Plotinus and Aristotle on the Simplicity of the Divine Intellect

Exam No.: B029330 MSc Ancient Philosophy The University of Edinburgh 2013

Table of Contents
Abstract Introduction Chapter 1: The Requirement of the First Principle and Simplicitys Role 1.1 Aristotles Search for the First Principle 1.2 Aristotle on Unity and the Simplicity Sought for the First Principle 1.3 Plotinus on Unity as the First Principle 1.4 Conclusion: Comparing the Unmoved Mover and the One Chapter 2: Divine Intellect and Self-Thinkings Unity or Duality for Aristotle and Plotinus 2.1 Aristotle on the Unmoved Mover as Divine Intellect 2.2 Human and Divine Intellection Compared 2.3 Plotinus on Intellect 2.4 Plotinus on the Necessity for Intellects Duality 3 4 7 7 10 14 18 20 20 23 25 27

Chapter 3: Comparing Divine Intellects Self-Thinking and Simplicity Between Aristotle and Plotinus 33 3.1 The Epistemological Necessity for Identity and Distinction 3.2 Reconsidering Aristotle 3.3 Conclusion Primary Sources Secondary Sources 33 35 37 39 40

Abstract
Aristotle and Plotinus both demonstrate the existence of a first principle as cause of the existence of all things. Aristotle puts forward that this first principle is a divine intellect which thinks on itself, and in being the highest being in complete actuality and without potentiality, it is also absolutely simple. Plotinus, on the other hand, sees reason to assert that the divine intellect can not be absolutely simple but a duality of some sort, and thus the first principle, as a cause of unity for all things, must be beyond the divine intellect and thus beyond being in being, itself, absolutely simple. Comparing Plotinus to Aristotle, Plotinus position appears odd at the outset given that he also holds to the divine intellect being completely in act and that it thinks on itself. Why thinking should be dual even when it is selfreferential and unified in its activity is not apparent, and so Aristotles position seems the more coherent one. Yet, through an analysis of both positions, this dissertation proposes that Plotinus better accounts for the problem of self-intellection as requiring some form of distinction in thought while maintaining an identity between the subject and object of thought. If absolute simplicity is an essential attribute to being the first principle, Plotinus position is ultimately more consistent in positing a first principle beyond the divine intellect while also holding to a more coherent understanding of thinking with his understanding of divine intellect as a duality instead of an absolute simplicity.

Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus

Introduction
In Metaphysics !.6, Aristotle points out the necessity for the existence of a first principlethe unmoved moverwhich is completely active and responsible for the motion and subsequent existence of all things. In saying that the first principle must be fully active and without any potentiality, Aristotle concludes that the nature of the unmoved mover must be an intellect which thinks on itself, so that its thinking is a thinking on thinking (Metaph. !.9 1074b33-34). This follows on Aristotles understanding of the activity of thinking as continuous and fully actual when thinking possesses its object, and in the case of the unmoved mover, it is itself both this activity and the object of its own activity. In seeing this, Aristotle also maintains the importance of the unmoved movers simplicity in being the simultaneous subject and object of its own activity. Without this simplicity, potentiality in the unmoved movers nature would be implied which would no longer make possible the eternal motion of the cosmos and the existence of all things. Plotinus picks up on the theme of simplicity as an essential attribute of the first principle in positing the existence of the One as being absolutely simple and without multiplicity. Although he still holds to some form of Aristotles divine intellectthe entity of Intellectas a principle for the motion and being of things, Plotinus disagrees that this is the first principle, positing rather that the One must be something beyond thinking and being. At first glance this may seem puzzling insofar as Intellect is fully active and eternally continuous when it thinks on itself; one might think that it should also be simple in its activity. However, Plotinus disagrees with this Aristotelian conception in concluding that Intellects self-thinking implies duality rather than simplicity. As a consequence, Intellects existence is maintained only in virtue of the prior existence of the One as being entirely simple and the basis on which Intellect and all subsequent beings have their existence. Certain questions should be posed in looking at Aristotles and Plotinus conceptions together. On what basis is there multiplicity in Intellect on Plotinus account? A few interconnected reasons are given, such as that Intellect is defined by the intelligible it receives, 1 and that it contains and contemplates all the forms existing in the world within itself, both of which imply multiplicity.2 When Plotinus looks at the activity of Intellect by itself, however, his primary reason for ascribing multiplicity appears to be that there is a real distinction between the thinker and the object of thought within Intellects thinking, even though that object is one and the same with the thinker itself. This can be seen in Plotinus Ennead V. 4.2.11-12: It is, certainly, also itself an intelligible, but it thinks as well: so it is already two.

1 2

Ennead V.4.2.6-8. Enn. V.9.5.1-10.

Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus We may wish to pause on this last statement. Given the implication of the last line, why is there duality in thinking by default? On Aristotles account of the intellect, thinking implies the possession of the object of thought, so that it is when the intellect acquires and, in some sense, becomes the object of thought that it is thinking. Aristotle would then assert, contrary to Plotinus, that there is not a duality but rather simplicity in thinking, especially when the divine intellect has itself as the object of its own thinking. Plotinus concedes that Intellect is one in a sense, but he would disagree with Aristotle by asserting that there is a kind of duality and division needed in all thinking. Given that Aristotle and Plotinus agree on the necessity for a first principle and the existence of a divine intellect on some level, whose account best argues for the simplicity or duality of the divine intellect as reason to posit it as the first principle or as a secondary principle of the cosmos? In this dissertation, I wish to analyze the respective arguments put forward by Plotinus and Aristotle, looking at the philosophical background and context presupposed in each position. I ultimately wish to show that Plotinus argument against the absolute simplicity of the divine intellect better accounts for the reality of self-intellection when compared with Aristotles account. A review of the nature of the divine intellects self-thinking will show that Aristotles account, although rigorous in its own right, fails to account for a proper distinction between the subject and object of thought which would otherwise make possible the divine intellects full knowledge of itself as the subject of its own thinking. Plotinus, on the other hand, preserves this distinction which makes possible Intellects transparent knowledge of itself as the subject of its thinking, thus validating his assertion of Intellects duality compared to Aristotles assertion of the divine intellects simplicity. Given what is to be shown, certain premises need to be elaborated. First, we must clarify the kind of first principle sought by Aristotle and Plotinus in the form of the unmoved mover and the One, respectively, to show in what way the divine intellect factors in with their general inquiry into the first principle (Chapter 1.1, 1.3). It must then be shown how both understand the importance of simplicity and unity in relation to the first principle, especially in seeing how Aristotle prioritizes substance compared to Plotinus placing unity over substance as a prior principle of reality (Ch. 1.2, 1.3). On comparing these latter two conceptions, Plotinus account will be shown to have more of a direct causal explanation for all beings as both an efficient and a final cause in comparison to Aristotles which causes motion as a final cause; the role of simplicity for each will show how a thinking intellect must match this simplicity (for Aristotle) or must be beyond all being, including intellect (for Plotinus) (Ch. 1.4). An analysis of the divine intellect for both, including a consideration of the nature of intellect and selfintellection as implying simplicity or duality for Aristotle and Plotinus (respectively) must next be shown, (Ch. 2). Afterward, Plotinus and Aristotles different accounts of the divine intellect must be compared,

Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus in which we must consider the question of a distinction between subject and object in all thinking, especially in the case of the divine intellect thinking on itself (Ch. 3). The consequences for this, paired with a consideration of the kind of simplicity required of the first principle, will show how Plotinus account is better bourne out in admitting duality in the divine intellect while holding to an absolutely simple first principle above the divine intellect.

Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus

Chapter 1: The Requirement of the First Principle and Simplicitys Role

In considering the question of the simplicity or duality of the divine intellect, it will be important to first see how Plotinus and Aristotle understand simplicity and unity (1.2, 1.3), starting with how both see the necessity to assert the existence of a first principle (1.1, 1.3). This consideration will show in what way the divine intellect will be the first principle for Aristotle, while for Plotinus it will not. It will also contextualize how the divine intellect is ultimately simple for Aristotle, while for Plotinus it is unable to be. A corollary to this discussion will be that Plotinus gives greater causal power to his first principle as an efficient (as well as final) cause of the existence of all beings, more so than Aristotles first principle which is a final cause for things movement and existence (1.4). 1.1 Aristotles Search for the First Principle First, what particular kind of first principle ("#$%) is being sought by Aristotle for the unmoved mover of Metaph. !.6? Since the unmoved mover is discussed as a first principle,3 it will be helpful to consider what Aristotle means by the term. If we consider the word by itself, "#$% implies either beginning, origin, element, and as we have used it, first principle. Aristotle looks into the various usages of the word in Metaph. &.1: It is common, then, to all origins ('()*+ ,-+ ./+ 0.1+2+ 3*+ "#$*+) to be the first point from which a thing either is or comes to be or is known; but of these some are immanent in the thing and others are outside. Therefore the nature of a thing is an origin, and so are the elements of a thing, and thought and choice, and substance, and that for the sake of whichfor the good and the beautiful are the origin both of the knowledge and of the movement of many things. (Metaph. 1013a18-23) In this passage, to be an origin ("#$%) implies being the first cause or basis on which something comes to be known, has its being, or from which it comes into existence. The examples that Aristotle lists of the origin of somethinga things nature or elements, thought and choice, or that for the sake of whichbrings to mind the four kinds of cause from Physics II.3: formal, efficient, material, and final.4 At least in this sense, origin implies cause although in the sense that it is the first one from which something is (or comes to be or is known); thus the contrary, cause implying origin, would not necessarily follow. The example of the good as a final cause of knowledge and movement is helpful insofar as there is nothing further for which something moves or acts except insofar as the good is sufficient and complete in itself; the good, in this sense, is a first principle of movement.

Metaph. 1071b12-22, esp., speaking in context of the unmoved mover: There must, then, be such a principle ("#$%+), whose very substance is actuality.
3 4

Physics 194b24-195a6.

Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus With this general sense of being a first principle in mind, it will help to situate Aristotles search for the unmoved mover in the context of its function as a first cause of all beings. We may get a clearer idea by looking at how Aristotle begins Metaph. !.1, where the unmoved mover is eventually discussed: Substance is the subject of our inquiry; for the principles and the causes ((4 "#$(5 0(5 36 (731() we are seeking are those of substances. For if the universe is of the nature of a whole, substance is its first part; and if it coheres by virtue of succession, on this view also substance is first, and is succeeded by quality, and then by quantity. (Metaph. !.1 1069a18-21) Some unpacking of this may be helpful. Aristotle begins by asserting that substance is prior in being when compared to the other kinds of beingsuch as quality, quantity and the others referenced in the Categories5so that the other kinds are dependent on substance for their own existence, either by being present in, or predicated of, substance. 6 By seeking the principles of substance, we are then seeking those which also end up being the principles of all beings. Yet, what would constitute these principles of substance? And in what sense would these principles stand in relation to the other kinds of being (e.g. as direct or indirect causes of their being)? We get a further clue in Metaph. !.5: (1) And if we inquire what are the principles or elements of substances and relations and qualitieswhether they are the same or different, clearly when the terms principle and element are used in several senses the principles and elements of all are the same, but when the senses are distinguished the causes are not the same but different, except that in a special sense the causes of all are the same. (2) They are in a special sense the same, i.e. by analogy, because matter, form, privation, and the moving cause are common to all things; and the causes of substances may be treated as causes of all things in this sense, that when they are removed all things are removed; further, that which is first in respect of fulfillment is the cause of all things. (1071a29-36) In (1), Aristotle asserts that the principle of all things will be the same in a certain way, even though the particular causes and principles are distinguished according to their kinds, like those of colours, sounds, substances, etc. Yet common to those varied principles is the existence of certain principles like matter, form, privation, and the moving cause, which are common in all cases. This is carried further in (2) where Aristotle elaborates that when the principle which is common to the particular principles of qualities, relations, and others is taken away, the latter principles are also removed. So the kind of principle being sought for substances would be one which has an analogically causal relationship to all things insofar as by supporting the motion and existence of substances, it would also be supporting the existence of the other kinds of things, like relations, qualities, etc. Consequently, the principle would have to be itself a substance or individual which is the first cause by which all other substances, both

5 6

Categories 1b25-27. Categories 2b15-17.

Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus primary and secondary (as with universals, such as that of man, animal, etc.), have their existence. 7 On this reckoning, Aristotles first principle could not simply be such in a simple, absolute sense but only in the analogous sense just spoken of by keeping substances in existence and, with them, the other kinds of being. In Metaph. !.6, Aristotle goes on to show the first principle with his discussion of the necessity for an immaterial substance responsible for the motion and existence of all things. In doing this, Aristotle brings in his discussion of the three kinds of substance from !.1, which are: 1) sensible and perishable; 2) sensible and eternal; and 3) immaterial, non-sensible, and therefore unmovable.8 While the first kind is self-evident for us, we may be unsure about the existence of the second. Implied in this latter kind is Aristotles argument from On Generation and Corruption II.9-10 which ascribes the cause of continuous coming-to-be and passing-away to bodies such as the sun, stars and, implicitly, the planetary bodies which have the needed regular motion. 9 These kinds of bodies must in some way be tied to a movement which is single, unmoved, ungenerated, and incapable of alteration (On Gen. and Corr. 337a21) in such a way that the continuity of movement in bodies which come into being and perish is preserved. 10 Because of the existence of this second kind of substance which provides the eternal movement supporting the existence of perishable substances, this eventually leads to the necessity of a first, unmoved mover in the form of the third kind of substance: Since there were three kinds of substance, two of them natural and one unmovable, regarding the latter we must assert that it is necessary that there should be an eternal unmovable substance. For substances are the first of existing things, and if they are all destructible, all things are destructible. But it is impossible that movement should either come into being or cease to be; for it must always have existed. (Metaph. 1071b3-6)

As implied earlier at Metaph. 1071a18-23, esp.: The universal causes, then, of which we spoke do not exist. For the individual is the source of the individuals. For while man is the cause of man universally, there is no universal man.
7 8 9

Metaph. 1069a30-36.

On Gen. and Corr. 336b1-13, 337a16-23; on circular motion as causal explanation of the continuity of sun and planetary bodies motions, see 337a1-5. The argument for the continuity of motionseen in Physics VIII.1 (esp. 251b8-252a4)going back to a first, ungenerated movement is also carried over from Physics VII.1 (esp. 241b24-6, 242a14-21) which shows the necessity for a first movement behind a series of motions. Inevitably this leads to the necessity for a first, unmoved mover: it is clear that the first unmoved mover cannot have any magnitude. For if it has magnitude, this must be either a finite or an infinite magnitude. Now we have already proved in our course on Physics that there cannot be an infinite magnitude: and we have now proved that it is impossible for a finite magnitude to have an infinite force, and also that it is impossible for a thing to be moved by a finite magnitude during an infinite time. But the first mover causes a motion that is eternal and causes it during an infinite time. It is clear, therefore, that is indivisible and is without parts and without magnitude (Physics VIII.10 267b18-26). As we eventually see in Metaph. !.6, this is reaffirmed in terms of the unmoved mover being completely actual and without potentiality.
10

Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus As in !.1, the implication of the dependence of the other kinds of being on substance is re-affirmed by Aristotle saying that they are destructible if substance, by itself, is destructible. Yet how is this first kind of substance necessary for the existence of all things? Understanding the role of the second kind of substance (sensible and eternal) as providing the basis of existence for perishable beings, Aristotle is reaffirming the necessity for eternal motionbut in such a way that this necessitates the existence of a first, unmoved mover. Without a first mover which is unmoved, the motion of the eternal substances as the first moved sensible beings could not be explained, and subsequently all substances would lack a basis for their being. Thus, the existence of the third kind of substance, that which is a first mover and unmoved, must be posited in explaining the continuous motion and existence of all substances. In stipulating the existence of the unmoved mover, Aristotle shows that it must be completely in act (8+9#:;1() and without any capacity or potencyliterally, its substance must be actuality.11 As we will eventually see, thinking is the activity which constitutes this actuality, and in being identical with that activityparticularly in its thinking on itselfthe unmoved mover will necessarily be absolutely simple. Before this, we must consider this next question: what does Aristotle consider simplicity and unity to be in relation to the unmoved mover? 1.2 Aristotle on Unity and the Simplicity Sought for the First Principle The consideration of the unmoved movers simplicity comes up in Metaph. !.7, where Aristotle shows that the unmoved mover, as the best and first among all beings, causes motion as an object of thought: And thought is moved by the object of thought, and one side of the list of opposites is in itself the object of thought (+.<3% =- > ?39#( )@)3.1$A( 0(BC (D3E+); and in this, substance is first, and in substance, that which is simple and exists actually (0(5 3(F3<G > .H)A( '#I3<, 0(5 3(F3<G > J'KL 0(5 0(3C 8+9#:;1(+).12 (The one and the simple (32 M+ 0(5 32 J'K.N+) are not the same; for one means a measure, but simple means that the thing itself has a certain nature.) (Metaph. 1072a30-35) The first sentence is part of Aristotles general argument for how the unmoved mover causes motion by being a final cause. Aristotle mentions that thought is moved by what is first and best among the list of opposites ()@)3.1$A(), an indirect reference to the Pythagorean table of opposites, where the one, main side of the list expresses positive perfections. 13 Putting the perfections from the list of opposites together with the kinds of being, as was described earlier in Metaph. !.1 and 6, substance comes first
11 12

Metaph. 1071b12-32.

Taken literally: And of this, being [or, substance] is first, and of this, that which is simple and according to activity [energeia].
13

Elders 168-9.

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus among the others which are ultimately accidents of substance. Among the kinds of substance, that which is completely in act and simple would then come first among all the perfections of the list of opposites, where the opposite of being in act and being simplepotentiality and multiplicityimply a lack of perfection in being posterior to actuality.14 Consequently, the unmoved mover causes motion, particularly for the second kind of substance with the eternally-moving sun and stars, as a final cause (and, in some sense, an efficient cause) in being an object of thought which is best and most desirable among all beings.1516 One particular attribute to note is that being first and completely in act also implies being entirely simple. This is further carried in the distinction Aristotle makes between one and simple, where the latter implies a things nature while the former implies being a unit to measure the number of other things of that kind. Implicit from this is that to be one of a kind implies a necessity to be simple in possessing a whole, complete nature. Carrying this to the unmoved mover, if it is the first of all beings as a kind of measure and completely in act, it must then be simple. Yet this is an aspect to consider further: in what way does simplicity for the unmoved mover imply being in complete act and being of a certain nature? We can see this aspect considered in Aristotles discussion on the various senses of unity, beginning in Metaph. O.1. Speaking from what is less one to more one, the senses of unity or being one include: 1) the continuous;17 2) that which is a whole, including having a shape and form which is one; 18 3) that in numberthe individual is indivisible;19 and 4) that in kind: that which is in intelligibility and in knowledge is indivisible, so that that which causes substances to be one must be one in the primary

Regarding how actuality (8+9#:;1() is prior in substance, cf. Metaph. P.8 1050a4-16; in regards to how actuality is prior in a general sense, see Metaph. P.8 1050b6-34, esp. 1051a3: Obviously, then, actuality is prior both to potentiality and to every principle of change.
14

Metaph. !.7 1072a24-b13. See Politis 277-8, esp. in relation to how the unmoved mover could be considered as an efficient cause in a loose sense: For the ultimate cause of change is not simply the object of thought and desire of the cosmos, it is a supremely real thing and it produces this thought and desire in the cosmos, i.e. it causes the cosmos to have this thought and desire; similarly, cf. Bradshaw 38-44.
15

On how thought is moved by what is best, see On the Soul III.10 433a27-b17. Cf. Politis 277, 293-4, esp.: In particular, God moves and generates the rationally changing universe because the rationally changing universe somehow imitates Godhe moves as a paradigm (paradigma). But what the rationally changing universe imitates about God is nothing but what God ishis essence, i.e. reason and rational activity. On how the unmoved mover causes the primary movement (of the sun and stars), which is circular motion and by implication the closest imitation of the unmoved movers eternal activity, see Metaph. 1072b5-10.
16 17 18 19

Metaph. 1052a19-22. Metaph. 1052a22-31. Metaph. 1052a32.

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus sense.20 In each case, Aristotle sees being one as relative to the thing in consideration, whether one as referring to what is continuous (e.g., a line is one in being continuous with itself), one as referring to the individual (e.g. one thing), etc. This much is made clear later on: For this reason to be one is to be indivisible (being essentially a this and capable of being apart either in place or in form or thought) but it is especially to be the first measure of a kind, and above all of quantity; for it is from this that it has been extended to other categories. (Metaph. 1052b15-20) Aristotle sees that to be one is ultimately to be a unit of measure by which other things are measured in some way. When someone speaks of being one, it is in reference to one of a specific kind: one horse, for example, can be taken as a unit by which a number of other horses are counted. Being a unit then implies being an individual of a certain kind by which one measures the number of other beings of that same kind. This is implied by what Aristotle next says: For everywhere we seek as the measure something one and indivisible; and this is that which is simple either in quality or in quantity (Metaph. 1052b34-35). The criterium for being one is then something which is simple in quantitya unit among other thingsor in qualitysomething which has a specific nature or form apart from other kinds of quality. In speaking of one horse by which other horses are measured, the one horses simplicity as an individual of the kind horse is an important factor in considering it as a measure of that kind. In that case, it would have to be the nature of horse which unifies and provides the simplicity for being one of that kind. This would be as opposed to identifying the one particular horse as, for instance, a multiplicity of legs, which then implies identifying one legone particular of a certain kindamong other parts belonging to that horse. Being one of a kind implies that it must have an accountthe essence of horse, for instancewhich unifies the various other parts that that thing otherwise may have. The simplicity of an individual one of a kind would then refer to that things nature or actuality, 21 which would explain Aristotles statement in Metaph. !.7 that one indicates measure while simplicity indicates a things nature. Anticipating Plotinus argument for a one distinct from being, why can we not refer to a distinct one apart from it being a measure of a certain kind? This is a question Aristotle takes up in Metaph. O.2 with his response to Plato and the Pythagoreans on the question of whether the one stands apart as a being or as referring to an individual of a certain kind. 22 Aristotles answer, we may next see, is premised on some sense of the primacy of substance:

20 21 22

Metaph. 1052a32-33. Where actuality refers to a things form or substance, see Metaph. VIII.2, On the Soul II.1 412a7-12. Metaph. 1053b9-16.

