The Adhytma of akaras Brahmastra-Bhya Abhysa-Bhya akaras introduction to his bhya (commentary) on the Brahma-stras (or the rraka-mms-stras)

has acquired considerable fame in its own right under the name of adhysa-bhya, in which he lays down adhysa (superimposition) as the foundational concept of Advaita philosophy. This adhysa occurs between the viaya (object), which is yumat-pratyaya-gocara (what is encompassed by the notion of you), and the viayin (subject), which is asmat-pratyaya-gocara (what is encompassed by the notion of I). By superimposition is meant the appearance of the bhva (essence) and dharmas (properties) of one thing in another. Specifically, akara is referring to the superimposition between the arra (body) which is the viaya and the rra (self) which is the viayin. The svabhva (inherent being) of the body is to act and of the self is consciousness. However, on account of mutual superimposition between them, it appears as though the body is conscious and the self is an agent. akara argues that such a superimposition of the viaya and viayin upon each other is mithy, an inverted view of reality. We have now become accustomed to approaching the dichotomy between the subject and object as a distinction between a Self and an Other, corresponding to the asmat (I) and the yumat (you) of akara. It is then claimed that the Advaitin unity of being means that it is precisely the appearance of such a difference which is mithy that should be dispelled by the realization of the oneness of subject and object, or the conviction that asmat (I) and yumat (you) are the same. However, the astute reader would have discerned that akaras position as stated above is utterly contradictory to this view. According to him, the problem lies in the quite naturally occurring human error of failing to discriminate between the subject and object when they are in reality completely distinct from each other in terms of their essences and their properties. Consequently, the wise person is one who is able to resolve their misconceived unity and correctly discriminate between them. An investigation of how such a reversal of meaning has come to pass is beyond the scope of this work. What I do seek to accomplish, however, is to find a way back to the correct meaning. First of all, akara claims that it is a well-known fact that the object which encompasses the cognition of you and the subject which encompasses the cognition of I cannot be the same in terms of their essences and their properties. This realization, I propose, is the key to the whole system; what permits Advaita to conceptualize the tman as identical with brahman or vara and the human being as an inherently divine being who is capable of attaining liberation from knowledge alone without dependence on divine grace or mystical vision, because the human being on account of self-consciousness is aware of tman (oneself) as subject and of the antman (non-self) as object. On the basis of such

an awareness, akara argues, it should be self-evident to human beings that the mutual superimposition of the subject and the object must be mithy. Nonetheless, he laments, they do superimpose the essences (tmakats) and properties (dharmas) of the subject and object upon each other. Having done that, by their failure to discriminate between these two, the mithy-jna (contrary knowledge) of the dharma (attribute) and the dharmin (bearer of the attribute), which are absolutely distinct from each other, becomes the cause, having paired together truth and falsehood, of this naturally occurring loka-vyavahra (practical world) characterized by I am this and this is mine. The last sentence is a bit hard to follow because it is a literal translation of the Sanskrit; so it needs a gloss. I think the shift from viaya-viayin (object, subject) to dharma-dharmin (attribute, attribute-bearer) is deliberate. The mithy-jna is of the dharma-dharmin i.e., since we fail to discriminate between the viaya and viayin they appear to us as dharma and dharmin. When the viaya gets superimposed upon the viayin and vice versa, the viaya appears as if it were an attribute of the viayin and the viayin as its bearer. It is like looking at a white crystal through a red filter. The redness appears as a dharma (property) of the crystal and the crystal appears as the dharmin (attribute-bearer) of redness. But this as we know is mithy-jna. Another point to note is the pairing together of truth and falsehood (satynte mithniktya) which has a gerundive relation with (i.e., having done such pairing, there arises) the world of practical relations. It means that the world of experience is not entirely false from which escape is the only solution: there is an element of truth in it but it is in combination with a falsehood and that is why it appears the way it does. With regards to our self-understanding too, it is not absolutely false i.e, our egoity which our self-consciousness reveals to us is not a complete fiction it is a true being but mixed with falsehood. The ego is not a fully corporeal entity distinct from the soul but is in fact the soul upon which corporeality has been superimposed. With regards to the example given above, one could compare the soul to the white crystal and the body as the filter through which it is seen falsely superimposing embodiedness upon it. It is interesting to compare this Advaita conception of a human being as partly real and partly unreal, the real being the tman (self) and the unreal being the body, with the conception of vara in the Gt as consisting of two praktis (natures), the para (higher) one is vara-tmika (the self of vara) and the apara (lower) one is the my which evolves into the world. Needless to add, in the Advaita view, tman and vara are one. Finally, we attend to I am this and this is mine as the fundamental expression of the practical realm. It should be obvious by now that we are not at all concerned with the relation between the Self and the Other. Rather, from akaras point of view, the Self as understood in this relation would be already problematic

