TOPIC: LAND CLASSIFICATION NATIVIDAD STA. ANA VICTORIA VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No.

179673 June 8, 2011 To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may secure a certification from the government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable, but the certification must show that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the pubic domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. The applicant must also present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President. SPS. GABRIEL LLANES and MARIA LLANES vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 177947 November 27, 2008 FACTS: The Spouses Llanes applied for registration of their title over a parcel of land located in Malvar, Batangas. The land had been in the possession of Gabriels grandmother since the 1930s and declared the said property for taxation purposessince 1948. It was classified as agricultural land and was being cultivated by Eugenias son and Gabriels father. On 29 December 1995, the subject property came into the possession of the Spouses Llanes when they purchased the same from Servillano (Gabriels brother) and Rita as evidenced by a Kasulatan ng Bilihan. Gabriel himself cultivated the subject property and religiously paid real property taxes. In 1996, however, the Spouses Llanes conveyed the subject property to ICTSI Warehousing, Inc. (ICTSI), by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale. ICTSI filed an application for registration of title over the subject property before the RTC of Batangas, but has to amend the application due to the alleged technicality that the sale between ICTSI and the Spouses Llanes could not push through because the tax declaration covering the subject property was still in the names of the Spouses Llanes and could not be transferred and declared in the name of ICTSI. The Republic submitted to the RTC its Opposition to the Spouses Llanes application. On 21 April 1993, the Court issued Administrative Circular No. 64-93 delegating to first level courts the jurisdiction to hear and decide cadastral and land registration cases. Pursuant thereto, the RTC issued an Order remanding the entire records of the Spouses Llanes application to the MCTC. The Spouses Llanes filed their formal offer of evidence before the MCTC. Among the evidence they submitted were the Certifications issued by the DENR IV, Forest Management Bureau (FMB) dated 9 March 2000 and by the CENRO, Batangas City dated 15 June 2000, both declaring the subject property as alienable and disposable. The MCTC rendered a Decision granting the Application for Registration of Title of the Spouses Llanes. The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the MCTC erred in granting the Application for Registration of Title of the Spouses Llanes because the latter failed to comply with the statutory requirement of possession for 30 years, the subject property becoming alienable and disposable only on 22 December 1997 per the CENRO Certification. It was only at this point that the Spouses Llanes realized that the Certifications issued to them by the government agencies concerned stated different dates when the subject property became alienable and disposable. Based on the DENR-FMB Certification, the subject property became alienable and disposable on 26 March 1928. However, according to the CENRO Certification, the subject property became alienable and disposable only on 22 December 1997. The Spouses Llanes then verified the correctness of the CENRO Certification and found that CENRO committed a mistake therein. CENRO itself rectified its gaffe by issuing another Certification dated 20 July 2004, consistent with the DENR Certification, that the Case Digest in Land Titles and Deeds 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law

subject property became alienable and disposable on 26 March 1928. The Spouses Llanes attached the corrected CENRO Certification as Annex "A" to their Appellees Brief submitted to the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court, without providing any reason, did not consider the same. Hence, the present petition. The CA granted the appeal of the Republic. ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the grant by the MCTC of the Spouses Llanes Application for Registration of Title based on its finding that the subject property became alienable and disposable only on 22 December 1997. HELD: YES. The three requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title are: (1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation; and (3) that such possession has been under abona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, or an administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute. A certification by the CENRO of the DENR stating that the land subject of an application is found to be within the alienable and disposable site per a land classification project map is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of the application. In the instant case, the Spouses Llanes submitted to the MCTC Certifications from DENR Region IV and CENRO, Batangas City, to prove the alienability and disposability of the subject property. However, the two Certifications contained different dates as to when the subject property became alienable and disposable: 26 March 1928 per the DENR Certification, but 22 December 1997 according to the CENRO Certification. The discrepancy between the two Certifications was overlooked by the parties during the trial stage of the case before the MCTC. The MCTC granted the Spouses Llanes Application for Registration of Title without mentioning the said discrepancy between the two Certifications. The discrepancy was discovered only when the present case was already before the Court of Appeals. The Spouses Llanes immediately verified and secured a corrected Certification from the CENRO, which confirmed the DENR Certification that the subject property became alienable and disposable on 26 March 1928. The appellate court, however, did not consider the corrected CENRO Certification and, in ruling against the Spouses Llanes application, still relied on the first CENRO Certification which incorrectly stated that the subject property became alienable and disposable only on 22 December 1997. Since the determination of the true date when the subject property became alienable and disposable is material to the resolution of this case, it behooves this Court, in the interest of substantial justice, fairness, and equity, to consider the corrected CENRO Certification even though it was only presented during the appeal to the Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 179905 August 19, 2009 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NEPTUNA G. JAVIER F: Javier acquired property through Deed of Donation executed by her paternal aunt, Catalina Javier, a childless widow, on 27 Nov 1956. Javiers cousins questioned the execution of DD. CFI declared DD void, since, being unnotarized, failed to comply with the legal requisites for a valid donation. Nevertheless, in a Deed of Partition, Catalinas heirs allocated property to Javier. Catalina and her husband had been in possession of the property since 1907. Javier gained personal knowledge of Catalinas ownership when Catalina came to live with Javier in 1940. The subject property was being tilled by a kasama when Javier acquired the said property, but at the time she filed her Application for Registration, there were no more tenants on the subject property. -> Javier had been in OCEN possession and occupation, together with her PII, for more than 30 years. Catalina declared the subject property in her name for taxation purposes even before 1945, Javier subsequently declared the subject property in her name under Tax Dec in 1966. Javier had been paying real property tax 25 March 1999: Javier (75yo) filed before MTC a verified Application for Original Registration of Title to the subject property 1

Petitioner filed its Notice of Appearance and Opposition: neither Javier nor her PII had been in OCEN possession and occupation of the land since 12 June 1945; that the muniments of title alleged in the Application did not constitute sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition; that the subject property was a portion of the public domain Laguna Lake Development Authority also filed its Opposition: property was public land, forming part of the bed of Laguna de Bay (located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters) During the hearing, no private oppositor appeared except for LLDA -> court issued an Order of General Default Pablo Javier Quinto also offered his testimony in support of Javiers claims: familiar with property because he and his siblings co-owned a lot adjacent to the same (both part of Javiers inheritance from Catalina) MTC granted Javier her Application for Registration Republic, through OSG, filed a Notice of Appeal: testimonies of Javier and Quinto hardly established that Javier and her PII have occupied property OCEN, and under a claim of title since 12 June 1945 or earlier; tax decs submitted were not conclusive proof of ownership. CA again ruled in Javiers favor Republic: Possession of the subject property by Catalina, then Javier, can only be characterized as casual cultivation of the same; Deed of Partition executed by Catalinas heirs do not prove ownership of the subject property; and Javier has not been able to positively establish that property is A&D

