Pub Corp Notes

1987 Philippine Constitution, Article X LGC Territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines -> enjoy
oy local autonomy Provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays Autonomous regions in: o Muslim Mindanao and o Cordilleras -> not existing to date Enactment of LGC by Congress; Purpose: More responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization -> recall, initiative, referendum Allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources Provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials All other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units President -> general supervision over local governments Provinces -> Component cities and municipalities Cities and Municipalities -> Barangays Ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions Power of LGUs: To create its own sources of revenues To levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide -> accrue exclusively to LGU Just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them -> IRA Equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas Term of Office of Elective Officials: 3 years not more than 3 consecutive terms XPN: Barangay Officials -> 5 years (RA 8524) Voluntary renunciation -> not interrupt period of term Legislative bodies of LGU -> sectoral representation Creation, Division, Merger, Abolishment of LGU: Approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected (see notes in LGC) Congress may create special metropolitan political subdivisions -> subject to a plebiscite Component cities and municipalities -> retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executive and legislative assemblies Jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority -> limited to basic services requiring coordination Independent Component Cities -> highly urbanized cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials LGUs may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them in accordance with law President to provide for regional development councils or other similar bodies composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives from nongovernmental organizations within the regions Purpose: Administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in the region
All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions -> vested in the National Government Congress to enact Organic Act with assistance and participation of: regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies. Purpose of Organic Act: Defines the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly Provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws Organic act shall provide for legislative powers over: Subject to Constitution and National Laws Administrative organization; Creation of sources of revenues; Ancestral domain and natural resources; Personal, family, and property relations; Regional urban and rural planning development; Economic, social, and tourism development; Educational policies; Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. Preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the National Government.
REYNALDO R. SAN JUAN vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC): 1987 Consti -> Sec 25 Art II provides that The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments o This is further bolstered by the 14 Sections under Art X which give in greater detail the provisions making local autonomy more meaningful o Respondent: The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 Section 6, stating that the DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements o SC: Nomination and appointment process involves a sharing of power between the two levels of government -> Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the local level and after completion are forwarded to the national officials for review. DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS et al vs. COMELEC; ATTY. ABDULLAH D. MAMA-O vs. HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE: The creation of the autonomous regions is not absolute, but conditional to the results of the plebiscite therefor. Under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it. (read Art. X, sec. 18 in relation to Article XVIII, section 27) o The contention that those sharing the same cultural heritage should only be the ones includes is likewise untenable because to rule otherwise would tantamount to violation of the separation of powers since the same is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. o As to the position that the law violates the equal protection clause, it is settled that this constitutional guarantee permits reasonable classification, as in the instant case where classification was done by Congress based on substantial distinctions as set forth by the Constitution itself
Autonomous Regions Creation of Muslim Mindanao and Cordilleras -> consists of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas -> sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity Creation: Approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, Only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region President -> general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure compliance in laws
Notes in Public Corporation Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
As to the contention that the law violates religious freedom, no controversy to such effect existed between the real litigants, hence, this issue cannot be decided by the Court in the present case. Petitioners argument that the law gives undue power to the President in that the latter is allowed to merge the existing regions by administrative determination if the plebiscites results were otherwise, this provision being contrary to Article X Sec 10 of the 1987 Consti which provides that only upon approval by majority votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected, is likewise UNTENABLE. This is because the constitutional provision mentioned only relates to the a province, city, municipality, or barangay being created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered and NOT to the merger of existing regions. Lastly, Petitioners argument that the creation of an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer of powers of the regions shall unduly delay the creation of the autonomous region likewise does not hold water because such creation hinges only on the result of the plebiscite and, if the latter is favorable, the same shall have immediate effect.
Types of autonomy:
the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress
decentralization of administration
SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA vs. CONTE MANGELIN et al: ISSUE: Whether the autonomy of the SanggunianPampook placed it outside the jurisdiction of the national government, i.e., the national courts. HELD: No o Autonomous regions in Regions IX and XII were created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1618 which established "internal autonomy" in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution," with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities specified therein o The regions were required to "undertake all internal administrative matters for the respective regions," except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National Government," o However, the question on whether the autonomy contemplated in the instant case involves decentralization of administration or of power should be decided by the Court in a proper case involving the proper issue. o Under Article X 1987 Consti, LGUs enjoy autonomy in 2 senses, to wit: Constitutional Provisions (under Article X) Sec 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. Sec 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. Sec 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns
President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law."
President has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own
involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous
Distinctions decentralization of power
the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities
under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government) hence unarguably under the Court's jurisdiction o
amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency
subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy" hence beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction
PD 1618 mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." And provides that the SangguniangPampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services o Hence, the law never meant to have the LGUs in the instant case exercise autonomy tantamount to the central governments act of self-immolation o Ergo, the Court may verily look into the expulsion of Petitioner The Court sustained Petitioners position that the proceedings were null and void because the Assembly was then on recess o Under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the SangguniangPampook," but it provides likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals. o Respondents posited that the phrase recess of short intervals pertains to those that happen whenever arguments get heated up for the purpose of letting the parties settle their arguments, and not the recess contemplated by Petitioner 2
The Court opined that, while Respondents were correct in said position, such cannot be applied in the instant case because the phrases meaning has not been clarified yet during the time that Petitioner called for such recess and that it was not made aware by Respondents to Petitioner that such calling of recess was not permitted Hence, the Court upheld the "recess" called on the ground of good faith
Cordillera Regional Assembly Member ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO et al vs. The COMELEC (COMELEC) et al
Issue: Whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region Held: No. o Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution: o The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. o Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas.
MMDA vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION (BAVA), INC. Issue: Whether or not the mandate to open a private street to public is within MMDAs regulatory and police powers Held: No. o The MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA. o The administration of Metropolitan Manila, established as a public corporation under the said decree, was placed under the MMC Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities o The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose of establishing and administering programs providing services common to the area. As a "central government" it had: the power to levy and collect taxes and special assessments, the power to charge and collect fees; the power to appropriate money for its operation, and at the same time, review appropriations for the city and municipal units within its jurisdiction o The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the Sangguniang Bayan. o Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the MMC which fully possessed legislative police powers. With the passage of R.A. No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. o It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. o The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council, its governing board, to promulgate
administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDA's functions. o There is no grant of authority to MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. o The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." o R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. MMC under P.D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R.A. No. 7924. o Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. o In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are unnecessary. The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited.
THE LGC OF THE PHILIPPINES (RA No. 7160) BOOK I: GENERAL PROVISIONS TITLE ONE. - BASIC PRINCIPLES CHAPTER 1. - THE CODE: POLICY AND APPLICATION SECTION 1. Title. - This Act shall be known and cited as the "LGC of 1991". SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that: the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy Rationale: to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. The State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization from national government to local government units, whereby local government units shall be given more: powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. (b) To ensure the accountability of local government units through the institution of effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum. (c) To require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community SEC. 3. Operative Principles of Decentralization. - The formulation and implementation of policies and measures on local autonomy shall be guided by the following operative principles: (a) There shall be an effective allocation among the different local government units of their respective powers, functions, responsibilities, and resources; (b) There shall be established in every local government unit an accountable, efficient, and dynamic organizational structure and operating mechanism that will meet the priority needs and service requirements of its communities;
(c) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, local officials and employees paid wholly or mainly from local funds => shall be appointed or removed, according to merit and fitness, by the appropriate appointing authority; (d) The vesting of duty, responsibility, and accountability in local government units shall be accompanied with provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge their powers and effectively carry out their functions; hence, they shall have: the power to create and broaden their own sources of revenue and the right to a just share in national taxes and an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas; (e) Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions; (f) Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them; (g) The capabilities of local government units,especially the municipalities and barangays, shall be enhanced by providing them with opportunities to participate actively in the implementation of national programs and projects; (h) There shall be a continuing mechanism to enhance local autonomy not only by legislative enabling acts but also by administrative and organizational reforms; (i) Local government units shall share with the national government the responsibility in the management and maintenance of ecological balance within their territorial jurisdiction, subject to the provisions of this Code and national policies; (j) Effective mechanisms for ensuring the accountability of local government units to their respective constituents shall be strengthened in order to upgrade continually the quality of local leadership; (k) The realization of local autonomy facilitated through improved coordination of national government policies and programs and extension of adequate technical and material assistance to less developed and deserving local government units; (l) The participation of the private sector in local governance, particularly in the delivery of basic services, shall be encouraged Purpose: to ensure the viability of local autonomy as an alternative strategy for sustainabledevelopment; and (m) The national government shall ensure that decentralization contributes to the continuing improvement of the performance of local government units and the quality of community life.
(e)In the resolution of controversies arising under this Code where no legal provision or jurisprudence applies => resort may be had to the customs and traditions in the place where the controversies take place.
CHAPTER 2. - GENERAL POWERS AND ATTRIBUTES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS SEC. 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local government unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress => in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned => in the case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code. SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. GR: the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit: (a) Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned; (b) Population. - It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and (c) Land Area. It must be contiguous. XPN: Comprises two or more islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the: Department of Finance (DOF), the NationalStatistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau(LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources(DENR) Income At least P2.5M (average annual for the last 2 consecutive years) Population At least 25,000 Land Area At least 50 sq. Km.
LGU Municipality
SEC. 4. Scope of Application. - This Code shall apply to all provinces, cities, municipalities, barangays, and other political subdivisions as may be created by law, and, to the extent herein provided, to officials, offices, or agencies of the national government SEC. 5. Rules of Interpretation. - In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply (a)Any provision on a power of a local government unit => liberally interpreted in its favor In case of doubt: any question thereon => in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power => in favor of the local government unit concerned; (b) In case of doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue measure => construed strictly against the local government unit enacting it, and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. Any tax exemption, incentive or relief granted by any local government unit pursuant to the provisions of this Code => construed strictly against the person claiming it. (c) The general welfare provisions in this Code =>liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community; (d) Rights and obligations existing on the date of effectivity of this Code and arising out of contracts or any other source of prestation involving a local government unit shall be governed by the original terms and conditions of said contracts or the law in force at the time such rights were vested; and
Barangay
At least 5,000 for Metro Manila and other highly urbanized cities
Otherwise, at least 2,000
Component City
At least P20M (average annual for the last 2 consecutive years) Sec. 450, LGC
At least 150,000
At least 100 sq. km
For highly urbanized city: At least P50M For Highly urbanized city: At 4
least 200,000
Province
At least P20M
At least 250,000
At least 2,000 sq. Km.
SEC. 8. Division and Merger. - Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current income classification prior to such division. The income classification of local government units shall be updated within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Code to reflect the changes in their financial position resulting from the increased revenues as provided herein.
SEC. 12. Government Centers. - Provinces, cities, and municipalities shall endeavor to establish a government center where offices, agencies, or branches of the national government , local government units, or government-owned or -controlled corporations may, as far as practicable, be located. In designating such a center, the local government unit concerned shall => take into account the existing facilities of national and local agencies and offices which may serve as the government center as contemplated under this Section. The national government , local government unit or governmentowned or -controlled corporation concerned shall=> bear the expenses for the construction of its buildings and facilities in the government center SEC. 13. Naming of Local Government Units and Public Places, Streets and Structures (a) The sangguniang panlalawigan may, in consultation with the Philippine Historical Commission (PHC), change the name of the following within its territorial jurisdiction: Component cities and municipalities => upon the recommendation of the sanggunian concerned; Provincial roads, avenues, boulevards, thorough-fares, and bridges; Public vocational or technical schools and other post-secondary and tertiary schools; Provincial hospitals, health centers, and other health facilities; and Any other public place or building owned by the provincial government (b) The sanggunian of highly urbanized cities and of component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, i.e. independent component cities, may, in consultation with the Philippine Historical Commission, change the name of the following within its territorial jurisdiction City barangay => upon the recommendation of the sangguniang barangay concerned; City roads, avenues, boulevards, thoroughfares,and bridges Public elementary, secondary and vocational or technical schools, community colleges and non-chartered colleges; City hospitals, health centers and other health facilities; and (5) Any other public place or building owned by thecity government (c) The sanggunians of component cities and municipalities may, in consultation with the Philippine Historical Commission, change the name of the following within its territorial jurisdiction: city and municipal barangays => upon recommendation of the sangguniang barangay concerned; city, municipal and barangay roads, avenues, boulevards, thoroughfares, and bridges; city and municipal public elementary, secondary and vocational or technical schools, post-secondary and other tertiary schools; city and municipal hospitals, health centers and other health facilities; and Any other public place or building owned by the municipal government. None of the foregoing local government units, institutions, places, or buildings shall be named after a living person, nor may a change of name be made Unless: for a justifiable reason and, in any case, not oftener than once every ten (10) years. The name of a local government unit or a public place, street or structure with historical, cultural, or ethnic significance shall not be changed, unless by a unanimous vote of the sanggunian concerned and in consultation with the PHC. (e) A change of name of a public school shall be made only upon the recommendation of the local school board concerned.cralaw A change of name of public hospitals, health centers, and other health facilities shall be made => only upon the recommendation of the local health board concerned Effectivity of the change of name of any local government=> only upon ratification in a plebiscite conducted for the purpose in the political unit directly affected. In any change of name, the Office of the President, the representative of the legislative district concerned, and the Bureau of Posts shall be notified 5
SEC. 9. Abolition of Local Government Units. A local government unit may be abolished when its income, population, or land area has been irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum standards prescribed for its creation The law or ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall specify the province, city, municipality, or barangay with which the local government unit sought to be abolished will be incorporated or merged
SEC. 10. Plebiscite Requirement. - No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC (Comelec) within 120 days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action unless said law or ordinance fixes another date SEC. 11. Selection and Transfer of Local Government Site, Offices and Facilities. (a) The law or ordinance creating or merging local government units => shall specify the seat of government from where governmental and corporate services shall be delivered. In selecting said site, factors relating to: geographical centrality, accessibility, availability of transportation and communication facilities, drainage and sanitation, development and economic progress, and other relevant considerations shall be taken into account (b)When conditions and developments in the local government unit concerned have significantly changed subsequent to the establishment of the seat of government, its sanggunian may, after public hearing and by a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of all its members, transfer the same to a site better suited to its needs. Provided: no such transfer shall be made outside the territorial boundaries of the local government unit concerned The old site, together with the improvements thereon, may be disposed of: by sale or lease or converted to such other use as the sanggunian concerned may deem beneficial to the local government unit concerned and its inhabitants. (c) Local government offices and facilities shall not be transferred, relocated, or converted to other uses XPN: Public hearings are first conducted for the purpose and the concurrence of the majority of the members of the sanggunian concerned
o SEC. 14. Beginning of Corporate Existence. - When a new local government unit is created, its corporate existence shall commence: upon the election and qualification of its chief executive and a majority of the members of its sanggunian, unless some other time is fixed therefor by the law or ordinance creating it
Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.
SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ et al vs. HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR Issue: W/N the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent component city Held: Yes o A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs. o Every LGU is vested with the following rights: o the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue; o the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of IRAs; and o the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries o Section 450 (c) of the LGC provides that "the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income." o To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income. Issue: W/N RA 7720 can be considered to originate from the HR, hence, valid Held: Yes o It cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. -> No violation of Sec. 24 Art. VI of the Constitution o Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance: It is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in HR o Presumption of Constitutionality Dual Personality SEC. 15. Political and Corporate Nature of Local Government Units. Every local government unit created or recognized under this Code is a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it shall exercise powers as: a political subdivision of the national government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory Delegatas Potestas non Potest Delegare RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes) vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO o Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County -> What is forbidden is the delegation of power to make the law (which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be) and not the conferring of an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, as what is done in this case Wayman vs. Southard: Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official -> based on necessity In the case at bar, The Philippine Legislature has conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board. o Reason: As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state
EMMANUEL PELAEZ vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL o RA 2370: o GR:Barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed o XPN: By Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated Respondents reliance upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan is untenable -> Do not involve creation of a new municipality but a mere transfer of territory from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law. Requirements for a valid delegation: o Law be complete in itself -> set forth the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and o Fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions Sec. 68 of RAC do not conform to these requirements. o No policy to be carried out or implemented by the President Creation of municipalities -> not an administrative function but -> essentially and eminently legislative in character o The question of whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such power is a legislative question Sec. 10 (1) of Article VII of Consti: Power of Control in Executive Departments -> This power is not granted to the President as far as local governments are concerned o Sec. 68 of RAC is unconstitutional -> Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.
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MUNICIPALITY OF KAPALONG vs. HON. FELIX L. MOYA Facts: Municipality of Sto. Tomas, created by then President Garcia, which asserted jurisdiction over 8 barrios of petitioner, brought the subject action to the respondent judge to settle the conflicts on boundaries with the petitioner. o The court considered petitioners premise that the ruling of the court in Pelaez vs. Auditor General is clear that the President has no power to create municipalities. o Thus, there is no Municipality of Santo Tomas to speak of. It has no right to assert, no cause of action, no corporate existence at all, and it must perforce remain part and parcel of Kapalong.
o o
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO vs. HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ o Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than 6 years when the decision in Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. o The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of EO 353 but it was not the case -> EO 174 was promulgated The Municipality of San Andres had been considered to be one of the 12 municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon, under the ordinance apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, which is equally significant to the intention of Sec. 442(d) of the LGC The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Sec. 442(d) in the Code
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. JOSE O. VERA Any attempt to abdicate the legislative power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest. o John Locke: "The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have." o XPN: o Creation of the municipalities exercising local self government -> Such legislation is not regarded as a transfer 6
of general legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribed local regulations, according to immemorial practice, subject of course to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity (Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick) o Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI of the Constitution: The President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues o Section 16 of the Constitution: Authority of the President to promulgate rules and regulations in times of war or other national emergency Test for undue delegation: To inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature o The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. o The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The principle which permits the legislature to provide that the administrative agent may determine when the circumstances are such as require the application of a law is defended upon the ground that at the time this authority is granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the legislature. o In the case at bar, the legislature has not made the operation of the Prohibition Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board.