constituted as it is by an admixture of truth and falsehood. To attempt to reconcile such a Self with the Other would only end up reinforcing its false understanding of itself. Rather, Advaita attempts to deconstruct this Self and show that it is itself constituted by a self and a non-self and it is these sub-elements of ones identity that akara is referring to when he speaks of the asmat-pratyaya-gocara viayin and the yumat-pratyaya-gocara viaya. It is very tempting for us, when we come across the words subject and object, to understand the former as oneself and the latter as the world around us. But akaras point is that the oneself as we naturally perceive it is itself the outcome of the superimposition between subject and object i.e., the subject and object we are concerned with here are within oneself and our failure to discrimate between them is what produces the oneself. And it is this oneself, which we regard as a unity, that akara has characterized as I am this and this is mine i.e., in each of these statements there are two items here becoming one of which one is true and the other is false. * akara defines adhysa (superimposition) as smti-rpa paratra prva-daavabhsa the perception in the form of a memory of something perceived at a prior time, at some other place. It is interpreted in a variety of ways but there is no variance in the interpretations with regards to the idea that adhysa involves the perception of the properties of one object in another such as a pearl-oyster appearing as silver or the one moon appearing as two. There are several other examples, more famous being the rope appearing as a snake, the stump appearing as a man, the white crystal appearing red through a red filter, and so on. However, all of them deal with objects existing out there which are superimposed upon each other by a knowing subject. These examples are to be used as analogies merely to illustrate the phenomenon of adhysa. akara is well aware of the limitations involved in drawing an equivalence between them and the adhysa between the antman (non-self) and the tman (self). In these examples, both objects belong to the material realm or both are contents of consciousness, whereas in the adhysa under consideration, the antman belongs to the material realm or is a content of consciousness, and the tman belongs to the spiritual realm or is consciousness itself. This issue has been raised in the Gt-bhya as well with regards to the statement:

sarva-jantn hi dehdiu antmasu tmabhva nicita avidykta yath sthau purua-nicaya.

For in case of all living beings, the determination with regards to the antman such as the body and so on, as being the tman is caused by ignorance, just as the determination with regards to a stump as being a man.

Here the antman-tman superimposition is compared to a stump appearing in poor light as a man as a result of which the properties of a man become falsely attributed to the stump. A purva-paka (objection) is cited at this point arguing for what might be called a dnta-drntika doa (fallacy arising from the incompatibility of the analogy and the analogized):

sthu-puruau jeyau eva santau jtr anyonyasmin adhyastau avidyay. dehatmano tu jeya-jtro eva itaretara-adhysa iti na sama dnta.
Both the stump and the man are objects of cognition whom a cognizer superimposes on each other due to ignorance. But in case of the mutual superimposition between the body and tman, one is an object of cognition and the other is a cognizer. Thus, these are not similar cases. In defense, akara first of all argues that avidy.dhysa-mtra hi dntadrntikayo sdharmya vivakitam i.e., the only commonality between the analogy and the analogized that is desired to be asserted is that both are superimpostions caused by ignorance. He also addresses the problem arising from one of the objects being the cognizer but for that we will return to the Brahmastrabhya where the prvapaka raises a similar query: How can there be a superimposition of the object and its properties on the pratyagtman which cannot be an object? Everybody superimposes a different object only upon an object placed in front of them. And you assert that the pratyag-tman cannot be an object such that it can apprehended as you. In other words, viayas can be superimposed upon each other. How can anything be superimposed upon the viayin? In order for that to happen the viayin would have to be a viaya, in which case it cannot be a viayin anymore. But this, of course, touches the very core of Advaita philosophy which provides many examples of superimposition occurring between viayas, the objects of cognition, to illustrate the idea that the viayin, the cognizer who is the subject of cognition, is itself a product of superimposition between what the cognizer truly is and what the cognizer is not. The idea of a pratyag-tman becomes useful in this regard. This word is often translated as the inner self, real self, etc. When the tman is problematized as a product of superimposition between what the tman truly is and what it is not, the pratyag-tman can be used to refer unequivocally to the tman as it truly is, and different from the antman. Of course, this rule, as any other rule, is not universally followed and in most cases the tman is used unproblematically even in Advaita, in which case it is synonymous with the pratyag-tman. In this case, however, I think the word pratyag-tman is used precisely to refer to the unadulterated tman free of any superimposed antman properties. The problematized tman has arisen from the despoilation of the pratyag-tman by the superimposition upon it of the antman