FACTS: T.A.N. Properties filed an Application for Original Registration of Title for a land located at Sto. Tomas, Batangas. During the trial, the only oppositor is the Republic.. The testimonies of respondents witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27 September 1960, Antonio executed a Deed of Donation covering the land in favor of one of his children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato another piece of land. Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and the land was adjudicated to one of Antonios children, Prospero Dimayuga (Porting). On 8 August 1997, Porting sold the land to respondent. The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for registration of land provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land for 30 years or more. The trial court ruled that the facts showed that respondents predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in the concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945, which possession converted the land to private property. Petitioner appealed from the trial courts Decision. Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred in granting the application for registration absent clear evidence that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have complied with the period of possession and occupation as required by law. Petitioner alleged that the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are general in nature. Considering the area involved, petitioner argued that additional witnesses should have been presented to corroborate Evangelistas testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial courts Decision. ISSUE: 1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable; 2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier; and 3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the Public Land Act. HELD: YES.

I: WON MTC erred in granting Javiers Application for Registration. H: NO. Javier was able to sufficiently establish her title under Sec14(1) of PRD: The following persons may file an application for registration of title to land: Those who by themselves or through their PII have been in OCEN possession and occupation of A&D lands of PUBD under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Assertion of Republic that property is not A&D is belied by: To prove alienability, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the gov In this case: (1) CENRO Report confirms that the subject property falls within A&D zone and that the same was neither covered by any public land application nor embraced by any administrative title; (2) Javiers Approved Plan contains the statement that the subject property is within A&D area of PUBD as Project No. 5-A Evidence on record likewise supports the fact that Javier and PII occupied property in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier Per CENRO Report, property is not covered by any public land application or embraced by any administrative title. The Report of the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Rizal, likewise affirmed that there were no provincial projects that would be affected by the registration of the subject property in Javiers name.

On the first issue, the well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant. In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City, certified that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925." The second certification in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR (FMSDENR), stated "that the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582." The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38, dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate 2

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPS. NAPOLEON & EMILIA HUBILLA G.R. No. 157683. February 11, 2005 While the petitioner correctly asserts that the submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, is a mandatory requirement, this Court has recognized instances of substantial compliance with this rule. In previous cases, this Court ruled that blueprint copies of the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification to identify a piece of land for registration purposes. The petitioners contention that the Propertys status as alienable and disposable land was unsubstantiated is likewise unavailing. As stated earlier, the respondents offered as evidence before the trial court a certification from the DENR CENRO stating that the Property is entirely within the alienable and disposable zone classified under Project No. 8, Land Classification Map No. 582 and certified on December 31, 1925.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC. G.R. No. 154953 June 26, 2008 Case Digest in Land Titles and Deeds 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law

covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable. The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR: Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent. The government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable. Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19 (a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputyThe CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable. As to the second issue, The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the testimony of a single witness needs corroboration. However, in this case, we find Evangelistas uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove that respondents predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. The Court cannot consider the testimony of Torres as sufficient corroboration. Torres testified primarily on the fact of respondents acquisition of the land. While he claimed to be related to the Dimayugas, his knowledge of their possession of the land was hearsay. He did not even tell the trial court where he obtained his information. The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership. Respondent did not present any credible explanation why the realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the land only in that year. As to the third issue, the 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In Director of Lands, the "land x x x was already private property at the time it was acquired x x x by Acme." In this case, respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting, who, along with his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have been, as of that date, in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the land for 30 years since 12 June 1945. In short, when respondent acquired the land from Porting, the land was not yet private property. For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file for registration of alienable and disposable land, the corporation must have acquired the land when its transferor had already a vested right to a judicial confirmation of title to the land by virtue of his open, continuous and adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years since 12 June 1945. What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the corporate applicant for land registration to establish that when it acquired the land, the same was already private land by operation of law because the statutory acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed. The length of possession of the land by the corporation cannot be tacked on to complete the statutory 30 years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of Case Digest in Land Titles and Deeds 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law

such acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit corporations from acquiring lands of the public domain. Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of land under the doctrine in Director of Lands. Republic Act No. 9176 (RA 9176) further amended the Public Land Act and extended the period for the filing of applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain until 31 December 2020. Thus: Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares, consistent with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a private individual may only acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and disposable land. Hence, respondent, as successor-in-interest of an individual owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of land in excess of 12 hectares. Since respondent applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application for the excess area of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio. In applying for land registration, a private corporation cannot have any right higher than its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right. This assumes, of course, that the corporation acquired the land, not exceeding 12 hectares, when the land had already become private land by operation of law. In the present case, respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land was already private land when respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOMINGO ESPINOSA G.R. No. 171514 July 18, 2012 F: March 3, 1999, R filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land (5,525sqm) in Consolacion, Cebu; alleged that: (a) property is A&D; (b) he purchased the property from his mother, Isabel Espinosa, on July 4, 1970; and (c) he and his PII had been in possession of the property in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years R submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey Plan, 2 tax dec for the years 1965 and 1974 in Isabels name, Certification issued by the Office of the Treasurer of Consolacion, Cebu and 3 tax dec for the years 1978, 1980 and 1985 P opposed: (a) Sec 48(b) of CA141had not been complied with as Espinosas PII possessed the property only after June 12, 1945; and (b) tax dec do not prove that possession are in the character and for the length of time required by law MTC granted Espinosas petition: Espinosa was able to establish his ownership and possession over the subject lot which is within the area considered by DENR as A&D; applicant has been in OCEN and under claim of title thereto within the time prescribed by law (Sec. 14, subpar. 1, P.D. 1529) CA dismissed petitioners appeal and affirmed MTC: possession for at least 30 years, despite the fact that it commenced after June 12, 1945, sufficed to convert the property to private.

