Introduction:

What is SCADA? When it comes to speak about technology, you will see the impact of technology in every field .There was a time where there was no machines, slowly this machines were part of our life, then there was a need to manage this machines .To manage this machines we man were required .Slowly man felt the load in their mindset to manage these task, a system was to be created. A need to create system that can control the machine own its own was needed.
Now the next big question was how can a machine be controlled automatically this was the question in mind of normal people .One of the best solution was to use the computer, as computer can automatically perform the task was instructed on how to perform task. Its simple rule applied to computer was like Tell me once and see my work . Thus a industrial control system was developed. The name during the development given was Scada.

SCADA stands for Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition. As the name indicates, it is not a full control system, but rather focuses on the supervisory level. It is a software package that is positioned on top of hardware to which it is interfaced, in general via Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), or other commercial hardware modules. Systems similar to SCADA systems are routinely seen in factories, treatment plants etc. These are often referred to as Distributed Control Systems (DCS). They have similar functions to SCADA systems, but the field data gathering or control units are usually located within a more confined area. Communications may be via a local area network (LAN), and will normally be reliable and high speed. Basically, SCADA is a computer system for gathering and analyzing real time data.
Scada is a type of industrial control system (ICS). Industrial control systems are computer controlled systems that monitor and control industrial processes that exist in the physical world. SCADA systems historically distinguish themselves from other ICS systems by being large scale processes that can [1] include multiple sites, and large distances. These processes include industrial, infrastructure, and facility-based processes, as described below: Industrial processes include those of manufacturing, production, power generation, fabrication, and refining, and may run in continuous, batch, repetitive, or discrete modes.

Infrastructure processes may be public or private, and include water treatment and distribution, wastewater collection and treatment, oil and gas pipelines, electrical power transmission and distribution, wind farms, civil defence siren systems, and large communication systems. Facility processes occur both in public facilities and private ones, including buildings, airports, ships, and space stations. They monitor and control heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems (HVAC), access, and energy consumption.

What is data acquisition? Data acquisition is the process of retrieving control information from the equipment which is out of order or may lead to some problem or when decisions are need to be taken according to the situation in the equipment. So this acquisition is done by continuous monitoring of the equipment to which it is employed. The data accessed are then forwarded onto a telemetry system ready for transfer to the different sites. They can be analog and digital information gathered by sensors, such as flow meter, ammeter, etc. It can also be data to control equipment such as actuators, relays, valves, motors, etc. So why or where would you use SCADA? SCADA can be used to monitor and control plant or equipment. The control may be automatic, or initiated by operator commands. The data acquisition is accomplished firstly by the RTU's (remote Terminal Units) scanning the field inputs connected to the RTU ( RTU's may also be called a PLC - programmable logic controller). This is usually at a fast rate. The central host will scan the RTU's (usually at a slower rate.) The data is processed to detect alarm conditions, and if an alarm is present, it will be displayed on special alarm lists. Data can be of three main types. Analogue data (i.e. real numbers) will be trended (i.e. placed in graphs). Digital data (on/off) may have alarms attached to one state or the other. Pulse data (e.g. counting revolutions of a meter) is normally accumulated or counted. These systems are used not only in industrial processes. For example, Manufacturing, steel making, power generation both in conventional, nuclear and its distribution, chemistry, but also in some experimental facilities such as laboratories research, testing and evaluation centers, nuclear fusion. The size of such plants can range from as few as 10 to several 10 thousands input/output (I/O) channels. However, SCADA systems evolve rapidly and are now penetrating the market of plants with a number of I/O channels of several 100K.

The primary interface to the operator is a graphical display (mimic) usually via a PC Screen which shows a representation of the plant or equipment in graphical form. Live data is shown as graphical shapes (foreground) over a static background. As the data changes in the field, the foreground is updated. E.g. a valve may be shown as open or closed. Analog data can be shown either as a number, or graphically. The system may have many such displays, and the operator can select from the relevant ones at any time. SCADA systems were first used in the 1960s.SCADA systems have made substantial progress over the recent years in terms of functionality, scalability, performance and openness such that they are an alternative to in house development even for very demanding and complex control systems as those of physics experiments. SCADA systems used to run on DOS, VMS and UNIX; in recent years all SCADA vendors have moved to NT and some also to Linux.

