Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila G.R. No.

L-68635 March 12, 1987 IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLAILUSTRE in G.R. NO. 68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: In almost identical letters dated 20 October 1986, personally sent to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Isagani A. Cruz, and a fourth letter, dated 22 October 1986 addressed to Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division of this COURT, (mcorporated herein by reference), in feigned ignorance of the Constitutional requirement that the Court's Divisions are composed of, and must act through, at least five (5) members, and in a stance of dangling threats to effect a change of the Court's adverse resolution, petitioner Eva Maravilla Ilustre wrote in part: Please forgive us for taking the Liberty of addressing you this letter which we do hope you will read very carefully. It is important to call your attention to the dismissal of Case No. G.R. 68635 entitled Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. by an untenable minute-resolution although an extended one, dated 14 May 1986 which we consider as an just resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the First Division of the Supreme Court of which you are a member. xxx xxx xxx We consider the three minute-resolution: the first dated 14 May 1986; the second, dated 9 July 1986; and the third, 3 September 1986, railroaded with such hurry/ promptitude unequaled in the entire history of the Supreme Court under circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethic. xxx xxx xxx Your attention is called to minute-resolution of 9 July 1986 which writes finish to our case before the Supreme Court (... THIS IS FINAL.) There is nothing final in this world We assure you that this case is far from finished by a long shot For at the proper time, we shall so act and bring this case before another forum where the members of the Court can no longer deny our action with minute resolutions that are not only unjust but are knowingly and deuberat only promulgated. The people deserve to know how the members of the highest tribunal of the land perform in the task of decision making by affixing their respective signed on judgments that they render on petitions that they themselves give due course.

Please understand that we are pursuing further remedies in our quest for justice under the law. We intend to hold responsible members of the First Division who participated in the promulgation of these three minute- resolutions in question. For the members thereof cannot claim immunity when their action runs afoul with penal sanctions, even in the performance of official functions; like others, none of the division members are above the law. In our quest for justice, we wish to avoid doing injustice to anyone, particularly the members of the First Division, providing that they had no hand in the promulgation of the resolution in question. That is why we are requesting you to inform us your participation in the promulgation of these resolutions in question. Even we who are poor are also capable of playing fair even to those who take advantage of our poverty by sheer power and influence. We shall then wait for your reply. If, however, we do not hear from you after a week, then we will consider your silence that you supported the dismissal of our petition. We will then be guided accordingly. (Emphasis supplied). The letter also attacked the participation in the case of Justice Pedro L. Yap, Chairman of the First Division in this wise: As Division Chairman, Associate Justice Pedro Yap, as a copy of Resolution dated 14 May 1986 we received indicate, did not even have the elementary courtesy of putting on record that he voluntarily inhibited himself from participating in the promulgation of this minute-resolution, although an extended one, which he should have done consistent with judicial decorum and the Canons of Judicial Ethics. After he is the law partner of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez counsel for respondents, now the distinguished Solicitor General ... indicative that even at this stage of the proceeding in point of time, the Supreme Court still recognizes Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez as counsel for respondents, even as he is already the Solicitor General. For not withdrawing from the case formally Atty. Ordonez has manifested his unmitigated arrogance that he does not respect the Canons of Professional Ethics, to the actuation of his law partner, Associate Justice Pedro Yap, Chairman of the First Division of the Supreme Court, an act that further aggravates the growing wrinkles in the domain of judicial statesmanship, impressed as it is, with very serious and dangerous implications. (9) By 11 April 1986, date of the reorganization of the First Division, Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez already became the Solicitor General. With such amazingly magical coincidence, Dr. Pedro Yap, law partner of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez in the law firm Salonga, Ordonez Yap, Padian became the Chairman of the Division. xxx xxx xxx (11) So we see that on 11 August 1986 to 14 May 1986 when some members of the Division were still busy putting their respective offices in order and had possibly have no Idea about the Maravilla case. Was it possible for Chairman Yap to have convinced the Division members that Maravilla petition is without merit and since the members the new ones knew nothing about the case, readily agreed to the dismissal of the petition by a minute. resolution an

extended one. After all, this was the case of the Solicitor General. If this is what happened, then we are sorry to say that you were deliberately "had" After ala the 14 May 1986 untenable minute resolution although an extended one, does not bear the signatures of the Division members. The members should have signed the resolution, after ala the Supreme Court had given the petition due course, indicating whether they concur, dissent or otherwise abstain from voting. The letter to Justice Herrera went on to state: We assume, of course, that you had studied the case thoroughly since you were with the original First Division under the chairmanship of then Justice Claudio Teehankee. We assure you that we will bring this case before another forum to hold responsible the members of the Division who participated in the dismissal of the case by the unjust minute-resolutions, knowingly rendered for intended objective that your conscience you are aware. xxx xxx xxx We leave the next move to you by informing us your participation in the promulgation of the minute-resolutions in question Please do not take this matter rightly for we know justice in the end will prevail. For if we do not hear from you within a week, we will consider your silence as your admission that you supported the dismissal of the petition. In this way, we shall then be guided accordingly. The moment we take action in the plans we are completing, we will then call a press conference with TV and radio coverage. Arrangements in this regard are being done. The people should or ought to know why we were thwarted in our quest for plain justice. xxx xxx xxx Finally, in view of action that we are prepared to take in this case, that will no doubt cause nationwide attention, and there should be anyone that will cause me harm personally, may we request you to show this letter to the authorities concerned so that they will know where to look, when it becomes necessary. (Emphasis supplied) The aforesaid letters were included in the Agenda of the First Division of 22 October 1986, were "Noted," and referred en consulta to the Court en banc. On 28 October 1986, the Court en banc took up the background and history of the case, found no reason to take any further action, and referred the case back to the First Division 11 as set forth in the latter's resolution of October 27, 1986. " In this Resolution, the First Division traced the history of the case, clarified that Justice Yap assumed his position in this Court only on 2 May 1986; that when the resolution of dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986, Justice Abad Santos was the incumbent Chairman of the First Division, and that Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Ordonez was private respondents' counsel; that upon realization thereof, Justice Yap inhibited himself from further participation in the case; and that Justice Yap was designated Chairman of the First Division only on 14 July 1986, after the compulsory retirement of Justice Vicente Abad Santos on 12 July 1986. The Resolution of the First Division (incorporated herein by reference) concluded thus:

The dispositions in this case were arrived at after careful study. Because a case is resolved against the interests of a party, does not mean that it is an "unjust decision" or that it has been "railroaded". This Division declares without hesitation that it has consistently rendered justice without fear or favor. YAP, J., took no part. On 3 November 1986, petitioner again addressed similar letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera, and Cruz, (incorporated herein by reference), excerpts from which follow: It is rather amazing that when we wrote you our previous letter, we never dreamed that you would rush, as you did rush for assistance en consults with the Honorable Court en banc. The unfortunate part of it all is the fact that the Court en banc had to promulgate its resolution dated 28 October 1986 which to us when considered in its entirety, is just as untenable as the First Division extended and unsigned minuteresolution of 14 May 1986. Evidently you misunderstood our point of inquiry, to wit: 'Did you or did you not approve the dismissal of our petition under 1) The l4 May l986 minute resolution? Yes or No. 2) The 9 July l986 minute resolution? Yes or No. 3) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No. That was we asked. The other matters contained in our letter were intended merely to give you the highlights of our case. This is what we wanted to know to properly guide us when we finally bring our case to the other forum of justice. Did it ever occur to you that when you and the other members of the First Division referred our letters to the Honorable Court en banc en consults it was all your fault that the Court en banc had to promulgate its unsigned extended minute-resolution that unfortunately exposed the distinguished members of the newly reorganized Supreme Court and, at the same time, convicted themselves as guilty of distorting facts involved in our petition? This, we are sure, will come as a shock to you. We will show you why. xxx xxx xxx This is just a sample of what we will expose to the nation before the other forum of justice where we will soon bring this case beyond the reach of the newly reorganized Supreme Court We are prepared to expose many more of this kind of judicial performance readily constituting truvesty of justice Ponder upon this well because it is our very firm conviction that the people deserve to know how the distinguished members of the highest tribunal of the land perform in duties in this most sensitive area of decision making. Anyhow, whether you referred our letter to the Court en banc consults) or not, the situation remains the same. At the proper time, as we said, we will bring this case

before another forum of justice where the members of the First Division, in fact the Honorable Court en banc may no longer deny our action by mere untenable and unjust minute resolutions. Better believe it that we intend to hold responsible members of the First Division who took part in the promulgation of the untenable and unjust extended minute-resolution that is not even signed by any of those who promulgated it; therefore, to us, is clearly bereft of judicial integrity from its very inception on 14 May 1986. xxx xxx xxx Thus, we will bring this case before another forum of justice as Eva Maravilla Ilustre against the distinguished members of the First Division, in fact against the entire membership of the newly organized Supreme Court (because of its en banc unsigned extended minute-resolution that is without judicial integrity, dated 28 October 1986). But do not be mislead (sic) for we are not alone in this fight. Other lawyers, not just by their mere sympathy for me personally and my case, but by their firm conviction that judicial statesmanship must be maintained at nines in the highest tribunal of justice in the land, that they have offered their free legal services when the legal confrontation begins. xxx xxx xxx Paragraph 4, found on page 3 of the en banc resolution projects the most fantastic, most unbelievable picture of Division Chairman Justice Yap. It states ...When the resolution of dismissal on May 14, 1986, Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez was private respondent's counsel. The Honorable Court en banc must think everybody stupid to swallow this statement hook, line and sinker For Justice Yap we say. Tell that to the marines. But more than this, we leave this matter to the conscience of Justice Yap. Ignoramus that we are, unschooled in the domain of law and procedure, but we are learning a few as we promulgated our case within legitimate that we state here that both resolutions that promulgated by the Court en banc of 28 October 1986 and that promulgated by the First Division dated 27 October 1986, are nothing but a desperate attempt when both are considered in their respective entirety, to maneuver without success, some semblance of justification on the untenable and unjust 14 May 1986 extended and unsigned minute-resolution that is bereft of judicial integrity. xxx xxx xxx Thus, if the members of the First Division and those of the Honorable Court en banc think for one minute that because of their respective 4-page minute but extended resolutions apparently impressive for their lack of merit deliberately unsigned that exposed their lack of judicial integrity, that we win now give up the fight, just forget it. Ignoramus that we are, better believe it when we say we are prepared to carry the fight before another forum of justice. When we do, we shall call for a press conference with TV and radio coverage, so that we can present to the entire nation our quest for justice against the steam-roller of power and influence and, at the same time, to call the attention of the people to the manner in which the members of the

highest tribunal of the land perform their respective individual and collective functions in the domain of this most sensitive area of decision making. Allow us to restate our previous and now, our present inquiry, to wit: Did you or did you not approve the dismissal of our petition under a) The l4 May l986 minute resolution? Yes or No. b) The 9 July l986 minute resolution? Yes or No. c) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No. (Emphasis supplied). True to her threats, after having lost her case before this Court, petitioner filed on 16 December 1986 an Affidavit-Complaint before the Tanodbayan, totally disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal considerations set forth in this Court's aforecited Resolutions of the First Division and en banc. Some Members of this Court were maliciously charged with having knowingly and deliberately rendered, with bad faith, an unjust, extended Minute Resolution "making" her opponents the "illegal owners" of vast estates. Some Justices of the Court of Appeals were similarly maliciously charged with knowingly rendering their "unjust resolution" of 20 January 1984 "through manifest and evident bad faith," when their Resolution had in fact and law been upheld by this Court. Additionally, Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordonez and Justice Pedro Yap of this Court were also maliciously charged with having used their power and influence in persuading and inducing the members of the First Division of this Court into promulgating their "unjust extended Minute Resolution of 14 May 1986." All the foregoing, in complete disregard of the Resolutions of this Court, as the tribunal of last resort, 1) upholding the challenged judgment of the Court of Appeals; 2) dismissing the Petition on the ground that the doctrine of res judicata was clearly applicable not only as to the probate of the Will of the decedent but also as to the heirship of petitioner, among others, and their right to intervene and participate in the proceedings; and 3) finding that there was no attempt whatsoever on the part of Justice Yap nor Solicitor General Ordonez to unduly influence the members of the First Division. The Complaint before the Tanodbayan (incorporated herein by reference) was allegedly filed "in my quest for justice, something that has been closed to me by the Supreme Court forever" and specifically charged: CHARGE NO. ONE Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez and Justice Pedro Yap of 1) "persuading, inducing, influencing the members of the newly organized First Division ... into promulgating their unjust, extended minute RESOLUTION of 14 May 1986, knowingly with deliberate intent with such unusual hurry promptitude unequaled in the entire history of the Supreme Court base on insignificant issues and deliberately evading/prevaricating the more important substantial ones raised in my petition, in violation of Section 3, sub-letter (a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, ... ; and (2) Under the same Section 3, sub-letter (e) of the same Republic Act ... for causing me and the other heirs of Ponciano Maravilla undue injury by using their power and influence as Solicitor-General and Associate Justice, respectively. ... CHARGE NO. TWO

Associate Justices Luis Javellana, Vicente Mendoza and Serafin Cuevas, members of the then FOURTH SPECIAL CASES DIVISION, Intermediate Appellate Court 1) For knowingly rendering their unjust RESOLUTION dated 20 January 1984 in the exercise of their functions through manifest and evident bad faith in CA-G.R. No. SP13680, entitled "Francisco Q. Maravilla, et al. v. Hon. Antonia Corpus Macandog, et al." in violation of article 204 of the revised Penal Code,2) For causing me and the other heirs such undue injury' by deliberately, knowingly rendering their unjust RESOLUTION dated 20 January 1984 ... in violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, Section 3 (e) thereof. CHARGE NO THREE Associate Justice Vicente Abad Santos (retired) then Chairman of the First Division of the Supreme Court as of 14 May 1986, and Associate Justice Isagani Cruz, Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera and Pedro Yap, ... 1) For knowingly and deliberately rendering their unjust extended MINUTE RESOLUTION of 14 May 1986 dismissing my petition in G.R. No. 68635, ... with manifest and evident bad faith to make the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez now the distinguished Solicitor General the 'illegal owners' of the vast estates of my aunt Digna Maravilla ...; 2) Under Section 3, sub-letter (e) Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, ... for deliberately causing us heirs of Ponciano Maravilla undue injury by depriving us of our rights over my aunt's vast estates because of their manifest and evident bad faith in knowingly promulgating their unjust extended minute RESOLUTION of 14 May 1986, deliberately intended to make the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez, now the Solicitor General the "illegal owners" of my aunt Digna Maravilla's estates when under the law, these Ordonez clients are not entitled to own these vast properties whether under testate or intestate succession or mixed succession (Emphasis supplied). Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the press, which was widely publicized in almost all dailies on 23 December 1986, without any copy furnished this Court nor the members who were charged. The issue of the Daily Express of 23 December 1986 published a banner headline reading ORDONEZ, 8 JUSTICES FACE GRAFT CHARGES thereby making it unjustly appear that the Justices of this Court and the other respondents were charged with "graft and corruption" when the Complaint was actually filed by a disgruntled litigant and her counsel after having lost her case thrice in this Court. On 26 December 1986, the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) dismissed petitioner's Complaint and decreed in the dispositive portion of his Resolution (herein incorporated by reference) that: WHEREFORE, all the premises considered, this Office resolves to dismiss the complaint against Justices Pedro Yap, Isagani Cruz, Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, Vicente Abad Santos, and will continue evaluating the complaint

against Justices Serafin Cuevas, Luis Javellana and Vicente Mendoza, Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordonez and the private respondents. The aforestated Resolution indicated at the bottom of the last page: Copy Furnished: DEAN WENCESLAO LAURETA Counsel for the Complainant 919 Prudencio Street Sampaloc, Manila In the Resolution of this Court en banc, dated January 29, 1986, it required: (1) Petitioner Eva Maravilla Ilustre to show cause, with in ten (10) days from notice, why she should not be held in contempt for her aforecited statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or official actions of the Justices concerned, which statements, unless satisfactorily explained, transcend the permissible bounds of propriety and undermine and degrade the administration of justice; and (2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta, as an officer of the Court, to show cause, within ten (10) days from notice, why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for the aforecited statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and the official actions of the Justices concerned, and for hiding therefrom in anonymity behind his client's name, in an alleged quest for justice but with the manifest intent to bring the Justices into disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the Courts and the orderly administration of justice. (pp. 383-384, Rollo). (1) In her Compliance-Answer filed on February 9, 1987, wherein Eva Maravilla Ilustre prays that the contempt proceedings against her be dismissed, she contends, in essence, that: (1) "there was no intention to affront the honor and dignity" of the Court; (2) the letters addressed to the individual Justices were private in character and were never meant for anybody, much less the Supreme Court en banc, "there (being) a constitutional mandate affording protection to privacy of communications;" (3) if her statements in those letters were really contemptuous, the Court "should have immediately taken disciplinary proceedings" against her, and not having done so, the Court has "forfeited" that right and is now "estopped" from doing so; this citation for contempt is a "vindictive reprisal" for her having filed the complaint before the Tanodbayan, "an action that lacks sincerity, taken not in the spirit of judicial statemanship;" (4) she instituted the complaint before the Tanodbayan "in my honest behalf that I lost my case before the Supreme Court not because of lack of merit or of its own merits, assisted by attorneys who offered their services in the prosecution of my case;" (5) the newspaper publicity of this case "was no fault of mine; neither is it the fault of my former counsel Dean Wenceslao Laureta, " who prevailed upon her to call off the press conference with TV and radio coverage; that she is not a "disgruntled litigant" who thrice lost before the Court, rather, she has challenged the validity of the resolutions of the Court "containing distortion of facts, conjectures and mistaken inferences" particularly, in that (a) there is no res judicata, (b) the Court of Appeals in its

