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Science, Progress and Pluralism in the Study of International Relations

Fred Chernoff Millennium - Journal of International Studies 2013 41: 346 DOI: 10.1177/0305829812464405 The online version of this article can be found at: http://mil.sagepub.com/content/41/2/346

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MIL41210.1177/0305829812464405Millennium: Journal of International StudiesChernoff

MILLENNIUM
Forum
Journal of International Studies

Science, Progress and Pluralism in the Study of International Relations

Fred Chernoff
Colgate University

Millennium: Journal of International Studies 41(2) 346366 The Author(s) 2013 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0305829812464405 mil.sagepub.com

Abstract
The article looks at one of the central arguments of Patrick Jacksons book The Conduct of Enquiry in International Relations: the attempt to advance methodological pluralism and dialogue among contending metatheoretical schools of International Relations. The article supports the goal of pluralism but argues that there is a significant gap in Jacksons support of it and that his version of pluralism inhibits metatheoretical engagement of different schools of thought. The latter in turn limits the possibility of progress in the field. The article outlines the missing steps in Jacksons argument, the way in which he unduly limits the contribution that the philosophy of science can make to scientific progress and an alternative argument for pluralism that leaves a role for genuine philosophical engagement and the possibility of progress in IR.

Keywords
Methodological pluralism, philosophy of science, social science enquiry

Patrick Jacksons The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations1 offers one of the most clearly formulated and comprehensive guides to current debates in International Relations (IR) metatheory. The book outlines a range of positions at a very fundamental level of investigation. It provides an evolutionary history of the positions staked out in those debates, and an analysis of their presuppositions and implications. The book makes an effort to explicate some of the abiding differences between proponents of the contending approaches and to offer a basis for a dialogue between them.

1.

Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2011).

Corresponding author: Fred Chernoff, Colgate University, 13 Oak Drive, Hamilton, NY 13346 USA. Email: fchernoff@colgate.edu

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Professor Suganamis contribution to this forum does a very good job of assessing Jacksons conceptualisation of his four methodological positions. Rather than add to that discussion, the present article looks at Jacksons core effort to broaden debate in IR and advocate dialogue by advancing an argument for pluralism. This article maintains that Jackson is right about the need for theoretical and methodological pluralism in IR and that pluralism does not entail that anything goes in terms of methodology. But the article shows in the first section that Jacksons argument for pluralism has gaps, largely owing to problems with his discussion of the science debate in IR. This leads to a substantial underestimation, treated in the second section, of the role and value of philosophy of science for progress in IR debates. Jacksons argument for pluralism leaves all research traditions insulated from one another, at least insofar as IR scholarship is concerned, an issue that pertains to the possibility of progress in the field, which is discussed in the third section. The problems noted with Jacksons advocacy of pluralism lead to the need for a more adequate defence of that view, adumbrated in the fourth section. This article argues that the need for IR scholars to be aware of the presuppositions and implications of the onto-methodological starting points is much greater than simply to help ensure that research proceeds within the standards appropriate for that particular starting point. As the second section stresses, authors should recognise that their theories are only as justifiable and persuasive as the set of the claims on which they logically rely. Thus, while IR authors need not write extensively about their philosophical assumptions, they should understand what those assumptions are, what the alternatives positions are, and the strengths and weaknesses of those assumptions. Powerful philosophical critiques of those principles weaken the basis for accepting their theoretical conclusions in the same way that the conclusions would be undercut by the discovery of deficiencies in any other assumptions they make, for example, about the reliability of interview subjects testimony or relevance for their research design of statistical methods they employ. It should be noted at the outset that Jacksons book is not an empirical study of world politics; it does not aim to tell us about the role of international institutions or the causes of war. It is a work in IR metatheory and the philosophy of social science, and as such the argument can only be evaluated on philosophical standards of cogency and rigor. As Suganami puts it, the book is not itself a work of science but a contribution to metascience concerning world politics.2

Pluralism Defended by Denying Exclusive Claim to the Authority of Science to any One Standpoint
The Conduct of Inquiry examines and compares the consequences of different methodologies used in IR. Jackson develops a pair of distinctions that are basic to most contemporary debates in the philosophy of the social sciences between the mind-dependent

2.

H. Suganami, Meta-Jackson: Rethinking Patrick Thaddeus Jacksons Conduct of Inquiry, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 41, no. 2 (2012): 2. Suganami adds, Jackson dedicates more space to discussing foundational philosophers and social theorists of the four categories than contemporary IR scholars who exemplify them (ibid., 2).

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and mind-independent character of social phenomena and between phenomenalism and transfactualism. He then employs the notion of a wager to argue that the choice of any one of the different methodological approaches used in IR is tantamount to the acceptance of a particular sort of wager. Jackson seeks to move methodological debates forward by finding common ground among the various standpoints which will allow him to resolve the dispute between several approaches, each of which claims for itself, and denies to the others, the status of being scientific. His strategy involves defining science in a way that would presumably satisfy theorists no matter which of the four starting points they adopt, and in a way that qualifies them all as scientific. Jackson provides an analysis of the science debate in Chapter 1, develops the wager framework in Chapter 2, surveys each of the standpoints in the four chapters that follow and finishes the dialogue and pluralism arguments in Chapter 7. The position he develops in Chapter 1 is that no one definition from the philosophy of science may be used by IR scholars to delimit the range of legitimate inquiry. After surveying the different definitions, he concludes that the only solution that does not presume a non-existent philosophical consensus about the definition of science would be an account that, in effect, equated science with empirical inquiry designed to produce knowledge.3 He begins Chapter 2 by reiterating that the discussion in Chapter 1 effectively makes science equivalent to systematic empirical inquiry designed to produce factual knowledge.4 Jackson ultimately argues, citing Weber, that a broad definition of science is needed, which can accommodate all four standpoints.5 Jackson thus argues that none of the competing positions may justifiably dismiss as illegitimate the other sorts of inquiry and discourse.

