11 ofreclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or 16 years, five months and 11 days to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion temporal. The maximum term therefore may be anywhere between 16 years, five months and 11 days of reclusion temporal to 22 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 31, 2008 decision and July 28, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30380 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.Petitioner Amado Taopa is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided for by law. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 111107. January 10, 1997] LEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, respondents. DECISION TORRES, JR., J.: Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines? Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government? These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our resolution. The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15)

days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation. On June 22, 1989,[1] Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugans action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989.[2] Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would be denied then this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary.[3] Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan[4] with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan,[5] which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondents.[6] Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated December 28, 1989.[7] Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial courts order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal question.[8] Hence, this present petition,[9] with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the petitioners on September 9, 1993. By virtue of the Resolution dated September 27, 1993,[10] the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order of petitioners was granted by this Court. Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this principle asserting that the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was violated because they were not given the chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime. Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence on the matter, we are of the opinion that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order. This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to

ones cause of action.[11] Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.[12] This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process,[13] (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,[14] (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,[15] (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,[16] (5) when there is irreparable injury,[17] (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter,[18] (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,[19] (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,[20] (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,[21] (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.[22] In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989,[23] private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case. The letter, reads, thus: xxx If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, then this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary.[24] It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek courts intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings. Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court,

therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agencys prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.[25] In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary,[26] which was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez,[27] this Court held: Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbriddled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant controversy beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated. However, considering the circumstances prevailing in this case, we can not but rule out these assertions of private respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that there was violation of due process because they did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of petitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard.[28] One may be heard , not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings.[29] In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.[30] Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration,[31] as in the instant case, when private respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan. In Navarro III vs. Damasco,[32] we ruled that : The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing. Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the truck because the administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to perform these acts under the law. They insisted that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as follows: SECTION 68. xxx

xxx The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipments, implements and toolsillegaly [sic] used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Underline ours) A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents thinking not only because the aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor include conveyances that can be the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that private respondents interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A , which is quoted herein below: SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, theDepartment Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter. (Underline ours) It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase to dispose of the same is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made in accordance with pertinent laws, reg ulations or policies on the matter. In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute.[33] Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.[34] In this wise, the observation of the Solicitor General is significant, thus: But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws more responsive to present situations and realities and in view of the urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the country, that the government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and distinct from criminal proceedings. More than anything else, it is intended to supplant the inadequacies that characterize enforcement of forestry laws through criminal actions. The preamble of EO 277-the law that added Section 68-A to PD 705-is most revealing: WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos; WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;

WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts more responsive to present situations and realities; It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only conveyances, but forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest products by the court in a criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power on confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not have provided any solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, supra.[35] Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal because the petitioners themselves admitted in the Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan that the truck of private respondents was not used in the commission of the crime. This order, a copy of which was given to and received by the counsel of private respondents, reads in part , viz. : xxx while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in the commission of the crime, we uphold your claim that the truck owner is not liable for the crime and in no case could a criminal case be filed against her as provided under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. xxx[36] We observed that private respondents misread the content of the aforestated order and obviously misinterpreted the intention of petitioners. What is contemplated by the petitioners when they stated that the truck "was not used in the commission of the crime" is that it was not used in the commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a criminal action be filed against the owner thereof for violation of Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the truck was being used in the commission of another crime, that is, the breach of Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July 12, 1989, petitioners pointed out: xxx However, under Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended and further amended by Executive Order No.277 specifically provides for the confiscation of the conveyance used in the transport of forest products not covered by the required legal documents. She may not have been involved in the cutting and gathering of the product in question but the fact that she accepted the goods for a fee or fare the same is therefor liable. xxx[37] Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and punishable under Section 68 other than qualified theft, so that, when petitioners admitted in the July 12, 1989 order that private respondents could not be charged for theft as provided for under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, then necessarily private respondents could not have committed an act constituting a crime under Section 68. We disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No.277 amending the aforementioned Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:

SECTION 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. Any person who shall cut , gather , collect , or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx. (Underscoring ours; Section 68, P.D.705 before its amendment by E.O.277 ) SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.705, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows: Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without license. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx." (Underscoring ours; Section 1, E.O No. 277 amending Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended) With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and inserted the words shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.[38] From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to ones recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court. It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully detained.[39] To detain is defined as to mean to hold or keep in custody,[40] and it has been held that there is tortuous taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or right; this, without manual seizing of the property is sufficient.[41] Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceedings, that the

plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the property.[42] Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products with out the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence , no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar. Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D.705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. It reads : SECTION 8 . REVIEW - All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated October 16, 1991 and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on September 27, 1993 is hereby made permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is directed to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104988 June 18, 1996 MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary,

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and Investigations Division, DENR, respondents. G.R. No. 106424 June 18, 1996 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and RI CHUY PO, respondents. G.R. No. 123784 June 18, 1996 MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and Investigation Division, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), ATTY. NESTOR V. GAPUSAN, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H. CALLORINA, JR., respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p The first and third case, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784, were originally assigned to the Second and Third Divisions of the Court, respectively. They were subsequently consolidated with the second, a case of the Court en banc. Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a Lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit as such was to expire on 25 September 1990. Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty. Vincent A. Robles were, during all the time material to these cases, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Chief of the Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR, respectively. The material operative facts are as follows: On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR

compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. 1 The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner. 2 On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa. 3 On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin. 4 Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the owner retains the physical possession of the seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed by the owner or his representative. The owner is prohibited from disposing them until further orders. 5 On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles requesting an extension of fifteen days from 14 April 1990 to produce the required documents covering the seized articles because some of them, particularly the certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province of Quirino Robles denied the motion on the ground that the documents being required from the petitioner must accompany the lumber or forest products placed under seizure. 6 On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report recommending to Secretary Factoran the following: 1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber Dealer's Permit of Mustang Lumber, Inc. for operating an unregistered lumberyard and resaw mill and possession of Almaciga Lumber (a banned specie) without the required documents; 2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard including the truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and the lumber loaded herein [sic] now at the DENR compound in the event its owner fails to submit documents showing legitimacy of the source of said lumber within ten days from date of seizure; 3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber Inc. and Mr. Ruiz, or if the circumstances warrant for illegal possession of narra and almaciga lumber and shorts if and when recommendation no. 2 pushes through; 4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV. 458 as well as the lumber loaded therein for transport lumber using "recycled" documents. 7

On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit should not be cancelled. On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles informing the latter that the petitioner had already secured the required documents and was ready to submit them. None, however, was submitted. 8 On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein, after reciting the events which took place on 1 April and 3 April 1990, he ordered "CONFISCATED in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law" the approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside the petitioner's lumberyard. 9 On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a restraining order or preliminary injunction against Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A. Robles. The case (hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53648 and assigned to Branch 35 of the said court. The petitioner questioned therein (a) the seizure on 1 April 1990, without any search and seizure order issued by a judge, of its truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and its cargo of assorted lumber consisting of apitong, tanguile, and lauan of different sizes and dimensions with a total value of P38,000.00; and (b) the orders of Secretary Factoran of 23 April 1990 for lack of prior notice and hearing and of 3 May 1990 for violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations of P.D. No. 705 (The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines), as amended, were committed and acting upon instruction of Robles and under Special Order No. 897, series of 1990, a team of DENR agents went to the business premises of the petitioner located at No. 1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila. The team caught the petitioner operating as a lumber dealer although its lumber-dealer's permit had already been suspended or 23 April 1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's lumberyard was open, the team went inside and saw an owner-type jeep with a trailer loaded with lumber. Upon investigation, the team was informed that the lumber loaded on the trailer was to be delivered to the petitioner's customer. It also came upon the sales invoice covering the transaction. The members of the team then introduced themselves to the caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who turned out to be the wife of the petitioner's president and general manager, Mr. Ri Chuy Po, who was then out of town. The team's photographer was able to take photographs of the stockpiles of lumber including newly cut ones, fresh dust around sawing or cutting machineries and equipment, and the transport vehicles loaded with lumber. The team thereupon effected a constructive seizure of approximately 20,000 board feet of lauan lumber in assorted sizes stockpiled in the premises by issuing a receipt therefor. 10 As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorariand prohibition. The case (hereinafter, the SECOND CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54610 and assigned to Branch 24 of the said court.

In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint against the petitioner's president and general manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. After appropriate preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor, Claro Arellano, handed down a resolution 11 whose dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987. It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs covered by legal documents be released to the rightful owner, Malupa. 12 This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, who served as Chairman of the Task Force on Illegal Logging." 13 On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5 June 1991 by the DOJ with Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po with the violation of Section 58 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL CASE). The accusatory portion of the information reads as follows: That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within the premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully have in his possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa, without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations. 14 On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its decision 15 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows: 1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation in favor of the Government the approximately 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa, end almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, found inside and seized from the Lumberyard of the petitioner at Fortune Drive, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 4, 1990 (Exhibit 10), is hereby set aside and vacated, and instead the respondents are required to report and bring to the Hon. Adriano Osorio, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, NCR, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the said 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa and almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, to be dealt with as directed by Law; 2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute the appropriate action before the proper court regarding the Lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions Loaded in petitioner's truck bearing Plate No. CCK-322 which were seized on April 1, 1990;

3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on August 2, 1990 shall be rendered functus oficioupon compliance by the respondents with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment;. 4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the Lauan, supa and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks mentioned above in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment be returned to said petitioner is withheld in this case until after the proper court has taken cognizance and determined how those Lumber, shorts and sticks should be disposed of; and 5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs. SO ORDERED. In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's truck, which was moving out from the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes of lumber without covering document showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend the constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled and accepted exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving vehicle. 16 As to the seizure of a large volume of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts effected on 4 April 1990, the trial court ruled that the said seizure was a continuation of that made the previous day and was still pursuant to or by virtue of the search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not even question. 17 And, although the search warrant did not specifically mention almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts, their seizure was valid because it is settled that the executing officer is not required to ignore contrabands observed during the conduct of the search. 18 The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the Government for the reason that since the articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio they should have been returned to him in compliance with the directive in the warrant. As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary Factoran, the trial court ruled that the same had been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of the petitioner's lumber dealer's permit on 25 September 1990, a fact the petitioner admitted in its memorandum. The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 25510. On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings based on the following grounds: (a) the information does not charge an offense, for possession of lumber, as opposed totimber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila, the

FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals, which involves the legality of the seizure, raises a prejudicial question. 19 The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is included in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and possession thereof without the required legal documents is penalized therein. It referred to Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, series of 1989, for the definitions of timber and lumber, and then argued that exclusion of lumber from Section 68 would defeat the very purpose of the law, i.e., to minimize, if not halt, illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation of our forest resources. 20 In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE, 21 respondent Judge Teresita DizonCapulong granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case on the ground that "possession of lumber without the legal documents required by forest laws and regulations is not a crime. 22 Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order of 18 October 1991, 23 the People filed a petition for certiorariwith this Court in G.R. No. 106424, wherein it contends that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash and in dismissing the case. On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 24 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 dismissing for lack of merit the petitioner's appeal from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and affirming the trial court's rulings on the issues raised. As to the claim that the truck was not carrying contraband articles since there is no law punishing the possession of lumber, and that lumber is not timber whose possession without the required legal documents is unlawful under P.D. No. 705, as amended, the Court of Appeals held: This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature of the forest product involved has always been foisted by those who claim to be engaged in the legitimate business of lumber dealership. But what is important to consider is that when appellant was required to present the valid documents showing its acquisition and lawful possession of the lumber in question, it failed to present any despite the period of extension granted to it.25 The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 3 March 1992. 26 Hence, the petitioner came to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988, which was filed on 2 May 1992. 27 On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila handed down a decision in the SECOND CIVIL CASE dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition because (a) the petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies; (b) when the seizure was made on 17 September 1990 the petitioner could not lawfully sell lumber, as its license was still under suspension; (c) the seizure was valid under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended; and (d) the seizure was justified as a warrantless search and seizure under Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended. The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 33778.

In its decision 28 of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner's appeal in CAG.R. SP No. 33778 for lack of merit and sustained the grounds relied upon by the trial court in dismissing the SECOND CIVIL CASE. Relying on the definition of "lumber" by Webster, viz., "timber or logs, especially after being prepared for the market," and by the Random House Dictionary of the English Language, viz., "wood, esp. when suitable or adapted for various building purposes," the respondent Court held that since wood is included in the definition of forest product in Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, lumber is necessarily included in Section 68 under the term forest product. The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer or employee can seize the forest product involved in a violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 pursuant to Section 80 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1775, which provides in part as follows: Sec. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. -- A forest officer or employee of the Bureau or any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police shall arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense, or the forest products cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the process of committing the offense. Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said Section 80 are the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products or possession of timber or other forest products without the required legal documents. Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in the resolution of 6 February 1996, the petitioner filed with this Court on 27 February 1996 a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784. We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R. No. 106424 with which the other two were consolidated. G.R. No. 106424 The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 on the ground that it does not charge an offense. Respondent Judge Dizon-Capulong granted the motion reasoning that the subject matter of the information in the CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor "other forest product" under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and hence, possession thereof without the required legal documents is not prohibited and penalized under the said section. Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an information may be quashed on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense. It has been said that "the test for the correctness of this ground is the sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense, 29 and matters aliunde will not be considered." Anent the sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that the information state the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.

Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, which provides: Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest productsfrom the places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b) possession of timber forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations. Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But conceding ex gratia that this omission amounts to an exclusion of lumber from the section's coverage, do the facts averred in the information in the CRIMINAL CASE validly charge a violation of the said section? A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an infallible conclusion that lumber is not solely its subject matter. It is evident therefrom that what are alleged to be in the possession of the private respondent, without the required legal documents, are truckloads of (1) almaciga and lauan; and (2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa. The "almaciga and lauan" specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not described as "lumber." They cannot refer to the "lumber" in no. (2) because they are separated by the words "approximately 200,000 bd. ft." with the conjunction "and," and not with the preposition "of." They must then be raw forest products or, more specifically, timbers under Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which reads: Sec. 3. Definitions. -xxx xxx xxx

(q) Forest product means timber, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest plant, the associated water, fish game, scenic, historical, recreational and geological resources in forest lands. It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the information. The public and the private respondents obviously miscomprehended the averments in the information. Accordingly, even if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items therein as noted above fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the information validly charges an offense. Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his dissenting opinion that this Court go beyond the four corners of the information for enlightenment as to whether the information exclusively refers to lumber. With the aid of the pleadings and the annexes thereto, he arrives at the conclusion that "only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment." The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his proposition violates the rule that only the facts alleged in the information vis-a-vis the law violated must be considered in determining whether an information charges an offense. Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are insufficient to justify his conclusion. On the contrary, the Joint Affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, which is one of the annexes he referred to, 30 cannot lead one to infer that what the team seized was all lumber. Paragraph 8 thereof expressly states: 8. That when inside the compound, the team found approximately four (4) truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs and a negligible amount of narra lumber, and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa which are classified as prohibited wood species. (emphasis supplied) In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution 31 of the investigating prosecutor, which served as the basis for the filing of the information, does not limit itself to lumber; thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supaand for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 63 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987. (emphasis supplied) The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of the respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession thereof without the required legal documents is not a crime. On the contrary, this Court rules that such possession is penalized in the said section because lumber is included in the term timber. The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest productsas defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallbond, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products. This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market." 32 Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. 33 And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguere debemus. Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash the information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in dismissing the said case. G.R. No. 104988 We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has miserably failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in its assailed decision of 29 November 1991. It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with Plate No. CCK-322 was coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of different sizes and dimensions which were not accompanied with the required invoices and transport documents. The seizure of such truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of the power vested upon a forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully conducted without a search warrant. Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional mandate 34 that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause. The other exceptions are (3) search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches, and (4) consented warrantless search. 35 We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the search on 4 April 1990 was a continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be served at any time within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in one day, the same may be continued the following day or days until completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one day was interrupted, it may be continued under the same warrant the following day, provided it is still within the ten-day period. 36

As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because possession of lumber without the required legal documents is not illegal under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, since lumber is neither specified therein nor included in the term forest product, the same hardly merits further discussion in view of our ruling in G.R. No. 106424. G.R. No. 123784 The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this case palpally fail to shaw prima facie that a reversible error has been committed by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision of 31 July 1995 and resolution of 6 February 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778. We must, forthwith, deny it for utter want of merit. There is no need to require the respondents to comment on the petition. The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's appeal from the judgment of the trial court in the SECOND CIVIL CASE. The petitioner never disputed the fact that its lumberdealer's license or permit had been suspended by Secretary Factoran on 23 April 1990. The suspension was never lifted, and since the license had only a lifetime of up to 25 September 1990, the petitioner has absolutely no right to possess, sell, or otherwise dispose of lumber. Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative had the authority to seize the Lumber pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which provides as follows: Sec. 68-A Administrative Authority of the Department Head or his Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned. . . . The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is not penalized must also fail view of our disquisition and ruling on the same issue in G.R. No. 106424. Besides, the issue is totally irrelevant in the SECOND CIVIL CASE which involves administrative seizure as a consequence of the violation of the suspension of the petitioner's license as lumber dealer. All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are nothing more than rituals to cover up blatant violations of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 705), as amended. They are presumably trifling attempts to block the serious efforts of the DENR to enforce the decree, efforts which deserve the commendation of the public in light of the urgent need to take firm and decisive action against despoilers of our forests whose continuous destruction only ensures to the generations to come, if not the present, an inheritance of parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The Government must not tire in its vigilance to protect the environment by prosecuting without fear or favor any person who dares to violate our laws for the utilization and protection of our forests. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered 1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING ASIDE and ANNULLING, for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the challenged orders of 16 August 1991 and 18 October 1991 of respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172, Regional Trial

Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po"; (c) REINSTATING the information in the said criminal case; and (d) DIRECTING the respondent Judge or her successor to hear and decide the case with purposeful dispatch; and 2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R. No. 123784 for utter failure of the petitioner to show that the respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged decisions of 29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and of 31 July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 on the SECOND CIVIL CASE. Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., dissenting: The prosecution seeks, in its petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 106424, the annulment of the 16th August 1991 Order of respondent Judge granting the motion of private respondent Ri Chuy Po to quash the information that has charged him with the Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree ("PD") No. 705 (otherwise known as the Forestry Reform Code, as amended by Executive Order ["EO"] No. 277 1) and the 18th October 1991 Order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The information of 04 June 1991, containing the alleged inculpatory facts against private respondent, reads: The undersigned State Prosecutor hereby accuses RI CHUY PO of the crime of violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, Series of 1987, committed as follows: "That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within the premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Drive, Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully, have in his possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including

almaciga and supa, without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations. "CONTRARY TO LAW." 2 Private respondent, on 10 July 1991, moved for the quashal of the information on the ground that the facts comprising the charge did not amount to a criminal offense, or in the alternative, to suspend the proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question, private respondent having formally challenged the legality of the seizure of the lumber in question in a civil case before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Manila, Branch 35, and now pending with the Court of Appeals. On 16 August 1991, the trial court promulgated its now questioned order granting the motion of private respondent to quash the information. It ruled that, unlike the possession of "timber or other forest products" (without supporting legal documents), the mere possession of "lumber" had not itself been declared a criminal offense under Section 68 of PD 705. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration insisting that lumber should be held to come within the purview of "timber" defined by Section 2.26 (b) of DENR Administrative Order No. 50, Series of 1986. The motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the petition for review on certiorari filed by the prosecution before this Court. Private respondent maintains (1) that PD 705 distinguishes "timber" and "other forest products," on the one hand, from "lumber" and "other finished wood products," on the other, and that the possession of lumber of any specie, size or dimension, whether it be lauan, tanguile, apitong, almaciga, supa, or narra, is not under that law declared a criminal offense; (2) that DENR Administrative Order No. 74, Series of 1987, totally bans the cutting, handling and disposition ofalmaciga trees but that possession of almaciga lumber is not considered illegal; (3) that while under DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987, the cutting or gathering of narra and other premium hardwood species (supa included) is prohibited, it does not, however, make possession of premium hardwood lumber (narra and supa included) punishable by mere inference; and (4) that Bureau of Forest Development Circular No. 10, Series of 1983, clarified by DENR Memorandum No. 12, Series of 1988, requires a certificate of lumber origin ("CLO") only on lumber shipped outside the province, city or the greater Manila area to another province or city or, in lieu of a CLO, an invoice to accompany a lumber shipment from legitimate sources if the origin and destination points are both within the greater Manila area or within the same province or city, and not, like in the instant case, where the lumber is not removed from the lumber yard. Petitioner counters (1) that the almaciga, supa and lauan lumber products found in the compound of Mustang Lumber, Inc., are included in Section 68, PD 705, as amended by EO No. 277, the possession of which without requisite legal documents is penalized under Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989, dated 17 March 1989, that defines "lumber" to be a -. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing, resawing, kiln-drying and passing lengthwise through a standard planing machine, including boules or unedged lumber;

and "timber," under Section 1.11 of DENR Administrative Order No. 80, Series of 1987, dated 28 December 1987, to be -. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at least 15 centimeters and at 1.5 meters long, except all mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered as timber regardless of size; which may either be -a) Squared timber (or) timber squared with an ax or other similar mechanical hard tools in the forest and which from the size of the piece and the character of the wood is obviously unfit for use in that form (Sec. 1.10 DENR Administrative Order No. 80, Series of 1987, dated December 28, 1987); or b) Manufactured timber (or) timber other than round and squared timber shall include logs longitudinally sawn into pieces, even if only to facilitate transporting or hauling, as well as all sawn products, all timber hewn or otherwise worked to approximate its finished form, such as house posts, ship keels, mine props, ties, trolly poles, bancas, troughs, bowls, cart wheels, table tops and other similar articles (Sec. 2.26, DENR Administrative Order No. 50, Series of 1986, dated November 11, 1986) -(2) that to exclude "lumber" under Section 68 of PD 705 would be to defeat the purpose of the law, i.e., to stop or minimize illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation of forest resources; (3) that the claim of private respondent that a CLO is required only upon the transportation or shipment of lumber, and not when lumber is merely stored in a compound, contravenes the provisions of Section 68 of PD 705; (4) that the failure to show any CLO or other legal document required by administrative issuances raises the presumption that the lumber has been shipped or received from illegal sources; and, (5) that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 90-53648 sustaining the legality of the seizure has rendered moot any possible prejudicial issue to the instant case. The real and kernel issue then brought up by the parties in G.R. No. 106424, as well as in the two consolidated cases (G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784), is whether or not the term "timber or other forest products" the possession of which without the required legal documents would be a criminal offense under Section 68 of PD 705 also covers "lumber". Prefatorily, I might point out that the information, charging private respondent with the possession without required legal documents of ". . . truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa, . . ." has failed to specify whether the "almaciga" and "lauan" there mentioned refer to "timber" or "lumber" or both. A perusal of the pleadings and annexes before the Court, however, would indicate that only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment. For instance -(a) The pertinent portions of the joint affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, 3 subscribed and sworn to before State Prosecutor Claro Arellano, upon which basis the latter recommended the filing of the information, read, as follows:

"That during the weekend, (April 1 and 2, 1990) the security detail from our agency continued to monitor the activities inside the compound and in fact apprehended and later on brought to the DENR compound a six-wheeler truck loaded with almaciga and lauan lumber after the truck driver failed to produce any documents covering the shipment; xxx xxx xxx "That we are executing this affidavit in order to lodge a criminal complaint against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber for violation of Section 68, P.D. 705, as amended by Executive Order 277, having in its possession prohibited wood and wood products without the required documents." 4 (Emphasis supplied) (b) The resolution, dated 14 May 1991, issued by Investigating Prosecutor Arellano, approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III, confirmed that -" . . . On April 1 and 2 1990, the security detail continued to monitor the activities inside the compound and in fact apprehended a six-wheeler truck coming from the compound of Mustangloaded with almaciga and lauan lumber without the necessary legal documents covering the shipment." 5 (c) The 23rd April 1990 Order of then DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, suspending the Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469 of Mustang Lumber, Inc., was issued because of, among other things, the latter's possession of almaciga lumber without the required documents. 6 (d) The subsequent 03rd May 1990 Order, likewise issued by Secretary Factoran, authorized the confiscation of approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks of various sizes and dimensions owned by Mustang Lumber, Inc. 7 (e) The complaint filed on 27 July 1990 by Vincent A. Robles, Chief, PIC/SAID, DENR, before the Department of Justice, Manila, against private respondent was for possession of lauan and almaciga lumber without required legal documents, 8 in violation of P.D. 705, as amended by EO 277. (f) The prosecution, in its opposition to private respondent's motion to quash, sought to argue that the possession of "almaciga, supa and lauan lumber found in the compound of Mustang Lumber, Inc., 9 was covered by the penal provisions of P.D. 705, as amended, pursuant to Section 32 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989. Indeed, the instant petition itself questions the quashal order of the court a quo solely on the thesis that "lumber" should be held to be among the items that are banned under Section 68 of PD 705. While generally factual matters outside of the information should not weigh in resolving a motion to quash following the standing rule that the allegations of the information must alone be considered and should not be challenged, there should, however, be no serious objections to taking into account additional and clarificatory facts which, although not made out in the

information, are admitted, conceded, or not denied by the parties. As early as the case of People vs. Navarro, 10reiterated in People vs. Dela Rosa, 11 the Court has had occasion to explain -. . . It would seem to be pure technicality to hold that in the consideration of the motion the parties and the judge were precluded from considering facts which the fiscal admitted to be true, simply because they were not described in the complaint. Of course, it may be added that upon similar motions the court and the fiscal are not required to go beyond the averments of the information, nor is the latter to be inveigled into a premature and risky revelation of his evidence. But we see no reason to prohibit the fiscal from making, in all candor, admissions of undeniable facts, because the principle can never be sufficiently reiterated that such official's role is to see that justice is done: not that all accused are convicted, but that the guilty are justly punished. Less reason can there be to prohibit the court from considering those admissions, and deciding accordingly, in the interest of a speedy administration of justice. And now on the main substantive issue. Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by EO No. 277, reads: Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. I agree with the court a quo that the coverage of Section 68, PD 705, as so amended, is explicit, and it is confined to "timber and other forest products." Section 3(q) of the decree defines "forest product" to mean -(q) . . . timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, orother forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational and geologic resources in forest lands (emphasis supplied); and distinguishes it, in correlation with Section 3(aa) of the law, from that which has undergone processing. In defining a "processing plant," this section of the decree holds it to refer to --

. . . any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber veneer, plywood, wallboard, block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products (emphasis supplied). In fine, timber is so classified, under Section 3(q) of the law, as a forest product, while lumber has been categorized, under Section 3(aa), among the various finished wood products. The various DENR issuances, cited by the Solicitor General, to wit: (1) Section 1.11 of the DENR Order No. 80, dated 28 December 1987, Series of 1987, which defines "timber" to be -. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at least 15 centimeters and at 1.5 meters long, except all mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered as timber regardless of size; 12 (2) Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, dated 17 March 1989, Series of 1989, stating that "lumber" includes -. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing, resawing, kiln-drying and passing lengthwise through a standard planing machine, including boules or unedged lumber;" and (3) DENR Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of 1988, dated 06 May 1988, to the effect that the term "forest products" shall include "lumber -cannot, in my view, go beyond the clear language of the basic law. While great weight is ordinarily accorded to an interpretation or construction of a statute by the government agency called upon to implement the enactment, 13 the rule would only be good, however, to the extent that such interpretation or construction is congruous with the governing statute. 14 Administrative issuances can aptly carry the law into effect 15 but it would be legal absurdity to allow such issuances to also have the effect, particularly those which are penal in nature, of extending the scope of the law or its plain mandate. 16 Accordingly, and with respect, I vote to deny the petition in G.R. No. 106424, to grant the petition in G.R. No. 104988 and to require comment on the petition in G.R. No. 123784. I must hasten to add, nevertheless, that I do appreciate the well-meant rationale of DENR Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of 1988, for, indeed, the need for preserving whatever remains of the country's forest reserves can never now be fully emphasized. Until properly addressed and checked, the continued denudation of forest resources, already known to be the cause of no few disasters, as well as of untold loss of lives and property, could well be on end the expected order of the day. I, therefore, join ail those who call for the passage of remedial legislation before the problem truly becomes irreversible.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., dissenting: The prosecution seeks, in its petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 106424, the annulment of the 16th August 1991 Order of respondent Judge granting the motion of private respondent Ri Chuy Po to quash the information that has charged him with the Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree ("PD") No. 705 (otherwise known as the Forestry Reform Code, as amended by Executive Order ["EO"] No. 277 1) and the 18th October 1991 Order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The information of 04 June 1991, containing the alleged inculpatory facts against private respondent, reads: The undersigned State Prosecutor hereby accuses RI CHUY PO of the crime of violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, Series of 1987, committed as follows: "That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within the premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Drive, Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully, have in his possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa, without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations. "CONTRARY TO LAW." 2 Private respondent, on 10 July 1991, moved for the quashal of the information on the ground that the facts comprising the charge did not amount to a criminal offense, or in the alternative, to suspend the proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question, private respondent having formally challenged the legality of the seizure of the lumber in question in a civil case before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Manila, Branch 35, and now pending with the Court of Appeals. On 16 August 1991, the trial court promulgated its now questioned order granting the motion of private respondent to quash the information. It ruled that, unlike the possession of "timber or other forest products" (without supporting legal documents), the mere possession of "lumber" had not itself been declared a criminal offense under Section 68 of PD 705. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration insisting that lumber should be held to come within the purview of "timber" defined by Section 2.26 (b) of DENR Administrative Order No. 50, Series of 1986. The motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the petition for review on certiorari filed by the prosecution before this Court. Private respondent maintains (1) that PD 705 distinguishes "timber" and "other forest products," on the one hand, from "lumber" and "other finished wood products," on the other, and that the possession of lumber of any specie, size or dimension, whether it be lauan, tanguile, apitong, almaciga, supa, or narra, is not under that law declared a criminal offense; (2) that DENR Administrative Order No. 74, Series of 1987, totally bans the cutting, handling and disposition ofalmaciga trees but that possession of almaciga lumber is not considered illegal; (3) that while

under DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987, the cutting or gathering of narra and other premium hardwood species (supa included) is prohibited, it does not, however, make possession of premium hardwood lumber (narra and supa included) punishable by mere inference; and (4) that Bureau of Forest Development Circular No. 10, Series of 1983, clarified by DENR Memorandum No. 12, Series of 1988, requires a certificate of lumber origin ("CLO") only on lumber shipped outside the province, city or the greater Manila area to another province or city or, in lieu of a CLO, an invoice to accompany a lumber shipment from legitimate sources if the origin and destination points are both within the greater Manila area or within the same province or city, and not, like in the instant case, where the lumber is not removed from the lumber yard. Petitioner counters (1) that the almaciga, supa and lauan lumber products found in the compound of Mustang Lumber, Inc., are included in Section 68, PD 705, as amended by EO No. 277, the possession of which without requisite legal documents is penalized under Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989, dated 17 March 1989, that defines "lumber" to be a -. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing, resawing, kiln-drying and passing lengthwise through a standard planing machine, including boules or unedged lumber; and "timber," under Section 1.11 of DENR Administrative Order No. 80, Series of 1987, dated 28 December 1987, to be -. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at least 15 centimeters and at 1.5 meters long, except all mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered as timber regardless of size; which may either be -a) Squared timber (or) timber squared with an ax or other similar mechanical hard tools in the forest and which from the size of the piece and the character of the wood is obviously unfit for use in that form (Sec. 1.10 DENR Administrative Order No. 80, Series of 1987, dated December 28, 1987); or b) Manufactured timber (or) timber other than round and squared timber shall include logs longitudinally sawn into pieces, even if only to facilitate transporting or hauling, as well as all sawn products, all timber hewn or otherwise worked to approximate its finished form, such as house posts, ship keels, mine props, ties, trolly poles, bancas, troughs, bowls, cart wheels, table tops and other similar articles (Sec. 2.26, DENR Administrative Order No. 50, Series of 1986, dated November 11, 1986) -(2) that to exclude "lumber" under Section 68 of PD 705 would be to defeat the purpose of the law, i.e., to stop or minimize illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation of forest resources; (3) that the claim of private respondent that a CLO is required only upon the transportation or shipment of lumber, and not when lumber is merely stored in a compound, contravenes the provisions of Section 68 of PD 705; (4) that the failure to show any CLO or other legal document required by administrative issuances raises the presumption that the

lumber has been shipped or received from illegal sources; and, (5) that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 90-53648 sustaining the legality of the seizure has rendered moot any possible prejudicial issue to the instant case. The real and kernel issue then brought up by the parties in G.R. No. 106424, as well as in the two consolidated cases (G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784), is whether or not the term "timber or other forest products" the possession of which without the required legal documents would be a criminal offense under Section 68 of PD 705 also covers "lumber". Prefatorily, I might point out that the information, charging private respondent with the possession without required legal documents of ". . . truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa, . . ." has failed to specify whether the "almaciga" and "lauan" there mentioned refer to "timber" or "lumber" or both. A perusal of the pleadings and annexes before the Court, however, would indicate that only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment. For instance -(a) The pertinent portions of the joint affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, 3 subscribed and sworn to before State Prosecutor Claro Arellano, upon which basis the latter recommended the filing of the information, read, as follows: "That during the weekend, (April 1 and 2, 1990) the security detail from our agency continued to monitor the activities inside the compound and in fact apprehended and later on brought to the DENR compound a six-wheeler truck loaded with almaciga and lauan lumber after the truck driver failed to produce any documents covering the shipment; xxx xxx xxx "That we are executing this affidavit in order to lodge a criminal complaint against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber for violation of Section 68, P.D. 705, as amended by Executive Order 277, having in its possession prohibited wood and wood products without the required documents." 4 (Emphasis supplied) (b) The resolution, dated 14 May 1991, issued by Investigating Prosecutor Arellano, approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III, confirmed that -" . . . On April 1 and 2 1990, the security detail continued to monitor the activities inside the compound and in fact apprehended a six-wheeler truck coming from the compound of Mustangloaded with almaciga and lauan lumber without the necessary legal documents covering the shipment." 5 (c) The 23rd April 1990 Order of then DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, suspending the Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469 of Mustang Lumber, Inc., was issued because of, among other things, the latter's possession of almaciga lumber without the required documents. 6

(d) The subsequent 03rd May 1990 Order, likewise issued by Secretary Factoran, authorized the confiscation of approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks of various sizes and dimensions owned by Mustang Lumber, Inc. 7 (e) The complaint filed on 27 July 1990 by Vincent A. Robles, Chief, PIC/SAID, DENR, before the Department of Justice, Manila, against private respondent was for possession of lauan and almaciga lumber without required legal documents, 8 in violation of P.D. 705, as amended by EO 277. (f) The prosecution, in its opposition to private respondent's motion to quash, sought to argue that the possession of "almaciga, supa and lauan lumber found in the compound of Mustang Lumber, Inc., 9 was covered by the penal provisions of P.D. 705, as amended, pursuant to Section 32 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989. Indeed, the instant petition itself questions the quashal order of the court a quo solely on the thesis that "lumber" should be held to be among the items that are banned under Section 68 of PD 705. While generally factual matters outside of the information should not weigh in resolving a motion to quash following the standing rule that the allegations of the information must alone be considered and should not be challenged, there should, however, be no serious objections to taking into account additional and clarificatory facts which, although not made out in the information, are admitted, conceded, or not denied by the parties. As early as the case of People vs. Navarro, 10reiterated in People vs. Dela Rosa, 11 the Court has had occasion to explain -. . . It would seem to be pure technicality to hold that in the consideration of the motion the parties and the judge were precluded from considering facts which the fiscal admitted to be true, simply because they were not described in the complaint. Of course, it may be added that upon similar motions the court and the fiscal are not required to go beyond the averments of the information, nor is the latter to be inveigled into a premature and risky revelation of his evidence. But we see no reason to prohibit the fiscal from making, in all candor, admissions of undeniable facts, because the principle can never be sufficiently reiterated that such official's role is to see that justice is done: not that all accused are convicted, but that the guilty are justly punished. Less reason can there be to prohibit the court from considering those admissions, and deciding accordingly, in the interest of a speedy administration of justice. And now on the main substantive issue. Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by EO No. 277, reads: Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:Provided, That in the case of partnerships,

associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. I agree with the court a quo that the coverage of Section 68, PD 705, as so amended, is explicit, and it is confined to "timber and other forest products." Section 3(q) of the decree defines "forest product" to mean -(q) . . . timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, orother forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational and geologic resources in forest lands (emphasis supplied); and distinguishes it, in correlation with Section 3(aa) of the law, from that which has undergone processing. In defining a "processing plant," this section of the decree holds it to refer to -. . . any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber veneer, plywood, wallboard, block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products (emphasis supplied). In fine, timber is so classified, under Section 3(q) of the law, as a forest product, while lumber has been categorized, under Section 3(aa), among the various finished wood products. The various DENR issuances, cited by the Solicitor General, to wit: (1) Section 1.11 of the DENR Order No. 80, dated 28 December 1987, Series of 1987, which defines "timber" to be -. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at least 15 centimeters and at 1.5 meters long, except all mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered as timber regardless of size; 12 (2) Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, dated 17 March 1989, Series of 1989, stating that "lumber" includes -. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing, resawing, kiln-drying and passing lengthwise through a standard planing machine, including boules or unedged lumber;" and (3) DENR Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of 1988, dated 06 May 1988, to the effect that the term "forest products" shall include "lumber -cannot, in my view, go beyond the clear language of the basic law.