decision declared that the judgment of the trial Court had long attained finality, so that it can no longer be set aside, (c) her 11 opponents," clients of Atty. Ordonez, are not entitled to own her aunt's "vast properties" whether under the law of testate or intestate succession or mixed succession," (d) that the statement in this Court's Resolution that the Court of Appeals had denied intervention is an "unadulterated distortion of the facts;" (b) the statement in the en banc Resolution that some Justices of the Court of Appeals were similarly maliciously charged with knowingly rendering their "unjust resolution" of 20 January 1984 is a bit "premature, a pre-judgment over a case over which this Court does not have jurisdiction;" (7) Atty. Laureta is not her counsel in the case before the Tanodbayan; (8) before the latter body, she has "established not only probable cause but has also proved the collective culpability (of the Justices concerned) as charged;" (9) and that her 53 page Motion for Reconsideration before the Tanodbayan is made an integral part of her Answer. (2) In his own Answer, Atty. Laureta maintains substantially that: (1) he is not respondent Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan and that she has consulted and/or engaged the services of other attorneys in the course of the prosecution of her case, fike Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan and Atty. Vedastro B. Gesmundo; that he just learned from other sources that respondent llustre was planning to bring her case to the Tanodbayan with the assistance of other lawyers who offered her their legal services; (2) it was he who dissuaded her from calling her intended press conference and from circulating copies of her complaint "not only in the performance of duty as an officer of the court, but also as a former president of Manila III Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and as a professional lecturer in Legal and Judicial Ethics in some Manila law schools in his desire to protect and uphold the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as the highest tribunal of the land." He should, therefore, be given "a little bit of credit for what he did" instead of taking this disciplinary proceeding against him; that Ms. Ilustre is not a "disgruntled litigant" who "lost her case thrice in this Court;" (3) he did not prepare respondent Ilustre's letters to the individual Justices, I appearances to the contrary notwithstanding," that these letters were "never, at any time, considered as constituting contempt of court" in the resolutions of this Court, otherwise, "it would have taken immediate disciplinary action as it is doing now;" the Court has lost its right to consider the statements in the letters as constituting contempt and it is now "estopped" from proceeding with this disciplinary action; (4) by doing so, this Court has "unmistakably revealed the intent and character that underlie its present action as a vindictive judicial vengeance, inconsistent with the spirit of judicial statesmanship by hiding behind the well-recognized fact that the Supreme Court is supreme in the domain of the administration of justice;" (5) "there was no disregard intended to the Resolution of the Honorable Court, as the tribunal of last resort, relative to its upholding the judgment of the Court of Appeals;" he is just doing "his duty as an officer of the court to put the records in this regard in their proper light;" particularly (a) that the judgment of the trial court had attained its finality long ago, (b) the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable, otherwise, this Court would not have remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for review, (c) the observation in the First Division's extended Resolution of 14 July 1986 that Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Ordonez was private respondents' counsel "defies every vestige of human understanding," that Justice Yap had forthwith inhibited himself from participating in the case is not borne out by the record of this case. Justice Yap had "never voluntarily entered on the record his inhibition" when he should have done so when respondent Ilustre's petition was taken up; Justice Yap's partner, Atty. Ordonez, continued to be recognized by this Court as counsel for private respondents even as he was the Solicitor General; (b) finally, "appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, he has not colted acts unworthy of his profession. The truth of the matter is, he should at least be credited in whatever small way for his acts and efforts taken by him to protect and uphold the honor and dignity of the Honorable Court. We find the explanations of both Ms. Ilustre and Atty. Laureta unsatisfactory. Their claims that they had done nothing that could constitute an affront to the honor and dignity of this Court dissipate in the face of attendant facts and circumstances and "defy every vestige of human understanding," to

use their own language. Indeed, they should not "think that they will win a hearing by the sheer multiplication of words." (Mathew 6:7). Respondents' reliance on the "privacy of communication" is misplaced. Letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire Court. The contumacious character of those letters constrained the First Division to refer the same to the Court en banc, en consults and so that the Court en banc could pass upon the judicial acts of the Division. It was only in the exercise of forbearance by the Court that it refrained from issuing immediately a show cause order in the expectancy that after having read the Resolution of the Court en banc of October 28, 1986, respondents would realize the unjustness and unfairness of their accusations. The Court is far from "estopped" in initiating these proceedings. The Chief Justice had promptly announced his Statement, dated December 23, 1986, that "the Supreme Court will take appropriate steps on the matter upon its resumption of sessions on the first working day of the year. " There is no vindicative reprisal involved. The Court's authority and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession. We are not convinced that Atty. Laureta had nothing to do with respondent Ilustre's letters to the individual Justices, nor with the com plaint filed before the Tanodbayan. In the Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 11, 1986, filed by Atty. Laureta in the main petition, he stressed: 10. The composition of the First Division was reduced to five members. Strangely enough, about one month later, the Honorable Court promulgated its extended resolution with such promptitude in the entire history of the Supreme Court, unequaled in a manner of speaking, ... In the Manifestation and Motion, dated June 25, 1986, filed by Atty. Laureta (p. 311, Rollo), the same phrases were incanted: the promptitude with which the Resolution of 14 May 1986 was promulgated (par. 9, Motion for Reconsideration, p. 5) unequaled in the entire history of the Supreme Court in so far as petitions given due course is concerned ... (Emphasis given) Those same terms are reproduced verbatim in the letters ostensibly authored by respondent Ilustre addressed to the individual Justices whom respondents have charged. Thus: We consider the three minute resolutions ... railroaded with such hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the Supreme Court under circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics" ltr., to Justice Narvasa, p. 2; Itr., to Justice Herrera, p. 2; Itr., to Justice Cruz, p. 2). xxx xxx xxx with such unusual hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the Supreme Court (Ltr., to Justice Narvasa, p. 5; Itr., to Justice Herrera, p. 5; Itr., to Justice Cruz, p. 5).

The same terminologies are reiterated in the Complaint and in the Motion for Reconsideration filed before the Tanodbayan (p. 2). Further, in his Manifestation & Motion, dated June 25, 1986, Atty. Laureta stated: counsel for petitioner personally inquired from Division Clerk of Court Corazon Served the following: (1) When was the above-entitled case deliberated by the First Division? (2) Are there recorded minutes of such deliberation? (3) Who among the members of the Division voted for dismissal of the petition to be promulgated by resolution and who did not, if any? (4) Who prepared the Resolution? (p.312, Rollo). Atty. Laureta's obsession to receive the answer to his queries surfaces again in the second letters dated November 3, 1986 to the individual Justices under the supposed signatures of respondent Ilustre, thus: Evidently you misunderstood our point of in our first letter. It is a very simple inquiry, to wit Did you or did you not approve the dismissal of our petition under 1) The l4 May l986 minute resoluTion? Yes or No 2) The 9 July l986 minute resoluTion? Yes or No 3) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No. (Emphasis supplied) ltr., to Justice Narvasa, p. 1; to Justice Herrera, p. 1; to Justice Cruz, p. 1) Additionally, the disparaging remarks like: exertion of "undue" and "powerful influence" by Atty. Ordonez and Justice Yap; "distortion of facts, conjectures and mistaken references"; "untenable minute resolution although extend. "unjust minute resolution" repeated by Atty. Laureta in his several pleadings, echoed and re-echoed in the individual letters to the Justices, as well as in the Complaint and the Motion for Reconsideration before the Tanodbayan, reveal the not-too-hidden hand of Atty. Laureta. The foregoing is bolstered by the reports received by the members of the Court that copies of the complaint filed with the Tanodbayan were distributed to the editors of the metropolitan newspapers in envelopes bearing the name of respondent Laureta, who was heard over the radio speaking on the same complaint, and that he was following up the complaint and the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the Tanodbayan. Furthermore, respondent Laureta as his co-respondent Ilustre's lawyer had control of the proceedings. As stressed by this Court in an early case, as such lawyer, "Whatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal E times should be reminded him that '(a) lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client pursuits in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation.' " (In Re: Contempt

Proceedings in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1, 23) Respondent Laureta manifestly failed to discharge such responsibility. For all intents and purposes, he appears to have encouraged and abetted his client in denigrating the members of the First Division of this Court, by baselessly charging them with rendering an "unjust" resolution with "deliberate bad faith," because of his stubborn insistence on his untenable arguments which had been rejected as without merit by the Court's First Division, whose Resolution was upheld by the Court en banc. Worse, the dissemination in the print and broadcast media in bold captions falsely depicting the Justices as "FAC(ING) GRAFT CHARGES" instead of the baseless rantings of a disgruntled litigant appear to have been timed to place them in a bad light at the height of the Christmas season. We come now to the specific accusations of respondents. They charge Associate Justices Vicente Abad Santos (retired) then Chairman of the First Division of the Supreme Court as of May 14,1986, Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Pedro Yap for knowingly and deliberately rendering their "unjust, extended Resolution of May 14, 1986" dismissing their petition in this case with manifest and evident bad faith to make the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez (now the Solicitor General) the "illegal owners" of the estates of Digna Maravilla, thereby causing the heirs of Ponciano Maravilla (Digna's eldest brother) undue injury by depriving them of their rights over the estates of Digna Maravilla (Charge No. Three before the Tanodbayan). They further charge Justice Yap (and Atty. Sedfrey Ordonez) of having 11 persuade(ed), inducted(ed) and influence(ed) the members of the newly organized First Division into promulgating their "unjust, extended minute Resolution of 14 May 1986" (Charge No. One before the Tanodbayan), which Resolution, (the "Division Resolution, " for short) is herewith attached as Annex "A ". Preliminarily, respondents deny that respondent Ilustre lost three times in this Court. It cannot be denied, however, that, as stated in the Resolution of October 28, 1986 of the Court en banc, this is the third time (in fact, the fourth, if we include Fernandez, et al. vs. Maravilla, L-18799, 10 SCRA 589 [1964]) that a controversy involving the estate of the late Digna Maravilla is elevated to this Court. The first was in G.R. No. L-23225 (37 SCRA 672 [1971], where this Court ruled: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decree of the court below denying probate of the 1944 will of Digna Maravilla (Exhibit "A") is reversed and the said testament is hereby ordered probated. Let the records be returned to the Court of origin for further proceedings conformable to law. ... As stated in the en banc Resolution of October 28, 1986 (hereto attached as Annex " B ", and hereinafter referred to as the "Banc Decision") while respondent Ilustre was not a party in that case, upon remand of the case to the probate Court, she and other children of the deceased brothers and sisters of the testatrix filed two Motions for Intervention. Respondent Ilustre's participation in the state involved, therefore, harks back to that first case. The Court of Appeals resolved the issue of intervention in CA-G.R. No. 05394, entitled "Heirs of Pastor Maravilla, et al. vs. Hon. Ernesto S. Tengco, et al." in a Decision penned by Justice Venicio E scolin (hereinafter referred to as the "Escolin Decision") wherein it was categorically ruled that there was no point to allowing intervention on the part of respondent Ilustre, et al., "for failure to show any right or interest in the estate in question. " Thus: (2) As heretofore stated, private respondents, in their counter-petition for mandamus, seek this Court's resolution on the petitioners' motion for intervention in Sp. Proc. No. 4977. In their respective pleadings and memoranda, the parties have lengthily discussed the issue of whether or not petitioners may be allowed to intervene; and the same may as well be determined in the present case, if only 'to avoid or, at least,

minimize further protracted controversy' between the parties (PCIB vs. Hon. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266). A resolution of this issue should render moot and academic the question anent the disqualification of respondent Judge. We agree with private respondents that petitioners' motions for intervention are devoid of merit, for failure on their part to show any right or interest in the estate in question. There is no dispute that the last will and testament of the late Digna Maravilla had already been admitted to probate in a final judgment which the Supreme Court promulgated on March 2, 1971 (G.R. No. L-23225). In the said will Digna instituted her husband Herminio Maravilla as xxx xxx xxx The above testamentary provision for the universal heirship of Herminio Maravilla over the residue of the decedent's present and future property legally and completely excluded the petitioners, as collateral relatives of the testatrix, from inheriting any part of the latter's estate through intestate succession or mixed succession. Having no forced or compulsory heirs, except her husband, the testatrix had the absolute freedom to institute the latter as her sole, universal heir, and such freedom is recognized by Article 842 of the Civil Code which provides: ART. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed. One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs. There is therefore no point in allowing the petitioners, who clearly appear to have no interest in the estate, to intervene in the proceedings involving the settlement thereof. xxx xxx xxx The aforesaid Decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. L-46155 on November 9, 1977 and has become final. That was the second case involving the estate filed before this Court. Respondents' contention, therefore, that the statement in the Banc Resolution "that the Court of Appeals had denied intervention" is an "unadulterated distortion of the facts" is obviously erroneous and intended to mislead. The "Escolin Decision" (in CA-G.R. No. 05394-R), which had become final, also finally foreclosed any claim that respondent Ilustre, and those who sought to intervene with her, may have had on the estate of Digna Maravilla. In unmistakable terms, what the Court of Appeals held in that Decision, affirmed by this Court, bears repeating: The above testamentary provision for the universal heirship of Herminio Maravilla over the residue of the decedent's present and future property legally and completely excluded the petitioners, as collateral relatives of the testatrix, from inheriting any part of the latter's estate through intestate succession or mixed succession. ...

To circumvent that judgment, however, two years later, or on February 29, 1979, respondent Ilustre, with respondent Laureta as counsel, filed a complaint for partition of Digna Maravilla's estate and for damages against the heirs of Digna Maravilla's husband, who had then passed away (docketed as Civil Case No. X-404), before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, San Carlos City, Branch X, presided over by Judge Antonia Corpuz Macandog. That Court, after declaring defendants therein (private respondents in the petition under review) in default, ordered "all properties of Digna Maravilla mentioned in this case to go back to their trunk of origin, the plaintiffs herein who are represented by Eva Maravilla Ilustre and Eva Maravilla Ilustre herself" (hereinafter referred to as the "Macandog Decision"). In addition, the judgment awarded damages to the respondent Ilustre, et al., (the plaintiffs therein), and the sum of P100,000.00 to their counsel, respondent Laureta. A special civil action for certiorari was filed by the defeated parties (private respondents in the petition under review) before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. L-58014, praying that the lower Court's declaration of default in Civil Case No. X-404 and all other actions or decisions taken thereafter be declared null and void and that the dismissal of the complaint be ordered. On January 21, 1982, this Court resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, questions of fact being involved. In a Decision dated January 14, 1983, the Court of Appeals (Fourth Division)', 1 in AC-G.R. SP No. 13680 (hereafter called the Busran Decision"), dismissed the petition and denied certiorari stating in one breath that "the judgment subject of assail had long become final" (at p. 13), and in another "for all we know, the judgment below had already attained finality long ago." The reason relied upon was that petitioners therein had the remedy of appeal but instead availed of Certiorari, which is not a substitute therefor. On motion for reconsideration, however, filed by petitioners (private respondents in the petition under review), in that appealed case AC-GR SP No. 13680), the same Court of Appeals (Fourth Special Cases Division) 2 in its Resolution of January 20, 1984 (the "Javellana Resolution"), reconsidered and set aside the BusRan Decision" and entered another one: 1. Annulling the order of default of the Hon. respondent Court dated 29 April 1980 and its decision dated 11 August 1981; and 2. Dismissing private respondents' complaint in Civil Case No. X-404 and ordering the Hon. respondent Court not to take further action therein. Respondent Ilustre challenged that reversal in the present Petition for Review filed on October 22, 1984. This is the third case brought before this Court involving the same estate. Review was denied in an extended Resolution by the First Division of this Court in the challenged Resolution of May 14, 1986, for the following reasons: The appealed Decision stands on firm legal grounds. (1) The Order of Default of the Trial Court was issued in grave abuse of discretion. The Answer was only one day late besides the fact that when so filed, the Order of default had not yet been issued by the Trial Court. (2) While appeal is, indeed, the remedy from a judgment by default, certiorari may be resorted to when a party has been illegally declared in 4 default Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation vs. Vallejos 63 SCRA 300-301 [19751), or where it is

necessary to restore order to proceedings in the Court below (Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 462-463 [19751). (3) More importantly, the judgment of the Trial Court, in Civil Case No. X-404 declaring that the Testatrix's collateral relatives have a rightful claim to her estate to the exclusion of the husband who was designated her sole and universal heir, nullifies the Will already probated by final judgment and overturns the pronouncements of both the Appellate Court and this Court on the case. There being former judgments on the issues which have become final rendered by Courts having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, the said judgments having been rendered on the merits, and there being between the prior and subsequent action Identity of parties, subject matter and substantial Identity of cause of action, it is clear that the complaint below in Civil Case X-404 is barred by the principle of res adjudicata, and whatever transpired therein are nun and void ab initio and without any legal effect. To rule otherwise would upset the fundamental issue on which res judicata rests that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, that when a right or fact has been judicially determined, the judgment of the Court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate (Sarabia vs. Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 2 SCRA 54 [1961]). ACCORDINGLY, the review sought for is denied and respondent Court's judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 13080 is hereby affirmed. SO ORDERED. Respondents decry the fact that the First Division set aside the due course Order and denied review in an extended Minute Resolution instead of in a signed Decision. They allege that said Resolution was "railroaded with such hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the Supreme Court under circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics," unduly "persuaded, induced and influenced" by Solicitor General Ordonez and Justice Pedro Yap. Nothing is farthest from the truth. As explained in the "Banc Resolution" The petition for review was assigned to the then First Division of seven Justices, which initially gave it due course because the resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court had reversed a decision originally rendered by the then Court of Appeals, and in order to have more time for further study. Pleadings were submitted, the last being on May 3, 1985, which can be considered as the date when this case was submitted for resolution. The First Division of seven (7) was not able to act on the case up to the February, 1986 political upheaval The last incident in the case was a motion for the early release of decision filed by petitioner on November 19, 1985. When this Court was reorganized in April of 1986, the membership of the First Division was reduced to five (5) Justices. Taking account of the motion of petitioner