HISTORY
SCADA systems have evolved through four generations as follows: First generation: "Monolithic" In the first generation, computing was done by mainframe computers. Networks did not exist at the time SCADA was developed. Thus SCADA systems were independent systems with no connectivity to other systems. Wide Area Networks were later designed by RTU vendors to communicate with the RTU. The communication protocols used were often proprietary at that time. The first-generation SCADA system was redundant since a back-up mainframe system was connected at the bus level and was used in the event of failure of the primary mainframe system. Some first generation SCADA systems were developed as "turnkey" operations that ran on minicomputers like the PDP-11 series made by the Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC). These systems were read only in the sense that they could display information from the existing analogy based control systems to individual operator workstations but they usually didn't attempt to send control signals to remote stations due to analogy based telemetry issues and control centre management concerns with allowing direct control from computer workstations. They would also perform alarming and logging functions and calculate hourly and daily system commodity accounting functions. Second generation: "Distributed" The processing was distributed across multiple stations which were connected through a LAN and they shared information in real time. Each station was responsible for a particular task thus making the size and cost of each station less than the one used in First Generation. The network protocols used were still mostly proprietary, which led to significant security problems for any SCADA system that received attention from a hacker. Since the protocols were proprietary, very few people beyond the developers and hackers knew enough to determine how secure a SCADA installation was. Since both parties had vested interests in keeping security issues quiet, the security of a SCADA installation was often badly overestimated, if it was considered at all. Third generation: "Networked" Due to the usage of standard protocols and the fact that many networked SCADA systems are accessible from the Internet, the systems are potentially vulnerable to remote attack. On the other hand, the usage of standard protocols and security techniques means that standard security improvements are applicable to the SCADA systems, assuming they receive timely maintenance and updates. Fourth generation: "Internet of Things"

With the commercial availability of cloud computing, SCADA systems have increasingly adopted Internet of Things technology to significantly reduce infrastructure costs and increase ease of maintenance and integration. As a result SCADA systems can now report state in near real-time and use the horizontal scale available in cloud environments to implement more complex control algorithms than are practically feasible to implement on traditional programmable logic controllers. Further, the use of open network protocols such as TLS inherent in Internet of Things technology provides a more readily comprehendible and manageable security boundary than the heterogeneous mix of proprietary network protocols typical of many decentralized SCADA implementations.

CONCEPTS OF SCADA
The term SCADA usually refers to centralized systems which monitor and control entire sites, or complexes of systems spread out over large areas (anything from an industrial plant to a nation). Most control actions are performed automatically by RTUs or by PLCs. Host control functions are usually restricted to basic overriding or supervisory level intervention. For example, a PLC may control the flow of cooling water through part of an industrial process, but the SCADA system may allow operators to change the set points for the flow, and enable alarm conditions, such as loss of flow and high temperature, to be displayed and recorded. The feedback control loop passes through the RTU or PLC, while the SCADA system monitors the overall performance of the loop.

SCADA's schematic overview

Data acquisition begins at the RTU or PLC level and includes meter readings and equipment status reports that are communicated to SCADA as required. Data is then compiled and formatted in such a way that a control room operator using the HMI can make supervisory decisions to adjust or override normal RTU (PLC) controls. Data may also be fed to an Historian, often built on a commodityDatabase Management System, to allow trending and other analytical auditing. SCADA systems typically implement a distributed database, commonly referred to as a tag database, which contains data elements called tags or points. A point represents a single input or output value monitored or controlled by the system. Points can be either "hard" or "soft". A hard point represents an actual input or output within the system, while a soft point results from logic and math operations applied to other points. (Most implementations conceptually remove the distinction by making every property a "soft" point expression, which may, in the simplest case, equal a single hard point.) Points are normally stored as value-timestamp pairs: a value, and the timestamp when it was recorded or calculated. A series of value-timestamp pairs gives the history of that point. It is also common to store additional metadata

with tags, such as the path to a field device or PLC register, design time comments, and alarm information. SCADA systems are significantly important systems used in national infrastructures such as electric grids, water supplies and pipelines. However, SCADA systems may have security vulnerabilities, so the systems should be evaluated to identify risks and solutions implemented to mitigate those risks.

Architecture:
In this section we are going to details which describe the common architecture required for the SCADA products. Hardware Architecture The basic hardware of the SCADA system is distinguished into two basic layers: the "client layer" which caters for the man machine interaction and the "data server layer" which handles most of the process data control activities. The data servers communicate with devices in the field through process controllers. Process controllers, e.g. PLCs, are connected to the data servers either directly or via networks or fieldbuses that are proprietary (e.g. Siemens H1), or nonproprietary (e.g. Profibus). Data servers are connected to each other and to client stations via an Ethernet LAN. Fig.1. shows typical hardware architecture.

Figure 1: Typical Hardware Architecture

SCADA Systems Software

The typical components of a SCADA system, with emphasis on the SCADA software are indicated in the Figure 9.3.

Figure 9.3
Components of a SCADA System

Typical key features expected of the SCADA software are listed below. These features depend on the hardware to be implemented. 9.2.1. SCADA Key Features User Interface _ Keyboard _ Mouse _ Trackball _ Touch screen Graphics Displays _ Customer-configurable, object orientated and bit mapped _ Unlimited number of pages _ Resolution: up to 1280 x 1024 with millions of colors Alarms _ Client server architecture _ Time stamped alarms to 1 millisecond precision (or better) _ Single network Acknowledgment and control of alarms _ Alarms shared to all clients _ Alarms displayed in chronological order _ Dynamic allocation of alarm pages _ User-defined formats and colors
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_ Up to four adjustable trip points for each analog alarm _ Deviation and rate of change monitoring for analog alarms _ Selective display of alarms by category (256 categories) _ Historical alarm and event logging