While great weight is ordinarily accorded to an interpretation or construction of a statute by the government agency called upon to implement the enactment, 13 the rule would only be good, however, to the extent that such interpretation or construction is congruous with the governing statute. 14 Administrative issuances can aptly carry the law into effect 15 but it would be legal absurdity to allow such issuances to also have the effect, particularly those which are penal in nature, of extending the scope of the law or its plain mandate. 16 Accordingly, and with respect, I vote to deny the petition in G.R. No. 106424, to grant the petition in G.R. No. 104988 and to require comment on the petition in G.R. No. 123784. I must hasten to add, nevertheless, that I do appreciate the well-meant rationale of DENR Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of 1988, for, indeed, the need for preserving whatever remains of the country's forest reserves can never now be fully emphasized. Until properly addressed and checked, the continued denudation of forest resources, already known to be the cause of no few disasters, as well as of untold loss of lives and property, could well be on end the expected order of the day. I, therefore, join ail those who call for the passage of remedial legislation before the problem truly becomes irreversible.

[G.R. No. 125797. February 15, 2002] DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), Region VIII, Tacloban City, Represented by Regional Executive Director Israel C. Gaddi, petitioner, vs. GREGORIO DARAMAN, NARCISO LUCENECIO and Hon. CLEMENTE C. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Calbayog City, respondents. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, particularly Section 68-A, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources secretary or a duly authorized representative may order the confiscation in favor of the government of, among others, the vehicles used in the commission of offenses punishable by the said Code. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the December 6, 1995 Decision[1] and the June 3, 1996 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbayog City (Branch 32) in Criminal Case No. 1958. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, the Court hereby declares accused GREGORIO DARAMAN and NARCISO LUCENECIO acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de [o]ficio. The bond of the accused is hereby cancelled. The court hereby orders the CENR Officer of Samar, or any DENR employee who is taking custody of the Holy Cross Funeral Services vehicle St. Jude, with Plate No. HAJ-848, to return the said vehicle to the owner thereof.[3] The assailed Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration challenging the last paragraph of the Decision regarding the return of the subject vehicle to herein respondents. The Facts In the assailed Decision, the trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows: The accused herein Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio are charged [with] violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277 in an information which is quoted herein below: That on or about the 30th day of November, 1993, at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, at Barangay Bulao, Municipality of San Jorge, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, with a total volume of 72.93 board feet valued at SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY NINE PESOS (P729.30) and THIRTY CENTAVOS, without first securing and obtaining any permit or license therefor from the proper authorities, thus Violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended and further Amended by Executive Order No. 277, series of 1989. CONTRARY TO LAW. Assisted by their counsels, the accused were arraigned and they entered the plea of not guilty. Thereafter trial was conducted. The prosecution presented Pablo Opinion who testified as follows: That he is an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as a Forest Ranger. On November 30, 1993 at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, while he was in his house in Brgy. Bulao, San Jorge,Samar, a vehicle named St. Jude with Plate No. HAJ-848 coming from barangay Blanca Aurora passed by. He stopped the said vehicle and found some lumber of assorted sizes [and] wood shavings inside. The lumber consisted of 62 pieces of 1 x 2 x 4, 16 pieces of 1 x 24 x 2.3 and 1 piece of 1 x 2 x 4. In his estimate at the price of P10.00 per board foot the total value of the lumber would be P729.30. He asked the driver for [the] owner of the lumber and he was informed that it was a certain Asan of Brgy. Blanca Aurora. The driver also informed him that the vehicle was owned by his employer, Narciso Lucenecio of the Holy Cross Funeral Services in Calbayog City. He then took

hold of the vehicle and the assorted lumber and, thereafter, he issued a Seizure Receipt marked as Exhs. B and series. He also took photographs of the lumber which are now marked as Exhs. C and series. Besides, he signed a Joint Affidavit with Oligario Mabansag, also a Forest Ranger. When he asked the driver Gregorio Daraman for some papers for the assorted lumber, the latter replied that he had none because they were not his. Daraman further told him that [they] went to Brgy. Blanca Aurora to secure some wood shavings from the furniture shop owned by Asan and Asan merely asked him a favor of loading his assorted lumbers in the vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services to be brought to his (Asans) house in Barangay Abrero, Calbayog City. The prosecution has still another witness in the person of Oligario Mabansag, but both the prosecution and the defense agreed to dispense with his testimony considering that the case would be merely corroborative [of] those already offered by Pablo Opinion. The prosecution rested its case with the admission of Exhs. A and B and their series. Its Exhs. C and series were rejected because the photographer who took them did not testify to identify [them]. For the defense, only accused Gregorio Daraman testified because his co-accused would merely offer corroborative testimony. From his testimony, the following facts have been established: That on November 30, 1993 in the afternoon his employer Baby Lucenecio instructed him to procure some wood shavings (sinapyo) in San Jorge, Samar. He used the service vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services. His companion[s] were Melio Bedoya, Fanny Fiel and Ragi Mabutol. They went to barangay Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar and thereat, they got some wood shavings from the furniture shop owned by a certain AsanAbing. They loaded 20 sacks of wood shavings, each sack measuring 22 inches in height by 32 1/2 inches in circumference as he demonstrated in court. The wood shavings [were] being used by the Holy Cross Funeral Services as cushions in the coffin. After the 20 sacks of wood shavings were loaded, Asan Abing asked him a favor to bring his (Asan) assorted lumber to his house in Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City where the Holy Cross Funeral Services [was] also located. Asan himself personally loaded his assorted lumber into the vehicle. The subject assorted lumber were already in the furniture shop where they got the wood shavings. On their way home as they passed by Brgy. Bulao, Pablo Opinion stopped him and took the wood shavings. Opinion also inquired about the assorted lumber and he told him that they were owned by Asan, owner of the furniture shop inBrgy. Blanca Aurora, who loaded them in his vehicle to be brought to his (Asans) house in Barangay Obrero, Calbayog City. He told Opinion also that Asan advised him that if somebody would [ask] about his lumber, just to tell the person that Asan had the papers for the lumber with him in his furniture shop at Brgy. Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar. Pablo Opinion, however, did not take his word and he instead impounded the vehicle together with the assorted lumber. At about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, the vehicle was still not returned to him and so Gregorio Daraman left and returned to his employer at Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City and told the latter about what happened.[4] After trial, the RTC acquitted both accused and ordered the return of the disputed vehicle to Lucenecio.

Prior to these court proceedings, the Department of Environment and Natural ResourcesCommunity and Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) of Catbalogan, Samarconducted administrative confiscation proceedings on the seized lumber and vehicle in the presence of private respondents.[5] The two failed to present documents to show the legality of their possession and transportation of the lumber seized. Hence, CENRO Officer Marciano T. Talavera recommended to the Regional Executive Director (RED) the final confiscation of the seized lumber and conveyance.[6] Atty. Pastor C. Salazar filed a Memorandum dated January 26, 1994, concurring with the recommendation to forfeit the lumber and the vehicle seized from private respondents. The Memorandum was approved by RED Augustus L. Momongan and Arty. Fiel I. Marmita, chief of the Legal Division of the DENR, Region VIII, Tacloban City.[7] Atty. Rogelio G. Bato Jr. of DENR, Region 8, Tacloban City, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision, only insofar as it ordered the return of the said vehicle to the owner thereof.[8] He contended that the vehicle had already been administratively confiscated by the DENR on December 2, 1993, and that the RED approved its forfeiture on January 26, 1994.[9] He further claimed that the DENR had exclusive jurisdiction over the conveyance, which had been used in violation of the Revised Forestry Code pursuant to Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended by EO 277. The trial court denied the Motion via the assailed Order. Ruling of the Trial Court The trial court acquitted private respondents for insufficiency of evidence. The unrebutted testimony of Respondent Daraman was that, in exchange for the wood shavings from Asan, the former agreed to take the lumber to the latters house in Calbayog City, where the Holy Cross Funeral Services office was also located. Asan advised Daraman to reply, when asked, that the papers showing the authorization for the lumber were in the formers shop in Barangay Blanca Aurora. Finding the evidence against Respondent Lucenecio to be likewise insufficient, the RTC considered the vehicle as an effect of the crime and ordered its delivery to him. In the challenged Order, the trial court ruled that the Motion for Reconsideration was untenable on procedural and substantive grounds. Since Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Feliciano Aguilar did not sign the Motion, the RTC deemed his silence a sign of his disapproval of the Motion. Substantively, the trial court ruled: x x x [T]he Court finds the motion still wanting in merits considering that as found by the Court the owner of the vehicle in question, St. Jude, which is the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor owned by accused Narciso Lucenecio, did not commit any violation of P.D. 705. Likewise, the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish that accused Gregorio Daraman had taken or kept control of the lumber subject of the motion which would thereby demonstrate that he had x x x possession of the subject forest products. Instead, as established by the evidence it was a certain Asan who owned the subject lumber. xxx.

xxx

xxx

xxx

The decision of the Court has never been brought on appeal, thereby the same has long become final and executory. Again, as shown by the evidence in the alleged confiscation proceedings conducted by the OIC DENR Officer Marciano Talavera of Samar on December 2, 1992, the lumber in question [was] found to be owned by AsanAbing. But notwithstanding this fact, for reasons not known to the Court, the said Asan Abing was never made an accused in the present case. Sec. 68-1 of P.D. 705 contemplates a situation where the owner of the vehicle is himself a violator of P.D. 705 or has been found to have conspired with any other persons who committed the violation of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 or consented to the use of his vehicle in violating the said law. In the present case as shown by the evidence, neither the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor or its owner accused Narciso Lucenecio has committed a violation of P.D. 705 as already declared by the Court in its decision of December 6, 1995 nor the driver, accused Gregorio Daraman. In fact both were declared acquitted of the violation charged, and the decision has not been appealed.[10] Hence, this Petition.[11] Issues In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts consideration: (A) Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction and/or authority to order x x x the return of property already owned by the government. (B) Respondent judge utterly disregarded and/or misinterpreted the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of thePhilippines. (C) The government is not estopped from protecting its interest by reason of mistake, error or failure of its officers to perform their duties.[12] Stated simply, the issues are: (1) whether the RTC had jurisdiction to release the confiscated vehicle; (2) whether the trial court misconstrued PD 705, as amended; and (3) whether, as a result of its filing of the criminal action, petitioner is estopped from confiscating the vehicle administratively. The Courts Ruling The Petition is meritorious. First Issue: Jurisdiction to Order Return of Vehicle

Petitioner contends that the RTC overstepped its jurisdiction when it ordered the return of the disputed vehicle, because the vehicle had already become government property by virtue of the forfeiture Order issued by DENR on January 26, 1994. The DENR secretary or his duly authorized representative, under Section 68-A of PD 705 as amended by EO 277, may order the confiscation and disposition of all conveyances -- by land, water or air -- used in illegally cutting, gathering, removing, possessing or abandoning forest products. We agree. Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law.[13] A comparison of the provisions of the two relevant sections of PD 705, as amended, shows that the jurisdiction of the RTC covers the confiscation of the timber or forest products as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found; it is the DENR that has jurisdiction over the confiscation of forest products and, to stress, all conveyances used in the commission of the offense. Section 68 reads: Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: x x x. The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.[14] Section 68-A, in contrast, provides: SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.[15] If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be understood in its literal meaning and applied without resort to interpretation, on the presumption that its wording correctly expresses its intent or will. The courts may not construe it differently.[16] Machinery is a collective term for machines and appliances used in the industrial arts;[17] equipment covers physical facilities available for production, including buildings, machineries and tools;[18] and implements pertains to whatever may supply a want, especially an instrument, tool or utensil.[19] These terms do not include conveyances that are specifically covered by Section 68-A. The implementing guidelines of Section 68-A define conveyance in a manner that includes any type or class of vehicle, craft, whether motorized or not, used either

in land, water or air, or a combination thereof or any mode of transport used in the movement of any forest product.[20] Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same is vested in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) secretary or a duly authorized representative. The DENR secretary has supervision and control over the enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules and regulations. [21] To implement Section 68-A, DENR promulgated Administrative Order (AO) No. 54-93, amending Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 59-90. AO 54-93 provides the guidelines for the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations. Even the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 1958 limited the acts attributed to private respondents to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, x x x without first securing and obtaining any permit or license therefor from the proper authorities, x x x. The Information did not contain any allegation pertaining to the transportation or conveyance of illegally cut, gathered, possessed or abandoned lumber in violation of Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended. Confiscation Without Due Process Private respondents main defense is that the Order of Forfeiture (Annex C) is a false, falsified and perjurious document. The Order was attached to and made part of the record only when petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration dated February 6, 1996, or only after the trial court rendered the assailed Decision. Petitioner made it appear, according to the private respondents, that RED Momongan had approved the Memorandum on January 26, 1994. This does not appear to be true because Atty. Marmita, officer-in-charge (OIC) of the DENR Legal Division ofTacloban City, signed the Memorandum recommending approval only on January 31, 1994. Further, on April 6, 1995, Judge Rosales of the RTC of Calbayog City (Branch 32) ordered the provincial environment and natural resources officer to transfer the confiscated vehicle and pieces of lumber in connection with the prosecution of Criminal Case 1958.[22] Reynaldo R. Villafuerte, OIC of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), replied that his office could not deliver the vehicle because it was not in running condition.[23] We are not persuaded. The validity and legality of the Order of Forfeiture falls outside the ambit of the review of the assailed Decision and Order. The basis for the assailed Order to release the vehicle was private respondents acquittal of the charge of violating Section 68. On the other hand, the forfeiture Order issued by the DENR was based on Section 68-A, which involved a distinct and separate matter cognizable by it. Petitioner is questioning only the RTCs jurisdiction over the assailed Order to release the confiscated vehicle. Private respondents have not appealed the DENRs Order of Forfeiture, the validity of which can thus be presumed.[24] The genuineness of the Order and its proper service upon them are factual issues that will not be dwelt upon by this Court, which is not a trier of facts.[25]

The jurisdiction of this Court, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, is in the main limited to reviewing legal errors committed by a lower court.[26] Under PD 705, the actions and the decisions of the DENR are reviewable by the courts only through special civil actions for certiorari or prohibition.[27] Second Issue: Construing PD 705, as Amended Petitioner alleges that the RTC misinterpreted the law when it held that Section 68-A, PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle was the violator or was a conspirator with other violators of that law. Department Order No. 54, Series of 1993, provides that the proceedings for the confiscation and the forfeiture of the conveyance shall be directed against its owner, and that lack of knowledge of its illegal use shall not bar its forfeiture. In the present Petition, the trial court ruled in the assailed Order that Section 68-A of PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle violated this law or conspired with other persons who violated it or consented to the use of his or her vehicle in violating it. Respondents Lucenecio and Daraman were not shown to have violated PD 705, and their acquittals were not appealed. We side with petitioner. The guilt or the innocence of the accused in the criminal case is immaterial, because what is punished under Section 68 is the transportation, movement or conveyance of forest products without legal documents. The DENR secretary or the authorized representatives do not possess criminal jurisdiction; thus, they are not capable of making such a ruling, which is properly a function of the courts. Even Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended, does not clothe petitioner with that authority. Conversely, the same law takes out of the general jurisdiction of the regional trial courts the confiscation of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws. Hence, we cannot expect the DENR to rule on the criminal liability of the accused before it impounds such vehicles. Section 68-A covers only the movement of lumber or forest products without proper documents. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation is resorted to only where a literal interpretation would lead to either an absurdity or an injustice.[28] We also uphold petitioners argument that the release of the vehicle to private respondents would defeat the purpose and undermine the implementation of forestry laws. The preamble of the amendment in EO 277 underscores the urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit of the present and future generations. Our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected only through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws.[29] Strong paramount public policy should not be degraded by narrow constructions of the law that frustrate its clear intent or unreasonably restrict its scope. [30] Third Issue: Estoppel