I: WON Espinosa has acquired an imperfect title over the subject property that is worthy of confirmation and registration. H: NO Erred in not applying the present text of Section 48(b) of the PLA Sec 14(2) of PD 1529: The following persons may file an application for registration: Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws. Sec 48(b) of the PLA originally states: Those who by themselves or through PII have been in OCEN possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the Government, since July 26, 1894, except when prevented by war or force majeure. June 22, 1957: RA 1942 amended Sec 48(b) of the PLA by providing a 30-year prescriptive period for JC of imperfect title Jan 25, 1977: PD 1073 was issued, changing the requirement for possession and occupation for a period of 30 years to possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier PD 1073, in effect, repealed RA 1942 such that applications under Sec 48(b) of PLA filed after the promulgation of PD 1073 should allege and prove possession and occupation that dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier For one to invoke Sec 48(b), it must be demonstrated that such possession and occupation commenced on Jan 24, 1947 and 30-year period was completed prior to the effectivity of PD 1073.

There is nothing on record showing that as of Jan 25, 1977 or prior to the effectivity of PD 1073, he or Isabel had already acquired title by means of possession and occupation of the property for 30 years it is Sec 14(2) of PD 1529 categorically provides, only private properties may be acquired thru prescription and under Articles 420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for public use, public service or intended for the development of national wealth, are considered private. There must be an express declaration by the State that PUBD property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. As the property is not held by the State in its private capacity, acquisition of title thereto necessitates observance of the provisions of Sec 48(b) of the PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 or possession and occupation since June 12, 1945. Notation on the survey plan does not constitute incontrovertible evidence that would overcome the presumption that the property belongs to the inalienable public domain: a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling that respondent was able to sufficiently prove that the land was alienable and disposable; and that she had possessed the subject lot in the manner and for the duration required by law HELD: YES.

In Republic v. Doldol, we said that the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land; and (b) that the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land must have been either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. In resolving the case at bar, we find Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. is on all fours with the present case. (refer to the tan case, on the first issue.. as in un ang ruling reiterated dito. Ung naka-highlight un na un.) In conclusion, respondent was not able to comply with Sec. 14(1) of P.D. 1529. TOPIC: FRIAR LANDS SOLEDAD BACALZO, ET AL. vs. MARTINA PACADA G.R. No. L-10915 March 30, 1960 Facts:

Republic vs Hanover G.R. No. 172102, July 2, 2010 Pursuant to PD 1529 and CA 141, applicants for registration of title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. No testimonial evidence was presented to prove that respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had been possessing and occupying the subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Hanovers President and General Manager testified only with respect to his claim that he was the former owner of the subject property and that he acquired the same from the heirs of a certain Damiano Bontoyan; that he caused the payment of realty taxes due on the property; that a tax declaration was issued in favor of Hanover; that Hanover caused a survey of the subject lot, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands; and that his and Hanovers possession of the property started in 1990. Settled is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who must show by clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and occupation of the land is of the nature and duration required by law. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LUCIA M. GOMEZ G.R. No. 189021 February 22, 2012 Lot No. 2872 was alleged to have been originally possessed by Gabriel Gomez. In 1936, his nephew Emilio Gomez, who was the father of respondent herein, bought the lot in a public auction and declared it under the name of the heirs of Gabriel Gomez. The lot was declared for taxation purposes and in 1955, Emilio declared part of Lot No. 2872 under his name. When he died in 1969, his surviving spouse and children allegedly took continuous possession and occupancy of the lot, for which they paid real property tax. On 29 December 1986, the lot was allegedly partitioned by Emilios heirs when they executed a Deed of Adjudication with Consolidation and Extrajudicial Partition, by which Lot No. 2872-I was allegedly partitioned to petitioner. Respondent filed an Application for registration of title with regard to her part. Meanwhile, herein petitioner filed its Opposition to the Application. The MTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondent. the dispositive portion of which states: On appeal, petitioner asserted that respondent had the burden to prove that the subject lot was alienable and disposable. Failing to present this certification, she failed to overcome that burden. Subsequently, the CA dismissed the appeal. It held that the Certification made by Geodetic Engineer Rafael Escabarte that the land was alienable and disposable was sufficient. Case Digest in Land Titles and Deeds 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law

A certificate of sale was constituted over a lot, forming part of friar land, between the Government and Carmiano Bacalzo, which is payable in installments o The certificate of sale also stipulated that upon complete payment of the stipulated price, the Director of Lands would issue a final deed of sale to the purchaser Carmiano Bacalzo then contracted a second marriage with the respondent Martina Pacada. Carmiano died. Consequently, herein petitioners filed a special action for declaratory relief for a determination of their rights to the lot in question as against Martina Pacada, surviving widow of their deceased father. However the court did not grant the same. Such decision was predicated on the theory that the deceased Carmiano Bacalzo, prior to and until his death was a mere holder of a certificate which is only an agreement to sell, and that the purchase price of the lot was not fully paid until when respondent paid the amount of 45 centavos (P0.45) for the additional 5 square meters discovered upon resurvey of the lot. o According to the court, respondent Martina Pacada, under section 16 of the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120), succeeded in the right of her deceased husband.

Issue: Whether petitioners father became the actual owner of the lot in question upon full payment during his lifetime of the purchase price thereof, and as his legal heirs, they succeeded him in the ownership of said lot Held: Yes All the requirements of the law for the purchase of the lot having been complied with by said Carmiano Bacalzo, the Government on that date was legally bound to issue to him "the proper instrument of conveyance" by reason of section 12 of the Friar Lands Act, which provides that o Upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued interest the Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance in the manner provided in section 122 of the Land Registration Act It is not the issuance of the deed of conveyance that vests ownership in the purchaser under the Friar Lands Act. Section 16 of the said law is only applicable in the case where the purchaser-applicant dies before completing payment of the purchase price. The friar lands as was said by this Court in the case of Director of Lands et al. vs. Rizal, et al. supra "are surveyed before they are sold. The purchaser buys a definite parcel with fixed boundaries, at an agreed price, not a parcel yet to be surveyed when he pays the final installment and whose price is to be ascertained and fixed according to the area then found by the survey o Hence, respondent by virtue of the payment she made is not entitled to receive the deed of the subject lot, specially since said payment was made more than 4 years after the original purchase price had been paid in full. Hence, petition was granted.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, MATIAS NAREDO, VALENTIN NAREDO, and JUANA DE LEON vs. RICARDO RIZAL, POTENCIANA RIZAL, ELENA RIZAL, BENJAMIN RIZAL, and SATURNINA RIZAL G.R. No. L-2925 December 29, 1950 Facts:

The Subject lot owned by Calamba Friar Lands Estate Subdivision located in Calamba, Province of Laguna was sold to Santos Alcaraz in 1910 under certificate of sale, the sales price to be paid in 15 annual installments. Upon payment of some installments, Alcaraz assigned all his rights to the certificate of sale to Severino Rizal, and this assignment was approved by the Bureau of Lands After paying all the installments, the final deed of conveyance was executed in his favor by the Bureau of Lands, and its certificate of title was issued, which was later on lost during the Pacific was Severino Rizal died in 1934 and his heirs, the appellees and respondents herein, succeeded him in the ownership of the lot. The present case had its origin in the Court of First Instance of Laguna where the heirs of Severino Rizal, the respondents herein filed an action to recover title and possession of the lot in question or rather the portion added by the river (by accretion), from the petitioners who since 1938 cultivated said portion, as their tenants. The Director of Lands then intervened and claimed that portion as belonging to the Government. This was granted by the lower court, which was affirmed by CA. Hence, this petition. Petitioners contention: The sale to the predecessor in interest of the respondents is governed by the Friar Lands Act, where in section 15 thereof, the Government reserves title to any lot sold under it until the sales price is fully paid, that inasmuch as the accretion to the lot in the form of alluvium was formed before the sales price was fully paid in 1930, after which the corresponding final deed of conveyance was issued, the Government became the owner of said addition or accretion, and consequently, the respondents herein have no right to said property.

would find itself under the obligation of making a new survey of every such lot so that the purchaser may be held to pay for any increase or to be reimbursed for any decrease in area. o This will involve considerable work and expense to the Government and to the purchasers and may even result in court litigation as where the Government agents and the purchasers cannot agree as to the valuation of the area involved for purposes of additional payment or reimbursement, or even the area gained or lost. The spirit behind the Friar Lands Act was to resell the land to the actual tenants or occupants at cost. The Government did not intend to make any profit. In conclusion, the sale of a Friar Lands lot or parcel under Act 1120, pending payment in full of the purchase price, although the Government reserves title thereto, for its protection, the beneficial and equitable title is in the purchaser, and that any accretion received by the lot before payment of the last installment belongs to the purchaser thereof.

FRANCISCO ALONSO (Deceased), substituted by MERCEDES V. ALONSO, TOMAS V. ALONSO and ASUNCION V. ALONSO vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC. G.R. No. 130876 December 5, 2003 Facts:

Issue: Whether petitioners contentions are meritorious Held: No It is true that the Government under section 15 of Act 1120 reserves title to any parcel sold under said Act until the full payment of all installments of the sales price. -> Only refer to the bare, naked title The equitable and beneficial title really went to the purchaser the moment he paid the first installment and was given a certificate of sale. o Reservation of government is made merely to protect the interest of the Government so as to preclude or prevent the purchaser from the payment in full of the purchase price. o Outside of this protection the Government retains no right as an owner. o Pending the completion of the payment of the purchase price, the purchaser is entitled to all the benefits and advantages which may accrue to the land as well as suffer the losses that may befall it. The petitioners contend that the contract between the Government and the purchaser of a Friar Lands lot involves a mere promise to sell on the part of the Director of Lands and a promise to buy and to pay the purchase price in installments, on the part of the purchaser, and that the Government continues to be the real owner until the purchase price is completed. o If this were true, then in case of default of the purchaser to pay any installment the Director of Lands could merely cancel the certificate of sale, cancel its promise to sell and, considering the installments already paid as mere rentals for the occupation of the land, eject the purchaser, and the relation between the Government and the said purchaser is ended. But this theory runs counter to the very law governing the disposition of the Friar Lands. Act No. 1120 itself, despite the reservation of title in the Government pending the payment of the full purchase price under section 15 thereof, really considers the purchaser as the owner of the lot or parcel purchased even before the payment of the last installment. Section 17 of Act No. 1120 inevitably leads to the conclusion that the purchaser, even before the payment of the full price and before the execution of the final deed of conveyance, is considered by the law as the actual owner of the lot purchased, under obligation to pay in full the purchase price, the role or position of the Government being that of a mere lien holder or mortgagee. If the rule were otherwise, then as regards Friar Lands lots bordering on rivers, upon the payment of the final installment, the Government Case Digest in Land Titles and Deeds 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law

In the January 2012 decision of the Court, it was ruled that: o Neither Tomas N. Alonso nor his son Francisco M. Alonso or the latters heirs are the lawful owners of the lot in dispute. o Neither has the respondent Cebu Country Club, Inc. been able to establish a clear title over the contested estate. Hence, petitioners and respondents filed separate motions for reconsideration Petitioners contentions: o the majority decision unduly deprives petitioners of their property without due process of law and "in a manner shocking to good conscience"; o in invalidating the sale of Lot 727 to the late Tomas Alonso, the ponencia unfairly deviated from established doctrine to favor a mere obiter dictum as misapplied in Liao vs. Court of Appeals, using as basis factual findings either unsupported by the evidence or contradicted by the appellate courts findings of fact; o the core issues of fraud and want of jurisdiction afflicting the reconstitution of respondent Cebu Country Clubs title were not squarely and frontally met, to the prejudice and damage of the petitioners; and o the dissenting opinion deserves a second hard look as it presents a more balanced, sober, factually accurate, and juridically precise approach to the critical issues of this case, including prescription and laches. Respondent Cebu Country Club, on the other hand, assails the decision insofar as it declared that "Lot 727-D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate legally belongs to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines". o Respondent argues that the OSG, as representative of the Government, has not intervened nor has it been impleaded in the RTC nor during the appeal in the Court of Appeals, and, the Torrens Certificate of Title of respondent, Banilad Friar Lands Estate, cannot be collaterally attacked and nullified in this case at bar.

