Military Review

US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, NANSAS

COMMANDANT Major General John J. Hennetweg

DEPUTY COMMANDANT Brigadier General James M. Gibson

Editor in Chief COL O. W. Martin, Jr. Associate Editor COL Paul Goadman, Armg War College Assistant Editor LTC R. Glenn McCue

Production Editor Helen M. ?lall

Spanish-American Editor LTC Nentor L. Berrfoa

Brazilian Editors LTi! Alberto Fajardo LTC Alvara Galvia Publication Officer MA3 Steuen E. Bartek

Features Editor MAI Rabert W. Ifaraadag

Art and Oesign Chark8 A. Moore Walter 3. Sehwenk

Military Review
Professional Journal of the US Army
ARTICLES
hSriCdI

Ground Power After Vietnam . . . . .

. . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . .

LTC Zeb B. Bradford Jr., USA MAJ John F. Meehan Ill, USA . . GEN Cao Van Wen, AftVN Edward Bernard GIick

4 14 22 31 35 50
62

sOVkt Maneuvers Summer 1971

Vietnam What Next?

hlfhIMICe of a Historian on History

. ,.

Escalation or Detente in the Middle East The President and the Military The Media and Armed Services . . . . . . . . .

LTC James B. Peabody, IJSAR . . . Morton H. Halperin

MG D. W. Scoti.Barrett, British Army . . . LTC John If. Napier Ill, IJSAF MAJ Jeffrey L. Scribrser, USA

General Leonard Wood: Nationbuilder The President versus Congress .

77 87

DEPARTMENTS
Reader Forum Militar yNote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...2 ...97 ...107 s........ . .

Military Books

COVER
Concept by Production Editor Helen M. Hall; execution by MR artist Walter J. Schwenk. The official Modem Volunteer Army logo motif suggasts Military Reviews role in the exchange of ideas leading to enhanced profe~ional knowledge and improved military systems. I

READER FORUM
50th Arrniveraafy
FOR COMMANDANT, U6ACGSC FROM COMMANOER CANADIAN OEFENCE EOUCATION ESTABLISffiAENTS SUBJECT: FIFTIETH ANNWERSARY-ANLITARY REVIEW ON THE OCCASION OF THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MILITARY REVIEW, fAAY 1,ON BEHALF OF TNE PERSONNEL OF OUR DEFENCE ANO STAFF COLLEGES, E%TENOTO YOU, TNE EDITOR ANO STAFF OF THE MILITARY REVIEW,OUR BEST WISHES ANO APPRECIATION FOR YOUR CONTRIBUTION TO TNE GROWTH OF MILITARY SNOWLEOGE AND PROFESSIONALISM. ..

Tactics in Vietnam LieutenantColonelZeb B. Bradfordks ertlcle with the requisite qualities for performing in a in the Februery i?we of Mifiiry Review fUS prephase 111environment. (Emphaais added.)
Tactics in Vietncm) was most appreciated,for it was an imNcetor that some attempts, however fragmentary,are being made to analyze the Vietnam experience.Colonel Bradfcrd did #ot attempt to treat Vietnam as an aberration by advocating its dismissal from the mainstream of American militery thought. He correctly reafizes that future opponents are unfikely to ehccse methods and locales where the United States can most effectively project its mesaive military power. Aside from this not inconsiderable achievement, the article itself was seriously flawed. The weakness in US Tactics in Vietnem lies in its basic premise, aa well sc a disregard for the political reafities of pcst#ietnam America. At the outset, the authcr claims that Vo Nguyen Giep waa aa enamored of the concept of threastege warfare in the mid-1960s as he apparently had been in the early 1950a. From Uda point, Colonel Bradford moves on to claim that the major Iaaecn to be Iaemed from Vietnam is thet the US Army can function well only in phaae Iii operations when the insurgent is conducting conventional operations and relying on main-foresunk. Earlier US in. volvement in revolutionary wara, the article con. tinues, is seriously hampered by the obvious fact that the US Army ia inherently ill-suited for producing subetanffal numbers of eeldiera 2 Colonel Bradfords sole suppmf for his thesis that Vo Nguyen Giap waa doggedly following the now.classicthree-stage formula in 1965 was a statement by Giap teken from Bernard Falls Street Without Joy, a statement made in 1950. A better source of Giaps tfrhrkingon revolutionary war in the mid-1960s may be found in a major article by Giap originally printed in the North Vietnamese Army newspeper Qrran Ooi fNtarr Oan subsequently ccrried in tha Oefober 1965 ad edition of the periodicalToyen Nuan. Lcfacriouslyentitled Understand the Mifitary Policies of the Party and Go On to win New WCtOrieS,the article was noteblefor the absence of the thremtcge prescription.Written prior to sustained heavy Icsses by the North Vietnamese Army (Ml in the Republic of Vietnam, Oiap did not consider the war to the south to be In a third phece, but, rather, described it as a partial aeneral uprising.Gfap discouragedthe COIV ventional phase 111doctrine and called instead for equal emphaeisto be plecad on guerrilla end regular warfere in waging a war of attrition by which, Giap posited, the war m be brought to a succecefulconclusion.The tenor of Giaps article waa a call for conaidereble flasibifii, with the only mandatory requirement being thet the war be protracted. The impact of a long protracted war on a Military Review

READER FORUM
Western society accustomed to lightning war and dapendent on military technology was clearly foreseen by Truong Chbrh as aarly as 194S, and his words loom large today: Tha more we fight,the more united our paople et home will be, and the more the world demo. crctic movamentwill auppmf ua fmm the outside. On the ether hand, the more the enemy fights, the more the antiwar and democratic movement ! in France will check hia hands. . . . The political etoation in France is confused. . . . The anti. war movament has been launched throughout France . . . embracing millions of peepIe with the alogart Immediate negotiations wNh ViatNam. Given that Giap in 1S65 waa not preaching the docfrina of threa.efage warfare, but of a protracted war, whet, then, of Selonel Bradferds contention that the US Army should concentrate on the refhrament of those thhrga it did well and should eschew theee it did poorly? Follewing this line of reesoning,the US Army should prapare itself for entry at tha third phase, avoiding any involvement in earlier stagee of rawolutionary wars. This would place us squaraly on tha horns of a potentially diaestrous dilemma. Colonel Bradford teuched all tee briafly on one major question Suppose it is pessibie that future oPPenen~ IJO eot move into phese Iii but dastmy friendly nations by other than corwanfiOnal or nearmnvantionai means. By circorn. scribing US Army capabilities so that we could daal only with phase 111operations, wa would be admitting our inability to sarva as an instrument of force for national policy save in certain cases-much like a highly skilled boser who cennot come out a winnar in an allay fight, but somahow must entice his opponent to climb into tha ring and fight by civilized rulae. At the same time, if the US Army limits itself to participation in nearanvantional situations, thare is tha distinct Iikalihc=cd that it will not be used in these circumstarn%s.N is unlikaly that any future US president will commit con. vantional Army units to combat in ravelufionary ware no matter how vieibla tha phase ill activitiaa of the ineurgants, for tha Ararericen public will net be in a moodanytimaseen to Put up with the ceeuaity tolls of tha kind that marked the US operations in Viatnwn in tha late 1S60s. For the time baing, at least, tha Communist parties in Africa, Asia and Lctin Arnaricehava ona thing going fer tharrr-tha National libereApril 1972 tion Front and the NVA hava paid off the cemmiseion to the bmkar and new other Cemmuniat ravelutiensriasin a position to reap tha divldande, sure in the knowladgethat if thay are not stopped in the eariy stages of their wars ef national Iiberationfl thay wiil not be etopped by US forces later. The eplandidly trained and aquipped cerrventional fercaa will remain in the United Stctes beccuse that Nation will lack the will to eemrnit tham to armthar Viatrssrn. AS has baen so wall put elsewhere,Not tee many people wanted the first Vietnam. No ene wants a secend Viatnsm. Rather than presenting simplified choices b~ twean the %mrnterguarrilla and the more of tha same schools et tbia particular juncture, we should, or et least some of us should, clear our minds of cent and taka a fresh look at the anfire spectrum of what Harry Eokstein has ap. propriateiy celled intemai wars. What, for inatcnca, is the causation of internal wars? Is it really necassery that tha Unitad states Iocata and train substantial numbers of personnel to engaga in intarnal wars, or can a smallar number suffice pmvidad wa use tham in a better fashion than was the case in the FAilitsryAssistance Ar!vieery Group/US MNNcry Assistance Command setup in Vietnam? Oid %euntarinaurgency fail dee to the particular doctrine, inherent weaknesses or parhaps to its unenlightanadimplamen. tation or eema combination of factors as yat unknown?tiaey other quastions have to be posed, but it should be evident that we have not yet sufficiently dafinad tha quaefiona to permit embarkationon new coursesof action for the future. Until the problem ia batter dafhred, we must resist tha tampfetion in these parlous times to clutch our strengths to eur mlleofivebosoms and close our eyes to our failures. We might adopt Genaral Joseph Stilwalia testy attitude that, in some areas and aspaets of the Viatnam unpleaaenfnass,wa did take a halluva besting, and we should find out why. If we ara unabla er unwilling to leek at tha early stegas of revohsfionary warfare and find soma answers,we might lend credance te tha Marsiek claim that our Nation will perieh because of a major centrediction: the irrsbNNy to wage the kind of war we must in erdar to eurvive. I do net beliave that wa really know how quickly tha tima ia running .. out. Ml William R. Andmws USA 112) 3

(Cmtinud

on DW

READER FORUM
(m.th.fd from ma. 8)

The German Army

There were inaccuracies in the MR Speciel

Feature dealingwith the GermanArmYPublished

in the January 1972 issue. The plan to aquip the rifle btigadea with the wheeled amphibious personnel carrier has baen scrapped due to lack of funds. Further develov ment and testing of this vabicla has ceased, although its suspension ayatem and eartain other components may be used in the building of a light reconnaissancevehicle for the brigade m. eonrzaissanceplatoons. Infantrymen in the Ja& gerbrigaden (rifle brigades) will continue to ride in the 1.5-ton Unimog truck.

The service battalionsof all type brigades

have baan diabandad,with the medical companias having been shifted to the division medical battalion. The brigades ara left with the following separate companies a haadqfrarteraand headquarters company, a light maintenancecompany, a supply company and an armored anginaer company. Contrary to what wae stated in the article, there are no signal and reconnaissance companies in the brigades although platoon-sizad elements exist in the brigade headquarters and headquarter company.

Although plans exist eventuallyto augment the machanizad and tank battalions of tha armored and mechanized brigadas with an additional fourth company, there ia little hope that this will come about in the foreseeablefutura. Neither equipmant nor personnel are availabla for this venture at this time, nor ia the future outlook in this reepect vary encouraging. The conclusion to ba drawn from thasa corrections is that the combat strength of the Garman eround forces Is considerably lass than prasented by the article. The field armYe Ceiling of 24S,000 men, with which 12 rNviaions and thrae corps are manned, poses for the plannara a continuous dilemma in their attempt to mairf tain the credibility of combat effectiveness. To consider this force the equivalent of a US three
corp~ field army would be misleading.

MAJ Renald A. Hofmann, USA Federal Republic of Germany Armed Foroaa Command and Staff Collage

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ARS GRATIA ARTIS?

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to can hardly be expected sake. Nevertheless, we believe that such a journal need not, and should not, be dull in appearance. Surely there are few who equate scholarly cvntent with drabness of mien. Furthermore, modern printing practices bring the reproduction cost of art and illustration down to that of plain unadorned type. Then too, there are many times when a good graphic representation conveys thought more clearly, quicker and in less space than a textual description.
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b--.......

ground

power

can be quife

inflexible

once com@fed

American
Ground Power

After Viehwm
Lieutenant Coionel Zeb B. Brudford Jr., United States Army NE of the more obvious results of our long involvement in Vietnam is a new awareness that the use of ground combat power can have distinct disadvantages as well as advantages. Its introduction to a cause can involve and commit a nation far more deeply than perhaps was intended initially. This is a characteristic of ground forces which is not likely soon to be forgotten and one which will have marked effects on future security policy. Ground troops of a modern democracy poesess this quality for two main reasons: . Once employed, they commit the nation to protect the lives of the soldiers involved and to redeem them if lost. There is nothing new in this. In 1910, when asked what British support the French would desire in the event of a German invasion, General Ferdinand Foch ie said to have replied, A single British soldler-and we will see to it that he is killed. Ground troops uniquely involve and commit a power becauee, once introduced into a combat situation, they cannot easily be extracted, While aircraft and ships can often reverse 4

course and make a clean break, ground forces rarely can do so once engaged. For better or worse, their employment burns the bridges of easy political or logistical withdrawal. For these reasons, we have learned that, in strategic terms, ground power can be quite inflexible once committed, however much flexibility it may provide on a tactical level. In the final analysis, therefore, flexible response was flexible only in a certain limited senee as it applied to ground forces. It gave us only a one-way flexibility by providing 8 vafiety of meane by which to commit ourselves and thus theoretically to provide deterrence across a broad spectrum of contingencies. But if and when deterrence failed, theee were not matched by means enabling us satisfactorily to decommit when once involved and when a situation no longer required a continued effort or presence. Perhaps thie is an inevitable dilemma of any strategy for the employment of military power. If extraction from a situation is too easy, then the act of commitment itself becomes less significant.
Militery Review

Nevertheless, the effect of this lesson is a strong public desire to avoid thoee situations in which we can become overinvolved t h r o u g h the use of ground forcee. Concurrent with this desire, and largely in response to the Vietnam experience, has come a public policy of moving toward greater, if not total, reliance upon volunteer forces in the near future. This policy appears to have a good chance of snccess. If so, it will have very great implications for military strategy. The effecttaking the form of manpower policies will be to place much more formidable and explicit political constraints on our abl]ity to engage in sustained and intensive conventional warfare. It appears clearly that these will be far greater than any which we have experienced in a generation. Obviously, this will not mean that the United States will no longer have the potential capability to conduct such warfare should it choose to do so. Strong popular support would permit this as it has in the pact on many occasions. But euch a capability will be clearly beyond the resources of smaller volunteer ground forces. Furthermore, the potential political constraints which thk manpower policy will introduce will have the effect of establishing a new threshold withhr the conventional spectrum of military contingencies-a threshold which has been less significant in the past and which is not adequately taken into account by current strategic concepts. In the past, we have been able to assume for planning and force structuring purposes that there is a comparatively easy transition up the ladder of conventional conflict, at least until a nuclear threehold is reached. Thle can no longer be assumed. This point is so important, that the nature sf the straApril 1972

tegic implications of prospective manpower policies requires examination in some detail. A large and steady flow of replacements is a prerequisite for a sustained war on any significant scale as can be illustrated by our extended effort in Vietnam. In combination with the one-year tour and a policy of in. dividual replacements, the draft hes enabled the United States to pursue a limited ground war for more than six years. Without the draft, we would have been faced fairly early in the war with the choice of changing our strategy by expanding the war or avoiding combat, or getting out. This was the kind of choice faced eventually by the French in Indochina. Under constitutional provisions, conscripts could not be deployed outside metropolitan France. Therefore, the French professional unite had to fight the war largely with what they had when it began. Eventually, the combat effectiveness of these unite began to euffer from lack of unit and individual replacements. This was in sharp contrast to our own experience in Southeast Asia. Since 1965, nearly two million US military personnel have served in Vietnam. Our casualties have been distributed over that large number rather than over the much smaller number of people serving in Vietnam at any given time. As a result, losses have been widely diffused-not reflected in the progressive weakening of combat units. These unite were largely unaffected by losses, being sustilned at full strength by a conetant flow of replacement. Whether or not this kind of policy is desirable, a volunteer system would probably preclude it. Certainly, we should not assume that we can attract sufficient volunteers in wartime to re5

we should

not assume that we can attract sufficient volunteers in wartim-e

stituted, in a limited war, even though current policies emphasize their importzncc aa active forces decline in size. Again, this ie based upon what one considers the true purpose of volunteer forma to be. A consequence of achieving a volunteer force would be thzt active duty personnel reasonably can be considered to be performing their chosen role if they ge$ committed to combat. Furthermore, they would Iiiely be far more profeesionally motivated and more proficient than Rczerve combat unite. Even if the Reserves are volunteers, there may be a distinct qualitative lessening in Wth their outlook and competence. Should we then consider Reserve combat unite in an all-volunteer environment as fully comparable to active units ? Currently, the active forces are merely the tip of the ieebergfl with mobilized Reserve unite being add-mm to them in a mobilization. Both Active and Reserve forces are made up largely of the same kind of nonprofessional manpower, largely drafted or draft-motivated. It eecms likely that, with volunteer a c t i v e forces, the predsuree against eommifi ting Rceerves in a limited war combat role will greatly incrcaze, even if people are drafted into them, unlczs a much closer linkage between Active and Reserve elements can be developed to compensate for what appears to be an incrcaeing divergence between them. There is another kind of consideration related to volunteer forms. This ia a possible attitudinal change on the part of much of the public which would accompany a move from draftee to professional forces. If indeed Army ground forces possess a unique capacity to commit the United States beeeuee American men are placed on the line, it seems reasonable
MilibIY Review

place large losses even jn a popular war. More especially, we should not do so if anything like current attitudes prevail. Without a continuous draft, any extended ground eonfllct which volunteer forces could not successfully terminate before being rendered ineffestive hy casualties would require a key political decision to alter manpower policy: either to m-institute the draft or to mobilize res~ smning the nation wished to continue the same limited war strategy. The preasuree against either of these decisions would inevitably be great. A request for draftees in a limited war situation would imply that the volunteer forces bought at great cost and effort were for peacetime cadre purposes only. Many Americans would doubtless question thie rationale since at kmst one of the major reasons we are attempting to move to a volunteer force is precisely to avoid the drafting of Americane ti fight especially in a limited war context. If, in fact, the Nation ie expected to continue to rely on the draft when a conflict develops, the need for educating the public to this feet is clear. Thie point is not being stressed in current efforts ta achieve a Volunteer Army. Further elucidation would make it clear that the Nation is being asked to embark upon a substantially new course requiring perhaps the development of a new national eonzcneus over policy goals. This may be entirely desirable. Nonetbclese, the effect would be not only to avoid those situations which might risk euctained war, but also to create pressures against escalating into a sustained war even in- a crisis. There would also be marked constraint on the use of the Reserves, especially as they are presently con8

to assume that, if those men are regarded as .profeseionale, they will be conaidared somewhat more expendable in pursuit of a diplomatic or strategic cauee $han would he citizen soldiers. It ie conceivable that casualties suffered by a volunteer force would be more acceptable to the general public as a whole than would eeeualtiee suffered by a drafted force. So, too, the anticipation of a volunteer force sustahing losses might be lese distasteful. Therefore, in both the deterrence and conduct of conventional cotilct, a volunteer force would perhepa commit the Nations intereeta lese deeply. Nonetheless, c e r t&in 1y there ia a threshold beyond which this would not be true. Budgetary factors will also have a decisive influence on military capabilities. In turn, they are closely related to manpower policies. As a preetiwd matter, the resource pie must be optimally balanced between sophleticated equipment necessary to success on a modern battlefield and the highly qualified and teclndcally proficient manpower which can fully exploit it. It would be pointless to expend scarce dollars on advanced equipment at the expense of personnel competent to use it. It would likewise make little eense to hire more personnel then could be adequately equipped. The r~uirement to achieve the proper balance witldn limited reaourcee tends to rule out lsrge-scele land forces in the foreseeable future, for the demands of materiel modernization compete with manpower for the defense dollar. At the eeme time, the accelerating costs of manpower, associated largely with efforts to increase the numbers of volunteers, means that each dollar buys lees manpower. To illustrate tlis latter point, the ArmY forces which we maintained in F]scal Year 1969 Mril 1972

would cost us @ver $4 bSlion more now then they did then due to the increased wet of military manpower alone. Similar cost growth problems exist in the other eervicee. Manpower cost growth creates pressures to reduce reliance on manpower and to become more capital-intensive. These pressures, in turn, reinforce the influence of other factors whi@ tend to limit our capabilities for sustilned, ground combat on a large scale. The use of ground foreea cannot be adequately assessed without reference to nuclear weepone-tactical ones in particular. The utility of nuclear power hae changed relatively lees then that of conventional power although it is inevitably diminished in a world of greater tolerance for diversity. Fewer and fewer foreign policy goale eeem to be worth dying for as indlviduale, let alone es nations. But nuclear power in support of limited goals is potentially too unlimited to be very credible. This, of course, is notidng new. These are the kinde of considerations which brought a etrategy of flexible reeponee into being in the first place. It was the deeire to have alternatives to a nuclear response which prompted the buildup of conventional forces in the early 1960s. But it ia not a eimple matter of reversing the trend and now going hack to greeter reliance on nuclear forces. Nuclear weapons are now known not to have deterred limited conSict in Southe@ Asia or in the Middle Eask nor were they employed. That this would be the case was not known in 1960. It wee believed then that conventional war would be approached with much greeter trepidation than turned oat to be the ease. Now, there is prabably a greeter reluctance to pay a high price for a nuclear option, as 1

commitment

to sustained

conventional must

war . z .

be downgraded

well as perhaps less active concern over the inherent risk of escalation that nonnuclear confllct enti]ls. Ae a result, we could be moving unintentionally into a dangerous situation in which the early use of nuclear weapons might be seen as the eole means of compensating for the limitations of ground power in the event a crieie were to escalate rapidly and we were to find ourselves involved with ground forces or with other vital interests at stake. The challenge is to devise a means by which a tactical nuclear option has credibility while reducing the risks inherent in its possession. Since nuclear power has credibility only where the stakes involved can be shown to be reasonably worth the rieke inherent in its use, it must be tied to a context which makes the commitment of the United States credible. If configured properly, ground forcee not only play a key role in developing such a context, as they do now in Europe, but any conventional capability they possess provides an alternative to early nse of,. or the threat to rise, nuclear weapons. The combined effects of all of theee conetrainte and conditions point to a very circumscribed role for ground forces, con5ned to a much narrower range of likely contingencies than was the caee under flexible response. Thle reflects a changing assessment of the goale onr forces might usefully serve. But what should ground forces be configured for? Why should they be retained at all? The answers to these questions in the abstract are inevitably vague and rather unsatisfying beeause the future ia unknowable. Furthermore, different valuee are placed by varioua persons upon the resonrces which ehould be devoted to hedging against uncertainty. Differ0

ent people consider varying degr s of risk prudent and acceptable. Un r erlying theee valuee are widely dNergent aseumptione about what kinds of uncetilnties we o n g h t to hedge against. Military forces ought to be considered premiums paid for accident ineurance. The estimated rick of hav. ing an accidsnt, and the peqalty we are willing to accept if we have one, determines the size of the premium we are willing to pay. The likely kinds of miehape influence the form of protection we buy. Even the optimistic person, if he ie prudent, buys come inqurance. The difference, of course, ie that forces, unlike ineurance premiums, may actually change the degree of risk. But the analogy has enongh validity to illustrate the basic rationale for forces, as well as the difficulty of making preciee determinations of how much is needed. Beyond meeting current policy commitments, one cannot prove tbe need for any particular requirement for ground forces. However, it seems cafe to say that forcee are needed for wnknown, but probable, future contingencies which will take place within an uncertain future political context. Whether or not the bipolar features of the Cold War are really giving way to somethhg eke, and, even if the United States wishes to play a reduced role abroad, we will continue to have a large stake in retahing an ability to protect ourselves and to influence events abroad to some degree. We will continue to have an interest in inepiring caution in other powers whose aims or m i e t a k es would threeten our interesta. We will wish to have available military power in furtherance of these interests should MilitctyRewlaw

circumstances make their use appropriate. The remainder of this analyais auggesta how we might retain a conventional option for these purposes while making allowance for the probable influences on ground power which were discuaaed earlier. Any such approach muet meet the minimum needs of present policy and, atthe came time, provide an adequate basis for the longer temn. The di5culty in developing a conventional option appropriate for the future liea in the fact that our strategic conceptz and forces do not yet take into account the changing factors affecting the utility and role of military power. We are proceeding into a changing set of circumstances with strategic concepts designed essentially to cope with yesterdays problems-that ia, containment and the assumption of a ready ability to operate across a broad range of contingencies to include escalation into large-scale conventional war and willingneaa to risk nuclear war. Furthermore, our ground forces are designed and employed consistent with theze concepts. If the previous azsesement ie correct, we should coneider a new eet of principles or gnidelinea for ground force development in the emerging period: Commitment to suetained conventional war on the model of World War II s%ould be downgraded as a basic for force development and plenning. Utility of ground forcee must be derived primarily from optimisation of active force capabilities with relatively less reliance placed upon employment of Reserve forces in a wide range of contingencies. Greater eonzideration must be given to pot+al nuclear weapons employment in the design and employApril1972

ment of active ground forces, especially in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization context. These guidelines are intended to cope with the problem of designing and employing small active volunteer forces which have inherently limited capabilities, but wh]ch must still be effective in a wide range of contingencies in support of policy. The aim is neither to make it eaaier to enter into a auetained war, nor tA euggest nucl+r weapone as a means of compensating for the limitations of ground power. Rather, it ia to provide us, insofar es is possible, choices other than those undesirable o p t i o ns. These choices must eupport policy ,at minimum risk. They must enable us to hedge against both political and military uncetilnty. The guidelines presentedhere call for substantial changea in our current approach involving both organization and strategy. While perhaps eubstentially smaller in total numbers than what we now have, Active Army forces need to he better balanced internally and more capital-inteneive in order to provide maximum readiness, organizational flexibility and combat power in being. An army composed of several rapidly deployable corps-aizad forces is a concept worth ~amining in some detail. One euch corps could maintain a presence in Europe. Another might be Asia-oriented, with one elementperheps a divisionmaintilning a presence in Asia and the remainder prepared to reinforce it rapidly. A third might serve aa an active strategic reserve based in the United Statea oriented toward reinforcing a presence abroad or establishing a new one, perhape in the Middle Eeet. Even if most or all of our forces were to be redeployed eventually to 8

1# . . .

sui%ciency

musf . . . be based on . . . both political and military judgm&r

power to meet these criteria is, within broad limite, largely a queetion of political judgment. It is important to remember, however, that deterrence is not the only purpose for developing a conventional option, and, while Europe is clearly vital, it ie not the only area in which our interests are affected. It is conceivable that other limited policy goals might require a conventional option provided by ground power. These may be such that there ie little to dletinguieh between political and military assessments of what is needed a virtual overlap of the judgments involved. The criteria of sufficiency just described are primary since it would clearly be pointless to deploy forces inadequate to support the objectives of policy. These criteria have quite naturally been tbe point of departure for structuring forces to be deployed and for developing plans for their employment. But we should also consider an additional criterion which might he c a 11 e d survivability of deployed forcee. This would mean eimply that the minimum force we would deploy would have the capability to survive and to withdraw in the face of any conventional attack without substantial reinforcement from the continental United States. While such a criterion would have validity under any circumatencee, it is of particular importance that it be assessed now due to the changing constraints on military power in conjunction with the continued presence of nuclear weapone. If followed, such a criterion of survivability would eneure that we will not be faced with an undesirable choice between nuclear weapona or the lees of a large force in the event that deployed forces get
Military R0wi8w

the United States, the basic orientation and organization would remain. Corps of the type suggested should be highly mobile and deployable in bri. gade-size increment if necessary. Appropriate air and other support elemente would need to be similarly packaged. Our Marine Corpe divieione would, of course, complement thk capability although their primary tack would be the traditional one of supplementing and extending our eea power. How would these forces be configured and employed ? There are two II@Or criteria tu be met. The first concerne the adequacy of forces for achieving p 01 i c y goalswhatever those might be-and is termed here policy sufEciency. To support policy objectives, a deployed force must clearly be sufficient to ackdeve whatever limited goals have been eet for it. The determination of sufficiency must nearly always be based upon a mixture of both political and military judgment, depending upon the goals and circumstencea of employment. If the goal is primarily deterrence, as it is in Europe, it ie large] y political. In that type context, deterrence involves more than merely a unilateral US military capability. Our deployed force there contributes to a total Allied political-military posture which should be efficient to raiee the price of military adventurism to an unacceptable level for the enemy, to include forcing him to calculate the risk of prompting a nuclear response. Our deployed ground unite thus contribute to a conventional option in this type environment by having a credlhlc ability to commit the United States in conjunction with ita Allk+a and by creating a context in which the poseeaeion of a nuclear capability is meaningful. Therefore, sufficient combat
10

involved in eomething they sannot finish at a time when the Nation eennot, or chooses not to, substantially reinforce them or otherwise enter a sustained war. This concept can be explained beat in terms of NATO. The meaning of a conventional option in providing deterrence in that context has been discuseed. Quite obviouely, a generation of peace argues powerfully in support of our polities] aeeessmente concerning the general sufficiency of the forces there. Deterrence cannot be said to have failed, but what are its essential ingr~]ents ? In the complex NATO-Warsaw Pact milieu, it is a largely political eeeesement of Allied and enemy resolve, capabilities and intentions, of estimated future interests of numerous parties, and a wide variety of other feetors over and above our own combat eepabllity on the ground in Europe. Tide is in the nature of things-the world is a complicated place, not nsatly compartmentalised into political and military affairs. But nevertheless, there is a core military consideration here. If a conflict starts in Europe, can we get our forces out witbout a nuclear war if, for some reason, NATO forces as a whole fail to halt a Warsaw Pact attack? It may very well be that we can. But if through some shift in balance of forces or other circumstances it were to become clear that US forces could not survive, then, in effeet, the President would have only a Hobsons choice between nuclear escalation and an uneuecessful Amerieen Dunkirk should deterrence fail. Hietory illustrate to avoid. ence, the April1972 offere some examples which the kind of choice we want Looking to our own experidefeat of US forces in the

