REFERENCE 03-059/MSG-186 - Page 177

ENGINE SYSTEMS
Item 230 LRU Name Engine Instruments LRU PN Various Vendor Name Ametek Goodrich Smiths Aircraft B737-300 ATA From DLH

Engine instruments are increasingly involved in delays and cancellations. However, indicator removals are very often NFF. Delay and cancellation data in 2002 were: Incidents 14 10 9 6 Indicator Oil Pressure Indicator Oil Qty. Indicator N2 Indicator N1 Indicator PN SELOC4AD 10031-0000-01 WL201EED2 WL101EED3 Manufacturer Ametek Goodrich Smiths Smiths

Other operator and vendor comments, please. ILSTON/GOODRICH FUEL & UTILITY SYSTEMS - Lufthansa has provided us with some PIREPs and reliability data, which we have reviewed. Faults were found in most of the returns, but we agree that it is unlikely that the corrective action addressed the actual cause of most removals. We suggest that some of the removals are caused by intermittent wiring connections between the oil gauging transmitter and the oil gauging indicator. Identification and correction of the wiring faults should help to improve the system reliability. JACKSON/SMITHS - Analyzing data relating to the N1 Indicator PN WL101EED, we see that approximately one third are NFF, although there seems to be no trend with the reason for removal or repair findings. For the N2 Indicator PN WL201EED, we find that the NFF rate is not as high as Lufthansas, but that we see a similar trend with reasons for removal. Over 50% of units are removed for starter cut-out problems, and of these 70% are NFF. It would also seem that we do not see many early repeat returns which would suggest it is not a unit test or intermittent failure problem. BRUNER/BOEING - Other operators have expressed similar concerns regarding an increasing number of engine indicator removals and the high percentage of NFF findings in the respective repair shops. These operators have requested that Boeing and the indicator manufacturers identify appropriate corrective action to address this indicator removal trend, and the resultant effect on schedule reliability. This issue has been accepted for action by the B737/CFM56-3 Working Together Team. This team includes participants from Boeing, CFM, various suppliers, and many operators. This team has agreed to research available indicator removal data, shop findings, modification incorporation status, etc., in an effort to determine what action may be required. Team progress reports will be provided in monthly Working Together Team telecons and associated telecon Minutes. Lufthansa participates in the telecons and receives a copy of the telecon Minutes. Any significant findings from this activity will be provided to all operators thru the appropriate communication channels, such as Fleet Team Digest and/or SL.

Item 231

LRU Name Relay

LRU PN 295RT01W10BMY1

Vendor Name ECE

Aircraft A300-600

ATA 78

From JAS

An AD that prevents in-flight thrust reverser deployment was issued for A300-600 aircraft equipped with PW4000 series engines. Airbus SB A300-78-6018 which installs the Third Line of Defense (TLOD) for thrust reversers was issued for the aforementioned AD. We have accomplished this AD SB for seven of our A300-600 aircraft, and then we experienced many failures of the relays which control the TLOD. These failures have led to non-deployment of the thrust reversers on the ground.