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus If, then, no universal can be a substance, as has been said in our discussion of substance and being (';#5 .H)A(G 0(5 ';#5 3.N Q+3.G), and if being itself cannot be a substance in the sense of a one part from the many (for it is common to the many), but is only a predicate, clearly the one also cannot be a substance. (Metaph. 1053b17-23) Because being can be used as a predicate for the various kinds (like substance, quality, quantity, etc.), it could not be considered as a separate kind or substance over and distinct from the other kinds of being. Aristotle then sees the one similarly: it is also a predicate used of the different kinds of being in different senses, and not something apart. Thus Aristotles conclusion: That the one, then, in every class is a definite thing, and in no case is its nature just this viz. unity, is evident; but as in colours the one itself which we must seek is one colour, so too in substance the one itself is one substance. (Metaph. 1054a10-13) The one, for Aristotle, must refer to being one of a kind: it could not have a nature of its own, since speaking of a nature then implies speaking of a kind of beingwhich would then imply either substance, quantity, quality, etc. As a result, speaking of an abstract one as the first principle for all beings could not be possible, contrary to the Platonist position that Aristotle argues against. 23 Returning to the question of how the unmoved mover is simple, on this understanding that simplicity is an attribute of being one of a particular kind, the unmoved mover being completely in act directly implies that it must also be completely simple. Simplicity, contrariwise, then implies being completely in act and lacking potentiality, where multiplicity would introduce the potential to be or act otherwise. As we will eventually see, the activity of thinking constitutes the actuality of the unmoved mover which has itself as the object of its thinking. This implies that there is no potentiality in the unmoved mover thinking otherwise or in a different way, so that as a divine intellect it must also be absolutely simple insofar as is the first of all beings and completely in act as the activity of thinking. 24
Aristotle makes mention of Platos One and dyad as the two principles for the forms and matter, respectively, in Metaph. R.6 988d8-16, a position which Aristotle seems implicitly to attack here. Cf. Menn, Iota and the Attributes of Being, 4: In the context of the larger argument, the contribution of Iota 1-2 is to show that there is no one-itself but only, in each genus, an appropriate unit inseparable from the genus, and therefore that the one is not an "#$% in the strict sense; likewise the contribution of Iota 3-4 is to show that there can be no otherness or difference or contraries apart from some genus, so that none of these things can be "#$% in the strict sense.
23

OMeara 70-1 references this kind of priority of being for the unmoved mover: Thus the order of priority by nature and being, both in Plato and in Aristotle, implies much more than a relation of non-reciprocal dependence: this relation involves also an order of perfection of existence, of knowledge and of value. And, as Aristotle suggests in chapter 11 of Metaphysics V, other kinds of priority can be related back to the central order of priority by nature and being. Menn, Iota and the Attributes of Being, 21 also confirms this observation commenting on Metaph. 1072a34-35: The implication is that one does not signify the thing itself in a certain state, but rather signifies a relation, since being a measure is being in a certain relation to the things measured. So being one is certainly not the .H)A( of the "#$% that moves the heavens. The S@)A( of the "#$% will not be simplicity either, because simplicity, while non- relational, is privative, a lack of composition; rather, the S@)A( of the "#$% will be 8+9#:;1( (!6 1071b19-20), and a particular kind of 8+9#:;1( (it is +T<)1G, and so on), and it is because its S@)A( is 8+9#:;1( that it must be simple, because any composition would imply =F+(,1G (so !9, and U2 1088b14-28).
24

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus 1.3 Plotinus on Unity as the First Principle Considering Plotinus next, in order to understand his position on the duality of the divine intellect it will help to consider what he requires of the first principle being absolutely simple. While Aristotle sees simplicity as indicating a things nature, and that subsequently the highest, most active being is what is most simple, Plotinus sees that simplicity, or unity, is something prior to all the kinds of being, eventually leading up to a first principle which is absolute unity. The premise behind this can be first seen in Enn. VI.9.1, where Plotinus sees that all beings possess unity as a distinct characteristic which holds together their being and existence: It is by the one that all beings are beings, both those which are primarily beings and those which are in any sense said to be among beings. For what could anything be if it was not one? For if things are deprived of the one which is predicated of them they are not those things. For an army does not exist if it is not one, nor a chorus or a flock if they are not one. But neither can a house or a ship exist if they do not have their one, since the house is one and so is the ship, and if they lose it the house is no longer a house nor the ship a ship. (Enn. VI.9.1.1-8) For Plotinus, all beings are characterized by a prior unity which holds their being together. The being of the army is held together, for instance, if the various soldiers which constitute the army are brought together into one common grouping. The groups participants would otherwise disperse without the unity characteristic of the army which brings together the multiplicity of the soldiers into one. This may also be seen to be the case with the examples of the house and the ship, which are even more characteristically one and united compared to the army. We may also see similarities here to Aristotle linking simplicity with a things nature, which Aristotle called one in a primary sense, in seeing the unity of a particular house together with its account or nature of being a house. What is notably different in Plotinus account is his emphasis on unity by itself as the basis of a things existence: although the army, house, and ship have their respective accounts in being of that kind, which Aristotle might say is their one, Plotinus lays emphasis on the one in each case as a kind of distinct, prior principle which makes possible their existence. The world soul is an example of this, which for Plotinus is responsible for the rational organization of the universe and not simply for that of animate bodies.25 Although the world souls nature may be defined by its various powers under its one nature as soul, something else prior must impart that unity, or one, to the world soul in keeping it in existence. 26

25 26

OMeara 18-9.

Enn. VI.9.1.39-43: and then the soul is many, even the soul which is one, even if it is not composed from parts; for there are very many powers in it, reasoning, desiring, apprehending, which are held together by the one as by a bond. So the soul brings the one to other things being also itself one by something else: it too experiences this unity by the act of another.

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus Because Plotinus considers unity as something prior which forms the ground of existence for things, we may consider this to be what Dominic OMeara calls the principle of prior simplicity: the idea that everything made up of parts, every composite thing, depends and derives in some way from what is not composite, what is simple.27 This is further elaborated by Plotinus in Enn. V.4.1: For there must be something simple before all things, and this must be other than all the things which come after it, existing by itself, not mixed with the things which derive from it, and all the same able to be present in a different way to these other things, being really one, and not a different being and then one; it is false even to say of it that it is one, and there is no concept or knowledge of it; it is indeed also said to be beyond being. For if it is not to be simple, outside all coincidence and composition and really one, it could not be a first principle; and it is the most self-sufficient, because it is simple and the first of all: for that which is not the first needs that which is before it, and what is not simple is in need of its simple components so that it can come into existence from them. (Enn. V. 4.1.5-15) One can see a certain similarity to Aristotles understanding that there is a causal dependence on the highest kind of being for all beings, which for Aristotle is the unmoved mover. So likewise here, a prior principle which is absolutely simple must exist which is responsible for the existence of all things.28 What Plotinus calls the One must then be the first principle ("#$%) from which all things ultimately derive their existence.29 Also as with Aristotles unmoved mover, the One functions as a final cause, 30 however since it is the source of unity and imparts that unity to other beings, the One is also more directly an efficient cause. 31 Although closer to being an efficient cause compared to Aristotles unmoved mover, but unlike the example of the doctor imparting health to the patient, the One is a cause of unity in a distributed way through its direct production of Intellect, followed by the subsequent productions of the world soul from Intellect and matter from the world soul. 32 Plotinus also differs from Aristotles
27 28 29

OMeara 44. OMeara 45.

Enn. VI.8.8.8-9: for all noble and majestic things come after it. For he [the One] himself is the origin ("#$%) of these; yet, all the same, in another way not their origin ("#$%). As to why Intellect is not identical with Plotinus One will be further shown ahead with the requirement for differentiation and distinction of some kind in Intellect. The Ones final causality can be seen in 1) the souls desire for participation in the intelligible realm and ultimately union with the One (Enn. VI.7.20.14-20, IV.8.1.1-7), and 2) Intellects thinking on itself, which for Plotinus implies desire for the Good insofar as thinking implies movement (Enn. V.6.5); thinking as a kind of movement is discussed below in Ch. 2.4, pp. 28-30. Further discussion in Bussanich 51-7.
30

As Bussanich 46 notes: To the Ones efficient causality can be applied the counterfactual conditional: without the cause the effect would not have occurred (IIL8.10.I-2, IV.8.6.I-3, V.5.9.1-4). Most importantly, the simple and noncomposite One is conceived as the cause of the existence of all complex and composite things (III.8.11.40; V. 2.1.7-8, 13-14; V.3.15.28-30, 17.12; V .5.5.5-7; VI.6.13.50; VI.7.32.2; VI.8.19.12- 20). It is the cause both of things coming into existence and of their being sustained in existence by continuous participation in the One (V.3.15.12, 17.8-9; VI.7.23.20-4, 42.11).
31 32

Enn. V.2.1.8-18. See OMeara 60-8, n. 33 below.