MMDA vs. VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. Facts: Herein petitioners assail the order of the RTC of Manila declaring EO 179 (Greater Manila Mass Transport System Project), issued by then President Gloria Arroyo ordering the implementation of MMDAs plan to decongest traffic by the closure of provincial bus terminals along EDSA and major thoroughfares in MM, unconstitutional and denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. o o While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated. By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the President and administrative boards as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local governments under an express delegation by the LGC Under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. o Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question. o By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires. It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. o There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 (Act creating MMDA) that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the two tests of a valid police power measure, viz: o the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and o the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL vs. THE METROPOLITAN MANILA Facts: MMA issued Ordinance No. 11 of 1991 authorizing itself to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila Issue: W/N there was an undue delegation of legislative power under EO 392 as stated by the OSG in its comment Held: No o The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. o the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such that all the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done in the case at bar. o the presence of a sufficient standard It is settled that the "convenience and welfare" of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate's authority. However, the question now left is whether the exercise of such delegated power is valid. No. o Test of the validity of the exercise of the delegated legislative power -> Requisites of a valid ordinance: o must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; -> not passed this criterion since the ordinance is in contradiction with PD 1605, a statute o must not be unfair or oppressive; o must not be partial or discriminatory; o must not prohibit but may regulate trade; o must not be unreasonable; and o must be general and consistent with public policy
General Welfare Clause SEC. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers Expressly granted, Necessarily implied therefrom, Necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and Essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Duties of local government within their respective territorial jurisdictions under this provision: Ensure and support the preservation and enrichment of culture, Promote health and safety, Enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, Encourage and support the development of appropriate and selfreliant scientific and technological capabilities, Improve public morals, Enhance economic prosperity and social justice, Promote full employment among their residents, Maintain peace and order, and Preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. RAMON FABIE, ET AL. v s. THE CITY OF MANILA It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the city of Manila to make all reasonable regulations looking to the preservation and security of the general health of the community, and the protection of life and property from loss or destruction by fire. All such regulations have their sanction in what is termed the police power. US vs Toribio First, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrary interfere with private business, or impose 7
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, is determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the court. In the instant case, the requirement that buildings should "abut or face upon a public street or alley or on a private street or alley which has been officially approved," is reasonably necessary to secure the end in view, to wit: o It prevents the huddling and crowding of buildings in irregular masses on single or adjoining tracts of land, and secures an air space on at least one side of each new residence o It promotes the safety and security of the citizens of Manila and of their property against fire and disease, especially epidemic disease, by securing the easy and unimpeded approach to all new buildings That the ordinance is not "unduly oppressive upon individuals" becomes very clear when the nature and extent of the limitations imposed by its provisions upon the use of private property are considered with relation to the public interests, the public health and safety, which the ordinance seeks to secure. The ordinance proviso is manifestly intended to subserve the public health and safety of the citizens of Manila generally and was not conceived in favor of any class or of particular individuals. Those charged with the public welfare and safety of the city deemed the enactment of the ordinance necessary to secure these purposes, and it cannot be doubted that if its enactment was reasonably necessary to that end it was and is a due and proper exercise of the police power. We are of opinion that the enforcement of its provisions cannot fail to redound to the public good, and that it should be sustained on the principle that "the welfare of the people is the highest law" (salus populi suprema est lex).
THE CITY OF MANILA vs. ARCADIO PALLUNGNA In Uy Ha vs. The City Mayor, et al: o Ordinance No. 3628 seeks to regulate and license the operation of "pinball machines" within the City of Manila upon payment of an annual license of P300.00 for each "pinball machines" o Such ordinance is ultra vires, it being an exercise of power not granted by law to the City of Manila since those devices are prohibited by law, hence, not subject to regulation. Ordinance No. 3628 is ultra vires, not because it is a tax measure, but because it was enacted beyond the power granted by law to the City of Manila. Any attempt to collect any license fee under said ordinance is illegal.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. TEOFILO GABRIEL Under its police power, the City Council of Manila has authority to regulate and control public auctions within its city boundaries. o The ordinance is in the nature of a police regulation, and to that extent is intended as a business regulation. o It is no more than a regulation of the business, affairs of the city, and is a matter in the discretion of the council acting under its police power. There is no discrimination in the ordinance. o It applies to all kinds and classes of people alike doing business within the prohibited area, and no person within the city limits has any legal or constitutional right to auction his goods without a license from, or the consent of, the city o Hence, so long as the ordinance is uniform, the city has a legal right to specify how, when, where, and in what manner goods may be sold at auction within its limits, and to prohibit their sale in any other manner.
THE UNITED STATES vs. SILVESTRE POMPEYA The Philippine Legislature has power to legislate upon all subjects affecting the people of the Philippine Islands which has not been delegated to Congress or expressly prohibited by said Organic Act. o Police power the power of the government, inherent in every sovereign, and cannot be limited The power vested in the legislature to make such laws as they shall judge to be for the good of the state and its subjects The police power of the state includes not only the public health and safety, but also the public welfare, protection against impositions, and generally the public's best interest. It so extensive and all pervading, that the courts refuse to lay down a general rule defining it, but decide each specific case on its merits
EUSEBIO PELINO vs. JOSE ICHON, ET AL The portion of ordinance No. 8 which led the court to declare it null and void is that one authorizing as many cockpits in the municipality as there are applicants therefor. However, the municipal council acted within its powers in enacting this ordinance and it is granted discretion by law to regulate or prohibit cockpits (section 2243 of the Revised Administrative Code). o When the council does not so prohibit, these businesses are deemed to be authorized subject to its regulation. This power to regulate includes the power to fix its number, inasmuch as the law neither fixes it nor limits it to one.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA POLICE POWER; MANIFESTATION OF. Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is a manifestation of a police power measure specifically aimed to safeguard public morals. As such it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers extending as it does "to all the great public needs." There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note included as annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers." LICENSES INCIDENTAL TO. Municipal license fees can be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. Licenses for non-useful occupations are incidental to the police power, and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in taking the amount of license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a wide discretion in this class of cases. Aside from applying the well known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the 8
THE UNITED STATES vs. PRUDENCIO SALAVERIA Two branches of the general welfare clause: o One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. o The second branch of the clause is much more independent of the specific functions of the council which are enumerated by law this authorizes such ordinances "as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." The constitutional provision that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law is not violated by this ordinance. Liberty of action by the individual is not unduly circumscribed; that is, it is not unduly circumscribed if we have in mind the correct notion of this "the greatest of all rights." o The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people.
determination of the amount of this kind of license fee. (Cu Unjieng v. Patstone [1922], 42 Phil,, 818, 828). Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly.this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police power. MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; PROHIBITIONS IN. The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila making it unlawful for OMKA of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as transgression against the command of due process. The prohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute. [G.R. No. 118127. April 12, 2005.] CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. FACTS:Enacted by the City Council 9 on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993, the said Ordinance is entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES SECTION 1.Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, no person, partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the ErmitaMalate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West, pursuant to P.D. 499 be allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any business providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community, such as but not limited to: 1.SaunaParlors2.Massage Parlors3.Karaoke Bars4.Beerhouses5.Night Clubs6.Day Clubs7.Super Clubs8.Discotheques9.Cabarets10.Dance Halls11.Motels12.Inns Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. MTDC prayed to the court that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDCs Victoria Court considering that these were not establishments for amusement or entertainment and they were not services or facilities for entertainment, nor did they use women as tools for entertainment, and neither did they disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants or adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. In their Answer, petitioners City of Manila contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the inherent and plenary power of the State and the general welfare clause exercised by local government units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila and conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the LGU Code.They allege that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power; it does not contravene P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the presumption of validity. ARTICLE III THE MUNICIPAL BOARD Section 18.Legislative powers. The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers: xxxxxxxxx Notes in Public Corporation Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
(kk)To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months' imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense. Private respondent maintains that the Ordinance is ultra vires and that it is void for being repugnant to the general law. That the questioned Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power Respondent Judge Laguio issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the Ordinance. And granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC. Hence this petition. ISSUE: WON the ordinance is a valid exercise of the general welfare clause of LGUs. HELD: The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every sentence thereof violates a constitutional provision. Anent the first criterion of a valid oridinance, (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute - ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution and to the laws. The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. Local government units, as agencies of the State, are endowed with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the Code, known as the general welfare clause. The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power. REQUISITES FOR THE VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER ARE NOT MET - To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process clause. The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the establishments in the Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of legitimate, licensed and tax-paying nightclubs, bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses, cocktail lounges, hotels and motels. The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council's police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive. However, the worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community's social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses "allowed" under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community. 9
That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further the illegal prostitution is of no moment. We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most innocent of places that it may even take place in the substitute establishments enumerated under Section 3 of the Ordinance. The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men. The City Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the establishments, but not to the detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants, premiums and blessings of democracy. MEANS EMPLOYED ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM - It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental right to liberty and property. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." In accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty. [G.R. No. 122846. January 20, 2009.] WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners vs. CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, respondent. FACTS: City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance prohibiting the motels and inns, among other establishments, within the ErmitaMalate area from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or "wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays. It also prohibits renting out a room more than twice a day. Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" SEC. 1.Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and the youth in particular. SEC. 4.Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same meaning. The Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed for a TRO with (RTC) of Manila praying that the Ordinance, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by P.D. No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours. Petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), as operators of drive-in hotels and motels in Manila (Anito group of companies), filed a motion to intervene. Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business. RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution." Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the Notes in Public Corporation Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay. The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. ISSUE: WON Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4) (iv) of the LGC HELD: Ordinance 7774 is unconstitutional Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process". The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products. The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products. Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a "discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a "fundamental right". Consequently, two standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation. A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender 53 and legitimacy. 54 Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig,55 after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed.56 While the test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due process cases as well. We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest.Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest. It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The establishments have gained notoriety as venue of 'prostitution, adultery and fornications'. Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among consenting married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected will be curtailed as well. We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose to pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative. That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a 10
particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments. SORIANO, NICKOLAI CESAR JUANA RIVERA, petitioner, vs. RICHARD CAMPBELL, judge of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, respondent. (G.R. No. L-11119 March 23, 1916) FACTS:
water supply beyond the limits of the municipality is within the competency of the legislature, and that the municipality may exercise police power in the protection of the territory thus acquired to insure cleanliness, and prevent any business and conduct likely to corrupt the fountain of water supply for the city.' (28 Cyc., 703, 704.)
VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, RENATO ALIPIO, JOSE TORRES III, LEONCIOCORPUZ, TERESITACALOT, ROSALIA FERNANDEZ, ELIZABETH VELASCO, NANETTE VILLANUEVA, HONORATO BUENAVENTURA, RUBEN DE CASTRO, VICENTE ROXAS, RICARDO DAMIAN, DOMDINOROMDINA, ANGELINA OBLIGACION, CONRADO GREGORIO, TEODORO REYES, LYDIA ATRACTIVO, NAPOLEON MENDOZA, PERFECTO GUMATAY, ANDRES SABANGAN, ROSITA DURAN, SOCORRO BERNARDEZ, and PEDRO GABRIEL, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE EDGARDO L. PARAS, MATIAS RAMIREZ as the Municipal Mayor, MARIO MENDOZA as the Municipal Vice-Mayor, and THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF BOCAUE, BULACAN, respondents (G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983) FACTS:
Petitioner was charged and convicted for willfully and unlawfully washing garments, articles of clothing, and fabrics in the waters of that part of the Mariquina River lying between the Santolan pumping station and the Boso-Boso dam, in the Province of Rizal, a place then occupied by duly authorized representatives and employees of the city of Manila, on or about May 11th, 1915, in violation of of subsection (f) of Sec. 4 of Ordinance No. 149. Petitioner admitted of committing the violation but alleges that the Municipal Court and CFI of Manila does not have jurisdiction over her case.
The Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan enacted Ordinance No. 84 prohibiting the operation of night clubs by not issuing licenses to operate and by revoking those previously issued. Petitioners filed two cases of prohibition with preliminary injunction which was dismissed by respondent judge. Petitioners allege that a municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling.
ISSUE: WON the prohibition under Ordinance No. 84 is valid? HELD: No.Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as follows: "General power of council to enact ordinances and make regulations. - The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." It is practically a reproduction of the former Section 39 of Municipal Code.An ordinance enacted by virtue thereof, according to Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court in the leading case of United States v. Abendan "is valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right. Where the power to legislate upon a given subject, and the mode of its exercise and the details of such legislation are not prescribed, the ordinance passed pursuant thereto must be a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be pronounced invalid." In another leading case, United States v. Salaveria, theponente this time being Justice Malcolm, where the present Administrative Code provision was applied, it was stated by this Court: "The general welfare clause has two branches: One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. With this class we are not here directly concerned. The second branch of the clause is much more independent of the specific functions of the council which are enumerated by law. It authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.' It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powersand purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State." If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. In the two leading cases above set forth, this Court had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The admonition in Salaveria should be heeded: "The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation." It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in 11
ISSUE: WON the courts of Manila have jurisdiction over the case even though it was committed in Rizal? HELD: Yes. It may be noted that section 6 of said Ordinance No. 149, expressly confers upon the municipal court of the city of Manila power to try any violation of any of its provisions. Section 7 of said ordinance provides the penalty for its violation. The very well-reasoned decision of Judge Campbell, herein respondent:'Public water supply is not limited to water supply owned and controlled by a municipal corporation, but should be construed as meaning a supply of water for public and domestic use, furnished or to be furnished from waterworks.' (State vs. Township etc., 52 N. J. Law, 496; 19 Atl. Rep., 975.) The provisions of Ordinance No. 149 of the city of Manila and the Acts of the Philippine Commission upon which it is based would be meaningless and almost absurd if made applicable only to the Santolan pumping station and not to that part of the Mariquina River immediately above it and from which the said pumping station draws water for the use of the inhabitants of the city of Manila during the dry season, considering that the policy and purpose of said ordinance is the protection of the public health in the said city. According to American decisions on the construction of statutes: `Every statute must be construed with reference to the object intended to be accomplished by it. In order to ascertain this object it is proper to consider the occasion and necessity of its enactment, . . . .and the statute should be given that construction which is best calculated to advance its object, by suppressing the mischief and securing the benefits intended.' (36 Cyc., 1110, 1111.) That the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila has jurisdiction to try the offense under consideration, although committed in the Province of Rizal, by virtue of the provisions of said ordinance (149), based upon paragraphs (w) and (cc), of section 17 of Act No. 183, and paragraph (i) f section 3 of Act No. 1150 of the Philippine Commission can not be disputed, if we simply take into consideration the following rule, which has been pronounced on many occasions, in relation to the same question, by many courts: 'The corporation boundaries usually mark the limit for the exercise of the police power by the municipality; but in many instances because essential to the statutory performance of police functions, and especially for the preservation of the public health, the municipality is granted police power beyond its boundaries. Thus it has been held that the grant of power to acquire territory for Notes in Public Corporation Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed. The general welfare clause, a reiteration of the Administrative Code provision, is set forth in the first paragraph of Section 149 defining the powers and duties of the sangguniangbayan. It read as follows: "(a) Enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein; ..." There are in addition provisions that may have a bearing on the question now before this Court. Thus the sangguniangbayan shall "(rr) Regulate cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses and lodging houses, except travel agencies, tourist guides, tourist transports, hotels, resorts, de luxe restaurants, and tourist inns of international standards which shall remain under the licensing and regulatory power of the Ministry of Tourism which shall exercise such authority without infringing on the taxing or regulatory powers of the municipality; (ss) Regulate public dancing schools, public dance halls, and sauna baths or massage parlors; (tt) Regulate the establishment and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment; ..." It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business. During such time, their employees would undergo a period of deprivation. Certainly, if such an undesirable outcome can be avoided, it should be. The law should not be susceptible to the reproach that it displays less than sympathetic concern for the plight of those who, under a mistaken appreciation of a municipal power, were thus left without employment. Such a deplorable consequence is to be avoided. If it were not thus, then the element of arbitrariness enters the picture. That is to pay less, very much less, than full deference to the due process clause with its mandate of fairness and reasonableness.
HELD: No.To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts. We agree with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for themselves, A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in its implementation because as already experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare. There is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both children and adults. The petitioners are merely conducting their legitimate businesses. The object of every business entrepreneur is to make a profit out of his venture. There is nothing immoral or injurious in charging the same price for both children and adults. In fact, no person is under compulsion to purchase a ticket. It is a totally voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a ticket to such performances. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power.A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights.The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause. Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away. Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid. IBANGGA, CHRISTOPHER BERNARD G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994 MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners, vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,respondents. Facts: When PAGCOR decided to expand its operation to include the City of Cagayan de Oro, demonstrations from different civic organizations, religious elements, local officials and other cross oriented groups opposed the project. They all brand the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city. In furtherance to this opposition, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City enacted Ordinance No. 3353: "PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF 12
CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU CARCEL, petitionersappellants, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, Branch 11, and the CITY OF BUTUAN, respondents-appellees (G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988) FACTS:
The Municipal Board of the City of Butuan issued Ordinance no. 640 requiring those engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances to charge only one-half of dais tickets to children below 12 years old. Petitioners, who are managers of theaters in the city filed a complaint before respondent CFI to declare the ordinance unconstitutional for being ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. Respondent court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance claiming that there is no public necessity that justifies the exercise of the police power by the City of Butuan. Respondent City of Butuan maintains that the full price of tickets for the children is too burdensome for the parents and respondent court held that the children are entitled to share in the joys of their elders, but considering that, apart from size, children between 7 and 12 cannot fully grasp the nuance of the movies or other forms of amusement and that prices with respect to them ought to be reduced.
ISSUE: WON the power to regulate includes the authority in the fixing of prices of admission to these places of exhibition and amusement by invoking the police power delegated under the general welfare clause?
BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO." and Ordinance No. 3375-93: "PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION." Respondent Pryce Properties, Inc., the property owner where the casino would be placed, assailed the ordinances aforementioned.
billboards, allegedly for the sole reason that such signs are, or may be, offensive to the sight. Rafferty maintain, however, that Act No. 2339, conferred power upon the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard on the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance.