Philippines at the beginning of World War 11 can be cited. Could our President have survived the disasters of Bataan and C!orregidor had they not been presaded by a whole series of unprecedented events, including the fall of France and the attack on Pearl Harbor, which generated an atmosphere of world crisie in which our cause became transformed into virtually a moral crusade ? Had nuclear weapons been available to him, would President Franklin D. Roosevelt have employed them against the Japanese overwhehning our forces under Douglas MacArthur? Would he have had any real choice not to use them? While our forces in the Philippines were not sufficient to survive against the conventional power of the enemy, the environment was then nonuclear. Today, it is not. Another important reason for considering a criterion of survivability is ite potential as a meaningful basis for force structuring on military grounds. This, in turn, has great implications for the requirements and etandarde of military advice. The war-fighting capability sufficient in a given situation for a conventional option perhaps cannot be determined on military grounds alone since the assessment may be primarily political in nature. But survivability is more narrowly military and more measurable. Furthermore, it is clearly within professional military responsibility and competence. History provides an illustration. When Adolf Hitler sent his small token force into the Rhineland in 1936 to remilitarise it in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles and the large French Army, he was making a political gamble. His generals were right to tell him that it was an unsupport11

trends

already in process . . . point toward smaller, more ffexible,

forct%

able decieion on military grounds alone, for French forces could easily have destroyed the German units. Ae it turned out, hls political judgment wae vindicated since the French and the other treaty signatories acquiesced. Furthermore, Hitler was probably willing to lose the entire German force. But his military advisers made the potential costs of the policy clear. Had he erred in his political judgment and the German force been annihilated, perhaps he then would have been seen as an irresponsible, rather than a merely audacious, political leader. The point is that MS correct political judgment doea not vitiate the correct military judgment of KIs advisers, nor could it serve as any rational basis for designing a task force. We may again turn to NATO for illustration. There is a reasonably precise means of estimating what combat capabilities alternative US forces, including our current one, would possess in a combat withdrawal to the West in the face of conventional enemy pressure without substantial reinforcement or Allied assistance. The minimum adequate force is probably on the order of several heavy divisions supported by substantial air cover. But for deterrence, a necessary US contribution to tbe altiance may be significantly more or lees than that. As a practical matter, should deployed forcee be reduced below what professional military judgment considers to be a prudent minimum tm survive, it would be the responsibility of the military adviser to make this clear to the decisionmaker, Obviouely, there could be alternative optione for survival in a given situation. But the differences between these in terms of resource requirements could be meaeured with a fair amount of accuracy, 12

and their implication could be examined. As described, the two criteria of sufficiency and survivability can serve to define the parameters within which ground forces should be designed and employed in consonance with the probable new conditions of the post-Vietnam period we are entering. To be consistent with these employment concepts, active forces stationed in the United States would require sufficient logistic support on hand for immediate and rapid deployment and combat susteinabitity without substantial reinforcement. Therefore, sufficient direct support elements-those needed for survival in comba%should be retained in the active structure for these forces. The maintenance of physical military presences on land massea abroad, while feasible and desirable in the transitional near term as a part of our treaty commitments, can not be considered a permanent option. When conditions no longer require or permit them, our Army ground forces would, of course, be withdrawn to the United States. But their role would continue to be to provide the capabHity to interpose rapidly presences of the type described above into vital land areas abroad. It follows that a paramount task for military planners would be to develop scenarios for likely general-purpose force employment in key areas in order to determine with precision the strategic mobility and other logistical asseta required to support employment of ground forces in a limited war. Any mobiliaetion strategy would have to be designed to support that kind of selective employment. This article has euggeeted some concepts for the use of conventional Milituy Review

power which appear reasonable in view of current am-l expected conditions. In spite of unprecedented inhibitions on the use of military power, a posture adequate to afford the capabilities suggested should be poesible in the foreseeable future even within the resources expected to he available and in a volunteer environment. Furthermore, everything suggested herein could be accomplished in a way consistent with trends already in process which point toward smaller, more flexible, forces. Full adaptation to the general con. cepte suggested here would have far-reaching implications for policies and practices throughout the d e f ens e structure. Among the more important areas requiring analysis are: Impact of escalating manpower costs to include assessment of the means by which we can truly become more capital-intensive and acldeve greater effectiveness per man. . Means of achieving an improved tactical nuclear capability, particularly in the NATO f?mce. . Means by which inoreaeed reliance on active forcee can be made

feasible; this involves appropriate new concepts for Reserve and National Guard roles and condguration. . Assietauce to Alliee, policies and practices necessary to complement our own ground force employment concepts. Enha&ng the credibility of the military profeesioa. At stake ie the integrity of professional advice; this involves evaluation of means by which credibility can be genuinely related to recognizable and actual professional competence, capabilities and standarde. Adequate treatment of such subjects requires examination in depth not possible here. Such an examination is an essential precondition to any eerious effort to make the concepts developed here workable.

A forthcoming MILITARY REVIEW article by Army Reeearch Aeeociates Bradford and Lieutenant C 010 n e 1 Fredenc J. Brown will examine the policy irmplicatiorw of pntttng into effect the co?wepts prewrnted in thie artitle.EDITOE.

Li.cutsnmt Colonel Zeb B. Bradford Jr. ie a member of the US Army War College, class of 19Z2. Selected ae an Army Reeearch Aeeociate, he b eurrentlv a Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D. C. He holds a B.S. from the US MiUtnW Academg, a Maeter of Public Administration from Hareard University, and ie a 1969 graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff CoUege. He served irz Vietnam with the let and 9th Infantrg Divisione, and waa aeeigtwd to the Ofie of the Chief of Stuff, Washington, D. C., for two lWre. . 13

April1972

ECENT testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee indicated that the United States had not conducted any divieion-size maneuvers of ita US Strategic Army Forcee unite for at leaet four yeare although declining overeeze deployment of US units ehould lead to a more frequent scheduling of such exerciees. In the Soviet Union, however, division-size maneuvere are commonplace among thoee unite based in European Rueeia as opposed to those deployed in Eaetern Europe and on the Chinese border. An analysis of last summere activities provides a good example of a typical hnroer training program in the Soviet Union. In 1971, there were no large-eczle maneuvere such as Dnepr (fall 1967) or Duimz (spring 1970), and the absence ,of such showcaee maneuvere provides an opportunity to view the So. viet emmner echedule as it ia normally conducted. The Soviet training year begins in September with the demobilization of those completing their two-year obligation and the assimilation of inductees into the unite. This process is accompanied by parades, meetings and pageantry designed to stimulate the patriotism of both the old and the new. From September through the middle of April, all units are in the winter training period and are primarily concerned with individual and 14
Militam Review

Major John F. Meehen 111 Urn-ted States ArmU

small unit training+onducted, in the main, in the cantonment areas with only short periods spent in the field. In late winter and early spring, small-scale tactical exercises are held, but are frequently one sided and rarely larger than battalion in size. In late April or early May, depending upon the geographies location of the unit, the troops leave the compounds, not to return until the following September upon the completion of the eummer training period. Wherever and whenever possible, the units move to a training area totally unfamiliar to the% presumably to sever ties with the home base-and families-and to inject more realism into the exerciees to follow. Until the firet of June when the summer period officially begins, the unite are engaged in range dring which begins with individual and crew served weapons, including tanks and artillery, and cuhninates, for most units, in live-tire =ercises that involve atilllery and air, as well as the organic ground weapons. By mid-July, most units have completed the range firing, and combined arme maneuvers begin. Soviet maneuvers have the stated goal of teaching troopa that which ia necessary for battle and, mncurrently, craating the psychological etrains that would be present in a red battle. These two concepts are frequently in conflict as too much, psyhIIril1972 15

chological strain is not conducive to learning. However, realiem in training is the overriding consideration, and Soviet maneuvers generally approximate the ideal in this regard. Two-sided exercises are preferred, hut, as live-fire exerciaee are frequently held, obvious dlliiculties arise. Soviet literature is full of criticism of maneuvers that have been thought out to the last detail, but a high degree of control is an obvious necessity in a live-fire exercise. Nevertheless, a high degree of flexibility and freedom of action is obtained, especially at the small unit level, and junior officers enjoy wide latitude in their decisionmaking. Realism Prevails Realism, however, retains its high priority, and some interesting methods of achieving this have been discuesed in the Soviet press. Lhe isotopes are used to eimulate nuclear contamination, descending airborne troope ofbm fi~e on popup targets, and air and artillery fire is routinely used to prep objectives during maneuvers. Chemical, biological and radiological training receives constant emphasis, and most manauvers include prolonged operation conducted by the troops wearing protective masks and clothing of a typa not on hand within US unite. In two-eided exercises, such meaeuree invariably cause delays in the flow of the maneuver. However, in the Soviet context, this causes little difficulty es a portion of each training day is devoted to political indoctrination, and thie, coupled with the use of the discussion as a favored training vehicle, requiree frequent breaks in the maneuvar scenario under any circumstances. While Soviet maneuvers cover the
le

epectrum of poeeible tactical activities, certain activities occur with such frequency as to be almost a fetish. Soviet strategies emphasize the importance of surprise and of obtaining the initiative. The conduct of Soviet training reflects this aggressive doctrine. Soviet maneuvers almost alwaye begin with a night movemen&usually a forced marchand the following morning results in a meeting engagement with a prepositioned enemy force. The Red side-the friendly side in Soviet maneuverethen either continues the attack or assumes defensive positions, depending upon the scenario. River croseings are conducted during the course of most maneuvers, and, throughout all maneuvers, constant emphaeia is placed on speed and continuity of action. None of this is unique to the Soviet forces. What is unique is the constant

Major John F. Meehan III is a stw dent at the US Army Institute for Advancsd RuesiIzn and Eaet European Str4die8 in Garmi8ch, Weet Germany. He rsceived a B.S. from the US MWtnry Academy in 1962 and an M.A. in Political Seisnce from the Vniversitv of Colorado. Hie aiwignnwnts have included dutv in Korea and Vietnam.
Militery Review

Officially, Yug was conducted from 9 to 19 June in a vast are of southern RussiaYug means sent2 -and was centered in two regions: the first in an area on the Black Sss near Odessa, and the eeeond in an area several hundred miles to the eaat in the north of the Caucasus Mountains. Actual movement began several days prior to the official starting date with units deploying into the maneuver areas. Prior to the start of the maneuvers several days before, according to the Soviet pressthe units involved in the exercise received an influx of reservists as fillers. Approximateiy one-third of the Soviet divisions are maintained at less than wafilme strength, 1 and the emphasis given by

repetition and the predictability of Soviet maneuver scenarios. Interestingly, in US maneuvera, the friendly force usualiy begins the maneuver in the defensive position, and only after the enemy attack does it shift to the offensive. The predilection of the United States for maneuvers that begin defensively and that of the Soviet Union for those that begin offensively provides a rather striking illustration of each countrys view of the initial stages of any future war. The first combined arma maneuver of any sise to be held in the summer of 1971, and which was widely reported in the Soviet press, involved an estimated 10 divisions, including an airborne division and a Marine brigade. In no way was this maneuver unusual in the Soviet context, but an analysis of this exercise will illustrate the conduct and flavor of a Soviet maneuver.
April 1972

lUver crossings are conducted during most meneuver% and emphasis is on speed and continuity of sction as during Yug with troops above about to enter sn WI helicopter 17

SOVIET MANEUVERS

the Soviet press to the integration of reservist into the units involved in YZW would indicate that many of these units are among those maintained at less than full strength. The total number of reservists utilized was probably small as Soviet sources mention only the callup of specialists such as tank crews, drivers and radio operators, and no reference is made to the assimilation of infantrymen or others of a less technical nature. By 9 June, the augmentation process had been completed, and friendly units were in assembly areas a daya march from the maneuver ares, while enemy forces were prepositioned in defensive positions in the maneuver area itself. On the evening of 9 June, the alarm was given, and the friendly forces began the night march into the maneuver area. The maneuvers in the east, while officially part of Yug, do not appear to have been closely coordinated with the action around Odessa which received the attention of the press and 18

ie the more interesting of the two. The exercise in the eas~northern Caucasus-probably involved the bulk of the forces of Yug, and it closely followed the standard Soviet ecenario night march, meeting engagement, attack, defense, attack and victory with only a river crossing to break the monotony. Ae is frequently true of Soviet maneuvers, Yug had political overtones and thus eerved a dual function of being both a training exercise and a military demonstration. That portion of Yug conducted in the west, in an area bordering Rumania, was viewed se a political-military warning to the General Secretary of the Rumanian Communist Party, Nicolae Ceausescu, who was then in China, not to push his independent policy to the extreme. As the scenario of the maneuver involved an airborne assault by one of the seven Soviet airborne divieions, as well as an amphibious assault by a Marine brigade, the Rumanians must have been painMilibuy Review

SOVIET MAHESVESS fully aware of the implications. While it is difficult to obtain from Soviet eources exactly where the airborne aeeault and amphibious landing occurred, the weight of the evidence suggests that both were held in areas close to the Rumanian border, and publiehed Rumanian reaetione tend to confirm this. Z The lackluster character of the maneuvers in the east might be an indicator that the airborne eeaault was originally scheduled for that area rather than in the west. If this assumption is correct, the change in locale can be interpreted as politically motivated and as a military reminder to the Rumanians of the Soviet capability to intervene. A related political development revolves around the activities of the Black Sea Fleet which took en active part in the maneuvers-both in a support role and in the conduct of independent naval exercises. On 11 June, Leonid I. Brezhnev made a public call for a mutual reduction of the world navies, and yet, one day later, Marshal Andrei A. Greehko visited the Black Sea Fleet, making the traditional speeches calling for vigilsnce and maintenance of the armed might, which representa a curioue blend of signals from the Soviet hierarchy. On 10 June, Marehal Grechko and Marebol Alekeey A. Yepishev, Chief Political Officer of the Soviet Armed

The West Germ&r Soldd aid !teehniknoted the am of Irelieepters sod amphibious PTS vehicles dnriog the soviet 2%8 maneuver, end also Pietnred the old BTE162 armored personnel eerriere employed in the maneuver, in the top picture with f6Av Apdl 1972 18

SOVIET MANEUVERS Forces, visited the Marine detachment which was to kmd on the 14th, and, characteristically; commente made underscored the success of the assimilation of reservists into the Marine units. Since Marine units are main. tzined at 100 percent strength, the participation of Marine reservists in the maneuver is an indicator of the stress placed on them by the Soviet hierarchy. Amphibious Assault On 14 June, the Marine brigade conducted an amphibious assault in the rear of the defending Blue (enemy) forces. The night before, the embarked landing force had been attacked by eight torpedo boats and by several submarines. However, the landing force, aided by the antisubmarine warfare carrier LenirtgrozZ, successfully repulsed the attacks, and the landing began on schedule the following morning, preceded by a shore bombardment and bomb runs by land based naval aircraft, all of which gave the landing a high degree of reatism. The landing was successfully made against stubborn resistance, apparently provided by umpire ruffngs as the shore bombardment was lifted just prior to the actual landing. Immediately upon landing, the Marines were hlt in the flank by counterattacking enemy armor. But this threat was quickly eliminated, and an inland position was conao2idated. After the succese of the Marine landing to the rear of the Blue defenses, the main Red forces moved into the attack. A hasty river crossing was made by employing an infantry company in a he2iborne assault to secure a bridgehead, followed by the rest of the infantry battalion which swam the river in their organic vehL cles. Bridging equipment coon ar20 rived, and heavy equipment was quickly brought across. Blue defenses were penetrated, and, the next day, the airborne drop was mad~probably to seal off the retreat of the Blue forces. Tirree Drop Zonss The immediate objective of the airborne division was the seizure bf an improved airstrip in the rear of the enemy force. Three drop zones were used, but only a limited amount of heavy equipment was airdropped. Press releaees show the main drop being made within 1 mile of the airfield,.and this main drop probably was of regimental size, with the obvious mission of seizing the field. WNhin 30 minutes-another indicator of tbe close proximity of the drop aone to the objsetiva-the aiffield was secure, and the remainder of the divieion and the bulk of tbe heavy equipment were then airlanded. The third drop zone referred to in tbe press releaees was probably of battalion size and, by doctrine, would be on the most likely enemy avenue of approach. This element soon made contact with, and defeated, attacking enemy armor. As an exception to frequent. practices, none of this action involved live fire, but it was two-sided with defending forces being present in the objective area. On 19 June, the exercise officially terminated, but, contrary to normal Soviet practice, the parade and critique, standard after any sizable maneuver, were not publicized in the press. The parade may not have been held, and one can only speculate about causes. A reasonable explanation is that the reconcentration of forces from such a diverse area was not felt to ba worth the cost involved, and the cost would have been considerable. Military Review

SOViE7 MANEUVEIiS Yzw has interest to the Western observer because it illustrated, on ~ small scale, Soviet employment of its airborne and Marine units in conjunction with its standard infantry divi. sions. Air, aea and ground elements were all involved in the maneuver, but integration of these elements into the scenario, and subsequent coordination among the elements, appears to have been Iese than satisfactory. Frequent criticism was also dkected at low level commanders for their failure to conduct proper reconnaissance, and stress waa placed on the necessity for complete knowledge of enemy dispositions before commitment of friendly forces. Opal-71 The next maneuver to warrant comment in the Soviet press was not of a size large enough to command press attention under usual conditions, but, as it included Hungarian, Czechoslovakian and Soviet unite in a joint exercise, it was duly reported. OZMZ-71was conducted from 2 to 5 August in Czechoslovakia and Hungary under the control of the Hungarian Minister of Defense, General Lajos Czinege, and was a command post exercise designed to improve coordination of the forces involved. A limited number of troops from each army dld take an active part in the exercise which consisted of bridging the Danube by engineer elements of each of the armies and the crossing of heavy artiliery. No tactilcal maneuvering was reported, and the goal of the exercise seems to have been simply the coordination of the staff elements of the three countries involved. 1Tfu Militim Bdam 1070-1971, The lnstitutm for Stmtcak ShIdIM, London, Enc., D 7.
s Thd Dailv Tebonmh, Lmdan. 20 June 1971.

OSRZ1-71was the culmination of a series of Warsaw Pact maneuvers held in June and July which exceeded the normal pace of summer training of the pact forcee. The increased tempo of Warsaw Pact activity also had a dual purpose, as, in addition to increasing the military proficiency of the forces, including Soviet, it aiso helped remind Yugoslavia and Rumania of the lessons in Czechoslovakia. Similar Programs WhHe thk discussion has concentrated on the summer activities of those Soviet divisions in European Russia, specifically those in the south. ern part, other Soviet divisions conduct similar programs, and those deployed in East Europe and along the Chinese border can be assumed to maintain an even higher degree of combat reediness than those dlScuesed. The yearly cycle for all units is, however, identical, with the summer months devoted to field training and range firing. The Sovieta are obviously concerned with the lack of combat experience in their units, but successfully compensate for this by a vigorous, realistic training program. In the past several years, the Soviets have substantially improved their strategic offensive and defensive capabilities, but, concurrently, they have made comparable increases in the tactical capabilities of their air, ground and naval forces to conduct COIW3ntiOUfd warfare. 8 Realistic and demanding training exercises, such as OpaJ and Yug held this summer, maintain Soviet forces in a state of high readiness, fully prepared for virtually any eventuality. *Inbmbw with OemralAm& J. Gmh8ter, cOMslaId#a WV* ~mt of Derenca, WUI&@OIIj D. C., ss JUIJ 1971,D S. 21

APril 1912

General Cao Van Vien, Armu of the Republic of Vietmun

HERE was a time not too long ago when Communist troops in Vietnam moved about by foot and carried their supp2ies aboard bicycles they pushed up and down jungle trails. Mobility and distance were then measured by the amount of sweat and teare the seemingly indefatigable noncombat soldiers of the Vietminh movement shed to bring arms, ammunition, food and other supp2ies to their frontline comrades. French generals serving in Indochina in the early 1950s had a look at Communist propaganda pictures released abroad and shook their heads in a mixture of disbelief and compassion. In mid-1954, the valiant French ArmY was soundly beaten in a 2ittle-known mountain depression, the name of which hae come to eum up the myth of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) invincibility. Indeed, with nothing but human labor and resourcefulness, Vietminh fighters had thousands of tons of war supp2ies brought to Dien Bien Phu where they staged the biggest battle of the first Vietnam war. The isolated French garrison soon surrendered. Within weeke, a cease-fire agreement was concluded. When the hostilities were rekindled six years later, the Viet Cong chose to walk on the path laid out by their Vietrninh elders. For another decade, Viet Cong feats-of-arms eloquently illustrated one of the Communists most cherished tenets: that Iogistic prepara22 Milii Review

tions are a crucially important aspect of a military encounter, and, more often than not, its most decisive aspect. Another tenet wae freedom of movement, which eometimes has been referred to as their strategic mobility, an aspect of Mao Tee-tungs fishwater concept-the people being the water in which fish-guerrillas swim. The NVA etrategic mobility materialized only as the result of a set of external and internal conditions traceable to the divieion of the world into two rival blocs after World War II and the new sociopolitical frame of natione then emerging from the darknese of colonial days. Indeed, for nearly a quarter of a century, the Vietnamese Communists

bad two considerable advantages over the Alliee. They enjoyed the eafety of perfect baee areae-ineide the country or adjacent to ikwhere they could withdraw after a battle and prepare for the next etrike in all tranquility. Through terrorizing the people into submission or brainwashing them into cooperation, they could move around undetected, bringing death and destruction wherever they ,might deem militarily advantageous and politically profitable. Basic Militsrv Principles Against this, the South Vietnamese and US Armiee have tried everything short of an invasion of North Vi&. nam, the enemys great rear. However, until four years ago, all strategic notions embodied in the Allied effort had been more or less eucceesfnlly countered by the enemy in accordance with Maoe eix basic military principles w h i c h recommend withdrawal when the foe advancee, attack when he withdrawe, a strategy of the few against the many, tactics of the many against the few, reliance on ones opponent for supplies, and a fish-water relationship between the army and the population. As the second Vietnam conflict entered its eighth year in 1967, a military stalemate appeared to have been reached. Communiet and Allied units constantly clashed with one another throughout the country. Each day, there were reported countless big and small battles in which either party claimed b be victorious. fmoking back at tbie period, one must say both sides were justified in their claims-although only partially. In the face of the Alliee incomparable firepower, the enemy ueually had to disengage after come fighting. But, more often than not, AUied command23

GeneraZ Cao Van Vkm ie Chief of the Jmnt Geaerd Staff, Republic of Vietnam Arnwd Forcee. He joitwd the ArmII in 19.46 and in 195$ beoanw one of the youngeet battalion comnuwrdare in the Nati.mal ArmII of Vietnam. He attended the US ArmII Comnwnd and Geners4 Staff College, studied at the Fdty of Lettere, Saigon University, and graduated a licencie es lettree. He became Chief of the Personal Staff at ths Pre8&faq of the Republic and wee commmxting gen4ra4 of the III Corps aad Third Miiitaw Region ~or to hie pre8ent assignment. Apd!1972

VIETNAM ers failed to take advantage of their tactical successes, thereby permitting the foe to reach the safety of hk base areas. On the other hand, the enemy could not achieve anytbhg decisive enough to bring about the disintegration of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) or the collapse of the fighting will of the American public aa he did the French at Dien Bien Phu 13 years before. Deadlock This etelemete was quite visible from other angles too, With a clever propaganda apparatus, the Hanoi regime sncceeded in giving a substantial segment of world public opinion a degree of conviction that it was fighting for liberty and independence. But, in the Republic of Vietnam, too many people had experienced life under communism to subscribe to that proposition. Aleo, with no responsibilities vie-a-vis the common people, the Viet Cong underground repeatedly did its beet to wreck the socioeconomic infrastructure of the nation. Thns, in 1967, the conflict seemed to be at a deadlock militarily, politically and economicallyand neither side appeared willing or able to break it. Confronted with this stalemate, Allied generals knew they had to do eomething to break the vicious circle of war, death and destruction followed by bigger war, more deaths and wider destruction. But the US global strategy of flexible responsa, on which the Allied strategy in Vietnam was dependent, limited US and ARVN military initiatives to escalation steps Hanoi could easily preempt or counteract. On their part, the NVA commanders were also aware of this battlefield reality. But, unbound by moral considerations, they worked out a dia24 bolic plan of campaign that nearly gave them victory. It was the general attack, general uprising plan which resulted in the early days of 1968 in the famoua Tet offensive. In the course of this campaign, the Communists penetrated the Republic of Vietnams cities and townships, thanks to a holiday truce they themselves had suggested. By etaging this unprecedented flurry of attacks, the enemy posed an eloquent denial to Allied claims of seeing the light at the end of the tnnnel and convinced American pnblic opinion of the necessity to disengage from Sout@ast Asia. Three months and 80,000 casualties later, he eaw the attahment of none of his incountry objectives. Instead of the popular uprising he had forecast, he discovered that the people -of the Republic of Vietnam had shunned him altogether. Instead of being victorious, the NVA units were badly mauled and their ranke tragically decimated. Principle of Encirclement Also, the Tet campaign apparently was launched according to an original interpretation of Marshal Lln Plaos principle of encirclement of the townships by the countryside. The enemy high command must have reckoned that tbe NVA control over the many contested villages and hamlets would be gained as a bonus payment for its bold attacka on the urban areas. By mid-1968, bowever, US and ARVN troops had broken the Communist nooses around tbe cities, and, takhg advantage of the political vacunm in the countryside, expanded government control to an ever larger chunk of South Vietnamese territory. For all the blood, toil, ,tears and sweat of their troops during Tet, enemy commanders had achieved nothhlilltaryReview

VIETNAM ing but what a military analyst called an incomparable propaganda victory but a serious military fiasco. Confirmation of this was fast to come from the Communists themselves. The Central Office for South Vietnams Ninth Resolution, ordering a few months later an economy of force strategyin other words, a return to guerrilla warfare-constitutes a realistic assessment of post-Tet NVA capabilities. Tet might very well have been the turning point of the war-at least as we had known it. By mid-1968, with tbe enemy retreating on all fronts, the Alliee enacted a eeries of measures that were to alter the essential character of the confllct altogether. Indeed, as the maeees had unmistakably voted with their feet during Tet, a decision was made which could make or break the Republic: The people of the Republic of Vietnam were armed. Over a half a million obsolete weapone were distributed to the Popular Self-Defense Force (PSDF) which theoretically comprised all ablebodied men between. the agee of 16 and 50. With one million, then two million, and even more men given the means to resist the Communist rule of terror, the conflict became a peoples war-on the South Vietnamese eide. In the enemys parlance, the North Vietnamese Army fish found the level of the peoples water dangerously shallow. The North Vietnamese Army freedom of movement was drastically reduced. Then, with the PSDF formations taking over part of the task of the Popular Force (PF), the latter was made to ehoulder some of the reepon. sibilitiee thus far belonging to Regional Force (RF) troops. In a matters of months, RF and PF units were given most of the territorial defense duties, freeing all 10 regular ARVN divisions from static defense missions and converting them into ae many strike forces deployable againet the NVA incountry base areae. By late 1969, most Communist war

Through terrorizing the people into submission or brainwashing them into cooperation, the V1etnsmese Communists could move around undetected, bringing death and destruction wherever militarily advantageous and politirelly profitable

VIETNAM zones had been ruined and the cimSict reduced ti frontier regions. Thie new fact of military life in Vietnam also grew ail the more remarkable as US troops had started redeploying from the war theater and commenced a form of operational standdown in their tactical areas of responsibility. It was at this juncture that Norodom Sihanouk, the Cambodian Red fell from power. ImmePrince: diately, ARVN forcee were launched against the NVA sanctuaries in that neighboring country. At approximately the same time, the port of Slhanoukviiie, renamed Kompong Sore, was closed to Communist shipping. The enemy high command had only the notorious Ho Chi-minh Trail left for feeding the war in southern Indochina. To tbie point of verity muet be traced the real beginning of the controversial Lam Son 719 campaign in the Tchepone area and many other smaller, but equally significant, strikes against selected objective in the Laotian panhandle. New Situation Four years after the Communist Tet offensive, a basically new situation has definitely emerged from the maze of daily developments. Indeed, notwithstanding ite still high coet-especially in human iives: 50 Americans, 350 South Vietnamese, and 2500 Communist dead per week in 1971the crisis hae been essentially reduced to a war of logistics with the enemy trying to keep hh supply channel open and Aliied troops endeavoring to sever it. Moreover, the Communist war apparatus is different from the tightly knit politico-miiitary organization based on a cleze aliiance between the masses and their defenders that it used to be. Isolated from the buik of
2a

the people and kept apart from one another, the North Vietnamese Army units are now only pale reflections of their old selves. This point of verity is most vieible in the rather low morale of the individual Communist soldier which the enemy high command must try to offset by greeter reiiance on materiel means. Against this new foe, what options are left for the AIKes, especially in the purely military context of the struggle, and whet should they expect in the next phase of the protracted struggle? Isoption Speakhg as early as 1966 to various audiences of rarddng Vietnamese officere, the author suggeeted a sevenstep approach to the war wtilch he tentatively calied the Strategy of Isolation. For all of its imperfection, its main points are enumerated here before setting to the tazk of discussing its merits and limitation: . Separation of the guerrillas from the local population so that their infrastructure may be eliminated. . Isolation of local Communist elemente from main force unitz so that they may not rely on one another and may be destroyed more easily. . Neutraiization of enemy incountry baee areas. . Neutralization of NVA base areas in neighboring c~untriea. . Establishment of an anti-infiltration barrier along the 17th Parallel from Doug Ha to Savannakhet. . Separation of NVA frontline forces from their rear by an amphibL one landing in the region of Vhh or Ha Tinh. Formulation of an a 11 i a n c e grouping Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and the Repubiic of Vietnam. Since these notions were tket enunMilitaIY Review

AI tneempareble prepegande ktery bat n &to#~Uta& 5aecQ the Tet effensive led to a return to gnerrilte warf~ end a realistic assessment of pest-Tet North Vietnamese Army capebilitiea ciatad, much water has flowed under the Vietnam bridge. With the creation of the PSDF in 1968, the common citisen no longer was defenseless, and he started refusing to be intimidated by terror methods. Then, as a result of the Phoenix Program-a rather successful attempt at disrupting the Viet Cong underground-the enemy infrastructure in many a village and hamlet gradually ceased to exist. Better security conditions were restored to the countryside; the Communists, who fish well only in troubled waters, lost their politico-military equilibrium in populated areas. The etage was set for more conventional battles which Allied troops invariably won, thanks to their superior firepower. By 1970, most enemy incountry base areas had been neutralized. Luekiiy for the Allies, it was then that politieel developments in PnomPenh permitted the invasion of a string of enemy war zones along the border. The encouraging reaulta A@ 1872 scored in the Parrots BealG the Angels Wing, the Dogs Face and other parta of Cambodia made the Laotian foray a year later a matter of course which should have been expected. Lam Son 719 wcs launched in February 1971, lasting two monthe and resulting in preempting a Communist plan for the northern First Military Region. Less an indubitable success than the Cambodian operations, it was, nevertheless, equally suee-sful in keeping NVA units from the Republic of Vietnam and in destroying a considerable amount of their etwke in the neighborhood of Tchepone town. Critics of the eempaign thue have erred in concluding it was a failure, probably because they saw it as the ultimate Allied effort to bring the conflict to a close. It wee not. Viewed in the military context of the protracted crisis, it should have been followed by at least two of the last three steps of
27

m.