for early release of decision, the new First Division, then chairmanned by Justice Abad Santos, realizing that the doctrine of res judicata was clearly applicable not only as to the probate of the will but also as to the heirship of petitioner, among others, and their right to intervene and participate in the proceedings resolved, on May 14, 1986 to dismiss the petition through an extended resolution which at the same time recalled the due course order. The new Division of 5 acted unanimously. The recall of a due course Order after a review of the records of the case is a common occurrence in the Court. Respondents speak as if it were only their petition which has been subjected to such recall. They have lost all objectivity in this regard. They are hardly qualified, and cannot presume to speak of the I entire history" of the Supreme Court. As to the participation of Justice Yap in the ease, the "Banc Resolution" stated: Justice Yap clarified that he was an official mission to Switzerland for the Presidential Conunission on Good Government after his appointment to the Supreme Court an April 11, 1986 and did not assume his position in the Supreme Court his return on May 2, 1986. When the resolution of dismissal on May 14, 1986 was issued, Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Sedfrey Ordonez was private respondent's counsel. On June 11, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was taken up by the First Division on July 9, 1986 with Justice Abad Santos still the Chairman. This time, Justice Yap, realizing that his former partner, Atty. Ordonez, had submitted the pleadings for petitioner, inhibited himself and Justice Edgardo L. Paras was designated under Special Order No. 21, dated July 9, 1986, to sit in the Division in his place. The motion for reconsideration was denied with finality on July 9, 1986. Justice Yap was designated Chairman of the First Division on July 14, 1986. On August 7, 1986, petitioner asked leave to file a second motion for reconsideration, which was denied on September 3, 1986, entry of judgment of the May 14, 1986 resolution having been made on July 28, 1986. Justice Yap again took no part in the deliberation of the case. But respondents continue to claim derisively that Justice Yap could not have been "unaware" of the appearance of Atty. Sedfrey Ordonez. They reacted by saying "ten it to the marines" (Letters of November 3, 1986 to Justices Narvasa, Herrera, and Cruz, at p. 8, respectively). But that was the true and untarnished fact. With so many cases being handled by the Court, the appearances of lawyers during deliberative sessions very often escape attention, concentration being centered on the issues to be resolved. Respondents also fault the Court for "still recogniz(ing) Atty. Ordonez as counsel" for their opponents in the case. In the same " Banc Resolution," it was clarified: A copy of the resolution, dated May 14, 1986, was sent by the Releasing Clerks to Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez as his name still appears on the cover page of the Rollo. It was not necessarily because the Supreme Court still recognizes him as counsel for respondents (at p. 4) The fact of the matter is that even Atty. Laureta continued to recognize Atty. Ordonez as counsel as shown by his pleadings filed before the Court, which inevitably contained the notation "copy furnished Atty. Sedfrey Ordonez." No withdrawal of appearance having been presented by Atty.

Ordonez in the main petition, his name continues to be in the Rollo of the case and the personnel concerned continue to furnish him with copies of Resolutions of this Court. In respect of the charge that the Resolutions of the First Division of May 14, 1986, July 9, 1986 denying the Motion for Reconsideration with finality, and September 3, 1986 denying leave to file a second motion for reconsideration since entry of judgment of the May 14, 1986 Resolution had been made on July 28, 1986, were "unjust" and were "railroaded," the Banc Resolution, adopting the Division Resolution, explained: The aforesaid resolutions were by no means 'railroaded.' The pleadings filed by the parties, as in any other case, were included in the Agenda of the First Division as soon as feasible. The Division acts promptly on all Agenda items, and the minutes of its deliberations are released as soon as possible after Agenda day. xxx xxx xxx The dispositions in this case were arrived at after careful study. Because a case is resolved against the interests of a party, does not mean that it is an 'unjust decision;' or that it has been "railroaded." This Division declares without hesitation that it has consistently rendered justice without fear or favor. (at p. 4) Respondents insist that the doctrine of "res judicata" is inapplicable. In their own words "the ordered probate of the 1944 Will of Digna Maravilla by judgment of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225 is conclusive only as to the genuineness and due execution of said will but not upon the validity of testamentary provision, particularly with the invalid designation of Herminio Maravilla as sole and universal heir of Digna Maravilla." On this point, the "Javellana Resolution," in reversing the Busran Decision" AC-GR SP No. 13680), aptly held: The then Court of Appeals held that the questioned decision does not run counter to the decision of the Hon. Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225 admitting the will of Digna Maravilla to probate because the latter refers to the extrinsic validity of the will while the former concerns its intrinsic validity. We cannot agree with this observation because it is quite clear from the questioned decision that the will was in effect declared not to have been freely and voluntarily executed by the deceased Digna Maravilla but was the result of the evil and fraudulent machinations of her husband, Herminio Maravilla, and sets aside said will The declaration that private respondents, as collateral relatives of the deceased Digna Maravilla, are entitled to her estate, is an indication that the Hon. respondent Court has nullified the will. Private respondents are not compulsory heirs and, in the absence of their being named legatees or devisees in the will, they could only lay claim to the estate of Digna Maravilla if the latter died without a will, pursuant to Art. 1003 of the New Civil Code, to wit: Art. 1003. If there are no descendants ascendants, illegitimate children or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.'

However, assuming arguendo, that the matter complain d of by private respondents referred only to the intrinsic validity of the will, still, it was improper for them to have instituted a separate action in a court other than that in which the probate proceeding was pending. xxx xxx xxx It seems clear from these provisions of the law that while the estate is being settled in the Court of First Instance in a special proceeding, no ordinary action can be maintained in that court or in any other court by a person claiming to be the heir, against the executor or against other persons claiming to be heirs, for the purpose of having the rights of the plaintiffs in the estate determined The very purpose of the trial or hearing provided for in section 753 is to settle and determine those questions, and until they are settled and determined in that proceeding and under that section no action such as the present one can be maintained. Considering that the "Escolin Decision, " as affirmed by this Court on November 9, 1977 in G.R. No. L-46155, had become final, the "Javellana Resolution" aptly observed: 3. The questioned decision of the Hon. respondent Court dated 12 August 1981 (referring to the "Macandog Decision") unsettles and reviews issues which had long been laid to rest by the Hon. Supreme Court and the then Court of Appeals. But respondents ask: if res judicata were applicable, why did this Court, in G.R. No. L-50814, refer the case to the Court of Appeals? The answer is simple. The issue of whether the remedy of petitioners' in that case was appeal and not certiorari had to be resolved. If certiorari were proper, then the "Macandog Decision" had not become final. If appeal, its finality would be the consequence. The "Javellana Resolution," which -reversed the Busran Decision," held that certiorari was proper when a party has been illegally declared in default. It follows that the "Macandog Decision" had not attained finality. Still undaunted, respondents claim that the Court of Appeals "deliberately evaded divaricated" two important issues: (1) that the judgment of the Trial Court (in CC No. X-404) had attained finality as in fact the Court of Appeals had held that the "judgment of assail had long become final," and (2) that Digna Maravilla's husband could not be instituted as the sole and universal heir of the wife on indestructible ground of moral impossibility and could not inherit wife's vast estate on the ground of utter unworthiness. The penchant of respondents for making misleading statements is again obvious. It was not in the "Javellana Resolution" that the Court of Appeals held that "the judgment of assail (referring to the 'Macandog Decision') had long become final." That was in the BurRan Decision," which was precisely reversed by the " Javellana Resolution." As to the alleged unworthiness of the husband to inherit from his wife, the "Javellana Resolution" pointedly observed: The last will and testament of Digna Maravilla which instituted her husband, Herminio Maravilla, as her sole and universal heir, was admitted to probate, pursuant to a final judgment of the Hon. Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225, 27 February 1971. This probate foreclosed all questions as to the age and mental capacity of the testator, the

signing of the document by the testator, or by someone in his behalf, and the acknowledgment of the instrument by him in the presence of the required member of witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to attest the act. In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, 168). Yet, more than ten years later, the Hon. respondent Court would nullify the effects of the probate by declaring that Digna Maravilla did not voluntarily and sanely execute the probated last will and testament, unifying the institution of Herminio Maravilla as her sole and universal heir, and ordering the return of the properties of Digna Maravilla to the trunk of origin. The soundness of the legal conclusions arrived at in the "Escolin Decision" and "Javellana Resolution" commends itself. Only a disgruntled litigant and a defeated lawyer would claim that those judgments were accepted "hook, line and sinker" by this Court. The doctrine of res judicata is inescapably applicable. Thus it was that the First Division, in its challenged Resolution of May 14, 1986, found it unnecessary, after further study, to have a signed Decision and, instead, recalled the due course Order, which it had previously issued to give it "more time for further study" (p. 2, Banc Resolution, October 28, 1986). Contrary to respondents' claim, the Court is not "duty bound" to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case. But obdurately enough, respondents have seen fit to take their case to the Tanodbayan charging the members of the First Division of this Court collectively with having knowingly and deliberately rendered an "unjust extended minute Resolution" with deliberate bad faith in violation of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code 3 and for deliberately causing "undue injury" to respondent Ilustre and her co-heirs because of the 11 unjust Resolution" promulgated, in violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. 4 Respondents' action is brazenly unjustifiable. Nor can they plead ignorance. As aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of December 24, 1986, which the Court hereby adopts in toto, "(I)t is elementary that the Supreme Court is supreme the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them "unjust." " It is elementary that "(A)s has ever been stressed since the early case of Arnedo vs. Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263 [1911]) "controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgments of courts determining controversies submitted to them should become final at some definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even of the court which rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the courts are organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide the questions submitted to the litigants, and to determine the respective rights of the parties." (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305, 316-317) Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust judgment" refer to an individual judge who does so "in any case submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision rendered by him but the proper appellate court with jurisdiction to review the same, either the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents should likewise know that said penal article has no application to the members of a collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisions who reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper.

The Chief Justice's Statement of the supremacy of the Supreme Court's judicial power is by no means a "display of arrogance" as per respondents' puerile contention, but a restatement of the fundamental principle of separation of powers and checks and balances under a republican form of government such as ours, viz. that the three co-equal branches of government, the executive, legislative and judicial, are each supreme and independent within the limits of its own sphere Neither one can interfere with the performance of the duties of the other. (Forbes vs. Chuoco 16 Phil. 534 [1910]). As restated by the late Justice Jose P. Laurel in the 1936 landmark case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 134), our Constitution "as a definition of the powers of government"placed upon the judiciary the great burden of "determining the nature, scope and extent of such powers" and 'when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments . . . but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation entrusted to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which the instrument secures and guarantees to them.' " As an officer of the Court, respondent Laureta, should realize that the cardinal principle he would grossly impair and violate is that of the independence of the judiciary, which the members of the bar are called upon to defend and preserve. The independence of the judiciary is the indispensable means for enforcing the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so a member of the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in the regular exercise of official duty and judicial functions is to subvert and undermine that very independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive. "For it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful." (Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335). Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. (U.S. vs. Pons 34 Phil 729; Gardiner, et al. vs. Parades, et al., 61 Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) The Supreme Court's pronouncement of the doctrine that "(I)t is well settled that the enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive [as claimed by petitioner-importer who unsuccessfully sought refund of margin fees] on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree" is fully and reciprocally applicable to Supreme Court orders, resolutions and decisions, mutatis mutandis (Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350. (Citing Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1) The Court has consistently stressed that "the doctrine of separation of powers calls for the executive, legislative and judicial departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It has thus maintained in the same way that the judiciary has a right to expect that neither the President nor Congress would cast doubt on the mainspring of its orders or decisions, it should refrain from speculating as to alleged hidden forces at work that could have impelled either coordinate branch into acting the way it did. The concept of separation of powers presupposes mutual respect by and between the three departments of the government. (Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 286-287)

To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claim that the members acted "with deliberate bad faith" and rendered and "unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of the duty of their high office to act upon their own independent consideration and judgment of the matter at hand would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption of regular performance of official duty. To allow such collateral attack would destroy the separation of powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes. Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the separation of powers mandated by the Constitution relitigate in another forum the final judgment of this Court on legal issues submitted by them and their adversaries for final determination to and by the Supreme Court and which fall within the judicial power to determine and adjudicate exclusively vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law. In resume, we find that respondent Ilustre has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice in her letters addressed to the individual Justices quoted in the show-cause Resolution of this Court en banc, particularly the underlined portions thereof; in the language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan quoted and underscored in the same Resolution; in her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or the official actions of the Justices concerned and her ascription of improper motives to them; and in her unjustified outburst that she can no longer expect justice from this Court. The fact that said letters are not technically considered pleadings, nor the fact that they were submitted after the main petition had been finally resolved does not detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court. We likewise find that Atty. Laureta has committed acts unbecoming an officer of the Court for his stance of dangling threats of bringing the matter to the "proper forum" to effect a change of the Court's adverse Resolution; for his lack of respect for and exposing to public ridicule, the two highest Courts of the land by challenging in bad faith their integrity and claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgments (Montecillo vs. Gica 60 SCRA 234 [1974]); for authoring, or at the very least, assisting and/or abetting and/or not preventing the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of his client, respondent Ilustre, notwithstanding his disclaimer that he had absolutely nothing to do with them, which we find disputed by the facts and circumstances of record as above stated; for totally disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal considerations set forth in this Court's Resolutions of the First Division and en banc, as the Tribunal of last resort; for making it appear that the Justices of this Court and other respondents before the Tanodbayan are charged with "graft and corruption" when the complaint before the Tanodbayan, in essence, is a tirade from a disgruntled litigant and a defeated counsel in a case that has been brought thrice before this Court, and who would readily accept anything but the soundness of the judgments of the Courts concerned, all with the manifest intent to bring the Justices of this Court and of the Court of Appeals into disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the Courts. Atty. Laureta should be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his chent's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. For like the Court itself, "a lawyer is an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." (Surigao Mineral Conservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1 [1970]; Castaneda vs. Ago, 65 SCRA 505 [1975[). In assessing the penalty on respondent Laureta, the Court notes that "disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are suit generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers.

Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaint nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actions as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney." Viewed in the light of the demonstrated persistence of grave misconduct and undermining public confidence in the honor and integrity of the Court and its members (at a time when the Court is exerting every effort to regain public confidence in our courts after the trauma and debacle undergone by them in the past regime), the Court shall impose upon him an indefinite suspension, leaving it to him to prove at some future and opportune time, that he shag have once again regained the fitness to be allowed to resume the practice of law as an officer of the Courts. (In re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562) ACCORDINGLY, (1) respondent Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt, and is hereby fined in the amount of P1,000.00 only, mindful that the power of contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle of punishment; and (2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, and is hereby suspended from the practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all Courts of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Wenceslao Laureta. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur. Yap, J., took no part. Footnotes 1 Composed of Justices Busran (ponente), Coquia and Zosa, as members. 2 Composed of Justices Cuevas, Mendoza and Javena ponente 3 ART. 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision, shall be punished by prision mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification. 4 SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. xxx xxx xxx (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his

official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. ... Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987 DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, M.P., ORLANDO S. MERCADO, M.P., HONORATO Y. AQUINO, M.P., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, M.P., DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, M.P., OSCAR F. SANTOS, M.P., ALBERTO G. ROMULO, M.P., CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, M.P., ISIDORO E. REAL, M.P., EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, M.P., ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA, M.P., VICTOR S. ZIGA, M.P., and ROGELIO V. GARCIA. M.P., petitioners, vs. HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF THE BUDGET and VICTOR MACALINGCAG in his capacity as the TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FERNAN, J.: Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977." Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for" 1 listed the grounds relied upon in this petition as follows: A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977' INFRINGES UPON THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY AUTHORIZING THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEYS. B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 IS REPUGNANT TO THE CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF FUNDS ARE TO BE MADE. C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 ALLOWS THE PRESIDENT TO OVERRIDE THE SAFEGUARDS, FORM AND PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS. D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE EXECUTIVE. E. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF BY THE BUDGET

MINISTER AND THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF THEIR AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION. 2 Commenting on the petition in compliance with the Court resolution dated September 19, 1985, the Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners, who were allegedly merely begging an advisory opinion from the Court, there being no justiciable controversy fit for resolution or determination. He further contended that the provision under consideration was enacted pursuant to Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution; and that at any rate, prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility. On February 27, 1986, the Court required the petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment. This, they did, stating, among others, that as a result of the change in the administration, there is a need to hold the resolution of the present case in abeyance "until developments arise to enable the parties to concretize their respective stands." 3 Thereafter, We required public respondents to file a rejoinder. The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss, setting forth as grounds therefor the abrogation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution of March 25, 1986, which has allegedly rendered the instant petition moot and academic. He likewise cited the "seven pillars" enunciated by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) 4 as basis for the petition's dismissal. In the case of Evelio B. Javier v. The Commission on Elections and Arturo F. Pacificador, G.R. Nos. 68379-81, September 22, 1986, We stated that: The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner and the private respondents both of whom have gone their separate ways could be a convenient justification for dismissing the case. But there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic. The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future. It is in the discharge of our role in society, as above-quoted, as well as to avoid great disservice to national interest that We take cognizance of this petition and thus deny public respondents' motion to dismiss. Likewise noteworthy is the fact that the new Constitution, ratified by the Filipino people in the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, carries verbatim section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution under Section 24[5], Article VI. And while Congress has not officially reconvened, We see no cogent reason for further delaying the resolution of the case at bar.