Issue: Whether or not the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro has the power and authority to prohibit the establishment of a PAGCOR gambling casino within the City's territorial limits. Held: No. The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse.
Issue: Whether or not Act No. 2339 is a valid exercise of police power [though having for its purpose the promotion and gratification of the esthetic sense, and not solely the promotion or protection of the public safety, the public peace and good order of society]. Held: Yes, it is a valid exercise of police power. Objects may be offensive to the eye as well as to the nose or ear. Man's esthetic feelings are constantly being appealed to through his sense of sight. Large investments have been made in theaters and other forms of amusement, in paintings and spectacular displays, the success of which depends in great part upon the appeal made through the sense of sight. Moving picture shows could not possible without the sense of sight. Governments have spent millions on parks and boulevards and other forms of civic beauty, the first aim of which is to appeal to the sense of sight. Why, then, should the Government not interpose to protect from annoyance this most valuable of man's senses as readily as to protect him from offensive noises and smells? If the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people are included within those subjects, everything which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police power. A source of annoyance and irritation to the public does not minister to the comfort and convenience of the public. And we are of the opinion that the prevailing sentiment is manifestly against the erection of billboards which are offensive to the sight.
Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice. Petition is denied.
RE: NUISANCE Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which: Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or Annoys or offends the senses; or Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or Hinders or impairs the use of property. Art. 695. Nuisance is either: Public Nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal Private Nuisance one that is not included in the foregoing definition.
G.R. No. L-12172
August 29, 1958 PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
THE PEOPLE OF THE vs. JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants. Facts:
Appellant Juan Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia was convicted for violation of Ordinance No. 7 of Baao, Camarines Sur because they constructed a building that obstructs/destroys the view of the public plaza.
G.R. No. L-10572 December 21, 1915 FRANCIS A. CHURCHILL and STEWART TAIT, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. JAMES J. RAFFERTY, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant. Facts: Petitioners Churchill and Tait are advertisers who owned the billboards and signages subject of this case. They appealed before the Court to restrain and prohibit defendant Rafferty, as Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR), from destroying or removing any of their signboards, or
It is worthy to mention that Fajardo was the mayor of Baao when the municipal council passed the subject ordinance prohibiting the construction of any establishments that would block the view of Baao town plaza.
After his term, however, Fajardo applied for a permit to construct a building beside the gasoline station near the town plaza. His request has been repeatedly denied until he pushed through with it anyway, since according to him, he badly needed a house to stay because the old one was destroyed by a typhoon. He was indicted, convicted and thereafter, appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the petition to the Supreme Court because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question. 13
Issue: Whether or not the assailed ordinance is constitutional and reasonable to prevent a nuisance. Held: No, the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation.
But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
As to petitioners contention that there is lack of authority of the municipality to exercise this right since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved o Under Sec. 9 of BP Blg. 337 (LGC enforced at that time), a local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose o Further, Based on Sec. 153 of the same law, the only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is "beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same." Given this provisions, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove the resolution for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution Hence, it follows that the assailed Resolution is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners' property Petition was denied.
Power to Generate and Apply Resources Section 18 Medina vs. City of Baguio Eminent Domain Section 19 PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY (deceased) and LEONORA MODAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AGUSAN DEL SUR AND MUNICIPALITY OF BUNAWAN G.R. No. 107916 February 20, 1997 Facts:
MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, HON. ADRIANO D. DAEZ, MUNICIPAL MAYOR, MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PHILIPPINE PIPES & MERCHANDIZING CORPORATION G.R. No. 72126 January 29, 1988 Facts:
Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed to its municipal mayor a resolution Authorizing the latter to initiate the Petition for Expropriation on petitioners land This was approved by the mayor and was transmitted to Sangguniang Panlalawigan, who disapproved such and return it with a comment that the expropriation is unnecessary Subsequently, the municipality filed a petition for Eminent Domain against petitioner before the RTC and later on, a motion to take or enter upon the property stating that necessary amount was already deposited with the municipal treasurer RTC granted the same; Affirmed by the CA; Hence, this petition.
Petitioner municipality, however, issued a resolution manifesting the intention to expropriate the respondent's parcel of land Respondent company filed an opposition to the said resolution before the Office of the Provincial Governor, which in turn, created a special committee to investigate the matter As result of the finding of the special committee that there is no genuine necessity for the expropriation, the Provincial Board disapproved and annulled the subject resolution Petitioner filed with RTC a special civil action for expropriation which was granted, and subsequently deposited the market value of the land with PNB Upon motion for reconsideration by respondent company, IAC reversed the ruling of the lower court, stating that there is no genuine necessity to expropriate the land for use as a public road as there were several other roads for the same purpose and another more appropriate lot for the proposed public road. Respondent Court, taking into consideration the location and size of the land, also opined that the land is more ideal for use as storage area for respondent's heavy equipment and finished products; Hence, this petition
Issue: W/N there is a valid exercise by the Municipality of the Power of Eminent Domain Held: Yes Eminent Domain Defined: o fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. o Government's right to appropriate private property for public use or purpose by compulsory sale to the State o Inherently possessed by the national legislature -> may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. 16 Exercise of Eminent domain to be valid, 2 requisites must concur: o the taking must be for public use i.e. -> necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character o there must be just compensation, in addition due process of law must be observed In the case at bar, the following buildings were constructed in the subject land -> Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, the Municipal Motorpool, and the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium In addition, the provisional value of the land was deposited to the municipal treasurer in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court Hence, there is a valid exercise of eminent domain.
Issue: W/N there is genuine necessity in expropriating respondent companys land Held: No Petitioners purpose: To convert the same into a public road which would provide a connecting link between Malhacan Road and Bulac Road in Valenzuela, Bulacan and thereby ease the traffic in the area of vehicles coming from MacArthur Highway However, records show that -> there are 4 existing connecting links and that with the proposed road, there would be 7 Based on jurisprudence: o The foundation of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character o The courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity o The government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken In the case at bar, there is absolutely no showing in the petition why the more appropriate lot for the proposed road which was offered for sale has not been the subject of the petitioner's attempt to expropriate assuming there is a real need for another connecting road. Hence, petition was dismissed.
14
JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. vs. MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA G.R. No. 152230. August 9, 2005 Facts:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriationproceedings to acquire the property of the Ching Cuancos and appropriate the fund therefor. The ordinance stated that the property owners were notified of the municipalitys intent to purchase the property for public use as an access road E.R. Street to Brgy. Sto. Tomas Bukid but they rejected the offer The municipality then filed a complaint for expropriation with the RTC and deposited with the court 15% of the market value of the property based on the latest tax declaration covering the property In the answer of Ching Cuancos, they claimed that as early as 1993 they had sold the property to herein petitioner as evidenced by a deed of sale The RTC ruled in favor of respondent municipality, which was affirmed by the CA Herein petitioner now contends that there is no valid and definite offer made to the owner since a mere notice of intent to purchase is not equivalent to an offer to purchase and that such notice was not even addressed to the petitioner, being the real owner of the property In addition, herein petitioner argues that, if the property is already devoted to or intended to be devoted to another public use, its expropriation should not be allowed
conference to discuss the project and the price that may be mutually acceptable to both parties Notice of lis pendens -> not a substantial compliance with the requisite offer, in contrary to CAs ruling o A notice of lis pendens is a notice to the whole world of the pendency of an action involving the title to or possession of real property and a warning that those who acquire an interest in the property do so at their own risk and that they gamble on the result of the litigation over it
As to issue on public necessity o Public use -> as long as purpose of the taking is public o Not absolute necessity -> reasonable and practical necessity In the case at bar, the necessity for constructing the access road was testified upon by residents stating that although there were other ways through which one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except through the newly constructed Damayan Street However, the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioners property and not elsewhere In addition, an ocular inspection was not conducted during the trial, if there is petitioner was not notified -> petitioner was deprived of its right to due process Hence, petition was granted.
Issue: W/N the respondent complied with the requirement, under Section 19 of the LGC, of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the complaint Held: No Nature and Scope of The Right of Eminent Domain o An indispensable attribute of sovereignty; o A power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common need and advance the general welfare o However, Constitution provides -> for public use and with just compensation o Due process and equal protection clauses act as additional safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of this governmental power Strict Construction and Burden of Proof -> against the State in favor of the owner o Reason: Necessarily a derogation of private rights Sec. 19 of RA 7160 -> A LGU may exercise this right provided that: o An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. o Purpose: Public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless o Payment of just compensation (as provided in Sec. 9, Art. III of the Constitution) o A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted o To immediately take possession -> filing of expropriation proceedings and making deposit with the court of at least 15% of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated o Amount to be paid -> shall be determined by the Court based on the fair market value at the time of taking of the property Valid and Definite Offer o In relation to Art. 35 Offer to Buy and Contract of Sale of the IRR of LGC -> Must be in writing, i.e. specify the property sought to be acquired, reasons and price offered o Purpose of this requirement: To encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court action In the case at bar, the only evidence adduced by the respondent to prove compliance under this requirement is the photocopy of the letter purportedly bearing the signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco -> stating only its intent to buy the property and only an invitation to a
LOURDES DE LA PAZ MASIKIP vs. THE CITY OF PASIG, HON. MARIETTA A. LEGASPI and THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 136349 January 23, 2006 Facts:
Pursuant to Ordinance No. 42 enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig, petitioner was first notified of the respondent citys intention to expropriate her land to be used for the "sports development and recreational activities" of the residents of Barangay Caniogan She was then again notified but now with the purpose to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community. Respondent city then filed an expropriation proceeding with the RTC which ruled against petitioner. This was affirmed by the CA. Herein petitioner contended, among others, that there was no genuine necessity for the taking of the property sought to be expropriated
Issue: W/N there is a genuine necessity for the taking of herein petitioners land Held: No Power of Eminent domain - the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor In the exercise of eminent domain, judicial review is limited to the following: o the adequacy of the compensation, o the necessity of the taking, and o the public use character of the purpose of the taking The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from "the necessity" and the taking must be limited to such necessity. o In City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila -> The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. o The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land. o In City of Manila v. Arellano Law College -> Necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary -> not an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, i.e. greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property owner In the case at bar, respondent city has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioners property Records show that -> the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit 15
organization, not the residents of Caniogan, for the purpose of having their own private playground and recreational facility The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan. Hence, petition was granted.
The trial court granted the petitioner, but this was however, reversed by the CA, hence the instant petition
Issue: W/N the herein petitioners power of eminent domain was violated Held: No In general, eminent domain is defined as "the power of the nation or a sovereign state to take, or to authorize the taking of, private property for a public use without the owners consent, condition ed upon payment of just compensation." Requisites of a valid exercise of eminent domain o The expropriator must prove that the expropriation is for a public use. In this jurisdiction, "public use" is defined as "whatever is beneficially employed for the community." The number of people is not determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use, provided the use is exercisable in common and is not limited to particular individuals o Payment of Just compensation In APO Fruits Corporation v. The Honorable Court of Appeals: Just compensation has been defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator," and that the gauge for computation is not the takers gain but the owners loss. In the case at bar, the intended feeder road sought to serve the residents of the subdivision only. It has not been shown that the other residents of Barangay Sindalan will be benefited by the contemplated road to be constructed on the lot of respondents spouses The power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public use and with just compensation. Taking an individuals private property is a deprivation which can only be justified by a higher goodwhich is public useand can only be counterbalanced by just compensation. Without these safeguards, the taking of property would not only be unlawful, immoral, and null and void, but would also constitute a gross and condemnable transgression of an individuals basic right to property as well Hence, petition was denied
MIGUEL BELUSO, NATIVIDAD BELUSO, PEDRO BELUSO, ANGELITA BELUSO, RAMON BELUSO, and AMADA DANIEL, substituted by her heirs represented by TERESITA ARROBANG vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY (CAPIZ), represented by its Mayor, VICENTE B. BERMEJO G.R. No. 153974 August 7, 2006 Facts:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Panay issued a resolution authorizing the municipal government through the mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings against the lands of herein petitioners A petition for expropriation was then filed with the RTC which was and affirmed by the CA; hence, the instant petition In this petition, respondents expropriation is based merely on a resolution and not an ordinance as required under the LGC
Issue: W/N respondent city complied with the requisites in exercising its right to eminent domain Held: No The exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental right -> Thus, whether such power is exercised directly by the State or by its authorized agents, the exercise of such power must undergo painstaking scrutiny Under Sec. 19 of the LGC, an ordinance must be enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property o A resolution will not suffice for an LGU to be able to expropriate private property -> it is not an ordinance Ordinance Resolution A mere declaration of the sentiment or Law opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter Temporary Not required; Unless decided As to enactment: Third readings is requires otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members
General and permanent character
As respondents expropriation in this case was based merely on a resolution, such expropriation is clearly defective. While the Court is aware of the constitutional policy promoting local autonomy, the court cannot grant judicial sanction to an LGUs exercise of its delegated power of eminent domain in contravention of the very law giving it such power Hence, petition was granted.
BARANGAY SINDALAN, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, rep. by BARANGAY CAPTAIN ISMAEL GUTIERREZ,Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE MAGTOTO III, and PATRICIA SINDAYAN G.R. No. 150640 March 22, 2007 Facts:
Sec. 21 of the LGC Closure and Opening of Roads A local government unit may permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction -> Requisites: It is pursuant to an ordinance In case of permanent closure Ordinnce must be approved by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Sanggunian When necessary, a substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided Make provisions for the maintenance of public safety A property permanently withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local government unit concerned may be lawfully used or conveyed No freedom park shall be closed permanently without provision for its transfer or relocation to a new site Any national or local road, alley, park, or square may be temporarily closed during: Actual emergency, or fiesta celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs, or an undertaking of public works and highways, telecommunications, and waterworks projects No national or local road, alley, park, or square shall set temporarily closed for athletic, cultural, or civic activities not officially sponsored, recognized, or approved by the local government unit concerned Any city, municipality, or Barangay may, by a duly enacted, close and regulate the use of any local ordinance, temporarily street, road, thoroughfare, or any other public place where shopping malls, Sunday, flea or night markets, or shopping areas may be established and where
Pursuant to a resolution passed by the barangay council, petitioner Barangay filed a Complaint for eminent domain against respondents for the purpose of converting the latters land into a feeder road for the agricultural and other products of the residents, and just as inlet for their basic needs On the other hand, respondents alleged that the expropriation of their property was for private use, that is, for the benefit of the homeowners of Davsan II Subdivision
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goods, merchandise, foodstuffs, commodities, or articles of commerce may be sold and dispensed to the general public Closure of Roads Section 17 CALAPAN LUMBER COMPANY, INC. vs. COMMUNITY SAWMILL COMPANY, ET AL G.R. No. L-16351 June 30, 1964 Facts:
Pursuant to Resolution No. 222, which was later on supported by Resolution no. 119, herein petitioner undertake the construction of the a road and bridge known as Biga-Communal-Goob, with the condition that: o the province shall grant the sole right to use to the petitioner, o that after 20 years, the latter shall donate the same to the government and o that the road is open to all non-logging concerns or individuals during the said periodconstructed with the knowledge and consent of the Provincial Board of Oriental Mindoro From the completion of the road up to the present the plaintiff has been contributing to the repair and maintenance of the said road and has been used by the public without any restriction with the written consent of the herein petitioner A writ of preliminary injunction was then issued against herein respondent in using the road and bridge in bad faith Resolution No. 186 revoked the above said resolutions, for the reason that upon the recommendation of the Director of Public Works and with the concurrence of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications, provincial roads are considered as properties for public use and the Provincial Board may not therefore grant the exclusive use thereof to any private individual or entity which would discriminate against or exclude the general public from a reasonable use thereof
Provided -> newly established LGUs or those without corporate seals may create their own corporate seals which shall be registered, including any changes with such, with the DILG GR: No contract may be entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the LGU without prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned. Legible copy of such contract shall be posted at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipal or barangay hall. LGUs shall enjoy full autonomy in the exercise of their proprietary functions and in the limitations provided by the Code and other applicable laws Section 23. Authority to Negotiate and Secure Grants Local chief executives may negotiate and secure financial grants or donations in kind, in support of the basic services or facilities enumerated under Section 17, from local and foreign assistance agencies without necessity of securing clearance or approval therefor from any department, agency, or office of the national government of from any higher LGU; Requisites: Upon authority of the sanggunian, Projects financed by such grants or assistance with national security implications -> must be approved by the national agency concerned, and Failure to act national agency fails within 30 days from receipt -> deemed approved. Local chief executive within 30 days upon signing of such grant agreement or deed of donation -> report the nature, amount, and terms of such assistance to both Houses of Congress and the President. Section 24. Liability for Damages. - LGUs and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property. Art. 423 and 424, CC. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities patrimonial property -> all other property
Issue: W/N the road and bridge in question is a private road and therefore, petitioner can legally deny its use to herein respondents Held: No The contention of herein petitioner that the Provincial Board of Oriental Mindoro, pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code, is authorized to issue the assailed resolutions is untenable Under the said law, the Provincial Board is authorize to permit, upon favorable recommendation by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and subject to such conditions as may properly protect the public interests, the construction and maintenance, for private use of railways, conduits, and telephone lines across public thoroughfares, streets, roads, or other public property and in the province o Provided, That such construction and private use shall not prevent or obstruct the public use of such thoroughfares, streets, roads or other public property and o That the permit granted shall at all times be subject to revocation by the Secretary of the Interior, if, in the judgment of that official, the public interest requires it. Although herein petitioner built the road in good faith -> The provisions of the Civil Code on the right of a builder in good faith on a private land cannot be invoked and applied to the road in question ->> because public interest is involved and the people living in that part of the province are entitled to use the road Hence, petition was dismissed Property of Local Government Section 22. Corporate Powers Every LGU, as a corporation, shall have the following powers: To have continuous succession in its corporate name; To sue and be sued; To have and use a corporate seal; To acquire and convey real or personal property; To enter into contracts; and To exercise such other powers as are granted to corporations, subject to the limitations provided in this Code and other laws. LGUs may continue using, modify, or change their existing corporate seals
City of Manila vs. Gerardo Garcia et. al. G.R. No. L-26053 February 21, 1967 Facts: Herein respondents entered parcels of land owned by herein petitioner city during the period of liberation without the latters knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building permits from the city. Having discovered such occupation, were given by the city mayor written permits labeled as lease contract to occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth. Subsequently, due to the need for expansion of Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School, herein respondents were notified to pay their lease due and vacate the premises, but they refused, hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the contract of lease over the subject property is valid, hence the respondents have acquired the legal status of tenants Held: No
These permits, erroneously labeled lease contracts, were issued by the mayors in 1947 and 1948 when the effects of war had simmered down and when these defendants could have very well adjusted themselves Defendants' entry was illegal. Their constructions are as illegal, without permits. The city charter enjoins the mayor to "safeguard all the lands" of the City of Manila. o The permits granted to them did not "safeguard" the city's land in question. The Mayor of the City of Manila cannot legalize forcible entry into public property by the simple expedient of giving permits, or, for that matter, executing leases. o Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city officials will elevate it into a lawful act.
Victoriana Espiritu et. al. vs. Municipal Council, Mayor, and Chief of Police of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan G.R. No. L-11014 January 21, 1958
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Facts: During the last world war, the market building of the town of Pozorrubio was destroyed, and after Liberation, the market vendors began constructing temporary and make-shifts stalls, even small residences, on a portion of the town plaza. The Municipal Treasurer collected from these stall owners fees. In time, the whole municipal market was rehabilitated, but the owners of the structures on the plaza failed and refused to transfer to said market place. As a result of petitions from civic organizations, the Municipal Council of Pozorrubio No. 20, Series of 1951, stating that the public market had already been rehabilitated, and ordering the occupants and owners of the structures on the plaza to remove their buildings within 60 days from receipt of the resolution. Issue: Whether or not respondents can lawfully order petitioners to remove their buildings in the subject property Held: Yes Fee of P.25 per square meter collected by the Municipal Tresurer -> market stall fees charges on all market vendors in a public market o There was absolutely no contract or agreement between the appellants on one side and the municipality on the other, about renting of the Plaza to the former The occupation of the plaza and the construction of temporary buildings thereon by appellants mostly for market, even residence purposes, was merely tolerated by the municipality, because of the destruction of the public market during the war Town Plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general. They are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties. o In case of war or during an emergency, town plazas may be occupied temporarily by private individuals, as was done and as was tolerated by the Municipality of Pozorrubio, when the emergency has ceased, said temporary occupation or use must also cease, and the town officials should see to it that the town plazas should ever be kept open to the public and free from encumbrances or illegal private constructions. FELICIDAD VILLANUEVA et. al. vs. HON. MARIANO CASTAEDA, VICENTE A. MACALINO G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987 Facts: Herein petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in a strip of land within the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along Mercado Street by virtue of Resolution No. 218, authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stags and sell in the said place. The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property per municipal council Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality, thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218. The basic contention of the petitioners is that the disputed area is under lease to them by virtue of contracts they had entered into with the municipal government, first in 1961 insofar as the original occupants were concerned, and later with them and the other petitioners by virtue of the space allocations made in their favor in 1971 for which they saw they are paying daily fees. Issue: Whether or not the subject land is a public property, hence, outside the commerce of man Held: Yes The petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. There is absolutely no question that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, specially of residences, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. o Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general They are outside the common of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties. The people are denied the proper use of the place as a public plaza, where they may spend their leisure in a relaxed and even beautiful environment and civic and other communal activities of the town can be held. o The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners are covered by the police power as delegated to the municipality under the general welfare clause Notes in Public Corporation Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