Courts ruling: Section 18 of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act unequivocally provides: "No lease or sale made by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands (now the Director of Lands) under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior (now, the Secretary of Natural Resources). o Thus, petitioners claim of ownership must fail in the absence of positive evidence showing the approval of the Secretary of Interior. o Approval of the Secretary of the Interior cannot simply be presumed or inferred from certain acts since the law is explicit in its mandate. This is the settled rule as enunciated in Solid State Multi-Products Corporation vs. Court of Appeals5 and reiterated in Liao vs. Court of Appeals. It must be borne in mind that the disputed property is part of the "Friar Lands" over which the Government holds title and are not public lands but private or patrimonial property of the Government and can be alienated only upon proper compliance with the requirements of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act.

On the other hand, respondent relies solely on its reconstituted title which, by itself, does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. o The reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition. It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest ownership of the land or estate covered thereby. The declaration in the Courts judgment that the subject property belongs to the Government is not an offshoot of a collateral attack on respondents title. o The validity of the reconstitution of title to the land in question was directly in dispute, and the proceedings before the trial court was in the nature of a direct attack on the legality of respondents title. The Courts declaration that the subject lot legally belongs to the Government does not amount to reversion without due process of law insofar as both parties are concerned. o The disputed property is a Friar Land and both parties failed to show that it had ceased to belong to the patrimonial property of the State or that it had become private property. Hence, the motions for reconsideration filed by the parties were denied with finality.

FRANCISCO ALONSO, substituted by MERCEDES V. ALONSO, TOMAS V. ALONSO and ASUNCION V. ALONSO vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL G.R. No. 188471 April 20, 2010 Facts:

Herein petitioner Francisco Alonso, the only son and sole heir of the late spouses Tomas N. Alonso and Asuncion Medalle, discovered documents showing that his father had acquired a lot of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the Government in or about the year 1911 o Original vendee of the lot assigned his rights to Tomas o Tomas was consequently issued a patent o Director of lands had executed a final deed of sale in his favor, but the final deed of sale had not been registered with the Register of Deeds because of lack of requirements, like the approval of the final deed of sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as required by law. Subsequently, Francisco discovered that a reconstituted title covering the subject lot was issued in favor of Cebu Country Clubs predecessor, and the name of registered owner in the TCT had been changed to that of Cebu Country Club Francisco then commenced against Cebu Country Club an action for the declaration of nullity and non-existence of deed/title, the cancellation of certificates of title, and the recovery of property (then follow the aforecited case) The Congress ultimately enacted a law to validate the TCTs and reconstituted titles covering the Banilad Friar Lands Estate in Cebu City. This was Republic Act No. 9443 Thereafter, both Cebu Country Club and the OSG brought the passage of R.A. No. 9443 to the attention of the RTC for its consideration in resolving the OSGs motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. Upon being directed by the RTC to comment on the petitioners motion for reconsideration, the OSG manifested in writing that the Government was no longer seeking the execution of the decision in the previous case RTCs Ruling: o R.A. No. 9443 "confirms and declares as valid" all "existing" TCTs and reconstituted titles; thereby, the State in effect waived and divested itself of whatever title or ownership over the Banilad Friar Lands Estate in favor of the registered owners thereof o The situation of the parties had materially changed, rendering the enforcement of the final and executory judgment unjust, inequitable, and impossible, because Cebu Country Club was now recognized by the State itself as the absolute owner of the subject lot Hence, this petition

Lands issued a sales patent in the name of Tomas N. Alonso. The sales patent, however, and even the corresponding deed of sale were not registered with the Register of Deeds and no title was ever issued in the name of the latter. This is because there were basic requirements not complied with, the most important of which was that the deed of sale executed by the Director of Lands was not approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Hence, the deed of sale was void. R.A. No. 9443 gives petitioners no legal interest to assail the denial of the motion for execution o The law expressly declares as valid "(a)ll existing Transfer Certificates of Title and Reconstituted Certificates of Title duly issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu Province and/or Cebu City covering any portion of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate," and recognizes the registered owners as absolute owners. To benefit from R.A. No. 9443, therefore, a person must hold as a condition precedent a duly issued Transfer Certificate of Title or a Reconstituted Certificate of Title. Although the lot was earlier declared to be owned by the Government in G.R. No. 130876, R.A. No. 9443 later validated Cebu Country Clubs registered ownership due to its holding of TCT in its own name. o In the aforecited case, which declared the Government as the owner of the lot based on the absence of signature and approval of the then Secretary of Interior;" and that the decision in G.R. No. 130876 had "ceased to have any practical effect" as the result of the enactment of R.A. No. 9443, and had thereby become "academic." On the other hand, the petitioners could not benefit from R.A. No. 9443 because of their non-compliance with the express condition of holding any Transfer Certificate of Title or Reconstituted Certificate of Title respecting the lot or any portion thereof. Petitioners next argue that the reconstituted title of Cebu Country Club, Inc. had no lawful source to speak of; it was reconstituted through extrinsic and intrinsic fraud in the absence of a deed of conveyance in its favor. o Reconstitution was based on the owners duplicate of the title, hence, there was no need for the covering deed of sale or other modes of conveyance. o Cebu Country Club, Inc. was admittedly in possession of the land since long before the Second World War, or since 1931. o More importantly, Cebu Country Club, Inc. paid the realty taxes on the land even before the war, and tax declarations covering the property showed the number of the TCT of the land. Cebu Country Club, Inc. produced receipts showing real estate tax payments since 1949. Hence, petition was denied for lack of merit

Severino Manotok vs. Heirs of Homer Barque G.R. Nos. 162335 and 162605 Facts:

Issue: Whether petitioners have superior right over the lot than respondent Held: No In G.R. No. 130876, the Court found that the petitioners did not validly acquire ownership of the land in dispute Neither petitioners nor their predecessor had any title to the land in question. The most that petitioners could claim was that the Director of Case Digest in Land Titles and Deeds 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law

Homer Barque filed a petition for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of a TCT before the RD of Quezon City, alleging that the OCT was destroyed when a fire gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988. In support of the petition, Barque, Sr. submitted the owners duplicate certificate of title, Real Estate Tax Receipts and Tax Declaration. Ruling of the Reconstitution Officer: Denied petition o Lots covered by the Barques TCT appear to duplicate lots covered by another TCT owned by herein petitioners which was reconstituted in 1991 o The subdivision plan of the subject lots covered by Barques TCT is a spurious document, as stated by the Chief of Geodetic Surveys Division (Engr. Dalire) Barque moved for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit, hence, filed an appeal before the LRA Ruling of LRA: Granted appeal o Only the owners or co-owners duplicate of an original or transfer certificate of title may be used as a source of administrative reconstitution. Hence, Atty. Bustos (Reconstitution officer) erred in requiring the submission of documents other than the owners duplicate TCT o Engr. Dalires failure to deny or question the genuineness of his signature in the letter of 2 January 1997, affirming the existence of the record of the lots subdivision plan, which was he later on reversed o Property in question is located at Barrio Matandang Balara, Quezon City, contrary to several documents submitted by herein petitioners, which state that the subject lot is situtated at Barrio Payong, and/or Barrio Culiat 6