The exception taken to petitioners' legal standing deserves scant consideration. The case of Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, et al., 110 Phil. 331, is authority in support of petitioners' locus standi. Thus: Again, it is well-settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Although there are some decisions to the contrary, the prevailing view in the United States is stated in the American Jurisprudence as follows: In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. [ 11 Am. Jur. 761, Emphasis supplied. ] Moreover, in Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 and Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333, We said that as regards taxpayers' suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not. The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows: Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commis ions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body.

Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. "For the love of money is the root of all evil: ..." and money belonging to no one in particular, i.e. public funds, provide an even greater temptation for misappropriation and embezzlement. This, evidently, was foremost in the minds of the framers of the constitution in meticulously prescribing the rules regarding the appropriation and disposition of public funds as embodied in Sections 16 and 18 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Hence, the conditions on the release of money from the treasury [Sec. 18(1)]; the restrictions on the use of public funds for public purpose [Sec. 18(2)]; the prohibition to transfer an appropriation for an item to another [See. 16(5) and the requirement of specifications [Sec. 16(2)], among others, were all safeguards designed to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 puts all these safeguards to naught. For, as correctly observed by petitioners, in view of the unlimited authority bestowed upon the President, "... Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the enactment of unfunded appropriations, results in uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses accountability for budgetary performance and entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling party may well expand [sic] public money not on the basis of development priorities but on political and personal expediency." 5 The contention of public respondents that paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. 1177 was enacted pursuant to Section 16(5) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution must perforce fall flat on its face. Another theory advanced by public respondents is that prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government against a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility. Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations," Vol. 1, Eight Edition, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, explained: ... The legislative and judicial are coordinate departments of the government, of equal dignity; each is alike supreme in the exercise of its proper functions, and cannot directly or indirectly, while acting within the limits of its authority, be subjected to the control or supervision of the other, without an unwarrantable assumption by that other of power which, by the Constitution, is not conferred upon it. The Constitution apportions the powers of government, but it does not make any one of the three departments subordinate to another, when exercising the trust committed to it. The courts may declare legislative enactments unconstitutional and void in some cases, but not because the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to the legislative. Being required to declare what the law is in the cases which come before them, they must enforce the Constitution, as the paramount law, whenever a legislative enactment comes in conflict with it. But the courts sit, not to review or revise the legislative action, but to enforce the legislative will, and it is only where they find that the legislature has failed to keep within its constitutional limits, that they are at liberty to disregard its action; and in doing so, they only do what every private citizen may do in respect to the mandates of the courts when the judges assumed to act and to render judgments or decrees without jurisdiction. "In exercising this high authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of

the public will. If an act of the legislature is held void, it is not because the judges have any control over the legislative power, but because the act is forbidden by the Constitution, and because the will of the people, which is therein declared, is paramount to that of their representatives expressed in any law." [Lindsay v. Commissioners, & c., 2 Bay, 38, 61; People v. Rucker, 5 Col. 5; Russ v. Com., 210 Pa. St. 544; 60 Atl. 169, 1 L.R.A. [N.S.] 409, 105 Am. St. Rep. 825] (pp. 332-334). Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution] and which power this Court has exercised in many instances. * Public respondents are being enjoined from acting under a provision of law which We have earlier mentioned to be constitutionally infirm. The general principle relied upon cannot therefore accord them the protection sought as they are not acting within their "sphere of responsibility" but without it. The nation has not recovered from the shock, and worst, the economic destitution brought about by the plundering of the Treasury by the deposed dictator and his cohorts. A provision which allows even the slightest possibility of a repetition of this sad experience cannot remain written in our statute books. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is hereby declared null and void for being unconstitutional. SO ORDER RED. Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes 1 Petition, p. 3, Rollo. 2 pp. 6-7, Rollo 3 p. 169, Rollo. 4 The relevant portions read as follows: The Court developed, for its own governance in the case confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision. They are: 1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, nonadversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions "is legitimate only

in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought tht, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act." Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345. 2. The Court will not "anticipate question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it." Liverpool. N.Y. & P.S.S. Co. v. Emigration Commissioners, 113 U.S. 33, 39 ... "It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case. 'Burton v. United States. 196 U.S. 283, 295. 3. The Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied." Liverpool, N.Y. & P.S.S. Co. v. Emigration Commissioners, supra. 4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191; Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 538. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 53. 5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Tyler v. The Judges, 179 U.S. 405; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 621. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained..... In Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizenwho sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens. 6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits. Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Attorney General, 124, U.S. 581 . . . 7. "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.' Cromwell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62." [pp. 176-177, Rollo]. 5 p. 14, Rollo.

* Casanovas vs. Hord 8 Phil. 125; McGirr vs. Hamilton, 30 Phil. 563; Compania General de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility, 34 Phil. 136; Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883; Concepcion vs. Paredes, 42 Phil. 599; US vs. Ang Tang Ho 43 Phil. 6; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44 Phil. 248; People vs. Pomar, 46 Phil. 440; Agcaoili vs. Suguitan, 48 Phil. 676; Government of P.I. vs. Springer, 50 Phil. 259; Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transp. Co., 57 Phil. 600: People vs. Linsangan; 62 Phil. 464; People and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp. vs. Jose O. Vera, 65 Phil. 56; People vs. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535; City of Baguio vs. Nawasa, 106 Phil. 144; City of Cebu vs. Nawasa, 107 Phil, 1112; Rutter vs. Esteban 93 Phil. 68.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 133064 September 16, 1999

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO, MARIANO V. BABARAN and ANDRES R. CABUYADAO, petitioners, vs. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, In his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. EPIMACO VELASCO, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of Isabela, THE HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, in his capacity as Provincial Administrator, and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer, respondents, GIORGIDI B. AGGABAO, intervenor.

PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528 converting the city of Santiago, Isabela from an independent component city to a component city.

On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city was signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite. 1

On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among others, it changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city, viz.:

AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED 7720 AN ACT CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF SANTIAGO.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Sec. 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended by deleting the words "an independent" thereon so that said Section will read as follows:

Sec. 2. The City of Santiago. The Municipality of Santiago shall be converted into a component city to be known as the City of Santiago, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise of the present territory of the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela. The territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the present metes and bounds of the Municipality of Santiago.

Sec. 2. Section 51 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended deleting the entire section and in its stead substitute the following:

Sec. 51. Election of Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, and any Elective Provincial Position for the Province of Isabela. The voters of the City of Santiago shall be

qualified to vote in the elections of the Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and other elective provincial positions of the Province of Isabela, and any such qualified voter can be a candidate for such provincial positions and any elective provincial office.

Sec. 3. Repealing Clause. All existing laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Sec. 4. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. 2 They alleged as ground the lack of provision in R.A. No. 8528 submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago at the time of the filing of the petition at bar. Petitioner Afiado is the President of the Liga ng mga Barangay ng Santiago City. Petitioners Dirige, Cabuyadao and Babaran are residents of Santiago City.

In their Comment, respondent provincial officials of Isabela defended the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. They assailed the standing of petitioners to file the petition at bar. They also contend that the petition raises a political question over which this Court lacks jurisdiction.

Another Comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the respondent public officials. The Solicitor General also contends that petitioners are not real parties in interest. More importantly, it is contended that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city to a component city. It allegedly did not involve any "creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units," hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary.

A third Comment similar in tone was submitted by intervenor Giorgidi B. Aggabao, 3 a member of the provincial board of Isabela. 4 He contended that both the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 do not require a plebiscite "to approve a law that merely allowed qualified voters of a city to vote in provincial elections. The rules implementing the Local Government Code cannot require a plebiscite. He also urged that petitioners lacked locus standi.

Petitioners filed a Reply to meet the arguments of the respondents and the intervenor. They defended their standing. They also stressed the changes that would visit the city of Santiago as a result of its reclassification.

We find merit in the petition.

First. The challenge to the locus standi of petitioners cannot succeed. It is now an ancient rule that the constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 5 Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City when he filed the present petition in his own right as mayor and not on behalf of the city, hence, he did not need the consent of the city council of Santiago. It is also indubitable that the change of status of the city of Santiago from independent component city to a mere component city will affect his powers as mayor, as will be shown hereafter. The injury that he would sustain from the enforcement of R.A. No. 8528 is direct and immediate and not a mere generalized grievance shared with the people of Santiago City. Similarly, the standing of the other petitioners rests on a firm foundation. They are residents and voters in the city of Santiago. They have the right to be heard in the conversion of their city thru a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. The denial of this right in R.A. No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike the law as unconstitutional.1wphi1.nt

Second. The plea that this court back off from assuming jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the ground that it involves a political question has to be brushed aside. This plea has long lost its appeal especially in light of Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which defines judicial power as including "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." To be sure, the cut between a political and justiciable issue has been made by this Court in many cases and need no longer mystify us. In Taada v. Cuenco, 6 we held:

xxx xxx xxx

The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers "to those questions which under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the

legislative or executive branch of the government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

In Casibang v. Aquino, 7 we defined a justiciable issue as follows:

A purely justiciable issue implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law, for said breach of right.

Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue. Petitioners claim that under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution they have a right to approve or disapprove R.A. No. 8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced. It ought to be self-evident that whether or not petitioners have the said right is a legal not a political question. For whether or not laws passed by Congress comply with the requirements of the Constitution pose questions that this Court alone can decide. The proposition that this Court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning and nuances of the Constitution need not be the subject of a prolix explanation.

Third. The threshold issue is whether R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to provide that the conversion of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city should be submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite. We hold that the Constitution requires a plebiscite. Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

This constitutional requirement is reiterrated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), thus:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of local government units belongs to Congress. 8 This power is part of the larger power to enact laws which the Constitution vested in Congress. 9 The exercise of the power must be in accord with the mandate of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issue is whether the downgrading of Santiago City from an independent component city to a mere component city requires the approval of the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. The resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the downgrading falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of municipalities per Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political units directly affected." It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of this constitutional requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of local government units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru people's representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units.

The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished. The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will now have to be shared with the province. Petitioners pointed out these far reaching changes on the life of the people of the city of Santiago, viz.: 10

Although RESPONDENTS would like to make it appear that R.A. No. 8528 had "merely re-classified" Santiago City from an independent component city into a component city, the effect when challenged (sic) the Act were operational would be, actually, that of conversion. Consequently, there would be substantial changes in the political culture and administrative responsibilities of Santiago City, and the Province of Isabela. Santiago City from an independent component city will revert to the Province of

Isabela, geographically, politically, and administratively. Thus, the territorial land area of Santiago City will be added to the land area comprising the province of Isabela. This will be to the benefit or advantage of the Provincial Government of Isabela on account of the subsequent increase of its share from the internal revenue allotment (IRA) from the National Government (Section 285, R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991). The IRA is based on land area and population of local government units, provinces included.

The nature or kinds, and magnitude of the taxes collected by the City Government, and which taxes shall accrue solely to the City Government, will be redefined (Section 151, R.A. No. 7160), and may be shared with the province such as taxes on sand, gravel and other quarry resources (Section 138, R.A. No. 7160), professional taxes (Section 139, R.A. No. 7160), or amusement taxes (Section 140, R.A. No. 7160). The Provincial Government will allocate operating funds for the City. Inarguably, there would be a (sic) diminished funds for the local operations of the City Government because of reduced shares of the IRA in accordance with the schedule set forth by Section 285 of R.A. No. 7160. The City Government's share in the proceeds in the development and utilization of national wealth shall be diluted since certain portions shall accrue to the Provincial Government (Section 292, R.A. No. 7160).

The registered voters of Santiago City will vote for and can be voted as provincial officials (Section 451 and 452 [c], R.A. No. 7160).

The City Mayor will now be under the administrative supervision of the Provincial Governor who is tasked by law to ensure that every component city and municipality within the territorial jurisdiction of the province acts within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions (Section 29 and 465 (b) (2) (i), R.A. No. 7160), and to review (Section 30, R.A. No. 7160) all executive orders submitted by the former (Section 455 (b) (1) (xii), R.A. No. 7160) and (R)eportorial requirements with respect to the local governance and state of affairs of the city (Section 455 (b) (1) (xx), R.A. No. 7160). Elective city officials will also be effectively under the control of the Provincial Governor (Section 63, R.A. No. 7160). Such will be the great change in the state of the political autonomy of what is now Santiago City where by virtue of R.A. No. 7720, it is the Office of the President which has supervisory authority over it as an independent component city (Section 25, R.A. No. 7160; Section 4 (ARTICLE X), 1987 Constitution).

The resolutions and ordinances adopted and approved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod will be subject to the review of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Sections 56, 468, (a) (1) (i), 468 (a) (2) (vii), and 469 (c) (4), R.A. No. 7160). Likewise, the decisions in administrative cases by the former could be appealed and acted upon by the latter (Section 67 R.A. No. 7160).

It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite should not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City when R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the status of their city. Indeed, there is more reason to consult the people when a law substantially diminishes their right. Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code is in accord with the Constitution when it provides that:

(f) Plebiscite (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUS shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.

xxx xxx xxx

The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so long as they result in a material change in the local government unit directly affected, especially a change in the political and economic rights of its people.

A word on the dissenting opinions of our esteemed brethren. Mr. Justice Buena justifies R.A. No. 8528 on the ground that Congress has the power to amend the charter of Santiago City. This power of amendment, however, is limited by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Quite clearly, when an amendment of a law involves the creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory. He also contends that the amendment merely caused a transition in the status of Santiago as a city. Allegedly, it is a transition because no new city was created nor was a former city dissolved by R.A. No. 8528. As discussed above, the spirit of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution calls for the people of the local government unit directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and responsibilities. They may call the downgrading of Santiago to a component city as a mere transition but they cannot blink away from the fact that the transition will radically change its physical and political configuration as well as the rights and responsibilities of its people.

On the other hand, our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mendoza, posits the theory that "only if the classification involves changes in income, population, and land area of the local government unit is there a need for such changes to be approved by the people . . . ."

With due respect, such an interpretation runs against the letter and spirit of Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which, to repeat, states: "No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." It is clear that the Constitution imposes two conditions first, the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundary of a local government unit must meet the criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population and land area and second, the law must be approved by the people "by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."

In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government Code fixed the said criteria and they involve requirements on income, population and land area. These requirements, however, are imposed to help assure the economic viability of the local government unit concerned. They were not imposed to determine the necessity for a plebiscite of the people. Indeed, the Local Government Code does not state that there will be no more plebiscite after its requirements on income, population and land area have been satisfied. On the contrary, section 10, Chapter 2 of the Code provides: "No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes casts in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date. 11 Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, opines that the plebiscite is absolute and mandatory. 12

It cannot be overstressed that the said two requirements of the Constitution have different purposes. The criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population and land area are designed to achieve an economic purpose. They are to be based on verified indicators, hence, section 7, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code requires that these "indicators shall be attested by the Department of Finance, the National Statistics Office, and the Lands Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources." In contrast, the people's plebiscite is required to achieve a political purpose to use the people's voice as a check against the pernicious political practice of gerrymandering. There is no better check against this excess committed by the political representatives of the people themselves than the exercise of direct people power. As well-observed by one

commentator, as the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries are ". . . basic to local government, it is also imperative that these acts be done not only by Congress but also be approved by the inhabitants of the locality concerned. . . . By giving the inhabitants a hand in their approval, the provision will also eliminate the old practice of gerrymandering and minimize legislative action designed for the benefit of a few politicians. Hence, it promotes the autonomy of local government units." 13

The records show that the downgrading of Santiago City was opposed by certain segments of its people. In the debates in Congress, it was noted that at the time R.A. No. 8528 was proposed, Santiago City has been converted to an independent component city barely two and a half (2 1/2) years ago and the conversion was approved by a majority of 14,000 votes. Some legislators expressed surprise for the sudden move to downgrade the status of Santiago City as there had been no significant change in its socio-economic-political status. The only reason given for the downgrading is to enable the people of the city to aspire for the leadership of the province. To say the least, the alleged reason is unconvincing for it is the essence of an independent component city that its people can no longer participate or be voted for in the election of officials of the province. The people of Santiago City were aware that they gave up that privilege when they voted to be independent from the province of Isabela. There was an attempt on the part of the Committee on Local Government to submit the downgrading of Santiago City to its people via a plebiscite. The amendment to this effect was about to be voted upon when a recess was called. After the recess, the chairman of the Committee announced the withdrawal of the amendment "after a very enlightening conversion with the elders of the Body." We quote the debates, viz.: 14

BILL ON SECOND READING

H.B. No. 8729 City of Santiago

Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we consider House Bill No. 8729 as reported out under Committee Report No. 971.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] there being none, the motion is approved.