_ Context-sensitive help _ On-line alarm disable and threshold modification _ Event-triggered alarms _ Alarm-triggered reports _ Operator comments that can be attached to alarms Trends _ Client server architecture _ True trend printouts (not screen dumps) _ Rubber band trend zooming _ Export data to DBF, CSV files _ X/Y plot capability _ Event based trends _ Pop-up trend display _ Trend gridlines or profiles _ Background trend graphics _ Real-time multi-pen trending _ Short and long term trend display _ Length of data storage and frequency of monitoring that can be specified on a per-point basis _ Archiving of historical trend data _ On-line change of time-base without loss of data _ On-line retrieval of archived historical trend data _ Exact value and time that can be displayed _ Trend data that can be graphically represented in real time RTU (and PLC) Interface _ All compatible protocols included as standard _ DDE drivers supported _ Interface also possible for RTUs, loop controllers, bar code readers and other equipment _ Driver toolkit available _ Operates on a demand basis instead of the conventional predefined scan method _ Optimization of block data requests to PLCs _ Rationalization of network user data requests _ Maximization of PLC highway bandwidth Scalability Additional hardware can be added without replacing or modifying existing equipment. This is limited only by the PLC architecture (typically 300 to 40,000 points)
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Access to Data _ Direct, real-time access to data by any network user _ Third-party access to real-time data, e.g. Lotus 123 and EXCEL _ Network DDE _ DDE compatibility: read, write and exec _ DDE to all IO device points _ Clipboard Database _ ODBC driver support _ Direct SQL commands or high level reporting

Networking _ Supports all NetBIOS compatible networks such as NetWare, LAN Manager, Windows for Workgroups, Windows NT (changed from existing NT) _ Support protocols NetBEUI, IPX/SPX, TCP/IP and more _ Centralized alarm, trend and report processing - data available from anywhere in the network _ Dual networks for full LAN redundancy _ No network configuration required (transparent) _ May be enabled via single check box, no configuration _ LAN licensing based on the number of users logged onto the network, not the number of nodes on the network _ No file server required _ Multi-user system, full communication between operators _ RAS and WAN supported with high performance _ PSTN dial up support Fault Tolerance and Redundancy _ Dual networks for full LAN redundancy _ Redundancy that can be applied to specific hardware _ Supports primary and secondary equipment configurations _ Intelligent redundancy allows secondary equipment to contribute to processing load _ Automatic changeover and recovery _ Redundant writes to PLCs with no configuration _ Mirrored disk I/O devices _ Mirrored alarm servers _ Mirrored trend servers _ File server redundancy _ No configuration required, may be enabled via single check box, no configuration Client/Server Distributed Processing _ Open architecture design _ Real-time multitasking _ Client/server fully supported with no user configuration _ Distributed project updates (changes reflected across network)
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_ Concurrent support of multiple display nodes _ Access any tag from any node _ Access any data (trend, alarm, report) from any node 9.2.2. The SCADA Software Package Whilst performance and efficiency of the SCADA package with the current plant is important, the package should be easily upgradeable to handle future requirement. The system must be easily modifiable to allow for the requirements changing and expanding as the task grows - in other words the system must use a scaleable architecture. There have been two main approaches to follow in designing the SCADA system: _ Centralized, where a single computer or mainframe performs all plant monitoring and all plant data is stored on one database which resides on this computer. _ Distributed, where the SCADA system is shared across several small

computers (usually PCs). An effective solution is to examine the type of data required for each task and then to structure the system appropriately. A client server approach also makes for a more effective system. There are typically five tasks in any SCADA system. Each of these tasks performs its own separate processing. _ Input/Output Task. This program is the interface between the control and monitoring system and the plant floor. _ Alarm Task. This manages all alarms by detecting digital alarm points and comparing the values of analog alarm points to alarm thresholds. _ Trends Task. The trends task collects data to be monitored over time. _ Reports Task. Reports are produced from plant data. These reports can be periodic, event triggered or activated by the operator. _ Display Task. This manages all data to be monitored by the operator and all control actions requested by the operator. 9.2.3. System Response Times These should be carefully specified for the following events. Typical speeds which are considered acceptable are: _ Display of analogue or digital value (acquired from RTU) on the Master Station Operator Display (1 to 2 seconds maximum) _ Control request from operator to RTU (1 second critical; 3 seconds non- critical) _ Acknowledge of alarm on operator screen (1 second) _ Display of entire new display on operator screen ( 1 second) _ Retrieval of historical trend and display on operator screen (2 seconds) _ Sequence of events logging (at RTU) of critical events (1 millisecond)
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It is important that the response is consistent over all activities of the SCADA system. 9.2.4. Specialized SCADA Protocols A Protocol controls the message format common to all devices on a network. Common protocols used in radio communications and telemetry systems include the HDLC, MPT1317 and Modbus protocols. The CSMA/CD protocol format is also used.