In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for this Court to resolve petitioners third issue. It is no longer material to rule on whether it was erroneous for the RTC to hold that the assistant provincial prosecutors failure to comment on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was an implied disapproval thereof. The public prosecutors disapproval does not vest in the trial court the jurisdiction or authority to release the vehicle to private respondents. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Order are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 108619. July 31, 1997] EPIFANIO LALICAN, petitioner, vs. HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. DECISION ROMERO, J.: The issue posed for resolution in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order is whether or not a charge of illegal possession of "lumber" is excluded from the crime of illegal possession of "timber" as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines), as amended, to warrant the quashal of an information charging the former offense or a "nonexistent crime." On July 23, 1991, an information for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, was filed by the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City against petitioner Epifanio Lalican,[1] Ruben Benitez, Allan Pulgar and Jose Roblo before the Regional Trial Court of that city. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 9543, the information reads: "That on or about the 9th day of February, 1991, at Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan, City of Puerto Princesa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, without lawful authority or permit, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control 1,800 board feet of assorted species and dimensions of lumber on board two (2) passenger jeeps, with a value of Fourteen Thousand Pesos (14,000.00), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount aforestated. CONTRARY TO LAW." At their arraignment on August 9, 1991, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. On August 23, 1991, petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705

refers to "timber and other forest products" and not to "lumber," and asserting that "timber" becomes "lumber" only after it is sawed into beams, planks or boards, petitioner alleged that said decree "does not apply to 'lumber.'" He added that the law is "vague and standardless" as it does not specify the authority or the legal documents required by existing forest laws and regulations. Hence, petitioner asserted that the information should be quashed as it violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law.[2] The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not for the courts to determine the wisdom of the law nor to set out the policy of the legislature which deemed it proper that the word "timber" should include "lumber" which is a "product or derivative after the timber is cut." The position of the prosecution was that to hold otherwise would result in the easy circumvention of the law, for one could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. The prosecution asserted that the issue raised by petitioner was more semantical than a question of law.[3] On September 24, 1991, the lower court,[4] guided by the principles that penal laws should be construed strictly against the state and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, issued an Order quashing the information. It held that the distinction between "timber" and "lumber" is not artificial nor a matter of semantics as the law itself distinguishes the two terms. Sec. 3(q) of P.D. No. 705 classifies "timber" as a forest product while Sec. 3(aa) thereof considers "lumber" as a finished wood product. Adding that unlicensed cutting, gathering and/or collecting of "timber" is penalized under Sec. 68 while sale of "lumber" without compliance with grading rules established by the government is prohibited by Sec. 79, the lower court categorically stated that: "Logically, lumber, being a manufactured wood product, poses no more danger to forest lands by being cut, gathered, collected or removed. It is in fact, only bought and sold. Thus, Sec. 68 cannot be made to apply to lumber." The court, however, refrained from exploring the constitutional issues raised by petitioner upon a holding that the case could be resolved on some other grounds or issues.[5] The prosecution filed a motion for the reconsideration of this Order, pointing out that under the Primer on Illegal Logging of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), timber is not just any piece of wood for it may consist of squared and manufactured timber or one which has been sawn to pieces to facilitate transportation or hauling. It stressed that to consider a person who had made lumber out of timber as not criminally liable is an absurd interpretation of the law. Moreover, the prosecution underscored the facts that when apprehended, the accused presented Private Land Timber Permit No. 030140 dated February 10, 1991 which had expired; that while the certificate of origin indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the product actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that the two jeeps bearing the product were not equipped with certificates of transport agreement. Added to this was the fact that, if the product were indeed lumber, then the accused could have presented a certificate of lumber origin, lumber sale invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for transportation from one point to another.[6]

Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration contending that the DENR primer's definition of "timber" is erroneous because the law itself distinguishes "timber" from "sawn lumber." The non-inclusion of "lumber" in Sec. 68 could only mean a clear legislative intent to exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized under that section.[7] Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the Presiding Judge of Branch 49 inhibited himself from taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 9543. The case was subsequently assigned to Branch 52. On June 10, 1992, the lower court[8] issued the herein questioned Order setting aside the quashal Order of the previous judge. It declared that from the law itself, it is evident that what is sought to be penalized is not the possession, without the required legal documents, of timber only but also of "other forest products." It stated that even if lumber is not timber, still, lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is equally prohibited by the law which includes "wood" in the definition of forest products. Petitioner sought the reconsideration of this Order but the lower court denied it. Hence, the instant petition arguing that the lower court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the quashal order and in denying his motion for reconsideration on the ground that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 neither specifies nor includes "lumber" in the phrase "timber or other forest products." The petition is devoid of merit. Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 which was issued on July 25, 1987 by then President Corazon C. Aquino, provides: "SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License.- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found." (Underscoring supplied.) Punished then in this section are: (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; or (b) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.

In the recent case of Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[9] this Court, thru Justice Hilario Davide, held: "The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of 'Processing plant,' which reads: (aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood product. This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as 'timber or logs after being prepared for the market.' Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus." Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from the expressed reasons for enacting the law which, under Executive Order No. 277, are the following: "WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos; WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations; WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and WHEREAS, to overcome these difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts to make our forestry laws more responsive to present situations and realities; x x x" To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the law.[10] After all, the phrase "forest products" is broad enough to encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would merely result in tautology. As the lower court said:

"Even should it be conceded that lumber is not timber and is thus not covered by the prohibition, still it cannot be denied that lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is equally and, to the same extent, prohibited. Sec. 3 (q) of PD 705 as amended or otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code defines forest products, viz., x x x Stress must be given to the term WOOD embodied in the definition of forest product (supra). If we are to follow the rather tangential argument by the accused that lumber is not timber, then, it will be very easy for a person to circumvent the law. He could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. It is rather too narrow an interpretation. But the law also provided a plug for the loophole. If lumber is not timber, then surely, lumber is wood. x x x. If in seeking to abate the proceedings the accused also seek to imply that lumber seized in their possession were procured from lawful source, all they have to do is produce the legal documents contemplated by the law. It is not the mere cutting or possession of timber, forest products or whatever that is prohibited and penalized by the law. What is prohibited and penalized is the act of cutting or possessing of timber, wood, or other forest products without lawful authority." The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the quashal of the information. The petition simply has no legal basis. Certiorari may be issued only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[11] Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of power.[12] On the other hand, certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion.[13] Where the court has jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct, its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.[14] As this Court said: "x x x. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil action of certiorari."[15] In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions.[16] The unavailability of the writ of certiorari, and even that of prohibition, in this case is borne out of the fact that what petitioner considers as grave abuse of discretion in this case is the denial of his motion to quash the information filed against him and three others. This Court has

consistently defined the proper procedure in case of denial of a motion to quash. The accused has to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.[17] Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is denied. That the appropriate recourse is to proceed to trial and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction, as well as the denial of the motion to quash, is impelled by the fact that a denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory procedural aspect which cannot be appealed nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari.[18] The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.[19] An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.[20] However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari would not only delay the administration of justice but also would unduly burden the courts.[21] Petitioner may not seek refuge under Flordelis v. Himalaloan[22] for his contention that a denial of a motion to quash may be the subject of a petition for certiorari. That case has an entirely different factual milieu from the one at bar. The information herein not being "patently defective" nor that the offense charged has prescribed,[23] this case may not be considered an exception to the rule on the proper remedy for the denial of a motion to quash. With respect to the constitutionality of Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 which petitioner would have this Court consider,[24] this Court has always desisted from delving on constitutional issues. Thus, even if all the requisites for judicial review of a constitutional matter are present in a case, [25] this Court will not pass upon a constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case or if the case can be disposed of on some other grounds, such as the application of the statute or general law.[26] The Court can well take judicial notice of the deplorable problem of deforestation in this country, considering that the deleterious effects of this problem are now imperiling our lives and properties, more specifically, by causing rampaging floods in the lowlands. While it is true that the rights of an accused must be favored in the interpretation of penal provisions of law, it is equally true that when the general welfare and interest of the people are interwoven in the prosecution of a crime, the Court must arrive at a solution only after a fair and just balancing of interests. This the Court did in arriving at the foregoing interpretation of Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Reform Code. This task, however, has not at all been a difficult one considering that, contrary to petitioner's assertion, his rights to due process and equal protection of the law have not been clearly shown to have been jeopardized. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED. The lower court is enjoined to proceed with dispatch in the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9543. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Torres, Jr., J., on leave.

[G.R. No. 136142. October 24, 2000] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFONSO DATOR and BENITO GENOL, accused (Acquitted) PASTOR TELEN, accused-appellant. DECISION DE LEON, JR., J.: Before us on appeal is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 1733 convicting the appellant of the crime of violation of Presidential Decree No. 705. Pastor Telen and his co-accused, Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol, were charged with the crime of violation of Section 68[2] of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code,[3] in an Information that reads: That on or about the 29th day of October, 1993 at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, in barangay Laboon, municipality of Maasin, province of Southern Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with intent of gain, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess 1,560.16 board feet of assorted lumber flitches valued at TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (23,500.00), Philippine Currency, without any legal document as required under existing forest laws and regulations from proper government authorities, to the damage and prejudice of the government. CONTRARY TO LAW. Upon being arraigned on May 27, 1994, Pastor Telen and his co-accused, Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol, assisted by counsel, separately entered the plea of Not guilty to the charge in the Information. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. It appears that on October 29, 1993, Police Station Commander Alejandro Rojas of Maasin, Southern Leyte, and SPO1 Necitas Bacala, were on board a police patrol vehicle heading towards Barangay San Rafael, Maasin, Southern Leyte. Upon reaching Barangay Laboon of the same municipality, they noticed a Isuzu cargo truck loaded with pieces of lumber bound toward the town proper of Maasin. Suspicious that the cargo was illegally cut pieces of lumber, Police Station Commander Rojas maneuvered their police vehicle and gave chase.[4] Upon catching up with the Isuzu cargo truck in Barangay Soro-soro, Maasin, Southern Leyte, they ordered the driver, accused Benito Genol, to pull over. Benito Genol was left alone in the

truck after his companions hurriedly left. When asked if he had the required documents for the proper transport of the pieces of lumber, Genol answered in the negative. Genol informed the police authorities that the pieces of lumber were owned by herein appellant, Pastor Telen, while the Isuzu cargo truck bearing Plate No. HAF 628 was registered in the name of Southern Leyte Farmers Agro-Industrial Cooperative, Inc. (SLEFAICO) which is a local cooperative. Consequently, Police Officers Rojas and Bacala directed Benito Genol to proceed to the Maasin Police Station, Maasin, Southern Leyte for further investigation.[5] On November 5, 1993, Forest Ranger Romeo Galola was fetched from his office at the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Maasin, Southern Leyte by SPO1 Necitas Bacala to inspect the pieces of lumber that were confiscated on October 29, 1993 in Soro-soro, Maasin, Southern Leyte from Pastor Telen. Galola and his immediate supervisor, Sulpicio Saguing, found that the cargo consisted of forty-one (41) pieces of Dita lumber and ten (10) pieces of Antipolo lumber of different dimensions with a total volume of 1,560.16 board feet.[6] Subsequently, SPO1 Bacala issued a seizure receipt[7] covering the fifty-one (51) pieces of confiscated Dita and Antipolo lumber and one (1) unit of Isuzu cargo truck with Plate No. HAF 628.The confiscated pieces of lumber and the cargo truck were turned over to SPO3 Daniel Lasala, PNP Property Custodian, Maasin, Southern Leyte who, in turn, officially transferred custody of the same to the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte.[8] The defense denied any liability for the crime charged in the Information. Pastor Telen, a utility worker at the Integrated Provincial Health Office, Southern Leyte for nineteen (19) years, testified that he needed lumber to be used in renovating the house of his grandparents in Barangay Abgao, Maasin, Southern Leyte where he maintained residence. Knowing that it was prohibited by law to cut trees without appropriate permit from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Telen sought the assistance of a certain Lando dela Pena who was an employee at the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte. Dela Pena accompanied Telen to the office of a certain Boy Leonor, who was the Officer in Charge of CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte.Leonor did not approve of the plan of Telen to cut teak or hard lumber from his (Telen) mothers track of land in Tabunan, San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte. However, Leonor allegedly allowed Telen to cut the aging Dita trees only. According to Telen, Leonor assured him that a written permit was not anymore necessary before he could cut the Dita trees, which are considered soft lumber, from the private land of his mother, provided the same would be used exclusively for the renovation of his house and that he shall plant trees as replacement thereof, which he did by planting Gemelina seedlings.[9] On September 15, 1993, Telen requested his cousin, Vicente Sabalo, to hire for him a cargo truck in order to haul the sawn lumber from the land of his mother in Tabunan, San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte. His cousin obliged after Telen assured him that he had already secured verbal permission from Boy Leonor, Officer in Charge of CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte, before cutting the said lumber.[10] After having been informed by Vicente Sabalo on October 29, 1993 at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon that a cargo truck was available for hire, Telen instructed his cousin to personally

supervise the hauling of the sawn lumber for him inasmuch as he was busy with his work in the office. At around 7:00 oclock in the evening, Telen learned from his daughter that the sawn lumber were confiscated by the police in Barangay Soro-soro, Maasin, Southern Leyte.[11] Upon arrival in Barangay Soro-Soro, Telen was accosted by Police Station Commander Alejandro Rojas who demanded from him DENR permit for the sawn lumber. After confirming ownership of the sawn lumber, Telen explained to Rojas that he had already secured verbal permission from Boy Leonor to cut Dita trees, which are considered soft lumber, to be used in the renovation of his house and that he had already replaced the sawn Dita trees with Gemelina seedlings, but to no avail. Rojas ordered that the pieces of lumber and the Isuzu cargo truck be impounded at the municipal building of Maasin, Southern Leyte for failure of Telen to produce the required permit from the DENR.[12] Pastor Telen appeared before Bert Pesidas, CENRO hearing officer, in Maasin, Southern Leyte for investigation in connection with the confiscated pieces of lumber. Telen had tried to contact Officer-in-Charge Boy Leonor of the CENRO Maasin, Southern Leyte after the confiscation of the sawn lumber on October 29, 1993 and even during the investigation conducted by the CENRO hearing officer for three (3) times but to no avail, for the reason that Boy Leonor was assigned at a reforestation site in Danao, Cebu province.[13] Alfonso Dator, was the accounting manager of SLEFAICO, Inc., a local cooperative engaged in buying and selling abaca fibers. Dator testified that on October 29, 1993 at 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, a certain Vicente Sabalo, accompanied by their company driver, Benito Genol, proposed to hire the Isuzu cargo truck owned by SLEFAICO, Inc. to haul pieces of coconut lumber from Barangay San Jose to Barangay Soro-soro in Maasin, Southern Leyte. He readily acceded to the proposal inasmuch as the owner of the alleged coconut lumber, according to Sabalo, was Pastor Telen, who is a long time friend and former officemate at the provincial office of the Department of Health. Besides, the fee to be earned from the hauling services meant additional income for the cooperative.[14] At about 6:00 oclock in the evening of the same day, Dator met the Isuzu cargo truck of SLEFAICO, Inc. at the Canturing bridge in Maasin, Southern Leyte, being escorted by a police patrol vehicle, heading towards the municipal town proper. At the municipal hall building of Maasin, he learned that the Isuzu truck was apprehended by the police for the reason that it contained a cargo of Dita and Antipolo lumber without the required permit from the DENR. He explained to the police authorities that the Isuzu cargo truck was hired merely to transport coconut lumber, however, it was impounded at the municipal building just the same.[15] Due to the incident Dator lost his job as accounting manager in SLEFAICO, Inc.[16] For his defense, Benito Genol testified that he was employed by the SLEFAICO, Inc. as driver of its Isuzu cargo truck. Aside from transporting abaca fibers, the Isuzu cargo truck was also available for hire.[17] While Genol was having the two tires of the Isuzu cargo truck vulcanized on October 29, 1993 in Barangay Mantahan, Maasin, Southern Leyte, Vicente Sabalo approached him and offered to hire the services of the cargo truck. Genol accompanied Sabalo to the residence of the

accounting manager of SLEFAICO, Inc., Alfonso Dator, which was nearby, and the latter agreed to the proposal of Sabalo to hire the Isuzu cargo truck to haul pieces of coconut lumber from San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte, for a fee.[18] At 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, Genol, Sabalo and a son of Alfonso Dator, proceeded to San Jose after fetching about six (6) haulers along the way in Barangay Sorosoro.Upon arrival in San Jose, Genol remained behind the steering wheel to take a rest. He was unmindful of the actual nature of the lumber that were being loaded. After the loading, Genol was instructed to proceed to Barangay Soro-soro in front of the lumberyard of a certain Jimmy Go. Before the lumber could be unloaded at 8:00 oclock in the evening Genol was approached by Police Station Commander Alejandro Rojas who demanded DENR permit for the lumber. The pieces of lumber were confiscated by Rojas after Genol failed to produce the required permit from the DENR office.[19] Vicente Sabalo corroborated the testimonies of the three (3) accused in this case. He testified in substance that he was requested by his cousin, Pastor Telen, to engage the services of a cargo truck to transport sawn pieces of lumber from San Jose to be used in the renovation of his house in Abgao, Maasin, Southern Leyte; that he approached Benito Genol and offered to hire the services of the Isuzu cargo truck that he was driving; that both of them asked the permission of Alfonso Dator who readily acceded to the proposal for a fee of P500.00;[20] that he saw Genol remained behind the steering wheel as the loading of the lumber was going on in San Jose; and that the lumber and the Isuzu cargo truck were confiscated in Barangay Soro-soro for failure of his cousin, Pastor Telen, to show to Police Station Commander Alejandro Rojas any written permit from the DENR for the subject lumber.[21] After analyzing the evidence, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows: 1. CONVICTING the accused PASTOR TELEN beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged and there being no modifying circumstances, and with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable, the herein accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties provided by law, which is two (2) degrees higher than PRISION MAYOR maximum, the authorized penalty similar to Qualified Theft, and to pay the costs. His bail for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and he shall be committed to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila thru the Abuyog Regional Prisons, Abuyog, Leyte via the Provincial Warden, Maasin, Southern Leyte; 2. ACQUITTING co-accused Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol on reasonable doubt for insufficiency of evidence; and cancelling their bail; 3. CONFISCATING and SEIZING the 1,560.16 board feet of illegal lumber worth P23,500.00 and ORDERING the CENRO Maasin, Southern Leyte to sell the lumber at public auction under proper permission from the Court, with the proceeds thereof turned over to the National Government thru the National Treasury under proper receipt, and to REPORT the fact of sale to

this Court duly covered by documents of sale and other receipts by evidencing the sale within five (5) days from the consummation of sale; and 4. DIRECTING the CENRO authorities to coordinate with its Regional Office for immediate administrative proceedings and determination of any administrative liability of the truck owner, SLEFAICO Inc. if any, otherwise, to release the truck to its owner. SO ORDERED. In his appeal Pastor Telen interpose the following assignments of error: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 68, P. D. 705, AS AMENDED, BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND FOR BEING NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH DENR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 79, SERIES OF 1990. II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA FOR THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SEC. 68, P. D. 705, AS AMENDED, IT BEING A PATENTLY ERRONEOUS PENALTY NOT WARRANTED BY ANY PROVISION OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE OR JURISPRUDENCE. III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE VALUE OF THE CONFISCATED LUMBER IS P23,500.00 FOR NO EVIDENCE OF SUCH VALUE WAS ESTABLISHED DURING THE TRIAL. The appeal is not impressed with merit. It is not disputed that appellant Pastor Telen is the owner of the fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Antipolo and Dita lumber with a total volume of 1,560.16 board feet. He alleged that the pieces of lumber were cut from the track of land belonging to his mother in San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte which he intended to use in the renovation of his house in Barangay Abgao of the same municipality. After having been confiscated by the police, while in transit, in Barangay Sorosoro, appellant Telen failed to produce before the authorities the required legal documents from the DENR pertaining to the said pieces of lumber. The fact of possession by the appellant of the subject fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Antipolo and Dita lumber, as well as his subsequent failure to produce the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations constitute criminal liability for violation of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.[22] Section 68 of the code provides:

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License.-Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. Appellant Telen contends that he secured verbal permission from Boy Leonor, Officer-in-Charge of the DENR-CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte before cutting the lumber, and that the latter purportedly assured him that written permit was not anymore necessary before cutting soft lumber, such as the Antipolo and Dita trees in this case, from a private track of land, to be used in renovating appellants house, provided that he would plant trees as replacements thereof, which he already did. It must be underscored that the appellant stands charged with the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, a special statutory law, and which crime is considered mala prohibita. In the prosecution for crimes that are considered mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law has been violated.[23] The motive or intention underlying the act of the appellant is immaterial for the reason that his mere possession of the confiscated pieces of lumber without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations gave rise to his criminal liability. In any case, the mere allegation of the appellant regarding the verbal permission given by Boy Leonor, Officer in Charge of DENR-CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte, is not sufficient to overturn the established fact that he had no legal documents to support valid possession of the confiscated pieces of lumber. It does not appear from the record of this case that appellant exerted any effort during the trial to avail of the testimony of Boy Leonor to corroborate his allegation. Absent such corroborative evidence, the trial court did not commit an error in disregarding the bare testimony of the appellant on this point which is, at best, self-serving.[24] The appellant cannot validly take refuge under the pertinent provision of DENR Administrative Order No. 79, Series of 1990[25] which prescribes rules on the deregulation of the harvesting, transporting and sale of firewood, pulpwood or timber planted in private lands. Appellant submits that under the said DENR Administrative Order No. 79, no permit is required in the cutting of planted trees within titled lands except Benguet pine and premium species listed under DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987, namely: narra, molave, dao, kamagong, ipil, acacia, akle, apanit, banuyo, batikuling, betis, bolong-eta, kalantas, lanete, lumbayao, sangilo, supa, teak, tindalo and manggis.