Structure of One Major Argument in Chapter 7

In the final chapter, Jackson ties his discussion of the science debate to his analyses of the various starting points to develop several conclusions. One of the key arguments is designed to show the presence of common ground and comparability among the contending positions, and it proceeds by arguing that none of the standpoints can claim to be scientific at the expense of the others. Jackson draws important inferences that, as will be argued later, are not warranted by the discussion of Chapters 16. The structure of the argument in question appears to be the following (with justifications in parentheses): 1. There are four ideal-types of onto-methodological starting points that are used in IR, each with its own presuppositions and consequences and each instantiated by IR publications (premise drawn from observation of IR literature and philosophical analysis of central concepts). 2. There is no consensus in the philosophy of science on how to define science (empirical observation by surveying philosophy literature).
3. Jackson, Conduct of Inquiry, 19. 4. Ibid., 24. 5. There are small variations in Jacksons statements of the definition. For example, in some cases he includes the work to improve their extant stock of knowledge (ibid., 3). In Chapter 7, without acknowledging the change, he adds that science must be systematic and public.

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3. Many scholars have tried to extract a definition of science by analysing examples of good science (empirical observation by surveying philosophy of science debates). Therefore: 4. It is a mistake, at least for social scientists, to define science by choosing examples of successful science and extracting from them conclusions about what makes them good science (inference from 2, 3). 5. IR cannot adopt any definition of science found in the philosophy of science literature (from 2, 4). Therefore: 6. The definition of science used by IR scholars should be formulated to accommodate what exists in the IR literature (inference from 1, 2, 4, 5). Therefore: 7. Science should be defined for the purposes of the study of IR as inquiry that is systematic, public, and produces worldly knowledge or systematic, empirical inquiry designed to produce factual knowledge (justified by steps 1, 5, 6). Therefore: 8.  All four onto-philosophical starting points fit the definition of science, and the field of IR should acknowledge all as sufficiently scientific, even though it is not the case that anything goes (p. 196) (inference from 1, 6, 7).

Step 2 and the Character of Debates in the Philosophy of Science

Step 2 of the argument correctly points out that philosophers do not agree on a single account of science. Jackson refers a number of times to the non-existent consensus,6 which strongly suggests that the argument should be interpreted as placing a good deal of weight on it. But any use of this observation would benefit from some context. Two points are particularly relevant. One point of context is that there is very rarely consensus on the precise best answers to philosophical questions. The significance of this bit of context is that it would mean that relying only on consensus philosophical claims is tantamount to rejecting all use of philosophical claims (see later discussion on the use of this step in deriving step 7). A second contextual comment is that, despite the differing accounts

6.

For example, ibid., 11, 1516, 25.

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of science, there is an enormous amount of agreement among philosophers both on what does and does not properly count as science, and on which particular scientific theories are superior to which others. They concur that Newtons, Lavoisiers and Bohrs theories were advancements over the theories they supplanted.7 Disagreement over cases in the natural sciences is very much at the margins. The major disagreements are generally over the best explanations for the vast area of overlap regarding what is good science.

Step 5 and the Problem of the Consensus Requirement

Step 5 does not follow directly from steps 2 and 3; some further general principle is required. But a problem arises here because any principle capable of justifying the inference turns out, upon examination, to be dubious at best. It is certainly possible to reconstruct Jacksons science argument in ways that differ on specifics from the preceding. But however one does it, a general principle is needed to allow Jackson to move from the observation that there is no consensus science definition, and the claim that successful examples cannot serve as a basis for a definition, to the conclusion that it is not justifiable for IR scholars to pick out any philosophers definition of science to limit legitimate study in IR. Why is it impermissible for an IR theorist to study the philosophical issues pertaining to the starting points, draw conclusions about what accounts of science are more cogent and defensible than others, and then argue that her position is stronger than rivals that make use of less cogent philosophical premises? The argument against permitting the use of any philosophers definition or account of science would have to arise from some general principle or rule that justifies the prohibition. So we ask, what would that general principle look like? Jackson asks rhetorically, If philosophers of science as a group do not agree on what science is, what warrant do we have to pluck out one or another position on science?8 The general principle appears to be something like the following: if there is no consensus on a philosophical principle or definition, then it may not legitimately be cited in an argument by an IR author.9 In whatever way one chooses to formulate this suppressed major premise, if it is strong enough to allow the move from 2 and 3 to 5, then it runs into trouble on several fronts, which are discussed later in connection with the definition of science in step 7. At this point, we note only that Jackson criticises plucking a definition of science from philosophers, but he then appears to violate the ban when he offers a definition of science drawn from Weber. This is, at least on the surface, a clear contradiction of the statement that IR cannot state what is and is not acceptable scholarship by citing a philosophers definition of science.
7. See, for example, Michael Friedman, Explanation and Scientific Understanding, Journal of Philosophy 71 (1974): 519. Philosophers are more likely to reach consensus on the failure of a doctrine. The positive role that the philosophy of science can play in IR is discussed more fully in the third section. 8. Jackson, Conduct of Inquiry, 25; see also statements of it at 11, 1516. 9. This is a conservatively stated version, since there is no obvious reason why the justifying generalisation would be acceptable if confined only to the use of claims from philosophy and only to their use by IR researchers.

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Furthermore, Jackson relies on a number of other non-consensus metatheoretical principles and claims, beyond the definition of science. He approvingly cites metatheoretical arguments by a number of authors, including Weber, Taylor and myself, even though there is no consensus on any of those views. One crucial example is Jacksons acceptance, without discussion, of the factvalue distinction.10 The debate on this is vast within philosophy and it is disputed by a wide array of IR theorists and philosophers, some of whom Jackson cites on other matters.11 Another important example is his acceptance of Kuhns analysis of scientific language,12 a view that is far from a consensus in the philosophy of science.

Step 6
Jacksons basis for his definition is that all four sorts of standpoints are used extensively in IR publications and IR should operate under a big tent. Accordingly, the definition should be tailored to fit what in fact exists in the field (step 6). This essentially substitutes existing IR scholarship with scientific IR. But not everyone who publishes IR work claims to be doing science. And those who claim to be doing scientific work mean that they are doing something that has at least some significant features in common with what natural scientists do; they do not merely mean that they are doing science in the sense that their sort of work is publishable in IR journals. In the debate over science, all parties use the term to refer to a form of inquiry that associates the social sciences with what the natural sciences do and to separate it from what is generally regarded as pseudo-science.

Step 7
As just noted, Jackson repeatedly states that there is no consensus on the definition of science and holds that it is impermissible for IR authors to invoke a definition of science to support their positions. The general principle that would justify this inference appears to be questionable. And, Jackson appears to violate it when he presents his own Weberian definition, according to which science is systematic, empirical inquiry designed to produce factual knowledge. Is there a way to see Jacksons use of his definition as remaining consistent with the general principle discussed earlier that is needed to justify the inference to step 5?