and the prvpaka is objecting to this very idea how can the pratyag-tman become thus sullied when it has been conceptualized it as a non-object? akaras response is two-fold, the first part of which is justly famous:

na tvad-ayam-ekntena-aviaya asmat-pratyaya-viayatvt aporakatvt-ca pratyag-tma-prasiddhe

First of all, the pratyag-tman is not absolutely a non-object because it is wellknown on account of being the object of self-cognition and by virtue of its immediate perceptibility.

na ca ayamasti niyama puro.vasthita eva viaye viaya-antaram-adhyasitavyam-iti. apratyake.pi hyke bl tala-malina-di adhyasyanti. evam-aviruddha pratyagtmanyapi antmdhysa.
Also, it is not a rule that an object can be superimposed only upon another object situated in front of oneself. Children superimpose a base, dirt, etc. on the sky which is not visible. In this way, the superimposition of the antman (non-self) upon the pratyag-tman is also not a contradiction. The core narrative of Advaita is that the subject that we are ordinarily conscious of as self-conscious beings is itself a product of superimposition, constructed from an admixture of truth and falsehood, where the true self is called the pratyag-tman and the false self as the antman. In other words, one could say that the aham/tman is a mithy-viayin (false subject) apparent due to the superimposition between the pratyag-tman which is a sat-viayin (real subject) and the antman which is viaya. akara argues that such superimposition upon the pratyag-tman is possible because although it is not the object of yumat-pratyaya (you cognition) like the pearl-oyster, the white crystal, the snake, the stump, etc. it is the object of asmat-pratyaya (I cognition) and to that extent it can be the target of superimposition. In fact, as the example of the sky shows, any vague object of human consciousness is exposed to this problem. Therefore, there is no difference between the adhysa with regards to viayas out there that is perceived by the knowing subject, and the one occuring in case of the pratyag-tman and antman which produces the knowing subject and is not perceived by it. Such adhysa which causes the properties of one object to be perceived in another and vice versa, is called avidy (ignorance). And contrarily, the understanding of the real nature of things (vastu-svarpa-avadhraa) by discriminative intelligence is called vidy (knowledge). Since it is only on account of ignorance that the properties of objects appear in each other and not due to a real transfer of properties between them, when an object is superimposed upon another it does not come into the slightest contact with either the guas or the doas of the latter.

* The person that emerges from the ignorance which is the superimposition between the tman and antman becomes the basis of vyavahra (practical engagement). There are two kinds of vyavahras: laukika-vyavahra (practical engagement with regards to worldly matters) that proceeds from the pramas and para-laukikavyavahra (practical engagement with regards to other-worldly matters) that proceeds from the stras (pedagogical texts) concerned with vidhi (religious prescriptions), pratiedha (religious proscriptions) and moka (liberation). A person cannot be a pramt (knowing subject) or use the pramas without a false conception of I and mine with regards to the body and organs. Unless the sense organs are appropriated to oneself, the operations such as perception, etc. cannot occur. Unless there is a presiding entity (adhihna) the sense organs will not operate. Unless a body is superimposed upon by a selfhood, it does not act on anything. If these conditions are not satisfied and the tman remains unattached, then it cannot become the pramt (knowing subject). Without being a pramt it cannot operate the pramaas. Therefore the pramas and stras are objects connected with ignorance. The difference between the two kinds of vyavahras, the prama-prameya and stra is that the former is seen even among animals because it is not dependent on any self-understanding while the latter is restricted to humans inasmuch as it is dependent on a particular though false self-understanding. Human beings use the pramas in the same way as do animals. When any sense object such as sound, form, etc. comes into contact with the particular sense organ such as ears, eyes, etc. then if the knowledge derived from the senses is cautionary it turns away from the object or if it is congenial it proceeds towards it. Thus, if cows see a man branding a club they run away thinking he wants to beat me. On the other hand, when they see one with green grass in his hand, the run towards him. Human behaviour is no different. The way even wise humans use pramas is just as spontaneous as the animals and without any prior self-understanding. striya vyavahra (learned engagements), on the other hand, arise from knowledge about the other-worldly connection of the tman. The operation of stra passages such as a brhmaa should perform yaja is based on the particular adhysa (superimposition) of vara, rama, vaya, avasth, etc. upon the tman. Adhysa as explained before is the cognition that something is such and such with regards to something that is not so. One superimposes upon the tman a variety of dharmas such as the follows:

bhya-dharmas (external attributes) such as the sense that one is healthy or unhealthy when ones wife and sons are so, i.e., one thinks that one is so when the wife and sons are so because they are misconceived as the tman deha-dharmas (bodily attributes) such as one I am fat, I am thin, I a fairskinned, I stand, I go, I jump i.e., one thinks that one is so when it is the body that is so since the body is misconceived as the tman indriya-dharmas (attributes of the bodily organs) such as I am dumb, cock eyed, effeminate, deaf, blind i.e., one thinks that one is so when it is the indriyas that are so since the indriyas are misconceived as the tman anta-karaa-dharmas (attributes of the internal organs) such as kma (desires), sakalpa (volition), vicikits, adhyavasya (reflection), etc.

Such aham-pratyayin (self-believing) is superimposed on the pratyag-tman which is described as aea-svapracra-skin the witness of its own self-proliferation without remainder and vice versa the pratyag-tman which is the witness of all is superimposed on the internal organs and so on. In this way, this beginningless, endless, natural superimposition which has the form of a false apprehension that arouses a sense of karttva-bhokttva (doership-enjoyership) is observed among all the people. The study of all the Vedntic texts is undertaken to destroy it, the cause of misfortune and gaining the knowledge of the unity of the self (tma-ekatvavidy). And since this is the essential point of all the Vedntic texts, akaras objective is to show it in the rraka-mims. * Again, this point takes us to the heart of the Advaita view that the ego conceived as material or mental is not absolutely distinct from the soul. The aham/tman is the pratyag-tman perceived differently by ignorance. It was stated earlier that the tman as viayin cannot be the viaya but upon it are superimposed the properties of the viaya. But now it is being stated that the tman is not entirely an aviaya i.e., some degree of, or rather some quality of, viayatva is inherent within it. This viayatva of consciousness is distinct from the viayatva of the contents of consciousness inasmuch as the former is aparoka i.e., it is unmediated through any pramas because consciouness by virtue of its own being simply reveals itself as such. This immediacy makes it a different kind of viaya then the contents of consciousness. This ambiguity with regards to the tman that it is the viayin who cannot be a viaya and yet it is a viaya of some kind goes all the way back to the Upaniads. I dont think this ambiguity can be ultimately resolved and, indeed, I dont think it needs a resolution because it is a theological assumption that Advaita expounds as a path to liberation. And that principle asserts the meaningfulness of ordinary self-consciousness in that even if it provides us a distorted picture of our own reality it nonetheless opens a passage to it which can be navigated by means of knowledge alone. On other paths of liberation such as bhakti or yoga, it is necessary

to completely delink the aham/tman from the pratyag-tman in order to open a gulf that can be overcome only through some action such as a devotional surrender to God or profound meditation. But it is the reverse in Advaita where for knowledge to serve as the only way to liberation, reality becomes obscured only virtually by ignorance and not on account of a fall that would require personal effort or divine grace to compensate for it. Argumentatively, akaras position is weak, of course, for he has merely explained but not proved that it is the pratyag-tman that becomes objectified in the process of self-cognition. Yet, nobody can argumentatively defend any contrary position either. The self that we are so intimately familiar with as self-conscious beings is paradoxically the one thing about which neither do we know anything definitely nor do we know how we could go about knowing it. Unable to arrive at any conclusion using the pramas, we are left with no choice but to pick a narrative and run with it. Yet the inability of the pramas to grasp the self, ironically works in favour of the Advaita. Why do the pramas fail? Simply because, it is only after the self has been constructed as a pramt (knower) that it can make use of them. Therefore, it is impossible for the pramt to turn the pramas against itself and discover its own reality prior to the pramttva (knowership) and how it was acquired.

akara begins his commentary on the Brahmastras with the commonsensical view that the realm of You-cognition (yumat-pratyaya-gocara) which is the object (viaya), and the realm of I-cognition (asmat-pratyaya-gocara) which is the subject (viayin), whose svabhvas (essences) are as mutually contradictory as light and darkness, cannot possess each others essences. And there also does not exist the slightest possibility that they possess each others properties (dharmas). Therefore, the superimposition (adhysa) of the object (viaya), which is the realm of You-cognition, and its properties (dharmas), on the subject (viayin), which is the realm of I-cognition and whose nature is consciousness, and conversely the superimposition of the subject and its properties on the object, must be mithy (inversion).