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ENGINE SYSTEMS
The cause of these relay failures is as follows: High voltage spikes generated by TLOD control circuit at the time of thrust reverser operations break the IC and transistor of the time delay circuit of the relays (46KM , 47KM), and thus cause the failures of relays. According to our experiences, the relay failure depends on the manufacturing lot of the relays. For airlines, it is hard to determine which relay belongs to the suspected bad lot or non-suspected good lot. As manufacturers, ECE and Airbus should supply the non-suspected relays to its operators so that operators can satisfy the AD compliance without any operational problems on post SB aircraft. As countermeasures against these relay failures, Airbus issued SB A300-78-6026, which installs a two diode protection system on both relays 46KM and 47KM. We would like to know, will SB A300-78-6026 be able to provide effective countermeasures against relay failures regardless of the aforementioned manufacturing lot problem of the relay itself? Other operator, Airbus and ECE comments, please. COST PENALTY: $22,600 OLLION/INTERTECHNIQUE - The relays involved in the incidents reported by Japan Air System are time-delay relays PN 295RT 01W10BMY1 manufactured by ECE. That PN has been in service on the A300-600 since entry into service. As mentioned by Japan Air System, failures have been reported on locations 46KM and 47KM on aircraft equipped with PW4000 engines, after the implementation of Airbus SB A300-78-6018 for Thrust reversers (TLOD). The root cause of the failures has been found in voltage spikes generated by the new circuitry destroying a transistor inside the time relay. A protection kit of two external diodes has later been installed through Airbus SB A300-78-6026, and provides an efficient protection of the relays in those positions, whichever Amendment level or production batch is fitted. All relays delivered by ECE comply with their specification in terms of resistance to transient voltage spikes. However, during the course of the investigation of the failures on positions 46KM and 47KM, it has been envisaged to design a relay with an integrated protection. Airbus has issued a new specification to define higher sustainable transient voltage levels. ECE has designed and qualified the corresponding product, which will be available for new production aircraft and as spare parts from July 2003. The new PN is 295RT01W10BMY02. It will supersede the previous PN. GLAPA/AIRBUS - The addition of diodes through SB A300-78-6026 has been proposed to the airlines to protect the relays 46KM and 47KM against high voltage spikes. The high voltage spikes were at the origin of the relay removals. It has to be noticed that no further relay removal has been reported on post-TLOD SB aircraft on which diode protection SB SB78-6026 has been accomplished. Airbus has requested the relay manufacturer ECE to develop a new relay, more robust to high voltage spikes. The qualification process of the new relay has been completed, and the new relay is now available under the Airbus Standard PN ABS1416A10BM. The mandatory TLOD SBs will be revised to have concurrent requirement of diode protection through SB 78-6026 or SB 78-2026 included. Airbus issued OIT 999.0036/03 and TFU 78.30.00.050 on this subject for further follow-up if needed.

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ENGINE SYSTEMS
Item 232 LRU Name Engine Vibration Monitor LRU PN 6672M295 Vendor Name Endevco Aircraft B717 ATA 77-31 From HAL

The Engine Vibration Monitor (EVM) at power up can get into a mode where it reports 0.00 vibrations of both fan and compressor while correctly reporting the RPM. The unit needs a significantly longer power-on reset and detection than 0.00 units of vibration, which cannot be valid on real engines. This is aircraft dependent, but still not a valid condition. Other operator, Endevco and vendor comments, please. COST PENALTY: $13,000 MASON/ENDEVCO Endevco and Hawaiian Airlines are continuing efforts to resolve this issue. I have been informed that Boeing has released an interim procedure to reset the EVM circuit breaker in the aircraft which restores proper EVM operation minimizing aircraft dispatch delays. FULLER/BOEING - Boeing has released an interim procedure to reset the EVM circuit breaker which restores proper EVM operation minimizing aircraft dispatch delays. The following response has been coordinated with Endevco: This item is being coordinated by Hawaiian Airlines and Endevco, the EVM manufacturer. Hawaiian Airlines has been provided recording instrumentation by Endevco in an effort to identify the cause of the 0.0 EVM data. Hawaiian Airlines has captured some data and provided it to Endevco. The data implies that there may possibly be some unregulated power coupling with the EVM signal. Endevco has input the information into their test bench and could not duplicate the condition. Endevco has provided Hawaiian Airlines with some additional guidance in order to obtain some more information about the source that is coupling into the EVM signal. The Endevco contact is Mark Mason, tel +1 949-493-8181 x338

Item 233

LRU Name Detector Air Flow

LRU PN 123AG3

Vendor Name Goodrich

Aircraft B747-400

ATA 49

From KAL

This unit has been molded and repaired by the vendor. In addition, the CMM 75-41-01 does not have any repair procedures. Korean would like to repair this unit in our repair facility because it has a low reliability and many removals. Does the vendor have an intention to provide us with the repair procedures of this unit? Other operator comments, please. MOYNIHAN/GOODRICH - Repair and recalibration of the 123AG3 requires cutting open the welded stainless steel case and completing the repair and recalibration procedures. The case is then evacuated with inert gas, and hermetically sealed through the re-welding process. The sensor is then placed in a calibrated flow tunnel, and tested to the original ATP requirements. Goodrich Sensor Systems has determined that such activity is above and beyond normal repair procedures called out in a CMM. Goodrich Sensor Systems welcomes the opportunity to discuss this issue further with Korean Air.