10. Jackson, Conduct of Inquiry, 21. Nicolas Onuf, Worlds of our Making: The Strange Career of Constructivism in International Relations, in Visions of International Relations: Assessing an Academic Field, ed. D.J. Puchala (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2002), 11941. 11. Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science (London: Routledge, 1958), 1114; see also Charles Taylor, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), II, 1557, and Alastair MacIntyres commentary on Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes. V. 41 (1967): 95114. Other ways in which Jackson underestimates the role of the philosophy of science are discussed later. 12. Jackson, Conduct of Inquiry, 192.

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There are at least two responses to the charge of inconsistency. One is that Jackson is not merely plucking Webers definition but is offering a justification for it. However, the other conceptions of scientific knowledge that we find presented by IR authors are often supported by equally extensive arguments. So the mere existence of a defense is not enough. A second retort is that Jacksons definition is better because his supporting argument is more cogent and his definition is broader, thus conferring legitimacy upon a range of work that would be excluded by other definitions. This reply would open up debate by recognising that philosophical definitions are in principle legitimate, and thereby alter what appears to be the direction of Jacksons argument. Secondly, it would require a fuller comparison of Jacksons definition to the others on a range of criteria, which might well bring out shortcomings of Jacksons definition, even with regard to breadth. For example, those social scientists who reject the factvalue distinction may well argue that Jacksons definition is not broad enough, as it excludes moral-normative content that should qualify as science.13 And at the same time it might confer scientific status on approaches that should not be so regarded, since it would appear to count astrological theories of IR, which fulfil all of Jacksons conditions.14

The Role of the Philosophy of Science in IR and Social Science Inquiry

Jacksons view of the lack of interaction of the onto-methodological standpoints imposes limits on the role of the philosophy of science, discussed in this section, and on the possibility of progress in IR, discussed in the next section. In my view, the philosophy of science has a much greater and a more complex role to play in IR debates than Jackson envisions. It is important to emphasise at the outset, though, that the analysis here does not interpret Jackson as claiming that philosophy of science is incapable of valuable work, but only as claiming that arguments and developments in the philosophy of science cannot be applied by IR scholars for the purpose of arguing for the advantages of one theory over another. To begin with, philosophy of science debates have a bearing on the philosophy of science principles one adopts as a grounding for IR and social science research. While Jackson says that one must make choices between the two sets of options, he offers little hope of any rational progress on how to choose one among them, that is, on how to decide on the best pair of wagers. Presumably, one should not adopt one of Jacksons four standpoints by flipping a coin, but his analysis does not leave room for rational alternatives. In my view,

13. David Thomas defends naturalism compatible with a value-laden social science. He draws on postempiricist philosophy of science to defend the view that social study must be evaluative. The argument, as he presents it, depends on three premises. The statements of social theory are underdetermined by the social world. Values act as an extra criterion of theory choice in social study. [And] The significance of valuations for social study, from the point of view of both truth-judgments and meaningrelations, cannot be segregated in any specific area of social theory. Naturalism and Social Science: A Post-empiricist Philosophy of Social Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 137. 14. Many astrologers work on statistical associations and propound empirical generalisations. All in this category are engaged in systematic, empirical, public inquiry that is designed to produce factual knowledge.

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rational grounds are available for a researchers choice of one or another onto-philosophical position. The grounds are found in the philosophy of science and the empirical study of IR and social science theories that perform well. The evaluation is based on various theoretical and practical criteria, even though the principles that justify such criteria are fallible. Jacksons view concurs with my own on at least three major points. Firstly, foundational positions drawn from the philosophy of science do not tell us which specific IR theory or policy is better than all rivals, even though such positions play an essential role in IR scholarship. In the process of defending a theoretical or empirical conclusion in IR, one must rely, implicitly or explicitly, on a range of foundational propositions. Secondly, the commitments to most foundational propositions are almost always unstated in IR scholarship. Among the claims in metaphysics are those concerning the nature of truth and causation; among those in ontology are those regarding what is taken to be real, and whether there is a world of entia that exists independently of any individuals concept of them; among those in epistemology are those regarding what is taken to count as knowledge; and among the methodological premises, which may be shaped by those of step 1, are those concerning the legitimate forms of observation and generalisation. And, thirdly, the fact that foundational statements are often unstated and unacknowledged, and possibly unknown to the author herself in any explicit or conscious way, does not remove the logical reliance of the conclusion on such statements. Still, a philosophy of science position, whether implicit or explicit, is only one element of an argument. An argument for an IR theory, T, would typically rely on different sorts of premises, which may be summarised in the following schema: Schema 1. P (metaphysical/epistemological claims typically suppressed in IR publications) 2. Q (methodological claims sometimes suppressed in IR publications) 3. R (defence of research design) 4. S (empirical evidence) Therefore 5. T With the above points of agreement clarified, it is now possible to summarise my view of the role of the philosophy of science. The following subsections will discuss: (1) what makes one IR argument stronger than alternatives; (2) the difference between supporting foundations and foundational theories of knowledge; (3) rhetorical strategies for advancing a position in scholarly debates; and (4) the possibility of a rational basis for choosing a starting point.

Strength and Vulnerability of Arguments

When a scholar defends an IR theory, T, the persuasive strength of the argument for T will depend on the quality of the research design, the nature of the evidence, the strength of the alternative theories and so on, but also, as noted, on foundational propositions of premise 1-type. The foundational principles constitute implicit premises in the argument