Functionality:
Access Control

Users are allocated to groups, which have defined read/write access privileges to the process parameters in the system and often also to specific product functionality. MMI The products support multiple screens, which can contain combinations of synoptic diagrams and text. They also support the concept of a "generic" graphical object with links to process variables. These objects can be "dragged and dropped" from a library and included into a synoptic diagram. Most of the SCADA products that were evaluated decompose the process in "atomic" parameters (e.g. a power supply current, its maximum value, its on/off status, etc.) to which a Tag-name is associated. The Tag-names used to link graphical objects to devices can be edited as required. The products include a library of standard graphical symbols, many of which would however not be applicable to the type of applications encountered in the experimental physics community. Standard windows editing facilities are provided: zooming, re-sizing, scrolling... On-line configuration and customization of the MMI is possible for users with the appropriate privileges. Links can be created between display pages to navigate from one view to another. Trending The products all provide trending facilities and one can summarize the common capabilities as follows:

the parameters to be trended in a specific chart can be predefined or defined on-line a chart may contain more than 8 trended parameters or pens and an unlimited number of charts can be displayed (restricted only by the readability) real-time and historical trending are possible, although generally not in the same chart historical trending is possible for any archived parameter zooming and scrolling functions are provided parameter values at the cursor position can be displayed

The trending feature is either provided as a separate module or as a graphical object (ActiveX), which can then be embedded into a synoptic display. XY and other statistical analysis plots are generally not provided. Alarm Handling

Alarm handling is based on limit and status checking and performed in the data servers. More complicated expressions (using arithmetic or logical expressions) can be developed by creating derived parameters on which status or limit checking is then performed. The alarms are logically handled centrally, i.e., the information only exists in one place and all users see the same status (e.g., the acknowledgement), and multiple alarm priority levels (in general many more than 3 such levels) are supported. It is generally possible to group alarms and to handle these as an entity (typically filtering on group or acknowledgement of all alarms in a group). Furthermore, it is possible to suppress alarms either individually or as a complete group. The filtering of alarms seen on the alarm page or when viewing the alarm log is also possible at least on priority, time and group. However, relationships between alarms cannot generally be defined in a straightforward manner. E-mails can be generated or predefined actions automatically executed in response to alarm conditions. Logging/Archiving The terms logging and archiving are often used to describe the same facility. However, logging can be thought of as medium-term storage of data on disk, whereas archiving is long-term storage of data either on disk or on another permanent storage medium. Logging is typically performed on a cyclic basis, i.e., once a certain file size, time period or number of points is reached the data is overwritten. Logging of data can be performed at a set frequency, or only initiated if the value changes or when a specific predefined event occurs. Logged data can be transferred to an archive once the log is full. The logged data is time-stamped and can be filtered when viewed by a user. The logging of user actions is in general performed together with either a user ID or station ID. There is often also a VCR facility to play back archived data. Report Generation One can produce reports using SQL type queries to the archive, RTDB or logs. Although it is sometimes possible to embed EXCEL charts in the report, a "cut and paste" capability is in general not provided. Facilities exist to be able to automatically generate, print and archive reports. Automation

The majority of the products allow actions to be automatically triggered by events. A scripting language provided by the SCADA products allows these actions to be defined. In general, one can load a particular display, send an Email, run a user defined application or script and write to the RTDB. The concept of recipes is supported, whereby a particular system configuration can be saved to a file and then re-loaded at a later date. Sequencing is also supported whereby, as the name indicates, it is possible to execute a more complex sequence of actions on one or more devices. Sequences may also react to external events. Some of the products do support an expert system but none has the concept of a Finite State Machine (FSM).

Evolution:
SCADA vendors release one major version and one to two additional minor versions once per year. These products evolve thus very rapidly so as to take advantage of new market opportunities, to meet new requirements of their customers and to take advantage of new technologies. As was already mentioned, most of the SCADA products that were evaluated decompose the process in "atomic" parameters to which a Tag-name is associated. This is impractical in the case of very large processes when very large sets of Tags need to be configured. As the industrial applications are increasing in size, new SCADA versions are now being designed to handle devices and even entire systems as full entities (classes) that encapsulate all their specific attributes and functionality. In addition, they will also support multi-team development. As far as new technologies are concerned, the SCADA products are now adopting:

Web technology, ActiveX, Java, etc. OPC as a means for communicating internally between the client and server modules. It should thus be possible to connect OPC compliant third party modules to that SCADA product.

Potential benefits of SCADA:

The benefits one can expect from adopting a SCADA system for the control of experimental physics facilities can be summarized as follows:

A rich functionality and extensive development facilities. The amount of effort invested in SCADA product amounts to 50 to 100 p-years! The amount of specific development that needs to be performed by the enduser is limited, especially with suitable engineering. Reliability and robustness. These systems are used for mission critical industrial processes where reliability and performance are paramount. In addition, specific development is performed within a well-established framework that enhances reliability and robustness. Technical support and maintenance by the vendor.