Concededly, the varieties of lumber for which the appellant is being held liable for illegal possession do not belong to the premium species enumerated under DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987. However, under the same DENR administrative order, a certification from the CENRO concerned to the effect that the forest products came from a titled land or tax declared alienable and disposable land must still be secured to accompany the shipment. This the appellant failed to do, thus, he is criminally liable under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 necessitating prior acquisition of permit and legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations. The pertinent portion of DENR Administrative Order No. 79, Series of 1990, is quoted hereunder, to wit: In line with the National Reforestation Program and in order to promote the planting of trees by owners of private lands and give incentives to the tree farmers, Ministry Administrative Order No. 4 dated January 19, 1987 which lifted the restriction in the harvesting, transporting and sale of firewood, pulpwood or timber produced from Ipil-Ipil (leucaenia spp) and Falcate (Albizzia falcataria) is hereby amended to include all other tree species planted in private lands except BENGUET PINE and premium hardwood species. Henceforth, no permit is required in the cutting of planted trees within the titled lands or tax declared A and D lands with corresponding application for patent or acquired through court proceedings, except BENGUET PINE and premium species listed under DENR Administrative Order No 78, Series of 1987, provided, that a certification of the CENRO concerned to the effect that the forest products came from a titled land or tax declared alienable and disposable land is issued accompanying the shipment. Appellant Telen next contends that proof of value of the confiscated pieces of lumber is indispensable, it being the basis for the computation of the penalty prescribed in Article 309 in relation to Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code; and that in the absence of any evidence on record to prove the allegation in the Information that the confiscated pieces of lumber have an equivalent value of P23,500.00 there can be no basis for the penalty to be imposed and hence, he should be acquitted. The appellants contention is untenable. It is a basic rule in criminal law that penalty is not an element of the offense. Consequently, the failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence in support of its allegation in the Information with respect to the value of the confiscated pieces of lumber is not necessarily fatal to its case. This Court notes that the estimated value of the confiscated pieces of lumber, as appearing in the official transmittal letter[26] of the DENRCENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte addressed to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of the same province, is P23,500.00 which is alleged in the Information. However, the said transmittal letter cannot serve as evidence or as a valid basis for the estimated value of the confiscated pieces of lumber for purposes of computing the proper penalty to be imposed on the appellant considering that it is hearsay and it was not formally offered in evidence contrary to Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the case of People vs. Elizaga,[27] the accused-appellant therein was convicted of the crimes of homicide and theft, and the value of the bag and its contents that were taken by the accusedappellant from the victim was estimated by the prosecution witness to be P500.00. In the absence of a conclusive or definite proof relative to their value, this Court fixed the value of the

bag and its contents at P100.00 based on the attendant circumstances of the case. More pertinently, in the case of People vs. Reyes,[28] this Court held that if there is no available evidence to prove the value of the stolen property or that the prosecution failed to prove it, the corresponding penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant should be the minimum penalty corresponding to theft involving the value of P5.00. In the case at bench, the confiscated fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Dita and Antipolo lumber were classified by the CENRO officials as soft, and therefore not premium quality lumber. It may also be noted that the said pieces of lumber were cut by the appellant, a mere janitor in a public hospital, from the land owned by his mother, not for commercial purposes but to be utilized in the renovation of his house. It does not appear that appellant Telen had been convicted nor was he an accused in any other pending criminal case involving violation of any of the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code (P.D. No. 705, as amended). In view of the attendant circumstances of this case, and in the interest of justice, the basis for the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be the minimum amount under Article 309 paragraph (6) of the Revised Penal Code which carries the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods for simple theft. Considering that the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the said decree, the imposable penalty on the appellant shall be increased by two degrees, that is, from arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods to prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods.[29] Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[30] the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 1733 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant Pastor Telen is sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 120365. December 17, 1996] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. WILSON B. QUE, accused-appellant. DECISION PUNO, J.:

Accused-appellant Wilson B. Que appeals from his conviction for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 705[1] as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) 277.[2] The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City.[3] On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the area. At about 1:00 in the morning, they posted themselves at the corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes later, they saw a tenwheeler truck with plate number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge.[4] There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao, accused-appellant Wilson Que, and an unnamed person. The driver identified accused-appellant as the owner of the truck and the cargo.[5] SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs. When interviewed, accused-appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there were sawn lumber inserted in between the coconut slabs.[6] SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the Cargos supporting documents, specifically: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and (5) certification from the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut slabs. Accused-appellant failed to present any of these documents. All he could show was a certification[7] from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally acquired the coconut slabs. The certification was issued to facilitate transport of the slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.[8] SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of the Provincial Task Force at the provincial capitol. Again, accused-appellant admitted to the members of the Provincial Task Force that there were sawn lumber under the coconut slabs.[9] At 10:00 oclock in the morning, the members of the Provincial Task Force, together with three CENRO personnel examined the cargo. The examination confirmed that the cargo consisted of coconut slabs and sawn tanguile lumber. The coconut slabs were piled at the sides of the truck, concealing the tanguile lumber.[10] When the CENRO personnel inventoried and scaled the seized forest products, they counted two hundred fifty eight (258) pieces of tanguile lumber with a total volume of 3,729.3 board feet (8.79 cubic meters) and total assessed value of P93,232.50.[11] On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. The Information alleged:

That on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner of an I(s)uzu Ten Wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control and custody 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest Products Chainsawn lumber (Species of Tanguile) with a total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total amount of P93,232.50 at P25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit, license or authority to do so from the proper authorities, thus violating the aforecited provision of the law, to the damage and prejudice of the government. CONTRARY TO LAW.[12] Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa[13] and Elpidio Sabal.[14] The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest area covered by the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by th PLTPs of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling services.[15] Accused-appellant also objected to the admission of the 258 pieces of lumber as evidence against him. He contended that they were fruits of an illegal search and seizure and of an uncounselled extrajudicial admission. The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber and the ten-wheeler truck owned by accusedappellant. The dispositive portion of the Decision[16] states: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused Wilson B. Que guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, plus all the accessory penalties provided by law. The bail bond filed for the provisional liberty of the accused is CANCELLED. The two hundred fifty-eight (258) pieces of lumber (tanguile specie) and the ten-wheeler truck bearing plate No. PAD-548 which was used in the commission of the crime are hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law. Costs against the accused. SO ORDERED.[17] Appellant now comes before us with the following assignment of errors:[18] 1. It was error for the Court to convict accused under Section 68, PD705 as amended by EO 277 for possessing timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations on the ground that since it is only in EO No. 277 where for the first time mere possession of timber was criminalized, there are no existing forest

laws and regulations which required certain legal documents for possession of timber and other forest products. 2. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights of accused against unlawful searches and seizures. 3. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights of accused under custodial investigation. On the first assignment of error, appellant argues that he cannot be convicted for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 which amended Section 68 to penalize the possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents did not indicate the particular documents necessary to make the possession legal. Neither did the other forest laws and regulations existing at the time of its enactment. Appellants argument deserves scant consideration. Section 68 of P.D. 705 provides: Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (emphasis supplied) Appellant interprets the phrase existing forest laws and regulations to refer to those laws and regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E. O. 277. The suggested interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give life to the law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3 of the Administrative Order provides: Section 3. Documents Required. Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of logs, lumber, plywood, veneer, nontimber forest products and wood-based or nonwood-based products/commodities shall be covered with appropriateCertificates of Origin, issued by authorized DENR officials, as specified in the succeeding sections.

xxx 3.3 Lumber. Unless otherwise herein provided, the transport of lumber shall be accompanied by a CERTIFICATE OF LUMBER ORIGIN (CLO) issued by the CENRO or his duly authorized representative which has jurisdiction over the processing plant producing the said lumber or the lumber firm authorized to deal in such commodities. In order to be valid, the CLO must be supported by the company tally sheet or delivery receipt, and in case of sale, a lumber sales invoice. xxx When apprehended on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant failed to present any certificate of origin of the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber. The trial court found: xxx xxx When apprehended by the police officers, the accused admittedly could not present a single document to justify his possession of the subject lumber. xxx Significantly, at the time the accused was apprehended by the police offices, he readily showed documents to justify his possession of the coconut slabs. Thus, he showed a certification issued by Remigio B. Rosario, Forest Ranger, of the DENR, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (Exhibit "E") and a xerox copy of the original certificate of title covering the parcel of land where the coconut slabs were cut. (Exhibit "F") It is worthy to note that the certification dated March 7, 1994 states: THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the one (1) truckload of coconut slabs to be transported by Mr. Wilson Que on bo ard truck bearing Plate No. PAD 548 were derived from matured coconut palms gathered inside the private land of Miss Bonifacia Collado under OCT No. P-11614 (8) located at Nagrangtayan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan. This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. Wilson Que for the purpose of facilitating the transportation of said coconut slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan and is valid up to March 11, 1994 or upon discharge of its cargoes at its final destination, whichever comes first. It is crystal clear, therefore, that the accused was given permit by the DENR to transport one (1) truckload of coconut slabs only between March 7 to 11, 1994. The accused was apprehended on March 8, 1994aboard his truck bearing plate number PAD-548 which was loaded not only with coconut slabs but with chainsawn lumber as well. Admittedly, the lumber could not be seen from the outside. The lumber were placed in the middle and not visible unless the coconut slabs which were placed on the top, sides and rear of the truck were removed. Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the accused was very much aware that he needed documents to possess and transport the lumber (b)ut could not secure one and,

therefore, concealed the lumber by placing the same in such a manner that they could not be seen by police authorities by merely looking at the cargo. In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to his alleged letter dated March 3, 1994 addressed to the OIC CENRO Officer, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan informing the CENRO that he would be transporting the subject lumber on March 7, 1994 from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur but was returned to him for the reason that he did not need a permit to transport the subject lumber. (Exhibit 8, 8-A) While it is true that the letter indicates that it was received by CENRO on March 4, 1994, the court has doubts that this was duly filed with the concerned office. According to the accused, he filed the letter in the morning of March 4 and returned in the afternoon of the same day. He was then informed by an employee of the CENRO whom he did not identify that he did not need a permit to transport the lumber because the lumber would be for personal used (sic) and x x came from PLTP. (Ibid) The letter-request was returned to him. The fact that the letter-request was returned to him creates doubts on the stance of the accused. Documents or other papers, i.e., letter-request of this kind filed with a government agency are not returned. Hence, when a person files or submits any document to a government agency, the agency gets the original copy. The filer only gets a duplicate copy to show that he has filed such document with the agency. Moreover, his avoidance as regards the identity of the employee of the CENRO who allegedly returned the letter-request to him also creates doubts on his stance. Thus, on cross-examination, the accused, when asked about the identity of the employee of the CENRO who returned the letter-request to him answered that he could recognize the person x x but they were already reshuffled. (TSN, February 8, 1995, p. 104) At one point, the accused also said that he did not know if that person was an employee of the DENR. (Ibid, p. 105) Be that as it may, the Court finds significance in the last paragraph of this letter-request, to wit: x x x Please consider this as my Certificate of Transport Agreement in view of the fact that I am hauling and transporting my own lumber for my own needs. Thus, the accused through this letter considered the same as his certificate of transport agreement. Why then, if he was telling the truth, did he not take this letter with him when he transported the lumber on March 7, 1994? All these circumstances clearly show that the letter comes from a polluted source.[19] xxx Accused-appellants possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705. We also reject appellants argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering,

collecting or removal of such forest products is legal. There are two (2) distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit: (1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and (2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations. In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum. On the second and third assignment of error, appellant contends that the seized lumber are inadmissible in evidence for being fruits of a poisonous tree. Appellant avers that these pieces of lumber were obtained in violation of his constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures as well as his right to counsel. We do not agree. The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle was summarized by this court in People vs. Bagista,[20] thus: The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person shall be subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The basis for the rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized. Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the aforementioned right shall, among others, be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The Constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.

With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. (citations omitted; emphasis supplied) As in Bagista, the police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to search appellants truck. A member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received a reliable information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos Norte. Two weeks later, while members of the Provincial Task Force were patrolling along General Segundo Avenue, they saw the ten-wheeler truck described by the informant. When they apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge, accused-appellant, the owner of the truck and the cargo, admitted that there were sawn lumber in between the coconut slabs. When the police officers asked for the lumbers supporting documents, accusedappellant could not present any. The foregoing circumstances are sufficient to prove the existence of probable cause which justified the extensive search of appellants truck even without a warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber were lawfully seized and were thus properly admitted as evidence to prove the guilt of accused-appellant. The foregoing disquisition renders unnecessary the issue of whether appellants right to counsel under custodial investigation was violated. The Resolution of the issue will not affect the finding of guilt of appellant. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs Against appellant. SO ORDERED. Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-46772 February 13, 1992 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH VII), GODOFREDO ARROZAL AND LUIS FLORES,respondents. Felipe B. Pagkanlungan for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.: This petition seeks the annulment of the order of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Quezon in Criminal Case No. 1591, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Godofredo, Arrozal, Luis Flares and twenty other John Does," dismissing the information filed therein. The antecedent facts are as follows: The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and punished under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, in an information which read: That on or about the 28th, 29th and 30th days of July 1976, at Barangay Mahabang Lalim, Municipality of General Nakar, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Godofredo Arrozal and Luis Flores, together with twenty (20) other John Does whose identities are still unknown, the first-named accused being the administrator of the Infanta Logging Corporation, with intent to gain, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, titled in the name of her deceased father, Macario Prudente, under Original Certificate of Title No. 6026, and once inside, illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of the said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species, consisting of about 541.48 cubic meters, with total value of FIFTY THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIVE PESOS and FIFTY TWO CENTAVOS (P50,205.52) including government charges, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount. Contrary to Law. Lucena City, 7 January 1977. (p.17, Rollo). On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information on two (2) grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form. On April 13, 1977, the trial court dismissed the information on the grounds invoked (pp. 3242, Rollo), The reconsideration sought was denied on August 9, 1977 (p.42, Rollo). On October 15, 1977, this petition was filed directly with this Court, raising the following questions of law: (1) whether or not the information charged an offense; and (2) whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over the case. On the first issue, the People alleged that, contrary to the allegation of the private respondents and the opinion of the trial court, the information substantially alleged all the elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs as described in Section 68 of P.D. 705. While it was admitted that the information did not precisely allege that the taking of the logs in question was "without the

consent of the state," nevertheless, said information expressly stated that the accused "illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease, lease, license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species. . . ." Since only the state can grant the lease, license, license agreement or permit for utilization of forest resources, including timber, then the allegation in the information that the asportation of the logs was "without any authority" under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, is tantamount to alleging that the taking of the logs was without the consent of the state. We agree with the petitioner. Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . . . When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense (Rule 117, Sec. 2 [a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency of the Information hinges on the question of whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, meet the essential elements of the offense defined in the law (People v. Segovia, 103 Phil. 1162 [1958]; People v. Abad, L-55132, August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 57). The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered, collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber or other forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to any private individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under a license agreement, lease, license, or permit granted by the state. The Order dismissing the complaint concluded that the information was defective because: . . ., it is noted that the Information alleges that the cutting, gathering and carrying away of the logs were done without the consent of the owner of the land. While the prosecution admits that timber is a forest product that belongs to the state, the information, however, fails to allege that the taking was without the consent of the latter, for which reason the Information is patently defective. (p. 39, Rollo) The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal. It should be noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a public forest but from a private woodland registered in the name of complainant's deceased father, Macario Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not make the state the owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the Philippines including those produced in private woodlands. The case of Santiago v. Basilan Company, G.R. No. L-15532, October 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 349, clarified the matter on ownership of timber in private lands. This Court held therein:

The defendant has appealed, claiming that it should not be held liable to the plaintiff because the timber which it cut and gathered on the land in question belongs to the government and not to the plaintiff, the latter having failed to comply with a requirement of the law with respect to his property. The provision of law referred to by appellant is a section of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, which reads; "Sec. 1829. Registration of title to private forest land. Every private owner of land containing timber, firewood and other minor forest products shall register his title to the same with the Director of Forestry. A list of such owners, with a statement of the boundaries of their property, shall be furnished by said Director to the Collector of Internal Revenue, and the same shall be supplemented from time to time as occasion may require. Upon application of the Director of Forestry the fiscal of the province in which any such land lies shall render assistance in the examination of the title thereof with a view to its registration in the Bureau of Forestry." In the above provision of law, there is no statement to the effect that non-compliance with the requirement would divest the owner of the land of his rights thereof and that said rights of ownership would be transferred to the government. Of course, the land which had been registered and titled in the name of the plaintiff under that Land Registration Act could no longer be the object of a forester license issued by the Director of Forestry because ownership of said land includes also ownership of everything found on its surface (Art. 437, New Civil Code). Obviously, the purpose of the registration required in section 1829 of the Administrative Code is to exempt the title owner of the land from the payment of forestry charges as provided for under Section 266 of the National Internal Revenue Code, to wit: "Charges collective on forest products cut, gathered and removed from unregistered private lands. The charges above prescribed shall be collected on all forest products cut, gathered and removed from any private land the title to which is not registered with the Director of Forestry as required by the Forest Law; Provided, however, That in the absence of such registration, the owner who desires to cut, gather and remove timber and other forest products from such land shall secure a license from the Director of Forestry Law and Regulations. The cutting, gathering and removing of timber and the other forest products from said private lands without license shall be considered as unlawful cutting, gathering and removing of forest products from public forests and shall be subject to the charges prescribed in such cases in this chapter. xxx xxx xxx On the other hand, while it is admitted that the plaintiff has failed to register the timber in his land as a private woodland in accordance with the oft-repeated provision of the Revised Administrative Code, he still retained his rights of ownership, among which are his rights to the fruits of the land and to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof (Art. 429, New Civil Code) the very rights violated by the defendant Basilan Lumber Company.