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for T. A valid argument may have a false conclusion if one or more of the premises is false. A sound argument is by definition a valid argument with true premises; the conclusions of such arguments are always true. The truth of the premises of two sound arguments may not be equally plausible on the surface (without support) and thus may not be equally likely to persuade a given audience. The persuasive power of a valid argument depends upon how credible and how well supported the premises are. For example, since empirical observations, coding of cases and a research design are typically part of the overall argument for a conclusion, an author wants to show that the observations are accurate, the coding is reliable and the research design is appropriate. One argument is more persuasive than another if it is harder to prove that within the premises set, call it set K, there is a false statement. Given any two valid arguments, the stronger and more persuasive argument is the one that has the more minimal premise set, where minimal is understood as asserting less or having less content. A premise set K asserts less than K if K is consistent with a greater range of other statements than is K. The greater the range of other statements that is consistent with K, the harder it is to prove K false. That is, the less the content of the premises, the harder it is to prove the premises untrue. If someone advances an IR argument that relies on methods consistent with a range of philosophers, such as Kuhn, Lakatos, Popper and Quine (i.e. any of those philosophers or their followers will accept the starting point), it will be less vulnerable and thus more persuasive than an argument that requires a stronger, or more specific, set of premises, for example, that Kuhn is right and the others wrong.15 To cite an extreme example, consider the following pair of propositions that state both mechanisms and outcomes: Democratic dyads have greater structural constraints on crisis escalation than other sorts of dyads, which leads them to be less war-prone than other types of dyads and The political institutions realised through the unfolding of Absolute Spirit will exhibit perfection. The former is compatible with a wider range of premise 1-type principles; the latter would be accepted only by Hegelian Idealists.16 Research proceeds by means of comparisons of competing theories. The strength of the argument for any theory is a function of the evaluation of steps 1, 2, 3 and 4 in schema . It is a mistake to exclude appraisals of any of them because the grounds may not be indubitable or absolutely certain. Indeed, the grounds for appraising philosophical premises of step 1 in schema are fallible, just as is the case for the grounds for appraising methodological and research design premises 24 in schema . Because there is no requirement of certainty placed on the grounds for supporting premises 24, it would be entirely inconsistent to require certainty for evidence for step 1-type premises. For example, if a theoretical argument relied on a step 2-type methodological perspective that presumed the Logical Positivists verification principle, then it is hard to see why Jackson would say that the powerful philosophical criticisms in the mid-20th century of Logical Positivism and the verification principle would not lessen the persuasiveness of
15. Data-gathering publications are part of any science. In IR publications of an empirical/descriptive nature, for example, dealing with treaties, cables and so on, the authors can avoid commitment to anything even as specific as one of Jacksons philosophical standpoints. 16. Will Dudley, Introduction, in Hegel and History, ed. Dudley (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009), 114, esp. 12.

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the theoretical conclusion. Similarly, suppose that the philosophical (step 1) premise of a theory included reliance on (the verification-related view of) phenomenalism, as philosophers use the term. It would be an unjustifiable limitation on the comparative evaluation of such a theory to ignore the fact that nearly all philosophers abandoned phenomenalism following Chisholms devastating critique of that doctrine in the 1940s and 1950s.17

Foundations Do Not Depend upon Foundationalism

It is worth remembering at this juncture that when we speak of foundations for a conclusion, the reference is only to the development of a logical argument. There is no presumption of acceptance of a foundationalist theory of knowledge, which is the view that an edifice of truth can be erected on a foundation of certainty. This view is rejected by many social scientists. But this should not incline anyone to hesitate to accept the need for foundations in the natural or social sciences. Foundations for conclusions do not imply indubitability or certainty and do not require adoption of the specific doctrine of foundationalism in the theory of knowledge. Elsewhere, I explicate these two very distinct concepts and point out the serious error that results from confusing them.18 The metaphor of foundations of an edifice illuminates the concept of rational or rhetorical foundations without requiring certainty, since a buildings foundations, however much they may add to the strength of the superstructure, are not completely invulnerable. Foundations which are flawed in the sense that they are not the best currently available as compared with what a builder with unlimited resources could supply may still render the building more secure than it would be without any foundation. Moreover, even if the foundations are the best available, they may erode over time. There is nothing in the notion of the foundation of a building that would lead us to expect that they must render the superstructure invulnerable to any and all assaults. Hence, the metaphor of providing a foundation for a natural or social science theory should carry no presumption of indubitability or apodictic certainty.

Choosing a Winning Strategy

All works of scholarship seek to provide firmer grounds for the audience to accept a conclusion, whether it is a work of economics, physics or IR. The scholarly work must provide a way of persuading the audience that the conclusion is true. There are always many rhetorical strategy paths to this destination. An effective strategy will take into account, among other things, the character of the audience. The author seeks the most powerful method of persuasion that leaves the fewest points of vulnerability open to criticism. How much attention should be paid by IR scholars to philosophical questions like those Jackson raises? Because works of IR theory must rely on propositions of many sorts (as in schema ), ones chosen rhetorical strategy will influence which among the
17. See, for example, Roderick Chisholm, The Problem of Empiricism, Journal of Philosophy 45 (1948): 51217; and Perceiving (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1957). 18. See Chernoff, Defending Foundations for International Relations Theory, International Theory 1, no. 3 (2009): 46677.

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various (foundational, theoretical and empirical) statements should receive explicit attention, which may be left unstated and how far the author should go to defend each of those that are explicitly identified. The choice of a rhetorical strategy is in turn partially shaped in part by the particular target audience. For one sort of audience, one set of claims may be left unsupported because the audience would be unlikely to question them, and thus unlikely to see them as points of vulnerability in the argument, while for another audience, those statements would require support. If an author wants to defend a particular explanatory claim on an IR question, the amount of attention that should be paid to any of the sorts of premises identified in schema will depend on what the audience accepts before reading the piece. The author of a statistically oriented article is committed to the claim that statistical models have, for example, explanatory power, and she should ideally be able to defend it, though depending on the journal, it may be unnecessary to do so in a particular article. Readers of British Journal of Political Science, International Studies Quarterly and American Political Science Review generally accept the value of statistical tests before picking up the latest issue of the journal. So it would be strategically inefficient for the author of a statistical article in one of those journals to launch into a defence of the explanatory value of statistical modelling when that space could be used for a fuller defence of the research design, specific modelling techniques, coding procedures, data sources and so on. In contrast, the reader of an article published in Review of International Studies, International Theory or the present journal would be more likely to question the value of statistical models as explanatory tools, and at least some space might be devoted to a metatheoretical defence of statistical methods in the philosophy of social science, and how statistical models are better than others for the problem at hand.19 An author should have an idea of how to present a defence of her position, which includes a defence of premises on all levels in schema . But in a publication, she should muster the most powerful arguments for the types of premises that are most likely to be challenged by the target audience. Waltzs Theory of International Politics20 had such a major impact on IR debates in part because of the concise nature of the theory and in part because of the careful way Waltz uses the opening chapter to specify the naturalist, empiricist and instrumentalist foundational positions he holds. Of course, for those who reject his foundational principles, the argument that follows has reduced persuasive force. Because Theory of International Politics is a work of IR theory, Waltz does not offer a defence of those foundational views. His audience can be persuaded to some extent by his statement of the empiricist metatheoretical principles, but that audience did not expect or require a philosophical defence of those principles. A defence would have been appropriate, and perhaps necessary, had the book been primarily a work in the philosophy of social science or IR meta-theory. What Waltz does, rather, is to state his position on foundational questions in a way that lends support to the theory he defends and that
19. In a recent paper, Helen Turton surveys the nature of the articles published in a dozen US and European journals of IR and shows the sharp differences in methodologies typical in them. See Helen Turton, A Dearth of Data: A Critical Realist Solution (paper presented to BISA workshop, McGill University, March 2011). 20. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