VIETNAM the Strategy of Isolation if it were to have a lasting impact on events in this part of the world. As things are now, however, a degree of normalcy has been re-created which probably will be further enhanced. awaitinc the time when more In other words, only if the average person is convinced of the governments good intention can he be expected to keep away from the Commnnists. This is not enough, however. In order to completely isolate the enemy,

favorable circumstances may make the last options acceptable to public opinion. Although political conditions at present appear to keep the belligerents strategically at a deadlock the AIEes definitely are being favored by the new war trends. Still, there is on the Allied side plenty of rwm for improvement in accordance with the political demands of the Strategy of Isolation, at the baee of which there must be an unmitigated adherence to the principle of service to the people. 28

those in power must agree to a constant and many-pronged effort which should result in better secnrity and greater well-being for the common people. Only in these conditions can the government gain the approval and allegiance of the masses while redncing popular grievances and depriving the insurgents of the opportunities to foster subversion while hiding in a discontented community. Roger Trinquier, who wrote La Gue~e MO~WW, suggested in thle excellent book on modern warfare that revolutionary
Milltaiy Review

VIETNAM wars can only be solved by meeting popular aspirations with the help of a system of cadres imbued with the spirit of public service. Moreover, since a good half of the Vietnamese people reside in the countryside, priority treatment should be given problems of concern to countryfolke. In this undertaking, the Malaysian experiment can supply Vietnamese administrative and military pereonnel at all echelons with many valuable lessons. A measure of freedom is certainly good, but the freedom of some should not be allowed to endanger the personal security of others. Inadequate Ceuntemreasure The proposed forceful separation of the people from the Viet Cong, however, is inadequate as a counterinsurgency measure. It is a matter of common knowledge that their etrategy is one combining guerrilla and classical warfare, ueing local troops for small harassing actions, and large NVA unite for major thrusts. If those two military prongs were allowed to complement one another, the countryside would never be really pacified, and the current fighting might go on for a long time indeed. For this reason, the Allies must not simply seek the elimination of guerrilla elements only. The flow of suPplies and personnel from the North must he checked if the Communiet threat is to be brought under control. Since air raids alone have proved inadequate for this undertakhg, something else must be attempted. The Philippines, Malaysia and the Republic of Korea have been confronted with Communist-sponsored insurrections which were defeated with relative ease. They are geographically separated from the Asian Continent by a stretch of water, or only hpdl 1972 connected to it by a narrow neck of land, thus they can he said to be more or less favored in their anti-infiltration tack. The Republic of Vietnam, on the contrary, has nearly 1000 miles of land frontier to the west and an equally extensive coastline to the east. Thue, NVA corridors of infiltration abound. The Allies have tried to block them-et times successfully and at other times lees so. To sever the flow of enemy arms and men, a barrier cuttilng through all these main corridors should be established south of the 17th Parallel, going from Dong Ha in Quang Tri Province to the Laotian city of Savannakhet on the Mekong River. The author is a)so of the view that this defensive system should not be a Maginot or Siegfried-etyled line or a curtain of barbed wire of the type visible from Stetth on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic. It should, rather, be a system of operational bases manned by about three divisions of troops whose task would be to eliminate NVA elements presently roaming in southern Laos. Invasien er Alliance This project of a barrier, however, might not be welcomed by the neutralist government of Laos, especially if it should be aired when an attempt ia being made to revive the moribund 1962 Geneva agreements. Should potential obstacles prove insurmounb able, the Allies would have yet another optionnamely, an invasion of the North Vietnamese panhandle. In the last analysis, that might be the only alternative to continual warfare, especially if Saigon could convince world opinion that it nurtures no other wishes than imposing a fair solution on Hanoi. If this option were 29

ViEttUM

to be selected, the lending could be made just north of the 18tb Parallel and south of the mouth of the Song Ca RNer. It could, more speeiiiceliy, be staged in the area of Ben Thuy, from where invasionary forces would push through ta the Kee Neua and Mu Gia Passes, the femoua gates to eouthern battlefields. Any such plan, if successfully carried out, would result in a temporary occupation of the point where the Ho Ch&minh Trail begins and the severance of the NVA infiltration flow at ite very source. This option will perforce be construed as a violation of the 1954 Geneva agreements. The Paris Conference is now in ita fourth year, and the time may come when subtleties of international law wiil have to give way to battlefield rcquirementa. With an all-out invasion of North Vietnam outside the reabn of the possible in the present context of world politics, this limited invasion option is the only such measure to be considered here. It may even be made attractive to Moscow and Peking if Soviet and Chinese rulers can he convinced that the game they are watching-end footing the biil forin Southeast Asia is not worth the candle. With or without such an invasion and an ensuing negotiated settlement, however, the security of Indochina in the years to come can only be insured by a combination of military and Pelitical measures that ultimately would result in an alliance between Thailand, Lees, Cambodia and the Republic of Vietnam. In the course of a lecture delivered well before the political reaiigmnent in Pnom-Penh in March 1970, this writer bed predicted that: . . . such an a.fliance will aoencr or iatwcomeinto being, for aU theee Imfochine8e s tats e are prseentlg
30

threatened by the awns cnsmg, awl regardfcee of thmr political Wetenw, wiU eoine day recognice tkat a united front is the WJV eflective conree to cenntsr Hande qrg?eeeive design. ThbI, however, ie easier said than done, The current confllct in Indochina is total in character and thus demands a strategy of total involvement. It is only to be regretted that the etrategic tenet embodki by Aliied approaches to the conflict during the past decade implies anything but tdal involvement. If only for thie reason, no satisfactory solution to the crisis can ev= be expected to be worked out. The North Vietnamese, of course, stili work for a military victory, but the many weaknesses they present after so many years of unrelenting suffering must have made that objective nothing more than a dream. The recent catastrophic flood in the Red River Delta, the woret such calamity in a century, also must have turned that dream into a nightmare. The Republic of Vietnam is evidently in much better shape, but the contradictions in its current social arrangement probably wili prevent its rulers from venturing on something bold enough to yield potentially big rewards. Its alliance with the United States will also reduce its freedom of action, keeping it militarily on the defensive. Thus, unless sometidng truly out of the ordinary should happen, all it can hope for is to hack it outfl as a top US leader once said of the prebable outcome of the conflict. Starthg the hostilities without a war declaration, North Vietnam ia iikely to let it die down rather than acknowledge the nonfuidlbnent of its objecthwe through a formal treaty. True peace is yet to come.

tilt
Militefy Review

A&._..

-. >....

.. .

MAHAN

The [nfluenceof a Historian on History

Edward Bernerd Gliek in the aggrsasioe advance of the future upon the post, the . . . ofl Ittetow dstd of cdlieion bdng the prenent. Alfred T. Mshan

N LITTLE more than a quartar of a century, Alfred Thayer Mahan published about 100 articles and letters and more than 20 books. For these literary achievements with their accompanying political and historical impacta, he wae celled after hie death the first philosopher of eea power: I For theee achievements, too, he was in hie own lifetime elected to the British Royal Navy Club; feted by the Queen, her Prime Minister, and her First Lord of the Admiralty; appointed to the Naval Board of Strategy during the Spanieh-American

War; made a member of the US delegation to the 1899 Hague Peace Conference; advanced to the rank of rear admiral on the retired list although he was never a rcaUy outstanding naval officer when on active duty; awarded degrees by Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard, Yale, and Columbia Universities; and given the highest honor an American historian can receive: the presidency of the Amerissn Historical Aseoeiation. Why did Mahen become a hietorian, and what can be said about Mahan on history rather then on see power? 31

APIS1S72

The turning point in his life-the transition from naval officer to naval writerbegan in 1885, when, as. a captain, he was invited to become Lecturer in Naval History and Tactics at the newly formed Naval War College. He readily accepted the invitation since, in his words, at 45 he was drifting on the lines of simple respectability as aimlessly as anyone very well could. 2 while waiting to take up his new assignment, he used his free time to devour every hook he could find that might possibly have a bearing on his future lectures. 32

It was while reading Theodcm Mommeens History of Ronw in the Englieh Club in Lima that he was suddenly struck . . . [by] how different thzngs might have been could Hannibal have invaded Italy by sea, as the Rom8ns often had Africa, instead of by the long land route . . . Y and he resolved to investigate coincidentally the general history and naval history of the past twb centuries, with a view to demonstrating the influence of the events of the one upon the other. 8 The result, based on. lectures he gave at the Naval War College, was hi&book, The Injlusnce of SeePower Upon Hietorg, 1660-1788, published in 1890 and followed by his other sea power books, biographies, articles and letters. The book was an instant success, receiving the approval of many fellow officers and public leaders. But with the coming to power of the Cleveland administration, the Navy Department adopted a negative view toward the college and Mahans place in it. Accordingly, he was given orders to prepare for sea duty in European waters. This turn of events greatly depressed Mahan, for he was just beginning to feel the satisfaction of published authorship. However, lifes little tragedies are often blessings in disguise. The unexpected, but very gratifying, acclaim the English gave him in 1894 increased his self-confidence as an author and enhanced his reputation at home where the general public had previously shown little interest in his writinge. In fact, his experiences in England, where he was given honors never before bestowed upon untitled foreigners, had a great deal to do with hls decision to retire from the United States Navy two years later in order Military R0Vi8W

MAHAN to devote himself full time to writing. What did Mahan think about writing worde, particularly words of history, and what do others think of him as a historian? Mahan says that he never considered himself to be a historian becauee history to him was incidental and late in life and because he was thus necessarily superficial and limited. 4 Nevertheleee, he had very definite views about how history should be written and about how hard it is to write it. Research, in the sense of the painstaking gathering of facts and the serious study of primary sources, should not be the prims concern of the historian, he felt. Instead, he should worry about the classification and interpretation of materials: Facts . . . are but the bmcka and mortar of the hietorian. . . . It is not till they have undergone the mental process of the artist, b~ due eetection aud grouping of material at his diepoeal, that there i-s evolved a comprehensive picture. t Mabana main concern was with the artistic grouping of subordinate detaile around a central theme. 8 In hie phrase: It is~poeeible in come degree to imitate Froiseart and Boswell in that marvelous dilhgence to accumulate material . . . ; but when gathered how impossible it ia to work up . . . into permanewt engrossing intereet. . . . T Only in the light of Mahans approach to historiography can one understand and appreciate hh historical techniques, especially their shortcomings. In approaching Mahan as a historian, one muet alwaye beer in mind that he said: 1 cannot be expected to illustrate in my own person . . . the extensive delving into material hitherto inaccessible. . . .s This explains Apfil1972

bThe study of history lies at the foundation of all sound military conclusions and practice
perhaps why he relied so heavily on French eourcee. His work has very few footnotes, and they do not alwaye help the reader to find the references. Aleo, Mahan was in the habit of ineerting long digressions into his story. He thus followed the tradition of Edward Gibbon or Voltaire. Except for his From Sail to Steam: Recollections of Naval Life, his literary style is generally elow, antiquated and dry. Mahan sensed this, for he ones wrote: It is to thie anxiet~ for full and accurate development t of etatcmente and ideae that I chieffy attmbute a dif33

.
fwse?zes8 with which my writing has been reproached; I have no doubt jtwtlg. $ Lastly, Mahan is didactic in accordance with his own stated principle that the function of history is . . . to present them [i.e., facts] in such wise that the wayfaring man . . . shall not err. . . ,,, 10lhe wayfaring ~an as in thk case the people and Government of the United States, Since he was so nninterestad in facts as such, there are very new or little-known facts in MS works. HIS place in the hb+torieel hall of fame rests, then, not on any new material he uncovered, but on the new angle from which familiar evente are regarded. 11 Even one of his bitterest contemporary critics on political and moral groundp conceded that there is little to be said so far as the naval aspect of the case is concerned. . . . 12 There is no doubt that, when judged by MS own main standard of historiography, namely the uardinal role of interpretation, Mahan, overemphasizes the element of sea power in the determination of particular historical results. Although his own particular brand of historical determinism is different from those of Karl Marx, Sir Halford J. Mackinder, Karl Haushofer, or Samuel P. Huntington, he does share with them a devotion to historical discussion in terms of a single factor. Wbstever Ids faults as a historian, Mahan is probably the most influential military writer America has SD far produced. He did place the writing of naval history on its highest and most respected plane, making of it something much more than just the recounting of sea battles within some sort of chronological unity. Even thoee who cannot alwaya agree with his historical viewpoint anti rnetbo& ologiee must appreciate hk efforts to bring a novel and interesting, if not always valid, interpretation to the worlds attention. s AUmd Thwer MAE., FromSail ti .$tawn: of N.wal tifq RsrIMr andBmthem, Rtwil&ctioM N. Y., 1907, D 274. *Ibid., P 277. 68.64.Italka.dded. . Ibid.,p 60. . ?eIIhlm, l- wit * steam,OP.cit., p vii. e M81w, %borW@lc.. in Hle.ioricnl TreatIllerlt,,, CR.a., p 60. F- S(zit?,u St.snas, WI.cit.. m 289,. *MalmII,
4 Alfred Tkyer ?+fahan, ,,S.bordimtion in Eisbmksl Treahment,s, Amid Ewort of Ow Amm$. . . flutoricd Aswktion, Vdwm I, 1908, P 60. s IbiA, IV

1 Alfred Mtthm,Diotimwv of Amsricm Biqtranh#, Volume X11,lWS, II207.

Tiwmr

Edward Bernard Gliek is Professor of Political Science at Temple Urukw-reit~, Philadelphia, Penmqflvania. He hotde a B.A. in Hieto$y from Brooklyn CoUege of the City University of New York, and an M.A. in Latin American Ecerwmic Hiatoqf and a Ph. D. in Political Science from the Univermty of Florida. A frequent contributor to Pofessimwt jowrna.k, Dr. Glick 48 the author of SoMiers, Scholars, and Society: The Social Impact of tbe American Military.

34

Milltwy Review

Escalation or Detente h
the Middle East

Lieutenant Colonel James B. Peabody UmtedStete8 Armg Reaeros

HERE are signs that a new equilibrium of forces may he developing in the Middle East which could lead to detente. Nonetheless, it is necessary to understand the nature of the forces of nationalism shaping events there in order to assess the likelihood of avoiding general war. Tracing briefly the rise of Jewish, Arab and Palestinian nationalism, and then e x a m i n i n g the contlict caused by the collision of these forces withh the context of the rivalry of the Soviet Union and the United States over oil and other strategic intereets in the area, can provide a basis for an evaluation of the extraordinary series of events that have taken place in the Middle Eaat since 1967. Such an evaluation is necessary to assess the likelihood of peace or continuing war in the area.

Political zeientista tell ua that nationalism is the dominant force directing the tiaire of men in the world today. The entire globe is now organized on the basis of a system of sovereign independent nation-states. Every individual in the world is defined by his nationality. Nationality is, indeed, identity. Sovereignty, or the absolute power of the state, has been limited internally in the worlds most evolved states by the growth of institutional government, due process of law, the bSt of rights and enlightened legislation. The long and generally painful evolution which led to these developments has relcaeed great creetilve forces which have directly contributed to the remarkable achievements of modern civilization This is not to eay that all internal mwbhns of even the
35 1, ,,

A@

1972

MIDDLE EAST most moderh and powerf u] states have been solved, but it does mean that lawful and humane ways and means are available to them to do what needs to be done. In the external realm, however, nationalism has not yet been harnessed so productively. TWO catastrophic World Wars in this century serve to remind us how much progress is still needed here. Wave of Nationalism At a time when the older nationstates were curbing their external sovereignty in regional and world organizations after World War II, a wave of nationalism swept the world, creating scores of new nation-states. United Nations membership burgeoned from 60 states in Jnne 1945 to 127 statee as of November 1970. Too many young independent nationstates are now impatient to use their new sovereign powers in waye suggesting that they may well repeat many of the woret mistakes that have been made by others in the past. It is, indeed, an ironic tragedy that Jewish and Arab nationalism-twhls born into the world almost at the same time-should have collided with each other in the Middle East in the 20th century. The national liberation of these two formerly oppressed Semitic populations has become not only a threat to each others existence, hut a menace to the peace of the world. The Jdws are an ancient people who esbblished a state in Palestine under King David a thousand yeare before Christ. Their state lasted, with some breaks,. nntil the destruction of Jerusa]em by the Remans in 70 A.D. A1- . though the Diaspora, or scattering of the Jews throughout the world, began at an earlier date, the Roman persecution, climaxed by the suppression of Simon Bar Kokbae revolt in 135 A.D., 36 caused the Jews to emigrate in large numbers from Palestine. From that time, they settled in other parts of the Middle East, Arabia, all around the Mediterranean Basin, Asia and in Europe. In their new homes, they preserved their religion, their cultnre, the historical memories of past events, and their triumphs as well as their sufferings, an experience which is one of the essential elements of nationalism. With the rise of the modern nationstate in Europe in the 13tb, 14th and 15th centuries, the Jews were expelled from England, France and Spain respw~ively. They went to five in Italy and Austria, and, in the 17th century, they came to the New World. Ags of Enligbtsnment The 13th century was the age of Enlightenment, and it was the French Revolution which gave birth to new ideas envisaging the emancipation of the Jews and the possibility of their total assimilation into the modern Western nation-state based upon the superficial theory that their dMtinctivenese was limited to their religions beliefs. As the toleration of all religions was a sacred article of belief of the Enfightenment, this t h e o r Y seemed to provide a solution to the Jewieh problem. With the rice of the Romantic Movement in the 19th century, however, based upen anthropological and philological studies of peeplee folk origins, initiated by investigator like the brothers Grimm in such stndies as their famons fairy talee, the baeis of a revived anti-Semitiem on cultnral and ethnic grounds was laid. This new pseudoscientific anti-Semitism grew into the grim reality of Hitlerian barbarism in the 20th century. The Eastern European Jews, the
MiliteIv Rsview

MIDDLE EAST Asbkenazim, first saw a threat to the existence of the Jewish people in the pogroms of the 1880s in Russia and in the increasing number of anti-Semitic incidents in the West. Even worse than this, they perceived a new menace to the very existence of Judaism and Jewish culture iteelf arising out of the assimilationist ideas of the Enlightenment and the so-called progressive emancipation movemente in the West. Political Zionism was born at the first Zionist Congress in Basel, Swi& zerland, in 1897 where Theodor Herzls proposal for the establishment of a home for the Jewish people under public law in Palestine was adopted. The return to Zion had long been a mystical hope of the Diaspora Jews. They had always regarded their dispersion as a mark of favor bestowed on them by a benign God who had chosen them to do penance for their sins; ao had they suffered during the Babyloniari exile in the eixtb century before Christ. New Idea The concept of establishing a modern Jewish state, however, as the European peoples among whom they lived had done with such notable success, wae a new and daring idea. Many of the early Zionists do not eeem to have even considered the question whether there were other people living in Palestine who might object to their idea. It must be etzted that, at the turn of the century, there was little national consciousness among the small Arab-speaking population of the Holy Land. Herzl, however, caused gred concern among other Zionists when he suggested Uganda, offered by the British as a more euitable place than Palestine as the land for the future Jewish state. A split in Zloniem was avoided by returning to thie original choice of Paleetine for the new state. Up until World War I, plans to resettle Jewe in Palestine met with little succese or encouragement from the Sultan of Turkey who ruled the ares. There had always been a few pious Jewe who lived out the end of their days under the shadow of the wane of the temple in Jerusalem, and there were about 15,000 Jews living in Palestine around the turn of the century. The world population of Jewe grew from 1.5 million at the end of the Middle Ages to well over 16 million by the time of the outbreak of World 37

Lieutenant Colonel Jamss B. Peabody, US Arnut Re8eW8, ie an .48sociate of the Adanw Papsr8 which are owned by the Massachusetts Historical Society and are being publi8hed by the Harvard University Pres8. He obtained hia Docto?wte in Inter-national Law at the Univemity of Paris in 1968 and worked as a legal edviser to the United Natkwre Relief and Worke Organization for Pa188thw Refugees in the Middle Eaat from 196.9 to 1966. He is a member of the (%rwulting Faezdtg of the US ArmII Command and General Staff College. April1%12

Mut9i.E EAST War II. Pressures created by the worldwide population explosion were constantly increasing during thk period. Wfour Oeclsration On 2 November 1917, the Zionists won international recognition for their cause. A real charter under international law was drawn up for their movement with the announcement by the British Government of the Balfour Declaration. This document read in part: His Majestps Government mews with favour the .@ublishmeti $n Palesthw of a national horrw for the Jewish SWople, and will We their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of their object, it behzg clearl~ understood that nothing shall be done which mug prejudice the civil awd reli. giowe rights of existing non-.lemsh communities in Palestine, or the rights and politkxzl status enjoysd bg Jews in any other count~. This statement was incorporated into the terms of the British Mandate in 1922, and the World Zionist Organization became the official, recognized Jewish Agency through which the mandatory power worked to achieve Jewish immigration and the realization of the Jewish national home. It is at this point in time that Zionism began to conflict directly with Arab nationalism. The rift developed purely over tbe issue of the creation of the Jewish state. As iong as the Arabs thought in terms of Jews living together with Arabs in an Arab state or any other state, there was no trouble as is proved by the long history of toleration of Jews in Arabpopulated lands and by the FaieaiFrardrfurter correspondence in early 1919. 38 When it became apparent to the Arabs that Zionism meant nothing less than the creation of a Jewish etete, which was made painfully clear to them with the establishment of the Mandate in an area they felt had been promieed to them by the British for inclueion in an Arab state, their opposition became unrelenting. The history of the Mandate up until the withdrawal of the British from th~ area in 1948 is one of constant, unremitting Arab opposition to the evergrowing successes and achievements of the world Zionist movement in laying the foundations of the Jewish state. Ine1947, after ths British Government announced it was turning the Mandate over to the United Nations, the General Assembly passed a resolution which was supported by the Soviet Union and the United States and agreed to by the Jewish Agency. Rejected by the Arab Higher Executive, it calkd for the partition of the mandated territory of Palestine into two independent Jewish and Arab states with a Special International Regime for the city of Jerusalem. Stste of Isrsel When the state of Israel wae proclaimed on 14 May 1948, the armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, together with Saudi Arabian contingents, crossed its borders and were defeated. The frontiers of Israel as drawn under truce agreements in 1948 increased Israels territory by about 20 percent over what it had previously agreed to &ept under the UN partition plan of 1947. Since 1948, the Arab states have adopted the inconsistent position of denying the existence of the state of Ierael while, at the same time, claiming the rights of belligerency against it. The Arab-Israeli War has never Milii Review

MIDDLE EAST

.
stopped eince 1948. The so-c++lled wars of 1956 and 1967 have been only preemptive attacks in campaigns carried out by Ierael in this continuing war with its neighboring Arab state-a war which today ehowe little signs of ending in the foreeeeeble future. At the present time in the state of Israel, the World Zionist Organiaetion occupies a position similar to the one things might happen. Such a etate could become a binatiomd JewishArab etate beeed on modern secularist ideas ae opposed to racial, theoeratic ones. Thie, in itself, could point the way to an accommodation with neighboring Arab etatea and, above au with the UN camp refugees from Palestine. Before turning to the problem of Pelasthdan nationalism, it ie appro-

The road to Jemselem winds thmngh the Judesn EIIIs it held under the Mandate. It ie still the main instrument for the ingathering of world Jewry into the Jewish state. It is precieely the statue of the Zionist movement in Israel which is one of the key questions on whose solution depends the future of Israel as a Middle Eastern state. If a majority of the inhabitant of Ierael could be persuaded that Zloniem, having achieved ite historic goal in creating the Jewish state, should now quietly fold its tent so that the Zionist state could evolve into just another Middle Eastern Semitic state, come observers believe that wondrous M 1972 priate to examine the rise of Arab nationalism in the 19th century, and to point out in what respects its character differs from its Jewish counterpart with whkh it is now in heated competition. All nationalism is beeed on a mixture of myth and reality. The main difference between Jewish nationalism and Arab nationalism ia the amount of, myth and reality in each. In France, it is said that the difference between Burgundy and Bordeaux is the amount by which each ia cut by Algerian wine. The extent to which modern Pan39

Arab nationalism is diluted by mythological humbug is one of the major causes of the instability y and lack of cohesiveness in the Arab world today. The amount of unreality and selfdeception vitiating Pan-Arab nationalism is in sharp contrast with the Jewish experience. This does not mean, of course, that Pan-Arab nationalism is any less violent or real than Jewish nationalism. In this case, it is not what the facts are, but what one believes they are which is relevant. The Arabs are not alone, however, in not recognizing the difference between relevance and truth. By recognizing the illusions in Pan-Arab nationalism, it is possible both to explain many of the failures of Arab efforts in the Middle East and also to suggest the possibility of more hopeful developments in the future arising out of the very insubstantiality of Pan-Arab nationalism, a chimera now showing some hopeful eigns of healthy evaporation. literature and Ure Arts Ielam and the Arab language, the two pillars of Arab nationalism, are both going through periods of crisis as a result of almost a thousand years of cultural decline, recognized only too well by all educated Arabs. Before examining religion and language, it is appropriate, however, to assess some of the other historic claime of Arab nationalism: The Arabs have a glorious history of conquest and empire behind them, and their civilization during the Middle Ages achieved brilliant results in literature and the arte. In the seventh century, the Arabs poured out of the Arabian peninsula and settled like locusts upon the debris left by the fall of the Roman Empire
40

and tbe decayed remains of the Eastern Byzantine civilization centered in Constantinople. They scarcely met any SigIIifiCd resistance until a marauding party of Moors wee repulsed by Charles Martel in France at the Battle of Tours in 732 A.D. The first Arab dynasty in Damascus, that of the Ommayads, lasted until 750 A.D. At that time, the Abbasids set up their capital in Baghdad, thereby symbolizing the introduction of Persian (Indo-European) and other foreign leadership into the government. Arab Arcldtecture Beginning in the eighth century with KaliZa wa Dimna by Ibn al-Muqaffa, a Persian, the first example of Arabic prose writing, many of the great works written in the Arabic language have been written by Persians, Jews and other foreigners. The greatest examples of so-called Arab architecture, the Ommayad mosque in Damascus and the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, were designed and built by Greek Byzantine architects. The thin layer of Arab nomadic stock that poured out of the desert was zoon aeaimilated into the local societiee into which it flowed, and little specifically Arab has remained outaide the Arabian peninsula except religion and language. Since the 13th century, when Lisan al-Arab, the great Akab dictionary, was compiled by Ibn Manzur in 20 volumes, there has been a gradual breakdown of the spoken and written language until today a Lebanese cannot understand a Kuwaiti. Islam itself has broken up into as many squabbling, superstitious and fanatical secte as ever atftieted Christianity, and, with the general secular decline in culture ,and education throughout the Middle East, it has
Military REViOW

MIDDLE EAST

A sense of Egyptian identity revived aftertbe death ef Geaml Ahdel Nasser been reduced to an ahnoet irreducible mean level. This may account, on the other hand, for ita residual strength, as well as its expansion throughout the world. Isiam claime almost onehalf billion adherents, and it is considered to be the fastest growing major religion in the world today. Arab nationalism is p r i ma r i 1y based, therefore, upon the living realities of language and religion. In the 1830s, a movement was ieunched to purify, reform and revive the Arab language in the Middle Eset. This was done largely under the impetus of American mfseionariea in Lebanon who importad a printing press and obtained the services of two grcst, Christian Arab aebolare-Butros Buatani and Nasif al-Yasiji. They translated and pubiiehed many scholariy works into what was to become the basis of the new modarn Arabic. Jamaluddin al-Afghani, who seems to have coma from Afghanistan, preached a revival of the refigion
April 1972

j
called Pan-Icdainiem, while Abdul Rahman Kawekibi, a Syrian, preached pofitical revohrtion by Arab-apceking Moslems to gain freedom from Turkish tyranny. Since the 13th century after the Mongol invasions and later under the Ottoman hegemony in the 16tb centurythe Arab-speaking Mosleme of the Middle East have remained eubject peoples until their liberation by Weetern imperialist in the 20th century. But what of the pure Arab ethnic stock ? Far mora than the Jews, who are ethnically quite heterogeneous whHe stiii preserving Semitic traits, the Arabs became aasirniiated into the areas in which they had settied. while there are distinct Moorish, Egyptian, Lebanese and Syrian types, one has to turn to the Hejwian Bedouin to recognise a distinct Arab type. An Egyptian would have been insulted as iete es the 1920s if he had bean ealied an Arab. Many persona iiving today in Lebanon, a veritable anthropologi41