Claim of petitioners that property in question covers only one lot is inaccurate -> the property plan shows that it is composed of 2 lots, which was corroborated by the Certified copy of the tax map over the property in question o Examination of the technical description and boundaries appearing in petitioners TCT do not conform o the certified technical description and boundaries of the lot, issued by the Bureau of Lands o Reconstitution of the subject TCT may only be considered after cancellation of petitioners TCT Barques filed a petition for review before the CA, praying for immediate reconstitution of their title. This was granted, ordering cancellation of petitioners TCT, hence this petition The subject lot is a part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, a Friar Land acquired by the Philippine Government from the Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands on December 23, 1903, as indicated in Act No. 1120 (Friar Lands Act) Controversy arising from conflicting claims over the lot began to surface after a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall on June 11, 1988 which destroyed records stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

In the context of an administrative reconstitution proceeding before the LRA, the Barques have sought that the LRA exercise the power to cancel the Manotok title and forthwith cause the reconstitution of their own title. o The LRA refused to do so, although it did rule that the Manotok title was spurious and thus subject to cancellation through the proper judicial proceeding. Upon appellate review of that LRA decision, the Court of Appeals initially upheld the LRAs position, but ultimately, upon motion for reconsideration, directed the cancellation of the Manotok title and the reconstitution of the Barque title

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals was empowered to direct the annulment of the Manotok title through the petitions raised before it by the Barques and the Manotoks Held: No Section 48 of PD 1529, the Property Registration Decree: A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack *and+ cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law o Clearly, the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the Barque title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake. Nor could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRAs administrative proceeding. For the appellate court to be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of the LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first place. o Not provided in Sec. 6 of PD 1529 Hence, neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title. Issue: Whether the LRA had acted correctly in ordering, conditional as it may have been, the administrative reconstitution of the Barque title Held: No RA 26 and 6732 establish that the administrative reconstitution of Torrens titles is intended for non-controversial cases, or especially where the subject property is not covered by an existing title in favor of a person other than the applicant. Such an implication is consonant with the rule that the reconstitution proceedings are not the venue for confirmation or adjudication of title, but merely a means by which a previously adjudicated title whose original has been lost or destroyed may be reissued to its owner. None of the provisions pertaining to administrative reconstitution in Rep. Act No. 26 or 6732 extraordinarily empowers the LRA to exercise jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution, where the property is already covered by a Torrens title. If a petition for administrative reconstitution is filed with the LRA, and it appears from the official records that the subject property is already covered by an existing Torrens title in the name of another person, there is nothing further the LRA can do but to dismiss the petition. The 2005 Decision placed heavy reliance on Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, where in the course of reviewing an action for judicial reconstitution of title, the Court opted not to remand the reconstitution case filed by Molina to the court of origin in order to permit the appeals of Ortigas and the Solicitor General, which had been improvidently disallowed by the trial court. Instead, owing to the "fatal infirmities" of Molinas cause of action, the Court itself nullified the reconstituted titles issued by the trial court. Ortigas had been cited by the Court of Appeals and also by the 2005 Decision, in ruling on the Barques petition. o Unlike in Ortigas, the Court of Appeals herein was not endowed with the proper appellate jurisdiction to annul the Manotok title. As earlier pointed out, since the LRA had no original jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title, it follows that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdictional competence to extend the same relief, even while reviewing the LRAs ruling.

December 12, 2005 decision by Justice Ynares-Santiago (1st Division): Issue: Whether LRA has no authority to annul their title Held: Yes By enumerating the hierarchy of sources to be used for the reconstitution, it is the intent of the law to give more weight and preference to the owners duplicate certificate of title over the other enumerated sources. o Since respondents source of reconstitution is the owners duplicate certificate of title, there is no need for the reconstituting officer to require the submission of the plan In the reconstitution proceedings, the LRA is bound to determine from the evidence submitted which between or among the titles is genuine and existing to enable it to decide whether to deny or approve the petition. Without such authority, the LRA would be a mere robotic agency clothed only with mechanical powers. o Indeed, it would be needlessly circuitous to remand the case to the RTC to determine anew which of the two titles is sham or spurious and thereafter appeal the trial courts ruling to the Court of Appeals. After all, the LRA and the two divisions of the appellate court have already declared that petitioners title is forged. Court applied ruling in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco: The validity of respondents and petitioners title have been squarely passed upon by the LRA and reviewed and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which factual findings are no longer reviewable by this Court. By opposing the petition for reconstitution and submitting their administratively reconstituted title, petitioners acquiesced to the authority and jurisdiction of the reconstituting officer, the LRA and the Court of Appeals, and recognized their authority to pass judgment on their title. All the evidence presented was duly considered by these tribunals. There is thus no basis to petitioners claim that they were deprived of their right to be heard and present evidence, which is the essence of due process.

December 18, 2008 decision by Justice Tinga (En Banc): After the 2005 Decision, Barques filed multiple motions with the Courts First Division concerning the execution of the judgment, including a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession or For Execution. In response, the Manotoks filed an Urgent Motion to Refer Motion for Possession to the Supreme Court En Banc Subsequently, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a motion to intervene, alleging that they own the subject property o Their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manahan, was issued Sales Certificate covered lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, attaching to their petition the findings of the NBI that the documents of the Manotoks were not as old as they were purported to be. OSG was required to file its comments on these cases

Testing the premises under which the LRA and the Court of Appeals had concluded that the Barques had a valid claim to title: The Barques assert that they bought the subject property from a certain Setosta. However, TCT of the latter was registered under the name of Manotok Realty, Inc. o This detracts from the Barques claim that the Manotoks do not have title to the property, as in fact the Barque title was 7

Case Digest in Land Titles and Deeds 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law

a transfer from a title registered under the name of the Manotoks The Barques hinge their claim on a purported subdivision plan, made in favor of Setosta o Based on the records, it appears that there is a conflict as to its actual existence in the files of the government o Examining the subdivision plan, here are critical changes with respect to the boundaries named therein o Findings of Land Projection and LMB show that the land as described in the Barque title "when plotted thru its tie line falls outside Quezon City." -> subject lot is within QC o These discrepancies highlight the error of the LRA and the Court of Appeals in acknowledging the right of the Barques to seek reconstitution of their purported Barque title. Even assuming that the petition for reconstitution should not have been dismissed due to the Manotok title, it is apparent that the Barques claim of ownership is exceedingly weak.