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus understanding of efficient causality with his theory of two acts: for Plotinus, all things are characterized by an internal activity constituting their being and a subsequent external activity productive of another being. 33 Thus in the case of the One, although unlike any being, its production of Intellect through its external activity is a natural outcome of it possessing a kind of internal activity constituting its being although in a way that still denies any multiplicity. We may also note in the passage above that, because the One is absolutely simple and without complexity, Plotinus stipulates that it must be beyond being, which implies that there is no concept or knowledge of it, since our language, in implying concepts of being, also implies multiplicity. Yet what enables Plotinus to consider the existence of a principle of unity over and above all being? In Aristotles case, the unmoved mover as the highest, most active kind of being is consequently the most simple on his understanding. For Plotinus, however, this is not enough: because all beings are kept in existence by some prior cause which is more unified and one, this must eventually lead to a first principle which is absolutely one and without any multiplicityultimately something beyond any kind of being. This understanding is considered in a thought-experiment in Enn. VI.9.2, where Plotinus supposes otherwise that the one and substance are the same: Is it, then, true that for each of the things which are one as parts its substance and its one are not the same thing, but for being and substance as a whole substance and being and one are the same thing? So that anyone who has discovered being has discovered the one, and substance itself is the one itself: for example if intellect is substance, intellect is also the one since it is primarily being and primarily one, and as it gives the other things a share in being, so in the same measure it also gives them a share in the one. (Enn. VI. 9.2.1-8) Here, Plotinus puts forward the hypothesis that substance and being taken as a whole (whether in account or nature, for instance) are equivalent with being the one. If this is the case, then if we go towards what is primary beingultimately Plotinus Intellect as the highest beingwe will also come across the one itself. 34 Continuing with the analysis, Plotinus finds reasons to question identifying unity with substance and being in his thought-experiment:
Enn. V.4.2.27-39, esp.: In each and every thing there is an activity which belongs to substance and one which goes out from substance; and that which belongs to substance is the active actuality (8+9#:;1() which is each particular thing, and the other activity derives from that first one, and must in everything be a consequence of it, different form the thing itself. See Bradshaw 74-8, OMeara 62-5, Bussanich 46-51 for general considerations of the Plotinus theory of emanation (or two acts). Bussanich 48 also nicely sums up the difference of the Ones efficient causality from Aristotle: Plotinus employs the physical model of property-transmission to explain the first stage of the Ones generation of Intellect: the procession of potential Intellect. Aristotle's first principle, the Prime Mover, can not be the universal efficient cause because its actuality cannot be directed outside itself. But its final causality determines the structure of the second stage, the change from potential to actual Intellect: on the cognitive model the mind actually thinks when actualized by the object of thought and desire.
33

As with Aristotles divine intellect, Plotinus Intellect is responsible for the existence of things, although unlike Aristotle, it thinks the forms which are distributed to all beings through the mediation of the world soulthus being more responsible for the being of all things as the source of the forms. Discussed further on pp. 25-7.
34

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus For what can anyone say that [the one] is besides being and intellect? (1) For it is either (a) the same as beingfor man and one man are the same thing or (b) it is like a kind of number of the individual; you say one of a thing alone just as you say two things. (2) Now if number belongs to the real beings, it is clear that so does the one; and we must investigate what it is. (3b) But if numbering is an activity of soul going through things one after another, the one would not be anything factual. (3a) But our argument said that if an individual thing loses its one it will not exist at all. We must therefore see if the individual one and individual being are the same thing, and universal being and the universal one. But if the being of the individual is a multiplicity, but it is impossible for the one to be a multiplicity, they will be different from each other. At any rate, man and living being and rational are many parts and these many are bound together by the one. Man and one are therefore different, and one has parts and the other is partless. (Enn. VI.9.2.8-21) In (1), Plotinus begins by considering the one either as (1a) the same as being or as (1b) a number. Numbering, however, is consequent on real beings, where one counts from a number of beings, so the one as a number must also be consequent on being (2). If however the one is a number on this reckoning, it is impossible to see what the one is by itself when it is just like any other number in the souls going through things one after another, which implies it could not be a number in this sense (3b). The next step is to consider the one as equivalent to being, however this is already a problem: if we take away a things one or unity, we also take away its being, as implied earlier (3a). 35 The consequences for this are bourne out in seeing that multiplicity characterizes both the individual and the universal, either in the individual possessing multiple parts and powers, or in the universal possessing various definitions (such as man implying living being and rational). As we saw earlier, the one must then be something prior to beings and absolutely partless and thus beyond all being in the form of the One. As we will eventually see, even Intellect which was characterized as primary being and primarily one could not be the unqualified One since it is a multiplicity of some kind. Compared to Aristotle, Plotinus goes much further in emphasizing the first principles simplicity above and beyond any positive kind of being. Exact description is then impossible, since Plotinus One is always beyond comparison with any being; even to refer to it as the One is to speak in an improper way, since this only indicates that something beyond description is the first principle of all beings. An important factor to consider in Plotinus account is that any implication of multiplicity, even if a being like Intellect is completely in act and without potentiality, necessitates that the One must lie beyond that being. The admission of differentiation in Intellects activity of thinking for Plotinus will eventually be seen to reinforce why it must be a multiplicity and not the first principle.

35

This can already be seen in the army, house, ship examples in Enn. VI.9.1.1-8.

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus 1.4 Conclusion: Comparing the Unmoved Mover and the One Having seen Aristotles and Plotinus conceptions of the first principle and its simplicity, we must see how much each accounts for the existence and being of all things. One conclusion to Aristotles unmoved mover as the first principle is that it primarily serves as a final cause: the second kind of substance, that which is eternal and imperishable, imitates the eternal activity of the unmoved mover in its eternal motion, which in turn functions as the cause of coming-to-be and corruption in perishable substances.36 The unmoved movers simplicity is a consequence of it being the most active and complete kind of substance, and thus the highest kind of being. Yet, unlike Plotinus, a beings one for Aristotle is synonymous with its nature: because substance is the first, primary kind of being, the existence of substance is explainable according to its form or nature, without reference to a prior unity. As we saw with Plotinus, on the other hand, a things existence must ultimately be grounded on a prior, more simple principle which eventually leads to the One. The nature or form of something is not enough to explain that things existence without unity being imparted to it from some prior being, on this reckoning. Already we can see that Plotinus One does more in explaining the existence of all beings as both an efficient cause and a final cause for all beings. By being the ultimate source of unity and in imparting unity to subsequent beings through its production of Intellect, the latters production of the world soul, and ultimately the latters production of matter, the One plays a more direct cause of the existence of all things. 37 Aristotles unmoved mover only explains how all beings are kept in existence through either their continuous motion as the eternal heavenly bodies, or through their continuous coming-to-be or passing away as perishable substances of a certain nature. While Aristotles first principle only accounts for final causality in the latter case, Plotinus first principle accounts for both final and efficient causality. On this understanding, Plotinus positing unity as a distinct factor in a things existence goes further than Aristotle who sees simplicity, or unity, as referring to a things nature. The role that Plotinus One plays in being the source of unity, and subsequently in being absolutely simple and without any distinction, will influence how Plotinus sees Intellect as not being simple. Although Intellect is completely active like Aristotles divine intellect, Plotinus sees a necessity to introduce differentiation within Intellects activity which makes possible its thinking on itself. For Aristotle, by contrast, the unmoved mover being in complete activity denies any possibility for differentiation, since differentiation implies potentiality in Aristotles ontology. Because of this, Aristotles divine intellect must be completely simple on his understanding, since it is completely in act.
36 37

Metaph. !.6.1072a7-18. Enn. V.2.1.

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus However, as will be seen in Chapter 3, there is a crucial difficulty in the divine intellect thinking on itself if differentiation of some sort is denied. In the end, what can be seen between Plotinus and Aristotle is that there is an equal emphasis on simplicity as an essential factor for the first principle; but the characterization of simplicity as equivalent to activity, or as beyond being, factors into whether the first principle is an intellect, for Aristotle, or beyond intellect, for Plotinus.

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus

Chapter 2: Divine Intellect and Self-Thinkings Unity or Duality for Aristotle and Plotinus
Having considered unity and the nature of the first principle for both Aristotle and Plotinus, we must next look at how both conceive of the divine intellect. Both see that the divine intellect functions as a principle of beings, but both differ on whether it is the first principle. Aristotles conception of the unmoved mover as the divine intellect will first be considered (2.1), and its relation to human intellect will be factored in (2.2). Plotinus understanding of the divine intellect with his Intellect as related to, and distinct from, the rational soul will also be considered (2.3). Finally Intellects necessitated duality for Plotinus will be considered (2.4). 2.1 Aristotle on the Unmoved Mover as Divine Intellect Recalling the conclusion of Metaph. !.6 that the unmoved mover must be completely in act and not imply any potency, 38 Aristotle uses this to show in !.7 that the unmoved mover causes motion by being an object of thought and desirethus moving as a final cause.39 As we saw in Ch. 1.1, the unmoved mover being an object of thought comes about as a result of it being completely in act and the first and best of all kinds of being. A subsequent conclusion from this is that the activity which constitutes the actuality of the unmoved mover must be that of thinking. We see the premises for this built in the following: (1) And its life is such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time. For it is ever in this state (which we cannot be), since its actuality is also pleasure. (And therefore waking, perception, and thinking are most pleasant, and hopes and memories are so because of their reference to these.) (2) And thought (> +T<)1G) in itself deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is thought in the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense. And thought thinks itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its objects, so that thought and object of thought are the same. (3) For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought, i.e. the substance, is thought. And it is active when it possesses this object. (4) Therefore the latter rather than the former is the divine element which thought seems to contain, and the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant and best. (Metaph. 1072b14-24) Thus, in (1), the unmoved mover has the best life, since it is always in act and, therefore, has the kind of pleasure which naturally accompanies the best activity. This directly implies that the unmoved mover must be of the nature of thought or intellect, since intellect of its own nature is pure activity.40 In (2), the objects of the activity of thinking (> +T<)1G) are what is best, which follows on understanding that the objects of thought are of themselves in complete act when thought and, therefore, the best by not
38 39 40

Metaph. 1071b13-22. Metaph. 1072a24-36. On the Soul III.5 430a17-18.

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus implying potentiality.41 Because the mind thinks its object in act, it also indirectly thinks itself, since it also becomes the object of thought in act when it thinksthus it shares the nature of the object of thought. And in (3), while the mind normally has the ability to think its object, it is only fully active when it has that object in act. This brings about the conclusion in (4) that the unmoved mover has the best life as an intellect which thinks its object which it has identified with itself, and since it was shown to be always in act at the beginning, the unmoved mover must then always be actively thinking its object which is indirectly, if not directly, itself. In premise (1), although it is not immediately clear how pleasure is linked to actuality, let alone the kind of pleasure we enjoy in moments, we can see that the argument follows from Aristotles discussion on pleasure in Nicomachean Ethics X.4 as naturally complementing the best activity of a given sense in relation to its object, 42 particularly so in the case of contemplation with its object of thought.43 We also see in On the Soul III.5 that the intellect which brings potential objects of thought into act is of its own nature complete activity. 44 Since this kind of intellect is complete activity, it would then make sense that exercising it would bring about the highest pleasure, seeing that pleasure is relative to the kind of activity exercised. Because the unmoved mover is always in actor rather is, essentially, activitywe can see an implicit link between its being completely in act and the nature of this act being the activity of intellect which then implies the conclusion of premise (1), that it has the best and most pleasant life. While Aristotle concludes that the unmoved mover as intellect is most active and complete by always thinking its object, he does not yet make clear the direct object of thought, although implying that the unmoved mover has itself at least as an indirect object. Aristotle raises this question in Metaph. !.9, where he rules out the unmoved mover thinking either nothing45 or something else less divine than itself.46 This leads to Aristotles conclusion that it must unchangeably think what is most divinewhich is itself as the activity of thought:

41 42

On the Soul III.5 430a17-19.