For large collaborations, using a SCADA system for their controls ensures a common framework not only for the development of the specific applications but also for operating the detectors. Operators experience the same "look and feel" whatever part of the experiment they control. However, this aspect also depends to a significant extent on proper engineering. Security issues[edit]
SCADA systems that tie together decentralized facilities such as power, oil, and gas pipelines and water distribution and wastewater collection systems were designed to be open, robust, and easily operated and repaired, but not necessarily secure.[8] The move from proprietary technologies to more standardized and open solutions together with the increased number of connections between SCADA systems, office networks, and the Internet has made them more vulnerable to types of network attacks that are relatively common in computer security. For example, United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) released a vulnerability advisory[9] that allowed unauthenticated users to download sensitive configuration information including password hashes on an Inductive Automation Ignition system utilizing is a standard attack type leveraging access to the Tomcat Embedded Web server. Security researcher Jerry Brown submitted a similar advisory regarding a buffer overflow vulnerability[10] in a Wonderware InBatchClient ActiveX control. Both vendors made updates available prior to public vulnerability release. Mitigation recommendations were standard patching practices and requiring VPN access for secure connectivity. Consequently, the security of some SCADA-based systems has come into question as they are seen as potentially vulnerable to cyber attacks.[11][12][13] In particular, security researchers are concerned about:

the lack of concern about security and authentication in the design, deployment and operation of some existing SCADA networks the belief that SCADA systems have the benefit of security through obscurity through the use of specialized protocols and proprietary interfaces the belief that SCADA networks are secure because they are physically secured the belief that SCADA networks are secure because they are disconnected from the Internet.

SCADA systems are used to control and monitor physical processes, examples of which are transmission of electricity, transportation of gas and oil in pipelines, water distribution, traffic lights, and other systems used as the basis of modern society. The security of these SCADA systems is important because compromise or destruction of these systems would impact multiple areas of society far removed from the original compromise. For example, a blackout caused by a compromised electrical SCADA system would cause financial losses to all the customers that received electricity from that source. How security will affect legacy SCADA and new deployments remains to be seen. There are many threat vectors to a modern SCADA system. One is the threat of unauthorized access to the control software, whether it be human access or changes induced intentionally or accidentally by virus infections and other software threats residing on the control host machine. Another is the threat of packet access to the network segments hosting SCADA devices. In many cases, the control protocol lacks any form of cryptographic security, allowing an attacker to control a SCADA device by sending commands over a network. In many cases SCADA users have assumed that having a VPN offered sufficient protection, unaware that security can be trivially bypassed with physical access to SCADA-related network jacks and switches. Industrial control vendors suggest approaching SCADA security like Information Security with a defense in depth strategy that leverages common IT practices.[14] The reliable function of SCADA systems in our modern infrastructure may be crucial to public health and safety. As such, attacks on these systems may directly or indirectly threaten public health and safety. Such an attack has already occurred, carried out on Maroochy Shire Council's sewage control system in Queensland, Australia.[15] Shortly after a contractor installed a SCADA system in January 2000, system components began to function erratically. Pumps did not run when needed and alarms were not reported. More critically, sewage flooded a nearby park and contaminated an open surface-water drainage ditch and flowed 500 meters to a tidal canal. The SCADA system was directing sewage valves to open when the design protocol should have kept them closed. Initially this was believed to be a system bug. Monitoring of the system logs revealed the malfunctions were the result of cyber attacks. Investigators reported 46 separate instances of malicious outside interference before the culprit was identified. The attacks were made by a disgruntled ex-employee of the company that had installed the SCADA system. The ex-employee was hoping to be hired by the utility full-time to maintain the system. In April 2008, the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack issued a Critical Infrastructures Report which discussed the extreme vulnerability of SCADA systems to an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) event. After testing and analysis, the Commission concluded: "SCADA systems are vulnerable to EMP insult. The large numbers and widespread reliance on such systems by all of the Nations critical infrastructures represent a systemic threat to their continued operation following an EMP event. Additionally, the necessity to reboot, repair, or replace large numbers of geographically widely dispersed systems will considerably impede the Nations recovery from such an assault."[16] Many vendors of SCADA and control products have begun to address the risks posed by unauthorized access by developing lines of specialized industrial firewall and VPN solutions for TCP/IP-based SCADA networks as well as external SCADA monitoring and recording

equipment.[17] The International Society of Automation (ISA) started formalizing SCADA security requirements in 2007 with a working group, WG4. WG4 "deals specifically with unique technical requirements, measurements, and other features required to evaluate and assure security resilience and performance of industrial automation and control systems devices".[18] The increased interest in SCADA vulnerabilities has resulted in vulnerability researchers discovering vulnerabilities in commercial SCADA software and more general offensive SCADA techniques presented to the general security community.[19][20] In electric and gas utility SCADA systems, the vulnerability of the large installed base of wired and wireless serial communications links is addressed in some cases by applying bump-in-the-wire devices that employ authentication and Advanced Encryption Standard encryption rather than replacing all existing nodes.[21] In June 2010, anti-virus security company VirusBlokAda reported the first detection of malware that attacks SCADA systems (Siemens' WinCC/PCS 7 systems) running on Windows operating systems. The malware is called Stuxnet and uses four zero-day attacks to install a rootkit which in turn logs into the SCADA's database and steals design and control files.[22][23] The malware is also capable of changing the control system and hiding those changes. The malware was found on 14 systems, the majority of which were located in Iran.[24]