TOPIC Brahman is stra-pramakam i.e., brahman has the stra as its prama i.e., the stras are the valid source of knowledge about brahman.

Here, stra means the Vednta-stra. Not only are we dependent on it for knowledge about brahman but the various texts that comprise the Vednta-stra also become coherent (samanvita or samanugata) inasmuch as they are concerned with teaching the svarpa (reality) of Brahman. With regards to the stra passages concerned with teaching brahman, akara cautions us against the following misconceptions: (i) Their primary aim is to teach the svarpa (reality) of the agent or deity in the context of a ritual. No because passages such as tat kena kam payet (by what would one see what) deny kriy (action), kraka (instrument) and phala (result). (ii) The stra is not a necessary source of brahman-knowledge. Since the reality of Brahman is an existing thing (parinihita-vastu) it is knowable by means of other pramas such as perception. No because the identity of brahman and tman (brahma-tma-bhva) cannot be understood except from stra passages such as tat tvam asi (you are that). (iii) As far as the stras reveal brahman as a heya-updeya-rahita or heya-updeyaunya or aheya-anupdeya thing, their instruction is useless; heya-rahita, heyaunya or aheya means what cannot be rejected or avoided; updeya-rahita, updeya-unya or anupdeya means what cannot be taken up or received. The opposite is true about vidhis (procedural norms) one may choose to undertake or neglect them depending on our need. If knowledge of brahman provides this kind of information that can help one attain a particular goal, then it is useful. If it is merely knowledge for its own sake as a fact of the world, then it is fruitless. No because there is a purua-artha (human or spiritual goal) that is accomplished only from the heya-updeya-unya knowledge of the identity of brahman and tman. That puruartha consists of the destruction of all afflictions (sarva-klea-praha). (iv) Deities have their own statements extolling them for the purpose of upsan (paying homage). It would be contradictory to construe statements concerning brahman in a different way. No a supplementary process of paying homage (upsan-vidhi-eatvam) to brahman is not possible given its ekatva (identity or unity with tman). Two conditions are necessary for upsan: (a) Opportunity to exercise a choice. For example, consider an injunction Adore the eye as the sun. Here the deity, i.e., the eye, is not the sun according to any prama. But I exercise a choice by following this injunction and adoring it as such. I may choose not to do so or I may adore the eye as something else. On the other hand, the knowledge of brahman, as explained above, is heya-updeya-unya. (b) Consciousness of duality (dvaita-vijna). Differences such as kriy (action), kraka (instrument), etc. are sublated by the knowledge of brahman. Once the consciousness of duality is sublated by the realization of the ekatva (unity) of brahman, it does not arise again.

For these reasons, an upsan of brahman as a supplementary process is not possible. (v) The Vedas are seen as a prama (valid source of knowledge) only in the context of vidhi (ritual). No since the stras lead upto the realization of selfknowledge (tma-vijna) one cannot deny their prmya (validity) in this context. (vi) The prmya of the stras can be shown through inference. (The implication appears to be that self-knowledge can also be realized outside the stras whereby their truth claims can be verified, the point being, of course, that one need not be dependent upon them for self-knowledge). No the stras are not dependent on any proof (nidarana) external to itself. In this way, it is established that brahman has the stra as the prama. TOPIC We agree that brahman is stra-pramakam i.e., stras are the valid source of knowledge about brahman. However, brahman is knowable from the stras as an object acquired through a vidhi (pratipatti-vidhi-viaya). This is because the main purpose of the stras is prescription (pravtti) and proscription (nivtti). Statements that are neither prescriptive nor proscriptive should be interpreted as being supplementary to those which are. [Note that vidhi (commandment), pravtti (prescription) and nivtti (proscription) work differently in this case from the Abrahamic religion. They are not sanctioned as part of Gods will to be enacted as part of Gods plan for the person, etc. Rather, they are to be performed for the sake of attaining a persons own goals. These could be worldly or other-worldly. As far as the former are concerned, a variety of pramas are available to the person, while in the case of the latter, rti is the only prama. In the Gt, of course, acting for the sake of vara becomes an important feature but even here vara is not the source of those actions. In all cases, the origin of action lies in human volition and therefore knowledge is meanginful only as far as it is suitable for attaining a desirable goal which means that its vital characteristic must be its ability to be accepted or rejected by one i.e., it should be heya-updeya, depending on whether one desires the stated goal. For example, a knowledge claim like the performance of agnihotra leads one to heaven after death is meaningful inasmuch as it produces such an outcome and it may be accepted by those who desire heaven after death and rejected by those who dont. On the other hand, knowledge for the sake of knowledge, as an end in itself, for the mere joy of learning without aiming to accomplish any ulterior purpose, would be regarded as useless, which explains the lack of development of philosophy in ancient India. Even akara who defends the value of vastu-mtra-kathana (the articulation of the mere fact of a thing without making it supplementary to an action) does not object to this utterly practical approach to knowledge but rather makes his case by proving the usefulness of brahma-jna in overcoming bhti (fear) in the world.]