This authorizes the municipal council "to enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." This authority was validly exercised in this case through the adoption of Resolution No. 29.
CITY OF BAGUIO vs. THE NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY G.R. No. L-12032 August 31, 1959 Facts: Plaintiff, a municipal corporation filed a complaint against defendant a public corporation, created under RA No. 1383. It contends that the said act does not include within its purview the Baguio Water Works system, assuming that it does, is unconstitutional because it deprives the plaintiff ownership, control and operation of said waterworks system without compensation and without due process of law, and that it is oppressive, unreasonable and unjust to plaintiff and other cities, municipalities and municipal districts similarly situated. Issue: Whether or not Baguio Waterworks System is a public property, hence, subject to the control of Congress Held: No The Baguio Waterworks System is not like any public road, park, street or any other public property held in trust by a municipal corporation held for the benefit of the public but it is rather a property owned by appellee in its proprietary character. o Waterworks system is patrimonial property of the city that has established it o And being owned by the municipal corporation in a proprietary character, waterworks cannot be taken away without observing the safeguards set by our Constitution for the protection of private property. The right of state as to the private property of municipal corporation is a right of regulation to be exercised in harmony with the general policy of the state, and though broader than exists in the case of individuals, or private corporations, is not a right of appropriation. The property held by a municipal corporation unit in its private capacity is not subject to the unrestricted control of the legislature, and the municipality cannot be deprived of such property against its will, except by the exercise of eminent domain with payment of full compensation. THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE vs. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G.R. No. L-24440 March 28, 1968 Facts: Prior to the incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga was the provincial capital of Zamboanga Province. By virtue of Commonwealth Act 39, section 50 providing that the buildings and other properties that the Province will abandon in view of its conversion as Zamboanga City shall be paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General, the said properties consisting of 50 lots were identified and the price were fixed thereof. An allotment for its payment was authorized by the BIR Commissioner. In June 17, 1961, RA 3039 was approved and it amended section 50 of the Commonwealth Act 39 providing that all buildings, properties, and assets belonging to the Province of Zamboanga and located in the City of Zamboanga are transferred free of charge in favor of the City of Zamboanga. The Province of Zamboanga del Norte filed a complaint for declaratory relief with preliminary injunction contending that the RA 3039 is unconstitutional as it deprives the Province of its properties without just compensation and due process. Issue: Whether or not the subject properties are public properties of the province of Zamboanga, hence, the City of Zamboanga should pay for them Held: The matter involved here is the extent of legislative control over the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a province is one. The principle itself is simple: o If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it.
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If the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation. Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high school playground sites a total of 24 lots since these were held by the former Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress. But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly, governmental purposes.
Municipality. Under the Civil Code, petitioner is responsible or liable for the negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks. Municipal councilors cannot be held liable Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation with the municipal council acting as its board of directors. o It is an elementary principle that a corporation has a personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing it and the latter are not as a rule coresponsible in an action for damages for tort or negligence culpa aquilla committed by the corporation's employees or agents unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part.
Suability and Liability: Art. 2180, NCC The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable Art. 2189, NCC Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision
Municipality of Moncada vs. Pio Cajuigan et. al. G.R. No. L-7048 Facts: The municipality of Moncada and the defendant, Pio Cajuigan, entered into a contract of lease whereby the plaintiff leased to this defendant certain fish ponds situated within the jurisdiction of that municipality for a certain term. Subsequently, the lease was declared rescinded by the municipality, alleging that herein respondents have not paid rental for the last month of extension of the lease. Issue: Whether or not herein petitioner can validly rescind the contract of lease with respondents Held: Yes
Laudencio Torio et. al. vs. Rosalina Fontanilla et. al. G.R. No. L-29993 Facts: The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed resolutions to manage the town fiesta celebration and to create a committee which in turn organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage. A zarzuela was then staged but during the program, the stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned underneath, and later on, died. Issue: Whether or not the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by municipal council is a governmental function of the municipality from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents Held: No The powers of a municipality are twofold in character: o public, governmental or political those exercised by the corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial public, and political GR: If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function or duty no recovery, as a rule, can be had from the municipality nor from its officers, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously. XPN: There is an existing statute on the matter o corporate, private, or proprietary on the other those exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial private and corporate With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons: ex contract or ex delicto. The holding of town fiesta by the municipality of Malasiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of the municipality. o Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code gives authority to municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta, but it does not impose upon it as a duty to observe o Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state Petitioner or appellant Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability under the contention that it was Jose Macaraeg who constructed the stage. o The municipality acting through its municipal council appointed Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee on entertainment and in charge of the construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the
The parties knew and understood all conditions in these contracts and were bound by them. The contracts, being legitimate ones, were the law between the contracting parties. The lessee having failed to comply with the plain provisions of this contract by not making the payment as reacquired therein, the plaintiff had a right to have the contract rescinded, collect the penalties, and confiscate the deposit as agreed between the contracting parties in said contract.
City of Manila vs. Genario Teotico and Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-23052 Facts: In January 1958, at about 8pm, Teotico was about to board a jeepney in P. Burgos, Manila when he fell into an uncovered manhole. This caused injuries upon him. Thereafter he sued for damages under Article 2189 of the Civil Code the City of Manila, the mayor, the city engineer, the city health officer, the city treasurer, and the chief of police. CFI Manila ruled against Teotico. The CA, on appeal, ruled that the City of Manila should pay damages to Teotico. The City of Manila assailed the decision of the CA on the ground that the charter of Manila (R.A No. 409) states that it shall not be liable for damages caused by the negligence of the city officers in enforcing the charter; that the charter is a special law and shall prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law; and that the accident happened in national highway. Issue: Whether or not the City of Manila can be held liable Held: Yes Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" specifically "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision. o Section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon. Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos 19
Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409 Power to Contract; Ultra Vires Contract; Ratification; Non-impairment
SEC. 28. - Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of the Philippine National Police. Governing Law: R.A. No. 6975 - The DILG Act of 1990" and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto.
B. Intergovernmental Relations Article One. - National Government and LGUs SEC. 25. National Supervision over LGUs President -> general supervision over LGUs Purpose: to ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. President -> supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly urbanized cities, and independent component cities through the province with respect to component cities and municipalities; through the city and municipality with respect to barangays National agencies and offices with project implementation functions -> coordinate with one another and with the LGUs concerned in the discharge of these functions. Ensure the participation of LGUs both in the planning and implementation of said national projects President may direct the appropriate national agency to provide financial, technical, or other forms of assistance to the LGU. How? Upon request of the LGU concerned No extra cost to the LGU concerned National agencies and offices including government-owned or controlled corporations with field units or branches in a province, city, or municipality -> furnish the local chief executive concerned, for his information and guidance, monthly reports including duly certified budgetary allocations and expenditures SEC. 26. Duty of National Government Agencies, authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of any project or program that may cause: pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species to consult with the LGUs, NGOs, and other sectors concerned and explain the following: goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof Such consultation and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is required before implementation of program or project GR: Occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted XPN: Appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Article Three. - Inter-Local Government Relations Province, through the governor -> ensure that every component city and municipality within its territorial jurisdiction acts within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions Highly urbanized cities and independent component cities shall be independent of the province. GR: Governor shall review all executive orders promulgated by the component city or municipal Mayor within his jurisdiction XPN: As otherwise provided under the Constitution and special statutes GR: City or municipal Mayor shall review all executive orders promulgated by the punong barangay within his jurisdiction. Copies of orders are forwarded to the governor or the city or municipal Mayor within 3 days from their issuance. Failure to act within 30 days = deemed consistent with law, hence, valid Local chief executive concerned shall ensure that such executive orders are within the powers granted by law and in conformity with provincial, city, or municipal ordinances. In the absence of a municipal legal officer -> municipal government may secure the opinion of the provincial legal officer; In the absence of the latter, that of the provincial prosecutor on any legal question affecting the municipality City or municipality, through the city or municipal Mayor concerned -> exercise general supervision over component barangays Purpose: to ensure that said barangays act within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions LGUs may group themselves, consolidate, or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them. Requisite: Enact appropriate Ordinance In support of such undertakings, the LGUs involved may contribute funds, real estate, equipment, and other kinds of property and appoint or assign personnel under such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by the participating local units through Memoranda of Agreement Requisites: Public hearing conducted for the purpose, and Approval by the sanggunian concerned RELATIONS WITH PEOPLE'S AND NGOS LGUs to promote the establishment and operation of people's and NGOs to become active partners in the pursuit of local autonomy LGUs may enter into joint ventures and such other cooperative arrangements with people's and NGOs; Purpose: to engage in the delivery of: certain basic services, capability-building and livelihood projects to develop local enterprises designed to: improve productivity and income, diversify agriculture, spur rural industrialization, promote ecological balance, enhance the economic and social well-being of the people LGU may provide assistance, financial or otherwise, to such people's and NGOs -> through its local chief executive and with the concurrence of the sanggunian concerned for the following purpose: economic, socially-oriented, environmental, or cultural projects to be implemented within its territorial jurisdiction LOCAL PREQUALIFICATION, BIDS AND AWARDS COMMITTEE Local Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee (Local PBAC) in every province, city, and municipality -> primarily responsible for the conduct of prequalification of contractors, bidding, evaluation of bids, and the recommendation of awards concerning local infrastructure projects. Composition: Chairman -> The governor or the city or municipal Mayor; Members: The chairman of the appropriations committee of the sanggunian concerned; A representative of the minority party in the sanggunian concerned, If none -> one chosen by said sanggunian from among its members; The local treasurer; 20
Article Two. - Relations with the Philippine National Police
2 representatives of NGOs that are represented in the local development council concerned, to be chosen by the organizations themselves; Any practicing CPA from the private sector -> designated by the local chapter of the Philippine Institute of Certified Public Accountants, if any Duties of Representatives of the Commission on Audit: observe the proceedings of such committee certify that the rules and procedures for prequalification, bids and awards have been complied with The agenda and other information relevant to the meetings of such committee -> deliberated upon by the committee at least 1 week before the holding of such meetings All meetings of the committee shall be held in the provincial capitol or the city or municipal hall. Minutes and any decision made therein -> be duly recorded, posted at a prominent place in the provincial capitol or the city or municipal hall, and delivered by the most expedient means to elective local officials concerned Local Technical Committee in every province, city and municipality -> to provide technical assistance to the local prequalification, bids and awards committees Composition: Provincial, city or municipal engineer, the local planning and development coordinator, and such other officials designated by the local prequalification, bids and awards committee Chairman -> designated by the local prequalification, bids and awards committee and shall attend its meeting in order to present the reports and recommendations of the local technical committee.
Issue: Whether RA 6975 is constitutional Held: Yes Fundamentally accepted principle in Constitutional Law: The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices to lay at rest petitioner's contention on the matter. o This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk o The power of the President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter -> "heart of the meaning of Chief Executive." "Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency" -> As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members. o All executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. XPN: In cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally In short, the President's power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department NAPOLCOM and the PNP being placed under the reorganized DILG -> merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government. Such organizational set-up does not detract from the mandate of the Constitution that the national police force shall be administered and controlled by a national police commission as at any rate, and in fact, the Act in question adequately provides for administration and control at the commission level Sec. 14. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall exercise the following powers and functions: xxx xxx xxx
CITIZEN J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and THE NATIONAL TREASURER G.R. No. 96409 February 14, 1992 Facts: Herein petitioner, as citizen, taxpayer, and member of the Philippine Bar, filed this petition, seeking the Courts declaration of Republic Act 6975 entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Brief History of Sec. 6 Art. XVI of the Constitution: Article XVI, Section 6: The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which stall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law. Commonwealth Period: Philippine Constabulary -> nucleus of the Philippine Ground Force (PGF), now AFP its administrative, supervisory and directional control was handled by the then Department of the Interior After war -> it remained as the "National Police" under the Department of National Defense, as a major service component of the AFP Integration Act of 1975 created Integrated National Police (INP) under the Office of the President with PC as nucleus The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) exercised administrative control and supervision while the local executives exercised operational supervision and direction over the INP units assigned within their respective localities The set-up whereby the INP was placed under the command of the military component, which is the PC, severely eroded the INP's civilian character and the multiplicity in the governance of the PC-INP resulted in inefficient police service. The integration of the national police forces with the PC also resulted in inequities since the military component had superior benefits and privileges. Hence, the "one police force, national in scope, and civilian in character" provision that is now Article XVI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
(i) Approve or modify plans and programs on education and training, logistical requirements, communications, records, information systems, crime laboratory, crime prevention and crime reporting; (j) Affirm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed upon members of the Philippine National Police by the Chief of the PNP; (k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through .the regional. appellate boards over administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police benefits; xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 26. The Command and direction of the PNP shall be vested in the Chief of the PNP . . . Such command and direction of the Chief of the PNP may be delegated to subordinate officials with respect to the units under their respective commands, in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the Commission. . . . xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners contention: RA 6975 emasculated the NAPOLCOM by limiting its power "to administrative control" over the Philippine National Police (PNP), thus, "control" remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the National NAPOLCOM and the PNP were placed Notes in Public Corporation Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
Sec. 35. . . . To enhance police operational efficiency and effectiveness, the Chief of the PNP may constitute such other support units as may be necessary subject to the approval of the Commission. . . .
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xxx
xxx
xxx
Sec. 37. . . . There shall be established a performance evaluation system which shall be administered in accordance with the rules, regulations and standards; and a code of conduct promulgated by the Commission for members of the PNP. . . . Petitioners Contention: RA 6975 vested the power to choose the PNP Provincial Director and the Chiefs of Police in the Governors and Mayors, respectively; the power of "operational supervision and control" over police units in city and municipal mayors; in the Civil Service Commission, participation in appointments to the positions of Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director-General as well as the administration of qualifying entrance examinations; disciplinary powers over PNP members in the "People's Law Enforcement Boards" and in city and municipal mayors
D. PARTICIPATION OF LOCAL EXECUTIVES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE PNP: Sec. 51. Powers of Local Government Officials over the PNP Units or Forces. Governors and mayors shall be deputized as representatives of the Commission in their respective territorial jurisdictions. As such, the local executives shall discharge the following functions: a.) Provincial Governor (1) . . .
The grant of disciplinary powers over PNP members to the "People's Law Enforcement Boards" (or the PLEB) and city and municipal mayors is also not in derogation of the commission's power of control over the PNP. o Section 20(c): The Commission exercises appellate jurisdiction, thru the regional appellate boards, over decisions of both the PLEB and the said mayors o It is the Commission which shall issue the implementing guidelines and procedures to be adopted by the PLEB for in the conduct of its hearings, and it may assign NAPOLCOM hearing officers to act as legal consultants of the PLEBs (Section 43-d4, d5) o As a disciplinary board primarily created to hear and decide citizen's complaints against erring officers and members of the PNP, the establishment of PLEBs in every city, and municipality would all the more help professionalize the police force. Petitioners Contention: Section 12 constitutes an "encroachment upon, interference with, and an abdication by the President of, executive control and commander-in-chief powers
The provincial governor shall choose the provincial director from a list of three (3) eligibles recommended by the PNP Regional Director. 4) . . . City and municipal mayors shall have the following authority over the PNP units in their respective jurisdictions: i.) Authority to choose the chief of police from a list of five (5) eligibles recommended by the Provincial Police Director. . . . o Presumption should be indulged in favor of constitutionality and the court in considering the validity of the statute in question should give it such reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it within the fundamental law Full control remains with the National Police Commission Local executives are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM; As such deputies, they are answerable to the NAPOLCOM for their actions in the exercise of their functions under that section. Thus, unless countermanded by the NAPOLCOM, their acts are valid and binding as acts of the NAPOLCOM." It is significant to note that the local officials, as NAPOLCOM representatives, will choose the officers concerned from a list of eligibles (those who meet the general qualifications for appointment to the PNP) to be recommended by PNP officials. As regards the assertion involving the Civil Service Commission, suffice it to say that the questioned provisions precisely underscore the civilian character of the national police force, and will undoubtedly professionalize the same, which read:
Sec. 31. Appointment of PNP Officers and Members. The Appointment of the officers and members of the PNP shall be effected in the following manner: a.) Police Officer I to Senior Police Officer IV. Appointed by the PNP regional director for regional personnel or by the Chief of the PNP for national headquarters personnel and attested by the Civil Service Commission; b.) Inspector to Superintendent. Appointed by the Chief of the PNP, as recommended by their immediate superiors, and attested by the Civil Service Commission; c.) Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director-General. Appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Chief of the PNP, with proper endorsement by the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission . . . Sec. 32. Examinations for Policemen. The Civil Service Commission shall administer the qualifying entrance examinations for policemen on the basis of the standards set by the NAPOLCOM. Notes in Public Corporation Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
Sec. 12. Relationship of the Department with the Department of National Defense. During a period of twenty- four (24) months from the effectivity of this Act, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) shall continue its present role of preserving the internal and external security of the State: Provided, that said period may be extended by the President, if he finds it justifiable, for another period not exceeding twenty-four (24) months, after which, the Department shall automatically take over from the AFP the primary role of preserving internal security, leaving to the AFP its primary role of preserving external security o During deliberations -> The provision herein assailed precisely gives muscle to and enforces the proposition that the national police force does not fall under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. This is necessarily so since the police force, not being integrated with the military, is not a part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a civilian agency of the government, it properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive control. o Section 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-inchief powers -> The President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-inChief provision "represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature." His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that "civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military." Petitioners Contention: The creation of a "Special Oversight Committee" under Section 84 of the Act, especially the inclusion therein of some legislators as members is an "unconstitutional encroachment upon and a diminution of, the President's power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices." o The Special Oversight Committee is simply an ad hoc or transitory body, established and tasked solely with planning and overseeing the immediate "transfer, merger and/or absorption" into the Department of the Interior and Local Governments of the "involved agencies." o As an ad hoc body, its creation and the functions it exercises, decidedly do not constitute an encroachment and in diminution of the power of control which properly belongs to the President. What is more, no executive department, bureau or office is placed under the control or authority, of the committee. Independent Constitutional Commissions created under the Constitution: Not under control of the President Commission on Human Rights -> not on the same level as the Constitutional Commissions under Article IX, although it is independent like the latter Commissions. In contrast, Article XVI, Section 6 thereof, merely mandates the statutory creation of a national police commission that will administer and control the national police force to be established thereunder.
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This commission is, for obvious reasons, not in the same category as the independent Constitutional Commissions of Article IX and the other constitutionally created independent Office, namely, the Commission on Human Rights. o By way of resume, the three Constitutional Commissions (Civil Service, Audit, Elections) and the additional commission created by the Constitution (Human Rights) are all independent of the Executive; but the National Police Commission is not. o It was stressed during the CONCOM deliberations that this commission would be under the President, and hence may be controlled by the President, thru his or her alter ego, the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government. Hence, petition was dismissed.
Elective Officials, Secs. 39 75 Qualifications Sec. 39