,
MIDDLE EAST . Untold suffering and a justifiable eense of exploitation and shame among the camp refugees baz eeueed them to form the cadres of radicalized guerrilla armies, still indirectly fmpported by the United Natione, dedicated to the overthrow of Arab Governments, as well as the state of Israel, Since 1948, it is estimated that the UN camp refugees haye grown from approximately 600,000 to over 1.6 miliion, their average age now being about 15, and the ttdrd generation of theee wretched waifs of international welfare ie now growing up in the campe. Major Spokesman The Palestine Liberation Organization, Al Fatah, not to mention the more radical leftist groups, is the major epokeaman for the UN camp refugees. It claims to speak for all present and former Arab-speaking inhabitants of Palestine; it has set up a governmental organiaetion; it hae its own flag, national anthem and armed forcee; and it claime to represent a Palestinian nation whose primary goal is to regain its lost territory by destroying the state of Israel and anyone eise, the United Nations included, who stands in its way. The history of thoze Palestinian groups who did not become the wards of the United Nations and the pawns of Pan-Arab nationalism belies the credibility of the claims of the Palestine Liberation Movement. Many Palestinians coming from the more eduoeted cizeees of the non-Jewish population in Palestine emigrated before the eetabiisbment of the stete of Israel, and they soon assimilated themselves with little dficulty all over the Middle Eeet. There were 200,000 Palestinians who stayed in Ierael after 1948, and another 100,000
Military RWi8W

cal and cultural museum, still feel that they are more Phoenician or Canaanite than Arab. All this euggeete that the elements of Arab nationalism, other than the debased but iiving reelitiae of bmguage and religion, are largely fictitious, The reform and renewal of reli. gion and language by Arab scholars isas been the great goal and achievement of modern Arab nationalism. However, the new revival of a sense of Egyptian identity after the death of the charismatic Pan-Arab leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, is a welcome return to reality in the Middle Eaet. One of the meet hopeful development in the Middle Eset today iiee in the disappearance of a chimerical, Pan-Arab nationalism and the reemergence of a sense of regional identity in the United Arab Republic (UAR), Syria, Lebanon end eieewhere, among the more moderate and educated groups in these countries. A sound application of the principle of eelf-determination will enable these people to concentrate their national efforts on their own specific problems rather than upon grandiose dreams of conqueet and glory beeed upon empty rhetoric and passionate ignorance of the past. But what can be said about Palestinian nationalism, that changeling born of the hatred of Jews and Arabs? The 1Paleetine refugee problem hae been exacerbated, prolonged and magnified into the most inflammable and intractable problem in tbe area today, primariiy owing to the misconceived humanitarian efforts of the UN organization, the unrealistic policiee of the Arab etztes, and the gullibility of the United Stetee in supporting %wli,ef to the tune of $24 miUion a year for over 20 years. 42

MIDDLE EAST or so now live in the occupied territories on the West Bank of the Jordan. When conditions prevail in which the question of a just eolution to the refugee problem ie able to be negotiated by the parties concerned, it remaine to be eeen how many of the approximately two million non-Jewieh present and former inhabitante of Palestine will want to return to Palestine under the conditions that can reasonably be euppoeed to exist then, and how many will prefer to accept compensation and indemnities ~ for their lost properties and suffering and settle elsewhere. It ie still too early to anticipate what conditions will prevail in the area when theee questione come UP. The refugee problem and the new Palestine nationalism are among the most difficult of all the problems in the area to settle. It ie only regrettable that these probleme have been magnified by the misguided policies of the United Natione who failed to ineiet in 1948 on the prompt relocation of theee people on farmlands at a time when there was sufficient bmd available for them to till and ,put to use the only skills meet of them had. It can never be too soon ta break UP these festering refugee campe. This must be one of the immediate end major goals of any just settlement of the refugee problem. International aid for the Palestine refugees has now become a UN subsidy to eupport international banditry which the world witnessed with revulsion during the Jordanian civil war end airplane hijackings of 1970. The single moat important economic force in the MiddIe Eeet is oil. Oil also provides a focal point for the competing etrategic interests of the USSR and the United States. Thie region contains over 67 percent of the worlds proved oil reservee, and yet

MIDDLE E&W the surface has hardly been scratched. Fewer wells have been sunk there than are drilled in a month in the United States. Source of Enwgy Concurrent with the much publicized discoveries of oil off the north coast of Alaska, the discovery of an Arabian oil field having more established reserves than all the projected Alaskan fields was announced. Oil, not nuclear energy, wifl be one of the worlds most important sources of energy for some time to come. Approximately 80 percent of all Europes petroleum needs are filled by Middle Eaet oil; 90 percent of Japana oil comes from this area. US citisens own an investment of over $13 billion in the Middle East. This investment yields an annual income of over $1 billion, now sorely needed tQ bolster the countrys negative balance of payments. The Middle Eastern countries earn close to $4 bNion a year in oil revenues which means that oil is the main economic resource for their modernisation and development efforts. The Soviet Union, until recently a major oil exporter, is now looking to the Middle East to satisfy the needs of the new worldwide Navy it expects to deploy soon in the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, Cldna See and Pacific Ocean. The Soviets are already dril. ling from their own rigs in the Siwa oasis in the United Arab Republic. The United States does not wish to see control over the Middle East oil fields pass out of the hands of Arab Governments willing to cooperate with US companies, nor does it wish to aee US propertke and oil rights expropriated. Oil, with all its potential for trouble, is at the present juncture one of the most hopeful factors in the 44 tangled eituation, as a review of recent developments in the Middle East since 1967 clearly shows. At the present moment, we are at the most critical turning point in the history of the Middle East since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli War in 1948. By escalating the war in December 1969, the Israelis tri~gered a chain of events which lost them the strategic advantage they once held over the UAR-namely, the crdlble deterrent of making a preem~ive strike by land and air againat the UAR. In addWon, they Ioet their def~sive advantage along the Suez Canal; they alienated the United Statea, fearful of a confrontation with the Soviets in the area; and they provided the occasion for tbe greatest Soviet penetration of tbe area that the Soviete have yet dared to make. The period from the end of the 1967 campaign to the present can be divided es shown on the chart. Khartoum Conference During Phase One, Ierael wee not prepared to exploit the peaceful possibllitiee of ita victory in 1967; it was waiting for the telephone calf from the Arabs, which never came, in the course of which it was hoped that they would admit their defeat and talk peace. Instead, came the Khartoum conference in August 1967 from which issued the old Arab fine: no concessions, no negotiation and no peace. Furthermore, it wea announced that the United Arab Republic and Jordan were to receive a snbsidy from Kuwait dud Saudi Arabia amounting to $266 million a year to help build up their mifitary bases euffered in the course of the 1967 hosttlitiee. Then came Security Council Reaelution 242 of November 1967 (for complete text see i$filita~ Review,
Milltery Review

MIDDLE MT

Desti~the

flew of Je~eb immigrants to brae~ pepefetien projeetkm rael will soon wntain mere Arabs than Jews

show that 1s-

July 1969, page 46) supported by both the United States and the USSR. This reeohrtion bee served ever since es the frame of reference within wbieb the major world powers are not only prepared to discuss peace in the Middle East, but have shown that they will put increasing preaeure upon the befligerente there ta do ao es well. In brief, thie resolution created a peace mission headed by Dr. Gunner V. Jarring and established the following principles: Withdrawal of Ieraeli armed forcee from territories occupied in the recent contikt. Termination of belligerency between Ierael end Arab etate% and acknowledgment of the sovereignty and the right to 7ive in peace of every etate in the area. Guarantee of freedom of navigation through all international waterways in the area. APril1872

Guarantee of territorial inviolability and political independence of all etatee in area. Juet settlement of the refugee problem. President Lyndon B. Johnson and President Richard M. Nixon have gone out of their way on numerous occeeione to empbeeize.the importance of the terms of this resolution ee the beeis of US policy in the Wlddle East. Both Arabs and Jews immediately denounced the resolution. During the foUowing winter of 1968, the radical Paleatine Arab National Movement woe formed and eupported increasing guerriUa aetivitiee in the UN refugee camps diraeted against Ierael. The Jarring peace miesion, which had developed the Rhodee formula t.a enable the two parties to negotiate without meeting another, never got off the ground that year. So too, the Soviet peace plan wee a

45

failure. The United Statea was too preoccupied in ite national elections to do more then monitor developments which were quick to some. Phase Two began when President Naeser astutdy concluded that the small Israeii Army of 70,000 men could not continue to take casualties, even at a relatively low level, over any extended length of time. Nasser realized that the total Jewish population in Israel of 2.5 million was minuscule compared with 34 million Egyptiane, to say nothing of all the other Arab countries at war with Israel. On 8 March 1969, the Egyptians opened a eustained artiilery barrage along the Suez Canal. By July 1969, the Ieraelia had taken eo many cazualtiez they also baeame hawks. It was said in Ierael at that time that the alternative to being a hawk wae to be a sitting dusk and not a cooing dove. During Phaae Three, Isreeii retaliatory etrikes were totaiiy eucceaeful. Ierael destroyed the Egyptians surface-to-air missiles, as weii as aii the Egyptian artillery positioned along the canal, end the Ieraeii Air Force also patroiled a atrip of territory approximately 30 miles west of the 46

Ca;al preventing any E~lan buildup that could threaten Israeli forces along the canal. Unfortunately, the Israeiis now besame flushed with euceeza. Phase Four lasted less than four monthe. Aillicted with hubris, that form of wanton pride the Gods hate most, they made the fatal mistake of launching deep penetration bombing raids over the United Arab Republic with United States eupplied, long-range, offensive, Phantom fighter-hombers which many observers had long felt it wee unwise for the United States to have eupplied Ierael for preeisely this very reason. Nasser, with Cairo open to attack, felt hla own political existence threatened. In January 1970, he flew secretly to the Soviet Union where he requested the Soviets to take over the defenees of the UAR with new misailez end Soviet pilots to man Soviet pianez. On 18 April 1970, Israeli planes on a deep penetration raid in the Cairo area sighted eombet-ready planes flown by Soviet pilots waiting for them. They sheared off and returned to their bame. That was the end of deep penetration bombing. The Israelis were rightig atmmed
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MICIDLE EMT
by what their pilote had seen on 18 April 1970, and it did not take them long to see the negative implications of the new situation wldch they had precipitated. They quickly realized that they had strapped themeelvee into a tight strategic strait jacket out of which they could only extricate themselves either by escalating the war still further by attacking the Soviet defenses of the UAR and possibly declaring a nuclear C.Spablfity, or by achieving a detents with the UAR to try to reverse the etrategic advantage now held by the other side. The resulte of their misuse of USsupplied offensive weapons was the following: An immediate change in the strategic balance in the Middle East in favor of the Sovieti and Egyptians to the detriment of the Americans end Israelis. On the global level, the Soviet Union was now assured of the United Arab Republic as a stepping etone to the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, China See and the Pacific Ocean just as England had been in the 19th century. The Soviet Union quickly took over six airdelds in the UAR, created new major commend and control headquarters in the area, brought in 10,000 to 12,000 new servicemen and tecbnL cians, and, in a few months, wee able to deploy some of ita moat advanced military equipment for testing purposes like the SAiK9 missiles and the Fozbat airplanes which could fly over Israel beyond the range of its air defenses. . Israel lost its basic weapon against the Arabs: the cr~lbility of a major deterrent preemptive etriie by air and bmd against the UAR. Furthermore, if the Soviets had introduced pilots, planes and missiles in the UAR, why could they not do the April1272 same in Syria where they already had an ongoing military aid program? . Israel lost ita defensive edvantage along the Sues Canal as it no longer dared to send air patrde over the 30-@e wide etrip of territory west of the canal to knock out the new misailee and srtillery for fear of engaging the Soviets. The Egyptian artillery could now move up to the canal, leapfrogging under cover of the eurface-to-air missiles, and position itself to restart the war of attrition with impunity, a disagreeable possibility Israel soon discovered wee to become a reality. Finally, Israel had angered the United Statea, its strongeat supporter. With the United States becoming more concerned over Israela unrulineas and the growing likelihood of its precipitating a direct confrontation between the United States and tie Soviet Union, US foreign policy for the first time since 194S showed distinct eigne of divergence from that of Israel. Four Power Talks During Pheee Five, the Soviet Union and the United Statea, neither of them wishing to be precipitated into a confrontation in the Middle Eeet, brought pnxolure to bear on the United Arab Republic and Israel ta cool it by adopting a truce. The Egyptians acceded to Soviet prekeure with little or no objection. In Israel, a cabinet crisis,leading to a withdrawal of the right wing Gehal party, did not prevent the United States from pressing Israel into the truce. The immediate subsequent violation of the truce by the Soviet-Egyptian deeieion to move up the S&fS missile sites closer to the canal confirmed Israels worst fears that it had, in fact, lost all the edvantagea won 47

MIDDLE EAST in the successful 1969 counteroffensive. Israel knew that it now faced a far more serious threat to its defenses on the East Bank of the canal than before 1969. The US decision b extend a $.5 billion line of credit to enable Israel to obtain more military equipment wcs not likely to reastabSish its 1967 strategic superiority unless it were able to knock out the SAM9 missiles defending tbe Egyptian artillery with the new US electronic devices it wea buying. However, the stakes were high if it attacked Soviet-manned sites, and it risked Ioeing the whole air force if it shot down Soviet pilots and planes should the Soviets chooee to respond with a massive counterattack supported by a thousand planes, which their new overSight rights in the Middle East enabled them to do on short notice. Truce Introduced Phase Six, which introduced the truce, has continued to the present time. The Israelis did not dare to recommence hostilities in spite of the Soviet-Egyptian violations, and, in September 1970, Nasser died. Tbia event introduced a novel element of flexibility into the situation. The new President of the United Arab Republic, Anwar Sadat, is now consolidating his position at a time when Pan-Arab nationalism has reached a low point due to Arab defeats and the diaappearence of ita charismatic leader. In Israel, the old Zionist hard line against the Arab states has backSred, and the cooing of the dovea is being heard again. Indeed, it is believed that Premier Golda Meir was not tlirting with the reindeer in Lapland at the time of this writing. She could be bargaining for a Soviet concession to permit Jewish emigration to Ierael in 4e return for Israels concession to agree to the opening of the SUW Canal-the Soviet Unions most immediate etrategic goal. Population projections show that Israel will soon contain more Arabs than Jewe unbwe Jewish immigration is greatly augmented and the Jewish birth rate ia also substantially increased. Furthermore, there is, for the first time, a clear convergence of Sbviet and United Statea national intereata in tbe face of the Israeli threat to eeealate the level of military operations in the area, and this hae dismayed the hawks and encouraged the dovca. Suez Canals Future Perhapa the most hopeful sign of the beginning of a new forging of peaceful links in the broken texture of the Wlddle East ie to be seen in the talks over the future of the Sues Canal. It is in the Soviet, as well as the Egyptian, intereet to reopen the canal. It is also in the Israeli interest to have the canal operating and its ships Pessing through it rather than losing men in a war of attrition along ita banks. In the ehort run, it is not in the strategic interest of the United States to open the ehort way for the Soviet Navy into the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. However, the cost of a new naval construction program to increxise the size and power of the US Navy as the British presence in the Persian Gulf disappears is a small price to pay if it reduces si@ficr@y the chances of a general war in the area. The United Statee could win immediate Soviet concessions in Southeast Asia in return for euppotilng the opening of the canal. At the very least, reopening of the canal will tend to keep the level .of instability in the Middle Eaet down to a more acceptMilii RCVkW

MIDDLE EAST

able level. The deeper the Soviets commit themselves in the United Arab Republic, Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East, the greater will be their interest to resolve the most explosive queetione in . the area peaeafuffy enough to guarantee a return on their investment and prevent a direct confrontation with the United States. Conversely, the United States will prefer a more flexible global rivalry with the Sovieta on the high eees rather than a direct threat of confrontation on fend and in tbe air with them in the Middle Eaet. If the present negotiations to open the Suez Canal are successful, the firet major step toward detente in the Middfe Eaet will have been made since the 1967 hostilities. On the other band, it ia not wiee to be optimistic about the immediate chances for peace in the lWddle East. The Soviet Union dose not want peace there. It hae been remarked that, if Israel did not exist, it would be necessary for the Sovieta to create it. While it is unrealistic to hope for a complete settlement of all problems in the area

in the foreseeable future, the United Stztee does have an interest in attempting to slow down se much as possible its eroding intluence in the area and to attempt to persuade the Soviets that, at the very hat, further eeeafetion is against everyones interest. While the Sovieta went a high level of instability ehort of direct confrontation with the United Statee, the United Statee clearly wante more stability and lees chance of confrontation. It must be possible for Soviet and American diplomats to strike a median which may not produce a total or even partial settlement in the area, but which will gain time for new leadership to develop positions of peace in the area before the UN camp refugees shoot up King Hussein and topple the governments of Lebanon and Syria. Some irritation is eeceptable, provided Israel is content to remain the grain of sand in the Middle Eastern oyeter that wifl some day produce the peer] of ultimate prosperity and harmony in the area. SIC

. . . . There ie a tendency, especially when tensions ere high end tempers ehort, to regerd the present as the feed point of all of mans history. But oure ie 00IY the lstest generation, not the lset generation; end nothing we lesve to future generations will mstter so much as a structure of enduring peace.
SecretnW of State William P. Rogers

April 1972

Morton E. Halperin

LL Preeident8 are dependent on the permanent bureaucracies of Government inherited from their predecessors. A President must have the information and analysis of options which the bureaucracies provide in order to anticipate problems and make educated choicee. He muet, in most cases, also have the cooperation of the bureaucracies to turn his decisions into governmental action. A bureaucracy can etWctively defuse a presidential decision by refueing to support it with influential members of Congress or to implement it faithfully. so
Milibry Review

PRESIDENT AND MILITARY

The Presidents dependence on the bureaucracy and hie limited freedom to maneuver are acute in all areas. The military, however, poeee a unique set of problems for him. These arise, in part, from the limitations upon the Prwident when he is seeking military advice. When the National Security Council (NSC) or other presidential sessions are convened to discuss highlevel foreign and national security mattere, the President has a great deal of infkence on the selection of all those who will attend, emjept the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who must be chosen from a smaU group of senior career military officers. Compare also the Presidents ability to appoint noncareer people to subeabinet and mnbeeeadorial poata with the limitations on hia range of aeleetion for appointment to senior military positions or overeees military commands. One dilemma for the President is tiding alternative sources of military advice. The military, for example, has a virtual monopoly on providing information to the President about the readiness and capabilities of US or even allied forces. Other groups and individuals can provide advice on many military questions, but their access to information is Iiiited. The President may call for judgments from his Secretary of Defense, but the Secretary% analysis must rely on the basic faeturd material and field evaluations provided by the military. Judgments about the liiely effectiveness of US combat operations are also the exclusive province of the military. In assessing the potential effects of a diplomatic move, the President can turn not only to career Foreign Service officers, but also to businessmen, academics and intelligence specialiete in other agencies. On the other hand, if be wiehee to know how many US dhdsions would be necessary to defend Laos against a Chinese attae~ the legitimacy of advim from groups other than the military is distinctly reduced. The militarys influence on the information and evaluation of options which reach the President is further enhanced by the important role it plays in the preparation of national intelligence estimates. Yet enother source of leverage for the military is the prestige and influence that military leaders have enjoyed, at least in the peat, with leading figures in Congress. Until quite recently, this inttuence limited presidential effectiveness with Congress and the general public. Even now, military inSuence continues to be strong with the leedere of the Armed Services Committees and appropriations subcommittees. Legislation clearly gives the military the right to inform congressional committees directly of their differences with administration policy, when asked. Senior military otlicers frequently exercise that right. In addition, military views on matters of major concern to the services often become known tn the press. Thus, Preeidenta have shied away from decisions that they believed the Thie article wfw reprinted bv permission from FOUEIGN AFFAISS, Janua?y 10Z?. CoWright @ 1972? by the Council on Foreign Relations, Ins., New York. Mr. Hal&n is Senior Staff Member of. The Breeh4nge Institution. He waa Senior Stufl Member of the Natienul Sectaitg Council in 1969 and Depwty Seoretavy of Def enee durhg 1967-69. He ti author of the book, Defense Strategies for the Seventies.

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military would take to the Congress and the public, and have frequently felt obliged to negotiate with the military. For example, both Preaidenta Truman and Eisenhower carried on extensive negotiations with the military to secure ite support for defense reorganization programs which appeared to have little chance of getting through Congress without military acquiescence, Later Praaidente have shied away from deftinse reorganizations requiring congressional approval, at least in part because of the difficulty of gaining military concurrence, or congressional action without the concurrence. The backing of the military has also been vital to Presidents in other important programs. T~uman, for example, relied heavily on the military to endorse his Korean War policies, eepecialty in his disagreement with General Douglas MacArthur over limiting the war. MacArthur, who then commanded the United Nations forces in Korea, wanted to expand the war to China and to use nuclear weapons. The Joint Chiefs were not in favor of the expaneion, and Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and a much decorated World War II hero, strengthened Trumans position enormously when he stated publicly that MacArthurs propoeal would lead to the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time. The political influence of the military has been substantially reduced in the last few years. The fact that the Joint Chiefs favor a pafilcular proposal ia no longer a guarantee of congressional snpport and may, in come eases, be counterproductive. For example, the Joint Chiefs were not asked by the Nixon administration to play a major rok h defending the Sa@guard antiballistic missile. Nevertheless, the fact that the Joint Chiefs still wield influence with cetiln members of Congm.ss and some parta of the public may inhibit the Pr.aaiden~ particularly if he feara a right-wing attack or needs a two-thirds vote to gwt a treaty through the Senate. The implementdion of presidential decieione by the military works both for and against the Chief Executive. The military tradition of discipline, efficiency and a clearly delineated chain of command incr+sea the probability that precise orders will he observed and carried out with dispatch. However, the fact that tbe military impknmnte decisions according to standard procedures may cause presidential ordera to be misconstrued through oversimplification. The Joint Chiefe will defer to the field commander end not monitor his compliance carefully. Moreover, President find it difficult to develop alternate means to secure implementation of decisions in the domain of the military. For example, the President may use special envoys in place of career Foreign Service officers to carry out delicate negotiations, while he can hardly eend a retired busineaeman to lend US forces in Lebanon or to command a nuclear missile-carrying submarine. Preaidentealso have great difficulty convincing the military to create new capabilities which they may need in the future but which might tend to alter the traditional role of a particular branch. The services emphasize the forces which conform to their notion of the essence of their role and resist capabilities which involve interservice cooperation (e.g., airlift), noncombat roles (e.g., advisers), and elite forces (e.g., Green Berets). At least until recently, they have also resisted the maintenance of combat-ready nonnuclear forces.

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II This is not to suggest that the Presidente probieme with the military are greeter than, for example, those with the Department of Agriculture or other agencies with strong Iinkz to domestic constituencies and congressional committees. Nor is it to suggest that the information and advice given the President by the miiitary has, over the years, been lees valuable then the advice of others. The point is rather that, witbin the foreign policy field, the greateot iimit.atione on the Presidents freedom of action tend to come from the military. None of our Presidents bee been content with his relations with the miiitary. In fact, Presidents have used a number of devices to overcome iimitatione on their power, to get the information and advice they want and to find support for implementing their decisions. Presidential strategies have varied, depending on the type of issue and depending on whether they were seeking: (1) information or options, (2) politiml support or (3) faithful implementation. Their tectilquee include the following: (1) lZeowAmthn& The Nixon National Security Council system and the appointment of the Presidente Blue Ribbon Panel on Defense Reorganization (Fitzhugh Panel) suggest a return to the emphasis on reorganization which tended to dominate thinking in the eariy postwar period and, indeed, through 1960. Reorganicstion efforts within the Pentagon have aimed at securing coordinated miiitary advise rather than separate advice from each eervice. Presidents have, in general, pressed the Joint Chlefe to transcend service biaaee and to come Up with agreed positions based on a unified perspective. Eisenhower was particularity adverse to JCS splite. But the succeee of these efforts hae been relatively limitd. Most observere conclude that JCS papers still tend to reflect particular service viewe, either by way of deference or compromise, rather than the unified military jndgment of a true Joint Staff. Secretaries of Defense have not looked upon the Joint Staff ae part of their own etaff. The reorganization of the National Security Council system beginning in 1969 appears to have been designed to bring to bear a varie~ of different views on military problems. The evaluation of alternate miiitary forces is centered in the Council)e Verification Panel. This group first considered the Strategic Arms Limitation Taike (SALT) and then the prospects and problems of mutuai force reductions in Europe, thereby going beyond traditional military and intelligence channels. The Defense Program Review Committee was deeigned to apply expertiee to a review of budget decisione from the Budget Bureau and the Presidents economic advisere, as well as the State Department. and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The NSC eyetem itself wee deeigned ta take into account the viewe of the State Department and other Government agencies about miiitary commitments, baeee, overseas departments and mtStary assistance. At the same time, these efforts assured the military of orderly eoneideration of ita viewa, reSecting the judgment that the miiitary ie more willing to participate faithfully in the implementation of a decieion where it has been overruled if it feels that military views have been fuiiy taken into account. (2) MilitmY adviser in the White House. President l%nkih Rooeevelt relied heavily on Admiral Wiliizm Leahy es the Chief of Staff to

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the Commander in Chief. Truman, for a brief period, continued to use I&shy and then, on a part-time basis, relied on General Eisenhower for advice on budget issues while Eisenhower was president of Columbla University. Truman later turned to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Eisenhower, his own military adviser in the White House, had only a junior military officer in the person of Colonel Andrew Goodpaster who functioned, in effect, es a staff secretary, collecting and summarizing for the President intelligence materials from the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well es the military. Kennedy, after the Bay of Pigs operation, brought General Maxwell Taylor into the Wldte Houee as the military representative of the President, and Taylor advised the President on a broad range of iesues involving all aspecta of national security policy. When Taylor moved over to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, a JCS liaieon office was created in the white House, working primarily with the Presidents Aeeistant for National Sacnrity Affairs. President Johnson relied primarily on other mechanisms but did use General Taylor as a WIdte House consultant after his return from Vietnam. Taylor functioned in relation to the Vietnam issue, providing an alternate source of advice and information to the President on options open to him in Vietnam operations and negotiations. President Nixon recalled General Goodpaster briefly during the transition period and the very early days of his administration, but eince then has not had a senior military adviser in the white House. Henry Kissingers deputy is an army major general. He ensures, along with the JCS liaison office, that Kissinger and the President are aware of JCS concerns, but he does not serve as an alternate source of mititary advice. (S) A civilian adviser in the White Howe. There has been a growing trend m the postwar period toward presidential reliance on white House staff assistance in both domestic and national security policy. In the na. tional security field, civilian aesiskmce has been ueed not only as a source of additional information, advice and options, but aleo as an aid to the President in seeing that his decisions are carried through. Truman tended to rely on his Cabinet officers and the uniformed military, but there were episodic interventions by civilians in the white House. Under Truman, Clark Clifford became heavily involved in the negotiations leading to the Defense Unification Act and the National Security Council syetam. Later, he contributed to the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission and the continued control of nuclear weapons by the Commission. Averell Harriman, who became Trumans national eacurity adviser just before the Korean War, functioned briefly during the early atagee of the war as a spokesman for the Preeidents position; his tasks included a visit to General MacArthur tv explain the Presidents policies to hlm and eeek hia compliance, Eisenhower had no single national security adviser in the white House. Hie Aesistanta for National Security Council Affairs were involved only in the very limited number of iseues that were handled in the rather etylized machinery of the National Security Council system aa then constituted. Eisenhower brought in several advisers for specific issues, including Nelson Rockefeller, but these advisers tended to interact and overlap with Sezra-

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tery of Stata Dullee rather than with the Department of Defenee. They were responsible for some new initiatives, euch es Eisenhowers open ekies propoeal in 1954, but the inetancee are few. The regularisation and inetitutionalicetion of a civilien advieer in the White Houee on national security matters came with President Kennedye appointment of McGeorge Bundy. Bundy, following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, moved to increase the independence of the white Houee in securing information by arranging to get a good deal of the raw material directly from the field, including State, Defenee and CIA cable tratlic. Bundy a7eo aeeumed primary responsibility for briefing the President. Despite the expanded role which involved them in many foreign policy matters with military implication, neither Bundy nor Walt Rostow, Johneons advieer for national security affairs, were heavily engaged in Defenee budget mattere. Under President Nixon, Henry Kiseinger has been as active in Defense Deparbnent mattere es he is in those for which the State Department hae primary responsibility. Nixon appears to rely upon IGeeinger ae an alternative source of information and optione on tbe broad range of military and national security matters, and ae a channel for various kinds of military advice. (4) Relianoe on the Secretary of Defense. Truman and Eisenhower tended to rely on their Secretaries of Defense primarily to eecure the implementation of their decisione, particularly Defense budget decieions. They =wwted the Secretaries to bear the weight of military objections to ceilings on Defenee spending and to force the services to develop forces within thoee ceilings. Even in thie role the Defenee Secretaries were of limited value to the Preeident eince they tended to become epokesmen for the military deeire for increased spending. Tbe appointment of Robert S. McNamara brought to fruition a trend which had been developing gradually and had accelerated during the brief tenure of Secretary Thomas Gatee. This called for the Secretary of Defenee to bemme, in effect, the principal military advieer to the President, euperewhg the Joint Chiefe. Over time, Kennedy and Johnson, at leeet until the Vietnam war accelerated in late 1965, tended to look to the Secretary of Defense for advice on commitments, bases, oversees deployment and military aid, as well es budget deeisione. The Secretarys job included absorbing the advice tendered by the military and Combining that in his recommendations to the President. Both Kennedy and Johnson did, of course, continue to meet with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefe in formal s-ions of the National Security Council and in other meetinge, but by and large they received military judgments and advice through the filter of the Secretary of Defense. As the Vietnam war heated up, JCS Cbehmum General Earle Wheeler wee included in Johneone regular Tuesday lunchee and began to act as en independent vehicle for reporthg JCS views to the Preeidenk at least on the range of seuee discuesed at those meetinge. Defense Secretary Leird has contin~$ the tradition of taking positions on .suhetantive ieeuee of military pcdi y and operations, ae well es Defense budget iesuee, although the Preeiderit eeeme to regard him simply as a eeeond source of advice on military questions. The Secretary and the Joint Chiefs have a co-equal role in the National security Council and in all of its subordinate institutions.