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ENGINE SYSTEMS
Item 234 LRU Name EPR Transmitter LRU PN ED747201-1 Vendor Name Hamilton Sundstrand Aircraft B747-200 ATA 77-10 From PIA

The failure rate of the subject LRU is high due to failure of the shock mounts PN L21X12 due to low strength (0.5 lbs weight). To minimize the removal rate and for better performance, the vendor is asked to improve the shock mount in quality and strength. Other operator and vendor comments, please. COST PENALTY: $2,500 SEABACK/HAMILTON SUNDTRAND - The PN L21X12 vibration isolators used on the mechanical EPR Transmitter are the proper isolators for this application. These parts provide sufficient vibration isolation when the transmitter mount assembly is properly maintained, including the proper orientation of the clamps that secure the flexible hoses to the mount assembly to the transmitter assembly, and the alignment of the vibration isolators to the plane of motion during engine operation. Field experience indicates that adherence to these practices ensures an adequate service life of the PN L21X12 vibration isolators.

Item 235

LRU Name APU Controller

LRU PN 2117342-20

Vendor Name Honeywell

Aircraft B757

ATA 49-61

From NWA

In the summer of 2002, SBs 2117342-2220 and -2367 were completely revised to Rev 3 and Rev 1 respectively. The revision notes are so vague and the revision bars so extensive that we cannot tell what happened unless we compare them side by side, word for word. These SBs rework the APU controller to PN 2117342-20. Since Northwest Airlines completed the PM 2117342-20 upgrade before the revisions were issued, Northwest Airlines needs to know if the APU Controller needs further shop visits, and if the changes will be reflected in ATLAS test program revisions. Other operator and vendor comments, please. GIPSON/HONEYWELL - SBs 2117342-49-2220 and 2117342-49-2367 were revised to implement technical changes to the IPL, the description and operation section, and add clarification to the test section. There are no changes to any of the hardware or software modifications implemented by earlier versions of either of these SBs. Therefore, units modified by the original issue (or by subsequent revisions, as applicable) do not require another shop visit for additional modifications. There is an open project to update the ATLAS, but we do not have a schedule for the completion.

Item 236

LRU Name N1 Limit CDU

LRU PN 757420-06 757420-07

Vendor Name Sagem

Aircraft A300

ATA 76-12

From JAS

We have checked the lifetime of the display of N1 Limit CDU for our 21 CDUs. The average lifetime of the Pre-SB ANL01-76-C05 Display PN 14230028 was 21,682 hours. On the contrary, the average lifetime of Post-SB ANL0176-C05 Display PN 14230127 is 1251 hours and apparently less than that of the Pre-SB Display PN 14230028. We cannot determine the cause of the shorter lifetime of Post-SB ANL01-76-C05 Display, whether it is due to the quality problem of Display PN 14230127 itself, or due to the electronic circuit design problem of the Post-SB CDU.

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ENGINE SYSTEMS
Other operator and Sagem comments, please. COST PENALTY: $13,530 SPERAZZA/SAGEM - After review of our shop records over the last 18 months with our agreed workshops in Barfield and Sogerma, France, we found out that over 132 units were repaired, 79 pre-SB failed, and 53 post-SB failed. These figures show that the reliability of the post SB units is better than the pre-SB units. For the post-SB units that we have repaired, no specific failure mode could be identified, neither electronic part nor on the display part. Sagem is ready to organize a specific visit to Japan Air System by mid 2003 to review with them the situation.