Sangguniang Kabataan Member of Member of Sangguniang Vice-Mayor / Sangguniang Panglungsod or Mayor Panlalawigan Bayan Filipino Citizen Able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect Vice-Governnor / Governor
Punong Barangay
Registered Voter in Registered Voter in Registered Voter in Registered Voter in Barangay where he Barangay where he district where he district where he intends to be intends to be intends to be intends to be elected (at least 1 elected (at least 1 elected (at least 1 elected (at least 1 year in the year in the year in the year in the immediately immediately immediately immediately preceding preceding preceding preceding election) election) election) election) Highly Urbanized / Component: At least 21 years old on election day Municipality: At least 18 years old on election day
Registered Voter in Registered Voter in Municipality or City Province where he where he intends intends to be to be elected (at elected (at least 1 least 1 year in the year in the immediately immediately preceding preceding election) election)
At least 15 to 21 years old on election day
At least 18 years old on election day
At least 21 years old on election day
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995 Facts:
Herein petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, wherein she stated that her residency in the constituency where she seeks to be elected immediately preceding the election is 7 months. Herein private respondent, the incumbent Representative of the said district and a candidate for the same position, then filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte did not accept the amendment, contending that the same was filed out of time. Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office, together with her Answer to private respondent's petition, wherein she averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" and that she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. Second Division of COMELEC found that private respondent's Petition for Disqualification meritorious and cancelled petitioners original Certificate of Candidacy. 23
COMELEC issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. Based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, Petitioner then averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte. On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Issue: Whether petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections Held: Yes The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions and settled jurisprudence on residence in election law have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" o Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. Moreover, in ruling in favor of petitioner, the Court held that: o First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. o Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and Acts which correspond with the purpose Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium) o The wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium. o Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones. Hence, petition was granted.
where he seeks to be elected immediately preceding the election is 10 months. Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. Second Division of COMELEC promulgated a resolution, upholding petitioners eligibility to run for the position. Election was held and petitioner garnered the highest number of votes. However, herein respondent filed an Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. The COMELEC en banc in resolving, issued a resolution reversing the resolution of the Second Division. Hence this petition. COMELEC contended that in order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. o To prove his residence at Makati, petitioner presented an alleged lease agreement of a condominium in the area.
Issue: Whether petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art.VI of the Constitution Held: Yes It is settled in our jurisprudence that the term "residence" has always been understood as synonymous with "domicile" not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. o The place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. o The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community" from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac. o He was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. o His certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. o His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. o While a lease contract maybe indicative of petitioners intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile. While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact, of his stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical residence" is not to acquire new residence or domicile "but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City." Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. o To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bonafide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. o In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. Hence, petition was dismissed. JUAN G. FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC, and RAUL R. LEE
AGAPITO A. AQUINO vs. COMELEC, MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and JUANITO ICARO G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995 Facts:
Herein petitioner, Agapito Aquino, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City, wherein he stated that his residency in the constituency
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G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996 RAUL R. LEE vs. COMELEC and JUAN G. FRIVALDO G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996 Facts: Petitioner, Juan G. Frivaldo, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. Private respondent, Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. This was granted. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. o Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes. However, on Comelec en bancs order, Raul Lee was then proclaimed as the newly elected governor. Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, praying for the annulment of the proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. o He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted" o As such, when the said order was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution, holding that Lee is not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor and that Frivaldo having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation, is qualified to hold the office of governor.
Disqualifications Sec. 40 Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by 1 year or more of imprisonment, within 2 years after serving sentence; Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic; Those with dual citizenship; Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad; Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and The insane or feeble-minded
URBANO M. MORENO vs. COMELEC and NORMA L. MEJES, CHICO-NAZARIO G.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006 Facts:
Issue: Whether Frivaldos repatriation was valid and legal and reasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office Held: Yes Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired: o by direct act of Congress, o by naturalization or o by repatriation The LGC of 1991 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor o Based on Sec. 39 of the Code, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day). Repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994 o By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, since they are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws and curb certain evils. o In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law, specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization. o It is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. Hence, petition was dismissed. Notes in Public Corporation Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
Herein private respondent, Norma Mejes filed a petition to disqualify petitioner from running for Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar (July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections) on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 4 Months and 1 Day to 2 Years and 4 Months Petitioner filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted probation. o Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. o Under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. On motion for reconsideration filed with the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the First Division disqualifying petitioner from running for Punong Barangay was affirmed. o Sec. 40(a) of the LGC provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position. o Since Moreno was released from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and end two (2) years thence. o The grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from running for an elective local office. o Provisions of the LGC take precedence over the case of Baclayon v. Mutia cited by Moreno and the Probation Law -> it is a much later enactment and a special law setting forth the qualifications and disqualifications of elective local officials In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the LGC applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence.
Issue: Whether petitioner is qualified for a local elective office within 2 years from his discharge from probation after having been convicted by final judgment for an offense punishable by 4 Months and 1 Day to 2 Years and 4 Month Held: Yes Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code appears innocuous enough at first glance. The phrase "service of sentence," understood in its general and common sense, means the confinement of a convicted person in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court. o Alleged to have broadened the coverage of the law to include even those who did not serve a day of their sentence because they were granted probation Difference with Dela Torre vs. Comelec o The phrase "within two (2) years after serving sentence" should have been interpreted and understood to apply both: to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude and
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to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment. o Dela Torre v. Comelec involves a conviction for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense involving moral turpitude covered by the first part of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code. Dela Torre, the petitioner in that case, applied for probation nearly four (4) years after his conviction and only after appealing his conviction, such that he could not have been eligible for probation under the law. o Perfection of an appeal is a relinquishment of the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which is to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who, although already eligible, did not at once apply for probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal. In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. o The grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. o Applying this doctrine to the instant case, it appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation. Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence. When Moreno was finally discharged upon the courts finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for public office. Hence, petition was granted.
disqualification found in Section 40 (a), subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. o In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation. Petition was dismissed.
FLORENTINA L. BACLAYON vs. HON. PACITO G. MUTIA, as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. L-59298 April 30, 1984 Facts:
Petitioner, a school teacher, was convicted of the crime of Serious Oral Defamation by herein respondent judge, Pacito G. Mutia, for having quarrelled with and uttered insulting and defamatory words against Remedios Estillore, principal of the Plaridel Central School. On application for probation, respondent Judge issued an order granting petitioner's probation, but modified the Probation Officer's recommendation by increasing the period of probation to 5 years and by imposing several conditions, one of which is to refrain from continuing her teaching profession Petitioner's plea for deletion of the last condition was rejected by respondent judge. Hence, the petition at bar alleging grave abuse of discretion in the imposition of the said condition
Issue: Whether the assailed condition is not only detrimental and prejudicial to her rights but is also not in accordance with the purposes, objectives and benefits of the probation law Held: Yes The conditions which trial courts may impose on a probationer may be classified into general or mandatory and special or discretionary o Mandatory conditions, enumerated in Section 10 of the Probation Law o Special or discretionary conditions are those additional conditions, listed in the same Section 10 of the Probation Law, which the courts may additionally impose on the probationer towards his correction and rehabilitation outside of prison. The enumeration, however, is not inclusive. Special or discretionary conditions of probation should be realistic, purposive and geared to help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-respecting individual Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in their application and each case should be judged on its own merits on the basis of the problems, needs and capacity of the probationer. Probation statutes are liberal in character and enable courts to designate practically any term it chooses as long as the probationer's constitutional rights are not jeopardized. To order the petitioner to refrain from teaching would deprive the students and the school in general the benefits that may be derived from her training and expertise. o In this case, teaching has been the lifetime and only calling and profession of petitioner. o The law requires that she devote herself to a lawful calling and occupation during probation. Yet, to prohibit her from engaging in teaching would practically prevent her from complying with the terms of the probation. An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a suspension of the imposition of sentence. o It is not a final judgment but is rather an "interlocutory judgment" in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. RENATO U. REYES vs. COMELEC, and ROGELIO DE CASTRO G.R. No. 120905 March 7, 1996 JULIUS O. GARCIA vs. COMELEC, and RENATO U. REYES G.R. No. 120940 March 7, 1996 26
ROLANDO P. DELA TORRE vs. COMELEC and MARCIAL VILLANUEVA G.R. No. 121592 July 5, 1996 Facts:
Herein petitioner seeks the nullification of two resolutions issued by the COMELEC allegedly with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction o 1st Resolution: Declared the petitioner disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the last May 8, 1995 elections -> Sec. 40(a) of LGC Petitioner was convicted for violation of the AntiFencing Law, which involves moral turpitude Appealed with RTC, which affirmed petitioners conviction o 2nd Resolution: Denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration Petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to his case inasmuch as the probation granted him by the MTC on December 21, 1994 which suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences flowing therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well
Issue: Whether a grant of probation affects Section 40 (a)'s applicability Held: No Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element, i.e. actual knowledge by the "fence" of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one's rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. Legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. o Petitioner's conviction of fencing which was declared as a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the Notes in Public Corporation Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
Facts:
Petitioner was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro having been elected to that office on May 11, 1992. Later on, he Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the following charges and ordered his removal from office: o Petitioner exacted and collected P50,000,00 from each market stall holder in the Bongabong Public Market o That certain checks issued to him by the National Reconciliation and Development Program of the DILG were never received by the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of accounts of the same officer; and o That he took 27 heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program after the latter had reared and fattened the cattle for seven months After learning that the Sanggunian had terminated the proceedings in the case and was about to render judgment, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the RTC, alleging that the proceedings had been terminated without giving him a chance to be heard o TRO was issued by the court enjoining the Sangguniang Panlalawigan from proceeding with the case Following the expiration of the TRO, an attempt was made to serve the decision upon petitioner's counsel in Manila. However, the latter refused to accept the decision. On March 20, 1995, petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy with the Office of the Election Officer of the COMELEC in Bongabong On March 23, 1995, the Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued an order for petitioner to vacate the position of mayor and peacefully turn over the office to the incumbent vice mayor. But service of the order upon petitioner was also refused. Private respondent Rogelio de Castro, as registered voter of Bongabong, sought the disqualification of petitioner as candidate for mayor, citing LGC Sec. 40(b). Second division of COMELEC thus issued a resolution disqualifying petitioner. Nonetheless, because of the absence of any contrary order from the COMELEC, petitioner Reyes was voted for in the elections and that the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong, apparently unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the COMELEC, proclaimed him the dulyelected mayor
office and, pursuant to 40(b) of the Local Government Code, he was disqualified from running for reelection G.R. No. 120940: Annulment of the aforesaid resolution of the Commission en banc insofar as it denies his motion to be proclaimed the elected mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, in view of the disqualification of Renato U. Reyes. Issue: Whether Garcia can be proclaimed as mayor in view of Reyes disqualification Held: No That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. ROMEO R. SALALIMA et. al. vs. HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA et. al. G.R. Nos. 117589-92 May 22, 1996 Facts:
Several administrative complaints against the petitioners, who were elective officials of the Province of Albay, were filed with the Office of the President The President and public respondent Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., approved the findings of fact and recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee and holding the petitioners administratively liable for the following acts or omissions: (a) wanton disregard of law amounting to abuse of authority in O.P. Case No. 5470; (b) grave abuse of authority under Section 60 (e) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) in O.P. Case No. 5469; (c) oppression and abuse of authority under Section 60 (c) and (e) of R.A. No. 7160 in O.P. Case No. 5471; and (d) abuse of authority and negligence in O.P. Case No. 5450. The said order meted out on each of the petitioners penalties of suspension of different durations, to be served successively but not to go beyond their respective unexpired terms in accordance with Section 66 (b) of R.A. No. 7160. Herein petitioner Salalima, together with others, was reelected as on the May 1992 elections
G.R. No. 120905: Seeks to annul the resolution of the Second Division of the COMELEC, declaring petitioner Renato U. Reyes disqualified from running for local office and cancelling his certificate of candidacy, and the resolution of the Commission en banc, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, contending that he decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, ordering him removed from office, is not yet final because he has not been served a copy thereof. Issue: Whether Petitioner is qualified Held: No The failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a copy of its decision was due to the refusal of petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision. o If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him, service is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered validly served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it not for his or his counsel's refusal to receive it. In the case at bar, petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Prudence required that, rather than resist the service, he should have received the decision and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with R.A. No. 7160, 67. But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final on April 2, 1995, 30 days after the first service upon petitioner. The net result is that when the elections were held on May 8, 1995, the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already become final and executory. o The filing of a petition for certiorari with the RTC did not prevent the administrative decision from attaining finality. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC: A public official could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection operated as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. o Since the decision in the administrative case against petitioner became final, hence, he was validly removed from Notes in Public Corporation Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
Issue: Whether herein petitioner Governor Salalima which have incurred administrative liability in his prior term was was validly reelected in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections Held: Yes Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor o A public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his reelection to office operates a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioners for acts he may have committed during the failed coup. Any administrative liability which petitioner Salalima might have incurred in the execution of the retainer contract in O.P. Case No. 5469 and the incidents related therewith and in the execution on 6 March 1992 of a contract for additional repair and rehabilitation works for the Tabaco Public Market in O.P. Case No. 5450 are deemed extinguished by his reelection in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO vs. HON. LUIS SANTOS, as Secretary of the Department of Local Government, and MELVIN VARGAS, as Acting Governor of Cagayan G.R. No. 94115 August 21, 1992 Facts:
Herein petitioner Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo assails the decision of respondent Secretary of Local Government, dismissing him as Governor of Cagayan for disloyalty to the Republic during the coup detat, on the ground that the power of the Secretary of Local Government to dismiss local government official under Section 14, Article I, Chapter 3 and 27
Sections 60 to 67, Chapter 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, was repealed by the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. After the hearing conducted, respondent Secretary rendered the questioned decision finding petitioner guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. Installed as Governor of Cagayan in the process was respondent Melvin Vargas, who was then the Vice-Governor of Cagayan. While this case was pending before this Court, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan for the May 11, 1992 elections. Three separate petitions for his disqualification were then filed against him, all based on the ground that he had been removed from office by virtue of the March 19, 1990 resolution of respondent Secretary. This was granted by the Commission. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with this Court, G.R. Nos. 105128-30, entitled Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, et al., seeking to nullify the resolution of the Commission ordering his disqualification. A resolution was issued in the aforementioned case granting petition and annulling the resolution of the Commission on the ground that the decision of respondent Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending review with this Court. As petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.
Issue: Whether petitioner is qualified to run to the said elective office Held: Yes Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administration case pending before Us moot and academic. o Offenses committed, or acts done, during a previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true were the Constitution provides that the penalty in proceeding for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for a term for which the officer was elected or appointed. Clear then, the rule is that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. o XPN: Criminal cases -> those pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup Hence, petition was granted. MATEO CAASI vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990 Facts:
to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., the country in which he resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return for the protection given to him during the period of his residence therein. Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel o Reason: He acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18,1988 local elections, waive his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States? NO. o The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code o XPN: Said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. o Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMELEC, LUIS M. BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUAN G.R. No. 198742 August 10, 2012 Facts:
G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the COMELEC First Division, dismissing the 3 petitions for the disqualification of private respondent as candidate for municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan filed prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988. G.R. No. 88831 - a petition for review of the decision of CA dismissing the petition for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel on account of his being a green card holder. In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. o He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. o He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on May 18,1987.
Issue: Whether private respondent is disqualified to run for the elections on the ground that he is a green card holder Held: On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service
Petitioner, a natural-born Filipino citizen, became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon. In 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. o It was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines In 2006, petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen. Petitioner sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. Separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioners eligibility were filed before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioners disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. Petitioner argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and not a mandatory requirement. 28
Issue: Whether petitioner is qualified to hold her elective post Held: Yes R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores ones Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5 Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine. o Before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia, which was not under oath, contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath. When the law is clear and free from any doubt, there is no occasion for construction or interpretation; there is only room for application. Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is one such instance. o In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship. Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office. BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR. vs. COMELEC and EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ G.R. No. 112889 April 18, 1995 Facts:
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact, private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter. COMELEC resolutions were reversed and was remanded.
EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELEC, BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR. G.R. No. 120099 July 24, 1996 Facts:
Herein petitioner, a defeated candidate for the elective position for the elective position in the Province of Quezon in the May 1992 elections filed this petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against the winning candidate, herein private respondent, Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice. It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for 10 counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that country.
Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr. (Rodriguez and Marquez, for brevity) were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor. Marquez challenged Rodriguez' victory via petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC, alleging that the latter has a pending case in LA, hence, a fugitive from justice and thus disqualified for the elective position. Marquez Decision: "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (. . .), and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term In previous case, Whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" under the definition thus given was not passed upon by the Court. That task was to devolve on the COMELEC upon remand of the case to it, with the directive to proceed therewith with dispatch conformably with the MARQUEZ Decision. Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same position of governor. This time, Marquez challenged Rodriguez' candidacy via petition for disqualification before the COMELEC, based principally on the same allegation that Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice." The COMELEC, allegedly having kept in mind the MARQUEZ Decision definition of "fugitive from justice", found Rodriguez to be one. At any rate, Rodriguez again emerge as the victorious candidate in the May 8, 1995 election for the position of governor. Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez' proclamation which the COMELEC granted
Issue: Whether petitioner is disqualified to the elective position Held: No The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. o There is no dispute that his arrival in the Philippines from the US, as per certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigrations, preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice") are involved in the MARQUEZ Decision and the instant petition. The MARQUEZ Decision was an appeal (the Marquez' quo warranto petition before the COMELEC). The instant petition is also an appeal although the COMELEC resolved the latter jointly (Marquez' petition for the disqualification of Rodriguez). Therefore, what was irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule in the MARQUEZ Decision must govern the instant petition. And we specifically refer to the concept of "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision which highlights the significance of an intent to evade but which Marquez and the COMELEC, with their proposed expanded definition, seem to trivialize. To re-define "fugitive from justice" would only foment instability in our jurisprudence when hardly has the ink dried in the MARQUEZ Decision. To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground for the disqualification or ineligibility of a person seeking to run for any elective local petition under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, should be understood according to the definition given in the MARQUEZ Decision 29
Issue: Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from justice" contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code and, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office Held: No The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. o An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. o The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente (expressed during the Court's en banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment." is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law. Notes in Public Corporation Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
A "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. (Emphasis ours.) Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. o Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post.
Term of Office (Sec. 43) ARSENIO A. LATASA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROMEO SUNGA G.R. No. 154829 December 10, 2003 Facts:
Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. During petitioners third term, the Municipality of Digos was declared a component city, to be known as the City of Digos. This event marked the end of petitioners tenure as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. o However, under Section 53, Article IX of the Charter, petitioner was mandated to serve in a hold-over capacity as mayor of the new City of Digos. Hence, he took his oath as the city mayor. Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor. Despite the petition filed by private respondent praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of herein petitioner, which was granted and upon which petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration, Latasa was sworn into and assumed his office as the newly elected mayor of Digos City in July 2001. However, it was only on August 2002 that the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether petitioner is eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos Held: No GR: The people should be allowed freely to choose those who will govern them o XPN: Art. 8, Sec. 9 of the Constitution Term of office. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected o Purpose: To prevent the monopolization of political power An elective local official is not barred from running again in for same local government post, unless two conditions concur: o that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and o that he has fully served three consecutive terms. Notes in Public Corporation Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law 30
Petitioner asserts that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different juridical personality. o Therefore, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, he cannot be construed as vying for the same local government post Substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a city. o There is a material change in the political and economic rights of the local government unit when it is converted from a municipality to a city and undoubtedly, these changes affect the people as well. o Such creation or conversion is based on verified indicators Charter of City of Digos provides that: o The territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the present metes and bounds of the Municipality of Digos. o The present elective officials of the Municipality of Digos shall continue to exercise their powers and functions until such a time that a new election is held and the duly-elected officials shall have already qualified and assumed their offices. As seen in the aforementioned provisions, this Court notes that the delineation of the metes and bounds of the City of Digos did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by the Municipality of Digos. This Court also notes that the elective officials of the Municipality of Digos continued to exercise their powers and functions until elections were held for the new city officials. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. o The territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. o Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years. The term served must be one "for which the official concerned was elected (Borja vs. Comelec) The Court believes that petitioner did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor. The principle behind the three-term limit rule is to prevent consecutiveness of the service of terms, and that there was in the case a break in such consecutiveness after the end of respondents third term and before the recall election. (Socrates vs. Comelec) Hence, petition was dismissed.
ROMEO LONZANIDA vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and EUFEMIO MULI G.R. No. 135150 July 28, 1999 Facts:
Held: No The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-term limit which is now embodied in section 8, Art. X of the Constitution was initially proposed to be an absolute bar to any elective local government official from running for the same position after serving three consecutive terms. o Reason: To forestall the accumulation of massive political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his tenure in office The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms o The petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and he did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. o After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. o His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. A proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest o The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. o Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Hence, petition was granted. VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS et. al. G.R. No. 154512 November 12, 2002 Facts:
Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the RTC, which decision declared a failure of elections (January 1997). In February 1998, the COMELEC issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post, which he obeyed, and Alvez assumed office for the remainder of the term. In May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio. His opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post, which was granted/
COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the City of Puerto Princesa, and scheduled the recall election on September 2002. Edwin Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election. Hagedorn had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 until 2001 and did not run in the immediately following regular elections. Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were consolidated seeking the disqualification of Hagedorn to run for the recall election and the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998 immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post. COMELECs First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit and OMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
Issue: Whether petitioners assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials Notes in Public Corporation Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
Issue: Whether Hagedorn who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election 31
Held: Yes The constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. o 1st part An elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. o 2nd part Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. o The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. o Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. A subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. The intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service. Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the re-election is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. o A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the third term. Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate re-election after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. ATTY. VENANCIO Q. RIVERA III and ATTY. NORMANDICK DE GUZMAN vs. COMELEC and MARINO "BOKING" MORALES G.R. No. 167591 May 9, 2007 Facts:
local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms. Here, Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. Such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term. Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him "to stay on indefinitely".
FRANCIS G. ONG vs. JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 163295 January 23, 2006 Facts:
Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre and petitioner Francis Ong were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 2004 elections. Ong was then the incumbent mayor. Alegre filed a petition to disqualify petitioner and cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter already maximized the threeterm rule, i.e. he ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor The May 1998 elections saw both Alegre and Francis opposing each other for the office of mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte, with the latter being subsequently proclaimed by COMELEC winner in that contest. Alegre subsequently filed an election protest before the RTC, which declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest, albeit the decision came out only on July 4, 2001, when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente.
Issue: Whether Ongs assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule. Held: Yes Ong ran for mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. The RTCs disposition was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. o Petitioner Francis contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. o His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule. The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would under the three-term rule - be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election. Vs. Lonzanida Case: The result of the mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the stated reason of "failure of election", and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service. o In the case at bar, there was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of Francis service respecting the 1998-2001 term. Hence, petition was dismissed. Succession (Sec. 44)
In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections, respondent Marino "Boking" Morales ran as candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term Herein petitioner filed with the Second Division of COMELEC a petition to cancel respondent Morales Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that he was elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy violated Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, also known as the Local Government Code. In his answer to the petition, respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term), but he served the second term from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer" because of the following reasons: o He was not validly elected since his proclamation as mayor was declared void by the RTC, the decision of which became final and executory; and o He was preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-graft case from January 16, 1999 to July 15, 1999.
Issue: Whether respondent is qualified to run for the 2004 elections Held: No For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same Notes in Public Corporation Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
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RAMON L. LABO, Jr. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROBERTO ORTEGA G.R. No. 105111 July 3, 1992 Facts:
mayor, in accordance with Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code, to wit: Chapter 2. Vacancies and Succession - Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor and Vice-Mayor. (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or the vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. OTTOMAMA BENITO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ABDALAWE M. PAGRANGAN, and the Heirs of the Deceased Mayoralty Candidate MURAD KISMEN SAMPIANO OGCA, represented by CABILI SAMPIANO G.R. No. 106053 August 17, 1994 Facts:
Shortly after petitioner Labo filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baguio City in the May 1992 elections, private respondent filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the COMELEC on the ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated therein that he (Labo) is a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. In essence, it is the contention of petitioner Labo that he is a Filipino citizen. o Petitioner cites the 1980 US case of Vance v. Terrazas (444 US 252), wherein it was held that in proving expatriation, an expatriating act an intent to relinquish citizenship must be proved by a preponderance of evidence. o Petitioner contends that no finding was made either by the Commission on Immigration or the Comelec as regards his specific intent to renounce his Philippine citizenship. Petitioner Ortega, on the other hand, submits that since the Court did not issue a temporary restraining order as regards resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy, said resolution has already become final and executory. Ortega further posits the view that as a result of such finality, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes should be declared Mayor of Baguio City.
Issue: Whether Labo is a qualified candidate to run in the elections Held: No Petitioner Labo still failed to submit a scintilla of proof to shore his claim before this Court that he has indeed reacquired his Philippine citizenship. The fact remains that he has not submitted in the instant case any evidence, if there be any, to prove his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship either before the Court or the Comelec. Petitioner Labo claims, however, that Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code "operates as a legislatively mandated special repatriation proceeding" and that it allows his proclamation as the winning candidate since the resolution disqualifying him was not yet final at the time the election was held. o Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, to wit: o Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or the Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. Petitioner Labo's status has not changed in the case at bar. To reiterate, he (Labo) was disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His election does not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable requirement for holding public office Issue: Whether the disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate (Ortega) receiving the next highest number of votes to be proclaimed as the winning candidate for mayor of Baguio City Held: No While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect. Rule: The ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. As a consequence of petitioners' ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred. This should now be filled by the viceNotes in Public Corporation Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
Petitioner Ottomama Benito and the deceased Hadji Murad Kismen Sampiano Ogca were candidates for mayor in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur in the May 1992 election. Sultan Mikunug filed a petition for disqualification against Ogca, assailing that Ogca asked him to work for the latters re-election and that when he refused, Ogca struck him on the head with a billiard cue. After the election, candidate Ogca was killed in an ambush while returning home from the residence of Lanao del Sur Governor Saidamen Pangarungan in Marawi City. Petitioner, probably not aware of the death of his opponent, filed a motion to suspend the proclamation of Ogca as elected mayor of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, contending that there was strong evidence of guilt against him in the disqualification case. COMELEC denied the same stating that Ogca was dead, hence, his proclamation as winner was essential to pave the way for succession by the Vice-Mayor-elect as provided for in Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 Meanwhile, the Municipal Board of Canvassers ruled to exclude from tallying, counting and canvassing all votes for and in the name of deceased mayoralty candidate Ogca. Despite appeal of herein private respondents appealed in the said ruling of COMELEC, Benito was still proclaimed. Subsequently, the COMELEC issued a resolution declaring the proclamation of petitioner an absolute nullity and of no force and effect. The certificate of canvass and proclamation was set aside. The Municipal Board of Canvassers was likewise directed to prepare a new certificate of canvass indicating therein that the winning candidate for mayor was Hadji Murad Ogca but with the information, in parenthesis, that he died on May 20, 1992, for the purpose of applying the rule on legal succession to office pursuant to Section 44 of R. A. No. 7160. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether petitioner can be proclaimed as the winning candidate for having the highest number of votes after ruling of the Comelecs exclusion of votes of deceased Ogca was set aside Held: No The Municipal Board of Canvassers, instead of performing what was incumbent upon it, that is, to proclaim Ogca as the winner but with the information that he died, to give way to legal succession to office, went on to proclaim herein petitioner, the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes as winner, believing that the death of Ogca rendered his victory and proclamation moot and academic. 14 This cannot be countenanced. In every election, the people's choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must, at all times, be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, no one can be declared elected in his place. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes dies, or is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. o For to allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the people's right to elect officials of their choice On petitioners contention that appeal of herein respondents was filed out of time: Well-settled is the doctrine that election contests involve 33
public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute and obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. And also settled is the rule that laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. On petitioners contention that the votes for deceased Ogca should not have been counted based on Section 6 of R. A. No. 6640: This provision applies only to candidates who have been declared by finally judgment to be disqualified. In the present case, there is no final judgment declaring the deceased Ogca disqualified, hence, the provision does not cover him. Hence, petition was dismissed.
Preventive Suspension HON. RICARDO T. GLORIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO A. ABAD, VIRGILIA M. BANDIGAS, ELIZABETH A. SOMEBANG and NICANOR MARGALLO G.R. No. 131012 April 21, 1999 Facts:
Private respondents are public school teachers. On various dates in September and October 1990, during the teachers' strikes, they did not report for work. For this reason, they were administratively charged with (1) grave misconduct, (2) gross neglect of duty, (3) gross violation of Civil Service Law Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations. (4) refusal to perform official duty, (5) gross insubordination, (6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and (7) absence without leave (AWOL), and placed under preventive suspension. The investigation was concluded before the lapse of 90-day suspension and private respondents were found guilty as charged. Respondent Margallo appealed to the Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB) which found him guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposed on him a six-month suspension while the other respondents also appealed to the MSPB, but their appeal was dismissed because of their failure to file their appeal memorandum on time. On appeal, the CSC affirmed the decision of the MSPB with respect to Margallo, but found the other three (Abad, Bandigas, and Somebang) guilty only of violation of reasonable office rules and regulation Their appeal being denied, respondents moved for a reconsideration, contending that they should be exonerated of all charges against them and that they be paid salaries during their suspension. CA , while maintaining its finding that private respondents were guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations for which they should be reprimanded, ruled that private respondents were entitled to the payment of salaries during their suspension "beyond ninety (90) days." Petitioners contention: The administrative investigation of respondents was concluded within the 90-day period of preventive suspension, implying that the continued suspension of private respondents is due to their appeal, hence, the government of their salaries. o Under the law, private respondents are considered under preventive suspension during the period of their appeal and, for this reason, are not entitled to the payment of their salaries during their suspension
If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after investigation respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be reinstated. Sec. 42 of PD 807: When the administrative case against the officers or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of 90 days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service; When the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. o Preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated No compensation was due for the period of the preventive suspension pending investigation but only for the period of preventive suspension pending appeal in the event the employee is exonerated. o Reason: Respondent is penalized before his sentence is confirmed that he should be paid his salaries in the event he is exonerated. It would be unjust to deprive him of his pay as a result of the immediate execution of the decision against him and continue to do so even after it is shown that he is innocent of the charges for which he was suspended. To be entitled to such compensation, the employee must not only be found innocent of the charges but his suspension must likewise be unjustified. But through an employee is considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of his appeal in the event he wins, his suspension is unjustified because what the law authorizes is preventive suspension for a period not exceeding 90 days. Beyond that period the suspension is illegal. Hence, the employee concerned is entitled to reinstated with full pay. Under existing jurisprudence, such award should not exceed the equivalent of five years pay at the rate last received before the suspension was imposed.
IGNACIO R. BUNYE et. al. vs. ASSOCIATE JUSTICES ROMEO M. ESCAREAL et. al. G.R. No. 110216 September 10, 1993 Facts:
Issue: Whether petitioners contention is meritorious Held: No Two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: o Preventive suspension pending investigations -> not a penalty A measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or any way influencing witnesses against him. Notes in Public Corporation Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
In this petition, petitioners seeks to annul the resolution of the Sandiganbayan preventively suspending them from office pending trial for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act under an information alleging that herein petitioners as public officers in the Municipality of Muntinlupa while in the performance of their their official functions, in conspiracy with one another and taking advantage of their official positions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enact Kapasiyahan Bilang 45 o On the basis of the act, petitioners took possession of the new public market in Alabang despite the fact that there was a valid term of lease for 25 years between the municipality, through the former mayor, and the Kilusang Magtitinda. Petitioners Contention: o The fear of the Court that, unless petitioners are preventively suspended, they may tamper with the records of the transaction, has no more validity, since they have admitted the enactment of the assailed act, hence preventive suspension is unjustified or unnecessary o Proceedings against the petitioners before the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan involves no factual issue but only the legal question of whether or not the cancellation by the petitioners of the Cooperative's subsisting lease contract over the Municipal Public Market was justified by public interest or general welfare o Preventive suspension will "sow havoc and confusion in the government of the Municipality of Muntinlupa, to the certain shattering of the peace and order thereat" for
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without a mayor, vice-mayor, and six (6) councilors, the local government would be paralyzed Issue: Whether petitioners preventive suspensions are valid Held: No Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, unequivocally provides that the accused public officials "shall be suspended from office" while the criminal prosecution is pending in court -> preventive suspension herein is mandatory It is not for the petitioners to say that their admissions are all the evidence that the prosecution will need to hold up its case against them. "The prosecution must be given the opportunity to gather and prepare the facts for trial under conditions which would ensure nonintervention and noninterference for ninety (90) straight days from petitioners' camp"