Two points follow: [1] Just as the agnihotra is sanctioned as the means for the attainment of heaven after death, so brahma-jna is recommended for the attainment of amtatva (immortality) i.e., moka (liberation) which is escape from the cycle of birth and death. [2] The articulation of the mere fact of a thing (vastumtra-kathana) without connecting it with any vidhi (process) to be accomplished is meaningless for such knowledge, similar to statements like the earth has seven isles or there goes the king can neither be accepted nor rejected. We argue and counter-argue against these two points: Argument against [1] The inquiry of dharma is contradictory to the inquiry of brahman. Since dharma is bhavya (a thing to be accomplished) it does not yield its fruit through mere knowledge it also requires enactment. But brahman is bhta (an accomplished thing) and therefore the mere knowledge of it is sufficient to yield its fruit. Counter-argument Brahman is set forth as a thing to be accomplished in statements such as the tman ought to be seen, ought to be investigated, ought to be adored, etc. which raises questions about brahman, in regards to which the knowledge is provided that it is eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, etc. And moka (liberation), the stra-da ada phala (the unseen fruit seen by the stras), is realized by its upsan (adoration). Argument against [2] The factual knowledge of a thing such as this is a rope, this is not a snake is meaningful as far as it removes the fear arising from the misapprehension of a rope as a snake. In the same way the factual knowledge about the tman as asasr is meaningful as far as it removes the misapprehension of its sasritva. Counter-argument This would be a valid point if, indeed, the mere hearing of its reality (svarpa) as brahman would remove the misapprehension of its sasritva. But that does not happen. Even one who has heard of brahman is seen as being possessed of the characteristics of a sasr such as happiness and sorrow. Also, statements such as it ought to be heard, it ought to be reflected, it ought to be meditated imply that hearing should be followed by reflection and meditation. Thus it is established brahman is stra-pramakam (has the stras as its valid source of knowledge) only as a pratipatti-vidhi-viaya (the object of process leading to an acquisition).

The difference between karma-phala and brahma-vidy-phala.

aarra arreu anavastheu avasthitam. mahnta vibhum-tmna matv dhro na ocati. Having conceived the mahat (great) and vibhu (all-pervading) tman as aarra (bodiless) among arras (bodies) and as avasthita (steadfast) among the anavasthita (unsteady), the wise do not grieve. Karma-phalas (results of action) is anitya (impermanent) and tratamya-avasthita (occurs in a graded position). ruti passages show that the result of tma-jna (self-knowledge) is merely the nivtti (cessation) of moka-pratibandhas (hindrances to liberation). Topic: Moka is not saskrya and hence not dependent on vypra. Saskra involves a gua-dhna of the saskrya or its doa-apanayana. First of all, guadhna is not possible because the svarpa of moka is the andheya and atiaya Brahman. Neither is doa-apanayana because the svarpa of moka is the nitya and uddha Brahman. Objection: Although moka is a svtma-dharma it is trobhta. When the tman is saskriyama by kriy, moka becomes manifest (abhivyakta) just as the dharma which is bhsvaratva (resplendence) becomes manifest when the dara is saskriyama by nigharaa-kriy. Reply: No. Because the tman cannot be dependent on action. yadray kriy tam avikurvat na eva tmnam labhate. yadi tm sva-raya-kriyay vi

