( REMONTE VS BONTO ) G.R. No.

L-19900 February 28, 1966

EXPEDITO REMONTE and SECURITY CREDIT and ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, plaintiffsappellants, vs. AQUILINO P. BONTO, City Fiscal of Legaspi City, N.B.I. Agent No. 20, N.B.I. Agent No. 92, N.B.I. Agent No. 104, and N.B.I. Agent No. 112, defendants-appellees. FACTS: Defendant NBI agents entered the premises of plaintiff corporation's branch office and investigated the personnel thereof relative to its business operations, to ascertain whether or not there was a violation of the General Banking Act, Republic Act No. 337. On the same day defendant, Aquilino P. Bonto, City Fiscal of Legaspi City, subpoenaed plaintiff Expedito Remonte, manager of the branch office aforesaid, to appear at his office and to testify in a criminal investigation for violation of said Republic Act No. 337. Remonte and his corporation lodged with the Court of First Instance of Albay the complaint herein for injunction, to restrain defendants "from further proceeding with their investigation and examination of plaintiffs' business operations relative to the application of the provisions of the General Banking Act". They prayed that a ceaseand-desist order issue ex-parte, and that after trial the injunction be made permanent and upon the averment that the NBI agents conducted their investigation in an unauthorized, illegal and capricious manner. Defendant NBI agents filed their opposition to the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction. They assert their legal right to investigate. Their stand is that injunction may not issue to restrain public officers from performing acts required of them by law. Defendant City Fiscal moved to dismiss the complaint. Ground: Lack of cause of action.Plaintiffs appealed from the order. Appellants challenge the legality of the order. Their battle-cry is that they were denied their day in court. Here are the facts: The Fiscal's motion to dismiss filed on February 3 was set for hearing on February 8. But plaintiffs received copy of that motion only on February 10. They were thus unable to register their opposition until February 12. ISSUE: Whether or not the order dismissing plaintiffs complaint for injunction is valid. HELD: Yes. The purpose of the law in requiring a three-day notice of hearing of a motion, to wit: "to avoid surprise upon the opposite party and to give to the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion has been sufficiently complied with. For, plaintiffs have had the chance to present and in fact virtually did present their objection to the motion to dismiss. Hearing on the motion to dismiss has thus become a superfluity, a surplusage. The ends of justice have been subserved. And the court's failure to note that, on the date of hearing of said motion plaintiffs had no notice thereof, descends to the level of error without prejudice and may well be overlooked. And if the court were wrong in not having given plaintiffs opportunity to orally argue against the motion, they could have availed of a remedy: move for the reconsideration of the order. But they did not. This harmless error which does not affect the jurisdiction of the court may not be raised for the first time on appeal. The injunction suit seeks to restrain defendants from further proceeding with their investigation and examination of plaintiffs' business operations relative to the application of the