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. RODOLFO B. ALBANO and City Mayor ANTONIO C. ACHARON & ROSALINA BERNABE G.R. Nos. L-45376-77 July 26, 1988 Facts:
An information was filed against herein respondent mayor for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, i.e. o In his capacity as the Municipal mayor of General Santos, South Cotabato, now a city, denied the application of one Emilio Evangelista for license or permit to operate a cockpit, as in fact respondent mayor issued a license to his uncle and inspite the order of the court (in a mandamus action) directing him to accept and give due course to the application of Evangelista. o Use the name of 327 employees of the city government p procure and purchase 1,635 sacks of rice in bulk with the Regional Office of the Rice & Corn Administration, and dispose he same illegally to persons other than the said 327 employees of the city government The prosecution then filed an Urgent Motion for the issuance of an order suspending the accused from office. After hearings, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the informations filed invalid ab inition, hence this petition.
by the right to a due preliminary investigation granted to the accused. The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before the trial on the merits proceeds. he law permits the trial of the accused based merely on probable cause, as long as probable cause has been properly determined. Considering the mandatory suspension of the accused under a valid information, the law does not contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence, so that a court can have a valid basis in evaluating the advisability of his suspension pending the trial proper of the case filed against him. 10 Besides, a requirement that the guilt of the accused must first be established in the pre-suspension proceeding before trial proper can proceed would negate the ruling of the Court that the " ... mandatory suspension ... requires at the same time that the hearing be expeditious, and not unduly protracted such as to thwart the prompt suspension envisioned by the Act" 11 and make the trial proper a surplusage. The submission by the parties of the issue of invalidity of the informations on the basis of the records of the case makes said records, in addition to facts admitted by the prosecution and indubitable facts contained therein, only a legal source from which the trial court can inquire whether accused Acharon was afforded due preliminary investigation before the informations were filed against him. Considering that the law does not require the conviction of the accused in the pre-suspension proceeding but only the determination of the validity of the criminal proceeding leading to the filing of the information, and given the ability of the latter to overcome a motion to quash, the prosecution should not be faulted if what it presents as evidence in the pre-suspension proceedings does not satisfy a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused.
Issue: Whether in a pre-suspension proceeding to determine the validity or invalidity of an information filed under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a court may consider matters not alleged in the information under consideration Held: No The Court has previously ruled that, under Sec. 13, Rep. Act 3019, suspension of a public officer is mandatory. However, suspension cannot be automatic, the reason being that "a hearing on the validity of the information appears conformable to the spirit of the law, taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an elective public official even before his conviction and that public interest demands a speedy determination of the issues involved in (the) cases." o Thus, before a suspension order can be issued, a hearing on the issue of the validity of the information must first be had. o This pre-suspension hearing is conducted to determine basically the validity of the information, from which the court can have a basis to either suspend the accused, and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity. It should be stressed that the right to challenge the validity of the information, in prosecutions under the anti-graft law, is not limited to the right to challenge the completeness or sufficiency of the recitals in the information vis-a-vis the essential elements of the offense as defined by substantive law. In a pre-suspension proceeding, the accused is accorded the right to prove that the information filed against him was filed without prior and due preliminary investigation to which he is entitled under the law. This is to protect him from hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. Contrary to private respondent's contention, the right to be secured against false, malicious and unfounded imputations is already covered Notes in Public Corporation Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law 35
Section 47. Approval of Leaves of Absence Position Governor / Mayor of HUC or ICC Mayor of Municipality or CC Vice-governor/Vice-mayor Sangguinian members and employees Punong Barangay Sanggunian barangay members Approval President or his duly authorized representative Governor Local chief executive concerned Vice-governor/Vice-mayor City / municipal mayor Punong barangay
its
No action for application for leave of absence within 5 days after receipt = deemed approved
CHAPTER III: Local Legislation Section 48. Local Legislative Power shall be exercised by: Sangguniang panlalawigan for the province Sangguniang panlungsod for the city Sangguniang bayan for the municipality Sangguniang barangay for the barangay Section 49. Presiding Officer vote only to break a tie Vice-governor -> sangguniang panlalawigan City vice-mayor -> sangguniang panlungsod Municipal vice-mayor -> sangguniang bayan Punong barangay -> sangguniang barangay Absence of the regular presiding officer to preside at a sanggunian session -> the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer, who shall certify within 10 days from the passage of ordinances enacted and resolutions adopted
Section 50. Internal Rules of Procedure Rules of procedure to be adopted or updated by the Sanggunian on the first regular session following the election of its members and within ninety (90) days thereafter, which shall provide the following: o Organization of the sanggunian and the election of its officers o Creation of standing committees which shall include, but shall not be limited to the committees on: appropriations, women and family, human rights, youth and sports development, environmental protection, and cooperatives; o General jurisdiction of each committee; o Election of the chairman and members of each committee; o Order and calendar of business for each session; o Legislative process; o Parliamentary procedures which include the conduct of members during sessions; 36
The discipline of members for disorderly behavior and absences without justifiable cause for 4 consecutive sessions, for which they may be: censured, reprimanded, or excluded from the session, suspended for not more than sixty (60) days, or expelled Penalty of suspension or expulsion shall require the concurrence of at least 2/3 vote of all the sanggunian members A member convicted by final judgment to imprisonment of at least 1 year for any crime involving moral turpitude shall be automatically expelled from the sanggunian Such other rules as the sanggunian may adopt
In case there is no quorum: o Presiding officer may declare a recess until quorum is constituted o Majority of the members present ay adjourn from day to day and may compel the immediate attendance of any member absent without justifiable cause by designating a member of the sanggunian to be assisted by a member or members of the police force assigned in the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned, to arrest the absent member and present him at the session o If still no quorum, no business shall be transacted Presiding officer, upon proper motion duly approved by the members present, shall declare session adjourned for lack of quorum
Duties of sanggunian member upon assumption to office: o Make a full disclosure of his business and financial interest o Disclose any business, financial or professional relationship or any relation by affinity or consanguinity within 4th civil degree, which he may have with any person, firm or entity affected by any ordinance or resolution under consideration by the sanggunian of which he is a member; it includes: Ownership of stock/capital or investment Contracts or agreements Conflict of interest one where it may be reasonably deduced that a member of a sanggunian may not act in the public interest due to some private, pecuniary, or other personal considerations that may tend to affect his judgment to the prejudice of the service or the public
Disclosure shall be in writing and submitted to secretary of the committee of which he is a member When to disclose? o before the member participates in the deliberations on the ordinance or resolution under consideration If member did not participate in the deliberation > disclosure shall be made before voting on the ordinance or resolution on second and third readings o When a member takes a position or makes a privilege speech on a matter that may affect the business interest, financial connection, or professional relationship described herein
Section 54. Approval of ordinances Ordinance enacted by sangguniang panlalawigan/panlungsod/bayan -> presented to provincial governor/mayor o If approved -> sign every page o If vetoed (may be exercised only once)-> return it with his objections within 15 days in case of province or 10 days in case of city or municipality; otherwise, it shall be deemed approved; Sanggunian may: Reconsider the objections Override the veto by 2/3 voted of all its members, making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purpose o Grounds of veto: Ultra vires Prejudicial to public interest o In case some items of an appropriations ordinance were vetoed: Not objected items shall not be affect Vetoed items shall not take effect unless sanggunian overrides the veto Otherwise, appropriations ordinance of the previous year corresponding to those vetoed shall be deemed reenacted Ordinance enacted by sangguniang barangay -> approved by majority of all its members, and will be signed by the punong barangay Section 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Within 3 days after approval -> Secretary to the sanggunian panlungsod or sangguniang bayan shall forward to the sangguniang panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development plans and public investment programs formulated by the local development councils Within 30 days after the receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions -> sangguniang panlalawigan shall: o examine the documents or o transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination make comments or recommendations within 10 days from receipt, which may be considered by the sangguniang panlalawigan in making its decision If sangguniang panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned -> declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part No action within 30 days = presumed lawful and valid Section 57. Review of Barangay Ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan Within 10 days after enactment -> sangguniang barangay to furnish copies of all barangay ordinances to the sangguniang panlungsod/bayan for review, as to whether it is consistent with law and city/municipal ordinances o If inconsistent with law, within 30 days from receipt thereof > return the same with its comments and recommendations for adjustment, amendment or modification; in such case, effectivity of the ordinance is suspended until revision is effected No action within 30 days = presumed lawful and valid 37
Section 52. Sessions Minimum number of regular sessions: o Once a week -> sangguniang panlalawigan/panglungsod/ bayan o Twice a month -> sangguniang barangay o No 2 sessions, regular or special, may be held in a single day Special session o When: Public interest demands -> called by local chief executive or majority of the members o Written notice to the members shall be served personally at the members usual place of residence, at least 24 hours before special session o GR: Matters stated in the notice are the only ones to be considered XPN: concurred by 2/3 vote of present members in a quorum GR: All sessions shall be open to public. XPN: o By affirmative vote of a majority of members present in a quorum o Public interest o For reasons of security, decency or morality Each sanggunian shall keep a journal and record of the proceedings Section 53. Quorum Quorum majority of all the members of the sanggunian who have been elected and qualified to transact official business In case of Question of quorum -> presiding officer shall immediately proceed to call the roll of members and thereafter announce the results Notes in Public Corporation Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
Some guidelines in enforcing ordinance or resolution: Any attempt to enforce any ordinance or any resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program, after the disapproval thereof, shall be sufficient ground for the suspension or dismissal of the official or employee concerned GR: Effectivity of ordinances or resolutions shall be after 10 days from date a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may be, and in at least 2 other conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned o XPN: Stated in the ordinance or resolution o Text of ordinance disseminated -> in Filipino or English and language or dialect understood by majority of people in LGU concerned All ordinances with penal sanctions -> published in a newspaper of general circulation within province where local legislative body concerned belongs o In absence of such newspaper -> posting in all municipalities and cities of province where sanggunian of origin is situated Additional requirement in case of HUC and ICC -> published in a local newspaper of general circulation within the city, in case of absence thereof, in any newspaper of general circulation CHAPTER IV: Disciplinary Actions Grounds for Disciplinary Actions, such as suspension or removal: o Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines; o Culpable violation of the Constitution; o Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty; o Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor; o Abuse of authority; o Unauthorized absence for 15 consecutive working days XPN: In the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang barangay; o Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; o Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws Order of court is necessary for removal from office on the said grounds Filing of complaint o Against elective official of a province, HUC, ICC or CC -> filed before office of the President o Against elective official of municipality -> filed before sangguniang panlalawigan o Against any elective barangay official -> filed before sangguniang panglungsod/bayan, whose decision shall be final and executory Notice of hearing -> within 7 days after filing the complaint, Office of the President or Sanggunian shall require answer to be submitted within 15 days from receipt of notice Investigation -> commence within 10 days after receipt of answer o Venue of investigation: In case of province, HUC -> in the place where he renders or holds office Other officials -> where sanggunian concerned is located o No investigation within 90 days prior to any local election o Duration: 90 days Within 30 days after end of investigation -> Office of the President or sanggunian concerned shall render decision Rights of respondent: o full opportunity to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel, o to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and o to require the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary process of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum Penalties which may be imposed o Suspension not to exceed unexpired term of respondent, or for a period of 6 months for every administrative offense
not a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office o Removal from office A bar to the candidacy of the respondent for any elective position Administrative appeals o Period to appeal: within 30 days from receipt of decision o Where to appeal? Sangguniang panlalawigan -> in case of decisions of sangguniang panlungsod/bayan Office of the President -> in case of decisions of sangguniang panlalawigan and sangguniang panlungsod of HUC and ICC; its decision shall be final and executory o Appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory During pendency, respondent shall be considered placed under preventive suspension in the event he wins such appeal In the event appeal results in an exoneration -> he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments during the pendency of the appeal
CHAPTER V: Recall Exercised by the he registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs Reason: Loss of Confidence How? Through a resolution adopted by a majority of all the members during its session called for the purpose Petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in the LGU concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected
Who may initiate?
Preparatory recall assembly
Registered concerned
voters
in
the
LGU
Composition of Preparatory recall assembly: o Provincial level. - All mayors, vice-mayors, and sanggunian members of the municipalities and component cities; o City level. - All punong barangay and sanggunian barangay members in the city; o Legislative District level. - In case where sangguniang panlalawigan members are elected by district, all elective municipal officials in the district; and in cases where sangguniang panlungsod members are elected by district, all elective barangay officials in the district; and o Municipal level. - All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the municipality Recall process: o Written petition for recall shall be filed with COMELEC through its office in the LGU concerned, who shall cause, or its representative, publication of the petition in a public and conspicuous place for a period of not less than 10 days , nor more than 20 days Reason: Verifying the authenticity and genuineness of the petition and the required percentage of voters o Upon lapse of period, the COMELEC or its duly authorized representative shall announce the acceptance of candidates to the position and thereafter prepare the list of candidates which shall include the name of the official sought to be recalled o COMELEC or its duly authorized representative shall set the date of the election on recall -> not later than 30 days after the filing of the resolution or petition for recall in the case of the barangay, city, or municipal officials and 45 days in the case of provincial officials o Official set to be recalled shall be considered as candidate and entitled to be voted upon 38
Effectivity of Recall -> upon election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on recall Elective local official sought to be recalled -> not allowed to resign while the recall process is in progress Limitations on Recall: o Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence o No recall shall take place within 1 year from the date of the official's assumption to office or 1 year immediately preceding a regular local election
TITLE III: HUMAN RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT Organizational Structure and Staffing Pattern -> takes into consideration service requirements and financial ability; subject to minimum standards and guidelines prescribed by CSC Local chief executive may employ emergency or casual employees or laborers paid on a daily wage or piecework basis and hired through job orders for local projects authorized by the sanggunian concerned, without need of approval or attestation by the Civil Service Commission o Period of employment shall not exceed 6 months Limitation to appointment: Those related within the 4th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to the appointing or recommending authority In case of vacancy in a career position: o Notices of vacancy shall be posted in at least 3 conspicuous public places in the LGU concerned for a period of not less than 15 days o Establishment of personnel selection board to assist the local chief executive in the judicious and objective selection or personnel for employment as well as for promotion, and in the formulation of such policies as would contribute to employee welfare Members of which to be determined by sanggunian concerned Ex-officio members: CSC representative, personnel officer of LGU concerned Compensation of Local officials and employees -> determined by sanggunian concerned o Increase in compensation of elective local officials -> take effect only after the terms of office of those approving such increase shall have expired o Increase in compensation of the appointive officials and employees -> take effect as provided in the ordinance authorizing such increase o Condition: Not exceed the limitations on budgetary allocations for personal services; based on RA 6758 (Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989) Elective local officials -> entitled to the same leave privileges as those enjoyed by appointive local officials, including the cumulation and commutation thereof Resignation of Elective Local Officials Receiver of Resignation
Position
Governors, vice-governors, and mayors and vice-mayors of HUC and ICC M unicipal mayors, municipal vicemayors, city mayors and city vicemayors of CC Sanggunian members Barangay officials
President
Governor
Sanggunian concerned City or municipal mayor
DILG shall be furnished with the copies of resignation letters Deemed accepted if not acted upon by the authority concerned within 15 days from receipt thereof Irrevocable resignations by sanggunian members -> deemed accepted upon presentation before an open session of the sanggunian concerned and duly entered in its records
XPN: Sanggunian members who are subject to recall elections or to cases where existing laws prescribed the manner of acting upon such resignations. There shall be a grievance procedure in every LGU -> to be established by the local chief executive o Purpose: To inquire into, act upon, resolve or settle complaints and grievances presented by local government employees Investigation and adjudication of administrative complaints against appointive local officials and employees as well as their suspension and removal -> in accordance with civil service law Preventive Suspension of Appointive Local Officials and Employees o By local chief executive pending investigation but not to exceed 60 days, and o Charge involves either: Dishonesty Oppression Grave misconduct Neglect in the performance of duty Tthere is reason to believe that the respondent is guilty of the charges which would warrant his removal from the service o Automatic reinstatement upon expiration of the period But without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative proceedings against him until its termination o Delay in the proceedings of the case due to the fault, neglect or request of the respondent -> Time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension Administrative Investigation may be conducted by a person or a committee duly authorized by the local chief executive. Duties: o Conduct hearings on the cases o Submit findings and recommendations to the local chief executive concerned within 15 days from the conclusion of the hearings -> to be decided within 90 days from notice of charge Disciplinary actions which may be exercised by the local chief executives: o Removal from service o Demotion in rank o Suspension for not more than 1 year without pay If suspension without pay for not more than 30 days -> his decision shall be final Otherwise, appealable to the CSC -> to decide within 30 days from receipt thereof o Fine -> not exceeding 6 months salary o Reprimand If the penalty imposed is suspension without pay for not more than 30 days, his decision shall be final Appeal -> not prevent execution of the decision of removal or suspension of a respondent-appellant o In case of exoneration -> reinstated to his position with all the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto from the time he had been deprived thereof Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to: o Engage in any business transaction with the LGU in which he is an official or employee or over which he has the power of supervision, or with any of its authorized boards, officials, agents, or attorneys, whereby money is to be paid, or property or any other thing of value is to be transferred, directly or indirectly, out of the resources of the LGU to such person or firm o Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a LGU o Purchase any real estate or other property forfeited in favor of such LGU for unpaid taxes or assessment, or by virtue of a legal process at the instance of the said local government unit; o Be a surety for any person contracting or doing business with the LGU for which a surety is required; and o Possess or use any public property of the LGU for private purposes Practice of Profession o Governors, city and municipal mayors -> prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives 39
Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools (XPN: during session hours) o Sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall not: Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a LGU or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party; Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office. Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the LGU of which he is an official; and Use property and personnel of the government XPN: Sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the government o Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of emergency Officials must not derive monetary compensation therefrom Officials and employees of LGUs shall file: o sworn statements of assets, liabilities and net worth, o lists of relatives within the 4th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in government service, o financial and business interests, and o personnel data sheets as required by law Oath or affirmation of office -> upon assumption to office; filed with office of the local chief executive concerned Prohibitions on Partisan Political Activity No local official or employee in the career civil service shall: o Engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or o Take part in any election, initiative, referendum, plebiscite, or recall XPN: To vote o Use his official authority or influence to cause the performance of any political activity by any person or body o Allowed actions: Express his views on current issues, Mention the names of certain candidates for public office whom he supports o Elective local officials may take part in partisan political and electoral activities XPN: It shall be unlawful for them to solicit contributions from their subordinates or subject these subordinates to any of the prohibited acts under the Omnibus Election Code Appointment of Elective and Appointive Local Officials o No elective or appointive local official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. o GR: No elective or appointive local official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries XPN: Allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position Prohibitions on Compensation o GR: No elective or appointive local official or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation XPN: Specifically authorized by law o Accept without the consent of Congress, any present, emoluments, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation Provincial, city, municipal, and barangay appointive officials going on official travel shall apply and secure written permission from their respective local chief executives before departure. o Considerations for approval: Public interest Financial capability of LGU
Urgency of travel Local chief executives failure to act within 4 days from application -> deemed approved o Mayors of component cities and municipalities -> secure the permission of the governor concerned for any travel outside the province o Local government official traveling abroad -> notify their respective sanggunian XPN: Approval from office of the president in the following circumstances: Travel extends to more than 3 months During emergency or crisis Travel involves use of public funds o In case of field officers of national agencies or offices assigned in provinces, cities, and municipalities -> give prior written notice to the local chief executive concerned Annual report o When: On or before March 31 of each year o Who: Local chief executive to the sanggunian o What: Socio-economic, political and peace and order conditions, and other matters concerning the LGU, which shall cover the immediately preceding calendar year o