NE X.4 1174b15-20: Since every sense is active in relation to its object it follows that in the case of each sense the best activity is that of the best-conditioned organ in relation to the finest of its objects. And this activity will be the most complete and pleasant. NE X.4 1174b32-35: Pleasure completes the activity not as the corresponding permanent state does, by its immanence, but as an end which supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age. So long, then, as both the intelligible or sensible object and the discriminating or contemplative faculty are as they should be, the pleasure will be involved in the activity.
43 44 45 46

On the Soul III.5 430a17-18. Metaph. 1074b17-18. Metaph. 1074b18-21.

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus Evidently, then, it thinks that which is most divine and precious, and it does not change; for change would be change for the worse, and this would be already a movement. First, then, if it is not the act of thinking but a capacity, it would be reasonable to suppose that the continuity of its thinking is wearisome to it. Secondly, there would evidently be something else more precious than thought, viz. that which is thought. For both thinking and the act of thought will belong even to one who has the worst of thoughts. Therefore if this ought to be avoided (and it ought, for there are even some things which it is better not to see than to see), the act of thinking cannot be the best of things. (3) Therefore it must be itself that thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking (0(5 V)31+ > +T<)1G +.E);WG +T<)1G). (Metaph. 1074b25-34) At the beginning, Aristotle is restating what follows from the unmoved mover always being in act by saying that it always thinks what is best and most divine. If it were to think one thing and then something else, it would change, which implies something less than divinity. This is carried further in supposing that the essence of the unmoved mover is a capacity of thought rather than an act, which implies effort that would have to be applied in continuously thinking somethingagain, implying something less than divinity which is effortless and free. And finally, to think something other than itself would imply that there is something higher and more divine than the unmoved moverwhich is absurd, given it was shown that the unmoved mover is by definition completely in act and consequently the highest and first among beings. What makes the unmoved mover ultimately distinctive as the most divine being is that it thinks itself directly as the act of thinkingthus, its thinking is a thinking on thinking. Important to bear in mind with this last statement, however, is that the unmoved mover thinks on itself not as the subject of its own thinking but rather as the activity of thinking in itselfthat which is the most excellent of thingswhich is incidentally itself. 47 One outcome from this is that the unmoved mover is ultimately simple and not multiple. Because it is unable to change in its thinking or to think on something else other than itself, it ultimately has itself as the object of its own thinking. We have already seen that it is completely in act and that the activity constituting its being is that of thinking; because it does not think on anything else other than itself, it does not have any potentiality to think or to be otherwise. Recalling Aristotles definition of being simple as indicating the nature or essence which unifies something, it would follow that the unmoved mover is absolutely simple by being completely in act as the activity of thinking. Even the distinction between subject and object that exists in our thinking on things, which might endanger the unmoved movers simplicity, does not exist for the unmoved mover which is identical to itself as the object of its own thinking. 48 That being said, it will help to see exactly how the unmoved mover is one as the subject
As will eventually be discussed, whether or not the unmoved mover thinks on itself directly as the subject of its own activity will be a question to consider in how it fully thinks on itself. See Ch. 3.1, 3.2.
47 48

Metaph. !.9 1075a2-4. Discussed further below.

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus and object of its thinking by comparing this with, and distinguishing from, the case of human intellection in Aristotles understanding. 2.2 Human and Divine Intellection Compared In On the Soul III.4-5, Aristotle lays out his understanding of the intellect as a power of the rational soul. In III.4, one key characteristic of the intellect is its ability to take on any of its objects without being them, while the intellect must also become in some sense identical with each of its objects for thinking to be possible.49 Aristotle eventually expands this sense of the intellects potentiality to think anything to include: a) the aforementioned pure potentiality of the intellect to become any object of thought without yet thinking that object, and b) the kind of potentiality whereby intellect has already become and thought its object of thought, like a scientist who, while not actively thinking about his field at the moment, can easily think that which he has already come to know. 50 The element of the intellect responsible for bringing objects of thought to act, discussed in III.5, must then itself be purely active: And in fact thought (+.NG), as we have described it, is what it is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is another which is what it is by virtue of making all things: this is a sort of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential colours into actual colours. Thought in this sense of it is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity (for always the active is superior to the passive factor, the originating force to the matter). Actual knowledge is identical with its object (On the Soul 430a14-20) The active intellectthat which is it what it is by virtue of making all thingsplays the same role that light does, insofar as light for Aristotle is the actuality of the transparent which in turn brings colour as a sensible quality into act. 51 The transparent in this context, for Aristotle, is the medium by which the sensible colour of something is communicated to sight. 52 So when, for instance, light illumines a room with white walls, the whiteness of the walls is brought into full act through the transparent which is,
On the Soul 429a14-18: The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object; that is, must be potentially identical in character with its object without being the object. Thought must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible.
49

On the Soul 429b5-9: When thought has become each thing in the way in which a man who actually knows is said to do so (this happens when he is now able to exercise the power on his own initiative), its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense from the potentiality which preceded the acquisition of knowledge by learning or discovery: and thought is then able to think itself. The distinction between the two senses of potentiality is an implicit reference to first and second potentiality, discussed further in On the Soul II.5 417b30-418a2, where Aristotle distinguishes between the two senses like comparing the potentiality of a boy becoming a general with that of a man.
50

On the Soul II.5 418b9-14. Wedin 141 notes that light for Aristotle is to be taken as a disposition and an activity: Light, I suggest, is strictly an activity, but one that might be called a dispositional activity. While it does not occur without some colour, it need not occur as any given colour. Rather it is an activity which, while active, is disposed to take different manifestations, and must manifest some colour.
51 52

On the Soul II.5 418b4-8.

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus itself, brought to act by the light. Thus in the analogous case of the intellect, the active intellects presence brings the object of thought, which is potentially present, into act in the intellect. Yet we should also bear in mind that, once the active intellect brings the object of thought into act, the intellect in this instance becomes identical with the object of thought which is also in actthus the statement that actual knowledge is identical with its object. Before this identity happens, however, the object of thought exists separately as a mere potentiality to be thought and brought into act through the active intellect. Having looked at Aristotles account of human intellect in On the Soul, we should now see how this conception of the human intellect compares with the divine intellect of Metaph. !.7, 9. It was already mentioned from !.9 that the unmoved mover is completely in act and, as a consequence of this, thinks directly on itself as the activity of thinking. An immediate difference here is that the divine intellect does not possess the capacity to think of any mere object of thought as the human intellect, so in this sense it always has the active intellect component that we have, which we only exercise at certain moments in our case. Its object of thought is always identical with itself, however, and in this it is not bringing its objectwhich is itselfout of potentiality into actuality but is always active with itself as the simultaneous object. What of the subject-object distinction that we see with the human intellect? As we see in Metaph. !. 9, the distinction is one which ultimately does not exist for the divine intellect: in the theoretical sciences the formula or the act of thinking, is the object [of thought]. As, then, thought and the object of thought are not different in the case of things that have not matter, they will be the same, i.e. the thinking will be one with the object of its thought. (Metaph. !.9 1275a2-4) The subject-object distinction thus only exists in the human intellect, since it is abstracting and bringing to act objects of thought which exist in potentiality in material things.53 Because the divine intellect does not have to do that for itself, since it is always in act and thus without matter or potentiality, the distinction in the act of thinking disappears. We could say that a notional distinction exists in our distinguishing the divine intellect, as a subject, thinking itself as the object of its own activity, but this distinction does not exist within the divine intellect itself. Once again, it already becomes clear of the degree to which Aristotles divine intellect is simple in its activity of thinking itself.

On the Soul III.4 430a6-9: In the case of those which contain matter each of the objects of thought is only potentially present. It follows that while they will not have thought in them (for thought (X +.NG) is a potentiality of them only in so far as they are capable of being disengaged from matter) thought may yet be thinkable.
53

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus 2.3 Plotinus on Intellect Turning now to Plotinus, we should first consider how he gets to the entity of Intellect as a principle of reality in a roughly similar role to Aristotles divine intellect, from his conception of the souls relation to intellection and the forms. An inkling into the souls connection and reliance on Intellect may be found in Enn. V.9.3, where Plotinus picks up on the theme of being as multiple and on the necessity for a principle which imparts unity and existence to beings. 54 Considering natural things and the universe in general, Plotinus then looks into that which brings together the matter into its unified formin the case of man, for instance, it is the soul which brings together the multiple elements of the body into one form. 55 However, Plotinus asks where the soul gets its form by which it molds and unites the matter. Recalling that Plotinus sees soul as a general principle organizing all material entities and not simply as a principle of living beings, 56 we next see that Intellect must be the prior cause of the forms from which soul itself imposes forms on things: then again that soul gives to the four elements the form of the universe, but Intellect provides it with the forming principles, as in the souls of artists the forming principles for their activities come from their arts; and that one intellect is like the form of the soul, the one which pertains to its shape, but the other is the one which provides the shape, like the maker of the statue in whom everything that he gives exists. The things which Intellect gives to the soul are near to truth; but those which body receives are already images and imitations. (Enn. V.9.3.30-37) In imagery quite familiar from Aristotles example of the sculptor forming the bronze into a statue, 57 Plotinus sees that soul is what is responsible for bringing form onto the four elements with various physical compounds. Yet the soul by itself does not possess the forms, but rather there must be another principle, Intellect, which informs the soul with the intelligible forms, or the forming principles. 58 Yet why not suppose the soul to be the source of the forms? For Plotinus, soul is a thing subject to affections and is also in the universe, since it informs and imparts the forms on to physical bodies.59 We can see this encapsulated in what Plotinus next says: For if what is in the universe is what is in body and
54 55

Enn. V.9.3.9-11.

Enn. V.9.3.15-21: And again you will be able to resolve the things put together by nature, those of them which are multiple compounds and are called compositions, into the form imposed on all the elements of the composition: man, for instance, into soul and body, and the body into the four elements. And when you have found that each of the elements is a compound of matter and what forms itfor the matter of the elements is itself formlessyou will enquire from where the form comes to the matter.
56 57 58

OMeara 18-19. Physics II.3 195a5-8.

OMeara 34-35, esp.: The wisdom shown by soul, Plotinus argues, in its ordering of things is not one belonging by nature to soul. Soul is informed with this wisdom: soul can acquire and can lose it.
59

Enn. V.9.4.13-16.