April 1972

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(5) &eliance on the SecretaW of State. No President has given the Seeretary of State a dominant role in decisions regarding combat operation or the Defense bndget. Truman did call on General Marshallwhen he was Secretary of Stat+for eupport in keeping the Defense budget down, and Nixon has brought the Sacretarye etaff into the Defense budget proeaes through the Defenee Program Review Committee. However, on ieeuea Concerning cornmitznenta, beeaa. avecs@ee deployments and miiitarY aid, Truman tended to rely largely on Achesons judgment, and Eisenhower depended, to 8 large extent, on Dulles. Secretary Ruek played a major role in these issues along with SecreW~ McNsrn8ra. (6) Reliarwe on uoientictc. Although ecientiets have occasiona~ly been ueed to evaluate combat operations, hy end large their role has been limited to issues reflected in the Defense budget. Eisenhower depended, pertiwdarly in the lster years of his administration, on the cldef ecientist in the Pentegon (the Director of Defense Rcaesreh and Engineering) and on his ecience advieere. Kennedy also looked to hia ecience adviser, Jerome Weiener, for alternate advice on the Defense budget, cc well as on arms control matters, particularly relating to the nuclear tsstiig iseue. The role of the science advisera seeme to have declined preeipitouely under Johnson and Nixon, with their energies going largely to non-Defense matters. (7) Rekiwwe on the Bureau of the Budget. The role of the Budget Bureau (now Office of Management and Budget) in Defense decisions has been very limited. Truman and Eisenhower relied upon the Budget Director to help set a ceiiing on Defense spending, but the Bureau did not get involved in deciding how that money would he spent. Under Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson, it became a matter of tradition that the Budget Director would have to appeal secretarial deeieions on the Defenee budget to the President, the reverse of the situation in all other departments. Press reports suggested that initially Nixon had reversed tbie procsse, but he now appears to have returned to this traditional pattern. The Budget Direetor cite on the Defense Program Review Committee, bnt the extent of Budget Bureau influence is difficult to determine. (8) Ad hoG techniwe. Preaidenta have used a number of ad hoe or special techniques to secure information and options on military gueetione. One technique frequently used during the Truman and Eisenhower periods was the President appointed commission. Nixons Fitahugh Panel may mark a return to the use of thie technique, although it has thus far been limited to organisational rather than substantive questions. Occeeionally, Presidents have sent special representatives into the field to investigate military questions. Kennedy, for example, sent an old friend and military officer to the camp preparing the Cuban guerrillas for the Bay of Pigs operation, and Richard Nixon sent British guerrilla war expert Brigadier General Thompeon to Vietnam for an independent 8seessment. Now and then, a President has been fortunate enough to have the concurrence of the mi~tary on a particular policy, without bating to bargain. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed expaneien of the Korean War and felt that General MacArthur had, ind~. been insubordinate wss of critiul importance to Truman in securing public acceptance of this policy. .Howevq, in most cases, the President has been forced to bargain for the pubtic

56

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RoW?

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support of the Joint Chiefe. Truman had to accept the ease for German rearmament in order to gain JCS approval tQ send US forces to Europe. Kennedy and his Secretary of Defense engaged in long hours of bargaining with the Joint chiefs before they were able to deviee an acceptable eafeguard program of etandby preparations for nuclear testing that made it poesible for the Joint Chiefe to give their reluctant support to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Johnson felt obliged to have the Joint Chiefs of Staff on board before he would order the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam in 1968. In come cases, the President has sought to use the prestige and power of his oillce to accomplish his objer,tivee in the face of military opposition. Thie tatiIc hae a better chance of success when the decisions involve only executive department action; when the Chiefs are split; and particularly whcm the decisione do not require the use of armed forces in combat operation. But it can be done in other cases. For example, on the matter of civilian control of nucleer weapons and the crwtion of a civilian dominated Atomi~ Energy Commission, Truman appealed to the public and Congress over the objections of the military, and wae able to win. Eisenhower in the same way (although less successfully) enlisted the eupport of the US bueinezs community in hie effort, to reorganize the Defense Department against the judgment of the mifitary. Prwidente have had the greatest success in bypassing the military on Defense budget limitations, because military demands are essentially open ended and alwaye have to be overruled. However, the appezl to 6sss1 conservatism and alternative demands for resources have also tended to cheek Defense expenditures. III Techniques used to improve the information and options reaching the President can also be applied to the implementation of decisions. For ex-Pie, civilian advisere in the White House have been used to monitor compliance with presidential decisions, and other Presidents have tended to rely on the Secretary of Defense to eee that their decisions were carried out. In addition, Presidents have sometimes resorted to eelecting military officers who they felt shared their views and, therefore, would act to implement them properly. The most dramatic case came in 1959 when lZisenhower replaced all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointed Admiral Radford, a known supporter of his policy of massive nuclear retaliation, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefe and chose Service Chiefs who by and large were prepared to comply. After the Cuban miesile crisie, Adrnhal George Anderson, who had not cooperated fully with the President, was not reappointed to the post of Chief of Naval Operations. However, there are severe Iimite to the value of such actions: General Ridgway and later Generrd Taylor, the Arroy Chiefs of Staff appointed by Eleenhower, resisted the reduction in the size of the Army and the administrations reliance on maseive nuclear retaliation. When their views were ignored, they resigned and protested publicly. In response to Admiral Andersone rezesignment se Arobzzsador to Portugal, Congress legislated etatutory terms for the members of the Joint Chiefe. Another technique that has been used to increase compliance with presidential decieions is the creation of new organisations which reflect

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new deeirea. The most successful euch effort was to create within the Navy a Special Projeet$ Otiice to monitar the Pohzne program and to alter pro. motion procedures so that command of a Polans submarine would permit promotion to senior grades. The least successful effort was Kennedys attempt in the early 1960s to give the mili~ a greater flexibility in dealing with counterinsurgency operations by creating the Green Berets. Iv The decline of the prestige of the military over the pact several years has given Preeident Nixon and his successors greater freedom to determine how advice from the military reachee them, and to accept or reject that advice. The experience of the postwar period suggeete two basic changes which the President could inetitute now ~that would increaee his leverage vis-h-vie the militery-one involving the channel by which he receives advice from senior military officers and the other concerning the role of civilian advisers. The experience of the last 25 years ~uggests that the effort to reorganize the Pentagon and then to demafid unified military advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been a failure. Ae noted above, most observere who have had the opportunity to view the product of the Joint Chiefs would argue that unified JCS papere reflect either a compromise among the services, a form of logrolling in which the proposals of all services are endorsed, or deference to the service or field commander most concerned. As long as the function of the Joint Staff is to come up with a paper that will be endorsed by all of the Chiefs, there does not appear to he any way to alter the situation fundamentally, although come progrees has been made in the last several yeare in increasing the flexibilityy and independence of the Joint Staff. More radical changes must be effected if the President is to get good military advice. The key to improving the situation is to separate the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff from the Service Chiefs. The President and the Secretary of Defense would, in thie case, solicit the separate views of each of the Service Chiefs and of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and, where appropriate, the views of the relevant unified and specified commanders (e.g., commanders in Europe and Asia and the head of the Strategic Air Command). These latter views might be chamakd to the Secretary through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The Chairman would, in turn, he the officer in the line of command through the President and the Secretary of Defense to the commanders (bypassing the Service Chiefs) for carrying out operationa in the field. The baeic rationale behind this change in procedure ie that the Service Chiefs and the unified and specified commands constitute the higheat level at which reliable (firsthand) information and advice are available. The Joint Staff, when it needs information, must eolicit either the eervice staffs in Washington or the field commanders. In fact, JCS information and advice presented to the President and the Secretary ueually come from the services and the eubordhate eervice commands in the field. For example, most of the positions taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on queetione relating to Vietnam simply involved a JCS endorsement of the recommendation of General Westmoreland or General Abrame, the Army Commander in

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PREsIDENT AND MII.ITARY

Vietoem, and Admiral Sharp, Commander in Chief of the Pacific, who bed . particular responsibility for the bombing operation. On questions of requirements for oversees bases, to take another example, the Joint Chiefs, in most cases, simply eudorse the position of the eervice which utilizes the base. on budget issues, the Cbiefe tend to endoree all of the programs desired by each of the cervices. When forced to choose on an issue of policy, the Chiefs compromise amoug the different service positions rather than attempting to develop a poeition based on a unified military point of view. Under the propoeed change of procedure, the President and the Secretary of Defense would be made aware of differing positions which might otherwise be compromised. In addition, this would leave the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Joint Staff free from the job of developing a compromise position and, therefore, able to present the Secretary of Defense with a military jud~mt separate from the intereate of the services. If thie proccee ie to euccecd, the president and the Secretary will have to choose a Chairman of the Joint chiefs with whom they Can work. Then, if the syetem is developed properly, the Chairmen and the Joint Staff would come to be seen aa part of the OfiCS of the Secretary of Defense, providing him and the President with military advice which could be weighed againet the advice of the operatora-the Service Chiefs and the unified and specified comm~nders. The influence of the Chairman would come from hIS record of pefsuaeivenees with the President and the Secretary of Defanee. They will take his judgments seriouely if MS choice is shown to be based on a broader range of considerations than the advice of the Service Chiefe. Such a procedure would increase the probability that imaginative and innovative propoeale would reach the Preeident. It would aleo make it more likely that the President would become aware of the wide diversity of military opinione on a question and not act on an erroneous assumption that there was a unitied view. one of the few instances on record in which the President did seek separate opinions from the several Chiefe came in 1961 when President Kennedy was contemplating an invasion of Laos. Partly bwause of the Bay of Pigs episode in which the doubts of individual Cbiefa about the military feasibility of the landing in Cuba never reached him, Kennedy asked each Chief separately for his views in writing and then met with them as a group. He discovered by this process that ench one had a slightly different position on what should be done, what troops should be committed, and what the likely outcome of US intervention would be. Receiving this conflicting advice, it was harder for Kennedy to make a decision to intervene, but it also meant that he did not make a decision under a mistaken impreeaion that there was a unified military view either for or against the intervention. The proposed procedure would also increase presidential flexibility in aeeentirm or re~eetirw military advice becauee he would no longer be confron-ti &itb ~ una~ious but misleading statement of JCS-views. He would be able to choose among eervice and command viewpointa rather than having to develop a new position which, in essence, overrules all of the military, inasmuch as JCS opinions now represent all the aervicee.

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In order to increase the Presidents freedom to chooee and the likelihood that he will get faithful implementation and political support for his actions; a procedure should be developed which providca for military access to the President on issues of importance to the military. Access should be provided not only for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, but also for the Service Chiefe and the unified commanders most concerned. when he findd it necessary to overrule the military, the President should justify his decision on broad political grounds; he should be eeen doing so personally; and he ehould do so in writing with a clear memorandum stating his position. All of these acts would increase military willingness to go along with presidential decisions and to implement them faithfully. The military takes seriously the Presidents role as Commander in Chief and also recognizes that he has broader responsibility concerned with both domestic and international political situations. They are much more amenable to being overruled on these grounds than to being told that their military. judgment is questioned. (For this reason, tbe military resented McNamaras reliance on civilians, particularly in tbe Office of Systems Analysis, for judgmente on what they took to be purely military questions +.e., statements of military requirements.) They also implement decisions faithfully when assured that their position has been heard by the President and it has not been lost in the filter of Secretary of Defense memoranda. Securing separate advice from the Service Cbiefe and other military commander will require that the President, or at least hk WMte House staff, spend more time digesting the eeparate poeitions. However, this seeme a price worth paying to increase the flow of new ideas or doubts about proposed courses of action to the white Houee. Military compliance with presidential decieions would also be enhanced by avoiding the practice of using the military to seek public support for presidential decisions. The value of such action has become considerably reduced in recent years, and such use of the military tends to legitimize and increase the importance of their opposition when they choose to oppose policy.
v

Implicit in the new procedures as suggested is a reduced role for the Secretary of Defenee from that which he assumed in the 1960s. His scope would also be affected by another proposed change-that decision msking on matters concerning Defense budgeta and the use of military force be moved oubdde of the Pentagon and into a broader arena involving officials from the white House and other agencies. The Nixon adrninietration hae moved rather significantly, at least in form and to some extent in substance, to change the 10CUSof decisions. The creation of tbe Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) brings into existence, for the first time, a forum in which detailed contingency planning for the actual use of military force is carried out beyond the Pentagon. WSAG is chaired by the Presidente Assistant for National Security and includes senior State Department and CIA officials as well as civilian and military representatives of the Pentagon. It provides a forum where the military, diplomatic and intelligence evaluations of likely use of US military forces can be brought together in a systematic way, eomething which was not done in the past. This institution needs to be strength-

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ened, probably with the addition of come Widte House staff assigned speci5eally to thle tack. A eecond institution of significance is thi Defense Program Review Comtnittee wbichieafeo chaired by the Preeidents Assistant for National Security and includes representetivee not only from State, but also from the Arme Control and Disarmament Agency, the Council of Economic. Advisers and the Office of Management and Budget. The implications of thhi institution are enormoue. If it ie functioning effectively, decieione not only on the total size of the Defense budget, but also on the major Defense programs, will be made outside the Pentagon in an interagency forum where white House influence ie dominant. The President would be receiving advice on Defense budget issues from several different perspectives. while theinatitutfon has been created, it does not appear yet to have either the staff or then eesarytop.level direction to get into a wide range of Defense issues. For tlds rposeand also tomzke the WSAG more effective, the Presidente Aseistei t for National Swurity probably needs a Senior Deputy who would take some of the responeibllity for white House direction for budget and combat decisions, and who would be explicitly charged with bringing to bear the broader concerne of the Preeident. The procedure suggested here in no sense imply a downgrading of military advice. Instead, they are designed to aesure that the President receivee the full range of the existing military opinions rather than what filters through aJCScompromiee procedure or a Secretary of Defense responsible for presenting military views to the President. They also aim to give the President critical commentary on military proposals from civilian officials with a different and somewhat broader range of responsibilities. In the end, good decisione will depend on the wisdom and judgment of the President. What he decides, however, is greatly influenced by the information presented to him, as weU ashy his eense of freedom to choose, regardless of strong mititary and other bureaucratic pressures. SIC

Very near the heart of all foreign affairs is the relationship between policy and military pewer. ilfcGeorge f?wzd~

APril 1972

61

From Seaford House Papera: 1970 (Great Britain)

Seaford House, Belgrave Square Royal College of Dafance Studies

THEMEWI MID THEARMEDSERVICES

Major General D. W. Scott.Barreth flfitiefi ArmD In the old dqs men had the rwk, noeothep hwe the pre88. -@car Wilde URING the Crimean War. blood wae brougbt to the living rooms of Eng~ land by the stark reality of the diapatci& of Howard- Ruaself of f~e Tin%% with their descriptions of sarnage and incompetence. Previous campaigns were perhaps as widely csitieized at home, but this was the firet time that public emotion and fervor ware so greatly stirred by the forerunner of todaya maes media. Ten years later, Matthew Bradys photographs, ewcompanied by the songs of 62 kSStesyReview

7SEMEOth

both sides in the American Civil War, not only helped touch the hearta and minds of those at home, but heralded a new public interest in the conditions of war, ita causes and ideals. With news traveling fester then ever before, in a war which affected the livee of so many of the American people, there was increasing public discussion which resulted in the appointment of war correspondents on newspapers large and small, and led to a stream of reflection from military historians. This era of new public interest in contlict, criticism of any mismanagement, together with the post-mortems of historians, has not only affected the pattern of subsequent ware, but often forced a new pace of military change and thinking. Without the preesure to reform from newspapers, writers and cartoonists, would the scarlet of Sebastopol have still been seen on tbe South African veld ? The public interest and support for the Red Cross in the last two World Wars were a long way from the pre-Nightingale indifference of Scutari. In the Second World War, the publickept in touch for tbe first time by radio correepondente, film news and a meet mofeeeional corps of preee
wae alwa-~ on the wat& fo; an

lipoli and tbe horrors-of trerich warfare and gas. The world concern over Hiroehima may yet restrain the course of future warfare. In the last 20 yeare, there has been a revolution in tha speed, breadth and visual i m p a c t of communications which has profoundly affected the attitudes of society and bee created a new challenge to govermnenta and thoee in authority. They have found it more difficult to face their responsibilities to meet aggression with force, to explain the need for deterrence, to restrain confllct and violence, and to resist blackmail. With instant and abnost total exposure of the backgrounds of unrest relayed to an international audience, there is far more reason to justify publicly the necessary, hard decisions if they are to be understood and accepted, not only at home, but by demecratilc opinion in the world at large. Right to Question In a democracy, the right of an informed public and the media to question tbe purpose and coet of the armed forces baa an increasing effect on their use and recruitment. For all thesa reasons, it ie particularly important that the armed services do not cut themselves off from the svciety in whkh they live and which they eerve. They must underetond how best to use the media to explain their case and to convince their critics-amongst them intellectuals and journalists whose influence on the young cannot be overestimated-of the relevance of their task and the reality of the threeta they exist to meet. In tide era of newe which knows no boundaries, and which can be controlled and used as propaganda by unfriendly natione, the responsibility for explanation can no longer be left 62

repetition

of the unsubtlety

of Ga

Thie article wae rwnted from the original, publi-rhed in SEAEWaO Houen PAFWJIS: 1970, under the title, The Media, Confiict and the Armed Services. SEAFOaOHoueE PAPERS are publiehed by the Ro@ College of Defence Studies, $7 Be~grav8 Square, London, S.W. 1. Major General Scott-Barrett iv Commander of the Eostm Dhtmct. This article was written while he was a Brigadier at the Regal CoUege of Defence Sttui$ee.
RPM 1972

TNE MEDIA to public relations experts alone. The effecte of the media now often require tbe actual kourse of evente to be weighed against their explanation to the public. Governments, service officers and those in positions of responsibility must understand tbe etbica, susceptibilities and weaknesses of the profession of journalism, reeist taking offense at criticism, and study the possibilities of new developments of communications as they occur. They must remember that the free society of democracy today depends largely on the existence of an informed public which is in possession of the facts and makes considered and reaeoned judgmente, particularly on issues of national importance. Multiple Rob? The media in our society, as well as informing, see themselves as having a multiple role as watchdogs, judges and independent observers of events. They believe it is to the people, not to the government, that they are ultimately acconntible, and it is for this reason that it is so important both tbe government and the services are seen to welcome their freedom, interest and inquiry. Experience has shown that the services cannot hide their actions by censorebip unless vital national interests are at etake. * * By mid-1969, it had become clear to the world that, in one way or another, sooner rather than later, the United States was going to disengage from Vietnam. Whatever the precise terme of that disengagement, whatever the ultimate resolution, tbe US efforts at counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia were coming to an end, with a heartfelt national prayer throughout the United States of no more Viet04 nams ! It is a valid queetion ae to how much of thie pressure to pull out, leaving an uncertain eecurity to the United States alliee and the cause that had met it so much, was due to the agony, the bitterness and the tensione snffered by its society in eeeing and feeling this war in their homes. Dnring their involvement in tbie undeclared 6-year war, the, people of the United States had received in their living rooms a constant stream of television film, etatietics, pictures and newsprint about Vietnam. Great optimism and high predictions had so often been followed by heavy caeualt%s and allegations of concealmentand all the time evidence of suffering and needleee waste. This came to the American people in an era of new preeeuree of economic uncertainty, heightened racial tensions, and a new readiness by youth to question both social and moral values. It seemed a tragedy to many in government and the cervices that the very real successes, both militarily and in winning the snpport of the Santh Vietnamese people, ebould be obscured by this play on the emotions of thoec at home. New Pressure At the same time, the United States was subjeded to a new pressure that of opinion in the democratic countries openly critical of, and hostile toward, the morality and conduct of the war, ps~lcularly tbe bombing of North Vietnam. Much of tbie protest was stimulated by a view of the war and ite issues as seen from both fibns and articlee controlled and eeIected ae propaganda from Hanoi, Some of the most effective of these were channeled through partisan conntriea such ae Sweden, giving a neutral veneer to, those unaware of Wilitary Review

THE MEDIA the source, An efficient Communist propaganda machine exploited the sympathies of many well-meaning liberals and leftwing sympathizers to pubhcize the sufferings of North Vietnam, depicted as part of a David and Goliath struggle. The not inconsiderable French contribution to this battle for the opinions of the uncommitted world had a distinct flavor of sour grapes. Tet Offensive The Tet offensive in 1968 was the watershed in destroying public support for the Vietnam war, and became instrumental in changing US policy. It was used most effectively by Hanoi to influence democratic opinion and to shock an unwarned and unsuspecting American public with North Vietnams aggressive fervor and its determination to fight on indefinitely. Some objectives were eebmted more for their propaganda value than for their military significance; the United States Embassy in Saigon, near the press center, wae a case in point. The unexpected epesd and weight of the enemy attack was at first successful, and was given enormous publicity throughout the world, but the US forcee felt greet resentment that their subsequent and significant successes passed relatively unrecorded. Thbr bitterness against the media lasta today. After Tet, varioue high-ranking misitary and civilian officials of the Defense Department still made overoptimistic statements of the success and progrese attained by the US forces although the Vietnam insurgents end their North Vietnamese supporters continued to influence much of the South Vietnamese countryside. At every stage, as the United States escalated the war, the enemy forces reeeived better equipment from
April le72

China and the Soviet Union who were not slow to exploit the dhision and debates so vividly described by the media in both the United States and the Free World. One of the most compelling examples of the power of United States and world opinion, fanned and expreesed through the media, was the enforcement of a target date by which the United States had to withdraw from Cambodia. However right or wrong the decision to destroy the North Vietnamese bases in Cambodia, and there was military evidence to show that it was right, President Nixon failed to convince the United States and the world that the action was justified. Perhaps Nixon lacked the Kennedy flair for publicity, but it seemed incredible that he had no equivalent of the aerial photographs of the Cuban missile sites produced so dramatically by Adlai Stevenson in the General Assembly debate on the Cuban missile crisis. To the Free World, to have ae a target a sanctuary rather than a stockpile or lair was seen as an unfortunate choice of words and eet the tone for a poorly justified case. Oaily Briefing Since September 1964, every afternoon at five oclock, seven daye a week, many of the 350 journaliete covering the war in Vietnam have been to a briefing in the headquarters of the United States Military Aesistznce Command in Saigon, known widely as the MacVee Five OClock Follies. Although often criticized for being uninspiring, using the language of the third sex, and preaching the party line laid out in sheeta of mimeographed handout, this daily meeting provided a service to the press and a forum for some discussion. The week65

TWE MEDIA nesses of this system were that large numbers of journalists, photographers and tlim men were kept living toe cloeely and inevitably vying with each other for the exclueive news item and that the optimistic statistical jargon used at the briefings often dehumanized the activities of the .voldiere and widened the credibility gap. While there were a significantnumber of highly qualified journalists in Vietnam, men who had been covering Aeia for years, there were many from the world press and television who had little knowledge of the hietory, politics and background of this complex war or of Vietnamese culture. It seemed a pity that those charged with the responsibility for bringing thie conflict to the homee of millions could nOt have had at least some of the briefing given as a matter of routine to so many thousands of US Government and military officers. CmrtimdRya Problem Continuity of reporting was another problem. Six-month toure for resident journalists and one or two weeke for %ransiente were hardly exceptional. A by no means untypical telegram to public relations could read: Arriving Saigovz Thurmlw morning PanAvw Flight One. Pleaee meet aud arrange appointments with Bunker, Weetnwrekvnd, Kovrw, Thieu and Kg. Stop. Aleo representative Vietuame8e. Stop. lZequeet travel Daaang for ivrterview Walt, Pleiku for quick revtew uwntagvuerd eitvmtion and D e 1t a where hope to ese Van. Stop. Also + tereeted meeting with Gen Tnang and Majov Be if time permite. Step. Keep Sumfag clear ehwe I muet fits before depurture early afteruoon that dag. Incredible to believe, come managed this whirlwind tour. Vietnam must W. really have seemed like a landscape from the window of a fast-moving train to these inetant experts. Another related difficulty wae that of sourcee, for few correspondents knew Vietnamese and not m a n y French although so many of the most worthwhile sources in Vietnam were comfortable only in these languages. What limitations did this kick of language place on correspondence in obtaining and evaluating eourcee ? HOW much did they depend on other correspondents rather than undertake independent inquiriee ? How mnch w~re they the captivee of their Vietnamese aseietants or interpreters, and did they question their qualifications and prejudices ? How much did the established Vietnamese sources respond out of habit, with outdated comment on the general situation because they had come to believe that correspondents wanted to hear it that way ? Theee were some of the prob. lems facing the US Government Information Services in its briefings and relationship with the prese. War Crimes Probably the greatest failure in communication between government, press and army in Vietnam was the armys reluctance, in the early phase of the war, to reveal or diecuss any of its dirty linen concerning the allegations of war crimes, such as at My Lai, and its ref neal to have the hearings and investigations made public at an early stage. The fact that these incidents were firet revealed by Hanoi angered the press, and they resented most strongly the initial denials and subsequent evasions by the army, which put them on the defensive with their readers. Understandably perhaps the military had initially tried to hide its erMilitary Review

rors and mistakes, and, when accused, had often been too quick on the draw to try and prove the prese wrong; it could well be that the remarkable public support for Lieutenant Calley after his conviction in the My Lsi trial, which forced the President to intervene on his behalf, stemmed primarily from the portrki%d by the media of widespread iack of discipline and drug taking in the army in Vietnam and the implied smear that he was the scapegoat for many more unrevealed incidents. Thle does scant justice to the United States Armye ruthless investigation and punishment of such offendere, aa witnessed by the numbers serving prison sentences at that time. By the end of 1967, thoee working on Vietnam at CBS ueed the expression shmting bloody to describe the Apfil1972

filming they had to do to get on the air. It was not that they were ordered to shoot only war scenes, but, when they shot a poiitical story, or the progress of the pacification program, as well as war scenes, it would be the action fikn which the program producere selected. American families have seen episodes more gripping than those concocted for \ entertainment shows later in the evening. They ,have seen, in color, vivid portrayal of suffering, badly wounded Americans, eacke of dead being loaded for shipment home, and sprawled heaps of smal~ dead Vietnamese bodies. Latterly, on top of all the bloodshed, have come the interviews with disgruntled draftees referring openly to their uee of drugs and condemnation of their countrys involvement in Asia. Many believe 67 I

THE MEDIA
that this depiction of horror and disillusion has been the significant factor in turning people against the war which has seemed increasingly pointlees. Once the major involvement of the United Statee was decided npon, did the government give sufficient thought to working with those in charge of the media as to how, without censorship, a war could be f onght against an enemy who rigidly and selectively controlled all aspects of news and had the snpport of world communism to aprend its propaganda? Vice President Agnews attempts to criticize the unfettered freedom of the media, and make them a scapegoat, were Wltterly resented.

security, but complete denial of acceee, as recently imposed in East Pal+ istan, can lead to disastrous treatment by the world media. The flooding of a far-off theater of war with large numbers of journalists and film makers, some with little experience of the background of the war, poses a problem in their selection and briefing which must be recognized by editors. If confidence between the press and the military is to be achieved on the ground, it ie important that the generally high etandards of fair reporting are always qmintained. Was it fair, as sometimes occurred, to the army or to the public, to send a confirmed pacifiet to cover the war, and not inform either of his viewpoint ? TelevisionsImpact Since the impact of television may have been decisive in forcing withdrawal, it is essential that the armed forces learn to live with the power, speed and impact of thk means of communication. They must work with those responsible to attain a new close cooperation and understanding, both on the ground and in the studio. At present, the television newe editor eits in his office in New York, surrounded by five television screene, and is a long way both physically and mentally from the Pentagon in Washington and the official epokesman and releaee. Surely, the army must come cloeer. The silence of General Abrame after the harrying of General Westmoreland by the worlds media ie perhaps understandable, but, if the media are a weapon in this war, and used as such by Hanoi, is he right? To most people in Northern Ireland, the monthe of claehee after 1968 seemed inevitable. The high unemploymen& arbitrary allocation of housMilita~ Review