TITLE IX: THER PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Dispute Involving two or more barangays in same city or municipality -> referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned Involving two or more municipalities within the same province -> referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned Involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces -> jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the province concerned Involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities -> jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties o Failure to amicable settle within 60 days from referral of dispute > certification shall be issued to that effect o Dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within 60 days from the date of the certification o Appeal to the decision of sanggunian concerned may be elevated to RTC having jurisdiction over the area in dispute, to be decided within 1 year from filing Pending final resolution of the disputed area prior to the dispute shall be maintained and continued for all legal purposes Local Initiative and Referendum Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance Procedure in Local Initiative: o Not less than 1,000 in case of province, 100 in case of municipalities, and 50 in case of barangay may file a petition with the sanggunian concerned proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment of an ordinance o No favorable action taken within 30 days by sanggunian -> the proponents, through their duly authorized and registered representatives, may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the sanggunian concerned o The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from Roman numeral I. The COMELEC or its designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition o Two (2) or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative o Proponents shall have 90 days in case of provinces and cities, 60 days in case of municipalities, and 30 days in case of barangays, from notice to collect the required number of signatures. o The petition shall be signed before the election registrar or his designated representatives, in the presence of: a representative of the proponent, and a representative of the sanggunian concerned in a public place in the local government unit, as the case may be. 40
Upon the lapse of the said period, the COMELEC, through its office in the LGU concerned, shall certify as to whether or not the required number of signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain the required number defeats the proposition. o If the required number of signatures is obtained, the COMELEC shall then set a date for the initiative during which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the LGU concerned for their approval within 60 days from the date of certification by the COMELEC, in case of provinces and cities, 45 days in case of municipalities, and 30 days in case of barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set, after which the results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the COMELEC. Effectivity of Local Propositions o If approved by a majority of the votes cast -> take effect 15 days after certification by the COMELEC as if affirmative action thereon had been made by the sanggunian and local chief executive concerned. o If it fails to obtain said number of votes, the proposition is considered defeated. Limitations on Local Initiative o Not be exercised more than once a year. o Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the sanggunian to enact. o If at any time before the initiative is held, the sanggunian concerned adopts in toto the proposition presented and the local chief executive approves the same, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner herein provided. Limitations upon Sanggunians o Any proposition or ordinance approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended by the sanggunian concerned within six (6) months from the date of the approval thereof, and may be amended, modified or repealed by the sanggunian within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided, That in case of barangays, the period shall be eighteen (18) months after the approval thereof. Local referendum is the legal process whereby the registered voters of the local government units may approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian. The local referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the COMELEC within 60 days in case of provinces and cities, 45 days in case of municipalities and 30 days in case of barangays. o The COMELEC shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum. Authority of Courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Chapter is not prohibited in the following cases: o Violation of the Constitution or o Want of capacity of the sanggunian concerned to enact the said measure
fact, both agreed to elevate the matter to the trial court via Resolution No. 97-01. It also held that Section 118 governed venue; hence, the parties could waive and agree upon it under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: WON Section 118 of the LGU on boundary dispute settlement applies. WON respondent court may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary dispute between a municipality and an independent component city. HELD: No, Section 118 does not apply. Yes, RTC has jurisdiction. POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; SECTION 118 THEREOF; PROCEDURE FOR SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES BETWEEN A COMPONENT CITY OR MUNICIPALITY AND A HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY; ORMOC IS NOT A HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY IN CASE AT BAR. "Sec. 118.Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Disputes. Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. To this end: "(a)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or municipality shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned. "(b)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned. "(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the provinces concerned. "(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties. "(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred to above." Under Section 118 of the Local Government Code, the settlement of a boundary dispute between a component city or a municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other or between two or more highly urbanized cities shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the local government units involved. There is no question that Kananga is a municipality constituted under Republic Act No. 542. By virtue of Section 442(d) of the LGC, it continued to exist and operate as such. However, Ormoc is not a highly urbanized, but an independent component, city created under Republic Act No. 179. Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city, not with an independent component city. While Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118 does not apply to them. SECTION 451 THEREOF; CITY; CLASSIFICATION; ORMOC IS DEEMED AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY IN CASE AT BAR. Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city may be either component or highly urbanized. Ormoc is deemed an independent component city, because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It is a city independent of the province. In fact, it is considered a component, not a highly urbanized, city of Leyte in Region VIII by both Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, which calls for a plebiscite; and the Omnibus Election Code, which apportions representatives to the defunct Batasang Pambansa. There is neither a declaration by the President of the Philippines nor an allegation by the parties that it is highly urbanized. On the contrary, petitioner asserted in its Motion to Dismiss that Ormoc was an independent chartered city. REMEDIAL LAW; B.P. BLG. 129; GENERAL JURISDICTION OF RTCs TO ADJUDICATE ALL CONTROVERSIES EXCEPT THOSE EXPRESSLY WITHHELD FROM THEIR PLENARY POWERS; CASE AT BAR. As previously stated, "jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties." It must exist as a matter of law and cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties or by estoppel. It should not be confused with venue. Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC finds no application to the instant case, the general rules governing jurisdiction should then be used. The applicable provision is found in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent component city of the same province, respondent court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary 41
[G.R. No. 141375. April 30, 2003.] MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA, Represented by its Mayor, Hon. GIOVANNI M. NAPARI, petitioner vs. Hon. FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City (Branch 35); and the CITY OF ORMOC, Represented by its Mayor, Hon. EUFROCINO M. CODILLA SR., respondents. FACTS: When a boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of Ormoc. By agreement, the parties submitted the issue to amicable settlement. No amicable settlement was reached. The City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of Ormoc City a complaint to settle the boundary dispute. Petitioner municipality filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, but the RTC denied the same. RTC: it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. that Section 118 of the Local Government Code had been substantially complied with, because both parties already had the occasion to meet and thresh out their differences. In Notes in Public Corporation Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
powers. They have the power not only to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is not only original, but also exclusive. [G.R. No. 111230. September 30, 1994.] ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MORONG, BATAAN, respondents. FACTS: In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, 1 The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act No. 7227. petitioners filed a petition 2 with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 The municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within thirty (30) days after its submission Petitioners then resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. 3 They started to solicit the required number of signatures 4 to cause the repeal of said resolution. Unknown to the petitioners, however, the Honorable Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 to the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of ". . . the petition for a local initiative and/or referendum because the exercise will just promote divisiveness, counter productive and futility." The COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject is "merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance. The same stance is assumed by the respondent Sangguniang Bayan of Morong. ISSUE: whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the proper subject of an initiative. HELD: YES.
Appropriating Funds Therefor." Thus, its section 3(a) expressly includes resolutions as subjects of initiative on local legislations, viz: prcd "Sec. 3.Definition of Terms For purposes of this act, the following terms shall mean: (a)"Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely: a.1.Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution. a.2.Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and a.3.Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance." (Emphasis ours). In the case at bench, however, it can not be argued that the subject matter of the resolution of the municipality of Morong merely temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a permanent rule of conduct or government. The inclusion of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone has far reaching implications in the governance of its people. Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social, political, and economic existence of the people of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the Subic Special Economic Zone, it is but logical to hear their voice on the matter via an initiative. It is not material that the decision of the municipality of Morong for the inclusion came in the form of a resolution for what matters is its enduring effect on the welfare of the people of Morong. [G.R. No. 125416. September 26, 1996.] SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ENRIQUE T. GARCIA and CATALINO A. CALIMBAS, respondents. FACTS:
Father Bernas explains that "in republican systems, there are generally two kinds of legislative power, original and derivative. Original legislative power is possessed by the sovereign people. Derivative legislative power is that which has been delegated by the sovereign people to legislative bodies and is subordinate to the original power of the people." thru an initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution itself. Sec. 2 of Art. XVII provides: "Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein." Likewise, thru an initiative, the people were also endowed with the power to enact or reject any act or law by congress or local legislative body. The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: "The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body . . ." An act includes a resolution. Black 20 defines an act as "an expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote something done . . . as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards, and determinations . . ." It is basic that a law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the Constitution. 21 In line with this postulate, we held in In Re Guarina that "if there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that interpretation will be adopted which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import of the language used." The constitutional command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative was implemented by Congress when it enacted Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Notes in Public Corporation Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which among others, provided for the creation of the Subic Special Economic Zone R.A. No. 7227 likewise created petitioner to implement the declared national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses. 2Petitioner was organized with an authorized capital stock of P20 billion which was fully subscribed and fully paid up by the Republic of the Philippines with, among other assets, "(a)ll lands embraced, covered and defined in Section 12 hereof, as well as permanent improvements and fixtures upon proper inventory not otherwise alienated, conveyed, or transferred to another government agency." 3 On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippine government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the seaports, airports buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy. the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone. On September 5, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong submitted Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993 to the Office of the President. respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their companions filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong acted upon the petition of respondents Garcia, Not satisfied, and within 30 days from submission of their petition, herein respondents resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991 respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845, adopting therein a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan," and which indicated, among others, the 42
scheduled Referendum Day (July 27, 1996, Saturday). On June 27, 1996, the Comelec promulgated the assailed Resolution No. 2848 providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan." ISSUE: whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, as worded, is sufficient in form and substance for submission to the people for their approval; in fine, whether the Comelec acted properly and juridically in promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848. HELD: To begin with, the process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution 11 as reproduced in the footnote below, the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description "referendum." To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE. There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an initiative. In enacting the "Initiative and Referendum Act", 12 Congress differentiated one term from the other, thus: (a)"Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations throughZSAX an election called for the purpose. There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely: a.1.Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution; a.2.Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and a.3.Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (b)"Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action. (c)"Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely: c.1Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and c.2Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies. DIFFERENTIATED. There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an initiative. In enacting the "Initiative and Referendum Act", Congress differentiated one term from the other. Along these statutory definitions, Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines initiative as the "power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly." On the other hand, he explains that referendum "is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law." The foregoing definitions, which are based on Black's and other leading American authorities, are echoed in the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160). "SEC. 120. Local Initiative Defined. Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. "SEC. 126.Local Referendum Defined. Local referendum is the legal process whereby the registered voters of the local government units may approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian. The local referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Comelec within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. Notes in Public Corporation Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
The Comelec shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum." Prescinding from these definitions, we gather that initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by the people directly either because the law-making body fails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance, resolution or act that they desire or because they want to amend or modify one already existing. Under Sec. 13 of R.A. 6735, the local legislative body is given the opportunity to enact the proposal. If it refuses/neglects to do so within thirty (30) days from its presentation, the proponents through their duly-authorized and registered representatives may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned. Should the proponents be able to collect the number of signed conformities within the period granted by said statute, the Commission on Elections "shall then set a date for the initiative (not referendum) at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned . . .." On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body submits to the registered voters of its territorial jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution which is duly enacted or approved by such law-making authority. Said referendum shall be conducted also under the control and direction of the Commission on Elections. In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is begun and consented to by the law-making body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves without the participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body. Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative are understandably more complex than in a referendum where expectedly the voters will simply write either "Yes" or "No" in the ballot. COMELEC EXERCISES ADMINISTRATION AND SUPERVISION ON THE CONDUCT THEREOF. From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for the Comelec to supervise an initiative more closely, its authority thereon extending not only to the counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily understood and voted upon by the electorate. This is especially true where the proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated, and should thus be broken down into several autonomous parts, each such part to be voted upon separately. Care must also be exercised that "(n)o petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate," although "two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative." It should be noted that under Sec. 13 (c) of R.A. 6735, the "Secretary of Local Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition." In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation. In the exercise of its authority, it may (in fact it should have done so already) issue relevant and adequate guidelines and rules for the orderly exercise of these "people-power" features of our Constitution. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COURT CANNOT PASS UPON A PROPOSED INITIATIVE UNTIL THE PEOPLE HAVE VOTED FOR IT AND IT HAS BECOME AN APPROVED ORDINANCE OR RESOLUTION. Deliberating on this issue, the Court agrees with private respondent Garcia that indeed, the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ of prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. We also note that the Initiative and Referendum Act itself provides that "(n)othing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act . . .." So too, the Supreme Court is basically a review court. It passes upon errors of law (and sometimes of fact, as in the case of mandatory appeals of capital offenses) of lower courts as well as determines whether there had been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any "branch or instrumentality" of government. In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncement about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers. cCDAHE 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COMELEC MAY PASS UPON SUCH PROPOSAL INSOFAR AS TO ITS FORM AND LANGUAGE ARE CONCERNED AND WHETHER THE SAME IS PATENTLY 43
AND CLEARLY OUTSIDE THE CAPACITY OF THE LOCAL LEGISLATIVE BODY TO ENACT. Having said that, we are in no wise suggesting that the Comelec itself has no power to pass upon proposed resolutions in an initiative. Quite the contrary, we are ruling that these matters are in fact within the initiatory jurisdiction of the Commission to which then the herein basic questions ought to have been addressed, and by which the same should have been decided in the first instance. In other words, while regular courts may take jurisdiction over "approved propositions" per said Sec. 18 of R.A. 6735, the Comelec in the exercise of its quasijudicial and administrative powers may adjudicate and pass upon such proposals insofar as their form and language are concerned, as discussed earlier; and it may be added, even as to content, where the proposals or parts thereof are patently and clearly outside the "capacity of the local legislative body to enact." Accordingly, the question of whether the subject of this initiative is within the capacity of the Municipal Council of Morong to enact may be ruled upon by the Comelec upon remand and after hearing the parties thereon.
Term of Office (Sec. 43) Term is for 3 years, not more than 3 consecutive terms Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected Succession (Sec. 44) Permanent Vacancy arises when an elective local official: o fills a higher vacant office o refuses to assume office o fails to qualify o dies o removed from office o voluntarily resigns o permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office Position Governor mayor or Permanent Vacancy Vice-Governor or Vice-Mayor Highest ranking sanggunian (2nd highest if PI) Highest ranking sangguniang barangay member (2nd highest if PI) Appointment by President, through Exec. Sec. Notes Tie on highest ranking sanggunian members -> resolved by draw lots Successors shall serve only unexpired portion of predecessors In case of sanggunian member (except for barangay), appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the member who caused the vacancy (Conditions: Nomination and certificate of membership of appointee from highest official of the political party concerned, otherwise, appointment shall be null and void ab initio) If the sanggunian do not belong to any political party -> local chief executive (in relation to above said appointments), upon recommendation of sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person
Vice-Governor or Vice-Mayor
Punong Barangay Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member and Sangguniang Panlungsod of HUC and ICC Sangguniang Panlungsod/baya n of CC/municipalitie s Sangguniang barangay Representation of youth and barangay in the sanggunian
Appointment Governor
by
Appointment by City or Municipal Mayor Official next in rank of the organization concerned
Temporary Vacancy may occur, but not limited to, due to the following reasons: o Leave of absence o Travel Abroad o Suspension from office Position Notes in Public Corporation Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007 1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law Temporary Vacancy 44
Governor/City or Municipal Mayor/Punong barangay
Vice-governor/vicemayor/highest ranking sangguniang barangay member
No temporary replacement for Vice-governor/Vice-mayor GR: To perform duties and functions of local chief executive concerned o XPN: Power to appoint, suspend, and dismiss employees o XPN to XPN: Temporary incapacity exceeds 30 days Termination: Upon submission to appropriate sanggunian of a written declaration by local chief executive that he has reported back to office o If due to legal causes, he shall also submit necessary documents showing that said legal causes no longer exists When travel is within the country, but outside his territorial jurisdiction for a period not exceeding 3 consecutive days, he may designate in writing the officer-in-charge of said office -> powers and functions shall be specified o Refusal to issue authorization letter -> Vice-governor/Vicemayor shall have the right to assume powers, duties, and functions of said office on 4th day of absence of the local chief executive Authorized official must only be the Vice-governor/Vice-mayor or highest ranking sanggunian, as the case may be
Preventive Suspension No preventive suspension shall be imposed within 90 days prior to any local election o If imposed before the said period -> deemed lifted from commencement of the such period Imposition: o President -> respondent is an elective official of a province, HUC, ICC o Governor -> respondent is an elective official of a CC or municipality o Mayor -> respondent is an elective official of the barangay When? o After issues are joined, evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence Duration: o Not to exceed 60 days o In case of several administrative cases filed -> not more than 90 days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at time of first suspension Upon expiration of preventive suspension -> elective official shall be deemed reinstated o Without prejudice to the continuation of proceedings against him, which shall be terminated within 120 days from time he was notified o If delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect, or request, other than the appeal duly filed, the duration of such delay shall not be counted in computing the time of termination of the case Salary of respondent pending suspension: o During preventive suspension -> no salary o Upon subsequent exoneration and reinstatement -> paid full salary or compensation including such emoluments accruing during such suspension
45

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1987 Philippine Constitution, Article X LGC Territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines -> enjoy

Distinctions decentralization of power

Otherwise, at least 2,000

At least 100 sq. km

At least 2,000 sq. Km.

G.R. No. L-12172

August 29, 1958 PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

THE PEOPLE OF THE vs. JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants. Facts:

General and permanent character

Article Two. - Relations with the Philippine National Police

Elective Officials, Secs. 39 75 Qualifications Sec. 39

At least 15 to 21 years old on election day

At least 18 years old on election day

At least 21 years old on election day

Who may initiate?

Preparatory recall assembly

Sanggunian concerned City or municipal mayor

Governor/City or Municipal Mayor/Punong barangay

Vice-governor/vicemayor/highest ranking sangguniang barangay member

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