Consideration of House Bill No. 8729 is now in order. With the permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title of the bill without prejudice to inserting in the Record the whole text thereof.

The Acting Secretary [Atty. Raval]. House Bill No. 8729, entitled:

AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF R.A. NO. 7720 ENTITLED "AN ACT CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF SANTIAGO

The following is the full text of H.B. No. 8729

Insert

Senator Tatad. Mr. President, for the sponsorship, I ask that the distinguished Chairman of the Committee on Local Government be recognized.

The President. Senator Sotto is recognized.

SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR SOTTO

Mr. President. House Bill No. 8729, which was introduced in the House by Congressman Antonio M. Abaya as its principal author, is a simple measure which merely seeks to convert the City of Santiago into a component city of the Province of Isabela.

The City of Santiago is geographically located within, and is physically an integral part of the Province of Isabela. As an independent component city, however, it is completely detached and separate from the said province as a local political unit. To use the language of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, the City of Santiago is an "island in the provincial milieu.

The residents of the city no longer participate in the elections, nor are they qualified to run for any elective positions in the Province of Isabela.

The Province of Isabela, on the other hand, is no longer vested with the power and authority of general supervision over the city and its officials, which power and authority are now exercised by the Office of the President, which is very far away from Santiago City.

Being geographically located within the Province of Isabela, the City of Santiago is affected, one way or the other, by the happenings in the said province, and is benefited by its progress and development. Hence, the proposed bill to convert the City of Santiago into a component city of Isabela.

Mr. President, it is my pleasure, therefore, to present for consideration of this august Body Committee Report No. 971 of the Committee on Local Government, recommending approval, with our proposed committee amendment, of House Bill No. 8729.

Thank you, Mr. President.

The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I moved (sic) that we close the period of interpellations.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the period of interpellations is closed.

Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee amendments.

Senator Roco. Mr. President.

The President. What is the pleasure of Senator Roco?

Senator Roco. Mr. President, may I ask for a reconsideration of the ruling on the motion to close the period of interpellations just to be able to ask a few questions?

Senator Tatad. May I move for a reconsideration of my motion, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection to the reconsideration of the closing of the period of interpellations? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

Senator Roco is recognized.

Senator Roco. Will the distinguished gentlemen yield for some questions?

Senator Sotto. Willingly, Mr. President.

Senator Roco. Mr. President, together with the Chairman of the Committee on Local Government, we were with the sponsors when we approved this bill to make Santiago a City. That was about two and a half years ago. At that time, I remember it was the cry of the city that it be "independent." Now we are deleting that word "independent."

Mr. President, only because I was a co-author and a co-sponsor, for the Record, I want some explanation on what happened between then and now that has made us decided that the City of Santiago should cease to be independent and should now become a component city.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the officials of the province said during the public hearing that they are no longer vested with the power and authority of general supervision over the city. The power and authority is now being exercised by the Office of the President and it is quite far from the City of Santiago.

In the public hearing, we also gathered that there is a clamor from some sectors that they want to participate in the provincial elections.

Senator Roco. Mr. President, I did not mean to delay this. I did want it on record, however. I think there was a majority of 14,000 who approved the charter, and maybe we owe it to those who voted for that charter some degree of respect. But if there has been a change of political will, there has been a change of political will, then so be it.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, to be very frank about it, that was a very important point raised by Senator Roco, and I will have to place it on the Record of the Senate that the reason why we are proposing a committee amendment is that, originally, there was an objection on the part of the local officials and those who oppose it by incorporating a plebiscite in this bill. That was the solution. Because there were some sectors in the City of Santiago who were opposing the reclassification or reconversion of the city into a component city.

Senator Roco. All I wanted to say, Mr. President because the two of us had special pictures (sic) in the city is that I thought it should be put on record that we have supported originally the proposal to make it an independent city. But now if it is their request, then, on the manifestation of the Chairman, let it be so.

Thank you.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Will the gentleman yield for a few questions, Mr. President.

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, further to the interpellation of our good friend, the Senator from Bicol, on the matter of the opinion of the citizens of Santiago City, there is a resolution passed by the Sanggunian on January 30, 1997 opposing the conversion of Santiago from an independent city.

This opposition was placed on records during the committee hearings. And that is the reason why, as mentioned by the good sponsor, one of the amendments is that a plebiscite be conducted before the law takes effect.

The question I would like to raise and I would like to recall the statement of our Minority Leader is that, at this time we should not be passing it for a particular politician.

In this particular case, it is obvious that this bill is being passed in order that the additional territory be added to the election of the provincial officials of the province of Isabela.

Now, is this for the benefit of any particular politician, Mr. President.

Senator Sotto. If it is, I am not aware of it, Mr. President.

Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.

The President. With the permission of the two gentlemen on the Floor, Senator Alvarez is recognized.

Senator Alvarez. As a born inbred citizen of this city, Mr. President, may I share some information.

Mr. President, if we open up the election of the city to the provincial leadership, it will not be to the benefit of the provincial leadership, because the provincial leadership will then campaign in a bigger territory.

As a matter of fact, the ones who will benefit from this are the citizens of Santiago who will now be enfranchised in the provincial electoral process, and whose children will have the opportunity to grow into provincial leadership. This is one of the prime reasons why this amendment is being put forward.

While it is true that there may have been a resolution by the city council, those who signed the resolution were not the whole of the council. This bill was sponsored by the congressman of that district who represents a constituency, the voice of the district.

I think, Mr. President, in considering which interest is paramount, whose voice must be heard, and if we have to fathom the interest of the people, the law which has been crafted here in accordance with the rules should be given account, as we do give account to many of the legislations coming from the House on local issues.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, the reason why I am raising this question is that, as Senator Roco said, just two and-a-half years ago we passed a bill which indeed disenfranchized if we want to use that phrase the citizens of the City of Santiago in the matter of the provincial election. Two-and-a-half years after, we are changing the rule.

In the original charter, the citizens of the City of Santiago participated in a plebiscite in order to approve the conversion of the city into an independent city. I believe that the only way to resolve this issue raised by Senator Roco is again to subject this issue to another plebiscite as part of the provision of this proposed bill and as will be proposed by the Committee Chairman as an amendment.

Thank you very much, Mr. President.

Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, the Constitution does not require that the change from an independent to a component city be subjected to a plebiscite.

Secs. 10, 11, 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

This change from an independent city into a component city is none of those enumerated. So the proposal coming from the House is in adherence to this constitutional mandate which does not require a plebiscite.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the key word here is "conversion". The word "conversion" appears in that provision wherein we must call a plebiscite. During the public hearing, the representative of Congressman Abaya was insisting that this is not a conversion; this is merely a reclassification. But it is clear in the bill.

We are amending a bill that converts, and we are converting it into a component city. That is how the members of the committee felt. That is why we have proposed an amendment to this, and this is to incorporate a plebiscite in as much as there is no provision on incorporating a plebiscite. Because we would like not only to give the other people of Santiago a chance or be enfranchised as far as the leadership of the province is concerned, but also we will give a chance to those who are opposing it. To them, this is the best compromise. Let the people decide, instead of the political leaders of Isabela deciding for them.

Senator Tatad. Mr. President.

The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Tatad. At this point, Mr. President, I think we can move to close the period of interpellations.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee amendments, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none the motion is approved.

Senator Sotto. On page 2, after line 13, insert a new Section 3, as follows:

Sec 3. SECTION 49 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7720 IS HEREBY AMENDED BY DELETING THE ENTIRE SECTION AND IN ITS STEAD SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING:

Sec. 49. PLEBISCITE. THE CONVERSION OF THE CITY OF SANTIAGO INTO A COMPONENT CITY OF THE PROVINCE OF ISABELA SHALL TAKE EFFECT UPON THE RETIFICATION OF THIS ACT BY A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF SAID CITY IN A PLEBISCITE WHICH SHALL BE HELD FOR THE PURPOSE WITHIN SIXTY (60) DAYS FROM THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SHALL CONDUCT AND SUPERVISE SUCH PLEBISCITE.

The President. Is there any objection?

Senator Enrile. Mr. President.

The President. Senator Enrile is recognized.

Senator Enrile. I object to this committee amendment, Mr. President.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Tatad. May I ask for a one-minute suspension of the session.

The President. The session is suspended for a few minutes if there is no objection. [There was none].

It was 7:54 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 7:57 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

Senator Sotto is recognized.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, after a very enlightening conversation with the elders of the Body, I withdraw my amendment.

The President. The amendment is withdrawn.

Senator Maceda. Mr. President.

The President. Senator Maceda is recognized.

Senator Maceda. We wish to thank the sponsor for the withdrawal of the amendment.

Mr. President, with due respect to the Senator from Isabela I am no great fan of the Senator from Isabela but it so happens that this is a local bill affecting not only his province but his own city where he is a resident and registered voter.

So, unless the issue is really a matter of life and death and of national importance, senatorial courtesy demands that we, as much as possible, accommodate the request of the Senator from Isabela as we have done on matters affecting the district of other senators. I need not remind them.

Thank you anyway, Mr. President.

Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.

The President. Senator Alvarez is recognized.

Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, may I express my deepest appreciation for the statement of the gentleman from Ilocos and Laguna. Whatever he may have said, the feeling is not mutual. At least for now, I have suddenly become his great fan for the evening.

May I put on record, Mr. President, that I campaigned against the cityhood of Santiago not because I do not want it to be a city but because it had disenfranchised the young men of my city from aspiring for the leadership of the province. The town is the gem of the province. How could we extricate the town from the province?

But I would like to thank the gentleman, Mr. President, and also the Chairman of the Committee.

Senator Tatad. Mr. President.

The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Tatad. There being no committee amendments, I move that the period of committee amendments be closed.

The President. Shall we amend the title of this bill by removing the word "independent" preceding "component city"?

Senator Sotto. No, Mr. President. We are merely citing the title. The main title of this House Bill No. 8729 is "An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act 7720". The title is the title of Republic Act 7720. So, I do not think that we should amend that anymore.

The President. What is the pending motion? Will the gentleman kindly state the motion?

Senator Tatad. I move that we close the period of committee amendments.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

Senator Tatad. Unless there are any individual amendments, I move that we close the period of individual amendments.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the period of individual amendments is closed.

APPROVAL OF H.B. NO. 8729 ON SECOND READING

Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we vote on Second Reading on House Bill No. 8729.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, we shall now vote on Second Reading on House Bill No. 8729.

As many as are in favor of the bill, say aye.

Several Members. Aye.

As many as are against the bill, say nay. [Silences]

House Bill No. 8279 is approved on Second Reading.

The debates cannot but raise some quizzical eyebrows on the real purpose for the downgrading of the city of Santiago. There is all the reason to listen to the voice of the people of the city via a plebiscite.

In the case of Tan, et al. v. COMELEC, 15 BP 885 was enacted partitioning the province of Negros Occidental without consulting its people in a plebiscite. In his concurring opinion striking down the law as unconstitutional, Chief Justice Teehankee cited the illicit political purpose behind its enactment, viz:

The scenario, as petitioners urgently asserted, was "to have the creation of the new Province a fait accompli by the time elections are held on February 7, 1986. The transparent purpose is unmistakably so that the new Governor and other officials shall by then have been installed in office, ready to function for purposes of the election for President and Vice-President." Thus, the petitioners reported after the event: "With indecent haste, the plebiscite was held; Negros del Norte was set up and proclaimed by President Marcos as in existence; a new set of government officials headed by Governor Armando Gustilo was appointed; and, by the time the elections were held on February 7, 1986, the political machinery was in place to deliver the "solid North" to ex-President Marcos. The rest is history. What happened in Negros del Norte during the elections the unashamed use of naked power and resources contributed in no small way to arousing "people's power" and steel the ordinary citizen to perform deeds of courage and patriotism that makes one proud to be a Filipino today.

The challenged Act is manifestly void and unconstitutional. Consequently, all the implementing acts complained of, viz., the plebiscite, the proclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte and the appointment of its officials are equally void. The limited holding of the plebiscite only in the areas of the proposed new province (as provided by Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion of the voters of the remaining areas of the integral province of Negros Occidental (namely, the three cities of Bacolod, Bago and La Carlota and the Municipalities of Las Castellana, Isabela, Moises Padilla, Pontevedra, Hinigaran, Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladoid, San Enrique, Ilog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and Candoni), grossly contravenes and disregards the mandate of Article XI, section 3 of the then prevailing 1973 Constitution that no province may be created or divided or its boundary substantially altered without "the approval of a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected." It is plain that all the cities and municipalities of the province of Negros Occidental, not merely those of the proposed new province, comprise the units affected. It follows that the voters of the whole and entire province of Negros Occidental have to participate and give their approval in the plebiscite, because the whole is affected by its proposed division and substantial alteration of its boundary. To limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.

Mr. Justice Mendoza and Mr. Justice Buena also cite two instances when allegedly independent component cities were downgraded into component cities without need of a plebiscite. They cite the City of Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental, 16 and the City of San Carlos, Pangasinan 17 whose charters were amended to allow their people to vote and be voted upon in the election of officials of the province to which their city belongs without submitting the amendment to a plebiscite. With due respect, the cities of Oroquieta and San Carlos are not similarly situated as the city of Santiago. The said two cities then were not independent component cities unlike the city of Santiago. The two cities were chartered but were not independent component cities for both were not highly urbanized cities which alone were considered independent cities at that time. Thus, when the case of San Carlos City was under consideration by the Senate, Senator Pimentel explained: 18

. . . Senator Pimentel. The bill under consideration, Mr. President, merely empowers the voters of San Carlos to vote in the elections of provincial officials. There is no intention whatsoever to downgrade the status of the City of San Carlos and there is no showing whatsoever that the enactment of this bill will, in any way, diminish the powers and prerogatives already enjoyed by the City of San Carlos. In fact, the City of San Carlos as of now, is a component city. It is not a highly urbanized city. Therefore, this bill merely, as we said earlier, grants the voters of the city, the power to vote in provincial elections, without in any way changing the character of its being a component city. It is for this reason that I vote in favor of this bill.

It was Senator Pimentel who also sponsored the bill 19 allowing qualified voters of the city of Oroquieta to vote in provincial elections of the province of Misamis Occidental. In his sponsorship speech, he explained that the right to vote being given to the people of Oroquieta City was consistent with its status as a component city. 20 Indeed, during the debates, former Senator Neptali Gonzales pointed out the need to remedy the anomalous situation then obtaining ". . . where voters of one component city cannot vote simply because their charters so provide." 21 Thus, Congress amended other charters of component cities prohibiting their people from voting in provincial elections.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist from implementing said law.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Panganiban, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., pls. see separate opinion.

Mendoza, J., please see dissent.

Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., we join Justice Mendoza in his dissent.

Buena, J., please see dissent.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., separate opinion;

I share the opinion of the majority of my colleagues that, for the reasons expressed in the ponencia, a plebiscite is essential in order to render effective the conversion of the City of Santiago, Isabela, from an independent to a component city. I would not go to the extent, however, of declaring Republic Act No. 7720 unconstitutional; instead, with due respect, I take the view that a plebiscite can be held conformably with the provisions of the Local Government Code. I do not see, in this instance, a serious incompatibility in having Republic Act No. 7720 stand along with the Local Government Code.

MENDOZA, J., dissenting opinion;

The issue in this case is whether the conversion of the City of Santiago in Isabela province from an independent component city to a component city constitutes the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of a city within the contemplation of Art. X, 10 of the Constitution so as to require the approval of the people in a plebiscite. The Court, in declaring R.A. No. 8528 unconstitutional for lack of provision for a plebiscite, does not say that the reclassification of Santiago City as an ordinary component city constitutes creation, division, merger, abolition, or

substantial alteration of boundary. Nonetheless, the Court today holds that because the reclassification of the city would result in a "material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein," the approval of the law in a plebiscite is required.1wphi1.nt

With all due respect I submit that not every change however "material" and far-reaching in the classification of a local government unit requires popular approval. Only if the reclassification involves changes in income, population, and land area of the local government unit is there a need for such changes to be approved by the people, for then there would be a creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of a local government unit, as the case may be, within the meaning of Art. X, 10 of the Constitution. Thus, the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), in implementing the constitutional provision in question, states:

Sec. 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators or viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:

(a) Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned;

(b) Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and

(c) Land Area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.

Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

Sec. 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current income classification prior to such division.

The income classification of local government units shall be updated within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Code to reflect the changes in their financial position resulting from the increased revenues as provided herein.

Sec. 9. Abolition of Local Government Units. A local government unit may be abolished when its income, population, or land area has been irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum standards prescribed for its creation under Book III of this Code, as certified by the national agencies mentioned in Section 7 hereof to Congress or to the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be.

The law or ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall specify the province, city, municipality, or barangay with which the local government unit sought to be abolished will be incorporated or merged.

The conversion from an independent component city to a component city involves no such changes in income, population, or land area. There may be changes in the voting rights of the residents of the city, the supervision of the city's administration, and the city's share in the local taxes, as petitioners point out, but such changes do not amount to the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of a local government unit so as to require a plebiscite for their approval. An independent component city and an ordinary component city are both component cities, as distinguished from highly urbanized cities. 1 The only difference between them is that the charters of the independent component cities prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials and such cities are independent of the provinces in which they are located. 2 Thus, the Local Government Code provides:

Sec. 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and nonrecurring income.

Sec. 451. Cities, Classified. A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided, however, That the criteria established in this Code shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities.

Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent component cities shall be independent of the province.