Re Motion of Intervene filed by Manahan: The Chief of the Legal Division of the LMB recommended that the appropriate proceedings be taken in the proper court for the cancellation of the Manotok title DENRL: Titles of the Manotoks could not have been derived from the mother title of the subject lot; TCT prior to transfer to Manotoks do not appear on record An investigation report by the CENRO through its land investigator provides that records show that original claimant of the land is the predecessor of Manahans predecessor The Court cannot engage in the review of an original action for the cancellation of such title Direct the Solicitor General to duly investigate the circumstances behind the transmission of Lot No. 823, formerly a Friar Land, to private persons Thereafter, the Solicitor General can file the appropriate proceedings for cancellation if warranted. Can the Court declare the Manotok title void? No o The Alonso approach especially appeals to the Court because, as in this case, the subject property therein was a Friar Land which under the Friar Lands Law may be disposed of by the Government only under that law. Thus, there is greater concern on the part of this Court to secure its proper transmission to private hands, if at all. o At the same time, the Court recognizes that there is not yet any sufficient evidence for us to warrant the annulment of the Manotok title. Hence, the Court set aside the assailed decision and remand the case to the CA for futher proceedings

On March 6, 2012 Decision by Justice Villarama: At bar are the motions for reconsideration separately filed by the Manotoks, Barques and Manahans of the August 2010 decision: Petitions of Manotoks and Manahan were denied as well as the petition for reconstitution filed by Barques The subject lot was declared to belong to the national government, without prejudice to the institution of REVERSION proceedings by the State through the Office of the Solicitor General Issue: Whether the subject lot belongs to the State and not to any of the claimants Held: Yes As it turned out, none of the parties were able to establish by clear and convincing evidence a valid alienation from the Government of the subject friar land. The declaration of ownership in favor of the Government was but the logical consequence of such finding. No officer of the DENR-NCR or LMB having official custody of sale certificates covering friar lands testified as to the issuance and authenticity the sale certificate submitted by the Manotoks. o Even assuming that such was actually sourced from the DENR-LMB, there was no showing that it was duly issued by the Director of Lands and approved by the DENR Secretary Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.: approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce of the sale of friar lands is indispensable for its validity, hence, the absence of such approval made the sale null and void ab initio. o No legal right over the subject friar land can be recognized in favor of the Manotoks under the assignment documents in the absence of the certificate of sale duly signed by the Case Digest in Land Titles and Deeds 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law

Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources The Deed of Conveyance covering the subject lot in favor of Felicitas Manahan was issued by then Director of the LMB, which was based on General Memorandum Order, authorizing the the Director of Lands, now Director of LMB, to approve contracts of sale and deeds of conveyance affecting Friar Lands. o It is stressed that the confirmation of the Deed by this office is only as to the execution and issuance based on the authority of LMB Director under GMO o However, in the absence of a valid certificate of sale duly signed by the Secretary of Interior or Agriculture and Natural Resources, such alleged confirmation of the execution and issuance by the DENR-LMB of Deed of Conveyance is still insufficient to prove the Manahans claim over the subject land. On the basis of Art. 1317 of the Civil Code, the Manahans contend that deeds of conveyance not bearing the signature of the Secretary can also be ratified. o Court held that contracts of sale lacking the approval of the Secretary fall under the class of void and inexistent contracts enumerated in Art. 1409 which cannot be ratified. Section 18 of Act No. 1120 mandated the approval by the Secretary for a sale of friar land to be valid Manotoks and Manahans reliance n MO 16-05 issued by the Secrtary, which provides that all these deeds of conveyance lacking the signature of the Secretary of Natural Resources are thus deemed signed or otherwise ratified, is of no merit o The argument that the Director of Lands had delegated authority to approve contracts of sale and deeds of conveyances over friar lands ignores the consistent ruling of this Court in controversies involving friar lands. Justice Carpios Dissenting Opinion: o Based on Section 12 of the Friar Land Act, it is the Deed of Conveyance that must bear the signature of the Secretary of Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources "because it is only when the final installment is paid that the Secretary can approve the sale, the purchase price having been fully paid." o It was pointed out that the majority itself expressly admit that "it is only a ministerial duty on the part of the Secretary to sign the Deed of Conveyance once the applicant had made full payment on the purchase price of the land", citing jurisprudence to the effect that "notwithstanding the failure of the government to issue the proper instrument of conveyance when the purchaser finally pays the final installment of the purchase price, the purchase of the friar land still acquired ownership. o Ruling in Alonso "was superseded with the issuance by then DENR Secretary Defensor of DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05." It was argued that the majority had construed a "limited application" when it declared that the Manotoks could not benefit from said memorandum order because the latter refers only to deeds of conveyance "on file with the records of the DENR field offices". The Court do not agree with the above said opinion that only the Director of Lands who signs the Certificate of Sale o The official document denominated as "Sale Certificate" clearly required both the signatures of the Director of Lands who issued such sale certificate to an applicant settler/occupant and the Secretary of the Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources indicating his approval of the sale -> as provided in Section 18 of Act No. 1120 o Where there is no certificate of sale issued, the purchaser does not acquire any right of possession and purchase, as implied from Section 15. By the mandatory language of Section 18, the absence of approval of the Secretary of Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in the lease or sale of friar land would invalidate the sale. o It would result in the absurd situation wherein thecertificate of sale and deed of conveyance both lacked the signature and approval of the Secretary, and yet the purchasers ownership is ratified, courtesy of DENR Memorandum o Disagree also on Justice Carpios contention on Alonso case: DENR MO No. 16-05 explicitly makes reference only to Deeds of Conveyances, not to Sale Certificates by which, under the express language of Section 15, the purchaser of friar land acquires the right of possession and purchase pending final payment and the issuance of title, such