The advantages of the PLC / DCS SCADA system

The advantages of the PLC / DCS SCADA system are: The computer can record and store a very large amount of data The data can be displayed in any way the user requires Thousands of sensors over a wide area can be connected to the system The operator can incorporate real data simulations into the system Many types of data can be collected from the RTUs The data can be viewed from anywhere, not just on site The disadvantages are: The system is more complicated than the sensor to panel type Different operating skills are required, such as system analysts and programmer With thousands of sensors there is still a lot of wire to deal with The operator can see only as far as the PLC

Considerations and benefits of SCADA system

Typical considerations when putting a SCADA system together are: Overall control requirements Sequence logic Analog loop control Ratio and number of analog to digital points Speed of control and data acquisition Master/operator control stations Type of displays required Historical archiving requirements

 System consideration Reliability/availability Speed of communications/update time/system scan rates System redundancy Expansion capability Application software and modeling Obviously, a SCADA systems initial cost has to be justified. A few typical reasons for implementing a SCADA system are: Improved operation of the plant or process resulting in savings due to optimization of the system Increased productivity of the personnel Improved safety of the system due to better information and improved control Protection of the plant equipment Safeguarding the environment from a failure of the system Improved energy savings due to optimization of the plant Improved and quicker receipt of data so that clients can be invoiced more quickly and accurately Government regulations for safety and metering of gas (for royalties & tax etc)

SCADA key features

SCADA User interface
Keyboard Mouse Trackball Touch screen

SCADA Graphics displays

Customer-configurable, object orientated and bit mapped Unlimited number of pages Resolution: up to 1280 1024 with millions of colors

SCADA Alarms
Client server architecture Time stamped alarms to 1 millisecond precision (or better) Single network acknowledgment and control of alarms Alarms are shared to all clients Alarms displayed in chronological order Dynamic allocation of alarm pages User-defined formats and colors Up to four adjustable trip points for each analog alarm Deviation and rate of change monitoring for analog alarms Selective display of alarms by category (256 categories) Historical alarm and event logging Context-sensitive help On-line alarm disable and threshold modification Event-triggered alarms Alarm-triggered reports Operator comments can be attached to alarms

SCADA Trends
Client server architecture True trend printouts not screen dumps Rubber band trend zooming Export data to DBF, CSV files X/Y plot capability Event based trends Pop-up trend display Trend gridlines or profiles Background trend graphics Real-time multi-pen trending Short and long term trend display Length of data storage and frequency of monitoring can be specified on a per-point basis Archiving of historical trend data On-line change of time-base without loss of data On-line retrieval of archived historical trend data Exact value and time can be displayed Trend data can be graphically represented in real-time

SCADA RTU (and PLC) interface

All compatible protocols included as standard DDE drivers supported Interface also possible for RTUs, loop controllers, bar code readers and other equipment Driver toolkit available Operates on a demand basis instead of the conventional predefined scan method Optimization of block data requests to PLCs Rationalization of network user data requests Maximization of PLC highway bandwidth

SCADA Scalability
Additional hardware can be added without replacing or modifying existing equipment Limited only by the PLC architecture (typically 300 to 40 000 points)

SCADA Access to data

Direct, real-time access to data by any network user Third-party access to real-time data, e.g. Lotus 123 and Excel Network DDE DDE compatibility: read, write and exec DDE to all IO device points Clipboard

SCADA Database
ODBC driver support Direct SQL commands or high level reporting

SCADA Networking
Supports all NetBIOS compatible networks such as NetWare, LAN Manager, Windows for Workgroups, Windows NT (changed from existing) Support protocols NetBEUI, IPX/SPX, TCP/IP and more Centralized alarm, trend and report processing data available from anywhere in the network Dual networks for full LAN redundancy

 No network configuration required (transparent) May be enabled via single check box, no configuration LAN licensing is based on the number of users logged onto the network, not the number of nodes on t he network No file server required Multi-user system, full communication between operators RAS and WAN supported with high performance PSTN dial up support

SCADA Fault tolerance and redundancy

Dual networks for full LAN redundancy Redundancy can be applied to specific hardware Supports primary and secondary equipment configurations Intelligent redundancy allows secondary equipment to contribute to processing load Automatic changeover and recovery Redundant writes to PLCs with no configuration Mirrored disk I/O devices Mirrored alarm servers Mirrored trend servers File server redundancy No configuration required, may be enabled via single check box, no configuration

SCADA Client/server distributed processing

Open architecture design Real-time multitasking Client/server fully supported with no user configuration Distributed project updates (changes reflected across network) Concurrent support of multiple display nodes Access any tag from any node Access any data (trend, alarm, report) from any node

What is SCADA software?