Sec. 452. Highly Urbanized Cities. (a) Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand (200,000.00) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office, and with the latest annual income of at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the city treasurer; shall be classified as highly urbanized cities.

(b) Cities which do not meet the above requirements shall be considered component cities of the province in which they are geographically located. If a component city is located within the boundaries of two (2) or more provinces, such city shall be considered a component of the province of which it used to be a municipality.

(c) Qualified voters of highly urbanized cities shall remain excluded from voting for elective provincial officials.

Unless otherwise provided in the Constitution or this Code, qualified voters of independent component cities shall be governed by their respective charters, as amended, on the participation of voters in provincial elections.

Qualified voters of cities who acquired the right to vote for elective provincial officials prior to the classification of said cities as highly urbanized after the ratification of the Constitution and before the effectivity of this Code, shall continue to exercise such right.

The Court says that the changes resulting from the reclassification of Santiago City as an ordinary component city "cannot be considered insubstantial." For one, it is said, its independence will be diminished because the city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. For another, the resolutions and ordinances of the city council will have to be approved by the provincial board of Isabela.

The fact is that whether the City of Santiago is an independent component city or an ordinary component city, it is subject to administrative supervision, with the only difference that, as an independent component city, it is under the direct supervision of the President of the Philippines, whereas, as an ordinary component city, it will be subject to the supervision of the President through the province. 3 That is hardly a distinction. For the fact is that under the Constitution, the President of the Philippines exercises general supervision over all local governments. 4

Nor does it matter that ordinances passed by the city councils of component cities are subject to review (not approval as the Court says) by the provincial boards for the purpose of determining whether the ordinances are within the powers of the city councils to enact. 5 For that matter, ordinances passed by the city councils of independent component cities are likewise subject to review, although by the Office of the President. 6 The reason for this is to be found in Art. X, 4 of the Constitution which provides:

The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

In any case, these are not important differences which determine whether the law effecting them should be approved in a plebiscite. The defining characteristics of a local government unit are its income, population, and local area, as 450 and 452 of the LGC provide. These are referred to in 7 of the LGC and its Implementing Rules as the "verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services." Tested by these standards, there is no change in the City of Santiago requiring the approval of the people in a plebiscite.

The majority states: "It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval of its People thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite should not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City when R.A. No. 8525 downgrades the status of their city." The conversion of the then Municipality of Santiago in Isabela Province by R.A. No. 7720 was an act of creation. It was based on the municipality's satisfying the requisites for the creation of a city as provided in the LGC, to wit:

Sec. 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of a least Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office;

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and nonrecurring income.

As thus indicated these requisites are based on the "verifiable indicators" of income, population, and land area and, therefore, the conversion of what was once a municipality into a city needed approval in a plebiscite. But the conversion of Santiago City from an independent component city into a component city involves no more than a change in the right of the people (i.e., the registered voters of the city) to vote for provincial elective officials.

If an analogy is needed, it is to the reversion of a component city whether independent or ordinary to the status of a municipality. For then the city is actually abolished and abolition, as stated in the Art. X, 10 of the Constitution, must be approved by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite. Stated otherwise, when a municipality is converted into a city, a city is created, and when the city is reverted into a municipality, the city is abolished. Both acts of creation and abolition require the approval of the people in a plebiscite called for the purpose. But when an independent component city is converted into a component city, it is not created into another form, it is not divided, it is not merged with another unit of local government, it is not abolished, much less is its boundary substantially altered.

Indeed, this is not the first time that an independent component city is converted into a component city without a plebiscite. The City of Oroquieta, created as an independent component city in 1969 by R.A. No. 5518, was converted into a component city in 1989 by R.A. No. 6726, while the City of San Carlos, created as an independent component city in 1965 by R.A. No. 4187, was converted into a component city by R.A. No. 6843 in 1990. In both cases, the conversion was made without submitting the matter to a plebiscite.

There is, therefore, no reason for requiring that the reclassification of Santiago City as a component city must be approved by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite and for holding that, because R.A. No. 8528 contains no provision for such plebiscite, it is unconstitutional.

It is easy to sympathize with calls for plebiscites as an exercise of direct democracy by the people. But, although the Constitution declares that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them," it also provides that we are a "republican State." 7 It is thus a representative form of government that we have. With few exceptions, we have vested the legislative power in the Congress of the Philippines. 8 This means that when an act of the people's representatives assembled in Congress is duly passed and approved by the President in the manner prescribed in the Constitution, the act becomes a law 9 without the need of approval or ratification by the people in order to be effective. 10

This is the theory of representative government. Such a government is no less democratic because it is indirect. In some ways it is better than direct government given the complexity of modern society, let alone the volatility of voters and their susceptibility to manipulation. In this age of mass communication there is less reason to distrust the judgment of the people's representatives in Congress on matters such as this and, therefore, no reason to require the people to manifest their sovereign will, except where this is expressly required by the Constitution.

For the foregoing reasons, I vote to dismiss the petition in this case.

BUENA, J., dissenting opinion;

With all due respect to my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno, whose well-written ponencia expresses his opinion with clarity, I regret that I am unable to agree that Republic Act No. 8528 should be declared as unconstitutional for the following reasons:

1. Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that

Sec. 10, Article X. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the

Local Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Sec. 10 Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) provides:

Sec. 10, Chapter 2. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.

In short, conversion does not appear in the 1987 Constitution nor in the Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code. Surprisingly, Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code included conversion in the enumeration of the modes of changing the status of local government units, thus:

(f) Plebiscite. (1) No creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUs shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Other than that, the Local Government Code uses the term "conversion" only in the following instances: (1) Section 7, which provides that "[a]s a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit: . . . . . .;" (2) Section 450, which provides for the requisites for the "conversion" of a municipality or a cluster of barangays into a component city; and (3) Section 462, which involves the "conversion" of existing sub-provinces into regular provinces.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. defines 1 "conversion," as "the elevation of an LGU from one level to another, like converting a municipality to a city or a component city to a highly urbanized one or the raising of the classification of one municipality, city or province from a fourth class category to third, second or first." It is my humble opinion therefore that the requirement of a plebiscite does not apply to the case at bar which does not involve the upgrading or elevation of Santiago City but a downgrading thereof.

2. I am not convinced that a mere Rule and Regulation intended to implement the Local Government Code can expand the terms and provisions clearly expressed in the basic law to be implemented. As aptly contended by the Solicitor General in his Comment on the petition viz.:

It is a settled jurisprudence that the power of administrative agencies to promulgate rules and regulations must be in strict compliance with the legislative enactment. Thus, in Tayug Rural Bank vs. Central Bank of the Philippines (146 SCRA 129-30), this Honorable Court ruled that in the case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation to implement said law, the basic law prevails as said rule or regulation can not go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. Neither can such rules and regulations extend or expand the letter and spirit of the law they seek to implement. (Iglesia ni Kristo vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 529) 2

As a matter of fact, Mr. Justice Puno, in his ponencia in the above cited case of Iglesia ni Kristo, opined that "(T)his rule is void for it runs smack against the hoary doctrine that administrative rules and regulations cannot expand the letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce. 3

3. The proceedings in the Senate show that the Committee on Local Government, to which H.B. No. 8729 was referred, reported back to the Senate with the recommendation that it be approved with the following amendment:

Sec. 3. Section 49 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended by deleting the entire section and in its stead substitute the following:

Sec. 49. PLEBISCITE. THE CONVERSION OF THE CITY OF SANTIAGO INTO A COMPONENT CITY OF THE PROVINCE OF ISABELA SHALL TAKE EFFECT UPON THE RATIFICATION OF THIS ACT BY A MAJORITY OF

THE PEOPLE OF SAID CITY IN A PLEBISCITE WHICH SHALL BE HELD FOR THE PURPOSE WITHIN (60) DAYS FROM THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SHALL CONDUCT AND SUPERVISE SUCH PLEBISCITE.

However, after the deliberations in the Senate, the Committee on Local Government decided to withdraw the foregoing proposed amendment. Hence, on February 6, 1998, the Republic Act No. 8528, the constitutionality of which is challenged by the petitioners, was approved.

Be that as it may, may this Court properly require a plebiscite for the validity of said law when Congress itself, which had been given the opportunity to include such a requirement, decided against it? Are we not supplanting our judgment over that of Congress, a co-equal branch of government entrusted by the Constitution to enact laws? I respectfully submit that we may not do so without disturbing the balance of power as apportioned and delineated by the Constitution.

4. I likewise submit that we must consider the ramifications of a declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528 on Republic Act No. 6726 (1989) and Republic Act No. 6843 (1990), respectively allowing the voters of the City of Oroquieta (Misamis Oriental) and San Carlos City (Pangasinan) to vote and be voted for any of the respective provincial offices, in effect downgrading them from independent component cities to component cities. The resulting confusion on the political structures of the local government units involved would surely be disastrous to the order and stability of these cities.

5. Finally, in a situation where the supposed breach of the constitution is doubtful, equivocal and, at best, based on argumentative implications, I believe that, as we have ruled in a plethora of cases 4, every law has in its favor, the presumption of constitutionality and in case of doubt, the Court must exert every effort to prevent the invalidation of the law and the nullification of the will of the legislature that enacted it and the executive that approved it.1wphi1.nt

I therefore vote to dismiss the petition.

Footnotes

1 See Section 4 of R.A. No. 7720.

2 See Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.

3 The intervention was granted on June 30, 1998.

4 After R.A. No. 8528 was enacted, COMELEC reallocated the seats for the provincial board in Isabela. It added one (1) seat to the 4th district where Santiago City belongs. The intervenor won the additional seat in the May 11, 1998 elections.

5 Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 (1976).

6 100 Phil. 1101 (1957).

7 92 SCRA 642 (1979).

8 Mendenilla v. Onandia, 115 Phil. 534 (1962).

9 Sec. 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

10 Reply of Petitioners, pp. 7-9.

11 See also Rule II, Article 6, par. F(1) of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code.

12 Pimentel, The Local Government Code of 1991, The Key to National Development, p. 36.

13 Hector S. de Leon, Philippine Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, 1991 ed., p. 509.

14 Journal of the Senate, 10th Congress, 3rd Regular Session, Session No. 55, February 3, 1998, pp. 92100.

15 142 SCRA 727, 753-754 (1986).

16 See R.A. No. 6720 which amended R.A. No. 5518.

17 See R.A. No. 6843 which amended R.A. No. 4487.

18 Record of the Senate, October 20, 1989, p. 795.

19 House Bill No. 1881; Committee Report Nos. 73 and 76 in the Senate.

20 Record of the Senate, November 25, 1988, p. 763.

21 Ibid., p. 764. See Record of the Senate, October 6, 1989, p. 506 where the cases of the cities of Naga and Ormoc were cited as examples.

MENDOZA, J., dissenting opinion;

1 See LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, 451.

2 CONST., Art. X, 12; LGC, 451.

3 LGC, 25.

4 Art. X, 4.

5 LGC, 468(a)(1)(i).

6 Id., 25(a).

7 Art. II, 1.

8 Art. VI, 1.

9 Id., 26-27.

10 In the following cases, the Constitution requires a plebiscite or a referendum to approve or ratify an act of Congress or of the President: (1) the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of a local government unit [Art. X, 10]; (2) the creation of a special metropolitan political subdivision [Id., 11]; (3) the creation of an autonomous region [Id., 18]; (4) the adoption of a new name, national anthem, or national seal for the country [Art. XVI, 2]; (5) referral to the people of the question whether to call a constitutional convention [Art. XVII, 3]; (6) ratification of constitutional amendments [Art. XVII, 4]; and (7) the adoption of a treaty allowing foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the Philippines if Congress decides to refer the matter to the people [Art. XVIII, 25].

Direct lawmaking by the people is provided through initiative and referendum [Art. VI, 32; R.A. No. 6735] and ratification of constitutional amendments through a plebiscite [Art. XVII, 4].

BUENA, J., dissenting opinion;

1 In The Local Government Code of 1991, The Key to National Development, 1993 ed., p. 34.

2 Rollo, p. 110.

3 Iglesia ni Kristo vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 529, pp. 547-548.

4 Tan vs. People, 290 SCRA 117 (1998); Tano vs. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154 (1997); Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 402 (1997); Alvarez vs. Guingona, Jr., 252 SCRA 695 (1996); Drilon vs. Lim. 235 SCRA 135 (1994); Garcia vs. Comelec 227 SCRA 100 (1993).

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 160261

November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents. JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003

SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners, ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

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G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention, vs. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

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G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003

HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

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G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003

SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,

vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

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G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003

LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.

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G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners, vs. HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003

ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003

CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003

U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRREPADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.

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G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003

FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003

NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,

vs. HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003

VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEA, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003

IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.

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G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003

DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.

Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of the instant petitions whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.

Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.

Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XI

Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT

Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. Impeachment shall be initiated only by a verified complaint for impeachment filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof or by a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House. RULE V

BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL

Section 16. Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. In cases where a Member of the House files a verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of endorsement against an impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution against such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in substance.

In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General.

RULE V

BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT

Section 14. Scope of Bar. No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within the period of one (1) year.

Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings. Within a period of one (1) year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same official. (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment

complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.

In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.

In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege

in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.

In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.

In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."

In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofilea, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.

In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.

Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.

Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions moot.

Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution,

from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.

On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.

On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.

On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."

On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.

The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.

On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:

Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:

a) locus standi of petitioners;

b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);

c) political question/justiciability;

d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;

e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;

f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and

g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.

Judicial Review

As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.

This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)

Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:

x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."26

Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.

Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.28 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation or instrument of intervention of the judiciary in that balancing operation."34

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:

xxx

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. x x x

xxx

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or

in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the

condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.

Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47

For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus,

they contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.

Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.

Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.

There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate

impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride."56

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57 "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.

The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform nonministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in

Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)

Standing

Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.

Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.

There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real partyin-interest.

The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."

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On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)

While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.

In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage

of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.80

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83

While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.

In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.

The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.

In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.

With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92

In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.

Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they

will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied with.

Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.

Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.

Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:

x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)

In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.

Ripeness and Prematurity

In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.

The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.

Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.

Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.

The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.

Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.

Justiciability

In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:

[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.99 (Italics in the original)

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.

The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:

MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed

regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only because our main writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of Malacaang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that Malacaang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I

proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.

A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the government was that the issue was a political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.

xxx

The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.

In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.

Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of "political question" was set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.

x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable.

xxx

x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial power? What is a political question?

The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."

This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:

Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable . . .

The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.

I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:

MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by law.

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.

MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?

MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether the government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.

xxx

FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for votes.

On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question doctrine?

MR. CONCEPCION. No.

FR. BERNAS. It is not.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .

FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.

When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition that we might make may not cover all possible areas.

FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial power.104 (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."

Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.

As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.

In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide.106 x x x

In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:

The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and nonjusticiable political questions, however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:

x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.112 (Underscoring supplied)

Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.

The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.

In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.

These petitions raise five substantial issues:

I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.

II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.

III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.113

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.

Lis Mota

It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:

x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]

Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.

As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied."119

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the

constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the judiciary.121

Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.

En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:

The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self.123

In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the aforementioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:

"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124

Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of

impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.

While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.

Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.

In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Judicial Restraint

Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.

On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment."125 But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral

compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them.

The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."

Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office."130

The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.

To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senatorselect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:

Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)

Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.

In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:

1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'

2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'

3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'

4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.

5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have

the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.

7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided (citations omitted).

The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case

3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground

4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute

5. that the parties are not in estoppel

6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.

As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:

1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power

2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement

3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity

4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136

Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.

Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.

Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.

x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also political consequences. Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of votes.

Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138

Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime.

Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.

Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.142

Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Proceedings adopted by the 12th Congress

Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all

cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.

The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.

That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.

"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:

Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.

Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of

impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:

MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would need some time for Committee action.

However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the

resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."

I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of onethird of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)

This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144

It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase

"to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.

During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:

Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

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(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)

refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."

Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a

progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.

Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.

Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.

In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives and disinterestedness.148

Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only two members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission Chief Justice

Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.

Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.

Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:

Section 3. (1) x x x

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.

In Osmea v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:

"x x x

"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:

Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers.154

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In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis--vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government.155

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The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of government despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected by the people.156

xxx

The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis--vis the other branches of government. This provision was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x

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In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress this Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.

Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.

The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on

Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."

Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Conclusion

If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.

Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.

This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.

The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.

It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.

The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon each other.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo and Tinga, JJ., see separate opinion. Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion. Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., see separate concurring opinion. Quisumbing, J., concurring separate opinion received. Carpio, J., concur. Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the majority opinion and in the separate opinion of J. Vitug. Corona, J., will write a separate concurring opinion. Azcuna, J., concur in the separate opinion.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 180-182; Annex "H."

2 Per Special Appearance with Manifestation of House Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. (Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 325-363) the pertinent House Resolution is HR No. 260, but no copy of the same was submitted before this Court.

3 Id. at 329. Created through PD No. 1949 (July 18, 1984), the JDF was established "to help ensure and guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy and required by the impartial administration of justice" by creating a special fund to augment the allowances of the members and personnel of the Judiciary and to finance the acquisition, maintenance and repair of office equipment and facilities."

4 Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 120-139; Annex "E."

5 The initial complaint impleaded only Justices Artemio V. Panganiban, Josue N. Bellosillo, Reynato S. Puno, Antonio T. Carpio and Renato C. Corona, and was later amended to include Justices Jose C. Vitug, and Leonardo A. Quisumbing.