Publicity or Information At a lower level, did the army in Vietnam provide tbe right briefing and escort for camera crews and journalists ? While many commanders and headquarters appointed public information officers, they often did not have the training and ability to transmit the background of their commanders views and resorted to official jargon and rhetoric, and sometimes irritated the press by trying to feed them publicity instead of information. In the future, the military must understand that it is fundamental to their ability to fight a limited war without censorship that confidence and mutual respect with the press be achieved. The dangers of the donbleedged weapon of censorship are illustrated by the attempt by the South Vietnamese to conduct their recent operations in Laos in early 1970 with .a total ban on the press which hae only convinced world opinion that theee were a military disaster with heavy casualties. Correspondents may need to be controlled on grounds of 66

THE MEDIA ing, and political backwardness were all issues for vigorous discussion within both the Protestant and Catholic communities, particularly among the young. Their historic division kept alive by segregated education, Protestant marches and Catholic processionshad polarized at the extremes the prejudices of an organized minority on both sides. For some years, the outside influence and window on the world of British press and television programs seen throughout Ulster had played a major part in highlighting the bigotry and bitterness and in drawing comparisons with conditions of one man one vote and the greater prosperity on the other side of the Irish sea. Londonderry-1968 The first reappearance of flame in the smoldering fire of unrest was the violence which occurred in Londonderry on 6 and 6 October 1968. At a protest meeting in Queens University, Belfast, a few days later, a group of radicals decided that the impact of the publicity both inside and outaide Ireland, depicting the fervor of protest and the heavyhandedness of the police during the recent riots, had so roused public support and sympathy for the cause of civil rights that it warranted a far more militant policy. From this moment, a permanent protest group, the Peoples Democracy Movement, with come outside revolutionary influences, led the new campaign for action. Their first target was to pressurize Britain to db+arm the hated B Speciale. This wae the start of a sustained effort through press, radio and television by the Catholic minority in Ulster to draw attention to the grievances and fears of their community. Their cause soon gained veealsupp+mt from the powerAptii 1972 ful,Irish lobby in the United States, from Southern Ireland and from the large Irish population in Britain kept informed by their own newspaper. On the other side, the Protestante, with their deep-rooted fear of being eventually outnumbered by the increasing Catholic population, and their intense loyalty to the Crown, strongly resented the open appearance of the Republican flag and the raieing of money for civil rights in the United States. This indignation encouraged rumors and fear of the IRA whose history of sabotage, reprisale and unprovoked attack underlined the threat to an insecnre border following the disarming of the B Specials. New Weapon With the shout to the world from the Catholic militants, the Protestants stood fast on their ancient rights to march. The drums and banners of the Orange Lodges were still exultantly paraded through the streets, their numbers swelled by their Scottieh brethren. This was the continuation of an old battle fought skillfully by relatively few extremists on both sides, using the new weapon of publicity to gather the maximum pressure from outside support for their cause. In the series of claehes which took place between October 1968 and August 1969, the hard-pressed Royal Ulster Constabulary endeavored to separate the two factions. The enmity between the Catholics and the almost , entirely Protestant armed police force, who were tough in deafing with the increasingly organized protesters, destroyed confidence in the police and the due course of law in certain Catholic urban areas. The appearance of television cameras eometimes increased the violence, bringing it to the outside world. Certainly, the 69

THE MEDIA Irishmans love of a tight was given an extra relish by the presence of fihn crews and attendant crowds. In April 1969, the British Government decided to reinforce the emall permanent garrison of 2400 British soldiers and cent another battalion to help guard key installations. Soon after their arrival, the well coordinated and violept attacka in Londonderrys Bogside and the Falls Road in Belfast, simultaneously with scenes at Lurgan, Dungannon and Omagh, stretched the police to the limit, and they suffered heavy casualties. The crunch came in the control by police when, in August, the violence led to burning buildinge, overturned buses and widespread injury. Honeymoon Period Savage intercommunal war was only etopped by the intervention of the British Army who succeeded in achieving a temporary calm. They were much helped in thie by the balanced support of the Britieh media who took General Freelands lead, making it clear that this was only a honeymoon period unless both governments moved quickly to deal with the sources of discontent. During Auguet, the army strength was increased to 10,000 men, most of whom were forced to live under extremely primitive conditions, undertaking long, tedious patrola and guards in a police role. Their good humor and morale were helped by the knowledge that those at home were being ahown a picture which recognized both the value and discomfort of their job. As predicted, the honeymoon was soon over, and those behind the protest, considering the promised reform from Storrnont too slow, soon saw value in publicly discrediting the impartiality of the troops.
70

By early September 1969, a eeriee of small but vicious incidents between the two factions were only restrained by the use of CS gae by British troope, and, from then on, they became the targets for crowds of jeering youths, insults, stones and petrol bombs. Their disciplined reetraint was quite remarkable, and it was only. in July 1970, when bullets were flying from both eides, that the army ahowed its teeth by the selective use of firepower. During the subsequent arms searches in the Falla Road, the wild allegations of sacrilege, looting and intimidation created enmity between the army and tlie Catholics, with memories of the Black and Tans revived. Respect and Friendsldp In August 1970, during the Belfast floode, the prompt assistance and goodwill of the same soldiera reecuing those whom they had previously eearched, and the publicity this received, did much to restore a measure of reepect and friendship certainly not there in the 1920s. Unfortunately, to the extremieta on both sides-and, in particular, the IRAthe good-humored forbearance of the British soldier endangered the impetus of their causes, and, in the early months of 1971, renewed and vicious incidents were perpetrated to try and provoke strong retaliation. In comparison with Vietnam, there was little problem of security of information, and, with tide freedom, the press center set up by General Freeland had two featuree new to the Britieh Army. The first was his direction that all major units and all brigade headquarters should appoint a fulltime otRcer for public relations duties. They provided a swift and accurate stream of information direct to the center when incidente arose, helping
Milltaty Review

THE MEDfA the hearts and minds campaign at the lowest level and acting as guides to journdista and camera crews. The second was that, by bringing the public relationa staff into the discussion and planning stage of operations, he was able to achieve a new confidence in the authority and background of the statements from the center, tha information being handled on a joint civil, police and army basis. Policy of Frssdom A policy of freedom in encouraging young officers and soldiers to be fihned brought excellent results, due to their careful briefing, natural good sansa and the responsibility of tbe media. With the exception of the troops anger at the immediate acceptance by some well-known Britk.h journaliate of the other sides account, and the wide publicity given to the accusations of looting and brutality after the Falls Road searches, the British Army has recognized the fairness of the reporthg of their attempts to prevent bloodshed in thh part of 1the United Kingdom. There is a certain disappointinent, however, that their considerable voluntary efforts, despite the bottles and etones, to assist young people in sports and clubs and to promote goudwill have been little seen at home. Recently, such factors as the murder of three young Seottiah soldiers, vividly brought home to people through their television screens, and the sight of soldiers enduring the c u r a es of screaming women, and petrol bombs and stones thrown by ganga of uncontrolled children has created a surge of support for the army throughout tbe remainder of Britain, and an acknowledgment that the arrnya restraint is more politically mature than the tactics of the extremists. As a result, the April1972 extremist have been driven to individual acts of terrorism and violence which are tending to alienate moderate world opinion. As both sides have become aware that the publicity of thejr cause is likely tQ have a major effect on its future, the media have played an increasingly significant role. With publicity as a weapon, it is important that the security forces in their task of keeping the peace are even more conecious of the need to present their unbiased behavior, which can only be acideved if they can convince the newsmen of tide truth, and do not get irritated by small inaccuracies and pinpricks. Emphasis on Impartiality While newemen rightly attach importance to stirring governments to action by showing the fervor of protest, the special problem in Ufzter is that, if bloodshed ie to be avoided, it is necessary that the impartiality of the troops be given equal emphasis. It must be remembered tha$, it ia tbe aim of the extremists on both sides to discredit the security forces to a world audience, and thus justify their own uee of violence. In an educated, volunteer army, with its soldiers, families and friends all watching television, eo different from the 1920s, the power of the media to encourage goodwill and suetzin restraint cannot be overestimated.

Many of those outaide the industry feel that, after 20 years of television, society has seen the beet and worst of its effects; thk is not s0. The speed of change and the public appetite for each new development in television has seldom been accurately forecast, particularly in Britain. The viewing habits of this country must surely in71

crease with more choice of channels and watching made easier by larger screens that may, in time, become a cinerama curved wall in the living room. Many of the young are already being conditioned by the far wider use of television for edncation in such schemes ae the Open University, the linkup of Lendon and Glasgow schools on cloagd-circuit television, and the hundred terminal network in Leeds University. The United States and Japan have even bigger plane. The next development, already advertised, will be the wide sale of a special converter to enable cassettes of taped, filmed programs to be shown through existing sets. The educational and entertainment possibilities are phenomenal eince it is probable that these cassettes will be distributed

through lending libraries and viewing clube which, besides drawing television yet further into peoples lives, will produce a new thirst for material. To meet thie demand, there will be a diversity of film units bringing more subjects under scrutiny, and, while thie development may not have a direct influence on conflict, it will probably promote more viewing of its causes and background. When people can select programs from sources other than the established networks, and the nature of television begins to approach publishing, tbe present BBC Chartme and Directions by which Parliament tries to exercise a degree of control will have lost much of their power. The possibility of censorship in a conflict situation will be reduced even further, and any barriers against lack of mo-

THE MEDIA gram balance by this means will be removed. A final long-term thought for the future is the probability of television being linked by telephone line through computere to produce a dial-a-program capability and visual telephoning. Tbe United States has already had successful trials. Satellib Communications Far more important as a potential influence on the seeds of conflict is the spread of visual communication by satellite. Already in some areas, the scenes and techniques of unrest can he instantly exchanged, with the Black Power and antipolice techniques of tbe United States seen and shared in Netting Hill, Manchester and Bermuda. There are signs that the high priority given by the Soviet Union to its satellite communication program is directed toward creating a new television educational service to assist some of the less developed nations and increase its world influence. This view of one way of life, relayed first into the schools, will inevitably be answered by similar schemes from the West. The preeent crowds pressed against the windows of television shops in Singapore, seeing other standards of life, are only forerunners of the village groups of the future. The fact that the first Chinese apace success circled the earth proclaiming The East is Red spotlights the future uee of this means to influence mens minds from far away. So far, the competition of television in Britain has done surprisingly little to discourage the eale and reading of newsprint, maybe partly due to the flexibility of Fleet Street in changing the pattern and layout of ite newspaper. With the acceptance that the
April 1972

main news has already been seen on television, there bas been more critieel analysis, questioning of accepted institutions and traditional values encouraging personality cults both of journalists and figures in the news. Depth of interest and exposure of subjects has been increased by the diversity of special seetions, supplements and magazines, many in color. By their quickly published critiques of television programs, some seen as a result of previews and the wide coverage and forecast in weekend papers, close links between Fleet Street and television are maintained. Television bas been mainly recruited from journalists, and the close ecrutiny of newspapera plays a part in influencing those who direct the television programs. Tabloid Format Future publishing trends, with more photographic printing, will favor the tabloid format in which the ottbeat photograph and comment will be used even further to catch the eye. As a result of these developments, all those concerned in the control of conflict, and the cervices, must expezt even further exposure, and be organized and ready to reply. The Times Corve8pondtmt, Sir, is a lging blackguard. Lord Raglan, 1854 They are a set of dirtg newspaper aoribblers who are a pest and shd not a~oach me. -General Sherman, 1864 Having seen from resent history the far-reaching and proved influence of the media on the army and its tasks, it would be madneas if these sentiments found any sympathy in 13

THE MEDlh our army today. Are the echoes sW1 there? Tkunk God the bloody Prem have gone. Officers overheard by a Lhzifg Mirror journalist, 1970 Taking into account that, when they meet, the interests of the army and the press are seldom the same, the onfy possible productive relationship for both eides to aim for is to achieve trust and confidence, within a set of agreed ground rules, at all levels. The journalist, a rcslist in a hard, cum. petitive world, expectc to come up against sensible safeguards and conditions and does not respect weakness. The army officer, used to an ordered, tidy and Klerarchlcal society, is often initially suspicious of the more casual, free thinking and probhg ap. preach of the reporter. InaccuratePoftrayal In spite of the mass of good pub. licity, the soldier frequently remem. hers and resenta those occasions when there have been either a prejudiced or inaccurate purtrayal of hk chosen profession by a prese to which, after all, he hea no direct reply. At such moments, the essential place of a free and questioning media in a democratic way of life can be lost sight of, and he buttons up in selfdefense. It is important that, keeping a sense of proportion, he doea not exaggerate the motives of the press for sensationalism and increased circulationfl any mention of which immediately puts their heekfea up. It is up to the soldier to create the best possible relationsldp by approacldng the press within a framework of positive, constructive tbhking rather than as an unpleasant 14 chore. He must not become irritated by pinpricks, but hang on to his sense of humor and realize that both good and had must come out. Nothing must be too much trouble to give the journalist the fade, to win bis respect, his confidence in the good and to put the bad in perspective. Discussion of the effects of press and television in the army can eo often be reduced to a review of public relations, the handling of press inquiries, publicity for recruiting or a snipe at unfavorable plays and articles, regretting tbe armys impotence to reply. Like all institutions in a d@mcracy, the army does not expect to escape close scrutiny and some crik icism since, being responsible for some half million individuals, soldiers and their famifies, there is a vast potential for human interest stories. while to have a good information service and to answer queries quickly and openly is essential, there is now a far wider angle to be considered. Under the threat of the spotlight from an increasingly penetrating visual exposure, there is a need for a more outward looking mental attitude and readiness to explain. Periodic Examination With this in mind, nearly every aepect of army life should be periodically examined and questioned for its relevance to be seen by a largely youthful and critical audience. Of course, under some circumstances, and particularly in a major conflict, control of journalists and camera men can be achieved, but thii must be carefully thought out well in advance, and be seen to be justified. To put this subject in ite right perspective in military thinking, it is now possible that Publicity should rate a heading in the format of opMilltafyrteview

---?
THE MEDIA eratilonal instructions of similar importance to Intelligence~ with its sPeeiali8t sWff tr-ted by commanders on en equal footing. Certahdy, publicity must be considered as a legitimate weapon of war and of part of everyday life in the army. of Militsq Hkterisas The lessons of recent history, if considered in the light of the growing tide of mass conmmnieatione, with its ability to cross frontiers and continents, its power to educate, entertain, excite and jnflame, show a wide and increasing impact on the seeds and course of confllct. Military historians have always influenced service thinking and development; now, with new meane of spreading discussion and with virtually no gap in time between the battlefield and the memoir, there ie a far greater need for those in responsibility in our society to consider the implications and possibilities of the media in relation to all forms of future conflict and in its control. The military involvement in Suez, Vietnam and Uleter each chow a landmark in separate aspecte of these influences and point to important lessons which require more study and action. * * *
Inlkmse this when fighting an enemy who rig-

idly controlled ita own media and exploited propaganda wherever possible. While it is easy to be critical of this far-off war, it is not in its conduct, but in the explanation of it to the United States and the watching world that the greatest failure has occurred. Ulster poses an entirely different problem, with publicity being used by both sides as a weapon to fan the flames of an ancient historical and religious quarrel. Nearly every incident hae been staged with an eye to the publicity it will receive and the pressure that this will exert on opinion in Britain and Eire. The army, helped by a responsible press, has so far prevented a bloodbath and retained stability, but, uxdees the Stormont government acts quickly to epeed the essential eocial reforms, at the same time safeguarding Protestant security, it will be at the mercy of the media-conscious extremists who will exploit further violence. RetSin Crestive Freedom The incrcxe.ing power of the media to give pleasure to millions, to broaden horisons and to educate ie a boon to mankind, but there is wide apprehension that, in a democracy, the knocking of its established values, the dramatic presentation of violence, comparisons of social unrest and susceptibility to radical influences shown constantly on television will not only create conflict, but make it diffimdt to control. Totalitarian regimes, rwmgnizing these dangers, rigidly restrict their press and television and use them for propaganda. In the United States and Britain, the freedom of the communicators to probe authority, to expose injustice, to give political balance, and to stand up for the underdog is fundamental. n

In Vietnam, the precipitate withdrawal of US forces-and, therefore, much of the credibility of US world leadership-woe largely due to the pressure on the tact two Presidents by a eickened public who for too long bad been fed on a diet of fibne of bloodshed, vast destruction and anguieh, without the balance of convincing explanation. Perhaps most of this was due to the unfettered freedom of world newsmen in the battle ares, poor official releases and a publicityconscious and vocal antiwar lobby; all Apdl 1972

THE MEDIA This freedom presents difficulties of control by governments when they require support for the tough and often unpopular decisions necessary to confront international pressures and deal with contlict. Without censorship, which can only be juetified when vital national issues are at stake, control must mainly lie in keeping the best poseible relationship with all those who are concerned with the media. The mainspring of the media is their need to provide a lively atimrrkw, and, to do this, they must retain their senee of creative freedom. In the last analysis, what really matters is to encourage good editorial control and the came sense of integrity and responsibility in all young journalists which generally exists at the top of this profession. To keep the balance in what they say, it is important that those in authority are accessible to journalists to ensure that they are well informed of the necessary facts. Finally, it is the army who has to bear the brunt of confllct and who is vulnerable to mierepresentation with its need to use force, tbe demands of security and ita traditional silence. There are changes required in attitudes of mind and training to ensure that they can continue to be used effectively, be respected at home and ready to deal with conflict wherever and whenever it should occur, as &urely it will.

In Vietcrsru,we were never successful in creating pubfic mrderstanding of our policy er ite executiun, and public eppneitien simply forced the Government to abandon its program.Vietnsrwie the classic ease where public epinion, public reactioh in due time fereed a maier reversal in Government performance, in Government action, for better or worse, depending en yeur cmtlook. I suggest that improvement in the eapablfity to communicate is critically important to the Government and to the mifitary if public understanding end public support for their policies and programs is to be achieved. Barry zorthian P?w8ident, Time-Life Broadcast Inc. in a speech at the Navat War College

76

hfilikwy Review

.d

Lieutenant Colonel John H. Napier III, United Stotes Air Force

HE first time in our hktory that US military forces engaged in an overseas nationbuilding campaign was in the Cuban occupation of 1898-1902, following our victory in the SpanishAmerican War. It was not the first US militery occupation of conquerad territory. There were the earlier ones in Mexico in 1847 and in the Confederacy in 1865. The Ameriean military occupation of Cuba was not only on foreign soil in an alien culture, but it succscded in establishing a newly sovereign Cuban nation-etate. Cuba wae aquippad with the public works, sanitation, legal and fiscal systems, education and public order neceseary to function effectively for the good of its people. what the Cubans did with this apparatus of society is another story. Nonetheless, the United Statae left a more eucceesful legacy in nationbuilding to Cuba than would be seen again until the
April 1972 77

LEONARO WOOD occupation of Japan after World War II. Considering the unreadiness of the US Army for the war with Spain and its deplorable administration, supply, medical service and transport, how could the Army have carried off the Cuban occupation with such success ? For the answer, one should look at the person and accomplishments of Major General Leonard Wood, US Volunteers. Wood was a unique man and a unique soldler. A New Englander, he graduated. from the Harvard Medical School. He never attended West Point, and, although he was not a line officer, but a surgeon, he won the Medal of Honor in the Indian ware helping to capture Geronimo. He wee well-connected in otlicial Washington. when the war with Spain began, he obtained authority to raise the lat Regiment of Volunteer Cavalry, dubbed the Rough Rldere. He was commissioned colonel, end hls friend Theodore Royevelt, lieutenant colonel. Colonel Wood demonstrated exceptional organizing ability in recruiting, training, equipping and transporting his regiment to Cuba where be commanded it at Lzs Guasimaa. He commanded the 2d Cavalry Brigade at San Ju~n Hill, wae quickly promoted to brigadier general of the Volunteers, was first military governor of tbe city of Santiago de Cuba, then governor of Santiago Province, and major general of the Volnnteere at age 3S, still holding his permanent rank of captain, Medical Corps, of seven months before. Absolute Ruler In December 1899, Wood replaced Major General John R. Brooke as military governor of all Cuba, and became absolute ruler of the ieland until sovereignty was handed over to the new Cuban Republic on 20 May 1902. During this time, he transformed the face of Cuba, bringing health to the soiled Pearl of the Antilles for the first time; instituting a syetem of public education; reforming the legal system; building tramways, highways and railroads; reforming the postal system; putting the ishmd on a sound fiscal basis and reforming taxation; insuring public order with a Cuban constabulary; and giving Cubans the promise of liberty and tbe hope of a better life and self-government. General Wood respected the Cubans and their mores, and he spoke their language. He was a natural master of
Nilitely Review

Liewtemwzt Colonel John H. Naver III, US Air Force, is on the faculty of the Air War College. He served mth the US Mark CoWe during World War II; in psychological warfare in the US Air Force dunng the Korean War; and as an uncenw3-nti& warfare plane ofjtcer, Headquarter, US MilitaqI Aeeiatmwe Command, Vietnam. Other assignments include duty on the Air Sta17 and with the Ofiiee of the Seeretarp of the Air Force. A graduate of the Air Command amt Staf? College, he k hi8 M.A. from Auburw Vniversitg, and ie a Ph.D. eamfidate at Georgetown University. 78

I.EOSASD WOOD

In Derember 1899,Major General John R. Brooke (right) was replaced by General Wood as mifitary gevernor ef all Caba

psychology, and he set an example of subordinating militav to civi2ian authority, even es a military governor. Ganeral Woods success may be explained as that occasional happy congruence of the right man in the right place at the right time. A contemporary British eyewitness etated that an extraordinary man was neaded to govern Santiago in July 1898: The occoaion demanded, j%8t, a phy8i&n to rfd wth the trwmwufou8 samtmy neeo%; then a soldier to mwpr+xe turbulence and effect a quick restoration of law and order; and J@ &y, a statestmzn to re-eetabti8h aad p8vfect a Ciml GovornmenA In GenOTOJWood waa fownd a man who by nature, edaorw%n and experisaee cm bined in himself a generous ehare of the apeeiu.1 8hW.?a of aU three.1 (lonternporary aeseeemente of Woode work eeem almost embarrassingly adulatory. For instance, Evelyn Baring, 1st Earl of Cromer, the great British colonial adminietrator called AIM 1972

the maker of modem Egypt, etated that Woods work in Cuba wee . . . the greatest pisce of colonial administration in ail history? Such praise rsquires an examination of Woods administration and accomplishments. In Spanish Cuba of 1898, the head of government was a mifitary autocrat backed by force in a regime in which home rule wae subordhate to central authority. The courts were vsnal and slow to act, and laws were made for the rich and influential. Taxation wee designed to let the landed aristocracy escape the burden; it was shoulderad, instead, by businessmen and coneumere. Import duties weighed heavily on naceasities and lightly on luxuries. The Church played a strong role in government. Postal service wee so bad that few would entmst important lettere to the maile. Illiteracy in many places wee es high as 80 to 90 percent. Disease wae both endemic and epidemic. Brigpndage prevailed and 78

LEONARD WOOD was supported by men in high otttce. Liberty and justice were only to be bought. Nonetheless, Cuba flourished because of natural resources and fertile soil. For the poor with simple wants, life need not be hard, and, for the rich, it could be desirable. General Wood recalled his afwignment to Santiago: On July 20, 1898 I received an order to report to Major Gen+wat Slr.after, USV at the @ace in Sant[ago de Cuba. On reporting, I wae $nfermed that I had been detailed to take comwumd of the city, to maintain order, feed the poor, and do everything poseible to facilitate the prompt re-eetablishment of bwainees.~ Stricken City He found that 15,000 of the civilian population of 50,000 were sick se were 2000 Spanish soldiers garrisoned in the city and as many more in camps outside. The US Army, in trenches ringing Santiago, counted 5000 of its number sick also. The fear of yellow fever stalked the stricken city like a ghoet. Of the inhabitants, 18,000 had been uprooted and sent to El Caney where they had been herded together with little shelter and exposed to disease. Lines of people queued up for the little available food. Dead animals and decaying refuee covered the streets. Tbe stench emanathg from houses told of unburied dead within. The dead had to be heaped in piles of 80 to 90 on railroad gratings and cremated with kerosene. UnwiUing civilians had to be dragooned to clean out the houses; police the streets; bury or burn the dead; and distribute food to hospitals, prisone, asylums and convents, for which they wem paid in Spanish rations, a plenteoue suPplY of which wae stocked in depots.
eo

Women spread shawls or stripped off their skirte to stow away and carry off baeic rations of eugar, hardtack, baron and rice. General Wood had the water eystem repaired and took draconian meamuws against profiteers in foodstuffs. The German vice consul established a diet kitchen which fed 500,0 persons a day. Ratilone were issued to 18,000 to 20,000 more. A hoapitel was aet up in the Cuban Boat Club, and a yeUow fever lazaretto on an island in the harbor. The death rate began to drop. Sanitary conditions improved aa did th~ epirits of the people. The police eystem was re-eetabliahed with native policemen, and every effort was made to establiah a firm respect for the civil agents of tbe land. Wood eaid: The law was militarff law . . . bwt even that I desired to administer aa mrwh by mml agents, awd not having the wnif ormed tvoope of the United Statee chasing petty offender8 through the 8tt-ests. [They were there] . . . to uphold the civil authority, not to 8wvplemcnt its He waa quoted more pungently ae saying: Let the Cubans kiU their own rats. Civil Power Also, he stated that, since Cubans had lived eo long nnder a military rule which suepended civil laws whenever it eaw tit, the great problem was to teach them that the civil power muet be absolute and supreme in a stable government. The military ehould act only in dire necessity, when aU other means are unable to cope with the situation: For thie reaeon in Cuba, it is meet desirable to inzi8t thnt all civil ofisre in aU rfe-partmeute of govermmmt from the policeman up to the highe8t o%al of the law, ehall be tmmted Military Revisw

LEONARDWOOO

General Woods head of the Department of Charities was Major E. St. John Grehle

with respect and ever~ poa$ible dignity and safeguard to their o~ee.~ General Wood thus realized two cardinal tenets to he expounded repeetadly 65 years later by the Britieh in counterinsurgency circles as prime lessons from their success in putting down Conmmnist terrorists in Malaya. The firet was The government must function in accordance with lawfl and, as a corollary: The armed forces acted in support of the civil power, and this coupled with the dominance of the police force, reeulted in political etability and the continuance of the rule of law throughout the insurgency.s As governor of Santiago Province, Wood rapidly organizsd a mountsd police there to maintain order in the rural districts, using US troops for the purpose only as an interim mezsure. He found that a force of 250 Cubans was ample, and officere and men were chosen from the best mataAprO 1972

rial in the former revolutionary Cuban Army. After Wood became military governor of Cuba, he established a constabulary, or Guardiu Rural, for the entire island. It totaled but 1604 officere and men organized into 15 troops, but disperssd at 247 posts so as to control the island completely. Brigadier General Alejandro Rodnquez, a noted soldier of the wars for Cuban liberation, became its commander. Guardia officers, had to rise from the ranks. Excellent morale resulted and the Guurditz remained apolitieel. Nearly all ex-Cuban soldiers, the men were armad with caliber .44 Ronhgton carbines, 12 cartridges, and a machete each, and fairly well mounted on native ponies. The municipal police had also bsen reorganized and were funded by their own municipalities. The resulte were gratifying. In the early months of the occupation, Wood
81

Li!OSARO WOOO could boast that: . . . my officers go all over the [Santiago] province with no other escort than a couple of mounted Cuban police. Two years later, he was able to say that Cuba was as safe or safer than the United States. One writer pointed out that Woods 1300-man constabulary reetored and maintained order which Spanieh Captain General Valeriano Weyler y Nkolau had been unable to do with 200,000 troope. Health and Sanitation The heroic exploits of Doctors Walter Reed, Carlos J. Finlay, Jesse W. Lzzear, Aristides Agramonte and Jamea Carroll in determining and isolating the deck? aegypti mosquito as the carrier of yellow fever are too well known to need recounting here. what is important to this discussion is tbe support Doctor Leonard Wood gave them, including financial support for risky experiments. Thanks to their reeearch and Woods backing, the scourge of yellow jack was iifted. In what we would now call medical civic action, Private William H. Dean, Troop B, 7th Cavalry, volunteered to be bitten by a mosquito, caught yellow fever, and, finaliy, recovered. In March 1901, Major William C. Gorgas began a war of extinction on the mosquito and won. There were other diseases too, malaria being one of the worst. Woods chief surgeon concluded in 1900 that, if the US troops took the field, at least half would become disabled from malaria. On the other hand, typhoid fever was rare and considerably less prevalent than among US troops at home, while venereal diseeee accounted for about half of aU medkud cases treated. During the first months of occupation, in October 1898, a Spanieh gar82 rieon of 12,000 withdrew from the northwest part of Santiago Province, leaving bebind a ravaging smallpox epidemic which struck down WOO inhabitants in Holguin. Colonel Duncan N. Hoods 600-man 2d Immune Regiment wcs vaccinated and revaccinated, and Wood sent it into Holguin where it established quarantine, organized hospitals, cleaned up the filth and refuee, and, in two months, brought the epidemic under control without one soldler catching smallpox. Heroic medical and cleanup meaeurea paid off. After 10 months in Santiago City, Wood claimed that: .Zoduv the city is clean, free from odors and Z.Vhenlthy of any city its size in the United States, ezcqting perhaps, for the cmwkwut presence of vnalaraa. Although the Cubans initially had resieted some of the cleanup measures, when they saw the death rate drop below previous norms, they appreciated fully what had been done. School !iystom Just before the war, there had been 36,000 children enrolled in Cuban public schools, but less than half actually attended. Cleesee were usually held in teachers homes, end there were few boo% or other school equipment. Instruction was poor, and unpaid teachers accepted fees from pupihv in a system that could accommodate lees than one-tenth of the children of echool age. The result was that poor children were excluded or neglected. The war broke down even tide eorry school system-oniy 21,000 were enrOlled in December 1899. One result was a 66 percent adult illiteracy rate in 1899. The Americans quickly turned this situation around. General Brooke bed appointed the zealous Alexis E. Frye
Militsvy Review

LEONARD Wooo to be superintendent of schools. In the first three months of 1900, he organized 2600 new schools, with 125,000 children enrolled, at least on paper. Wood furnished funds for books, school znpplies, and furniture for 100,000 pupils, and began construction of permanent school buildingz. Fryes enthusiasm ran away with him, howaver, and ha tried to organize too many schmle without materials, guidance or qualified teachers. Wood had to order a slowdown to consolidate the system and reorganize the school administration. Teachers Americanised The school eystem was hazed on that of the United States. However, Wood refnsed to man the new schools with American teachers ignorant of the language and mores. Instead, the Cuban teachers were Americanized. In the summer! of 1900, Harvard ra;eed enough money to transport nearly 1300 Cuban teachers to Cambridge for a summer school in American educational methode, and similar seasions were held in Cuba and in the United Statez the following year. Wood eaw the psychological advantages to be gained by tlds exposure of the Cuban teachers, and it seems to have borne fruik An interesting variation on the embolism of besting swords into plowshares ia that old Spanish erawtetes, ae weU es barracks that had been occupied by withdrawing US troops, were converted into ecboolroomz. Secretary of War Elihu Root reported that $250,000 were spent on such renovation in 1901. Shnilerly, Governor Wood moved the islande one university out of its mndowa buildings in Havena into the former Spenisli Arsenal, which wee high on a bill, thoroughly renovated and equipped April 1872 with apparatus. He also had to overhaul its faculty which numbered 96, with only 300 students. , Woods heed of the Department of Charities, Major E. St. John Greble was a fiery, explosive soul who made up in kindness of heart what he lacked in eleemosynary experience. He overhauled and consolidated the many miserable orphanages, and organized a new correctional school at Woods direction. The leper hospital, a place of horrors, was reformed. One day, Wmd called Greble in, saying: The irwane aeylum at Mazoma ie in tewrible skape. I want you to c5eaTsit up and Orgamze it. General, Im afraid I dont know much about insane asylums. I do-?ttknow much about being militmy governor. Find out how much it W-U cost, how long it wU tuke, wimt machiwery vow will ueed, what you W-U have to do for discipline; and repert.e Rehalrili~tion Starts Greble found a medieval inferno, a veritable Bedlam, reported and began rehabilitation. Secretary Root could report in 1901 a transformation in aU the charitable pub7ic institutions. Wocd could later write of Soldlere and Lifeeavere~ saying that We hem a great deal about the destructive work of the soldier. But he also performs a constructive and life-saving work. One could continue with examples of Governor Woode accomplishments in the other important fields of tax and fiscal reform, rebuilding the economy, land reform, transportation and communications, and, above all, in preparing the Cubans for eelf-govemment. What maybe more important in assessing Woods effectiveness, however, may be his attitude toward the as

., ..