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus matter, nothing will remain the same: so that man and the other rational forming principles will not be eternal or the same (Enn. V.9.4.17-18). Intellect, then, must be outside the universe as the provider of the forms which never change, so it must, itself, not be subject to change and time. 60 In asserting that Intellect is the source of the forms, Plotinus is understanding the intellect rather differently from Aristotle, who takes the intellect to abstract forms that exist in potentiality in material things, in the case of human thinking, or to merely think the activity of thinking itself, in the case of divine thinking. In Plotinus case, Intellect stands as a rational representation of the forms which fully exist in its thinking, while the forms in matter exist as images of those which are actually thought by Intellect. Plotinus further illustrates the existence of the separate, distinct Intellect in Enn. V.3.3 with the human soul in discursive reasoning: just as sense perception conveys objects to us, so also does Intellect convey the intelligible objects to us by which we have knowledge when we think on things discursively.61 Thus Plotinus words: [Intellect] is separate because it itself does not incline towards us, but we rather look up towards it. Sense-perception is our messenger, but Intellect is our king (Enn. V.3.44-46). An example of this is if, through various sense-perceptions of ducks, for instance, someone were to intuit an essential property of ducks as two-footed, one would get this property from Intellect imprinting the essence or form of duck on the reasoning part of the human soul from which one might infer the essential property of being two-footed. Our reasoning in the human soul would place one intuition received from Intellect together with another, while Intellect perceives all forms together without the discursive manner by which we come to think things.62 Because Intellect functions as a source of the forms, we should inquire into how Intellect contains and thinks the forms in Plotinus system. It was established earlier that Intellect, being outside the universe and therefore eternal, must somehow possess the forms in being a source of them for the soul. Like Aristotle, Plotinus asserts that Intellect must always be in act through its activity of thinking, and it must not imply potentiality in such a way that it is not at some point in being: it must be the constant,

A source for this argument can be found in Alcinous Didaskalikos, in Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism IX.2-3, esp. IX.3.32-39: Whether God is an intellect or is possessed of intellect, he has thoughts, and these are eternal and unchanging; and if this is the case, forms exist. For if matter is unmeasured in its own right, it needs to receive measures from something else superior to it and immaterial. But the former is true; therefore so is the latter; and if this is the case, the forms exist as a type of immaterial measure.
60 61 62

Enn. V.3.3.34-46.

Emilsson 183-184, esp.: The souls relation to Intellect is typically described by means of visual imagery: the soul sees the Intellect and absorbs the content of what it sees. It cannot, however, absorb it all at once. It has to do it successively. This is why it is called discursive.

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus eternal source and cause of the forms. 63 On account of this, Intellects thought must also not be subject to changing in such a way that it brings the forms out of potentiality and into being, since this would otherwise imply that something else must be the provider of the forms. Thus, it must always have the forms with itself, 64 and in this it must always think them unchangeably and at once. In thinking the forms which are in it, Intellect must then think itself, but it must think itself in such a way that it also thinks the forms as one with itself and not as different or distinct from itself, otherwise implying the earlier problem of change and potentiality. 65 Already we can see that Plotinus will need to work out a way for Intellect to think itself in a way which does not imply potentiality but rather actuality, while it must think on itself in a way which implies the multiplicity of the forms within it. Ultimately, this question will be answered when Plotinus can explain how Intellect thinks itself in such a way that it differentiates itself as subject and object in its thinking while still being one. This explanation we next turn to. 2.4 Plotinus on the Necessity for Intellects Duality Given the question of how Intellect thinks itself, we see an elaboration on the nature of Intellects thinking in Enn. V.3.5: If then [intellect] is active actuality (;Y ./+ 8+9#:;1(), and the first active actuality and the fairest, it is the first intellection and substantial intellection: for it is the truest; but an intellection of this kind which is primary and primarily intellective will be the first Intellect; for this Intellect is not potential, nor is it one and its intellection another: for in this way again its substantiality would be potential. If then it is actuality and its substance is actuality, it is one and the same with its actuality; but being and the intelligible are also one with the actuality. All together are one, Intellect, intellection, the intelligible. If therefore Intellects intellection is the intelligible, and the intelligible is itself, it will itself think itself: for it will think with the intellection which it is itself and will think the intelligible, which it is itself (+.E);1 :6# 3Z +.E);1, [';# \+ (H3TG, 0(5 +.E);1 32 +.<3T+, [';# Z+ (H3TG). In both ways, then, it will think itself, in that intellection is itself and in that the intelligible is itself which it thinks in its intellection and which is itself. (Enn. V.3.5.36-49)

Enn. V.9.4.7-8. It should be noted that a subtle distinction to be made between Aristotle and Plotinus on 8+9#:;1(, being in actuality, is that Aristotle generally indicates actuality as the substance or essence of a thing (Metaph. VIII.2, On the Soul II.1), while Plotinus adds to this understanding that actuality is also intrinsically productive (Enn. V.4.2.27-39), which implies the two-act model, discussed in Ch. 1.3, pp. 15-6. Cf. Bradshaw 76-7.
63

Enn. V.9.7.14-19: It is, then, incorrect to say that the Forms are thoughts if what is meant by this is that when Intellect thought this particular Form came into existence or is this particular Form; for what is thought must be prior to this thinking [of a particular Form]. Otherwise how would it come to thinking it? Certainly not by chance, nor did it happen on it casually.
64 65

Enn. V.9.5.1-10. Cf. OMeara 35-7.

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus In the first half of the passage, Plotinus reaffirms that Intellect, which is the first of all beings and in complete act or active actuality (8+9#:;1(),66 is unable to be potential or have itself as one and its intellection another, which would imply compromising being in act. Its activity must be self-directed: it must think itself as the most active and intelligible of beings. However in the later half, Plotinus says that it must think with the intellection which is itself (+.E);1 :6# 3Z +.E);1), 67 indicating the simultaneity in which which it uses its own activity to think on itself as the intelligible object of its thought. Yet why word it in such a way that it thinks with itself ? This is a different way of describing how Intellect thinks itself compared to Aristotle, for whom the divine intellect fully thinks in being simultaneously identical to itself as the object of thought in act. The description of thinking with itself rather seems to add a kind of differentiation to the process of thought for Plotinus. We get a clue to why Plotinus adds this attribute to thinking with his statement on the necessary duality of Intellect thinking on itself: [Intellect] must therefore be one and a pairbut if it is, on the other hand, one and not two, it will have nothing to think: so that it will not even be a thinking principle. It must, then, be simple and not simple. (Enn. V.6.1.13-15) If any meaningful thought is to happen for Plotinus, there has to be a distinction of some kind between the subject and object of thought. This much is admitted later in Enn. VI.7.40, when Plotinus states generally: It is necessary to know and understand that all thinking comes from something and is of something (5-6). Unlike Aristotle who sees that distinction between the subject and object of thought does not apply in the case of things that have not matter (Metaph. !.9 1275a3), Plotinus makes the unqualified statement that a subject-object distinction must exist in all thinking. Thus, for Plotinus it is not enough that Intellect is identical to itself as the object of thought in its activity, but rather Intellect must have a way to internally differentiate itself as the subject and object of its own thinking. While we have seen the necessity that Intellects thinking must be eternal, active, and therefore not change, how is it possible for Intellect to differentiate itself in its thinking on itself ? Recalling that thinking is completely active for Aristotle, activity (8+9#:;1(), as opposed to motion (0A+<)1G) in Aristotles account, implies completion at every point and is opposed to any sense of motion which
Although 8+9#:;1( has been taken to mean activity or being in act in Aristotle, Armstrong has some justification to translate the word as active actuality in the Enneads insofar as all 8+9#:;1( implies production of some kind for Plotinusthus the active component of actuality, indicating a things being in some sense. See Enn. V.4.2.27-39, Bradshaw 76-7.
66

The dative case used for 3Z +.E);1 could also be translated in other ways such as through the intellection or by the intellection, which might merely imply that Intellect is identical to itself in its thinking activity. Plotinus wording seems to be saying more than this, however, implying that Intellects thinking involves some sense of differentiation while being identical with itself. With this in mind, Armstrongs translation seems fairly justified to translate the phrase as with the intellection, rendering the case as a dative of means which would follow the implication that Intellect, in a manner of speaking, uses its own thinking as a means to think itself. This is further elaborated in the following.
67

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus implies going from a potential to an actual, complete state. 68 Aristotles divine intellect on this understanding merely has itself in a state of activity in being identical to itself as the object of thought. Plotinus, on the other hand, imports a kind of movement into Intellects activity to explain the possibility for thought in Enn. VI.7.13: but if [Intellect] was not in every way and for ever varied, in so far as it was not varied, Intellect would stand still. But if it stands still, it does not think; so that if it came to a standstill, it has not thought; but if this is so, it does not even exist. It is, then, thought; that is, all movement filling all substance (Enn. VI.7.13.38-42) Covering cases where Intellect first thinks itself, and where, in thinking itself, it also thinks the forms, Intellect is then varied in its thinking, so that if one denied variance, there would be no thought. But on this picture, if there is variance and if Intellect is active, it must have movement in continually thinking through the multiple intelligibles that it contains in itself, although in an undivided, non-discursive way which might imply potentiality. 69 Yet given Aristotles distinction between motion and activity, how does Plotinus maintain that there is movement in Intellect which is otherwise pure active actuality? Unlike Aristotle, Plotinus maintains that motion is a species of activity: it is not simply the indication of a being going from potentiality to actuality but rather the particular manifestation of a substance as complete and in act: For if movement is the activity of substance, and being and the primary genera altogether are actively actual, movement could not be something incidental, but, being the activity of what is actively actual ("KKC 8+9#:;1( ./)( 8+;#:;A]), could not any longer be called something which contributes to the completion of substance, but is substance itself. (Enn. VI.2.15.8-10) Plotinus modifies motion to mean that it is in some sense the substance itself in its completed state, while it is a resulting activity of the substances active actuality. Movement does not then change a things being in bringing it from a potential to an actual state but rather functions as a property of its actuality.70 This gives Plotinus justification to use motion in his account of thinking for Intellect, while it still affirms the actuality of Intellect and negates potentiality being in it. Although movement is one feature making possible Intellects internal differentiation in its thinking, implied in the mention of being and the primary genera is Plotinus use of the five great kinds (,9:1)3( :;+E) of Platos Sophistthat which is (being), change (or movement), rest, the
68 69

Physics III.2 201b31-33.