While it is only the state which can grant a license or authority to cut, gather, collect or remove forest products it does not follow that all forest products belong to the state. In the just cited case, private ownership of forest products grown in private lands is retained under the principle in civil law that ownership of the land includes everything found on its surface. Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not material; it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without any authority or license from the government. Anent the second issue raised, Section 80 of Presidential Decree 705, provides: Sec. 80. Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions. A forest officer or employee of the Bureau shall arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense, and the forest products cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the process of committing the offense. The arresting forest officer or employee shall thereafter deliver within six (6) hours from the time of arrest and seizure, the offender and the confiscated forest products, tools and equipment to, and file the proper complaint with, the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations and file informations in court. If the arrest and seizure are made in the forests, far from the authorities designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations, the delivery to, and filing of the complaint with, the latter shall be done within a reasonable time sufficient for ordinary travel from the place of arrest to the place of delivery. The seized products, materials and equipment shall be immediately disposed of in accordance with forestry administrative orders promulgated by the Department Head. The Department Head may deputize any member or unit of the Philippine Constabulary, police agency, barangay or barrio official, or any qualified person to protect the forest and exercise the power or authority provided for in the preceding paragraph. Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in this Chapter, not committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the deputized officers or officials, shall immediately be investigated by the forest officer assigned in the area where the offense was allegedly committed, who shall thereupon receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint. If there is a prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating forest officer shall file the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases and file an information in Court. The above cited provision covers two (2) specific instances when a forest officer may commence a prosecution for the violation of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The first authorizes a forest officer or employee of the Bureau of Forestry to arrest without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing, in his presence, any of the offenses described in the decree. The second covers a situation when an offense described in the decree is not

committed in the presence of the forest officer or employee and the commission is brought to his attention by a report or a complaint. In both cases, however, the forest officer or employee shall investigate the offender and file a complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation and file the necessary informations in court. The circumstances in the instant case do not fall under any of the situations covered by Section 80 of P.D. 705. The alleged offense was committed not in the presence of a forest officer and neither was the alleged commission reported to any forest officer. The offense was committed in a private land and the complaint was brought by a private offended party to the fiscal. The trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter because the information was filed not pursuant to the complaint of any forest officer as prescribed in Section 80 of P.D. 705. We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that: . . ., the authority given to the forest officer to investigate reports and complaints regarding the commission of offenses defined in P.D. No. 705 by the said last and penultimate paragraphs of Section 80 may be considered as covering only such reports and complaints as might be brought to the forest officer assigned to the area by other forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development, or any of the deputized officers or officials, for violations of forest laws not committed in their presence. Such interpretation becomes cogent when we consider that the whole of Section 80 deals precisely with the authority of forest officers or employees to make arrests and institute criminal actions involving offenses defined in the Decree. (p. 26, Rollo). Likewise, the Solicitor General was correct in insisting that P.D. 705 did not repeal Section 1687 of the Administrative Code giving authority to the fiscal to conduct investigation into the matter of any crime or misdemeanor and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against persons charged with the commission of the crime. Sec. 1687. Authority of fiscal to conduct investigation in criminal matter. A provincial fiscal shall have authority, if he deems it wise, to conduct an investigation into the matter of any crime or misdemeanor. To this end, he may summon reputed witnesses and require them to appear and testify upon oath before him. . . . With the exception of the so-called "private crimes" 1 and in election offenses, 2 prosecutions in Courts of First Instance may be commenced by an information signed by a fiscal after conducting a preliminary investigation. Section 80 of P.D. 705 did not divest the fiscals of this general authority. Neither did the said decree grant forest officers the right of preliminary investigations. In both cases under said Sec. 80 namely, 1) after a forest officer had made the arrest (for offenses committed in his presence); or 2) after conducting an investigation of reports or complaints of violations of the decree (for violations not committed in his presence) he is still required to file the proper complaint with the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations in court. Said section should not be interpreted to vest exclusive authority upon forest officers to conduct investigations regarding offenses described in the decree rather, it should be construed as granting forest officers and employees special

authority to arrest and investigate offenses described in P.D. 705, to reinforce the exercise of such authority by those upon whom it is vested by general law. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned order of the trial court dismissing the information is SET ASIDE. Criminal Cases No. 1591 is reinstated. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Cruz and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 152989. September 4, 2002] ROLDAN, JR. vs. HON. MADRONA, et al. THIRD DIVISION Gentlemen: Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 04 SEPT 2002. G.R. No. 152989 (Manuel Jorge Roldan, Jr. vs. Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona Pairing Judge, RTC Branch 12, Ormoc City and Hon. Alberto L. Conopio, City Prosecutor, Ormoc City, ATTY. FIEL MARMITA, OIC, DENR-CENRO, Albuera, Leyte.) At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Herein petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land consisting of about 60,000 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. TP-331 which he bought from a certain Ildefonso O. Maglasang. On August 9, 2001, petitioner applied for a Private Land Timber Permit (PLTP) from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for him to cut some trees for a proposed road and poultry farm in his property. He also paid all the fees required by the various government agencies. While waiting for the permit to be issued, petitioner was allegedly informed by some employees from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that he could proceed with the cutting of trees even though his application was still awaiting approval. Consequently, petitioner proceeded with the cutting of trees and bulldozing of the roadway. He used the cut logs as materials to build his chicken cages. About three weeks later, representatives of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and personnel from the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) of Tacloban City raided

petitioners place, allegedly without a search warrant. An inventory of the cut trees was conducted. The logs were not confiscated but were entrusted to a barangay kagawad since there was allegedly no search warrant at that time. About two days later, the CENRO representatives came back with members of the media and ISAFP charging illegal logging but they failed to get the logs, again for alleged lack of search warrant. Several days thereafter, the CENRO group and ISAFP returned, this time armed with a search warrant and proceeded to confiscate 872 pieces of sawn lumber/flitches (8,506 board feet) and three felled timber logs with a total market value of P235,454.68 at P27.00 per board foot. Consequently, on September 21, 2001, a complaint for violation of Section 68 of PD 705 as amended was filed against herein petitioner by CENRO before the City Prosecutor of Ormoc City. Thereafter, the City Prosecutor issued a resolution dated November 16, 2001 finding probable cause to convict petitioner for violation of Section 68 of PD 705 as amended. A motion for reconsideration proved futile for, as it turned out, the information had already been filed in court. Jurisdiction over the case was transferred to the regional trial court, also a public respondent in this case. A warrant for the arrest of petitioner was then issued by the court a quo. In view thereof, herein petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and the recall of his warrant of arrest. After hearing the said motion, public respondent Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, in an order dated February 15, 2000 denied the motion but reduced the recommended bail of petitioner. Hence, the instant petition. Before us, petitioner raises the following issues: (1) whether the owner of a private land, the petitioner in this case, is criminally liable under Section 68 of PD 705 for cutting trees within his own property; (2) whether the owner of the private property is administratively liable under Sec. 14 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21 despite the fact that he did not transport the logs out of his property and just used them for his own agricultural purposes therein and (3) whether the logs confiscated by the DENR should be returned to the petitioner considering that the same were not transported out and merely used for his own agricultural purposes. As to the first issue, petitioner contends that he should not be held liable under Section 68 of PD 705 as amended since the timber that was cut and gathered came from his titled property. He further asserts that the part of Section 68, PD 705 incorporating the provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code regarding qualified theft should not be made to apply to his case since the aforestated articles of the penal code apply only to those who commit theft, which under the law is a crime committed when there is unlawful taking of a property belonging to another. He insists that both penal provisions should not be made to apply since he is the owner of the property and as owner he cannot be accused of stealing his own property.

Petitioner concludes that Article 309 therefore applies only to other persons or strangers gathering timber from the titled property of another while Article 310 is inapplicable in his case since such pertains to theft of coconuts in a plantation. At the outset, the Court notes that while petitioner continues to harp on the alleged questions of law present in this case, the petition at bar was filed via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Nothing is more settled than the rule that a writ of certiorari lies only where a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Court believes that none of the aforementioned circumstances is present in this case. Be that as it may, although this Court at the outset had pointed out that herein petitioner adopted the wrong remedy and committed certain technical violations of the Rules on Civil Procedure which necessitate its outright dismissal, nevertheless, in the interest of substantial justice and in view of the novelty of the question of law involved, the Court in the exercise of its judicial discretion shall treat this petition as having been filed under Rule 45. The fundamental question of law we seek to resolve in this case is: may a person who cuts trees for his own use within his property without the necessary permit from the DENR and without transporting the same outside said property, be criminally charged for violating PD 705? Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by E.O. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines provides: SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License.- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied) Herein petitioner argues that even if the phrase pertaining to Articles 309 and 310 of the penal code was only meant to prescribe the imposable penalty, since the cut trees were from his private land, his penalty should not be equated with that imposable on those who commit theft inasmuch as theft and qualified theft involve the unlawful taking of a property belonging to another. The argument of petitioner is specious. Under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, it is clear that the violators of the said law are not declared as being guilty of qualified theft. Articles

309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code were referred to only for the purpose of determining the imposable penalties and not to define acts which constitute qualified theft. Moreover, petitioners argument that the provisions of the law regarding qualified theft should not be applied to him since he is the owner of the property is devoid of merit. It must be stressed that petitioner is not being charged for qualified theft but for violation of Section 68, PD 705 hence his ownership of the land is of no moment. The said law does not even distinguish whether or not the person who commits the punishable acts under the aforementioned law is the owner of the property, for what is material in determining the culpability of a person is whether or not the person or entity involved or charged with its violation possesses the required permit, license or authorization from DENR at the time he or it cuts, gathers or collects timber or other forest products. As to his assertion that his penalty for cutting trees in his own land should not be equated with that for qualified theft, suffice it to say that the judiciary is never concerned with the wisdom of the law. Whether or not the legislature was correct in imposing on violators of PD 705 a penalty equal to that imposable on those guilty of qualified theft is a question beyond the power of this Court to resolve. It is a settled rule that the fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law regardless of who may be affected, even if the law is harsh - dura lex sed lex. The remedy is elsewhere clemency from the executive or an amendment of the law by the legislature. We come now to the second issue posed by herein petitioner on whether the owner of a private property is administratively liable under Section 14 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21 despite the fact that he did not transport the logs out of his property and used them for his own agricultural purposes. Section 14 of Administrative Order No. 2000-21, the Revised Guidelines in the Issuance of Private Land Timber Permit/Special Private Land Timber Permit, provides: SEC. 14. Penal Provisions. - Any log/timber or finished-wood products covered by these regulations which are transported without the prescribed documents shall be considered illegal and, therefore, subject to confiscation in favor of the government and shall be disposed in accordance with laws, rules and regulations governing the matter. DENR Officials found issuing defective certificate of origin and other transport documents required in this Order shall be subject to suspension without prejudice to the imposition of other penalties as may be warranted by extant Civil Service Laws, rules and regulations. The rule is clear. The aforementioned administrative order considers the mere act of transporting any wood product or timber without the prescribed documents as an offense which is subject to the penalties provided for by law. As to the defense of petitioner that he never transported the logs out of his property, suffice it to say that such is a factual issue which this Court under Rule 45 cannot determine. We are limited to resolving questions of law. On the issue of whether the logs confiscated by the DENR should be returned to petitioner, any pronouncement thereon at this point would be premature as the guilt of the petitioner has not been legally established. The records of the case indicate that trial on the merits is still in

progress. Hence, this Court is not in a position to speculate on or prescribe the courses of action or remedies the petitioner may avail of under the aforementioned law. Well-entrenched is the rule that this Court is not duty bound to render advisory opinions. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Very truly yours, (Sgd.) JULIETA Y. CARREON Clerk of Court

[G.R. No. 161798. October 20, 2004] PICOP RESOURCES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. AUGUSTUS L. CALO, Presiding Judge, RTC of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 5, Butuan City, HON. VICTOR A. TOMANENG, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, 10thJudicial Region, Branch 5, Butuan City, EDUARDO CASIA, ROGELIO CASTILLO, ULDARICO CASINGINAN, ELADIO GALANO, CATALINO VIRTUDAZO, RICARDO BALAD-ON, JOEL VILLAREAL, TIBURCIO IMPUERTO, HILARIO FERNANDEZ, ANDREA VASQUEZ, SPOUSES REMELITO CODERA and MARILYN RANOSO-CODERA, and FLORIO JOSAFAT, JR., for himself and in representation by way of a class suit the Members of the UNIFIED FARMERS ASSOCIATION OF BISLIG (UFAB), respondents. RESOLUTION Tinga, J.: Petitioner PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) owns and operates a multi-billion peso pulp and paper manufacturing facility in Bislig City, Agusan del Norte. It holds government-issued Pulpwood and Timber License Agreement (PTLA) No. 47 and Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) No. 35 which gave petitioner the exclusive right to co-manage and develop with the State almost 130,000 hectares of forest land within the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through its officers, rendered three Memoranda, dated August 22, 1997,[1] February 16, 2001,[2] and April 6, 2001,[3] by virtue of which petitioner was designated a DENR depository and custodian for apprehended forest products and conveyances within its concession. On May 25, 2001, the Office of the CENROBislig and petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) containing Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Verification of Private Tree Plantation.[4] The MOA provided, among others, that field validation/verification of applications for Certificates of Private Tree Ownership (CTPOs) shall be conducted jointly by the DENR, the local government unit concerned, and petitioner. Pursuant to these Memoranda, petitioners security personnel were

deputized as DENR officers to apprehend and seize the tools, equipment and conveyance used in the commission of illegal logging and the forest products removed and possessed by the offenders. In the course of the enforcement of the aforesaid Memoranda, petitioner PICOP, through its security personnel, had on numerous occasions apprehended within its concession and tree plantation area, violators who loaded the illegally cut trees in trucks and other forms of conveyance, such as carabaos, for transport out of the plantation area. These illegally cut forest products and conveyances were kept in PICOPs impounding area. On June 18, 2001, private respondents Eduardo Casia, Rogelio Castillo, Uldarico Casinginan, Eladio Galano, Catalino Virtudazo, Ricardo Balad-on, Joel Villareal, Tiburcio Impuerto, Hilario Fernandez, Andrea Vasquez, Spouses Remelito Codera and Marilyn Ranoso-Codera, and Florio Josafat, Jr., for himself and in representation, by way of a class suit, of the members of the UNITED FARMERS ASSOCIATION OF BISLIG (UFAB), filed a complaint for damages and injunction with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary mandatory injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, Agusan del Norte and Butuan City against the DENR Regional Office XIII (CARAGA) and/or its Regional Executive Director Elias C. Seraspi, Jr., Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) of Surigao del Sur, Agusan del Norte and Butuan City and/or their respective PENR Officers, Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO) of San Francisco, Bunawan, Lianga and Bislig and/or their respective CENR Officers, and herein petitioner PICOP/Wilfredo D. Fuentes.[5] Private respondents-complainants were some of those apprehended by PICOPS security officers transporting without any permit several hundred cubic meters of falcata logs allegedly grown in petitioners plantation. The logs, trucks and other forms of conveyance on which they were carried were confiscated and kept in petitioners impounding area. Private respondents alleged in their complaint that the Memoranda dated August 22, 1997, February 16, 2001 and April 6, 2001 and the MOA dated May 25, 2001 were illegal for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. They sought to have the Memoranda declared null and void for this reason and also sought to restrain the DENR and all those acting for and in its behalf, including herein petitioner, from enforcing or implementing said Memoranda. On September 21, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision.[6] With regard to private respondents allegation that the aforesaid Memoranda were illegally issued, the trial court disregarded the claim and sustained the validity of the Memoranda. The Memoranda were issuances of a dulyauthorized government agency in the normal and regular course of its duty to enforce forestry laws and procedures. The RTC added that the application for the writ of preliminary injunction was the wrong remedy to assail the legality of the Memoranda, such an action being merely a collateral attack. Private respondents should instead have filed a petition to declare the Memoranda null and void. However, the trial court granted private respondents prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. It noted that administrative or criminal cases had been filed against private respondents involving the apprehended conveyances. The RTC ordered RED Elias R. Seraspio, Jr. to recall, withdraw and abrogate the enforcement of the assailed Memorandum dated February 16, 2001 and commanded all those acting pursuant to said

Memorandum to refrain and desist from implementing the Memorandum. Petitioner was also ordered to release the confiscated falcata logs and vehicles to the owners thereof, or to the CENRO-Bislig or the Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur, where the administrative and criminal proceedings were ongoing.[7] Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied for lack of merit on October 17, 2001.[8] On January 21, 2002, DENR-Region XIII RED Benjamin T. Tumaliuan issued a Memorandum revoking the February 16, 2001 Memorandum issued by former OIC-RED Constancio A. Paye, Jr.[9] On April 29, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of injunction before the Court of Appeals. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit on July 23, 2003.[10] The appellate court held there was no grave abuse of discretion when the RTC issued the assailed Decision and Resolution. Petitioner had no right or interest to protect in the confiscated forest products and conveyances. Petitioners compound was used only as a depository for the confiscated logs and conveyances by virtue of the Memorandum dated February 16, 2001. Neither did petitioner claim ownership of the confiscated conveyances. While it claimed that some of the confiscated forest products may have come from its concession area, petitioner admitted that the ownership of the confiscated products was still to be determined in the cases pending either at the CENRO-Bislig or at the Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur. Hence, petitioners interest in the confiscated forest products was merely contingent and cannot be material as contemplated under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Necessarily therefore, petitioner had no basis to bring the action against respondents and it was not entitled to the ancillary remedy of a writ of preliminary injunction. On August 15, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied in the Resolution of January 16, 2004.[11] Petitioner then filed this petition for review. Petitioner argues that it is a proper party-in-interest, vested with a material interest in the outcome of the case. It allegedly has more than just a contingent interest in the outcome of the dispute. Petitioner contend that private respondents intrusion was in violation of petitioners PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. These license agreements gave petitioner the exclusive right to comanage and develop forest lands, and recognized petitioner as owner of the trees and other products in the concession area.[12] In filing this petition, petitioner is merely defending its subsisting proprietary interest pursuant to these license agreements. Public respondents never refuted petitioner PICOPs allegation that private respondents were apprehended by the DENR-deputized PICOP guards at its checkpoint within PICOPs concession area. Private respondents also never denied that PICOPs guards had been deputized as DENR officers to enforce the Memoranda. Petitioner was therefore within its rights in exercising control over its concession area pursuant to its duty as DENR depository.