6 Supra note 4 at 123-124.

7 Rollo, G.R. No. 160403 at 48-53; Annex "A."

8 http://www.congress.gov.ph/search/bills/hist_show.php?bill_no=RPT9999

9 Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 8.

10 Rollo, G.R. No. 160295 at 11.

11 Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 43-84; Annex "B."

12 Supra note 2.

13 A perusal of the attachments submitted by the various petitioners reveals the following signatories to the second impeachment complaint and the accompanying Resolution/Endorsement. 1. Gilbert Teodoro, Jr., NPC, Tarlac (principal complainant) 2. Felix Fuentebella, NPC, Camarines Sur (second principal complainant) 3. Julio Ledesma, IV, NPC, Negros Occidental 4. Henry Lanot, NPC, Lone District of Pasig City 5. Kim Bernardo-Lokin, Party List-CIBAC 6. Marcelino Libanan, NPC, Lone District of Eastern Samar, (Chairman, House Committee on Justice) 7. Emmylou Talino-Santos, Independent, 1st District, North Cotobato 8. Douglas RA. Cagas, NPC, 1st District, Davao del Sur 9. Sherwin Gatchalian, NPC, 1st District, Valenzuela City 10. Luis Bersamin, Jr., PDSP-PPC, Lone District of Abra 11. Nerissa Soon-Ruiz Alayon, 6th District, Cebu 12. Ernesto Nieva, Lakas, 1st District, Manila 13. Edgar R. Erice, Lakas, 2nd District, Kalookan City 14. Ismael Mathay III, Independent, 2nd District, Quezon City 15. Samuel Dangwa,

Reporma, Lone District of Benguet 16. Alfredo Maraon, Jr., NPC, 2nd District, Negros Occidental 17. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Reporma, 1st District, Zamboanga del Norte 18. Agapito A. Aquino, LDP, 2nd District, Makati City 19. Fausto L. Seachon, Jr., NPC, 3rd District, Masbate 20. Georgilu Yumul-Hermida, Pwersa ng Masa, 4th District, Quezon 21. Jose Carlos Lacson, Lakas, 3rd District, Negros Occidental 22. Manuel C. Ortega, NPC, 1st District, La Union 23. Uliran Joaquin, NPC, 1st District, Laguna 24. Soraya C. Jaafar, Lakas, Lone District of Tawi-Tawi 25. Wilhelmino Sy-Alvarado, Lakas, 1st District, Bulacan 26. Claude P. Bautista, NPC, 2nd District, Davao Del Sur 27. Del De Guzman, Lakas, Lone District of Marikina City 28. Zeneida Cruz-Ducut, NPC, 2nd District, Pampanga 29. Augusto Baculio, Independent-LDP, 2nd District, Misamis Oriental 30. Faustino Dy III, NPC-Lakas, 3rd District, Isabela 31. Agusto Boboy Syjuco, Lakas, 2nd District, Iloilo 32. Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon, LDP, Lone District of Muntinlupa City 33. Leovigildo B. Banaag, NPC-Lakas, 1st District, Agusan del Norte 34. Eric Singson, LP, 2nd District, Ilocos Sur 35. Jacinto Paras, Lakas, 1st District, Negros Oriental 36. Jose Solis, Independent, 2nd District, Sorsogon 37. Renato B. Magtubo, Party List-Partido ng Manggagawa 38. Herminio G. Teves, Lakas, 3rd District, Negros Oriental 39. Amado T. Espino, Jr., Lakas, 2nd District, Pangasinan 40. Emilio Macias, NPC, 2nd District, Negros Oriental 41. Arthur Y. Pingoy, Jr., NPC, 2nd District, South Cotobato 42. Francis Nepomuceno, NPC, 1st District, Pampanga 43. Conrado M. Estrella III, NPC, 6th District, Pangasinan 44. Elias Bulut, Jr., NPC, Lone District of Apayao 45. Jurdin Jesus M. Romualdo, NPC, Lone District of Camiguin 46. Juan Pablo Bondoc, NPC, 4th District, Pampanga 47. Generoso DC. Tulagan, NPC, 3rd District, Pangasinan 48. Perpetuo Ylagan, Lakas, Lone District of Romblon 49. Michael Duavit, NPC, 1st District, Rizal 50. Joseph Ace H. Durano, NPC, 5th District, Cebu 51. Jesli Lapus, NPC, 3rd District, Tarlac 52. Carlos Q. Cojuangco, NPC, 4th District, Negros Occidental 53. Georgidi B. Aggabao, NPC, 4th District, Santiago, Isabela 54. Francis Escudero, NPC, 1st District, Sorsogon 55. Rene M. Velarde, Party List-Buhay 56. Celso L. Lobregat, LDP, Lone District of Zamboanga City 57. Alipio Cirilo V. Badelles, NPC, 1st District, Lanao del Norte 58. Didagen P. Dilangalen, Pwersa ng Masa, Lone District of Maguindanao 59. Abraham B. Mitra, LDP, 2nd District, Palawan 60. Joseph Santiago, NPC, Lone District of Catanduanes 61. Darlene Antonino-Custodio, NPC, 1st District of South Cotobato & General Santos City 62. Aleta C. Suarez, LP, 3rd District, Quezon 63. Rodolfo G. Plaza, NPC, Lone District of Agusan del Sur 64. JV Bautista, Party ListSanlakas 65. Gregorio Ipong, NPC, 2nd District, North Cotabato 66. Gilbert C. Remulla, LDP, 2nd District, Cavite 67. Rolex T. Suplico, LDP, 5th District, Iloilo 68. Celia Layus, NPC, Cagayan 69. Juan Miguel Zubiri, Lakas, 3rd District, Bukidnon 70. Benasing Macarambon Jr,. NPC, 2nd District, Lanao del Sur 71. Josefina Joson, NPC, Lone District of Nueva Ecija 72. Mark Cojuangco, NPC, 5th District, Pangasinan 73. Mauricio Domogan, Lakas, Lone District of Baguio City 74. Ronaldo B. Zamora, Pwersa ng Masa, Lone District of San Juan 75. Angelo O. Montilla, NPC, Lone District of Sultan Kudarat 76. Roseller L. Barinaga, NPC, 2nd District, Zamboanga del Norte 77. Jesnar R. Falcon, NPC, 2nd District, Surigao del Sur 78. Ruy Elias Lopez, NPC, 3rd District, Davao City.

14 Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 5. Petitioner had previously filed two separate impeachment complaints before the House of Representatives against Ombudsman Aniano Desierto.

15 299 SCRA 744 (1998). In Chavez v. PCGG, petitioner Chavez argued that as a taxpayer and a citizen, he had the legal personality to file a petition demanding that the PCGG make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to the PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. Petitioner Chavez further argued that the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an issue of transcendental importance to the public. The Supreme Court, citing Taada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985), Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 (1987) and Albano v. Reyes, 175 SCRA 264 (1989) ruled that petitioner had standing. The Court, however, went on to elaborate that in any event, the question on the standing of petitioner Chavez was rendered moot by the intervention of the Jopsons who are among the legitimate claimants to the Marcos wealth.

16 384 SCRA 152 (2002). In Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation, wherein the petition sought to compel the Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts on its then on-going negotiations with Amari Coastal Development Corporation to reclaim portions of Manila Bay, the Supreme Court said that petitioner Chavez had the standing to bring a taxpayer's suit because the petition sought to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties.

17 224 SCRA 792 (1993).

18 Subsequent petitions were filed before this Court seeking similar relief. Other than the petitions, this Court also received Motions for Intervention from among others, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., and Special Appearances by House Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr., and Senate President Franklin Drilon.

19 Supra note 2 at 10.

20 Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Former Constitutional Commissioners Justice Regalado E. Maambong and Father Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Former Minister of Justice and Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Deans Pacifico Agabin and Raul C. Pangalangan, and Former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga,.

21 Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 275-292.

22 Id. at 292.

23 63 Phil 139 (1936).

24 Id. at 157-159.

25 Vide Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil 83 (1924); Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil 1051 (1957); Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659, 665 (1987).

26 Const., art. VIII, sec. 1.

27 5 US 137 (1803).

28 Id. at 180.

29 In In re Prautch, 1 Phil 132 (1902), this Court held that a statute allowing for imprisonment for nonpayment of a debt was invalid. In Casanovas v. Hord, 8 Phil 125 (1907), this Court invalidated a statute imposing a tax on mining claims on the ground that a government grant stipulating that the payment of certain taxes by the grantee would be in lieu of other taxes was a contractual obligation which could not be impaired by subsequent legislation. In Concepcion v. Paredes, 42 Phil 599 (1921), Section 148 (2) of the Administrative Code, as amended, which provided that judges of the first instance with the same salaries would, by lot, exchange judicial districts every five years, was declared invalid for being a usurpation of the power of appointment vested in the Governor General. In McDaniel v. Apacible, 42 Phil 749 (1922), Act No. 2932, in so far as it declares open to lease lands containing petroleum which have been validly located and held, was declared invalid for being a depravation of property without due process of law. In U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1 (1922), Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorized the Governor-General to fix the price of rice by proclamation and to make the sale of rice in violation of such a proclamation a crime, was declared an invalid delegation of legislative power.

30 Vicente V. Mendoza, Sharing The Passion and Action of our Time 62-53 (2003).

31 Supra note 23.

32 Id. at 156-157.

33 Florentino P. Feliciano, The Application of Law: Some Recurring Aspects Of The Process Of Judicial Review And Decision Making, 37 AMJJUR 17, 24 (1992).

34 Ibid.

35 I Record of the Constitutional Commission 434-436 (1986).

36 31 SCRA 413 (1970)

37 Id. at 422-423; Vide Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770 (1988); Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51 (1990); Ordillo v. Commission on Elections, 192 SCRA 100 (1990).

38 194 SCRA 317 (1991).

39 Id. at 325 citing Maxwell v. Dow, 176 US 581.

40 152 SCRA 284 (1987).

41 Id. at 291 citing Gold Creek Mining v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259 (1938), J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc v. Land Tenure Administration, supra note 36, and I Taada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines 21 ( Fourth Ed. ).

42 82 Phil 771 (1949).

43 Id. at 775.

44 Supra note 38.

45 Id. at 330-331.

46 Id. at 337-338 citing 16 CJS 2.31; Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa. 365, 3 Atl. 220 and Household Finance Corporation v. Shaffner, 203, SW 2d, 734, 356 Mo. 808.

47 Supra note 2.

48 Citing Section 3 (6), Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

49 Supra note 21.

50 506 U.S. 224 (1993).

51 Supra note 2 at 349-350 citing Gerhardt, Michael J. The Federal Impeachment Process: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis, 1996, p. 119.

52 227 SCRA 100 (1993).

53 Id. at 112.

54 US Constititon. Section 2. x x x The House of Representatives shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

55 1987 Constitution, Article XI, Section 3 (1). The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

56 Supra note 2 at 355 citing Agresto, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy, 1984, pp. 112113.

57 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

58 141 SCRA 263 (1986).

59 Supra note 25.

60 298 SCRA 756 (1998).

61 272 SCRA 18 (1997).

62 201 SCRA 792 (1991).

63 187 SCRA 377 (1990).

64 180 SCRA 496 (1989).

65 Supra note 25.

66 Supra note 23.

67 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra note 38 at 330-331.

68 Id. at 158-159.

69 IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000) citing Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568 (1993); House International Building Tenants Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 703 (1987); Baker v. Carr, supra note 57.

70 Citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 250 SCRA 130 (1995).

71 Citing Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997).

72 Citing Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, 163 SCRA 371, 378 (1988).

73 Rule 3, Section 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

74 JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 143, 152 (2000).

75 246 SCRA 540 (1995).

76 Id. at 562-564.

77 Agan v. PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001, May 5, 2003 citing BAYAN v. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449, 562-563 (2000) and Baker v. Carr, supra note 57; Vide Gonzales v. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733 (2000); TELEBAP v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337 (1998).

78 Chavez v. PCGG, supra note 15.

79 Del Mar v. PAGCOR 346 SCRA 485, 501 (2000) citing Kilosbayan, Inc., et.al. v. Morato, supra note 70; Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (1980); Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 (1976); Philconsa v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966); Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil 331 (1960); Vide Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77; Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965); Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965); Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Association v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 (1965).

80 BAYAN v. Zamora, supra note 77 citing Bugnay v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240, 251-252 (1989); Vide Del Mar v. PAGCOR, supra note 79; Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77; TELEBAP v. COMELEC, supra note 77; Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70; Joya v. PCGG, supra note 69; Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Sanidad v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Philconsa v. Mathay, supra note 79; Pelaez v. Auditor General, supra note 79; Philconsa v. Gimenez, supra note 79; Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Association v. Feliciano, supra note 79; Pascual v. Sec. of Public Works, supra note 79.

81 Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77 citing Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Sanidad v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 (1972).

82 Tatad v. Garcia, Jr., 243 SCRA 436 (1995); Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70 at 140-141 citing Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994); Guingona v. PCGG, 207 SCRA 659 (1992); Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); Tolentino v. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702 (1971).

83 Del Mar v. PAGCOR, supra note 79 at 502-503 citing Philconsa v. Mathay, supra note 79.

84 Chinese Flour Importers Association v. Price Stabilization Board, 89 Phil 439, 461 (1951) citing Gallego et al. vs. Kapisanan Timbulan ng mga Manggagawa, 46 Off. Gaz, 4245.

85 Philippine Constitution Association v. Gimenez, supra note 79 citing Gonzales v. Hechanova, 118 Phil. 1065 (1963); Pascual v. Secretary, supra note 79.

86 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000).

87 MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003, citing Industrial Generating Co. v. Jenkins 410 SW 2d 658; Los Angeles County Winans, 109 P 640; Weberpals v. Jenny, 133 NE 62.

88 Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559, 570-571 (1974), citing Moore's Federal Practice 2d ed., Vol. III, pages 3423-3424; 4 Federal Rules Service, pages 454-455; Johnson, et al., vs. Riverland Levee Dist., et al., 117 2d 711, 715; Borlasa v. Polistico, 47 Phil. 345, 348 (1925).

89 MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, supra note 87, dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio; Bulig-bulig Kita Kamag-Anak Assoc. v. Sulpicio Lines, 173 SCRA 514, 514-515 (1989); Re: Request of the Heirs of the Passengers of Doa Paz, 159 SCRA 623, 627 (1988) citing Moore, Federal Practice, 2d ed., Vol. 3B, 23-257, 23-258; Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88 (1996), citing Section 12, Rule 3, Rules of Court; Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., supra note 88; Oposa v. Factoran, supra note 17.

90 Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994).

91 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70 citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra note 38; Philconsa v. Gimnez, supra note 79; Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association v. Feliciano, supra note 79; Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949); vide Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997); Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 (1997); KMU v. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 (1994); Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 368 (1993); Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 (1992); Osmea v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750 (1991); Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 (1991); Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991); Daza v. Singson, supra note 64; Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79.

92 Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 522, 531 (1999) citing Gibson vs. Revilla, 92 SCRA 219; Magsaysay-Labrador v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 266, 271 (1989).

93 Supra note 79.

94 Id. at 403.

95 Supra note 81.

96 Id. at 681.

97 SECTION 3. x x x

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

98 Supra note 25.

99 Id. at 1067.

100 Vide Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87 (1905); Montenegro v. Castaeda, 91 Phil. 882 (1952); De la Llana v. COMELEC, 80 SCRA 525 (1977).

101 Vide Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 (1949); Macias v. COMELEC, 3 SCRA 1 (1961); Cunanan v. Tan, Jr., 5 SCRA 1 (1962); Gonzales v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (1967); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971); Tolentino v. COMELEC, supra note 82.

102 50 SCRA 30 (1973).

103 Record of the Constitution Commission, Vol. 1, July 10, 1986 at 434-436.

104 Id. at 439-443.

105 177 SCRA 668 (1989).

106 Id. at 695.

107 203 SCRA 767 (1991).

108 Id. at 776 citing Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452, 463 (1990).

109 Supra note 64.

110 Id. at 501.

111 Supra note 57.

112 Id. at 217.

113 2 Record of the Constitutional Commission at 286.

114 Id. at 278, 316, 272, 283-284, 286.

115 76 Phil 516 (1946).

116 Id. at 522.

117 Supra note 37.

118 Id. at 58 citing Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989).

119 Vide concurring opinion of Justice Vicente Mendoza in Estrada v.Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 550 (2001); Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208, 210-211 (1987) citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).

120 As adverted to earlier, neither a copy the Resolution nor a record of the hearings conducted by the House Committee on Justice pursuant to said Resolution was submitted to the Court by any of the parties.

121 Rollo, G.R. No. 160310 at 38.

122 Supra note 107.

123 Id. at 777 (citations omitted).

124 Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 73.

125 Supra note 2 at 342.

126 Perfecto v. Meer, 85 Phil 552, 553 (1950).

127 Estrada v. Desierto, 356 SCRA 108, 155-156 (2001); Vide Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 166 SCRA 651 (1988); Vargas v. Rilloraza, et al., 80 Phil. 297, 315-316 (1948); Planas v. COMELEC, 49 SCRA 105 (1973), concurring opinion of J. Concepcion.

128 Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 705 (1993).

129 Ibid.

130 Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog, 144 SCRA 462, 477 (1986).

131 Supra note 127.

132 Estrada v. Desierto, supra note 127.

133 Id. at 155-156 citing Abbas, et al. v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, supra note 127; Vargas v. Rilloraza, et al., supra note 127.

134 Supra note 119 at 210-211.

135 Supra note 119.

136 Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88, 103 (1996); Joya v. PCGG, supra note 69 at 575; Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236, 242 (1993); Santos III v. Northwestern Airlines, 210 SCRA 256, 261-262 (1992), National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin, 171 SCRA 657, 665 (1989).