Emilsson 187-8. Emilsson 177-9 also points to the example of Egyptian likenesses on temple walls in Enn. V. 8.6 (On Intelligible Beauty) as an overview of how Plotinus may imagine non-discursive thought in relation to discursive thought in most human thinking when considering Intellects non-discursive thinking of itself. Enn. VI.2.7.25-26, particularly where Plotinus points out that movement appears in the sphere of being, not as changing the nature of being, but rather in being as if making it perfect. Also see Emilsson 34-8 on Plotinus response to Aristotle with his own understanding of motion in relation to activity (8+9#:;1().
70

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus different, and the same. 71 Plotinus uses the great kinds to account for the other aspects of Intellects differentiation while also accounting for its unity. Alongside the existence of movement, Intellects being must be balanced by the presence of rest as another distinct aspect of Intellects actuality, since Intellect does not change in its substance.72 Difference must also exist if these first two aspects, movement and rest, exist in distinct ways in Intellect, while sameness must also exist insofar as there is the unity of Intellects substance in spite of the existence of difference. 73 Being thus also arises as another essential aspect, since it is existing in the same state and in the same way and having a single definition. 74 In Plotinus words, understanding the existence of the five kinds simultaneously existing within Intellects actuality explains how Intellect can be a one-many (M+ '.KK^)that is, how it can ultimately be a qualified simple activity while being multiple in the various real distinctions that exist within its one activity. 75 In seeing the five great kinds at work, we can then return to looking at exactly how Intellect comes to think itself. Putting together Intellects internal differentiation with seeing that it is one and the same with its actuality; but being and the intelligible are also one with the actuality (Enn. V.3.5.41-42), we can see this combination elaborated in Enn. V.3.6: For in seeing the real beings it saw itself, and in seeing, it was in act, and its actuality was itself: for! intellect! and intellection are one; and it thinks as a whole with the whole of itself and not one part of itself with another. (Enn.!V.3.6.6-8) Re-iterating the point that Intellect is pure activity, we are reminded that Intellects activity of thinking is one with itself as its own object of thought, so intellect and intellection are one. Because all thinking necessitates a subject-object distinction for Plotinus, Intellects thinking or seeing is then on itself as a distinct objectbut in such a way that it is thinking itself as a whole with itself already as a whole. Unlike how we might think of thinking as involving discrete parts between one part knowing another distinct

71 72 73 74 75

Sophist 254b-e. See Crystal 194-6 for further discussion of Plotinus use of the great kinds in Intellect. Enn. VI.2.7.26-28. Enn. VI.2.8.35-38. Enn. VI.2.7.30-31.

Enn. VI.2.15.12-16: For being is not first being and then in movement, nor is it first being and then at rest; nor is rest a passive affection of it; and same and other do not come after it, because it did not become many afterwards, but was what it was, one-many; but if it is many, it is also otherness, and if it is one-many, it is also sameness. And these are enough for its substance. Also cf. Crystal 194-6.

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus part, this is not the case for Intellect: because it thinks as a whole and not in a discrete manner, its thinking could not possibly be in a part-part relationship, but rather in a whole-whole relationship. 76 Plotinus elucidates this in discussing the analogy of light in the physical world and how that might apply in the intelligible world: For here below also sight, since it is light, or rather united with light, sees light: for it sees colours; but in the intelligible world seeing is not through another [medium], but through itself, because it is not [directed] outside. Intellect sees one light with another, not through another (_KK` ./+ aW35 _KK. a*G X#b, .H =1C _KK.@). Light then sees another light: it therefore itself sees itself. (Enn. V.3.8.20-24) In the physical world, then, the object of sight is the colour, and it is through the medium of light, which is separate and distinct, that sight sees colour. 77 In the intelligible world, because there is no substantial distinction between the intelligibles and Intellect, and because there is no distinction between Intellect and its thinking or seeing, Intellect then sees itself through the medium which is itself. In other words: Intellect as the subject of thought (I1) thinks itself as the object of thought (I2) through the activity of its thinking. 78 There is, then, a distinction between the states of Intellects thinking (I1 and I2), while the states refer back to the one, same activity of Intellect. As seen earlier, Intellect differentiates itself in thinking on itself through the five great kinds of being, particularly movement, that exist within it, while it remains one in its activity and thus one in its substance. This makes it possible for Plotinus to say that Intellect thinks itself as one being, while a connotational but real distinction exists in Intellect differentiating itself as the subject and object of its own thinking. The ultimate conclusion to this is that Plotinus Intellect, compared to Aristotles divine intellect, is qualifiedly simple as a onemany (M+ '.KK^) but not absolute simple in the way that Aristotles divine intellect is. It remains for us

Crystal 192-4, 196-201, shows how Plotinus, here, is implicitly responding to Sextus Empiricus, who raises a reductio ad absurdum argument against self-thinking according to part apprehending part or whole apprehending whole, where the absurdity in the latter for Sextus lies in the simple identity of subject and object: For if as a whole it apprehends itself, it will be as a whole apprehension and apprehending, and the apprehending subject being the whole, the apprehending object will no longer be anything; If as a whole, the object sought will be nothing (Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, VII 311-312, in Crystal 193).
76

One can already see a strong familiarity to Aristotles light analogy in On the Soul III.5 and the discussion of light and colour in On the Soul II.5 (418b9-14), although Plotinus describes light as being, itself, the mediumnot just the actuality of the transparent medium for Aristotle. See Crystal 201-3 for further discussion on the light analogy in Plotinus and its relation to the intelligible world.
77

Crystal 203, on the question of how to understand with in Intellect seeing with itself: I understand the with to mean that the intellect itself, in addition to being the first light (a*G), i.e. the intellectual subject, is the other light (_KK` aW3A) qua +T<)1G and that light brings itself to bear on the other light (_KK. a*G) which is itself qua +.<3T+. If one compares this sentence to the sentence in the passage we had earlier, when discussing how none of the wholes eclipsed one another (+.E);1 :6# 3Z +.E);1, [';# \+ (H3TG, 0(5 +.E);1 32 +.<3T+, [';# c+ (H3TG [For it will think with the intellection which it is itself and will think the intelligible, which is itself], 5.3[49].5.43-50) one can see that the with picks out the bringing of the intellects self qualified in a specific way against itself qualified in another way: what could be called whole against whole.
78

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus to us see the consequences for this and to consider which account better appropriates the nature of the divine intellect either as absolutely simple or as a duality.

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus

Chapter 3: Comparing Divine Intellects Self-Thinking and Simplicity Between Aristotle and Plotinus
Having considered Aristotle and Plotinus on their understanding of the simplicity, or duality, of the divine intellect, we must next determine who offers a more coherent account. The general question of the necessity for a subject-object distinction will be discussed first, in which problems with Aristotles account will be outlined in comparison to Plotinus (3.1). A reconsideration of Aristotles account will consider whether the divine intellects properties of thinking are essentially different from that of human thinking (3.2). Finally, in seeing that all thinking necessitates some form of a subjectobject distinction, Plotinus metaphysics which allow for a distinction while holding to Intellects actuality will show that his account of the divine intellect as a duality is justified over Aristotles account (3.3). 3.1 The Epistemological Necessity for Identity and Distinction One common point that has been present in the discussion of intellection and thought is the relation between subject and object of thought. A general agreement between Plotinus and Aristotle seems to be that this relation should involve some sense of identity, while at least Plotinus sees that a simultaneous distinction is a necessary condition for thought to be possible. Both would at least agree that in the case of objects external to the intellect distinction necessarily exists, while some form of identity of the object with the subject must exist for understanding to happen. When it comes to intellect directly thinking itself, there is the question of whether this subject-object distinction should exist. In considering a strict logical form of identitye.g., x is xa danger exists that mere identity without distinction in thinking implies triviality and would undermine intellection in general, especially in the case of self-intellection. Both some form of identity and distinction must be maintained, as Ian Crystal notes: From a causal point of view, intelligent subjects, inasmuch as they are the subject of the intellectual activity, have the capacity to undergo a specific sort of affection. The subject is acted upon. Intelligent objects, by contrast, are not affected but rather bring about an affection in the subject. Thus, self-intellection requires that there be some sort of differentiation between that which thinks and that which is thought. It also entails some kind of identity relation. For the object that the subject is thinking is itself. However, identity, when imported into the epistemological domain, will have to be weak enough to accommodate such differentiation.79 By implication, since there is a distinct property to the thinker as the subject in possessing and having for himself (or itself) the object of thought, even when that object forms a certain identity in the intellect, thinking or intellection should imply some sense of distinction between subject and object in the activity if it is to be meaningful. The problem is otherwise not simply epistemological but rather
79

Crystal 9.

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus metaphysical: there is a defining property to being the subject, and being the object, of thought. Thus, in considering the simplicity of the divine intellect which directly thinks itself for both Plotinus and Aristotle, the challenge will be to consider which one successfully accounts for a proper distinction, while affirming the unity which exists, between the subject and object. Reviewing Aristotle, this was a concern that he initially recognized in Metaph. !.9: Further, if thinking and being thought are different, in respect of which does goodness belong to thought? For being an act of thinking and being an object of thought are not the same (1074b37-39). In this context, Aristotles question arises in addressing the simplicity of the unmoved movers thinking and how the unmoved mover has itself as a direct, rather than as an indirect, object of thought. The question is prompted insofar as a subject-object distinction has a real existence in thinking on the human level, between the subjectthe active intellect, which is in actualityand the object of thought existing in potentiality before it is thought. In answering whether this distinction exists for the divine, Aristotles response is that the subject and object of thought are ultimately the same for things which do not contain matter; 80 therefore the divine intellect, being without matter, is entirely simple and without any distinction of subject and object in itself. 81 One consequence of this, which was noted earlier, is that the divine intellects object is the highest, best activity of thinking which is coincidentally itself. It does not think on itself as the subject of its activity because no way exists for it to distinguish itself as the object of thought in being fully in act. In a manner of speaking, it thinks itself opaquely and not transparently as the subject of its thinking. 82 Thus, although one can speak of a conceptual distinction between the

80 81

On the Soul III.4 430a2-4; Metaph. !.9 1075a1-4.

Crystal, Subject and Object in Intellection, 159, n. 439, commenting on why Aristotle does not admit a distinction between subject and object in the divine intellect compared to the human intellect (emphasis his): Of course, one could argue that such connotational differences were open to Aristotle. Therefore, why did he not employ them as a means of escaping from the identity thesis which undermined his account of self-intellection? The answer to this question is that, while he did have access to such connotational differences, he had them in the guise of potentiality. Accordingly, when it came to expressing his account in terms of actuality, only then could the force of the identity thesis be fully felt. Plotinus, on the other hand, has these connotational differences at the level of actuality. Thus his account of self-intellection does not fall prey to such a strong identity thesis. Crystal, Self-Intellection, 146: Given that the primary function of the epistemic subject is to become an object, an object whose intensional content is notat least not transparentlythat epistemic subject, the subject will not grasp itself as that object. It will not grasp itself in a transparent manner. Although the epistemic subject by apprehending object x becomes that object and, as such, is identical with it, the subject does not recognise itself in that object or as that object. Instead the subject only apprehends itself in an opaque manner. On what Crystal means by opaque, see Self-Intellection 8, n. 31: By incidental or opaque in the context of Aristotelian intellection, what I mean specifically is that the epistemic subject does not immediately recognise the intelligible content as itself . Rather, it apprehends the content under the aspect of its first-order properties, say, the properties of a triangle, which just so happens to be the intellect.
82