Petitioner also argues that the RTC intruded upon the primary jurisdiction of the DENR when it took cognizance of private respondents complaint for damages and issued the writ of injunction. Petitioner invokes DENR Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 97-32[13] in asserting that it has the obligation to keep custody of the apprehended forest products, tools and conveyances, the disposal of which rests solely on the DENR. The RTC also allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion in granting private respondents prayer for issuance of injunction in violation of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Petitioner argues that private respondents should have awaited the results of the administrative procedure for summary administrative apprehensions and seizures of the DENR under Sections 5 and 6 of DAO No. 97-32, instead of filing the complaint before the trial court. This would have allegedly allowed the proper administrative officer to ascertain whether a prima faciecase lies against the offenders and whether the apprehended articles should answer for the offense. By issuing the assailed writ of injunction, the trial court arrogated unto itself the power to rule on the rightful possession of the subject conveyances. Petitioner also contends that the injunctive writ was issued without due process of law since the transfer of custody of the forest products and conveyances was not even sought by private respondents in their complaint. Consequently, the matter of the return of the seized conveyances was never ventilated during the hearing and the issuance of the writ not sought for violates the rules of due process. Petitioners arguments do not convince us. The petition should be denied. It is clear that petitioner has no material interest to protect in the confiscated forest products and conveyances. It has no subsisting proprietary interest, as borne out by its licensing agreements, which need to be protected by annulling the writ of injunction issued by the trial court. As observed by the Court of Appeals, any interest petitioner has in the confiscated properties is dependent on the outcome of the proceedings before the CENRO-Bislig and the Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur. The issue of ownership and possession of the confiscated products still has to be determined in those proceedings. Petitioner had not refuted this. Petitioner also cannot claim the right to retain custody of the apprehended logs and conveyances by virtue of its being designated a depository of the DENR pursuant to the assailed Memoranda. As such depository, petitioner merely holds the confiscated products and conveyances in custody for the DENR while the administrative or criminal proceedings regarding said products are pending. The trial court noted that the confiscated vehicles were already subject of administrative proceedings before the CENRO-Bislig and criminal complaints before the Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur. There were also letters or notices to petitioner from officers of the CENRO and the Office of the Government Prosecution requesting the release of some of the conveyances to their owners.[14] There is no reason for petitioner to refuse to hand over possession of the vehicles and forest products since, being confiscated items, they will

have to be handed over to the proper government agencies for appropriate disposition proceedings. Furthermore, the transfer of custody of the confiscated products and conveyances will not in any way place petitioner at a disadvantage. Petitioner is merely a depository and the release of the conveyances and products to the government agencies concerned has to be done but only in compliance with lawful court orders. It should also be remembered that the Memorandum dated February 16, 2001, which designated petitioner as a DENR depository, had been revoked by the Memorandum of January 21, 2002. As of the filing of the petition for review before this Court on March 11, 2004, petitioner no longer had any right, as a depository, to retain possession of the conveyances. All the foregoing considered, petitioners contention that the trial court violated the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies should also fail. The transfer of custody of the confiscated products to the CENRO and the Office of the Government Prosecution was for the purpose of resolving the cases with dispatch. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is DENIED. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 115634. April 27, 2000] FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA, respondents. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.: For review is the decision.[1] dated May 27, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191, denying the petition filed by herein petitioners for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in order to annul the Order dated May 27, 1992, by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order had denied petitioners (a) Motion to Dismiss the replevin case filed by herein private respondents, as well as (b) petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of said trial court dated April 24, 1992, granting an application for a Writ of replevin..[2] h Y The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows:

On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles, described as follows: "1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one thousand and twenty six (1,026) board feet of illegally sourced lumber valued at P8,544.75, being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by [a certain] Jose Vargas. 2. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one thousand two hundred twenty four and ninety seven (1,224.97) board feet of illegally-sourced lumber valued at P9,187.27, being driven by one Constancio Abuganda and owned by [a certain] Manuela Babalcon. ".[3] Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR (Department of Environment and Natural ResourcesProvincial Environment and Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan..[4] Seizure receipts were issued but the drivers refused to accept the receipts..[5] Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed before the Provincial Prosecutors Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda, in Criminal Case No. 3795, for violation of Section 68 [78), Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.[6] Mis sc On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and Abuganda from the custody of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer Calub this time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against Gabon and Abuganda. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public Prosecutor..[7] On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143, was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan and Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at Barangay Buray, Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded with forest products with an equivalent volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly filed a criminal complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, and several John Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code..[8] In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. But note the trial court ordered that a copy of the decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice, in order that the necessary criminal action may be filed against Noe Pagarao and all other persons responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code. For it appeared that it was Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle and ordered that cut timber be loaded on it..[9] Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles with an application for replevin against herein petitioners before the RTC of

Catbalogan. The trial court granted the application for replevin and issued the corresponding writ in an Order dated April 24, 1992..[10] Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the trial court.[11] Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with application for Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order. The Court issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting further proceedings in the civil case for replevin; and enjoining private respondents from taking or attempting to take the motor vehicles and forest products seized from the custody of the petitioners. The Court further instructed the petitioners to see to it that the motor vehicles and other forest products seized are kept in a secured place and protected from deterioration, said property being in custodia legis and subject to the direct order of the Supreme Court..[12] In a Resolution issued on September 28, 1992, the Court referred said petition to respondent appellate court for appropriate disposition..[13] On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit. It ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277 does not automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. According to the appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or his duly authorized representative to order the confiscation and disposition of illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance used for that purpose is not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or policies on that matter, added the appellate court. The DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate court said. For it prescribes the guidelines in the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in the commission of offenses penalized under Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277..[14] Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners failed to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to render a report of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover, petitioners failure to comply with the procedure laid down by DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the admission of petitioners counsel that no confiscation order has been issued prior to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure, according to the appellate court, the subject vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis..[15] Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in petitioners claim that private respondents complaint for replevin is a suit against the State. Accordingly, petitioners could not shield themselves under the principle of state immunity as the property sought to be recovered in the instant suit had not yet been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor of the government. Moreover, according to respondent appellate court, there could be no pecuniary liability nor loss of property that could ensue against the government. It reasoned that a suit against a public officer who acted illegally or beyond the scope of his authority could not be considered a suit against

the State; and that a public officer might be sued for illegally seizing or withholding the possession of the property of another..[16] Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based on the claim that the subject vehicles were validly seized and held in custody because they were contradicted by its own findings..[17] Their petition was found without merit.[18] Rtc spped Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors:.[19] (1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MERE SEIZURE OF A CONVEYANCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705 AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 277 DOES NOT PLACE SAID CONVEYANCE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS; (2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE OPERATIVE ACT GIVING RISE FOR THE SUBJECT CONVEYANCE TO BE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS IS ITS LAWFUL SEIZURE BY THE DENR PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705, AS AMENDED BY E.O. NO. 277; AND (3) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN AGAINST THE PETITIONERS IS NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE. In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are: (1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, is in custodia legis. (2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against the State. We will now resolve both issues. The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78. Section 78 states: Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forestland, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Codeslx mis The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with the penalties imposed for the

crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing authority to possess and transport said load of forest products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the persons responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the public prosecutor. The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78 of the Revised Forestry Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same Code. They read as follows: Sc Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter. Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. -- A forest officer or employee of the Bureau [Department] or any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense... [Emphasis supplied.] Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code, as follows: Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture. -- All conveyances used in the transport of any forest product obtained or gathered illegally whether or not covered with transport documents, found spurious or irregular in accordance with Sec. 68-A [78-A] of P.D. No. 705, shall be confiscated in favor of the government or disposed of in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter. Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance. -- The Secretary or his duly authorized representative such as the forest officers and/or natural resources officers, or deputized officers of the DENR are authorized to seize said conveyances subject to policies and guidelines pertinent thereto. Deputized military personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other forest products and their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field offices, and turn over said forest products and conveyances for proper action and disposition. In case where the apprehension is made by DENR field officer, the conveyance shall be deposited with the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED Office as the case may be, for safekeeping wherever it is most convenient and secured. [Emphasis supplied.]

Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code. Slxs c Note further that petitioners failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances. Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise..[20] In Mamanteo, et. al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264, promulgated on July 28, 1999, the case involves property to be seized by a Deputy Sheriff in a replevin suit. But said property were already impounded by the DENR due to violation of forestry laws and, in fact, already forfeited in favor of the government by order of the DENR. We said that such property was deemed in custodia legis. The sheriff could not insist on seizing the property already subject of a prior warrant of seizure. The appropriate action should be for the sheriff to inform the trial court of the situation by way of partial Sheriffs Return, and wait for the judges instructions on the proper procedure to be observed. Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we elucidated further: ". . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily be undermined by the simple devise of a writ of replevin...".[21] Scslx On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the two impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, a suit against the State? Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent..[22] And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable..[23] However, the protection afforded to public officers by this

doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption.[24] In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature.[25] In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the States consent. Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the Solicitor Generals line for the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss..[26] If not invoked at the proper time, this ground for dismissal could be deemed waived and the court could take cognizance of the case and try it.[27] Mesm ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191 is SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, dated May 27, 1992, and the Writ of replevin issued in the Order dated April 24, 1992, are ANNULLED. The Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Branch 29, is directed to take possession of the subject motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, for delivery to the custody of and appropriate disposition by petitioners. Let a copy of this decision be provided the Honorable Secretary of Justice for his appropriate action, against any and all persons responsible for the abovecited violation of the Revised Forestry Code. Costs against private respondents. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

CALUB V. COURT OF APPEALS 331 SCRA 55 FACTS: The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the DENR apprehended two trucks carrying with it illegally sourced lumber. The drivers failed to show any legal documents. Thereafter, the trucks and lumber were seized. A criminal complaint was filed against them. The trucks were taken forcibly by the two drivers from the custody of DENR. This

prompted the department to file charges but these were dismissed. Again though, the trucks were then caught and seized, for carrying illegally sourced lumber once again. Subsequently, an action for replevin was filed by the private respondents. The trial court granted the application for replevin and the CA affirmed this decision.

HELD: Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise.

[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1786. August 28, 2003] ALFREDO Y. CHU, complainant, vs. JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Ninth Judicial Region, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law, serious misconduct, and grave abuse of discretion filed by Alfredo Y. Chu (complainant) against Judge Camilo E. Tamin (respondent judge) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur (Branch 23). The Facts Complainant alleged that on 9 September 1999, Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer Michael F. dela Cruz (CENRO dela Cruz) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region IX, applied for a search warrant with respondent judge. CENRO dela Cruz claimed that complainant was in possession of forest products of dubious origin in violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705[1] (PD 705), as amended. On the same day, respondent judge issued Search Warrant No. 364 ordering the seizure of several pieces of mangrove lumber from complainants fishpond in Bulawan, Payao, Zamboanga del Sur. On the strength of the warrant, CENRO dela Cruz, assisted by law enforcement agents, seized from complainant 576 pieces of pagatpat lumber (mangrove specie) with an estimated value of P183,790.

On 22 September 1999, complainant obtained from Branch 23 a copy of the complete records of the issuance of Search Warrant No. 364, as certified by Branch Clerk of Court Ma. Asuncion Pabatao-Lumapas (Clerk of Court Lumapas). On 24 September 1999, complainant again obtained, for the second time, a copy of the complete records of the case, also certified by Clerk of Court Lumapas. These certified copies did not contain any transcript of respondent judges examination of CENRO dela Cruz or his witnesses as required under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus, complainant filed this administrative complaint. Complainant pointed out that this was the fifth time that respondent judge issued, under questionable procedure, search warrants against him for violation of PD 705. Complainant recalled that on 10 November 1998, respondent judge issued four search warrants against him (Search Warrant Nos. 281 to 284), authorizing the seizure from his compound of pagatpat lumber worth more than P1.5 million. Complainant alleged that the records of the four warrants did not also contain any transcript of the required examination of witnesses. Complainant therefore moved to quash the four warrants. Respondent judge, however, denied the motion on the ground that he had in fact conducted such examination but the record of the deposition was misfiled in another case folder through inadvertence.[2] In response to the directive of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of this Court to comment on the complaint, respondent judge, in his Second Indorsement (Indorsement) dated 16 December 1999, denied complainants allegations. Respondent judge asserted that at around 1:15 p.m. of 9 September 1999, he personally examined a certain Reynaldo Cuaresma (Cuaresma), allegedly a witness of CENRO dela Cruz, before issuing the warrant in question. He claimed that a transcript of the examination was included in the records of Search Warrant No. 364. However, he forwarded the records to the OCA on 30 September 1999 in connection with his request for the transfer of the case to the RTC, Branch 24, in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur (Branch 24). In lieu of the original copy, respondent judge attached to his Indorsement an alleged computer printout of the transcript, claiming that the time and date of its encoding was verifiable in the computer files in his office. Due to the conflicting factual allegations of the parties, the Court directed the Executive Judge of the RTC of Pagadian City, Zamboanga del Sur to: (1) verify from Branch 23 whether respondent judge examined any witness before issuing Search Warrant No. 364; and (2) secure from Clerk of Court Lumapas her explanation on the apparent discrepancy between the copy of the records of Search Warrant No. 364, as forwarded by respondent judge to the OCA and as obtained by complainant. In his Report, dated 30 July 2001, RTC Pagadian City Executive Judge Franklyn A. Villegas (Executive Judge Villegas) stated that he verified the records of Search Warrant No. 364 in Branch 23. He found on page 5 of the records a copy of the transcript of the examination conducted by respondent judge on one Reynaldo Cuaresma. He attached in his report the explanations of respondent judge and Clerk of Court Lumapas.[3] In his explanation, dated 11 July 2001, respondent judge reiterated the claim he made in his Indorsement of 16 December 1999 that he examined a certain Reynaldo Cuaresma before issuing Search Warrant No. 364. He explained that the records of the case contained a copy of

the transcript of the examination. However, respondent judge alleged, for the first time, that the legal researcher in his office who prepared the duplicate copy issued to complainant on 22 September 1999 failed, through pure inadvertence, to recopy such transcript. Respondent judge attributed such omission to the fact that at that time, the pages of the records were not yet physically paged. He claimed that the pages were numbered only upon preparation of the records for transmittal to Branch 24 the following week. He further asserted that the copy of the transcript in question was numbered page 5. Branch 24, however, refused to accept the referral of the case. Thus, respondent judge forwarded the records to the OCA with a request for their transmittal to Branch 24. The OCA later returned the records to respondent judge as their proper custodian.[4] Clerk of Court Lumapas affirmed respondent judges claims and defenses in her explanation dated 11 July 2001.[5] In the Resolution of 10 September 2001, the Court referred this case to the OCA for evaluation, report, and recommendation. OCAs Findings and Conclusions In its Report dated 10 December 2002, the OCA found respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of the law and recommended the imposition of a P5,000 fine. The Report reads in part: Respondent judge stands firm on his claim that he conducted searching questions on Reynaldo Charesma [sic]. We find this claim highly suspect. First, the respondent judge [initially] failed to produce a copy of the transcript of the searching questions allegedly made on September 9, 1999 and append the same to the record of the case. x x x x The transcript of the searching questions was, in fact, produced [only] after the filing of the instant complaint. Further, it was noted that during the hearing of [complainants motion to quash Search Warrant] Nos. 281, 282, 283 and 28[4] taken on 21 January 1999 at 9:30 a.m.[,] respondent judge apparently believes that searching questions need not be in writing. This is borne by the following exchange during the said hearing: Atty. R. Rambuyong [Counsel for complainant Alfredo Chu]: In other words Your Honor, they would not admit that the accused received copies? Court: Is there a rule that the searching question must be in writing? Atty. R. Rambuyong: From the Case of HATA versus BAYONA, Your Honor, the Supreme Court has required. As a matter of fact, I cited that in my supplemental motion and the Court said that, mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses is not enough. There must be the deposition in writing, and under oath of the complainants and his witnesses; and searching questions should be propounded by the examining Judge. As a matter of fact, there have been several decisions of

the Supreme Court to the effect that mere ceremonial searching questions and answers reiterating the contents of the affidavits will not be sufficient compliance [there] with. x x x x. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that respondent judge either did not conduct the required searching questions, or if he did, he did not put it in writing. Thus, respondent judge erred because Section 5, Rule 126, [of the ] Rules of Court specifically [requires such] x x x. This is a basic legal precept which all judges are expected to be conversant with. Th[e] Court has often impressed upon judges that as mandated by the Code of Judicial Conduct, they owe it to the public and legal profession to know the very law they are supposed to apply to a given case. In this case, respondent judge failed to observe an elementary rule which amount[s] to ignorance of the law, thereby subjecting him to disciplinary action. (Emphasis in the original) The Ruling of the Court The report of the OCA is well-taken. Section 5, Rule 126[6] of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted. (Emphasis supplied) This provision implements the proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures found in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which states: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for whatever purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The Court, in Pendon v. Court of Appeals,[7] reiterated the requirements of Section 2 on the issuance of search warrants, which judges must strictly observe,[8] as follows: Under the above provision, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause. x x x In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge x x x must examine the x x x witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. (Emphasis supplied)[9] Respondent judge explained that in issuing Search Warrant No. 364, he complied with the rule that he must personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses. Respondent judge stated, however, that the

certified copies of the records obtained by complainant did not include the transcript of his examination because the clerical staff in his office who prepared the certified copies inadvertently failed to do so. This explanation fails to persuade us. Respondent judges own Clerk of Court certified twice, first on 22 September 1999 and later on 24 September 1999, that the 29-page copy of the records obtained by complainant constitutes the entire record of the matter.[10] This renders improbable respondent judges claim that the transcript already formed part of the records but the legal researcher in his office inadvertently missed it in preparing the copy obtained by complainant on 22 September 1999. The alleged legal researcher, who presumably also prepared the second certified copy, could not have committed the same mistake, twice in a row, within two days of each other. Curiously, in his Indorsement of 16 December 1999, respondent judge did not point to his legal researchers negligence as the cause for the discrepancy. Neither did respondent judge state that the pages of the contents of the folder of Search Warrant No. 364 were unnumbered when complainant requested for copies. What he stated in his Indorsement was that the records contained a copy of the transcript but the same was already forwarded to the OCA. If, as respondent judge claims, he personally examined a certain Cuaresma as the witness of CENRO dela Cruz, he should have secured the affidavit of Cuaresma. Respondent judge should also have secured the affidavit of the unnamed legal researcher who allegedly prepared the copies of the records obtained by complainant. Respondent judge failed to secure their affidavits to corroborate his claims. Lastly, respondent judge should have shown Executive Judge Villegas, during the latters investigation, the magnetic (hard disk) copy of the transcript allegedly stored in his office computer. These omissions bolster complainants claim and correspondingly weaken respondent judges defense. As it is, other than respondent judges bare claim that he examined a certain Cuaresma, the only proof on record in his favor is an unsigned computer printout of the alleged record of the examination. Considering that any one can easily create and print out such document, it does not suffice to exculpate respondent judge from administrative liability. We uphold the OCAs findings that respondent judge, who had earlier professed ignorance of the rule in question, failed either to examine any witness before issuing Search Warrant No. 364 or to reduce the examination in writing. His omission renders him liable for gross ignorance of the law. When the law is so elementary, such as the provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court on search warrant issuance, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[11] Specifically, respondent judge failed to conform to the high standards of competence required of judges under the Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates that: Rule 1.01. A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. Rule 3.01 A judge shall x x x maintain professional competence. What was said in a case,[12] similarly involving gross ignorance of basic rules, bears repeating here:

[A judge] is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. It is imperative that he be studious of and conversant with basic legal principles. He owes [it] to the dignity of the court he sits in, to the legal profession he belongs, and to the public who depends on him, to know the law which he is called upon to x x x apply. Not only that, there would be on the part of the litigants less expense and greater faith in the administration of justice if there be a belief on their part that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of apparent deficiency in their grasp [of] legal principles. On the Penalty to be Imposed As recommended by the OCA, respondent judge should be fined P5,000. On 26 June 2003, in Gregorio Limpot Lumapas v. Judge Camilo Tamin,[13] this Court dismissed respondent judge from the service for disobedience to an order issued by a superior court, as well as for gross ignorance of the law x x x with forfeiture of all benefits due him except for accrued leave credits. Thus, the fine of P5,000 should be deducted from respondent judges accrued leave benefits.[14] WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Camilo E. Tamin, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is ordered to pay a fine of P5,000 to be deducted from his accrued leave credits. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 152160. January 13, 2004] VIRGILIO BON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Testimony of what one heard a party say is not necessarily hearsay. It is admissible in evidence, not to show that the statement was true, but that it was in fact made. If credible, it may form part of the circumstantial evidence necessary to convict the accused. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the August 22, 2001 Decision[2] and the February 15, 2002 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA - GR CR No. 15673. The dispositive part of the assailed Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 23, 1993 convicting [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon is hereby AFFIRMED with modification on the penalty in that [petitioner] is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen (14) years [and] eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Accused-appellant Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. is herebyACQUITTED.[4] The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The Antecedents The antecedents are summarized by the CA as follows: [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged for violating Section 68 of PD 705, as amended[,] together with Rosalio Bon under an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows: That sometime in the month of January or February, 1990, at Barangay Basud, Municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, cut, gather and manufacture into lumber four (4) narra trees, one (1) cuyao-yao tree, and one (1) amugis tree, with an approximate volume of 4,315 bd. ft. and valued at approximately P25,000.00, without the knowledge and consent of the owner Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza and without having first obtained from proper authorities the necessary permit or license and/or legal supporting documents, to the damage and prejudice of the Government and the owner in the aforementioned amount of P25,000.00. Contrary to law. Upon arraignment on May 16, 1991, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon[,] Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. and Rosalio Bon entered a plea of Not Guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, the trial of the case proceeded. The prosecution presented Nestor Labayan[e], [Private Complainant] Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza, [Barangay] Tanod Julian Lascano, Alexander Mendones [and] Manuel Dangalan as its witnesses. The defense, on the other hand, presented accused Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., Rosalio Bon and Virgilio Bon. The evidence for the prosecution [w]as synthesized by the trial court, as follows: Prosecutions evidence was supplied by Julian Lascano, Oscar Narvaez, Alexander Mendones, Manuel Dangalan, Nestor Labayan[e] and Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] which shows that Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] owns a titled agricultural land under Title No. 6666 located in Basud, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, administered by Virgilio Bon. Receiving information that trees inside the land were being stolen, cut [and] sawed into lumber by her administrator and/or workers, she sent her brother Manuel Dangalan to investigate the report. On February 7, 1990, Manuel Dangalan sought the help of Barangay Captain Nestor Labayane, who in turn wrote a letter to one of the [b]arangay [t]anod[s], Julian Lascano, to assist and investigate Teresita [Dangalan-Mendozas] complaint of Illegal Cutting of Trees. On February 12, 1990, together with Julian Lascano, Manuel Dangalan, Ricardo Valladolid, Natividad Legaspi and Virgilio Bon

repaired to the land of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza]. During their investigation, the group discovered six (6) stumps of trees[:] four (4) Narra trees, one cuyao-yao tree and one am[u]gis tree. Pictures were taken of the stumps x x x. On the land, Virgilio Bon admitted ordering the cutting and sawing of the trees into lumber. Oscar Narvaez testified that sometime in January, 1990, he sawed the trees into six flitches upon instruction of Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr.; Alexander Mendones, CENRO Officer, upon complaint of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] for Illegal Cutting of Trees repaired to the land on July 17, 1990, and found four stumps of trees. Scaling the four stumps, it was his estimate that the lumber produced was 11.97 cubic meters o[r] 4,315 board feet, with a value of P25,376.00 x x x. In their defense, all the three accused took the witness stand and denied the accusation. Their testimonies were summarized by the trial court, as follows: All the accused testified in their defense. Rosalio Bon, the son of Virgilio Bon denied the charge[.] [He said] that he was in Manila from December 1989 and returned to Sorsogon on March 21, 1990. He mentioned that the purpose of filing this case was to eject his father as tenant of the land. Virgilio Bon testified that he is the tenant of the land of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] [and was] instituted [as such] by Teresitas father. He developed the land[,] planting coconuts, abaca and fruit trees. Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] wanted to eject him as tenant. He and the private complainant [have] an agrarian case. Since Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] refused to receive the landowners share of produce, he deposited the money in the Rural Bank of Sorsogon in the name of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] x x x. He denied cutting and gathering the trees in the land and pointed to Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] as the one who ordered the trees [to be cut] and sawed by Oscar Narvaez. Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] upon being confronted about the cutting of trees, ignored his complaint. Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., son-in-law of Virgilio Bon, denied that he hired Oscar Narvaez to saw the lumber. Oscar Narvaez [indicted] him of the crime because the former had a grudge against him. In a drinking spree, he happened to box Oscar Narvaez[,] after [which he] heard [the latter threaten him with] revenge. On August 23, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision convicting [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. for the crime charged. Co-accused Rosalio Bon was acquitted. Aggrieved by the said decision, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. interposed [an] appeal [to the CA].[5] In their appeal to the CA, petitioner and Jeniebre questioned the prosecution witnesses credibility and the sufficiency of the evidence proving their guilt. Ruling of the Court of Appeals The CA sustained the trial courts assessment of the credibility of Prosecution Witnesses Julian Lascano and Manuel Dangalan. Both testified that petitioner had admitted to having ordered the cutting of trees on Teresita Dangalan-Mendozas land.

Furthermore, the appellate court held that despite the absence of direct evidence in this case, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict petitioner. It ruled that the requirements for the sufficiency of the latter type of evidence under Section 4 of Rule 133[6] of the Rules of Court were amply satisfied by the following established facts: 1) in the presence of Dangalan, Lascano and Natividad Legaspi, petitioner admitted that he had ordered the cutting of the trees; 2) on February 12, 1990, he and his son Rosalio went to Dangalan-Mendoza, demanding that she pay the value of the trees cut; and 3) on February 13, 1990, petitioner asked her to forgive him for cutting the trees. The CA held, however, that the same circumstances did not support the conviction of Jeniebre. Aside from the testimony of Oscar Narvaez that Jeniebre hired him to cut the trees into flitches, no other evidence was presented to show the latters participation in the offense charged. Moreover, the appellate court held that the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28 of Rule 130[7] of the Rules of Court would be violated by binding Jeniebre to petitioners admission, which did not constitute any of the exceptions[8] to this provision. It thus acquitted him. As to petitioner, the CA modified the penalty imposed, pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code as amended, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, and Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Hence, this Petition.[9] Issues Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration: I Whether hearsay testimony[,] which is denied by the alleged author under oath in open court, is admissible in evidence against him. II Whether hearsay testimony allegedly made to potential prosecution witnesses who are not police operatives or media representatives is admissible in evidence against the author because what a man says against himself[,] if voluntary, is believable for the reason that it is fair to presume that [it] correspond[s] with the truth and it is his fault if they do not (U.S. v. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583 (1912). III Whether or not x x x the [testimonies of the] prosecution witnesses x x x that x x x petitioner Bon admitted his guilt to them should be given high credence by the courts of justice considering that x x x many people who are being quoted in media today x x x have been found to be x x x lying. In other words, how much probity should we give a lying witness? IV

Assuming arguendo that petitioner Bon ma[d]e the extra-judicial admission to the prosecution witnesses, [whether or not] x x x the same [is constitutionally] admissible in evidence against him?[10] Simply put, the points challenged by petitioner are as follows: 1) the admissibility of his purported extrajudicial admission of the allegation, testified to by the prosecution witnesses, that he had ordered the cutting of the trees; and 2) the credibility and the sufficiency of the testimonies of those witnesses. The Courts Ruling The Petition has no merit. First Issue: Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Admission At the outset, it must be emphasized that the present Petition is grounded on Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 1 thereof, only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth may be raised. A reading of the pleadings reveals that petitioner actually raised questions of fact -- the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the sufficiency of the evidence against him. Nonetheless, this Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion and after taking into account the attendant circumstances, opts to take cognizance of and decide the factual issues raised in the Petition, in the interest of the proper administration of justice.[11] In the main, petitioner contends that Lascanos and Dangalans separate testimonies[12] regarding his alleged extrajudicial admission constitute hearsay evidence and are, therefore, inadmissible. He also argues that his supposed admission should not have been admitted, because it had been taken without the assistance of counsel at a time when he was already regarded as a suspect. We disagree. Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states the rule on hearsay evidence as follows: Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. - A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. Under the above rule, any evidence -- whether oral or documentary -- is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on that of some other person who is not on the witness stand.[13] Hence, information that is relayed to the former by the latter before it reaches the court is considered hearsay.[14] In the instant case, Lascano and Dangalan testified that on February 12, 1990, they had heard petitioner admit to having ordered the cutting of the trees. Their testimonies cannot be considered as hearsay for three reasons. First, they were indisputably present and within

hearing distance when he allegedly made the admission. Therefore, they testified to a matter of fact that had been derived from their own perception. Second, what was sought to be admitted as evidence was the fact that the utterance was actually made by petitioner, not necessarily that the matters stated therein were true. On this basis, a statement attributed to a person who is not on the witness stand is admissible; it is not covered by the hearsay rule.[15] Gotesco Investment Corporation v. Chatto[16] ruled that evidence regarding the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, because the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that fact. Third, even assuming that the testimonies were hearsay, petitioner is barred from questioning the admission of Dangalans testimony, because he failed to object to it at the time it was offered. It has been held that when parties fail to object to hearsay evidence, they are deemed to have waived their right to do so; thus, it may be admitted.[17] The absence of an objection is clearly shown by the transcript of the stenographic notes, from which we quote: "Atty. Fajardo: Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q Did you reach the land in question? Yes, sir. And upon reaching the land in question, what did you do? We were able to see the cut trees. And were you able to see who cut the trees? We were not able to see. And how many trees were cut? There were newly cut trees and 4 others which have been cut for a long time. What kind of trees were cut according to you? Narra, amogis and kuyawyaw. Upon seeing these cut trees, what did you do?

A I asked Virgilio Bon why those trees were [cut] down and he said that he took the liberty of cutting those trees. Q In your own understanding, [M]r. [W]itness, what did the accused mean when he said that he took [the] liberty of cutting those trees? A Q He caused the cutting of the trees. And during the time you were conversing, were you alone?

A Q A

I was with the barangay tanod. And who were the members of the barangay tanod who were with you at that time? Julian Lascano, Jr. and Natividad Legaspi.[18]

Moreover, a partys verbal admission that is established through the testimonies of the persons who heard it[19] fall under Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to this provision, [t]he act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. This rule is based upon the notion that no man would make any declaration against himself, unless it is true.[20] The testimony of petitioner may, therefore, be received in evidence against him. Regarding his alleged uncounselled admission, suffice it to stress that it was not given during a custodial investigation and, certainly, not to police authorities. Custodial investigation has been defined as any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any significant way.[21] We have ruled previously that constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement that is not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but is given in an ordinary manner.[22] Verily, the inquiry on the illegal cutting of trees, which -- with the assistance of the barangay tanods[23] -- was conducted by the owners brother, Manuel Dangalan cannot be deemed a custodial investigation. Consequently, the guarantees of Section 12 (1) of Article III[24] of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, cannot be successfully invoked by petitioner.[25] Furthermore, allegations of impropriety committed during custodial investigation are relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession is the basis of conviction.[26] In the present case, the conviction of petitioner was not deduced solely from his admission, but from the confluence of circumstantial evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Second Issue: Credibility and Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence The time-tested rule is that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve to be respected because of its unique advantage of having observed their demeanor as they testified.[27] Equally established is the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when such findings affirm those of the trial court,[28] as in this case. This Court refrains from disturbing the CAs findings, if no glaring errors bordering on a gross misapprehension of facts can be gleaned from them.[29] We have no reason to depart from this rule. Hence, we affirm the lower courts assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. We now come to the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence.

Section 68 of the Forestry Code, as amended,[30] provides: SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. Punishable under the above provision are the following acts: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b) possessing timber or other forest products without the legal documents. [31] Petitioner was charged with the first offense.[32] It was thus necessary for the prosecution to prove the alleged illegal cutting, gathering or manufacture of lumber from the trees. It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. This kind of evidence, however, is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt.[33]Conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, as long as the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.[34] To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that the following elements concur: 1. There is more than one circumstance. 2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. 3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[35] Did the circumstances in this case satisfy the above requirements? We rule in the affirmative. In its assessment of the evidence, the regional trial court (RTC) considered the following proven facts and circumstances: x x x Accused Virgilio Bon[,] being the tenant is in actual possession and control over the land, fruit trees and big trees. Virgilio Bon has a better chance to cut and saw the lumber. He admitted before the [b]arangay [t]anod[,] Julian Lascano[,] with other witnesses present[,] that

he ordered the cutting of the trees[, and the] saw[ing thereof] by his son-in-law, accused Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. His admission was corroborated by Oscar Narvaez, the one hired by Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., to saw the lumber. His extrajudicial confession is admissible evidence against him as it was voluntary and not under custodial investigation.[36] The appellate court, on the other hand, found that the following circumstances sufficiently proved petitioners culpability: x x x (1) [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon admitted in the presence of Manuel Dangalan, Julian Lascano and Natividad Legaspi that he caused the cutting of the questioned trees; (2) [o]n February 12, 1990, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and his son[,] x x x Rosalio Bon[,] went to private complainant[,] demanding [that] the latter x x x pay the value of the questioned trees which they had cut; (3) [o]n February 13, 1990, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon went to private complainant to ask forgiveness for cutting the trees.[37] A review of the records also shows that the fact of the alleged cutting, gathering and manufacture of lumber from the trees was proven by the prosecution through the following pieces of documentary evidence: photographs of tree stumps,[38] the investigation report of an officer of the Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) that no permit was secured for the cutting of the trees,[39] and the CENROs computation of the value[40] of the timber generated from the felled trees. This fact, together with the circumstantial evidence, indubitably points to no other conclusion than that petitioner was guilty as charged. Correct Penalty We now go to the penalty. We deem it necessary to discuss this matter because of the differing penalties imposed by the appellate and the trial courts. The RTC imposed an indeterminate sentence of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum. The CA, however, increased the penalty to imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum; to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Article 68 of the Revised Forestry Law, as amended by Executive Order No. 277,[41] provides that any violation thereof shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309[42] and 310[43] of Revised Penal Code. This amendment -- which eliminated the phrase shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code -- has already been interpreted by this Court. According to its interpretation, the quoted phrase means that the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing or possessing forest products without authority constitute distinct offenses that are now independent of the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), but that the penalty to be imposed is that which is provided under these articles.[44] Both the trial court[45] and the CA[46] found that the value of the lumber was P12,000. Under Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC, the statutory penalty should be two degrees higher than prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods;[47] or prision mayor in its

maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. The Indeterminate Sentence Law,[48] however, reduces the sentence to an indeterminate penalty anywhere in the range of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Clearly, the sentences imposed by the trial court and the CA are within the allowable range. In view, however, of the finding of the RTC that no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the penalty it imposed was more in accord with the liberal spirit of the law towards the accused. Hence, we adopt the trial courts indeterminate sentence of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum. Costs against appellant. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.