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forecloses certain sorts of objections one might level (e.g. that structures are not real enough to be the key focus of analysis for an IR theory). Waltz then proceeds to offer positive arguments for his theory and negative arguments against rival IR theories, but not against rival philosophical starting points. For the sort of work he was publishing and for the target IR audience, Waltz chose an effective and appropriate rhetorical strategy. One might lament that the need to take into account the nature of the intended audience in choosing what to foreground in a rhetorical strategy is a pitiable feature of imprecise fields like IR or dubious social-scientific enterprises like political science, and thus highlights yet another dimension of social sciences inferiority to natural science. However, as just mentioned, the same holds true for works in physics, mathematics and the like. Mathematics would seem to be the hard case for the claim that audience relevance affects rhetorical strategy and the level of persuasiveness. Consider that when it comes to how proofs are formulated, authors of articles in journals of mathematics and formal logic skip the steps that are obvious to their journal-reading peers, even though they might well include those steps for a different audience, for example, readers of a textbook or an audience in a classroom lecture. More to the point of how mathematicians deal with foundational questions in different contexts, today, authors who publish in leading academic journals employ indirect proof without justification of that method. However, there are certain times and places where a mathematician may not want to rely on reductio proof without comment. For example, after Browers intuitionist attacks in the 1920s on the law of excluded middle, and by implication doubts be raised about the validity of indirect proof, a mathematician who employed that strategy, especially soon after Browers publications, may have considered it rhetorically advantageous to devote at least some space to defending indirect proof. To return to the discussion of the persuasive strength of arguments, we note that since foundational positions are typically not defended in IR works, it is a wiser rhetorical strategy to make foundational assumptions that are consistent with more philosophicalfoundational doctrines. The wider the range of possible foundational positions that is consistent with the authors method and theory, the less attention she needs to devote to defending foundations. It is harder for an opponent to disprove (a disjunction of) a wide range of foundational doctrines than to disprove a specific one. But if the theory requires a very specific and less widely accepted set of views in philosophy of social science, then it may be strategically wise to allot some attention to the most limiting and controversial foundational principles and to give some indication of how they are best substantiated. This is the same tactic an author would use for any empirical, methodological or theoretical claim; the more unfamiliar and apparently dubious a claim may appear to the target audience, the more useful it will be for the author to devote explicit support for the claims. A strong argument makes use of as few premises and assumptions as is possible. To argue for an IR theory does not always require the author to declare herself, for example, a Popperian who opposes Lakatos, Kuhn and Latour. If the research design and argument can be formulated in a way that is consistent with all of them (as virtually all natural science research is), then one should avoid endorsing Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn or Latour specifically. The goal of research is to get the best answers, and the goal of formulating arguments for ones conclusions is to persuade the target audience.

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Rational Grounds for Starting Points

While Jackson and I agree that IR scholarship commits authors to philosophical principles, we differ greatly on the ability to choose principles rationally and on how much such choices limit the power of the IR scholarship that rests upon them. As this and the previous subsection argues, my view is that the nature and extent of the philosophical commitments of different IR authors may be very different from one another because there are substantial variations in the breadth-versus-specificity of the commitments a particular theoretical argument may require. Since not all wagers or philosophical commitments are equally sweeping, it follows that not all are equally limiting of the audience that will have to accept each step leading up to the termination of the argument. For many sorts of IR research, only minimal philosophical assumptions need be made to state the propositions and to justify the methods of study. For others, much more needs to be included in premise set P (in step 1) of schema . An author should understand the set of presuppositions and assumptions that are implicit in a work of scholarship and should be able to defend them. But she need not do so explicitly in any particular published work. Which assumptions or premises receive explicit support depends on the authors understanding of the intended audience. And the authors acceptance of one or another set of philosophical principles that ground the methods of study need not and should not be a matter of fiat. An understanding of philosophical and methodological debates should inform the authors position. This is not to say that all authors will choose the one best position in the philosophy of science. There is room for disagreement. But the points accepted by each side should be grounded in rational discourse and should not be a matter of religious faith even if Jackson is right that methodological positions are often treated in that way by their adherents. If IR is to be a rational and intellectual enterprise, more dialogue is needed than merely the respectful conversations in which no change of beliefs are in the offing.21 Jackson correctly states that IR requires certain philosophical commitments. He argues further that the philosophical debates do not produce consensus on science (or other philosophical questions), and then infers that it is impossible for IR scholars to know which philosophical positions are correct. He concludes that it is best to move to post-foundational IR. Scholars should pick a set of philosophical principles, be explicit about those choices and use them consistently to guide research methodologies. But on such a view, we cannot know if we have picked wisely or unwisely (or even extremely foolishly). This undercuts the notion that good philosophical arguments can advance natural or social science knowledge. Philosophical developments are not irrelevant to progress in science. Consider, for example, how critiques of Newtons concepts of absolute time and absolute space by
21. Jackson adds the public condition to his account of science. This is added to his claim that since all `science produces worldly facts. He argues as well that there should be cross-disciplinary dialogue and a resultant possibility of progress in our knowledge of the international. But it is hard to see how this argument can be made compatible with his clearly stated account of what each scholarly research tradition in IR can do within itself and cannot do with the others, which is to evaluate results. So the addition of public-ness does not help to increase the sort of all-discipline dialogue and cross-checking of results that Jackson lauds in Chapter 7.