.
LEONARD WOOO Cubans and how he obtained their esteem and allegiance to his efforts. Even before the end of the Spanish War, American commanders were embroiled with their Cuban revolutionary leader counterpart% and our Armys rank and file developed a strong bias against their Cuban allies. Stephen Crane reported that %oth officers and privates have the most lively contempt for the Cubans. They despise them; and the Manchester Guardians reporter wrote that , . . the United States Army made the very old mietake of judging its allies by its own standards: although the rag-tag Cuban irregulars excelled in guerrilla warfare and tied down 200,000 Spanish regulars. Leonard Wood did not show this prejudice. He understood the Cubans, appreciated their culture, and had studied Spanish. A few stories may be illustrative. As Governor of Cuba, it was expected that this Protestant New Englander would march in the Episcopal procession of the newly elevated Bishop of Havana under the canopy of an aged prelate named Bemaba, and Wood did so. A cry went up, Thank God, the Governor is a Catholic. The way was hot and weary, and the aged bishop, tiring of swinging his tenser, looked beseechingly at the stalwart, matter-of-fact, khaki-clad American general. Wood gravely took the tenser and swung it, looking possibly more solemn than he intended to because of the overwhelndng temptation to grin. Also, the bishops mitre slipped alarmingly on hk+ head each titne he bent to allow the Episcopal ring to be kiesed, and Wood, shifting the tenser to his other hand, straight. ened the prelates headdress each time it slid too far. The interminable procession over, Bishop Bemaba u t t e r e d fervent thanks, saying he could not have made it without the governors help. Wood demurred, adding that he may have

General Woods Sanitary Department represented a new concept of city services

84

Military Review

*
LEONARD WOOD shocked the seneibllities of some & baneros as a perdition-bound heretic. The old man retorted with a benign smile, You are a goed Catholic; only you dont know it. The dtrectress of a fashionable girls school invited Governor Wood to her commencement exercises, and he won the esteem of the old Spanish families by coming decked out in gold lace, knowing that that was what was expected hy Hkpanic ideas of dignidad. On the other end of the social scale, Doctor Wood visited San Lazaro, the leper hospital, alone and frequently. A natural athlet& Wood raised some American eyebrows, but more Cuban hearts by mastering jai akzi, the national sport. Wood Is Welcomed One gesture that Governor Wood made toward reconciliation to the former Cuban allies beare repeating. When he became Governor of Cuba, his ship docked in Havana Harbor, and he was met by tugs full of various Cuban committees, as well se the American generals and other officials from his predecessore staff. The Iatters enthusiasm for a man they regarded es a military upstart wae tepid, but they welcomed Wood with all honors, and asked the privilege of escorting hlm ashore. One biographer reported: The governor te appreciative but sorry; he has already told the Cuban veterana he will go wth them. The gesture makee an impreea{on CntiTelg out of proportion to its 8ig!nificance. News of it precedee the goverrwr aahore aud despene the weleome. General Rodriquez of the revolut$o~ arg amay comes to greet him. The governor draws the shot-shattered veteran into his carriage to ths deApril 1972

.:

light of the erouk%.? Leonard Wood realized that reeonciSiation was essential between the Cubans and the Spanish loyalists, many of whom stayed in Cuba and adopted Cuban citizenship, and Wood knew they were essential to the development of an independent Cuba: On the night of the inauguration of Cubas jfrat preaidmt, he [Wood] per80uaUg requested members of the newly elected Cuban Cengvess to call with, him at the Spanish Club, where the lo@ate were teaethcg King Alfon80; and per80m@ influenced men of the Spanieh Club in turn to come to the inaugural ball and toast the Cuban Republic. It was an imaginative piece of diplemac~ that appropriately cawed faur genre of government b~ sympath~, 8a@ZCitu,coUtinU@! a?uf a senee of humw-.8 Born Oiplomat When Governor Wood and his family finally sailed from Havana after the inauguration of the President of the new Cuban Republic, Havanas Spanish colony asked to escort his vessel with tbe Spanish Royal Mail Steamer to show appreciation for his work. As it steamed past Morro Castle, where the Spanish flag had flown for nearly 400 years, it was the first veesel to salute the just-raised Cuban flag. One can perhaps best conclude this etudy by quoting an assessment which Theodore Roosevelt, then Vice Preeident, made of hls friend in a letter to Secretary of State John M. Hay on 1 July 1899, recommending that Wood succeed General Brooke as Governor of Cuba: Wood is a boru diplomat, juet m he is a born sotdier. I question if any natieu in the world has now or hae had %-thin recent times, anyone so
85

LEONARO WOOD ideal of a milinearly approaching the taty administrator of the ki?td w required in Cuba. . . . We need Leonard Woods type today, not as a proconsul, but in tbe more delicate and tdlorrs task of advisor to developing sovereign nations living under subversive threats.

1 WilSam
Ptllfai% Sas,

IL

Hobbs, Wood, N. Y., 1920, D 66. Wind. .l@7azim, tiY

Leonnrd

G.

P.

Inatwomw: Tiw Laaom ~,mlo;rederhk A. Pmeaer,

of

Malwa and Viet1966, PP

Inc., N. Y.,

ameml Leon.d the Smender, Smibnd, 616.

, AC.jm * Ibi(t,

W3anthco Since

1899. P

p 622.

Leonard Wwd : A Bio@ Hermrm. 0T4PhlI. Xmus ReDrint C+rmmthn, A US Division of Kraus-Tbcmpmn Orsaniaation, Ltd., N. Y., 1981, D 270.
7

Hu@orn,

~ Leonard Wind, W%. Existing Conditions and Nor6h Anwri,.m Satiw. birw Needs in Ihba, 1899, P 694. ~ Sir Scdwt Thomrmm, D.feati.u Cmnm..iat

[bid.. m

260.64. That Human Beiw. Brace, and Howe, N. Y..

8 Hennann Hasedom, L.mani Wood, H.rco.rt, 1920, m) 70-71.

History teaches us that no one can guarantee us the privilege to enjoy freedom. It is ours to retain through our own hard work and sacrifice, juet ss it was gsined by other Ameriesns throogh their hard work and escritke. Those who cry for peece and freedom-both at the seine tics-are asking for sometfdf for which we must work and pray yet a little longer, mindful of the many irrtluerrces within our nation which sre gnawing at the very foundation of our American heritege. Geneval Ralph E. Haine8, Jr.

Milibwy Review

ThePresident versusCongress on Warmaking Authority

Major Jeffrey L. Scribner, United States Armu

HICH branch of the United Staterr Government, the executive or the legislative, has the authority to make war? This question hae been debated many times in the 183 years of our constitutional hietory. Once again, it has come to the fore. Thie distintilon was very much on the minds of the writers of the Constitution. They had grave reservations against lodging the warmaking power with the exesutive on the pattern of the British King. The first e&ended draft prepared for the Constitutional Convention contained the power to make war under the prerogatives of the legislature. But this raieed objections from some of the members who felt that lodging the total power to make war in the legislative branch restricted the ability of the executive to defend the country. Therefore it was moved tQ strike out make and substitute the word declare: thus leaving to the executive the power to repel eudden attacks. This measure carried by a vote of eight stat=aa to one, and resulted in the Congress being empowered to declare war. Arguments have ensued over the years concerning just what was inCowr&ht O 1S72br IKdor
April 1972
JeRrer

L. Suibner, Uni=

Stat.mb.

AU IUehta &rved. 87

WARMAKIN6 AUTHORITY tended by this change of words. Did the Founding Fathers want the President to have the authority to respond to attack only, or to be able to use the war power actively to further the national interest in the absence of a direct attack on the country? Did this change shift the warmaklng authority from the Congress to the executive or to some in-between point where it was felt that both would have to be involved ? Some have even suggested that the change wae in words only and that no change in meaning was intended. What Was Intended? Most arguments on the subject of the intent of the Founding Fathers are purely speculative. There is as much reason to suppose that all of the above points of view were represented as there is to ascribe one of them to a majority of the delegates. The only thing that can be said for the majority is that they evidently preferred to give tbe Congress the power to declare war rather than to make war. Upon examining the other provisions of the Constitution, most writers are inclined to agree that the intent of the change was to provide for a sharing of this power between the executive and both houees of Congress. The constitutional distribution of powers between the executive and legislative branches was most likely intended to require the agreement of the House, the Senate and the President before the country could be committed formally to a war with another nationwith all the legal consequences to people, rights and property that would be incurred. The Constitution, however, is interpreted by practice, as well as by trying to determine the intent of its writers. While there have been many 88 instances of armed conflict in our history, only five wars have been declared by Congress. In all the others they run to well over a hundred Presidents acting alone have assumed the responsibility. Congress and the American public seem not to have doubted the authority of the President acting alone to engage in hostilities in pursuance of national interests. Thus, there ie a great amount of precedent for the undertaking of hostilities by the executive without a prior declaration of war by the Congress. In practice, the executive has become paramount in the areas of military and foreign affairs and now controls the most important steps to war. Presidential Primacy The Constitution states in Article II, Section 2, The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. . . . The point of just exactly what is meant here has been debated repeatedly in the past. Discussions about the intent of the Founding Fathers, court decisions, studies by scholars, and even studies prepared for the Congress all conclude that the President has the necessary power and authority under this provision of the Constitution to direct the movements and activities of the military forces of the country.1 President Theodore Roosevelt provided the classic example of a Presidents use of his power as Commander in Chief to undertake an activity opposed by the Congress. He sent the Great White Fleet around the world, not only in the face of the objection of Congress, but also of Congressional refusal to vote the necessary funds. Thk event was a clear demonstration that the power of the purse alone is not sufficient to prevent
Military Review

WANMAKIN6 AUTNORIN the President from deploying forces around the world. Theodore Rooeevelt was not the first, nor wae he the laet, President to use thie power to place Congrees in a position where it had no alternative other than to hack the President. From the punitive expedition against the Barbary pirates to the escalation of the undeclared war in Vietnam, President have ehown that they have the capacity to order troope into any area of the world, As long as the troops are loyal, the orders will be obeyed. And once US troope are committed, it would appear that Congress has no alternative other than to support them. In addition to the initiative given the President through bie power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the Preeident has abnost complete control over the relations of the United States with other countries. This eecures for the executive another significant advantage over the Congress: It concentrates virtually all the initiative in the field of foreign affairs in the hands of the President.z In combination, the presidential duties of Commander in Chief and chief diplomat, coupled with the political nature of his office and the reluctance of the courts to allow questioning of presidential discretion, give the Chief Executive great flexibility in all aspeete of military operations and foreign affairs.a Presidential Latitude The office of the President has been compared to that of the chief executive officer of a corporation. The similarities in latitude are striking. The chief executive of a corporation will determine the policies of that corporation until he is replaced by a succeesor. He can be haraesed by the stockholders and by an unfriendly board of directore. The stockholders, and their representatives on the board of directors, can cauee a ehift in policy by firing their chief executive and bringing in a replacement, but then the new man will make corporate policy. Most corporate managere can lead their firms in directions other than thoee intended by their stockholders or boards of directore without abusing any of their authority. This is poesible because of the corporate managers control over day-to-day decisionmaking. The decisions muet be made by someone, and to make them by committee would, in most caees, not be practical.4 The Founding Fathers created an 09

Major Jeffrey L. Scribner i8 with the PolieII and Pla?w Division, O@e of the Chief of Inf ornration, in Washington, D. C. He holde a Bachelor of Arte degree from Syraouee University and is a graduate etudent in Government and Politics at the University of Mar-gland. He has eerved in Germany with the 56th Artillery and in Vietnam with the let Field Force and the Milita$y Assistance Command. He is the author of Soviet Military Buildup: A New Dimension in Foreign Policy which asweared in the Auguet 1971 issue of the MILITARY RUVIEW. April1972

WARMAKING AUTNORITY

President Theodore Roossvelt providaf the classic example of a presidents use of his power as Commander in Chief to undertake an activity opposed by the Congress

elaborate system of checks and balances, but they did not provide for an adequate check on this ability of the manager to take actions and make commitments which set the corporatione.,., the ,Nation+n a conrse which cannot be easily changed by the board of directors or Congress. While the authority and initiative of the Preeident appear to be paramount in the realm of foreign affairs and the employment of the military forces of the country, the Congress does have authority in these areas which, at least theoretically, can be used as a check on some of the activities of the sxacutive. Thk authority was written into the Constitution by those who thought they had created a balance of coercive powers whlcb would cancel each other out. In pursuing this objective, four powers were granted to the Congress which were tQ limit the executives unilateral abllfty to lead the Nation into war. 90

The first of these is the power to declare war eet forth in Article I, Section 8. In practice, this grant of authority to the Congress has not operated to prevent the executive from taking any and all actions which could lead to war or from engaging in warfare without obtaining a Congressional declaration of war. In the first 26 years of the Republic, conflicte were waged with France, Tripoli and Algiere without a declaration of war. In fact, Congress has never taken tbe initiative in declaring war. In only one instance, the War of 1812, was a war resolution even debated at length in Congress. Three contlicts which were fought without being declared wars by Congress were, nevertheless, ended by treaties of peace. The second power of Congress which can be used to limit the activities of the executive to lead the Nation to war is the control of the size of the military forces-i.e., the power to
Military Review

WARMAKIN6 AUTHORITY raise and support armies and provide and maintain a navy, provided by Article I, Section 9. There is no challenge to this authority of the Congress. It remains unimpeded just ae it was written into the Constitution. It could he used to prevent the President from going to war by the simple expedient of reducing the Armed Forces to such levele that they would not be able to fight. The wisdom of such a move might be eubject to question, but the authority is not.s The third power of the Congress is the power of the purse. Appropriations must originate in the House of Repreeentatives. In the case of land forces, money grants are valid only for two years. As with the power to regulate the size of the Military Establishment, the wisdom of cutting off the supply of money for the operation and maintenance of the Armed Forces is subject to question. Moreover, strong Presidents have been able to find ways to put the Congress in a position where it ,~ould be politically untenable to withhold funds from the military services. Still, the power of the purse is there, and it can be used to limit severely some activities of the President. It is doubtful, however, that the Congress can use this power to prevent the exeeutive from exercising his constitutional authority over the Armed Forces and foreign relations in a manner which can place the country in situation where war is the highly likely or inevitable result. In 132 years of American constitutional history, it has uot been done. The fourth power of the Congress is the power to remove the President from office through impeachment proceedings, as provided for in Article I, Section 2 and 3. To use this power to prevent the exwmtive from involving the country in a war would require him to be impeached on some other grounds since waiting until he had actually gotten the country involved

Senator Sam J. Rrvirr Jr. (DemeeratNorth Carofina) maintained the Cooper. Church amendment ie mwenetitutional because it attempts to have Cmgmss usurp and exercise some of tbe Presidents powers

April 1972

91

WMMMIN6

AUTNORITY the Congresses have been found to be of little effect and seldom exercised. Many writers have come to the concision that the Supreme Court will not rule on issnee of this kind on the gronnd that they are political and, therefore, m-e to be settled by the political organs of the national Government. One respected authority maintxins that the dbwuesion be~een the executive and the Congress will, therefore, continue until the contending parties have agreed upon some face-saving practical compromise which will serve for the time being.? Reliictant Judiclaty A few court opinions establish the reluctance of the judiciary to limit the authority of the President over the use of the military forces of the country and the conduct of foreign relations. These areas are central to presidential initiative, and, at the same time, they are areas where the Congress has shown little initiative or ability to exercise its more limited authority. In Marbury v. Madieon (1803) there was an attempt to use the courts to force the secretary of state to deliver certain commissions. In thk case, the Supreme Court opinion held in part: By the oorwtitztion of the Untted States, the preeident ia inveeted with certain important political power8, in tlw ezercise of which he ie to rise hi8 own discretion, and ie acceuntabls onlg to hi8 countcy in his political churacter, and to hic own conscience. To aid him in the performance of theee duties, he is authorized to appoint certain o#ioer8, who act bg hic authority, and in conformity with h{e ordere. In such caeee, their acts are hic acte; and whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in whiah exeonMilitwy ROViOW

obviously would not prevent a war. At any rate, if a Preeident had become unpopular enough to be impeached, ckances are tbkt an election would not be too far in the future, and a lost election would also result in removal from office. Power of the Senate In addition to the four main powers by which the Congress can limit the Presidents ability to lead the Nation to war, the Senate has some power which is thought to be a limit on the executives direction of foreign affairs in general. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution etates that the Senate must ratify treaties and confirm the appointment of high civil officials and military officers. In practice, these powers have been partially circumvented by the use of executive agreements and personal presidential representatives. The confirmation provision applies in the case of military officers, ambassadors and cabinet members. However, once these officials are confirmed, they are subject to the direction of the President, and so the value of the confirmation process as a cheek on the executives ability to make war is doubtful. It should be noted tltat Congress seldom has objected to the action of the President, as commander in chief, in sending abroad and maintaining the armed forces without ite prior concurrence. . . .8 In fact, over the years, Congress and the American people appear to have accepted the right of the executive and hk agents to fight in pursuit of national interests on the authority of the President alone. Hktoricrdly, the Nations course in foreign affairs has been committed into the hands of the Preeidenta we elect. The checks retained in a majority of 92

.
WARMAKlN6 AUTHORITY tive discretion map be used, stitl there exiet8, and can exist, no power to centrol that dieeretkm. The eubjecte are politicaJ: they represent the nation, not individual rights, and being entrusted to the ezeeutive, the deeieion of the ezecutive is conclusive. . . .S In 1860, a Federal Circuit Court applied the opinion quoted above in the case of Durand v. Holline which dealt ., : ..-. ., the countW ie pkwed in his bnd8, under the conetitzction, and the Zawe paeaed in pnreuuuee thereof; and different department of gwernment have been organized, through which this power may be most conveniently ezeowted, whether by negotiations or by force-a department of 8tate and a departtnent of the mvs~.o The Prize Caees (1862) arose from ~.. ,.

-4.: , ... ,.~ .:

-,

...-.

.%*:,.

m .-

Wlth the Greet Wfdte Fleet tadfway around the world, the Conrress had no oraetiral cheiee but to fnrsinb the money to complete tbe trip with the shelling of Greytown, Nisaragua, by a US Navy veseel, and added the following significant pointi: As the ezeontive head of the nation, the preeident is made the only legWmate organ of the general government, to open and carry on correspondence or negotiations with foreign natiotw, in matters concerning the interests of the conntrp or ite sitizetw. It is to him, also, the citizene abroad mud look for protection of person and of propertg, and for the faithful exesntkm of the laws existing and {ntended for their protection. For thie purpose, the whole exscutive power of
April 1972

actions taken uring a civil war. The decision in th Prize Caees established the legality / f a specific act of war a blockade-having international signitieance and the legality of the seizure of neutral shipping which violated the blockade. lhe following points, which bear on the warmaking power, were contained in the Supreme Court opinion deeiding thaee questions: . . . A state of actual war mag exist without any formal declaration of it by either partg; and thie is true of both a civil and a foreign war. . . . The proclamation of blackade by the President is of itself conckwive at

WARMAKING fifflNORllY evidence that a stute of war existed which demanded and mdhmzed recvwrae to eueh a nwaeure. War has been weU defined to be, that state in which a nat$on Woeeewtee ite mght by f oroe. . . . [The Prcaident] km no pewer to initiate or declare a war eithev againet a foreig?z nation or a domeetic etate. . . . If a war be made bg invasion of a foreign nation, the Preeident ie not only authomzed but bcund to reeist force bg force. He does not initiate the war, but ie bound to accept the challenge without waithzg for any epecial legishztlve authort%~. . . .10 The opinion also upholds the right of the executive to take hostile action against foreign powers without prior Congressional eanction: The battlee of Palo Alto and Re8aca de la Palma had been fought bef ore the paseage of the Act of Congrees of May I$th, 1846, which recognized a state of war as existing by the act of the Republic of Mexico. Thie act not enlg provided for the future prosecution of the war, but was iteelf a vindication and ratification of the Act of the President in accepting the challenge without a previous formal declaration of war by Congrees.ll CongressionalRatification The court further recognized that even subsequent Congressional ratification of executive acts of war may not be necessary. Where Congress has subsequently ratified such arts, however, the ratification is legal and operates to cover any acts where the sanction of Congrese could be considered neceesary. Taken as a whole, the opinion delivered by the court in the Prize Caees does not establish that the President cannot create a war, as is claimed by 94 some, only that he cannot decdare war or strike an unprovoked first blow. He can etill maneuver a potential enemy into takkg a warlike action and then retaliate. Powers of Congress Llmlted In 1893, in an opinion delivered in the case of Swaim v. The United Statee, the Court of Claims racogniaed the authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and limited the powers of the Congress to interfere with them through the power to make rules for the Government and regulation of land and naval fomes. Specifically, the court eaid: there remains the significant fait ii our military e@em that the President is always the commander in chief. Congress may increase the Army, or reduce the Army, or abolish it altogether; bet so long as we have a military force Congrees cannot take swag from the President ths supreme command. It ie true that the Constitution hae conferred upon Congrese the exclusive power to make rules for the government and regulation of land and naval forces; but the two powere are distinct; neither can trench upon the other; the President cannot, under the d~guiee of military orders, evade the legidative regulations by which he in common with the Arnw muet be governed; and Congrees cannot in the disguise of kales for the government of the Army impair the autheritg of the Preetdent ae cmamnnder in chief.lE In the 1936 caee of the ?_htitedStates v. Curties-Wright, tbe Supreme Court held that there is a fundamental difference between the limitations on Federal power in internal affairs ae resting on those granted or implied by the Constitution and the lack of a similar limitation in external affairs because: Mllitwy REVilIW

WARMAKIN6 AUTHORITY It re8ult8 that the investment of the federal government with the powere of external sovereignty did not depend upou the a&native grants of the Constitution. The powere to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treatiee, to maintain diplomatic relatioue with other sovereignties, if the~ had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have veeted in the federal government ae neceeaary conc0mitant8 of nationality. . . . In this vast exterual realm, with complicated, delicate it8 important, and manifold problem8, the Pre8ident alone hue the power to speak or listen ae a representative of the nation. . . . It i8 important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an authorit~ ve8ted in the Pre8ident bg an exertion of legislative power, but with euch an authoritg plu8 the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the eole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations a power which doee not require as a baei8 f W it8 eXeTCi8ean act Of CO?tgrees, but which, of couree, like every other governmental power, must be exerci8ed in 8ubordi?mtion to the applicable provisions of the Constitution. . . .Z~ In none of the foregoing cited cases does the Supreme Court decide the question of which branch of Government can create a etate of war. However, it is significant that the courts as a whole have shown a marked reluctance to restrict the executive in the conduct of foreign relations in general and in the exerciee of the powers of the Commander in Chief in particular. The logical conclusion of a etudy of the warmaking powers in the ~nited States is that the President can make war or that the Preeident and ConAoril1972 grees together can do eo. Congreaa alone cannot. This can, however, be carried ona step further. In a realistic sense, tbe Congrese cannot prevent a etrong and popular President from engaging the country in war. Thk ie because the checks and balances built into the Constitution do not all operate today as ite authors apparently thought they would. Control of Acfivitiss The meet important check the Congress has on the Preeidente activities in this area is the authority to raise and support armies and to provide and maintain a navy. Theoretically, the check involved here ie that the Congress can reduce the military forcee to the point where the executive cannot engage in hostilities. But thie would aleo denude the country of its defenses and reduce ite stature as a great power. In todays world, it would aleo invite attack. As we have seen, the power of impeachment would not be useful to prevent executive action. Moreover, presidential initiative can be ueed to partly overcome the Congressional power of the purse. Recent enactments of the Congrees operate to prohibit the uee of any funde to introduce or retain US ground forces in Cambodia or Laoe. Whether these enactment can actually operate to prevent the President from ordering US ground forces into these countries ie eubject to serious question. This was explained on the Senate floor on 18 May 1970 by Senator Sam J. Ervin Jr. (Democract-North Carolina), one of the Senates leading experta on the Constitution. Senator Ervin, spaaldng about the CooperChurch amendment, maintained that such an enactment by Congreee is unconstitutional in that it attempts to

as

WARMAIUN6 AUTNORITY have Congress usurp and exercise some of the Preeidents powers ti direct the activities and movements of the military forces. He went on to say: . . . The Founding Fathere were not foolish enough to ptace the command of Amerzcan troops engaged in combat operation in a Congress of the United Statee which is now composed of 100 Senatore and .435 Representatives.~~ In this, the senator appeare to be well supported by legal precedent: . . . An inherent attribute to an office established bg the Conetitutivn mwst exist without statutorp authoritg, and cannot be taken swag by statutory authomtg. . ..36 Itis apparent that, as a practical matter, President have the authority to make war in todays world. This may not have been what the writers of the Constitution intended, but it is what has, in fact, evolved. It will be true as long ae we are required by the world situation to maintain large standing military forces for the defense of the country.

1 The POW.?E of the President an Ommmnder in Chief of fhe Armed Forces have been the subject of n.mermx at.dies under vmicm -la&d tides. 1 think the s4a4ement made rdmve is . fair mm. m.tion of their findings. For more i. fm-m.tkm. the reader should refer ta: Ua Conmem House of Rewewifativen, Committee Q. Foreign AKairs. Backwmntd In fo?nwtion on the Use of Umf&d Stab Armed F.ro.a in F.nnm Cou.tn.ee, S2d Conmem, Fimt hsim, House Report Number 127, Superi. fendent of Doctune.fs, Ua Govern. ment PrintinE Oflke, W.MhiIIgton, D. C., 1961: us C.mmem, House of The PowChief of er. of fhe th. Arnw n-d Naw .{ fhe Unitid States, 94th Consrem, Second Session, 1956, House Document Ntmdw,r 443, S.perintmdent of Dccuments, US Government Pritiz Odbe, Wnshigbm, D. c., 196ti US Cmgrem, Seate Caninith cm Foreign Rek.tiom, Powers ?f the p~wewt t. s~ *e Arnwd F.,... Ouwde the United Sta4+ 82d C-agras. First Seql.n, Committee mint, S.Deri. tendet of nocumerds, US G.avermnet Printi= Oi%ce, Washincio., D. C., 1961; Cle.r-e.e A. Ber. iz the dr,hl, W., Powers of the Ezt%u:im University of Illinois, Urlma, Ill.. 1920; Elmer Plmhke, Condwt of Ainerk?.w Diph?+na.w, V.? Nostrand, N. Y., 196% Georze E. Reeds., The TUIdi@t of the Prem.dettq/, The World FnbUshig Cm., N. Y., r.d Cleveland, Ohio; ad Janwa Grafto Romrs, World Polioiw and the Cm@it.Nm, Peace Foundation, B.mto, Maw., 194.5 to cite just a few. The .umrk deci.ions menti..sd sw discumed late, in thw article.

zk Dipkmtacw, UAveraity Perk, Md., 1969, II 1.