SCADA software can be divided into two types, proprietary or open. Companies develop proprietary software to communicate to their hardware. These systems are sold as turn key solutions. The main problem with this system is the overwhelming reliance on the supplier of the system. Open software systems have gained popularity because of the interoperability they bring to the system. Interoperability is the ability to mix different manufacturers equipment on the same system. Citect and WonderWare are just two of the open software packages available in the market for SCADA systems. Some packages are now including asset management integrated within the SCADA system Key features of SCADA software are: User interface Graphics displays Alarms Trends RTU (and PLC) interface Scalability Access to data Database

 Networking Fault tolerance and redundancy Client/server distributed processing

The future of SCADA systems

The future of SCADA systems is linked to company information services. The overall trend in business is to move all data including SCADA on to HTML format.This will integrate the SCADA system into a complete company wide database. Hardware improvements in the past were overshadowed by better software. This willcontinue in the future. Companies will use www to access SCADA data from anywhere in the world. This will allow anyone in the company and even beyond to have access to SCADA derived data.

The future of SCADA Software

With the advent of the third party SCADA software package a complete interoperable system has been developed. Hopefully, the number of independentSCADA software companies will increase, unfortunately this has not been the case. It seems that the trend now is for large PLC companies to buy up independentSCADA software companies. This will bring into doubt the true interoperability of software packages such as CITECT, INTELLUTION and WONDERWARE. Without interoperable SCADA software systems, we will see a return to the bad old days of closed proprietary SCADA systems.

The future of SCADA Hardware

On the hardware side of SCADA, improvements in super smart sensors means that we will continue to see a reduction in the price and size of sensors. In addition, the functionality will increase at the same time. Fieldbus systems are becoming easier to set up and use. The move is to have a Fieldbus system that can be setup by almost anyone and is completely plug and play. This also will decrease repair cost and down time because everything will be modular. Super smart sensors allow the user to see problems, by way of the SCADA software, all the way down to the sensor level. The move to a universal protocol is slow at best and probably will be overshadowed by the use of Ethernet as a common carrier for data. Tunneling as its called will continue to grow because of the ease and low cost of Ethernet LAN systems.Systems of the future will use many protocols but each protocol will be imbedded into a 100 MHz Ethernet packet within an OSI compatible system. We will see more use of radio and fiber optic cables for communication. Wire will decrease and eventually disappear altogether, except for powering devices.

SCADA Data Communication

Even with the reduced amount of wire when using a PC to IED system, there is usually a lot of wire in the typical SCADA system. This wire brings its own problems, with the main problem being electrical noise and interference. Interference and noise are important factors to consider when designing and installing a data communication system, with particular considerations required to avoid electrical interference. Noise can be defined as the random generated undesired signal that corrupts (or interferes with) the original (or desired) signal. This noise can get into the cable or wire in many ways. It is up to the designer to develop a system that will have a minimum of noise from the beginning. Because SCADA systems typically use small voltage they are inherently susceptible to noise.

The use of twisted pair shielded cat5 wire is a requirement on most systems. Using good wire coupled with correct installation techniques ensures the system will be as noise free as possible. Fiber optic cable is gaining popularity because of its noise immunity. At the moment most installations use glass fibers, but in some industrial areas plastic fibers are increasingly used. Future data communications will be divided up between radio, fiber optic and some infrared systems. Wire will be relegated to supplying power and as power requirements of electronics become minimal, even the need for power will be reduced.

What is SCADA Hardware?

A SCADA system consists of a number of remote terminal units (RTUs) collecting field data and sending that data back to a master station, via a communication system. The master station displays the acquired data and allows the operator to perform remote control tasks. The accurate and timely data allows for optimization of the plant operation and process. Other benefits include more efficient, reliable and most importantly, safer operations. This results in a lower cost of operation compared to earlier non-automated systems. On a more complex SCADA system there are essentially five levels or hierarchies: Field level instrumentation and control devices Marshalling terminals and RTUs Communications system The master station(s) The commercial data processing department computer system The RTU provides an interface to the field analog and digital sensors situated at each remote site. The communications system provides the pathway for communication between the master station and the remote sites. This communication system can be wire, fiber optic, radio, telephone line, microwave and possibly even satellite. Specific protocols and error detection philosophies are used for efficient and optimumtransfer of data. The master station (or sub-masters) gather data from the various RTUs and generally provide an operator interface for display of information and control of the remote sites. In large telemetry systems, sub-master sites gather information from remote sites and act as a relay back to the control master station.

The SCADA twelve golden rules

Apply the KISS principle and ensure that the implementation of the SCADA system is simple. Ensure that the response times of the total system (including the futureexpansion) are within the correct levels (typically less than one-second operator response time). Evaluate redundancy requirements carefully and assess the impact of failure of any component of the system on the total system. Apply the open systems approach to hardware selected and protocols communication standards implemented. Confirm that these are indeed TRUE open standards. Ensure that the whole system including the individual components provide a scaleable architecture (which can expand with increasing system requirements).