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus divine intellect, as subject, thinking itself as object, the distinction collapses in the activity of its thought which only has itself incidentally. 83 On the other hand, Plotinus model offers a real way to distinguish the divine intellect thinking on itself between being the subject and the object of its own thought. Although it is fully in act, Plotinus introduction of movement and the other four of the great kinds within actuality make possible the distinction of states for Intellect as subject and object of its one thinking activity. On this understanding, Plotinus offers us a more coherent theory of the divine intellect thinking itself fully as the object of its own thinking, both in thinking itself as the highest activity possible and in thinking itself as the subject of its own activity. This comes, however, at the expense of the divine intellect being absolutely simple on his understanding of the requisite kind of simplicity needed for the first principle, where any implication of multiplicity, not just between potentiality and actuality but even within actuality, implies that that entity cant be the first principle as the source of unity and therefore the One. On Aristotles model, the divine intellect is absolutely simple in that there is no differentiation or distinction in its thinking, but this comes at the expense of its thinking on itself opaquely as the subject of its own thinking. With this understanding, there is an epistemological problem in Aristotles divine intellect thinking itself if it is unable to think on itself in a direct way as the subject of its own thinking. 3.2 Reconsidering Aristotle Given the difficulty presented, can Aristotles account of an absolutely simple divine intellect be saved? A possible counter-argument to consider in Aristotles defense is that the divine intellect is essentially different from human intellect, so that the properties of thinking that apply on the human level do not apply on the divine. Although the scope of the problem of a subject-object distinction applies to all thinking in general, if one were to suppose that the thinking of the divine intellect, by being absolutely simple and completely in act, is different in kind from human thinking, while the distinction applies on the level of human thinking with its properties of thought, it is then a question whether the distinction applies for the divine with an essentially different set of properties of thought. A reason to consider this possibility is that, while Intellect for Plotinus is essentially connected to human reasoning in informing it, Aristotles divine intellect does not have any apparent connection to the human intellect.84 In Plotinus case, the properties of thinking between human reasoning and the
Crystal, Self-Intellection, 149: God does the same as we do, or rather we perform his divine activity, when we perform, i.e. contemplate, the theoretical sciences. But to say the Aristotelian God thinks the entire intelligible structure of reality in performing its divine activity is at best only implicitly, i.e. non-transparently, claiming that it has itself before itself in the sense of thinking itself as a thinking subject. The itself , when spelled out, does not immediately or directly make reference to the epistemic subject as the object in question. The epistemic subject, divine or otherwise, is subsumed or eclipsed by its intelligible object.
83 84

See n. 87 below.

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus divine intellect can be seen to generally apply because our thinking has some relation to the divine. In many ways, Plotinus seems to be responding to Aristotle with his understanding of Intellect as a version of Aristotles divine intellect, and his assertion of a duality in Intellects thinking can be seen to be an indirect attack on Aristotles understanding of the divine intellect as completely simple. Much of what Plotinus knows about Aristotle likely comes through Alexander of Aphrodisias, who has a similar understanding of the divine intellect to that of Aristotle. One notable feature of Alexander is his interpretation of Aristotles active intellect in On the Soul III.5 as the divine intellect of Metaph. !.7, 9, which functions as an efficient cause of the intelligibility of the objects of thought in human thinking. 8586 Plotinus implicit critique and response to Aristotles divine intellect with his assertion for a distinction between the subject and object of thought is in large part dependent on seeing that the nature of thought is not different between the divine and human levels. This understanding would hold with Alexanders interpretation of Aristotles divine intellect as the active element in human thinking, where there is a direct connection between human and divine thinking. A problem with this interpretation is that the connection Alexander draws is one which Aristotle does not himself make between the active intellect of On the Soul III.5 and the divine intellect. Although an analogy exists between the active intellect and the divine intellect inasmuch as both are completely in act, it does not immediately follow that one should identify the former with the latter in Aristotles account.87 In fact, Aristotles description of the unmoved mover as being completely in act and without potentiality, unlike the human intellect, appears to signal a difference in kind between the divine intellect
Alexander, On the Soul, 89.9: Moreover, if such intellect is the first cause, which is the cause and the principle of being for all other things, it would also have been productive insofar as it is the cause of being for all the objects of thought (pasi tois nooumenois). Cf. Alexander, Mantissa 2, 112.17-22: When [the intellect that is in actuality] takes hold of this instrument, then it is active as through an instrument and in relation to matter and through matter, and then we are said to think. For our intellect is composed of the potentiality, which is the instrument of the divine intellect [and] which Aristotle calls intellect in potentiality, and of the activity of that [divine intellect]. And if either of these is not present it is impossible for us to think.
85

Although Alexander sees the divine intellect in the same way as Aristotle in its thought being of itself as the activity of thinking, the role of the divine intellect as the active intellect in human thinking is similar to Plotinus Intellect being responsible for imparting the forms into the human rational soul.
86

Wedin makes this point rather clearly in his Tracking Aristotles Nods 137-8, 143-54, where he sees that the discussion of the active element of the intellect, or productive intellect (+.NG '.1<310TG) (or also, in Wedins words, creative intellect), in On the Soul III.5 is essentially connected to the discussion of individual, finite minds in III.4not, ultimately, to the eternal, divine intellect of Metaph !.7, 9. On this reading, it would not make sense to talk about the active intellect of On the Soul III.5 as completely separate and without relation to the finite, perishable mind of On the Soul III.4, at least on Wedins read. In responding to the suggestion that On the Soul III.4 refers just to the receptive intellect in the human soul only while On the Soul III.5 is talking about the active intellect as implicitly related to the divine intellect, cf. Wedin, Tracking Aristotles Nods, 146: My solution would be to deny that [On the Soul] e.4 intends in the first place to limit itself to receptive mind. Rather, the subject of e. 4 is simply the individual mind of the ordinary person and e.5 provides a (partial account of how it must be organized to function in the way it does.
87

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus and ours. If the nature of thought in the divine intellect is essentially different in kind to that of human thinking, Aristotle may potentially escape Plotinus criticism that all thinking requires a distinction between subject and object. Our own, earlier analysis in Ch. 3.1 would then no longer apply for Aristotle. Yet, this possible counter-argument faces a problem: in describing the nature of the unmoved mover as having the best life, Aristotle appeals to our thinking when he talks about the unmoved mover having for eternity what we only have in moments. 88 Aristotles appeal to the same kind of activity of thought that we have in moments implies that the nature of thinking is the same for the unmoved mover, even though its thinking is eternal and only directed to itself. The difference, then, is one of degree instead of kind in relation to human thinking. Consequently, the same necessity for a subject-object distinction still applies for Aristotles divine intellect as it does in human intellection, as earlier discussed in Ch. 3.1. As a result, an epistemological problem still confronts Aristotles account without the admission of some kind of distinction within actuality which simultaneously does not imply potentiality. Plotinus, as was seen earlier, does admit these extra ontological categories which allow for a differentiation between the subject and object of thought, but he is willing to do so at the expense of an absolute simplicity within Intellects activity. 3.3 Conclusion In reviewing Aristotle and Plotinus, we have seen how they place emphasis on the first principle being simple, although either in the sense of being the highest kind of being and completely in act, or as beyond any kind of positive being. Both affirm that multiplicity is therefore impossible and should not be admitted in the first principle. With this in mind, we have also seen how Aristotle wants to affirm that the nature of the first principle must be an intellect that thinks itself, while Plotinus sees that the first principle must be something beyond intellect. Essential problems exist, however, for Aristotle making the divine intellect absolutely simple in its activity, since this denies any possibility for distinction between subject and object which makes possible meaningful thought for the unmoved mover to think itself as the subject of its thinking. The difficulty with this stems from Aristotles conception of simplicity as ultimately tied to a beings actuality and the assumption that thinking involves being identical to the object of thought without requiring some kind of distinction between the subject and object in self-intellection. Plotinus implicitly recognizes this problem when he introduces multiplicity and differentiation into the divine intellect while maintaining that it is without potentiality and completely in

88

Metaph. !.7 1072b14-15.

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus act.89 Plotinus can comfortably introduce multiplicity into the divine intellect, because he has shifted the burden of absolutely simplicity to a prior principle, the One, which otherwise guarantees the divine intellect being the highest, most unified kind of being in his system. Aristotles attempt at a first principle which is absolutely simple and also an intellect thinking itself, although rigorous, fails if one wishes to have a coherent understanding of self-intellection which makes possible the subject fully knowing itself. In the final analysis, two issues seem to be at play between Plotinus and Aristotle: absolutely simplicity, and self-thinking implying distinction. Aristotle manages to combine the two with his first principle as an intellect which thinks itself without distinction, but in doing so he ultimately fails to account for how his divine intellect can fully think itself as a subject without distinction. Plotinus seems to take seriously the implication that self-thinking must necessitate some form of distinction, and in this he is willing to separate absolute simplicity as the constitutive feature of the first principle from the divine intellect as posterior to the first principle. In looking at the two positions, Plotinus argument ultimately makes more sense in making the divine intellect a duality instead of a pure simplicity.

89

Cf. n. 66.

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus Primary Sources Alcinous. Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism. Translated and edited by John Dillon. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. Alexander of Aphrodisias. Mantissa. In Supplement to On the Soul. Translated by R.W. Sharples. Ithaca: ! Cornell University Press, 2004. . On the Soul. Translated by Inna Kupreeva. Draft manuscript, accessed July 15, 2013. Microsoft Word file. Aristotle. Categories. In The Complete Works of Aristotle, Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Translated by J.L. Ackrill. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. . On Generation and Corruption. In The Complete Works of Aristotle. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Translated by H.H. Joachim. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. . On the Soul. In The Complete Works of Aristotle. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Translated by J.A. Smith. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. . Metaphysics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by Jonathan Barnes. Translated by W.D. Ross. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. . Nicomachean Ethics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by Jonathan Barnes. Translated by W.D. Ross, revised by J.O. Ermson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. . Physics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by Jonathan Barnes. Translated by R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. Plato. Sophist. In Plato: Complete Works. Edited by John M. Cooper. Translated by Nicholas P. White. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. Plotinus. Enneads, 7 vols. Edited and translated by A.H. Armstrong. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 196688.

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Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus Secondary Sources Bradshaw, David. Aristotle East and West. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Bussanich, John. Plotinuss Metaphysics of the One. Chap. 2 in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus. Edited by Lloyd P. Gerson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Crystal, Ian M. Self-Intellection and Its Epistemological Origins in Ancient Greek Thought. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2002. . Subject and Object in Intellection as a Basis for a Theory of Self-Intellection in Ancient Greek Thought. PhD diss., Kings College London, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do? did=1&uin=uk.bl.ethos.362772. Elders, Leo. Aristotles Theology: A Commentary on Book ! of the Metaphysics. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972. Emilsson, Eyjlfur Kjalar. Plotinus on Intellect. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. Menn, Stephen. Iota and the Attributes of Being. Chap. Ig2 in The Aim and the Argument of Aristotles Metaphysics. Unpublished manuscript, accessed August 13, 2013. http:// www.philosophie.hu-berlin.de/institut/lehrbereiche/antike/mitarbeiter/menn/texte/ig2a. OMeara, Dominic. Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. Politis, Vasilis. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle and the Metaphysics. Abingdon: Routledge, 2004. Wedin, Michael. Tracking Aristotles Nods. In Aristotle's De Anima in Focus. Edited by Michael Durrant. Abingdon: Routledge, 1993.

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