137 Supra note 2 at 353.

138 Supra note 33 at 32.

139 Supra note 102.

140 Supra note 33.

141 249 SCRA 244, 251 (1995).

142 Id. at 251.

143 2 Records of the Constitutional Commission at 342-416.

144 Id. at 416.

145 Commissioner Maambong's Amicus Curiae Brief at 15.

146 2 Record of the Constitutional Commission at 375-376, 416

147 77 Phil. 192 (1946).

148 Justice Hugo Guiterrez's Amicus Curiae Brief at 7.

149 109 Phil. 863 (1960).

150 40 SCRA 58, 68 (1971).

151 286 U.S. 6, 33 (1932).

152 277 SCRA 268, 286 (1997).

153 144 U.S. 1 (1862).

154 Supra note 152 at 304-306.

155 Id. at 311.

156 Id. at 313.

157 Supra note 152 at 314-315.

158 Supra note 50.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5279

October 31, 1955

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC., petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS, respondents.

Manuel C. Briones, Vicente G. Sinco, Manuel V. Gallego and Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Assistant Solicitor General Francisco Carreon for respondents.

BENGZON, J.:

The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional, because: A. They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; B. They deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and C. Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power.

A printed memorandum explaining their position in extenso is attached to the record.

The Government's legal representative submitted a mimeographed memorandum contending that, (1) the matter constitutes no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the

constitutional questions; (2) petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the validity of the said acts; and (3) the Acts are constitutionally valid.

Petitioners submitted a lengthy reply to the above arguments.

Act No. 2706 approved in 1917 is entitled, "An Act making the inspection and recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction." Under its provisions, the Department of Education has, for the past 37 years, supervised and regulated all private schools in this country apparently without audible protest, nay, with the general acquiescence of the general public and the parties concerned.

It should be understandable, then, that this Court should be doubly reluctant to consider petitioner's demand for avoidance of the law aforesaid, specially where, as respondents assert, petitioners suffered no wrongnor allege anyfrom the enforcement of the criticized statute.

It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallability of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility. (Cooley Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. I, p. 332.)

When a law has been long treated as constitutional and important rights have become dependent thereon, the Court may refuse to consider an attack on its validity. (C. J. S. 16, p. 204.)

As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. (16 C. J. S., p. 207.)

In support of their first proposition petitioners contend that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorent to our system of law and government. Petitioners obviously refer to section 3 of Act No. 2706 as amended which provides that before a private school may be opened to the public it must first obtain a permit from the Secretary of Education. The Solicitor General on the other hand points out

that none of the petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits.1 And they do not assert that the respondent Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of lawand, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain.

It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is interest common to all members of the public. (Ex parte Levitt, 302 U. S. 633 82 L. Ed. 493.)

Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. (Tyler vs. Judges, 179 U. S. 405; Hendrick vs. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610; Coffman vs. Breeze Corp., 323 U. S. 316-325.)

The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigant require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. (United Public Works vs. Mitchell, 330 U .S. 75; 91 L. Ed. 754.)

Bona fide suit.Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. The authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants. (Taada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, p. 1138.)

Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy. (Cf. Com. ex rel Watkins vs. Winchester Waterworks (Ky.) 197 S. W. 2d. 771.)

And action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and positive relief. (Salonga vs. Warner Barnes, L-2245, January, 1951.) Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however intellectually solid the problem may be. This is specially true where the issues "reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court's

duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion." (Rice vs. Sioux City, U. S. Sup. Ct. Adv. Rep., May 23, 1995, Law Ed., Vol. 99, p. 511.)

The above notwithstanding, in view of the several decisions of the United States Supreme Court quoted by petitioners, apparently outlawing censorship of the kind objected to by them, we have decided to look into the matter, lest they may allege we refuse to act even in the face of clear violation of fundamental personal rights of liberty and property.

Petitioners complain that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit from the Secretary of Education. Such requirement was not originally included in Act No. 2706. It was introduced by Commonwealth Act No. 180 approved in 1936. Why?

In March 1924 the Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 3162 creating a Board of Educational Survey to make a study and survey of education in the Philippines and of all educational institutions, facilities and agencies thereof. A Board chairmaned by Dr. Paul Munroe, Columbia University, assisted by a staff of carefully selected technical members performed the task, made a five-month thorough and impartial examination of the local educational system, and submitted a report with recommendations, printed as a book of 671 pages. The following paragraphs are taken from such report:

PRIVATE-ADVENTURE SCHOOLS

There is no law or regulation in the Philippine Islands today to prevent a person, however disqualified by ignorance, greed, or even immoral character, from opening a school to teach the young. It it true that in order to post over the door "Recognized by the Government," a private adventure school must first be inspected by the proper Government official, but a refusal to grant such recognition does not by any means result in such a school ceasing to exist. As a matter of fact, there are more such unrecognized private schools than of the recognized variety. How many, no one knows, as the Division of Private Schools keeps records only of the recognized type.

Conclusion.An unprejudiced consideration of the fact presented under the caption Private Adventure Schools leads but to one conclusion, viz.: the great majority of them from primary grade to university are money-making devices for the profit of those who organize and administer them. The people whose children and youth attend them are not getting what they pay for. It is obvious that the system constitutes a great evil. That it should be permitted to exist with almost no supervision is indefensible.

The suggestion has been made with the reference to the private institutions of university grade that some board of control be organized under legislative control to supervise their administration. The Commission believes that the recommendations it offers at the end of this chapter are more likely to bring about the needed reforms.

Recommendations.The Commission recommends that legislation be enacted to prohibit the opening of any school by an individual or organization without the permission of the Secretary of Public Instruction. That before granting such permission the Secretary assure himself that such school measures up to proper standards in the following respects, and that the continued existence of the school be dependent upon its continuing to conform to these conditions:

(1) The location and construction of the buildings, the lighting and ventilation of the rooms, the nature of the lavatories, closets, water supply, school furniture and apparatus, and methods of cleaning shall be such as to insure hygienic conditions for both pupils and teachers.

(2) The library and laboratory facilities shall be adequate to the needs of instruction in the subjects taught.

(3) The classes shall not show an excessive number of pupils per teacher. The Commission recommends 40 as a maximum.

(4) The teachers shall meet qualifications equal to those of teachers in the public schools of the same grade.

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In view of these findings and recommendations, can there be any doubt that the Government in the exercise of its police power to correct "a great evil" could validly establish the "previous permit" system objected to by petitioners? This is what differentiates our law from the other statutes declared invalid in other jurisdictions. And if any doubt still exists, recourse may now be had to the provision of our Constitution that "All educational institutions shall be under the supervision and subject to regulation by the State." (Art. XIV, sec. 5.) The power to regulate establishments or business occupations implies the power to require a permit or license. (53 C. J. S. 4.)

What goes for the "previous permit" naturally goes for the power to revoke such permit on account of violation of rules or regulations of the Department.

II. This brings us to the petitioners' third proposition that the questioned statutes "conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power."

This attack is specifically aimed at section 1 of Act No. 2706 which, as amended, provides:

It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same,

"Nowhere in this Act" petitioners argue "can one find any description, either general or specific, of what constitutes a 'general standard of efficiency.' Nowhere in this Act is there any indication of any basis or condition to ascertain what is 'adequate instruction to the public.' Nowhere in this Act is there any statement of conditions, acts, or factors, which the Secretary of Education must take into account to determine the 'efficiency of instruction.'"

The attack on this score is also extended to section 6 which provides:

The Department of Education shall from time to time prepare and publish in pamphlet form the minimum standards required of primary, intermediate, and high schools, and colleges granting the degrees of Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Science, or any other academic degree. It shall also from time to time prepare and publish in pamphlet form the minimum standards required of law, medical, dental, pharmaceutical, engineering, agricultural and other medical or vocational schools or colleges giving instruction of a technical, vocational or professional character.

Petitioners reason out, "this section leaves everything to the uncontrolled discretion of the Secretary of Education or his department. The Secretary of Education is given the power to fix the standard. In plain language, the statute turns over to the Secretary of Education the exclusive authority of the legislature to formulate standard. . . .."

It is quite clear the two sections empower and require the Secretary of Education to prescribe rules fixing minimum standards of adequate and efficient instruction to be observed by all such private schools and colleges as may be permitted to operate. The petitioners contend that as the legislature has not fixed the standards, "the provision is extremely vague, indefinite and uncertain"and for that reason constitutionality objectionable. The best answer is that despite such alleged vagueness the Secretary of Education has fixed standards to ensure adequate and efficient instruction, as shown by the memoranda fixing or revising curricula, the school calendars, entrance and final examinations, admission and accreditation of students etc.; and the system of private education has, in general, been satisfactorily in operation for 37 years. Which only shows that the Legislature did and could, validly rely upon the educational experience and training of those in charge of the Department of Education to ascertain and formulate minimum requirements of adequate instruction as the basis of government recognition of any private school.

At any rate, petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any of them or interfered with their operation. Wherefore, no reason exists for them to assail the validity of the power nor the exercise of the power by the Secretary of Education.

True, the petitioners assert that, the Secretary has issued rules and regulations "whimsical and capricious" and that such discretionary power has produced arrogant inspectors who "bully heads and teachers of private schools." Nevertheless, their remedy is to challenge those regulations specifically, and/or to ring those inspectors to book, in proper administrative or judicial proceedingsnot to invalidate the law. For it needs no argument, to show that abuse by the officials entrusted with the execution of a statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute.

Anyway, we find the defendants' position to be sufficiently sustained by the decision in Alegra vs. Collector of Customs, 53 Phil., 394 upon holding the statute that authorized the Director of Agriculture to "designate standards for the commercial grades of abaca, maguey and sisal" against vigorous attacks on the ground of invalid delegation of legislative power.

Indeed "adequate and efficient instruction" should be considered sufficient, in the same way as "public welfare" "necessary in the interest of law and order" "public interest" and "justice and equity and substantial merits of the case" have been held sufficient as legislative standards justifying delegation of authority to regulate. (See Taada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, p. 793, citing Philippine cases.)

On this phase of the litigation we conclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power.

In this connection, and to support their position that the law and the Secretary of Education have transcended the governmental power of supervision and regulation, the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the said Department. However they failed to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for being "capricious," or pain "nuisance"; and it is one of our decisional practices that unless a constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately argued, the court will not consider it. (Santiago vs. Far Eastern, 73 Phil., 408.)

We are told that such list will give an idea of how the statute has placed in the hands of the Secretary of Education complete control of the various activities of private schools, and why the statute should be struck down as unconstitutional. It is clear in our opinion that the statute does not in express terms give the Secretary complete control. It gives him powers to inspect private schools, to regulate their activities, to give them official permits to operate under certain conditions, and to revoke such permits for cause. This does not amount to complete control. If any of such Department circulars or memoranda issued by the Secretary go beyond the bounds of regulation and seeks to establish complete control, it would surely be invalid. Conceivably some of them are of this nature, but besides not having before us the text of such circulars, the petitioners have omitted to specify. In any event with the recent approval of Republic Act No. 1124 creating the National Board of Education, opportunity for administrative correction of the supposed anomalies or encroachments is amply afforded herein petitioners. A more expeditious and perhaps more technically competent forum exists, wherein to discuss the necessity, convenience or relevancy of the measures criticized by them. (See also Republic Act No. 176.)

If however the statutes in question actually give the Secretary control over private schools, the question arises whether the power of supervision and regulation granted to the State by section 5 Article XIV was meant to include control of private educational institutions. It is enough to point out that local educators and writers think the Constitution provides for control of Education by the State. (See Tolentino, Government of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. II, p. 615; Benitez, Philippine Social Life and Progress, p. 335.)

The Constitution (it) "provides for state control of all educational institutions" even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of citizenship. (Malcolm & Laurel, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1936.)

The Solicitor General cities many authorities to show that the power to regulate means power to control, and quotes from the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention to prove that State control of private education was intended by the organic law. It is significant to note that the Constitution grants power to supervise and to regulate. Which may mean greater power than mere regulation.

III. Another grievance of petitionersprobably the most significantis the assessment of 1 per cent levied on gross receipts of all private schools for additional Government expenses in connection with their supervision and regulation. The statute is section 11-A of Act No. 2706 as amended by Republic Act No. 74 which reads as follows:

SEC. 11-A. The total annual expense of the Office of Private Education shall be met by the regular amount appropriated in the annual Appropriation Act: Provided, however, That for additional expenses in the supervision and regulation of private schools, colleges and universities and in the purchase of textbook to be sold to student of said schools, colleges and universities and President of the Philippines may authorize the Secretary of Instruction to levy an equitable assessment from each private educational institution equivalent to one percent of the total amount accruing from tuition and other fees: . . . and non-payment of the assessment herein provided by any private school, college or university shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation by the Secretary of Instruction of the permit for recognition granted to it.

Petitioners maintain that this is a tax on the exercise of a constitutional rightthe right to open a school, the liberty to teach etc. They claim this is unconstitutional, in the same way that taxes on the privilege of selling religious literature or of publishing a newspaperboth constitutional privileges have been held, in the United States, to be invalid as taxes on the exercise of a constitutional right.

The Solicitor General on the other hand argues that insofar as petitioners' action attempts to restrain the further collection of the assessment, courts have no jurisdiction to restrain the collection of taxes by injunction, and in so far as they seek to recover fees already paid the suit, it is one against the State

without its consent. Anyway he concludes, the action involving "the legality of any tax impost or assessment" falls within the original jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance.

There are good grounds in support of Government's position. If this levy of 1 per cent is truly a mere feeand not a taxto finance the cost of the Department's duty and power to regulate and supervise private schools, the exaction may be upheld; but such point involves investigation and examination of relevant data, which should best be carried out in the lower courts. If on the other hand it is a tax, petitioners' issue would still be within the original jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance.

The last grievance of petitioners relates to the validity of Republic Act No. 139 which in its section 1 provides:

The textbooks to be used in the private schools recognized or authorized by the government shall be submitted to the Board (Board of Textbooks) which shall have the power to prohibit the use of any of said textbooks which it may find to be against the law or to offend the dignity and honor of the government and people of the Philippines, or which it may find to be against the general policies of the government, or which it may deem pedagogically unsuitable.

This power of the Board, petitioners aver, is censorship in "its baldest form". They cite two U. S. cases (Miss. and Minnesota) outlawing statutes that impose previous restraints upon publication of newspapers, or curtail the right of individuals to disseminate teachings critical of government institutions or policies.

Herein lies another important issue submitted in the cause. The question is really whether the law may be enacted in the exercise of the State's constitutional power (Art. XIV, sec. 5) to supervise and regulate private schools. If that power amounts to control of private schools, as some think it is, maybe the law is valid. In this connection we do not share the belief that section 5 has added new power to what the State inherently possesses by virtue of the police power. An express power is necessarily more extensive than a mere implied power. For instance, if there is conflict between an express individual right and the express power to control private education it cannot off-hand be said that the latter must yield to the formerconflict of two express powers. But if the power to control education is merely implied from the police power, it is feasible to uphold the express individual right, as was probably the situation in the two decisions brought to our attention, of Mississippi and Minnesota, states where constitutional control of private schools is not expressly produced.

However, as herein previously noted, no justiciable controversy has been presented to us. We are not informed that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or that the petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights for so refusing.

The average lawyer who reads the above quoted section of Republic Act 139 will fail to perceive anything objectionable. Why should not the State prohibit the use of textbooks that are illegal, or offensive to the Filipinos or adverse to governmental policies or educationally improper? What's the power of regulation and supervision for? But those trained to the investigation of constitutional issues are likely to apprehend the danger to civil liberties, of possible educational dictatorship or thought control, as petitioners' counsel foresee with obvious alarm. Much depends, however, upon the execution and implementation of the statute. Not that constitutionality depends necessarily upon the law's effects. But if the Board on Textbooks in its actuations strictly adheres to the letter of the section and wisely steers a middle course between the Scylla of "dictatorship" and the Charybdis of "thought control", no cause for complaint will arise and no occasion for judicial review will develop. Anyway, and again, petitioners now have a more expeditious remedy thru an administrative appeal to the National Board of Education created by Republic Act 1124.

Of course it is necessary to assure herein petitioners, that when and if, the dangers they apprehend materialize and judicial intervention is suitably invoked, after all administrative remedies are exhausted, the courts will not shrink from their duty to delimit constitutional boundaries and protect individual liberties.

IV. For all the foregoing considerations, reserving to the petitioners the right to institute in the proper court, and at the proper time, such actions as may call for decision of the issue herein presented by them, this petition for prohibition will be denied. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., and Jugo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Court will not pass upon the validity of statute at the instance of one who has availed itself of its benefits. (Fahey vs. Mallonee, 322 U. S. 245; 91 L. Ed. 2030; Phil. Scrappers Inc. vs. Auditor-General, 96 Phil., 449.)

2 Cf. Montenegro vs. Castaeda, 48 Off. Gaz (8) 3392.

3 It should be observed that petitioners may not assert complete liberty to teach, in their schools, as or what they please; because the Constitution says "All schools shall aim to develop moral character, personal discipline, civil conscience and vocational efficiency and to teach the duties of citizenship." (Art. XIV, Sec. 5.) Would petitioners assert that pursuant to their civil liberties under the Bill of Rights they may refuse to teach in their schools the duties of citizenship or that they may authorize the broadcast therein of immoral doctrines?