 Assess the total system from the point of view of the maximum traffic loading on the RTU, communication links and master stations and the subsequent impact on hardware, firmware and software subsystems. Ensure that the functional specification for the system is clearly defined as far as number of points are concerned, response rates and functionality required of the system. Perform a thorough testing of the system and confirm accuracy of all data transferred back, control actions and failure of individual components of system and recovery from failures. Confirm operators of individual components of the system in the (industrial) environment to which they would be exposed (including grounding and isolation ofthe system). Ensure that all configuration and testing activities are well documented. Ensure that the operational staffs are involved with the configuration and implementation of the system and they receive thorough training on the system. Finally, although the temptation is there with a sophisticated system, do not overwhelm the operator with alarm and operational data and crowded operator screens. Keep the information of loading to the operator clear, concise and simple.

SCADA system documentation guidance

One of the great failures of many industrial and communication systems is the lack of good documentation. Poor documentation makes maintenance of installed systems very difficult. Therefore, the quality of documentation required should be clearly described in the tender document. There should be (at least) two maintenance handbooks provided for each type of equipment. Major items should also have an operating manual provided. An overall system handbook should also be provided. This should contain an extensive description of the system, including design, operating and performance data. It should contain an overall approach to operation and maintenance of the system. Included in the system manual should be all system drawings, plus the procedures and results of the commissioning tests. System drawings are probably the most important of all system documentation. At a minimum, the following should be requested from the contractor: Block and level diagrams Input/output logic diagrams Termination schedules including connector details Equipment interconnection diagrams of all sections of the system Rack elevations and equipment layouts Equipment room layout Mast and antenna layouts AC power wiring schematics DC power distribution and wiring schematics MDF, IDF and FDP schematics Jumpering records

SCADA System implementation

When first planning and designing a SCADA system, consideration should be given to integrating new SCADA systems into existing communication networks in order to avoid the substantial cost of setting up new infrastructure and communications facilities. This may be carried out through

existing LANs, private telephone systems or existing radio systems used for mobile vehicle communications. Careful engineering must be carried out to ensure that overlaying of the SCADA system on to an existing communication network does not degrade or interfere with the existing facilities. If a new system is to be implemented, consideration must be given to the quality of the system to be installed. No company has an endless budget. Weighing up economic considerations against performance and integrity requirements is vital in ensuring a satisfactorily working system at the end of the project. The availability of the communications links and the reliability of the equipment are important considerations when planning performance expectations of systems. All the aforementioned factors will be discussed in detail in the book. They will then be tied together in a systematic approach to allow the reader to design, specify, install and maintain an effective telemetry and data acquisition system that is suitable for the industrial environment into which it is to be installed.

Specialized SCADA protocols

A protocol controls the message format common to all devices on a network. Common protocols used in radio communications and telemetry systems include the HDLC, SCADA systems, software and protocols 73 MPT1317 and Modbus protocols.

High level data link control (HDLC) protocol

HDLC has been defined by the international standards organization for use on both multipoint and pointto-point links. Other variations of this protocol include SDLC (synchronous data link control used by IBM) and ADCCP (advanced data communication control procedure used by ANSI). HDLC is a bit-based protocol. Other protocols are based on characters (e.g. ASCII) and are generally slower. It is interesting to note that it is a predecessor to the LAN protocols. The two most common modes of operation of HDLC are: Unbalanced normal response mode (NRM): This is used with only one primary (or master) station initiating all transactions. Asynchronous balanced mode (ABM): In this mode each node has equal status and can act as either a secondary or primary node.

The CSMA/CD protocol format

The HDLC protocol describes the complete communications process and provides a complete set of rules for controlling the flow of data around a network. The CSMA/CD protocol is not as comprehensive as HDLC and is concerned with the method used to get data on and off the physical medium. HDLC and CSMA/CD can be incorporated together for a more complete protocol.

Distributed network protocol

The distributed network protocol is a data acquisition protocol used mostly in the electrical and utility industries. It is designed as an open, interoperable and simple protocol specifically for SCADA controls systems. It uses the master/slave polling method to send and receive information, but also employs sub-masters within the same system. The physical layer is generally designed around RS-232 (V.24), but it also supports other physical standards such as RS-422, RS-485 and even fiber optic. There is large support within the SCADA industry to use DNP as the universal de facto standard for data acquisition and control

Five basic tasks in SCADA system

Input/output task
This program is the interface between the control and monitoring system and the plant floor.

Alarm task
This manages all alarms by detecting digital alarm points and comparing the values of analog alarm points to alarm thresholds.

Trends task
The trends task collects data to be monitored over time.

Reports task
Reports are produced from plant data. These reports can be periodic, event triggered or activated by the operator.

Display task
This manages all data to be monitored by the operator and all control actions requested by the operator.