provisions of said Republic Act No. 337. But the injunction here involved necessarily operates upon unperformed and unexecuted acts. The acts complained of have already been consummated. They cannot be undone. Status quo ante cannot be restored. Injunction may no longer be availed of. More, the criminal case filed by defendant Fiscal had already been dismissed. The case thus becomes moot and academic. It is not the function of this Court to furnish an answer to a purposeless question that no longer exists. ( ROMULO VS YNIGUEZ ) G.R. No. 71908 February 4, 1986 ALBERTO G. ROMULO, JOSE B. LAUREL, MARCELO B. FERNAN, CECILIA MUOZ PALMA, EDMUNDO B. CEA, ANTONIO CUENCO, HOMOBONO ADAZA, CIRIACO ALFELOR, ROLANDO ANDAYA, HONORATO AQUINO, JOSE ATIENZA, JR., NATALIO BELTRAN, JR., CESAR V. BOLANOS, DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, FERRER MIN A. CARAM, NENITA C. DALUZ, ARTHUR D. DEFENSOR, EMILIO N. DELA PAZ, HILARIO DE PEDRO, DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, MANUEL C. DOMINGO, CARLOS C. FERNANDEZ, JOLLY T. FERNANDEZ, JAIME N. FERRER, WILSON P. GAMBOA, ROGELIO GARCIA, ROLLEO L. IGNACIO, EVA ESTRADA KALAW, RAFAEL L. LAZATIN, EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA, JR., ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, BIENVENIDO MARQUEZ, ANTONIO C. MARTINEZ, ORLANDO S. MERCADO, ROGACIANO M. MERCADO, RAMON V. MITRA, JR., JUANITA L. NEPOMUCENO, ROY B. PADILLA, HERNANDO B. PEREZ, GONZALO G. PUYAT, II, HIALMAR P. QUINTANA, ISIDRO E. REAL, JR., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, VIRGILIO P. ROBLES, AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, OSCAR F. SANTOS, FRANCISCO S. SUMULONG, EMIGDIO S. TANJUATCO, LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and VICTOR ZIGA, petitioners, vs. HON. NICANOR E. YIGUEZ, MANUEL M. GARCIA, GUARDSON R. LOOD, RENATO L. CAYETANO, ANTONIO M. DIAZ, DAMIAN V. ALDABA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, ADELINO B. SITOY, LEONARDO PEREZ, ALEJANDRO ALMENDRAS, SALACNIB F. BATERINA, LUIS S. ETCUBAEZ, CONCORDIO C. DIEL, REGALADO E. MAAMBONG, TEODULO C. NATIVIDAD, MACACUNA DIMAPORO, SALVADOR B. BRITANICO and COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOOD GOVERNMENT, respondents. FACTS: Petitioners, representing more than one-fifth of all members of the Batasan in 1985, filed with the Batasan Resolution No. 644 and complaint calling for the impeachment of President Marcos. Said resolution and complaint were referred by the Speaker to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government. The Committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further consideration and disapproved and dismissed all the charges contained in the complaint attached. It then submitted its report which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the archives. On August 14, 1985, MP Ramon V. Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying for the recall from the archives of Resolution No. 644 and the verified complaint attached thereto. Said motion was disapproved by the Batasan. Hence, this petition for prohibition to restrain respondents from enforcing Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Batasan Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings and mandamus to compel the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall from the archives and report out the resolution together with the verified complaint for the impeachment of the President of the Philippines.Petitioner contend that said provisions are unconstitutional because they amend Sec. 3 of Article XI I of the 1973 Constitution, without complying with the mandatory amendatory process provided for under Article XVI of the

Constitution, by empowering a smaller body to supplant and overrule the complaint to impeach endorsed by the requisite 1/5 of all the members of the Batasan Pambansa and that said questioned provisions derail the impeachment proceedings at various stages by vesting the Committee on Justice, etc. the power to impeach or not to impeach, when such prerogative belongs solely to Batasan Pambansa as a collegiate body. ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of mandamus should be granted.

HELD: No. A dismissal by the Batasan itself as a body of the resolution and complaint for impeachment (which is what the denial by the Batasan of MP Mitra's motion to recall from the Archives said resolution and complaint for impeachment is tantamount to) makes irrelevant under what authority the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government had acted. The dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of powers that have been vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the power of this Court to review. This Court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial prayed for by petitioners. The fact that petitioners are asking that it is the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, not the Batasan itself, which shall be commanded by this Court to recall from the Archives and report out the resolution and complaint for impeachment is of no moment. Aside from the fact that said Committee cannot recall from the Archives said resolution and complaint for impeachment without revoking or rescinding the action of the Batasan denying MP Mitra's motion for recall (which of course it had no authority to do and, therefore, said Committee is in no position to comply with any murder from this Court for said recall) such an order addressed to the Committee would actually be a direct order to the Batasan itself. Such in effect was the ruling in Alejandrino vs. Quezon 46 Phil. 83, where this Court said: It is intimated rather faintly that, conceding all that is said with reference to the right of the Supreme Court to issue mandamus directed to the Philippine Senate, yet we would be justified in having our mandate run not against the Philippine Senate or against the President of the Philippine Senate and his fellow Senators but against the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, the disbursing officer of the Senate. But this begs the question. If we have no authority to control the Philippine Senate, we have no authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the Senate. The secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing officer of the Senate are mere agents of the Senate who cannot act independently of the will of that body. Should the Court do as requested, we might have the spectacle presented of the court ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the Philippine Senate ordering them to do another thing. The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the person to whom it is directed has the absolute power to execute it