.f%erd.hl, OP.m.t., D Elmer Pits.bke,SUnb. of Maryland, College ntti$ MarshaU Kwpm,

Amen.. N. Y., Cranch i. this

An Introduction $. , .WI Fmign PrJUcV, Hmper & Brothem, 1956, PD 130.81; Mwbwy . Madiaen, 1 137, 164 ( 1903) and other cesfn cited later article. 4 Reedy, on. it., m 96.39. State., 28

PremdenL as (%nmati, S.

Remsentatiq

s SW.im v. The United Claims 173.221 (1893) .

court

.f

c,t., D
, 81 06 ,.2

@ US Cmrztws, House of Rewesmtatives, me Pmaem of the P.e.idtw . . C.nnnmndw in Chief of fJIe Army and Navy of tke Unifed Sbz#en, on. 19.

Ksrmwm OP. cit.,

Cramh

PD 130.31.

137, 164 (1803).

FE+Iernl Cases 111, 112 (1960). Slsck 996, 6W, 966, 666 (1692).

Stiken,

United

11 Ibid., p 671. ,* 29 Court of Claims 179. 221 ( 1893). ,, 299 United States 304, 315-320
,4

( 1996).

World

CaiLWe&cmal Quartert XXVII, Nmnb,, 21. 22 MW1970. P 1826. ,.28 courtof C1.lms 178,221 11693).

96

h!ilita~Review

UNITED STATES
Selective Service Several changes in Selective Service regulations went into effect during December 1971. State draft quotas were abolished. All men with the same lottery number who are 1-A and subject to call will receive their induction notices at the same time. This will eliminate variations between local boards. Young men will be able to register 30 days prior to or 30 days after their 18th birthday. After registration, they will be placed in a new holding classification, l-H, until the annual lottery is held during the year they reach 19. After the draw, those who have high lottery numbers will not have to take physical and mental teets. They will remain 1-H until they reach the cutoff age of 26 for those who have never received a deferment or 35 for all others with no military service. No new college student deferments will be granted. If called, an inductee will be given a minimum of 30 days notice rather than only 10. Reduction in the size of the Army and increased military pay are expected to further reduce draft requirements. Some reports indicate that only 40,000 young men will be drafted in 1972.News item. Arory War College Not to promote war, but to preserve peace. . . . These words are attributed to Elihu Root, former eecretary of war and founder of the US Army War College. Root saw a need to provide advanced training to Army officers who would have to deal with the broad scope of problems encompassed in the term national security. Recommended by Root in 1889, the US Army War College began its first session in 1903. After moving several times, it was permanently 10ceted at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, in 1951. Today, the US Army War College faculty includes 58 Army officers, representatives of the other services and civilian professors. The present class numbers 223, and 183 of them are Army officers.-US Army releaee. 01

VIETNAM WAR INDUCTIONS Year Number Drafted

1962 76,500 1968 119,000 1964 107,500 1965 233,200 1966 364,700 1967 218,700 1968 299,000 1969 289,900 1970 163,500 98,000 1971 1972 (esti40,000 mated) to 75,000
APrfl 1972

MILITARY NOTES

DOD 1973 Budget-strength Forecast SUMMARY OF ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FORCES ACTUAL 30 JUNE
1071 Military personnel (thousands): End strength: Army Nmy Marine IXOPS Air Force Total, Departmentof Defense Average strength: Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force Total, Department of Dafense 3trctegic forces Intercontinentalballiatic missiles Mhrufcmarr Titan N PolarisPoseidon missiies 3trategic bombers !AAI) General.purposeforces land forces Army divisions Marine Corps divisions Tacticalair forces: Air Forsa wings Navy attack wings Marine Corps wings Naval force= Attack and antisubmarinecarriers Nuclear ettcck submarines Escort ships Amphibious assault ships Airlift and sealift forces C6A aircraft aquadrona Other aircraft squadrone Troopships,sargoshipsand tankers

S37JMATE0
30 JUNE 1872 30 JUNE 1973

1,123 623 212 755 2,714

861 602 198 730 2,392

SW 602 188 717 2,358

1,238 655 234 764 2,891

974 607 203 751 2,536

870 601 198 727 2,397

1,000 54 656 575

1,000 64 656 512

1,000 54 656 511

13% 3

13 3

13 3

21 12 3

21 12 3

21 13 3

18 51 224 80

; 226 77

16 60 207 66

2 15 91

4 13 68

4 E

66

Military Review

MILITARY NOTEB $

Thor IRBM

lest Tim intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) have been refurbished for use as boosters in Air Force space progrsme, There have been 426 Thor missiles launched, with an overall successful llring rate of 96 percent. In February, Thor wee working on a string of 129 consecutive euecessful launches. Initially deployed in the late 1950s to defend the North Atbmtic Treaty Orgeniaation countries, the missiles were returned to the United States end stored when iUhw%nnan and !l%zn intercontinental baIHstic missilee became operational. Later, the IRBM design was refined and the thrust increased for use es a booster for epase probes. The Thor IRBM became prominent during the roles and missions controversy in 1958 between the Air Force and the Armg.-US Ak Force release.
The

T&a ?dltgAf:Y %%uI.

or futtul

REVIEW
aectuur

and the

of tnformstion

U. S. hmr

wntakmd

Item, are mirhl

mstmmts

as * temke

is Intended-The

to UN rasders.N Edtt.r.

d!ammand and GeaardSt@ Collage usnma m rein the MNATAUY NOTNS tactim of thla pub. ordtimru, aelctaleadmsement of the ti... L

ABril 1972

82

MILITJIRYNOTES Dragon Wagon The Dragon Wagon, a military load hauler version o f t h e two-bodied Twister, is a 30,000-pound, vehicle eight-wheel-drive which incorporate a twobodied! articulated design for high-epeed highway and agile crosscountry operation. Twister vehicles have been under study and development for the pas t decade. Three 2w is t e r combat vehicles were delivered to the Army in 1970 and completed Army testimr last year. The Dragon Wagow can carry loads up to eight to& ove~ rough terrain or back-country traile where conventional load haulers cannot operate. On the highway, it witl cruiee at a eteady 65 miles per hour. As a military logistiea vehicle, the Dra@wz Wagon can be used as a weapons transporter, tanker, ammunition carrier, special electronics van or mobile command post. The front body of the Dnzgow Wagon carries a three-man cab and a 225horsepower diesel engine which powers all eight wheele. The rear load-hauling body is linked to the front by a flexible joint that allows the bodies to yaw and roll independently of each other. Power from the engine is transmitted through the joint to the four wheele on the rear body.News release.

Basio Training After nearly a year of experimentthenics. The new program will contain about 40 percent more physical exering with new concepte in basic traincise than before. Thie increase is, in ing, the Army has decided that a part, at the request of the recruits. At relatively spartan environment is best Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, two out for recruits. Beer machines in recruit of three recruite said their training barracks will be removed, and the was not as physically demanding as private cubicles will be torn out. An additional three days were added to they expected, and one out of five recommended additional p h ys i c a 1 the eight-week course beginning in training. February 1972. Claseroom lecturing There are no plans to reinstitute will be reemphasized in favor of more hande-on training. reveille formations, and recruits will receive weekend passes during the Phyeical training will be toughened final four weeke of their training-if with a return to jogging between they have trained properly during the training areas and reinstitution of week.News item. the daily dozen program of calie100 Militafy Reviaw

MILITARY NOTES Space Shuttla The National Aeronautics and Space Administration haa been authorized to proceed with the development and construction of the space ehuttle, the Nations next generation of manned apace vehicle. The reusable shuttle is expected to take six years to develop, and program value is estimated at $5.5 biiiion, The space shuttle will consist of a manned delta-winged orbiter, about the size of a DC9, which will be launched by an unmanned booster. It wifl carry a payload measuring up to 15 feet in diameter by 60 feet long and weighing up to 65,000 pounde. Fuel for the orbitere engines will be carried in an external tank that wifi be, jettisoned in orbit. The orbiter w3U be able to operate in space for about a week while the men on board launch, service or recover unmanned spacecraft and satellites; perform experiments and other operations in apace; and, further in the future, reeupply space stations which themselves have been placed in orbit by the shuttle. At the end of the mission, the orbiter will return to earth and fand on a runway fike an airplane. Most of the components of the new shuttle system will be recovered and reused for UD to 100 timee. reducirm soace oneratinz costs to as low as one-tenth [ of their prekent level.News rel~ee~ -

Space shuttle orbiter opens rargo doors to plsec earth reaourees and weather satellite in orhit in this ertfats concept. Manned orbiter will be able to carry passengers errda variety of cargo to orbit and return to earth for future missions.

Plying toward orbi~ apaceabnttle orbiter carries along an external fuel tank wbieb wiff be jettisoned

April1972

101

MILITARY NOTES

COLOMBIA
Terrorists In January, the Castro-oriented National Liberation Army conducted two terrorist attacks in northeaet Colombia. In the town of San Pablo, the guerrillas killed three policemen, kidnapped four land owners and stole about $400,000 worth of goods and cash. The 10,000 inhebitanta of the town were aeeembled end forced to listen to epeechee by guerrilla leaders. One week later, the National Liberation Army conducted simultancoue attacks on the small northeastern towns of Remedies, Santa Isabel, El Tigre and the airport of Otu. Jails were opened, banks robbed and the vice president of a large Colombian bank was assassinated. Again, the townspeople were assemhkd to hear speeches. The National Liberation Army is the most active of three guerrilla groups which operate in Colombia. It has a strength of shout 260 men. News item.

CANADA
Military Cut In March 1972, the Canadian armed forces were cut ti 88,349 men. This was a reduction from 89,890 in 1971 and 98,238 in 1970. Since 1968, all members of the Canadian forces wear the same uniform and have army rank titles. Canadas five regional recrui~ ing areas turn away about six applicants for every one they accept. Privates in the Canadian forces earn up to $627 per month, corporals up to $698 and sergeante up to $765. In Europe, Canada maintaine a force of 5000 men consisting of a mechanized battle group supported by three squadrons of CF104 fighters. Formerly part of the British Army of the Rhine, the Canadian forces are now assigned to NATOe Central Army Gronp under the operational control of the US VII Corps. Of the NATO nations, only Denmark spends less for defense than Canada in terms of gross national product.Newe item.

FEDERALREPUBUCOF 6ERAUW%
YTOL

An experimental German vertirel takeoff and Iending

(VTOL) dre the

VJIOIC is shown on its 5rat slight

102

MlfJTMY NOTES

INDIA
VijsysnteTank

The Indian Army is reWrtedly well eatiefied with the performance of~the Vijayanta tank during the recent fighting with Pakistan. The Britieh-deeigned tank is built in India. It uees the same engine and transmission as the Britieh Chieftain, but weighe 14 tons Iese. When fitted with a flotation screen, the VijaVanti can swim. It features a 12.7-millimeter ranging machinegun and a 7.62-millimeter coaxial machinegun mounted in the mantlet beside the 106millimeter main gun. Supporters c~im that the Vilwjmtta is eimple and eeey to operate with good mobility end firepower. India has about 800 VijaMantu tanks and Kuwait about liO.-Intenuztiomzl Defenne Remsw, (Q)1971.

JAPAN
Oofense Spending The 1972 Japanese defense budget ie $2.58 billion, a 19.6-percent increase over 1971. For long-term acquisition of eqnipment, $371 milSion wae approved, part of the $18.7 billion Five-Year Defense Plan which etarts thie year. The most expensive items in the defense budget were the purchase of 11 Cl Japanese transport aircraft, 20 Japanese-built 22 supersonic trainers and 14 RF.4E Pluzntom reconnaissance aircraft from the United States. The budget also contained $653 milfion for military installations and forces on Oklnawa. News item. Apfil1972

NATO Dutch Brigsde The Netherlands has announced that it will strengthen its brigade etationed in Germany by the addition of an 800-man armored battalion. Brigade 41 of the Dutch Army is etationed at Seedorf, heffway between Hamburg and Bremerheven. The new bat++lion will be equipped with Leop ard tanks of German manufacture. Holland has also agtced to purphsae the new rapid-~]ng antiaircraft weapon mounted on the Leopard @assis. The radar-controlled gun ie spheduled to go into production sobn. News release. 102

MILITARY HOES

China is reportedly d e P 10 Y i n g intermediate-range ballistic miesiles (XRBMS). The new missiles, with an estimated range of 1500 t.a 2500 miles, use liquid fuel and ean be installed in underground silos. The medium-range missiles deployed by the Cldnase over the past two years had a range of only 000 to 1000 miles. In addition, they used a liquid oxygen and keroe4ne fuel which was very volatile. This fuel mixture had to be added immtilat.ely prior to launch above ground. Thus, the medium-range missilw were vulnerabl% elow to Iauneb, and eubject to aesidentd eaploeion. This greater range and survivability of the new miesilee should pose an increased threat to the Soviet Union. From underground silos in Cldua, the IRBM could reach the urban-indus~lal centers of European Ruseia. There have been no teete of Cbhmae missiles outilde of China. Experts say that China will not be able to develop an intercontinental ballistic miesile before 1974. News item. 104 MilibIY ROVIOW

MiLtlARY NOTES

Nuclear Test On 18 November 1971, China detonated a nuclear weapon with an eetimated yield of 20 kSotons. This was the 12th Chinea~ nuclear test in the last seven y~rs.~ This latest blast may have been a teet of a missile warhead or of an aircraft weapona eystem. Of the 12 Chinese nuclear tests, all but one have exploded in the atmos1 phere. Neither China nor France has signed the limited test ban agreement which prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere or under the sea. News item.

F9 Fightar The French Air Force has reported that the Chinese have been producing their new F9 fighter planes since April 1971. Most of the Chinese aircraft are manufactured in Shenyang Province in northeast China. About 60 of the new fighters have been deployed. The F9 is credited with a speed of 1400 miles per hour, twice the speed of sound. The French source indicated that the Chinese now have about 3600 combat aircraft, including 2900 fighteq+, 440 bombers, 300 helicopters and 400 transporta.-News item.

FRANCE

Under terms of an agreement eigned in october 1971, Yugoslavia wilt manufacture SAS41 GazsUe helicopters. The Yugoalav Government selected the SA841 after a comparative evaluation of several types of helicopters. Both civilian and military vereioae witl be produced in Yugoelatia. A joint FremchBritish development, 60 of the helicopters have been ordered for the British Army and 50 for French forces. The GazelJe features a ebrouded tail rotor and fiberglaee rotor bladee.-IntemmXenul Defenee Rtrviaa, @ 1971. April 1972
105

MILITARY NOTES

INTERNATIONAL
Road Siam

Umbrella Trouble When Windy!!

Stunt Drivers Practicing!!

You Are On a Runway!

Unfriendly Residents!

Marine Law Prevails!

A
#l#t

EscapedConvicts in the Area!!

A~A
One Out of Six Will Make It!! Nudists Ahead! Caution: Drunken Drivers Ahead!!!

AAA
Bookie Joint!! Watch Your Step!!!!!
CcmrtesY of VII COSCOM JOBBER

Returning Boomerangs!

106

MUiSary Ration

.&

,1
I

MON7SOMERY AS MIL17ARY COMMANOER. Oy Rena d Lawin. 2SS Pages. Stein & Oay Prrblishas, I N. Y., 1971. $10.UL
BY COL S. T. BALURY,Bntiah

MARIJUANk 7ha Seaond Trip. By Edward R. Bloomqui~ M. 0.424 Pagas. 61anaoePress, Bevarly Hills, Calii., 1971.$695. BY LTC CLASENCE E. MCKNIGHT JR. Thie is the second edition of the beet seller Marijuana which was published in 1968. The latest issues concerning marijuana are addressed by Dr. Bleomquist who ia considered by many as the most rational writer, consultant and lecturer in matters concerning drug abuse. A balanced argument of the pros and cons relating te the use of marijuana (cannabis) is presented in terms sufficiently devoid of technical jargon to permit the layman to form opinions or at kest to understand the issues better. Regardless of the bias of the reader, there is ample mental cannon fodder for both pro and antimarijuana advoeetes. The author feels that it would not be prudent to legalize pot at this time when conclusive research results will certainly be available witldn the next two or three years. Despite the retention of harsh narcotic laws by most states, the rising popularity of marijuana, especially among our young people, has not been arrested. Ae a rational approach to the current dilemma, Dr. Bkmmquist is strongly in favor of cresting exclusive laws which deal with problems associated with marijuana. Dr. Bleemquists bock reflects 20 years of research and active participation in programs designed to stem drug abuae. le7

ArmII

Of all the World War II commendere, Montgomery has heen the subject of se much controversy as any. This is not surprising because of his complicated personality; his supreme ccmfidence in himself, which mainly arose from a deep study of his profession; and because he commanded such dL verse forces. In analyzing Me subject, Ronald Lewin expoeea warta and all. The authors treatment is like that of a surgeon rather than a phyeician. He quickly identifies the areas of abnormality in an otherwiee htilthy body, and makes bold incieione to remove the offending tiesues and anything else that looks suspicious before sewing up the wounds. The patient must look for kindness elsewhere and, even more important, must be tough tQ stand the treatment. Monty, quite rightly, recovere. It would be dificult to thhk of any criticism, whether made fairly or maliciously, that bee been leveled against Montgomery wldch the author does not discuss. The frivolous criticism is disposed of succinctly. The book concentrates on providing a good evaluation of the greatness and the imperfections of the msn. It ie recommended reading for anyone interested in professional leadership of soldiers in battle. Amil1972

MILITARY BOOKS A BROKEN WORLO, 191S-1SS9: The Rise ef Medenr Eurepe. By RayrnendJ. Senfag. 415 Pagae.Jfarpar& Rew Publishers,N. Y., 1971. $s.S5.
BY BG JAM=

M. Gm90N, USA

This excelJent account of the 20 turbulent years between World War I and World War II is a work which no serious student of modern history can ignore. It haunts the reader even after it has been laid aside heeause it identifies the condition of man in thk century and illustrates in vivid terms how little he really learns from his own history. Though complete in itseJf, A Broken WorkZ is one of a series published under the general title, Tiw Rise of Modem Europe, and hegun over 40 years ago. Tbie is no mere compilation of facts and revelations. On the contrary, it ie an astute synthesis of a very fateful time in the Klstory of Western man-a period between the warefl the events of which are well known to every echoolboy. But the human frailties, duplicities and shortzightednees of the men who held the center of the stage, end those who followed them, appear to be little understmd or appreciated. The author describes the vindictiveness of the AIJiee in 1919 and the German reaction to a harsh peace. He retells the tales of mane first efforts to find a stable peace through the formation of an international body. He relates how the League of Nations plus Anglo-French power and leederehip were euppoeed to guarantee that peace. The efforts of France to hem Germany in by forming aHiancee with ita eeetern neighbore, the reluctance of Britain to become involved, the isoJationiet policies of the United States, and the growth of German
lW

and Russian power are all analyzed in brilliant detail. In the final chaptere, Sontag describes how a weak and hopelessly d& tided France, a short-sighted and hesitant Britain, and an aloof America could not check the ambitions of dictators bent on destroying democracy and remaking the world by force. The revolt of youth againet the eociety, the culture, and the moraJity of their elders in the years following World War I is revealed vividly. These were all tn make them easy prey for a new ideology and for a dictators pro~iees. The new ethics permitted them ti accept the excesses of the Nazi terror in Germany and the Great Purge in the new Soviet Union. Sontag ie paW1cularly illuminating in hie description of the dilemma in which the small etates that had emerged from the Peace of Paris found themselves as German and Russian power became a reality and the strength and resolve of France became increasingly questionable. The most painful worde in this book speak of the abandonment of Auetria and Czechoslovakia by the Weetern Powers and their inability to give Poland effective assistance when it was invaded, The policy of appeasement, nonintervention, and the efforts of Western pacifists are deecribvd against the background of growing tdalitarianism in Central and Eaetern Europe. The events leading to Munich and beyond to World War II are examined thoroughly. Chsmberhdn did his best to meet Hitlers demands. All hia n+ gotiatione led to failure. Woree yet, the armiea of Britain and ite AJJiea were not reedy for the teek ahead. Mr. Sontag makes clear the leseone of the developments which cubninatad in the holocaust of 1939-45. These are surely worthy of study today.
Miliirs ROViOW

ON THE BORDER WJTH CROON. By Captain John G. Barrrke, US Amry. 491 Pages. A BJ. aon Book. Univaraity of Nabrasks Prass, Lhraoln,Nabr. First Bison Book PrintJn~ Sew tomber 1971. Ttra Praface and Test of the Bison Book Edition Are Reproduced From the 1891 Edition, Published by Chartes Scribnars Sons. $2.45 paperbound. BY LTC DAVIOP. PEREINE, USA For 16 years, Captain John G. Bourke, 3d US Cavalry, was a member of General George Crooks staff. The gensrals star ascended with the Apache campaign in the early 1870s. It fell years iater in Arisona. Captiln Bourke was a participant and confidant during acl those years, carefully noting hls observations in his diary. Bourke describes the region and the people, and MS writings are used for background data for much of the history of the Southwest although this book wee written some 20 yeara after the events. Historians look today on tbie book as a biography of Crook whom General Sherman called the grea est Indian fighter and manager in t t e Army. The writing etyle is old-fashioned, but clear and concise. It is evident that Bourke was devoted tQGeneral Crook; indeed, much of Crooks lasting fame is owed to Bourke. Rarely is a soldier blessed with a biographer of such Klgh caliber. Unfortunately, Bourke died at 60, leaving many of his notee unpublished in his diaries and notebooks which are now in the West Point Library. This work is an essential tool to those seeking a true understanding of the campaigns against the Apaches in the Southwest and those in the north againat the Cheyennes and Sioux. In addition to detdled accounts of the miiitsry aspects of the
ARriI la72

times, there are interesting observations on the Indian Bureau and the Indians themselves. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS ANO MILITA. RI-SW A Classified Bibffography Covering tha Unitad states and Othar Nstlons of the World With Introductory Notes. By Arthur D. Larson. 113 Pages. Kansas State University Library, Manhaths, Mans.,1971. $S.00. The title and subtitle of this exhaustive work accurately suggest the broad sweep of coverage. Compilations begin with a history of books and articles on the origin of the military profession, range through ite development, and then treat the general aspects of relationships between civil government and the mititary. There is even an interesting !wction on noteworthy works of fiction in the field. There follows a very detilled compendium on civil-miiitsry relations in the United States to include sections on: hkkmy and trtiltions; poiicy, management and control; civil-military reiations since World War 11; domestic aspecte of mobilization; and the micitary institution and ite functions. The laet section cites material in English on civil-military rdations in other nations and regions. WMle the author does not tell us so, it appears that most of the writings Sisted were published since World War II. This bibliography should be very useful, not oniy to the scholar and student, but aieo to the general staff officer needing background for a study on a contemporary problem touching on the interrelationships of the miiitary and the body politic. Furthermore, in these days of expensive books, this functionality manufactured softbound volume is truly a good buy. OWM, JR 16s

MEMOIRS OF HOPE: Renewal and Errdeaver. BY Charles de 6aullo. Translatedby Terenco ~lmartkr. 392 Pans. Simon& Schuster Inc., N. Y., 1971.$10.00. BY COL HESMAN W. W. LANOE, USA, Retired There have been innumerable books written about Charles de Gaulle. All, including even the most friendJy by such a loyal friend and asswiate as Andre MaSraux, recognize him as something out of the ordinary, as a phenomenon, as an enigma. Now, with the publication of Memoirs of Hope, the viewe of De GauUe himseJf must be takem into consideration. Challenging thoughts wiJl be evoked as the reader ponders historical verities and wonders how much brutal realism lay behind De Gaullea dramatic approach to foreign poJicy. The original French text wee Published in two volumes, the first in October 1970 after De GauJle bed been out of office ordy 18 months. The eeeond volume contained only two chapters of a total of seven which were planned bnt cut ,ebort by the authors death in November 1970. Analysts have had time to contrast General de Gaulles written word with what he actually said, or is PurPorted to have said, and there are critical discrepancies. EesentiaUy a etatement of his beJiefs and philosophy, De GauJle dld not produce the eort of memoire which historian like to use. How much deliberate ambiguity had he usad on various oeeaeions ? How much had been foreeight ? How much had been remarkable political calculation ? These queatione are left unanswered. Reviewere regret the rehash of old iseuee, the colossal egoism and aelfpraiee. The pertinent and poignant human which wae characteristic of the general is completely lacking. 110

by French gossip columnists are omitted. The translation into EngJish of General de Gaulles extremely correct and erndite French is a formidable task. Terenee Kibnartin has done a commendable job on Memm-rs of Hope. The full flavor of De Gaulles worde, however, can only come from reading De Gaulle in French. The scholar wilJ do weJl to check the original text for preciseness. Notably, there are two major advantages to this edition: Both De Gaulle volumee are in a eingle book and there is an index which is rarely found in a French text. THE BLOOOY BOZEMAN: The Perlleus Trail to MentanasGeld. The American Trails Series. By Dorethy M. Johnson.Edited by A. B. tiuthrio, Jr. 308 Pages. Mc6raw.Hill Beek Cc., N. Y., 1971.$9.83. BY COL DONALOJ. DELANEY, USA, Retired Mrs. Johnson has compiled from diaries, Iettere, and official aceounta a loosely strung together series of vignettes about the Bozeman Trail which was open, more or less, from 1863 ti 1868. The stories are interesting and often excithg. The military reader will especially note the accounts of life at Forte Reno, Phil Kearny, and C. F. Smith during the guerrilla war waged by the Sioux under Chief Red Cloud, In fact, perhaps the meet interesting lesson to be learned from the. book ie Red Clouds abiSity to sustain a strategic campaign to a successful conckreion. The Bozeman Trail forts were abandoned by the Army and burned by the Indians. Western history buffs and those interested in the Old Army will find thle book worth their attention. Militcry Review

MILITARY BOOKS

NEW BOOKS RECEtVEO BLACK COMPANY: The StOry of Subchaser 1264. By Eria Purdon. 265 Pages. Robart B. Lute Inc.,Woshhgton, O. C., 1972.$6.65. COMMUNISM IN JAPAN. By Paul F. Lcngar. 112 Pagea. The Noover tnatftution on War, Revolution, and Paace,. Stanford, Calii., 1972.$5.95. TNE DOUBLE-CROSS SYSTEM IN THE WAR OF 1939 to 1S45. By J. C! Mastemran. 203 Pagas. Yala University Press, Naw Naven, Corm.,1972.$6.66. EYEWITNESS IN GREECE: The Colonels Come to Powar. By John A. Katris. 317 Pages. E. P. Drrttorr& Co. Inc., N. Y., 1971.$6.95. RUSSlk The Post-Wer Yaare. By Alexander Werth. Eoilemre by Narrison E. Salisbrrrv. 446 Pi@s. ~aplinger Publishing Co. trr;., N. Y., 1971. $12.m. THE PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL ANO BIOLOM. CAL WARFARE: Volume L The Rise of CB Waapons. By Stockholm International Peace Rasesrch Institute. 365 Pages. Humanities Press Inc.,M Y., 1971.$17.00. TNE PROBLEM OF CNEMICAL AND BIOL061S CAL WARFARE: Volume IV. CB Dlaarmament Negotiations, 1620-1670. By Stockholm lrrtemational Peaca Rasoarch Institute. 412 Pagas. Humanities Press [na,, N. Y., 1971. $17.DO. THE PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL AND B10L061CAL WARFARE: Volume V. The Prevention of CBW. BY Stockholm international Paace Rc. search Institute. 267 Pages. Humanities Press Inc., N. Y., 1671.$6.00. NO BRIDGES BLOWN. By William B. Dreus. 322 Pages. Univers.Nyof Notra Dame Pracs, Notre Dame, Ind., 1671.$6.65. YAN6T2E PATROL The U. S. Navy in China. By Rear Mmiral Kemp Tolley, US Navy, R* tirad. 326 Pages. Naval lnctNutc Press, Annapolis, Md., 1671. $10.MI. TRUDEAU IN POWER. By Wafter StewarL ;WIP~s Outerbridgc & Oienstfrey, N. Y., . . . STALfN: lhe History of a Dfctstor. By N. Montgomery Hyde. 676 Pages. Farrar, Strauss & Biroux, N. Y., 1971.$12.65. TNE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN lNTERVENTtON IN THE FIRST WDRLD WAR. BY Ross Gragory. 162 pages. W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., N. Y., 1671.$0,65, 6REAT COURT.MAR7tAL CASES: The Military Trials ?trat Shook the Natfon and Affaated Nistory-From Banadict Arnold to Lfeutcm ant Callay. BY Joseph dl Mona. Introduction by Senator Birch Bayh. 291 Pages. 6rossett & Dunlap, N. Y., 1972. $S.65. THE lROllfJOIS IN TNE AMERICAN REVOLW TION. By Barbara Srsymont. 356 Pages. Syracuse LfrrivcrsitfPress, Syracuse, N. Y., 1672.$11.50. LLOYO GEORGE: A Diary by Frances Staverk son. Edited by A. J. P. Tcyhw. 338 Pages. Harper & Row Publishers Inc., N. Y., 1071. $10,00. TOUCH THE EARTH: A Sefi-Portraftof Indian Esistcnc@.Compiled by T. C. McLuhan. 165 Pages. Outerbridge & Oienstfrey, N. Y., 1971.$6.65, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE PUOLISHEO WORKS OF CHARLES M. RUSSELL. Cempilad by Karl Yost and Frederic 6. Rarmer. 317 Pages. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, Neb., 1671.$2500.

April le72

111