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philosophers like Leibniz had a role in the development of modern relativistic theories. And consider how Duhems principle of underdetermination of theory by data has aided the understanding of what scientific experiments can and cannot establish.22 The list goes on. Since Jackson and others discount the value of philosophy and treat it as a sort of debating arena in which no progress is made that could be applied to the social sciences, they would have difficulty explaining how arguments in metaphysics and the theory of knowledge can have had such important effects on scientific progress in physics and astronomy. Jacksons view eliminates the chances for such philosophical arguments to aid the advancement of IR in a similar way. A related puzzle for Jacksons view is that social scientists occasionally change their methodological orientations. Is this always a process that is outside of the domain of the rational, essentially a religious conversion? It seems reasonable to conjecture (though an empirical study would be intriguing) that the changes in social scientists methodological orientations stem, in at least some cases, from philosophical dialogue and study of the works of philosophers of science or IR authors who write about metatheory like Cox, Dessler, Lebow, Little, Wendt and Wight. This is the sort of discourse that books like the Conduct of Inquiry promotes. Even new observations can lead to rationally grounded shifts in the philosophical foundations of ones preferred theory. For example, while we have noted examples of philosophical ideas affecting scientific theory, we note also that developments in 20th-century physics led a number of philosophers of natural science to abandon some of their philosophical views, like thorough going phenomenalism. Jackson understates what philosophy of science can contribute to IR, since he does not see philosophical arguments as able to strengthen substantive theories. He sees them only as able to create commitments or wagers, which may differ from various other authors commitments or wagers. But the philosophy of science can add (or subtract) force to various starting points, as I have tried to show in The Power of International Theory. All starting points are not equal in terms of their ability to strengthen the case for an IR theory.

Progress in the Study of IR

In order for the field of IR to advance, there needs to be considerable improvement in the relationship between the study of metatheory on which Jackson focuses and

22. Even though Duhem was a physicist and Leibniz was a mathematician and natural philosopher, the principles just cited were clearly the sort of arguments that we would classify as epistemological; see Samuel Clarke, The LeibnizClarke Correspondence (Notes and Introduction by H.G. Alexander; Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956); and Chernoff, Leibnizs Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1981): 12638. E.A. Burtt sees the effect in a similar way. He says that Newton gave new meanings to the old terms space, time and motion. In so doing, Newton was constituting himself as a philosopher rather than a scientist as we now distinguish them. These metaphysical notions were carried wherever his scientific influence penetrated. E.A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1925), 20. See also Thomas, Naturalism in Social Science, 140.

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the study of substantive empirical and normative IR. I have argued elsewhere that progress in IR, especially on empirical questions, is possible. My conclusion is based on the claim that progress has, in fact, occurred. Without taking sides on how to define scientific progress, I have examined the definitions advanced by five of the most influential philosophers of science of the past century and a half, and showed that there is at least one area of IR study, the democratic peace debate, that satisfies all of their necessary conditions. I explained, based on the causal conventionalist position that I have advocated, just what it is about that debate that enabled it to achieve that success.23 Jackson uses the science argument to promote dialogue across methodologies. He says the result of his efforts is a lexicon within which we can, as a field, have a number of philosophically richer and logically more coherent contentious discussions about world politics.24 If what constitutes valid knowledge can only be settled according to the standards internal to that methodology,25 it becomes unclear what the dialogue is to be about. This concern is deepened by Jackson choosing to open the final chapter with a comparison between the debate over science in IR and the typical debates between adherents of different religions in which each claims to have a monopoly on Truth. While Jackson acknowledges that the two are not the same in all respects, he cites a long list of parallels. Dialogue can be respectful but the intellectual progress to be achieved is very limited. Indeed, the main common ground indicated by this approach is the simple, let us agree to disagree. In his view, progress is possible within each starting point, but it will remain internal to each, and each will proceed on non-intersecting tracks. This does not seem to be consistent with the fact that philosophical developments have had an impact in advancing dialogue across starting points. For example, refutations of Logical Positivism noted earlier did have, and should properly have had, an effect on what fields outside of philosophy considered superior forms of inquiry. Progress requires recognising the importance of the philosophy of science and the need to emphasise good philosophical foundations and avoid weak ones. As the previous section attempted to show, there is simply no way for social scientists to get around the fact that their theories rely on various philosophical principles; Jackson acknowledges this much. But further, the strength of those theories relies on the merits of the philosophical principles. One sometimes encounters policy advocates who dismiss IR theory, claiming that their policy prescriptions are not soiled by any connection to it. But they are always wrong about this. Any policy prescription requires, implicitly or explicitly, various causal claims of the form: doing X under circumstances C will (usually or sometimes) result in Y, the desired policy outcome. There is no way around reliance on (causal) IR theory for policy prescriptions. The desire to avoid theory is understandable for the practical-minded, given the presence of so many controversies in IR theory, but
23 See Chernoff, The Power of International Theory (London: Routledge, 2005), ch. 6; and The Study of Democratic Peace and Progress in International Relations, International Studies Review 6 (2004): 4977. 24. Jackson, Conduct of Inquiry, 193. 25. Ibid., 191.

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the goal is a chimera. In the same way, some IR theorists claim that metatheory and the philosophy of social science can be avoided. The desire is, again, understandable but the goal is equally unattainable.26 How is the progress lauded at the outset of this section, and the rebalancing of philosophical and substantive material, to be achieved? Two necessary conditions are that IR scholars be made aware of the unavoidable reliance of empirical and normative IR upon various sorts of philosophical principles, as the previous section illustrated, and that IR scholars be trained more satisfactorily in the foundational questions they must ask, and in the strengths and weaknesses of the contending answers. At a recent conference, an audience member asked participants on a methodology panel what balance of readings each thought, ideal for a one-semester graduate-level IR methodology course. After a moments thought, I was ready, when my turn came, to take a pro-philosophy hard line by suggesting at least one-third. Before I had a chance to deliver my answer, a co-panellist, a distinguished empirical researcher who was then ISA president, outbid me by saying it should be at least half. That is one concrete suggestion. The study of the philosophy of social science cannot displace the study of IR; but since IR conclusions do depend on certain philosophical claims, IR scholars should be aware of the connection and the power of various doctrines.