Topic: We agree that moka cannot be attained by kriy (action) but only through jna (knowledge). But is not jna a mnas kriy (mental action)? A kriy is an impulsion that is independent of the real essence of the object (vastusvarpa-nirapeka) and dependent on the functioning of the persons mind (puruacitta-vypra-dhna). A mnas kriy is articulated in the form of manas dhyyet (reflect upon by the mind) with regards to some object. For example, devatm manas dhyyet (reflect upon the deity by the mind). In this case, the person may choose to reflect upon the deity or not, or choose to reflect upon something else. Thus, mnas kriys such as dhyna, cintana, etc. are dependent upon the person and independent of the object. On the other hand, jna is the result of a prama

and prama is yath-bhta-vastu-viayam, it attempts to reveal the object as it truly exists. Therefore, jna is not a matter of choice one cannot choose to know or not know an object for what it is or choose to know it as something else. It is not codan-tantra (dependent on an impulsion) or purua-tantra (dependent on the person). It is only vastu-tantra (dependent on the object) and not on anything else. Therefore, although jna is also mental it is different from mental actions such as meditation (dhyna or cintana). For example, consider the Vedntic statements O Gautama, a man verily is fire and O Gautama, a woman verily is fire that are normative in nature. The mental reflection on the man and the woman as fire is an action because it is dependent on the injunction and the person who has chosen to carry it out. But our ordinary understanding of fire as fire is not dependent on an injunction or a person. What then? It is dependent on a thing that is an object of perception (pratyaka-viayavastu-tantra). Therefore, it is knowledge and not a mental action. This holds true with regards to anything that is an object of any prama. This being the case, what has for its object the reality of tman as brahman, is also knowledge independent of any impulsion. Topic: We agree with the difference between jna and mnas kriy. But then why are verbs in the imperative mood used in the scriptures with regards to the object of knowledge that brahman is the reality of tman? Such an object is not prescribable (aniyojya-viaya) and is not a thing that can be accepted or rejected (aheyaanupdeya-vastu-viaya). Therefore, those statements that have a semblance of injunctions (vidhi-cchyni vacanni) such as tm v are draava rotavya become blunted like a sharp razor applied on stones. What is their point? Their purpose is to divert the person away from the objects of natural impulsion. One does not attain the ultimate human goal (tyantika pururtha) in the external realm where one engages with the hope that one gains the desirable and avoids the undesirable. Statements such as tm v are draava divert those who seek the ultimate human goal from the natural domain consisting of the impulses arising from the aggregate of the body and organs and set them on the stream leading to the pratyag-tman. Having motivated them to seek the tman they are taught the truth of the tman by statements such as: idam sarvam yadayamtm, yatra tvasya sarvamtmaivbhttakena kam pasyet ... kena kam vijnyt, vijtram are kena vijnyt, ayam tm brahma. That the tma-jna of Vednta is primarily unprescriptive (akartavya-pradhna) and leaves no choice for acceptance or rejection i.e., it is not dependent on the individual, is precisely how it should be. It is the prized feature of the system that when tman is realized as brahman there is a loss of a sense of obligation (sarva-

kartavyat-hni) and a sense of having accomplished ones obligations (ktaktyat). Thus we have the ruti passage ... Therefore, Brahman is not presented as a supplement to an injunction about obtainment (pratipatti). TOPIC: There is no section of the Vedas that concerns itself only with an object (kevala-vastu-vdi) that is neither an injunction, prescriptive or proscriptive, nor a supplement to one. There is a purua (being) found only in the Upaniads which is asasr, brahmasvarpa, different from the four types of substances viz., those which can be produced, purified, transformed and achieved, situated in its own discourse (svaprakaraa-stha) and is not supplementary to another (ananyaea). One can deny neither the existence nor the accessibility of this being because it has been termed as tman in the passage sa ea neti neti tm and nobody can deny the tman since even if one tried to do so, it would be the tman denying itself. Objection: Since the tman is the object of self-consciousness (aham-pratyayaviaya), it is not rational to say that it is known only from the Upaniads. Reply: The object of self-consciousness (aham-pratyaya-viaya) is the kart (agent). The tman, however, is the sk (witness) of it. It is sarva-bhtastha, sama, eka, kastha-nitya purua (being) that is not found in the vidhi-ka (ritual section of the Vedas) or tarka-samaya (logical discussions) being the tman of all. Since it is the tman of all, it cannot be denied by anyone, it cannot be made supplementary to a vidhi, it cannot be acknowledged or refused. For everything that is vinayat-vikra-jtam TOPIC