certificate being duly signed under the provisions of Act No. 1120 The existence of a valid certificate of sale therefore must first be established with clear and convincing evidence before a purchaser is deemed to have acquired ownership over a friar land notwithstanding the non-issuance by the Government, for some reason or another, of a deed of conveyance after completing the installment payments. In the absence of such certificate of sale duly signed by the Secretary, no right can be recognized in favor of the applicant. Neither would any assignee or transferee acquire any right over the subject land. The perceived disquieting effects on titles over friar lands long held by generations of landowners cannot be invoked as justification for legitimizing any claim or acquisition of these lands obtained through fraud or without strict compliance with the procedure laid down in Act No. 1120. As consistently held by this Court, friar lands can be alienated only upon proper compliance with the requirements of Act No. 1120. The issuance of a valid certificate of sale is a condition sine qua non for acquisition of ownership under the Friar Lands Act. Otherwise, DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 would serve as administrative imprimatur to holders of deeds of conveyance whose acquisition may have been obtained through irregularity or fraud. The enactment of RA 9443 signifies the legislatures recognition of the statutory basis of the Alonso ruling to the effect that in the absence of signature and/or approval of the Secretary of Interior/Natural Resources in the Certificates of Sale on file with the CENRO, the sale is not valid and the purchaser has not acquired ownership of the friar land. RA 9443 expressly excludes from its coverage those cases involving certificates of title which were shown to have been fraudulently or irregularly issued. As the reconstitution and remand proceedings in these cases revealed, the Manotoks title to the subject friar land, just like the Barques and Manahans, is seriously flawed. The Court cannot allow them now to invoke the benefit of confirmation and validation of ownership of friar lands under duly executed documents, which they never had in the first place. Strict application by the courts of the mandatory provisions of the Friar Lands Act is justified by the laudable policy behind its enactment -- to ensure that the lands acquired by the government would go to the actual occupants and settlers who were given preference in their distribution.

Detailed Justice Carpios Dissenting Opinion: The former DENR Secretary states in his Affidavit that all the deeds examined by LMB personnel on file with the LMB, CENRO and the National Archives do not have the signature of the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. To repeat, former DENR Secretary Defensor states that upon examination, all deeds of conveyance involving friar lands did not have the signature of the Secretary. Hence, DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 was issued precisely to "remove doubts or dispel objections as to the validity of all Torrens transfer certificates of title issued over friar lands, where such doubts or objections arise either from the lack of signature of then Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on the deed of conveyance that have led to the issuance of said titles, or because of the loss or unavailability of such deeds or of the records from which the Secretarys signature or approval may be verified." DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 was not limited to the Banilad Estate but applied to all friar lands in the Philippines because all deeds of conveyance, regardless of where located, did not have the signature of the Secretary. Since the lack of signatures and absence of approval by the Secretary of Interior/Agriculture and the Director of Lands were cured with the passage of RA 9443, the benefits of the law should also apply to other lands similarly situated. o While RA 9443 refers only to the Banilad Estate, to limit its application solely to the Banilad Estate will result in class legislation. RA 9443 should be extended to lands similarly situated; otherwise, there will be violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The majority assert that the dissent suggests that Memorandum Order No. 16-05 "would apply even to those deeds of conveyance not found in the records of DENR or its field offices, such as the Manotoks Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 sourced from the National Archives. It would then cover cases of claimants who have not been issued any certificate of sale but were able to produce a deed of conveyance in their names." o The majority mistakenly denigrate the records of the National Archives. It cannot be disputed that the National Archives is the official repository of government and public documents. Case Digest in Land Titles and Deeds 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law

The Court recognizes that documents from the National Archives have the same evidentiary value as public documents from government offices which, after all, are the source of the archived documents. o The records of the National Archives on the existence of Sale Certificate submitted by the Manotoks are supported and confirmed by the records of the LMB. The LMB has on its file the original of Assignment of Sale Certificate between M. Teodoro and Severino Manotok as assignors and Severino Manotok as assignee and approved by the Acting Director of Lands. o Contrary to the majority opinion, the Manotoks incontrovertible proof of existence of the three Assignments of Sale Certificate, as well as the existence of the other supporting documents, clearly and convincingly establishes beyond any doubt the existence of Sale Certificate No. 1054. It is the Deed of Conveyance that must bear the signature of the Secretary of Interior/Agriculture because it is only when the final installment is paid that the Secretary can approve the sale, the purchase price having been fully paid. o Under Section 18 of Act No. 1120, any sale of friar land by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands (now Director of Lands) shall not be valid until approved by the Secretary. This means that the Secretary, under Section 18, approves the sale and thus signs the Deed of Conveyance upon full payment of the purchase price. However, under Section 12 of Act No. 1120, only the Director of Lands signs the Sales Certificate upon payment of the first installment. o The Sales Certificate operates as a contract to sell which, under the law, the Director of Lands is authorized to sign and thus bind the Government as seller of the friar land. This transaction is a sale of private property because friar lands are patrimonial properties of the Government. The majority insist that where there is no certificate of sale issued, the purchaser does not acquire any right of possession and purchase. o Section 12 of Act No. 1120 provided that "upon payment of the last installment together with all accrued interest[,], the Government will convey to [the] settler and occupant the said land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and twentytwo of the Land Registration Act." o The Manotoks paid the full purchase price to the Government on 7 December 1932. Deed of Conveyance No. 29204, dated 7 December 1932, on its face acknowledged receipt by the Government of the amount of P2,362 in consideration for Lot 823 granted and conveyed to Severino Manotok. Thus, the Manotoks acquired ownership. Since the majority expressly admit that upon full payment of the purchase price it becomes the ministerial duty of the Secretary to approve the sale, then the majority must also necessarily admit that the approval by the Secretary is a mere formality that has been complied with by the issuance of Memorandum Order No. 16-05. Since the majority further expressly admit that upon full payment of the purchase price ownership of the friar land passes to the purchaser, despite the failure of the Secretary to sign the Deed of Conveyance, then the majority must also necessarily admit that the Manotoks became the absolute owners of the land upon their full payment of the purchase price on 7 December 1932. The Manotoks should not be punished if the documents leading to the issuance of the TCT could no longer be found in the files of the government office, considering that these were pre-war documents and considering further the lack of proper preservation of documents in some government offices. The Certificate of Sale to the original assignors is not on file with the LMB for reasons that could not be attributed to the Manotoks fault.