Pluralism May also Be Supported by Question-Driven IR Research

One of the chief objectives of The Conduct of Inquiry is to advance methodological pluralism, a position that I believe is entirely correct. However, because of the difficulties in his argument, described earlier, it is important to seek more effective and defensible ways to support the sort of pluralism Jackson endorses. Jackson makes his case by defining each category of IR research as a type of science. I have defended pluralism in a different way, by arguing: (1) that the various forms of theorising published in IR journals, while perhaps not science, must at least be regarded as legitimate IR scholarship; (2) that the best and most appropriate methods and methodologies are a function of the sorts of questions those works seek to answer; (3) that there are different kinds of questions asked about IR; (4) that different kinds of questions are best answered by different sorts of methods, which are grounded in different philosophical principles;27 and (5) that there is no available theory that shows the superiority of one methodology in handling

26. Jackson is not the only one to attempt to defend ones philosophical foundational claims in IR; see, for example, Nuno P. Monteiro and Keven G. Ruby, IR and the False Promise of Philosophical Foundations, International Theory 1, no. 1 (2009): 1548, and my reply Defending Foundations for International Relations Theory. 27. Jackson finds it curious that IR is organised along the lines of substantive topics rather than along conceptual or philosophical lines (Conduct of Inquiry, 39). In contrast, I would regard it as odd if a field, especially an interdisciplinary field, like IR, should not have been organised along substantive lines. The field is defined by subject matter events and processes that cross the borders of states, nations and societies and the ways to develop and evaluate theories should clearly be question-driven.

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the wide range of kinds of questions posed in IR to the point of successfully degrading all others as illegitimate forms of IR.28 Why should someone pursue the study of IR? People in fact do it for various reasons to answer questions based on their desire to understand the workings of international politics, to produce cause-and-effect principles that will allow policy formation to reduce violence, to produce principles that will enable their government to rule the world, to publish works that will earn them royalties or enhance promotion chances, to name a few. Obviously, there is no one right or best reason to study world politics. These various motivations stimulate different sorts of questions, such as: why did X happen? What is the best explanation for X? What can we know about what happened (or what patterns can be found in interstate behaviour)?29 Which side was right in that conflict? What is likely to happen under condition Y? And the scholar seeks answers. The diverse reasons to study IR relate to the wide range of questions scholars ask. A more powerful argument for pluralism can be based on the observation that the study of IR is driven by the questions scholars pose, and the range of types of questions they pose is wide. As I have argued, IR research is question-driven and there is no available argument to counter this claim. In The Power of International Theory, I argue, along these lines, that there are very different kinds of questions that are legitimately asked in the IR literature. All deal properly with social processes, events and phenomena across the borders of states, nations and societies. The position I develop there may be summarised as follows.
The methodological pluralism advocated in this study not only finds room for both to co-exist, but emphasises the positive need for both sorts of theories. One of the bases of the methodological pluralism here is the recognition of the wide array of questions asked by scholars.30

The book offers examples of questions that are legitimately within the domain of IR, such as: are bipolar systems more stable than multipolar systems? Was the US nuclear alert in 1973 aimed at enhancing military readiness or a warning to Brezhnev? Are preventative wars ever morally justifiable? Respected IR journals and presses publish the works of scholars seeking to answer these and similar questions. But the kinds of methods appropriate for pursuing answers to them are highly divergent. Empirical and statistical methods are appropriate, perhaps among others, for answering the first question; interpretative methods are appropriate for the second; and moral-normative methods of argument are appropriate for the third.31
28. See Chernoff, The Power of International Theory; and Methodological Pluralism and the Limits of Positivism in the Study of Politics, in Theory and Evidence, eds Richard Ned Lebow and Mark Lichbach (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 10741. Because of space limitations, only a rough outline of the argument is presented here. 29. See Gary Goertz, Descriptive-Causal Generalizations: Empirical Laws in the Social Sciences?, in The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Science, ed. Harold Kincaild (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 85108. 30. Chernoff, The Power of International Theory, 25. 31. These, interestingly, correspond to the three types of questions Suganami identifies (Meta-Jackson, 17). Suganami argues the differences between the IR schools that Jackson identifies are better understood by reference to the different types of questions that they pose.

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While many authors advocate methodological pluralism, most advocates have little tolerance for empiricist methodology, which is employed in most IR publications. It is interesting to note, firstly, that according to the recent TRIP survey, more IR academics, even in the US, self-identify as constructivists than realists,32 and, secondly that while the US journals publish a great deal of empirical work, books and articles on meta-theory are nevertheless dominated by opponents of empiricism and positivism. In this climate, my book, The Power of International Theory, deals with methodological pluralism by defending also empiricist methods against the array of interpretivist and post-structural attacks often found in IR organs.33

Complexity, Inconvenience and Messiness

The social world is very complex and has manifold dimensions. Different kinds of questions may be asked and different kinds of methods of study are appropriate to answer them. A plurality of methods is essential, and Jackson is right to support this stance. He is right also to say that the best arguments are to be judged by the standards of a particular methodology. But he does not leave room for assessing the methodologies themselves. He is wrong to conclude that post-foundational IR is the solution and all four sorts of standpoints on social knowledge should be accepted as wagers whose pay-off is unknowable.34 The social world is too complex for scholars to have confidence that one method is right, and, for that matter, to have as much confidence in grand, sweeping philosophical claims as in more modest claims. As I have argued:
There is no single, unified IR or social-science field equation into which all must ultimately be made to fit, though there are some specific forms of reasoning that are applicable to all.

32. Daniel Maliniak, Susan Peterson and Michael J. Tierney, TRIP around the World: Teaching, Research, and Policy Views of International Relations Faculty in 20 Countries. Available at: http://irtheoryandpractice.wm.edu/projects/trip/TRIPAroundTheWorld2011.pdf. Constructivism, realism and liberalism were the self-described approaches by 22%, 16% and 15%, respectively. 33. See Chernoff, The Power of International Theory, esp. 25, 21617. Suganamis article also identifies differences in the types of questions IR scholars pose and he argues that this difference is a more significant one dividing groups of IR scholars than Jacksons distinction between Z and Y. 34. Jackson does not discuss the extensive literature on the applicability of the notion of the wager to science and knowledge. It plays a central role in subjectivism in philosophical studies of probability developed by DeFinetti, in Bayesian epistemology generally, in the theory of knowledge developed by Isaac Levi in his classic Gambling with Truth, and subsequent works. Secondly, one might question whether accepting the consequences of a methodological position bears any resemblance to making a wager. For example, since the answer to the question Which is the best starting point? is unknowable for IR theorists, according to Jackson, one might ask whether the presuppositions of the wager analogy apply. While Jackson scrutinizes the presuppositions of various starting points, he offers no analysis of the presuppositions of his own framework. Space limitations prevent a fuller discussion here. See, for example, Bruno DeFinetti, Foresight: Its Logical Laws, its Subjective Sources (translation of the 1937 article in French) in Studies in Subjective Probability, eds H.E. Kyburg and H.E. Smokler (New York: Wiley, 1964); Isaac Levi, Gambling with Truth (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967) and The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980); and H. Leitgeb and R. Pettigrew, An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy, Philosophy of Science 77 (2010): 20135.

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Because the social world is complex and multifaceted, even questions about a possible war between the US and North Korea yields questions that, though related, sometimes require orthogonal and cross-cutting theoretical approaches and methods.35

Jackson acknowledges complexity and supports methodological pluralism, but his argument is based on his assessment of science in IR, and it is not, as stated, persuasive. This argument relies on premises concerning the fact that IR scholarship includes a diverse range of questions posed and concerning the diversity of methods appropriate to answer those questions. These premises are compatible with a wider range of philosophical and methodological doctrines than Jacksons argument for pluralism in The Conduct of Inquiry. Based on the standard developed earlier, this argument would appear to be a stronger one than Jacksons.

Conclusion
The Conduct of Inquiry is an ambitious work that fulfils a number of important functions, particularly in formulating a valuable typology of philosophical starting points for IR discourse and in clarifying some of their presuppositions and implications. This article has argued that Jacksons attempt to advance dialogue and progress in IR through advocacy of methodological pluralism encounters several problems. One is that there are gaps in his argument for pluralism, and another is that Jackson sees the starting points as largely taken on faith, which means there are strict limits on genuine exchanges between the groups. With regard to the argument for pluralism, Jackson argues that definitions of science cannot be imported from the philosophy of science, but he then uses just such a definition to draw a set of boundaries of science. While it is true that the boundaries Jackson draws are wider than most, that feature does not qualify his account as superior. The argument that maximum breadth is imperative relies on the general rejection of philosophical propositions on which there is no consensus, a general claim that is difficult to justify.36 Determining whether or not the Weberian definition is better would require a comparison on a number of dimensions beyond breadth. Jacksons argument for pluralism depends

35. Chernoff, The Power of International Theory, 20. This predictive superiority of multiple and limited theories, as against all-encompassing theories overarching principles, is supported by the empirical tests of Philip Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); he argues that foxes with smaller-scale hypotheses and frequent updates on belief sets predict much better than hedgehogs who emphasise grand generalisations. 36. The requirement that consensus or certainty is needed for an author to make use of a published conclusion in her own argument is misplaced and inconsistent with all existing social science scholarship. For example, while authors seek the most reliable data available, there is no requirement of infallibility of the data in order for authors to use them to support their arguments. The author citing the work then must acknowledge that any errors in the cited work will weaken her conclusions. But the work may still be cited, despite its status as fallible and lacking consensus. Similarly, consensus is not required in order for an IR author to make use of a previously published work. As this forum suggests, there may be no consensus on Jacksons typology or conclusions, but that should not prohibit others from citing them approvingly; they must, as noted, acknowledge that any argument that relies on them is thus vulnerable if flaws are found in Jacksons.

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on highly contestable premises to justify all of the essential inferences. Based on the standard of strength of arguments developed in the second section, Jacksons argument for pluralism appears not to be as strong as that sketched in the fourth section. With regard to the level of dialogue that remains possible, Jackson argues the four standpoints are distinct, separate and irreconcilable, and that standards of argument for IR can only be internal to each approach. While he offers an encouraging prescription for civil discourse among adherents of the standpoints, he underplays the possibility of dialogue that could lead to progress stating: (1) that all of the methodological approaches are equally scientific; (2) that the standards of proof are strictly internal to each standpoint; and (3) that there is no rational way to choose among standpoints, especially given that arguments in the philosophy of science are not helpful all that scholars can do is to make explicit their starting points. While I agree with Jacksons conclusion about pluralism, the way he reaches it has gaps and it limits scientific-style progress in IR. Jackson tries to finesse the divide that has been created among adherents of the different standpoints by invoking Kuhns later view of scientific language. Here, Jackson again relies on a philosopher of science to solve a problem, using a doctrine upon which there is no consensus. One might reply that Kuhns view is only an argument about language. But of course most of 20th-century Western philosophy is centred on the role of language for approaching all philosophical issues. Even staunch empiricist philosophers of science, who are treated harshly by so many commentators, view any scientific theory as itself a language. Jackson moves on to argue for civility and open-mindedness. But those are matters of the tone of the debate; neither resolves, or even suspends, the fundamental disputes that must be aired for progress to be possible. When there are good philosophical arguments against a foundational position, it should be rejected, or at the very least the starting point should be viewed with great suspicion. But because Jackson admits only internal assessment and discounts philosophical debate about methodologies, he is forced to reject any such grounds for criticising the value of conclusions based on flawed philosophical premises or for extolling the merits of conclusions based on firm ones. As noted earlier, Logical Positivists came to dominate thinking about scientific character and method. Natural and social scientists developed methodologies that drew from the core principles of this school. When fissures were discovered in this foundational doctrine, researchers had good philosophical reason to find alternatives; and those who continued to rely on this doctrine were appropriately subject to criticism. It is hard to see how this process, which my approach regards as essential to progress in a field, can be accommodated when each foundational position for IR theories is immune from criticism from any other group. Philosophical questions are not amenable to simple solutions. They add complexity to the problems of discovering the best empirical and theoretical conclusions in IR. IR conclusions depend, in part, on philosophical principles, just as much as they rely on empirical claims, and IR conclusions will be more persuasive the stronger are the principles on which they rest. The social sciences would welcome the easing of its burden if someone were to find a way to avoid having to deal with them. This temptation has led a number of authors, including Jackson, to try to find a path to do just that. But no proposal of which I am aware is successful at circumnavigating the philosophy of science. The role of philosophy in IR and social science theory is inconvenient but there is no evident way around it.

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Author Biography Fred Chernoff is Harvey Picker Professor of International Relations at Colgate University, Hamilton, NY, USA. He has also taught at Brown, Yale and Wesleyan Universities. He is author of After Bipolarity (University of Michigan Press, 1995), The Power of International Theory (Routledge, 2005) and Theory and Metatheory in International Relations (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), and has contributed to journals of international affairs, such as International Studies Quarterly, Review of International Studies, Journal of Conflict Resolution, and analytic philosophy, such as Mind, Analysis, Philosophical Quarterly.